Supplementary Online Material

This document contains the online supplementary material to **Are women more generous than men? A meta-analysis** by David Bilén, Anna Dreber and Magnus Johannesson. Supplemental Online Material A contain the online appendix with additional tables and figures. Supplemental Online Material B contain a reference list of all studies included in the meta analysis.

Supplemental Online Material A: Tables and Figures

Table A1: Gender differences in the DG estimated by the random effects model. Results are shown both for the data pooled across all DG studies and separately for the standard DG and the charity DG. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
				All or nothing DG study excluded	
	Pooled	Standard DG	Charity DG	Pooled	Charity DG
Female	0.04***	0.023***	0.109***	0.031***	0.080***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.018)
$\hat{\tau}$	0.046	0.033	0.064	0.038	0.047
Conditions	117	83	34	107	24

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A2: Meta-regression results of the difference in the gender gap between the charity DG and the standard DG (the between study variance is estimated by method of moments and without Knapp-Hartung modifications). Standard errors in parentheses.

	(1) Full sample	(2) All or nothing DG study excluded
Charity DG	0.087***	0.059**
	(0.016)	(0.018)
Constant	0.023***	0.023***
	(0.007)	(0.006)
Observations	117	107
$\hat{\tau}$	0.038	0.034
Conditions	117	107

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3: Mixed random effects results of gender differences in the DG. Each model includes a random intercept for each condition and a random slope for the gender gap in each condition. Standard errors clustered on the condition level in parentheses and the co-variance between random effects is unstructured.

	(1) Share	(2) Share	(3) Share	(4) Share
Female	0.047***	0.046***	0.022***	0.020***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Charity DG		0.168***	0.137***	0.088**
		(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.028)
Charity DG $*$ Female			0.094***	0.095***
			(0.018)	(0.018)
Constant	0.300***	0.252***	0.259***	0.405***
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.051)
Condition random effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual controls[a]	No	No	No	Yes
Treatment controls[b]	No	No	No	Yes
Female + (Charity DG $*$ Female)			0.115***	0.115***
			(0.016)	(0.016)
Condition	117	117	117	117
Observations	15016	15016	15016	15016

[a] Individual controls: Student characteristics, age and region.
[b] Treatment controls: Double-blind, setting characteristics, random payment and partitioning of endowment.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4: Mixed random effects results of gender differences in the DG, excluding the all or nothing study. Each model includes a random intercept for each condition and a random slope for the gender gap in each condition. Standard errors clustered on the condition level in parentheses and the covariance between random effects is unstructured.

	(1) Share	(2) Share	(3) Share	(4) Share
Female	0.033***	0.033***	0.022***	0.020***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Charity DG		0.159***	0.127***	0.108***
		(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Charity DG * Female			0.060**	0.062***
			(0.019)	(0.019)
Constant	0.288***	0.254***	0.259***	0.407***
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.053)
Condition random effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual controls	No	No	No	Yes
Treatment controls	No	No	No	Yes
Female + (Charity DG * Female)			0.083***	0.082***
			(0.018)	(0.018)
Conditions	107	107	107	107
Observations	13614	13614	13614	13614

[a] Individual controls: Student characteristics, age and region.
[b] Treatment controls: Double-blind, setting characteristics, random payment and partitioning of endowment.
  * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A5: Tobit results of the estimated gender gap in the DG. We model censoring of the donated share donated both from below at 0 and above at 1. Standard errors clustered on the condition level in parentheses.

	(1) Share	(2) Share	(3) Share	(4) Share	(5) Share	(6) Share
Female	0.078***	0.066***	0.039**	0.040***	0.044***	0.041***
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Charity DG		0.267***	0.201***	0.214***		
		(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.051)		
Charity DG * Female			0.124***	0.123***	0.130***	0.130***
			(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Constant	0.227***	0.179***	0.192***	0.454***	0.239***	0.298***
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.077)	(0.012)	(0.037)
Condition fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Individual controls^a	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Treatment controls^b	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Female +(Charity DG * Female)			0.164***	0.164***	0.174***	0.172***
			(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Observations	15016	15016	15016	15016	15016	15016
Number of conditions	117	117	117	117	117	117

^{a} Individual controls: Student characteristics, age and region.
^{b} Treatment controls: Double-blind, setting characteristics, random payment and partitioning of endowment.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A6: Tobit results of the estimated gender gap in the DG, excluding the all or nothing study. We model censoring of the donated share donated both from below at 0 and above at 1. Standard errors clustered on the condition level in parentheses.

	(1) Share	(2) Share	(3) Share	(4) Share	(5) Share	(6) Share
Female	0.058***	0.047***	0.037**	0.039***	0.042***	0.039***
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Charity DG		0.256***	0.213***	0.191***		
		(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.047)		
Charity DG*Female			0.077*	0.079**	0.076**	0.077***
			(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Constant	0.224***	0.197***	0.202***	0.545***	0.269***	0.324***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.064)	(0.011)	(0.036)
Condition fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Individual controls^a	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Treatment controls^b	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Female +(Charity DG * Female)			0.114***	0.118***	0.118***	0.116***
			(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Observations	13614	13614	13614	13614	13614	13614
Number of conditions	107	107	107	107	107	107

^{a} Individual controls: Student characteristics, age and region.
^{b} Treatment controls: Double-blind, setting characteristics, random payment and partitioning of endowment.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A7: OLS results of the estimated gender gap in the DG. The dependent variable is the share of the endowment donated in the DG divided by the average donation within the condition the participant took part. We multiply this measure with 100 to interpret the results in terms of percentage of the average donation within a study condition. Standard errors clustered on the condition level in parentheses.

	(1) Percent	(2) Percent	(3) Percent	(4) Percent	(5) Percent	(6) Percent
Female	12.279***	12.307***	8.878***	8.142**	9.089***	8.376**
	(2.245)	(2.253)	(2.547)	(2.461)	(2.626)	(2.517)
Charity DG		-0.689*	-9.203***	-9.244***		
		(0.272)	(1.961)	(2.600)		
Charity DG * Female			16.094***	15.933***	16.697***	16.921***
			(3.822)	(3.847)	(3.950)	(3.850)
Constant	93.895***	94.029***	95.679***	97.788***	88.642***	109.194***
	(1.114)	(1.075)	(1.220)	(2.518)	(1.300)	(6.968)
Condition fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Individual controls[a]	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Treatment controls[b]	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Female + (Charity DG * Female)			24.972***	24.075***	25.786***	25.296***
			(2.849)	(2.881)	(2.951)	(2.853)
Observations	15016	15016	15016	15016	15016	15016
Number of conditions	117	117	117	117	117	117

[a] Individual controls: Student characteristics, age and region.
[b] Treatment controls: Double-blind, setting characteristics, random payment and partitioning of endowment.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A8: OLS results of the estimated gender gap in the DG, excluding the "all or nothing" DG study. The dependent variable is the share of the endowment donated in the DG divided by the average donation within the condition the participant took part. We multiply this measure with 100 to interpret the results in terms of percentage of the average donation within a study condition. Standard errors clustered on the condition level in parentheses.

	(1) Percent	(2) Percent	(3) Percent	(4) Percent	(5) Percent	(6) Percent
Female	10.259***	10.289***	8.878***	8.142**	9.089***	8.387**
	(2.298)	(2.307)	(2.548)	(2.461)	(2.627)	(2.513)
Charity DG		-0.795*	-6.715*	-6.161*		
		(0.284)	(2.368)	(2.611)		
Charity DG * Female			10.732*	11.159*	11.066*	11.666*
			(4.350)	(4.274)	(4.465)	(4.289)
Constant	94.909***	95.000***	95.679***	104.903***	91.122***	110.643***
	(1.129)	(1.102)	(1.220)	(4.274)	(1.591)	(7.036)
Condition fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Individual controls[a]	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Treatment controls[b]	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Female + (Charity DG * Female)			19.610***	19.403***	20.155***	20.054***
			(3.525)	3.473)	(3.611)	(3.417)
Observations	13614	13614	13614	13614	13614	13614
Number of conditions	107	107	107	107	107	107

[a] Individual controls: Student characteristics, age and region.

[b] Treatment controls: Double-blind, setting characteristics, random payment and partitioning of endowment.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A9: Meta-regression results of the difference in the gender gap between conditions that had gender in the title of the paper and those that did not (the between study variance is estimated by method of moments and without Knapp-Hartung modifcations). Standard errors in parentheses.

	(1) Pooled	(2) Standard DG	(3) Charity DG
Gender in title	-0.013	0.002	0.003
	(0.014)	0.013)	(0.051)
Constant	0.045***	0.023**	0.108***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.019)
Observations	117	83	34

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A10: OLS results of differences in the estimated gender gap in conditions that either had or did not have gender in the title of the paper. Standard errors clustered on the condition level in parentheses.

	(1) Pooled	(2) Pooled	(3) Standard DG	(4) Standard DG	(5) Charity DG	(6) Charity DG
Female	0.041***	0.041***	0.019*	0.018*	0.118***	0.114***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Gender in title	-0.017	-0.008	-0.037	-0.050*	0.067	0.264
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.052)	(0.134)
Gender in title*Female	-0.004	-0.001	0.007	0.011	-0.018	-0.006
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Constant	0.268***	0.453***	0.283***	0.467***	0.403***	0.864***
	(0.015)	(0.049)	(0.014)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.212)
Individual controls[a]	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Treatment controls[b]	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Charity DG dummy	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Female + Gender in title*Female	0.038***	0.040***	0.026*	0.029**	0.100***	0.108***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Conditions	117	117	83	83	34	34
Observations	15016	15016	11802	11802	3214	3214

[a] Individual controls: Student characteristics, age and region.
[b] Treatment controls: Double-blind, setting characteristics, random payment and partitioning of endowment.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A11: Power to detect the effect sizes estimated in the random effects model for the mean and median sample sizes in the standard DG (median $N = 130$, mean $N = 288$) and the charity DG (median $N = 192$, mean $N = 271$). The power is shown for the game specific effect sizes (0.023 and 0.109), with results for the pooled effect size (0.04) in parentheses.[a]

Effect size	DG	α	Power (median N)	Power (mean N)	N for 80% power	% papers with at least 80% power
0.023 (0.04)	Standard	0.05	0.086 (0.163)	0.148 (0.306)	3,224 (1,068)	0 (2)
0.023 (0.04)	Standard	0.005	0.013 (0.033)	0.024 (0.087)	5,470 (1,812)	0 (0)
0.109 (0.04)	Charity	0.05	0.679 (0.144)	0.821 (0.184)	256 (1,888)	25 (0)
0.109 (0.04)	Charity	0.005	0.346 (0.027)	0.524 (0.04)	436 (3,204)	8 (0)

[a] The power estimations are based on the average STD in the standard DG studies (0.233) and the average STD in the charity DG studies (0.310).

Table A12: Egger's and Begg's test of publication bias[a]. The tests are carried out both based on all DG studies pooled and separately for the standard DG and charity DG studies. Column 4-5 only includes studies with gender in the title of the paper[b]. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(1) Pooled	(2) Standard DG	(3) Charity DG	(4) Pooled	(5) Standard DG
Egger's test					
slope	0.015	0.026*	0.138*	0.074*	0.079*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.054)	(0.032)	(0.031)
bias	0.502	-0.069	-0.411	-0.955	-1.233
	(0.263)	(0.291)	(0.781)	(0.763)	(0.733)
Begg's test (continuity corrected)					
z-score	1.17	0.37	0.95	1.12	1.13
p-value	0.244	0.712	0.343	0.262	0.260
Observations	117	83	34	31	28

[a] The Egger's test estimates $\frac{ES_j}{SE_j} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \frac{1}{SE_j} + \epsilon_j$ and if the intercept is different from zero this could be evidence of publication bias. A statistically significant result does not necessarily imply evidence of publication bias, we could also have true heterogeneity in the data that is not due to publication bias.
[b] There are only three studies with gender in the title of the paper for the charity DG, and it is therefore not meaningful to test for publication bias for charity DG studies with gender in the title. The tests of publication bias for papers with gender in the title are therefore only done for the pooled sample and standard DG studies.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.005$, *** $p < 0.001$

(a) Pooled



(b) Standard DG

(c) Charity DG

Figure A1: Funnel plots using all studies. The lines represent the pooled effect size in each sample.

(a) Pooled

(b) Standard DG

(c) Charity DG

Figure A2: Funnel plots restricted to studies that had gender in the title of the paper. The lines represent the pooled effect size in each sample.

Supplemental Online Material B: papers included in the meta-analysis

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