Appendix A. Supplementary material

Figure A1: Time trends of coordination by study



Figure A2: Relative performance of coordination devices: preliminary insights



Figure A3: Distribution of contributions and earnings



Figure A4: Distribution of transfers and their relationship with time trend, destination rule, and overheads



Table A1: Description of the included treatments

Study	Treatm. name	N_PG	Single_PG	Dom_PG	1PG_ME	1PG_LE	R_signal	Delegation	Dest_rule
CCV	1G	1	✓						0
	4G_EE	4							0
	4G_1ME	4			✓				0
	4G_1LE	4				✓			0
	4G_RS	4					✓		0
	4G_EE/NC	4							0
	4G_RS/NC	4					✓		0
CCR	NoDel	12		✓					0
	Del	12		✓				✓	0
	DelRule	12		✓				✓	1
	NoDel[1]	1	✓						0
	Del[1]	1	✓					✓	0
	DelRule[1]	1	✓					✓	1
ACFR	$\text{NoRule}_{\text{NoCost}}$	12		✓				✓	0
	$\text{20Rule}_{\text{NoCost}}$	12		✓				✓	0.2
	$\text{80Rule}_{\text{NoCost}}$	12		✓				✓	0.8
	$\text{NoRule}_{\text{Cost}}$	12		✓				✓	0
	$\text{20Rule}_{\text{Cost}}$	12		✓				✓	0.2
	$\text{80Rule}_{\text{Cost}}$	12		✓				✓	0.8
	$\text{100Rule}_{\text{NoCost}}$	12		✓				✓	1
	$\text{100Rule}_{\text{Cost}}$	12		✓				✓	1
	$\text{80Rule}_{\text{MarginalCost}}$	12		✓				✓	0.8
CCLR	Homogeneous	8		✓					0
	P_Diff	8		✓					0
	E_Diff	8		✓					0
	P&E_Diff	8		✓					0

N_PG is a continuous variable indicating the number of public goods.

Table A1: Description of the included treatments *(continued)*

Study	Treatm. name	High_overheads	Low_overheads	Reshuffling	No_constraint	Het_endow	Het_pref
CCV	1G						
	4G_EE						
	4G_1ME						
	4G_1LE						
	4G_RS						
	4G_EE/NC				✓		
	4G_RS/NC				✓		
CCR	NoDel			✓ in rounds 5 and 9 only			
	Del			✓ in rounds 5 and 9 only			
	DelRule			✓ in rounds 5 and 9 only			
	NoDel[1]						
	Del[1]						
	DelRule[1]						
ACFR	$\text{NoRule}_{\text{NoCost}}$			✓ in rounds 5 and 9 only			
	$\text{20Rule}_{\text{NoCost}}$			✓ in rounds 5 and 9 only			
	$\text{80Rule}_{\text{NoCost}}$			✓ in rounds 5 and 9 only			
	$\text{NoRule}_{\text{Cost}}$	✓		✓ in rounds 5 and 9 only			
	$\text{20Rule}_{\text{Cost}}$	✓		✓ in rounds 5 and 9 only			
	$\text{80Rule}_{\text{Cost}}$	✓		✓ in rounds 5 and 9 only			
	$\text{100Rule}_{\text{NoCost}}$			✓ in rounds 5 and 9 only			
	$\text{100Rule}_{\text{Cost}}$	✓		✓ in rounds 5 and 9 only			
	$\text{80Rule}_{\text{MarginalCost}}$		✓	✓ in rounds 5 and 9 only			
CCLR	Homogeneous						
	P_Diff						✓
	E_Diff					✓	
	P&E_Diff					✓	✓

Table A2: Summary statistics by treatment

			Coordination	
Study	Treatm. name	Group-level obs.	Mean	Std. dev.
CCV	1G	144	0.806	(0.397)
	4G_EE	144	0.479	(0.501)
	4G_1ME	144	0.806	(0.397)
	4G_1LE	144	0.375	(0.486)
	4G_RS	144	0.632	(0.484)
	4G_EE/NC	144	0.771	(0.422)
	4G_RS/NC	144	0.875	(0.332)
CCR	NoDel	216	0.394	(0.490)
	Del	216	0.296	(0.458)
	DelRule	216	0.662	(0.474)
	NoDel[1]	216	0.537	(0.500)
	Del[1]	216	0.356	(0.480)
	DelRule[1]	216	0.639	(0.481)
ACFR	$\text{NoRule}_{\text{NoCost}}$	156	0.218	(0.414)
	$\text{20Rule}_{\text{NoCost}}$	156	0.308	(0.463)
	$\text{80Rule}_{\text{NoCost}}$	180	0.806	(0.397)
	$\text{NoRule}_{\text{Cost}}$	156	0.167	(0.374)
	$\text{20Rule}_{\text{Cost}}$	156	0.327	(0.471)
	$\text{80Rule}_{\text{Cost}}$	156	0.282	(0.451)
	$\text{100Rule}_{\text{NoCost}}$	96	0.677	(0.470)
	$\text{100Rule}_{\text{Cost}}$	108	0.407	(0.494)
	$\text{80Rule}_{\text{MarginalCost}}$	96	0.333	(0.474)
CCLR	Homogeneous	180	0.500	(0.501)
	P_Diff	180	0.344	(0.477)
	E_Diff	180	0.539	(0.500)
	P&E_Diff	180	0.567	(0.497)

For each study the columns report treatment name, number of group-level observations, as well as means and standard deviations for *Coordination*.

Table A3: Explaining contributions in one-stage vs. two-stage games

Variable	*Rel_contributions*			
	(2a) M2LT		(2b) M1LT	
	Coeff.	(St. E.)	Coeff.	(St. E.)
Framework				
Single_PG	0.224*	(0.117)	0.443***	(0.151)
Coordination devices				
Trend	-0.002	(0.004)	-0.080***	(0.019)
$Trend^2$	-0.002***	($3.8e^{-4}$)	0.001	(0.002)
1PG_ME	0.200*	(0.117)		
1PG_LE	-0.028	(0.117)		
R_signal	0.067	(0.089)		
Deleg20			0.261	(0.167)
Deleg80			0.441***	(0.163)
Deleg100			0.612***	(0.121)
Personal characteristics				
Female	-0.039	(0.027)	0.242***	(0.054)
Age	0.002	(0.004)	0.012	(0.010)
Risk_attitude	0.021***	(0.006)	0.037***	(0.013)
Controls				
High_overheads			-0.135	(0.130)
Low_overheads			-0.311	(0.264)
Dominated_PG	0.078	(0.156)		
No_constraint	-0.086	(0.089)		
Het_endow	0.002	(0.112)		
Het_pref	-0.076	(0.112)		
Het_endow * Het_pref	0.133	(0.159)		
Reshuffling	-0.324***	(0.037)	-0.065	(0.054)
Study dummies	Yes		Yes	
Constant	0.439**	(0.173)	-0.874**	(0.275)
Wald χ^2	442.570***		253.300***	
No. of obs.	8,640		8,496	
No. of groups	180		177	

(2a): coefficient estimates from multilevel two-limit tobit (M2LT) model, with lower limit 0, upper limit 1, and standard errors clustered at both the group and the individual level in parentheses. This model includes only observations from treatments without delegation. (2b): coefficient estimates from multilevel one-limit tobit (M1LT) model, with lower limit 0 and standard errors clustered at both the group and the individual level in parentheses. This model includes only observations from treatments implementing delegation. In this case, *Del0* is the reference category.

*** p-value < 0.01.

** p-value < 0.05.

* p-value < 0.10.

Table A4: Matching results with goals

Goal 1: Project summary	
What are the most effective coordination devices?	- The presence of a single contribution option that is more profitable than the alternatives; - Learning; - Delegation associated with a destination rule whose level is at least 80%.
How do they work?	The effective coordination devices do not leverage greater contributions to solve the coordination dilemma. Rather, they work despite the fact that donors reduce their contributions over time.
What are their implications in terms of wealth?	The effective coordination devices generate higher individual earnings.
Goal 2: New findings	
Learning & coordination	Learning turns out to be an effective coordination device, since there is evidence for an inverted U-shaped relationship between learning and coordination.
Gender & contributions	Women delegate less than men, and consequently prefer direct contributions. Gender differences in delegation are so strong that they arguably drive those in cooperation.
Risk attitude & contributions	Risk tolerance increases overall donations and transfers.
Risk attitude & earnings	Risk tolerance decreases individual earnings.