

## SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

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A. Survey Details	p. 1
B. Model Results	p. 4
• Table B1: Regression Model Results, Binary and Four-Category Measures	p. 4
• Figure B1: Support for Copartisan and Outpartisan Candidates Accepting Supreme Court Ruling on Election, Four-category Dependent Variable	p. 5
• Figure B2: Estimates of Copartisan Candidate Effects, Four-category Dependent Variable	p. 6
C. Results Excluding Independent Leaners	p. 7
• Figure C1: Support for Biden or Trump Accepting a Supreme Court Ruling on Election	p. 7
• Figure C2: Estimates of Copartisan Candidate Effects	p. 8
• Figure C3: Support for Judicial Power Over Elections, Post-Inauguration	p. 9
D. Results Using Logit	p. 10
• Table D1: Logit Model Results, Binary Outcome Measure	p. 10
• Figure D2: Estimates of Copartisan Candidate Effects from Logit Models	p. 11

## Supplementary Material A: Survey Details

We contracted with Ipsos and fielded questions on their “KnowledgePanel,” which was formerly run by Knowledge Networks and then Gfk. Via the KnowledgePanel’s Government and Academic Omnibus survey, we fielded our questions across four time points. Each survey round represents a fresh cross-section and random sample of approximately 1,000 respondents. In reality, our samples yielded slightly more than 1,000 respondents, as seen below:

<b>Survey Round</b>	<b>Field Dates</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Completion Rate</b>
1	Oct. 9-19, 2020	1,002	59%
2	Oct. 27-Nov. 2, 2020	1,014	55%
3	Nov. 9-14, 2021	1,015	55%
4	Dec. 18-29, 2021	1,006	57%

The following description is based on Ipsos’s “KnowledgePanel Methodology,” which is available in full at:

<https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ipsosknowledgepanelmethodology.pdf>

The KnowledgePanel is a large online panel that is a representative, probability-based sample of the adult U.S. population. Subjects are recruited using an address-based sampling methodology. The panel includes households regardless of whether they have a phone and is therefore a fully representative online sample. Ipsos provides respondents with a tablet or computer and free internet service for those recruited without internet access. Surveys are also offered in Spanish.

For each survey, a representative sample is drawn from the panel using Ipsos’s weighted selection methodology. Ipsos also constructs post-stratification weights to address any departure from an “equal probability selection method” (EPSM) design. It then uses raking to adjust the weights using benchmark distributions based on gender, race, education, census region, and

income. Finally, Ipsos identifies and trims outliers of the weight distribution if necessary, and then scales the weights to sum to the total sample size of all eligible respondents.

### Sample Characteristics

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Round 1</b>	<b>Round 2</b>	<b>Round 3</b>	<b>Round 4</b>
Party				
Democrat	54.5%	54.9%	54.2%	53.4%
Independent	3.0%	3.1%	3.2%	3.7%
Republican	41.7%	41.8%	41.9%	42.0%
Race				
White	62.8%	62.8%	62.8%	62.8%
Black	12.0%	12.0%	12.0%	12.0%
Hispanic	16.7%	16.7%	16.7%	16.7%
Other race	8.6%	8.6%	8.6%	8.6%
Age (median)	48	48	47	48
Education				
No H.S.	8.8%	8.7%	9.9%	9.8%
H.S. graduate	28.8%	28.9%	27.7%	27.8%
Some college	27.6%	27.6%	27.6%	27.6%
Bachelors or higher	34.8%	34.8%	34.8%	34.8%
Female	51.6%	51.6%	51.6%	51.6%
Family income (median income band)			\$75,000 to \$84,999	

Note: Entries are weighted using post-stratification weights. For party, independents who lean toward a party are coded as Democrats or Republicans (see text). For family income, the median income band is the same across all rounds.

### Human Subjects Research Principles

We received approval from our university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) to field all survey questions reported in this article. As stated in the text, Ipsos (including the KnowledgePanel) is committed to core human subjects research principles. Respondents are given full information that participation as a panelist in general and for a particular survey is completely voluntary. Respondents are not penalized for declining participation in a given

survey. Respondents are also free to exit a survey at any time on a voluntary basis without penalty. Informed consent is given before adults agree to join the panel and receive survey invitations. While Ipsos does not require consent for each survey (nor do most IRBs, including ours), Ipsos maintains an agreement with respondents that every survey and every survey item is voluntary and that data are collected and provided to clients anonymously. Respondents understand they are participating in research for Ipsos clients who are analyzing public opinion, politics, public affairs, and other research topics. There is no deception on this front. Nor does our survey question in particular engage in deception. Though we ask about the prospects of one of the presidential candidates (randomly assigned) having to respond to a potential Supreme Court ruling during a heated election campaign, the issues we ask about were widely reported in news outlets and discussed by the candidates themselves. And, of course, the Supreme Court did eventually issue a ruling as many anticipated it would have to do (given Republican-led challenges to the election, both before and after the election).

Finally, Ipsos fairly compensates panelists. For households without internet access, Ipsos provides internet access and a web-enabled device for taking surveys free of charge. Ipsos employs a points system for taking surveys. Respondents redeem points for cash, merchandise, gift cards or game entries. They can also be entered into a sweepstakes for cash and prizes. Panel members are typically invited to complete one survey per week. On average, panel members complete two to three 10-15 minute surveys per month. In the case of longer surveys, an additional reward is provided.

Further details on compensation and all other commitments to human subjects principles can be found at: <https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/Documentation%20for%20IRBs.pdf>.

**Supplementary Material B: Model Results**


**Table B1: Regression Model Results, Binary and Four-Category Measures**

Variables	Binary Measure				Ordinal Measure			
	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3	Round 4	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3	Round 4
Copartisan Candidate	-0.24** (0.03)	-0.30** (0.03)	-0.48** (0.03)	-0.19** (0.03)	-0.29** (0.02)	-0.32** (0.02)	-0.45** (0.02)	-0.24** (0.02)
Republican	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.08** (0.02)	-0.10** (0.02)
Copartisan x Republican	0.06 (0.05)	0.22** (0.04)	0.40** (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.10** (0.03)	0.21** (0.03)	0.35** (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Black	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Hispanic	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)
Other race	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Age	0.05 (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.07* (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)
Education	0.09* (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.09** (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Female	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
Family income	0.11 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.10* (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Constant	0.82** (0.06)	0.84** (0.05)	0.89** (0.05)	0.91** (0.05)	0.76** (0.04)	0.77** (0.04)	0.83** (0.04)	0.84** (0.04)
N	957	974	977	957	957	974	977	957
R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.15	0.26	0.10	0.22	0.24	0.32	0.19


Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. The first 4 models are linear probability models (OLS). Figure 2 in the main text is derived from these models. The last 4 models are OLS models; Figure B2 in this SI is derived from these models. “Copartisan candidate” is based on the randomized candidate variable (Biden v. Trump); it equals 1 if Democrats are randomly assigned to Biden or Republicans randomly assigned to Trump and 0 otherwise. These models do not use post-stratification survey weights (see text).

**Figure B1: Support for Copartisan and Outpartisan Candidates Accepting Supreme Court Ruling on Election, Four-category Dependent Variable**

**A. Support for Copartisan Candidate Accepting**




**B. Support for Outpartisan Candidate Accepting**



Note: Figure A reports means of those agree that their copartisan candidate (Biden for Democrats, Trump for Republicans, which was randomly assigned) should accept a Supreme Court ruling on the election, even if he loses. Figure B reports means for the outpartisan candidate (Trump for Democrats, Biden for Republicans). 95% confidence intervals are included for each mean. Estimates are weighted using post-stratification weights.

**Figure B2: Estimates of Copartisan Candidate Effects, Four-category Dependent Variable**




Note: The figure reports the copartisan candidate effects (support of one’s copartisan candidate accepting a Court ruling minus support of one’s outpartisan candidate accepting a ruling) and 95% confidence intervals. Effects for each round are marginal effects for the copartisan candidate variable conditional on party; they are derived from the last four models (OLS models for the ordinal dependent variable) in Supplementary Material B, Table B1 (p. 4). Increasing copartisan effects in the negative direction represent lower public acceptance of rulings on election interventions.


## Supplementary Material C: Results Excluding Independent Leaners

Figure C1: Support for Biden or Trump Accepting a Supreme Court Ruling on Election

### A. Support for Copartisan Candidate Accepting




### B. Support for Outpartisan Candidate Accepting



Note: Figure A reports the percentage of individuals who agree that their copartisan candidate (Biden for Democrats, Trump for Republicans, which was randomly assigned) should accept a Supreme Court ruling on the election, even if he loses. Figure B reports this percentage for the outpartisan candidate (Trump for Democrats, Biden for Republicans). Estimates are weighted using post-stratification weights. 95% confidence intervals are reported for each percentage. Both graphs exclude independent leaners.




**Figure C2: Estimates of Copartisan Candidate Effects**



Note: The figure reports the copartisan candidate effect (percent supportive of one’s copartisan candidate accepting a Court ruling minus percent supportive of one’s outpartisan candidate accepting a ruling) and 95% confidence intervals. Effects for each round are marginal effects for the copartisan candidate variable conditional on party. Analyses exclude independent leaners. We report effects here in percentage terms (as opposed to probabilities) to maintain comparability to Figure C1. Increasing copartisan effects in the negative direction represent lower public acceptance of rulings on election interventions.

**Figure C3: Support for Judicial Power Over Elections, Post-Inauguration**



Note: The figure shows percent support for the “Supreme Court’s ability to make decisions on presidential election disputes” at two time points after President Biden’s inauguration. Estimates are weighted using post-stratification weights. 95% confidence intervals are reported for each percentage. The figure excludes independent leaners.


**Supplementary Material D: Results Using Logit**

**Table D1: Logit Model Results, Binary Outcome Measure**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Round 1</b>	<b>Round 2</b>	<b>Round 3</b>	<b>Round 4</b>
Copartisan Candidate	-1.93** (0.29)	-2.21** (0.29)	-3.41** (0.35)	-1.97** (0.35)
Republican	-0.06 (0.39)	0.06 (0.40)	-0.76 (0.42)	-0.37 (0.44)
Copartisan x Republican	0.28 (0.44)	1.22** (0.46)	2.51** (0.48)	0.12 (0.49)
Black	-0.31 (0.34)	-0.88** (0.29)	-0.44 (0.30)	-0.39 (0.33)
Hispanic	-0.41 (0.28)	-0.00 (0.30)	0.03 (0.30)	-0.34 (0.31)
Other race	-0.50 (0.32)	-0.34 (0.35)	-0.08 (0.34)	-0.20 (0.37)
Age	0.41 (0.38)	0.93* (0.43)	0.24 (0.44)	0.30 (0.43)
Education	0.70* (0.32)	1.02** (0.34)	0.92** (0.33)	0.52 (0.34)
Female	-0.28 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.39* (0.19)	-0.58** (0.20)
Family income	0.90* (0.45)	-0.00 (0.49)	0.25 (0.46)	0.60 (0.48)
Constant	1.87** (0.44)	1.87** (0.47)	2.71** (0.49)	2.79** (0.50)
N	957	974	977	957
Pseudo $R^2$	0.12	0.17	0.25	0.13

Standard errors in parentheses; \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05; Figure D1 (on the following page) is derived from these models. “Copartisan candidate” is based on the randomized candidate variable (Biden v. Trump); it equals 1 if Democrats are randomly assigned to Biden or Republicans are randomly assigned to Trump, and 0 otherwise. These models do not use post-stratification survey weights (see text).

**Figure D1: Estimates of Copartisan Candidate Effects from Logit Models**



Note: The figure reports the copartisan candidate effect (probability of supporting one's copartisan candidate accepting a Court ruling minus the probability of supporting one's outpartisan candidate accepting a ruling) and 95% confidence intervals. Effects for each round are changes in the probability of accepting as the copartisan candidate variable moves from 0 (outpartisan) to 1 (copartisan); these effects are conditional on party. Effects are derived from the logit models (linear probability models) in this Supplementary Material, Table D1 (p. 10). Increasing copartisan effects in the negative direction represent lower public acceptance of rulings on election interventions.