

The Price of Justice: Compliance and Damages Awarded by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights — Appendix

A.1 Omnibus Model

In Table A1, we run the models with variables from both Hypotheses 1 (award size) and 2 (total victims), as well as H1a (revenue) and H2a (domestic reparations program). The coefficient for *Monetary awards* is negative and statistically significant in all four models, while the coefficient for *Total victims* is negative and statistically significant in three of the four models (the exception is the last model, in which the constituent term of the interaction is insignificant, but the interaction effect still is). The coefficient on *Monetary awards* \times *Revenue* is positive and close to, but not quite, statistically significant ($p=0.14$).¹ The coefficient on *Total victims* \times *reparations program* is negative and statistically significant, the same as in the main models in the paper. Among the control variables, the coefficients on cumulative orders and preliminary objections are negative and statistically significant across all models and the coefficient on government effectiveness is positive and statistically significant across all models. While H1a loses support in the omnibus models, the key variables of interest – monetary awards and total victims – remain significant predictors of the probability of compliance in any given year.

¹The coefficient is 0.0071 and standard error is 0.0048.

Table A1: Different combinations of variables of interest from Hypotheses 1 and 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Monetary award (logged)	-0.17*** (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.05)	-0.37*** (0.14)	-0.16*** (0.05)
Total victims (logged)	-0.13** (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.06)	-0.12** (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)
Revenue		0.09*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.06)	
Reparations program		0.39 (0.27)	0.49* (0.27)	1.06*** (0.34)
Award (logged) × Revenue			0.01 (0.00)	
Victims (logged) × Reparations program				-0.27*** (0.09)
Preliminary objections	-0.17*** (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.06)
Acceptance of responsibility	-0.18 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.12)	-0.15 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.12)
Non-pecuniary damages	0.03 (0.14)	0.09 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)	0.07 (0.15)
Article 4 violation	-0.28 (0.18)	-0.27 (0.19)	-0.30 (0.19)	-0.34* (0.19)
Article 5 violation	-0.19 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.20)	0.00 (0.20)	0.06 (0.20)
Government effectiveness	1.47*** (0.46)	1.45*** (0.57)	1.46*** (0.57)	1.14** (0.58)
Rule of law	-0.38 (0.45)	-0.38 (0.53)	-0.42 (0.53)	-0.35 (0.53)
Impunity	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Cumulative orders	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations (order-year)	2,447	2,030	2,030	2,030

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.2 Case Illustration: Guatemala and Peru

To better illustrate the dynamics we have identified, we considered how states might prioritize payments when they receive multiple judgments per year. We looked at cases from Guatemala and Peru, the two states that have had the most judgments against them (29 and 40, respectively). Each state received three judgments between July 2004 and March 2005. We picked these dates to ensure there is sufficient time for the state to have complied by December 2023. This sample also has sufficient variation in terms of damages awarded, victims involved, and victim identities. The six cases examined appear in Table A2.

Table A2: Cases against Guatemala and Peru, 2004–2005

Case	Judgment date	Direct victim(s) identity	Total damages	Total victims	Time to compliance
<i>Guatemala</i>					
Molina Theissen	Jul. 2004	14-year-old boy forcibly disappeared	\$690,400	6	5 months
Carpio Nicolle et al.	Nov. 2004	Journalist/politician critical of government coup and delegates attacked and murdered	\$1,709,000	30	48 months
Plan de Sanchez Massacre	Nov. 2004	Maya indigenous community	\$7,925,000	466	145 months
<i>Peru</i>					
Gomez Paquiyauri Brothers	Jul. 2004	14- and 17-year old brothers executed by police	\$740,500	11	17 months
De La Cruz Flores	Nov. 2004	Female physician detained as alleged terrorist	\$289,050	8	13 months
Huilca Tecse	Mar. 2005	Trade union leader executed by Colina group	\$270,000	8	10 months

Looking first at the three judgments from Guatemala, we can see a great deal of variation in time to compliance. In *Molina Theissen*, Guatemala paid the almost \$700,000 award in just 5 months. Although the amount is high, the direct victim is a murdered child, and the indirect victims are his family members. This may have been a sympathetic case. *Carpio Nicolle* has a large award — over \$1.7 million — given to 30 victims (multiple families are affected by the deaths). Nevertheless, Guatemala paid this award, too, although it took 4 years. Finally, in the *Plan de Sanchez Massacre*, Guatemala was ordered to pay almost \$8 million to an indigenous community, which ultimately took over 16 years. In this case, it was likely the number of victims (466) prolonged compliance, as the state had to locate and identify all of the beneficiaries, which took a great deal of time. Indeed, Guatemala’s best efforts to locate all of the victims fell short in the end, and the Inter-American Court declared full compliance even though 27 of the 466 victims were never paid. Turning to the cases from Peru, we can see first that the damages and victim counts are more similar among these cases than in Guatemala, which had a greater range. The three judgments are spaced out by four months each, although compliance took place around the same time (December 2005 for two and January 2006 for the third). Although the *Gomez Paquiyauri* case took the longest for Peru to fulfill of the three, this

case also involved three additional victims, and the total award was about 2.5 times as large. Peru's months to compliance in *De La Cruz Flores* averages to about \$22,235 per month. If Peru had complied at that rate in *Gomez Paquiyauri*, it would have taken the state 33 months to comply, not 17. However, *Gomez Paquiyauri* involved two dead children, which may have generated incentives for Peru to pay damages quicker.

A.3 Alternative Measures of Capacity

Below we present the results of our model using two alternative measures of capacity. The variables are the same as in the model in the main paper, except for *Government effectiveness* and *Rule of law*, which have both been removed due to high correlation with the capacity measure (ρ of 0.43 and 0.34, respectively).

In the first model, we measure capacity using GDP per capita. In the second, we create a dichotomous variable called "Richer state" which is coded as 1 if the state's GDP per capita is above the median and 0 otherwise. The results show that the size of the award still significantly affects time to compliance. GDP per capita on its own does not moderate the effect of award size on time to compliance, although being in the top half of GDP per capita does, consistent with our hypothesis.

Table A3: Hypothesis 1a using alternate measures of capacity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Monetary award (logged)	-0.24*** (0.08)	-0.25*** (0.08)	-0.32*** (0.05)	-0.31*** (0.06)
Preliminary objections		-0.17*** (0.05)		-0.15*** (0.05)
Acceptance of responsibility		-0.20* (0.12)		-0.18 (0.12)
Non-pecuniary damages		0.07 (0.14)		0.05 (0.14)
Article 4 violation		-0.28 (0.18)		-0.30* (0.18)
Article 5 violation		-0.17 (0.18)		-0.22 (0.18)
Impunity		0.01 (0.01)		0.02 (0.01)
Cumulative orders		-0.06*** (0.01)		-0.04*** (0.01)
Capacity (GDP per capita)	-0.00 (<0.01)	0.00 (<0.01)		
Capacity (Richer state)			-2.16** (0.94)	-2.89*** (0.92)
Award (logged) × Capacity	0.00 (<0.01)	0.00 (<0.01)	0.20** (0.08)	0.17** (0.08)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations (order-year)	2,252	2,252	2,252	2,252

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$