

Appendix

Awareness of Executive Interference and the Demand for Judicial Independence: Evidence from Four Constitutional Courts

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A SURVEY TECHNICAL INFORMATION

Germany

The German survey was part of a 6-wave panel study fielded between April 2020 and September 2021, immediately preceding the 2021 national elections. These field dates corresponded with the early days of the global Covid-19 pandemic, and tracked German citizens' attitudes regarding the pandemic, government crisis-mitigation responses and policies, and the rule of law.

In Wave 1, YouGov interviewed 4,729 respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 4,400 to produce the final wave 1 dataset. The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, and education. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the 2018 Eurobarometer with selection within strata by weighted sampling (using the person weights on the public use file). The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, years of education, and state. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these deciles. The weights were then post-stratified on 2017 General Election vote choice, and a stratification of gender, state, age (4-categories), and education (4-categories), to produce the final weight.

In waves 2-4, YouGov re-contacted all respondents from the previous wave to complete the current wave's interviews. Wave-specific weights were then constructed following the same procedures as in Wave 1. YouGov re-contacted all 3,697 Wave 2 respondents to achieve 3,189 Wave 3 interviews. All 3,189 Wave 3 respondents were recontacted to Achieved 2,633 Wave 4 interviews. In wave 5, YouGov re-contacted all 2,633 wave 4 respondents and achieved 1,334 completed wave 5 interviews, which is the data we analyze here. Interviews took place between June 24th and July 6th, 2021.

United States

In wave 1, YouGov interviewed 2,234 respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 2,000 to produce the final dataset. The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, and education. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2018 American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling (using the person weights on the public use file). The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, race, years of education, and region. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these deciles. The weights were then post-stratified on 2016 General Election vote choice, 2020 General Election vote choice, and a four-way stratification of gender, race, age (4-categories), and education (4-categories), to produce the final weight. Interviews took place between June 23rd and July 6th, 2021.

Poland

YouGov interviewed 2000 respondents. The respondents were weighted to a sampling frame on gender, age, and education. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the 2019 Eurobarometer with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file). The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, years of education, and region. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these deciles. The weights were then post-stratified on ideology (10-categories), region, and a four-way stratification of gender, age (4-categories), race (4-categories), and education (4-categories), to produce the final weight. Interviews took place between June 1st and July 13th, 2021.

Hungary

YouGov interviewed 2029 respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 2000 to produce the final dataset. Respondents were matched to a sampling frame on the basis of gender, age, and education; the frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the 2019 Eurobarometer with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file). Matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, years of education, and region. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these deciles. The weights were then post-stratified on ideology (10-categories), region, and a four-way stratification of gender, age (4-categories), race (4-categories), and education (4-categories), to produce the final weight. Interviews took place between June 1st and July 14th, 2021.

B DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table B1: *Knowledge of the Court* Questions

Question	Wording
Correct 1	Some judges around the world serve for a set number of years; others serve a life term. The justices of the [U.S. Supreme Court\Bundesverfassungsgericht\Polish Constitutional Tribunal\Hungarian Constitutional Court] serve. . . For a set number of years; For a life term; Don't know
Correct 2	When the [U.S. Supreme Court\Bundesverfassungsgericht\Polish Constitutional Tribunal\Hungarian Constitutional Court] decides a case, would you say that. . . The decision can be appealed to another court; Parliament can review the decision to see if it should become the law of the land; The decision is final and cannot be reviewed; Don't know

Table B2: Variables Statistics - US

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Demand for Judicial Independence	1.17	0.58	0.00	2.00
Awareness	3.60	0.69	1.00	4.00
Perceived Exec. Infl.	2.19	0.94	1.00	4.00
Diffuse Supp.	0.59	0.27	0.00	1.00
Specific Support	2.53	0.78	1.00	4.00
Gov. Supporter	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00
Ideology	5.14	2.72	1.00	10.00
Pol. Interest	4.02	1.23	1.00	5.00
Strong Leader	0.09	0.28	0.00	1.00
Knowledge Court	1.46	0.72	0.00	2.00
Age	48.96	18.23	18.00	92.00
Gender	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00

Table B3: Variables Statistics - DE

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Demand for Judicial Independence	1.00	0.56	0.00	2.00
Awareness	2.72	0.68	1.00	4.00
Perceived Exec. Infl.	2.06	0.96	1.00	4.00
Diffuse Supp.	0.67	0.26	0.00	1.00
Specific Support	3.03	0.70	1.00	4.00
Gov. Supporter	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Ideology	4.90	1.72	1.00	10.00
Pol. Interest	3.87	1.01	1.00	5.00
Strong Leader	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
Knowledge Court	1.10	0.73	0.00	2.00
Age	53.44	16.80	20.00	91.00
Gender	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00

Table B4: Variables Statistics - HU

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Demand for Judicial Independence	1.53	0.66	0.00	2.00
Awareness	2.68	0.67	1.00	4.00
Perceived Exec. Infl.	3.03	1.06	1.00	4.00
Diffuse Supp.	0.45	0.23	0.00	1.00
Specific Support	2.23	0.89	1.00	4.00
Gov. Supporter	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
Ideology	5.47	2.32	1.00	10.00
Pol. Interest	3.41	1.08	1.00	5.00
Strong Leader	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
Knowledge Court	0.98	0.74	0.00	2.00
Age	45.60	15.45	18.00	90.00
Gender	0.53	0.50	0.00	1.00

Table B5: Variables Statistics - PL

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Demand for Judicial Independence	1.46	0.73	0.00	2.00
Awareness	3.09	0.72	1.00	4.00
Perceived Exec. Infl.	2.86	1.10	1.00	4.00
Diffuse Supp.	0.43	0.26	0.00	1.00
Specific Support	1.82	0.89	1.00	4.00
Gov. Supporter	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Ideology	5.34	2.41	1.00	10.00
Pol. Interest	3.72	1.04	1.00	5.00
Strong Leader	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Knowledge Court	1.32	0.72	0.00	2.00
Age	45.08	16.03	18.00	94.00
Gender	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00

C FULL REGRESSION TABLES AND ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS

C1 Full Regression Results for Main Text's Table 3 (OLS)

Table C1: Determinants of Demand for Judicial Independence (OLS Models)

	Additive Models				Interaction Models			
	US (1)	DE (2)	HU (3)	PL (4)	US (5)	DE (6)	HU (7)	PL (8)
Awareness	0.089*** (0.025)	0.159*** (0.027)	0.038 ⁺ (0.020)	0.013 (0.024)	-0.109* (0.052)	0.020 (0.047)	0.072 (0.051)	0.039 (0.053)
Perceived Exec. Infl.	0.158*** (0.015)	0.135*** (0.018)	0.292*** (0.015)	0.265*** (0.015)	-0.152 ⁺ (0.085)	-0.046 (0.065)	0.322*** (0.037)	0.296*** (0.051)
Awareness × Exec. Infl.					0.086*** (0.023)	0.066** (0.022)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.016)
Diffuse Supp.	0.224*** (0.059)	0.290*** (0.085)	0.124* (0.053)	0.106* (0.049)	0.226*** (0.059)	0.295*** (0.084)	0.121* (0.053)	0.106* (0.049)
Specific Support	-0.078*** (0.019)	-0.112*** (0.030)	-0.084*** (0.018)	-0.025 (0.021)	-0.075*** (0.018)	-0.103*** (0.030)	-0.086*** (0.018)	-0.026 (0.021)
Gov. Supporter	-0.109** (0.036)	-0.203*** (0.035)	-0.271*** (0.039)	-0.332*** (0.047)	-0.109** (0.036)	-0.205*** (0.035)	-0.274*** (0.040)	-0.333*** (0.047)
Ideology	-0.008 (0.007)	0.021* (0.010)	-0.013* (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.021* (0.010)	-0.014* (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.007)
Pol. Interest	0.039** (0.014)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.012)	0.039* (0.016)	0.041** (0.014)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.012)	0.040* (0.016)
Strong Leader	-0.151** (0.058)	-0.230*** (0.066)	-0.066 ⁺ (0.039)	-0.148*** (0.040)	-0.146* (0.057)	-0.235*** (0.066)	-0.067 ⁺ (0.039)	-0.149*** (0.040)
Knowledge Court	0.049* (0.024)	0.005 (0.023)	0.052** (0.017)	0.135*** (0.022)	0.051* (0.024)	0.007 (0.023)	0.052** (0.017)	0.134*** (0.022)
Age	-0.0005 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.0004 (0.001)	0.001 ⁺ (0.001)	-0.0005 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.0004 (0.001)	0.001 ⁺ (0.001)
Gender	0.038 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.032)	0.001 (0.024)	0.040 (0.028)	0.036 (0.027)	-0.001 (0.032)	-0.001 (0.024)	0.039 (0.028)
Constant	0.461*** (0.115)	0.275 ⁺ (0.143)	0.848*** (0.101)	0.492*** (0.110)	1.162*** (0.201)	0.626*** (0.176)	0.771*** (0.138)	0.414* (0.176)
Observations	1,852	1,246	1,852	1,901	1,852	1,246	1,852	1,901
Adjusted R ²	0.111	0.129	0.464	0.388	0.119	0.134	0.464	0.388

Note: Robust (heteroskedasticity-consistent) standard errors in parentheses.

⁺p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C2 *Determinants of Demand for Judicial Independence - Bivariate Models*

Table C2: Determinants of Demand for Judicial Independence (Bivariate Models)

	US		DE		HU		PL	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Awareness	0.141*** (0.021)		0.142*** (0.023)		0.121*** (0.023)		0.161*** (0.024)	
Perceived Exec. Infl.		0.115*** (0.014)		0.097*** (0.017)		0.389*** (0.010)		0.361*** (0.011)
Constant	0.665*** (0.078)	0.923*** (0.029)	0.617*** (0.066)	0.802*** (0.031)	1.203*** (0.063)	0.350*** (0.037)	0.960*** (0.077)	0.425*** (0.037)
Observations	1,852	1,852	1,246	1,246	1,852	1,852	1,901	1,901
Adjusted R ²	0.028	0.034	0.029	0.027	0.015	0.398	0.024	0.294

Note: Robust (heteroskedasticity-consistent) standard errors in parentheses. ⁺p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C3 Ordered Logit Models

Table C3: Determinants of Demand for Judicial Independence (Ordered Logit Models)

	Additive Models				Interaction Models			
	US (1)	DE (2)	HU (3)	PL (4)	US (5)	DE (6)	HU (7)	PL (8)
Awareness	0.335*** (0.084)	0.654*** (0.091)	0.260*** (0.073)	0.100 (0.074)	-0.431** (0.160)	0.089 (0.176)	0.028 (0.166)	-0.157 (0.151)
Perceived Exec. Infl.	0.620*** (0.048)	0.567*** (0.065)	1.184*** (0.052)	0.996*** (0.044)	-0.613* (0.257)	-0.192 (0.238)	0.939*** (0.130)	0.641*** (0.160)
Awareness × Exec. Infl.					0.340*** (0.069)	0.276*** (0.081)	0.097+ (0.051)	0.118* (0.049)
Diffuse Supp.	0.731*** (0.192)	1.250*** (0.296)	0.511* (0.200)	0.611*** (0.164)	0.742*** (0.197)	1.266*** (0.289)	0.539** (0.207)	0.637*** (0.167)
Specific Support	-0.300*** (0.059)	-0.499*** (0.103)	-0.587*** (0.065)	-0.183** (0.062)	-0.292*** (0.060)	-0.466*** (0.102)	-0.581*** (0.065)	-0.176** (0.063)
Gov. Supporter	-0.407*** (0.113)	-0.825*** (0.125)	-1.076*** (0.123)	-0.919*** (0.130)	-0.412*** (0.115)	-0.831*** (0.124)	-1.062*** (0.126)	-0.911*** (0.132)
Ideology	-0.031 (0.021)	0.092* (0.036)	-0.080*** (0.023)	-0.110*** (0.022)	-0.030 (0.021)	0.091** (0.034)	-0.079*** (0.023)	-0.107*** (0.022)
Pol. Interest	0.150*** (0.044)	0.014 (0.066)	0.036 (0.045)	0.182*** (0.053)	0.156*** (0.046)	0.013 (0.060)	0.037 (0.044)	0.176*** (0.050)
Strong Leader	-0.585** (0.187)	-0.988*** (0.225)	-0.267* (0.129)	-0.531*** (0.116)	-0.566** (0.185)	-1.010*** (0.227)	-0.269* (0.132)	-0.534*** (0.112)
Knowledge Court	0.193* (0.078)	0.020 (0.079)	0.321*** (0.063)	0.512*** (0.070)	0.196** (0.076)	0.031 (0.077)	0.326*** (0.063)	0.519*** (0.066)
Age	-0.002 (0.002)	0.009** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.009** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)
Gender	0.145+ (0.087)	-0.016 (0.115)	-0.031 (0.088)	0.134 (0.089)	0.139 (0.090)	-0.008 (0.111)	-0.021 (0.089)	0.142 (0.089)
Too Little Right Right Too Much	0.242 3.776	1.013 4.834	-0.928 2.025	1.202 3.219	-2.501 1.047	-0.440 3.389	-1.453 1.500	0.464 2.479
Res. Variance	3001.4	1903.5	2096.9	2576.2	2981.5	1894.7	2095.5	2573.2
AIC	3027.4	1929.5	2122.9	2602.2	3009.5	1922.7	2123.5	2601.2
Observations	1,852	1,246	1,852	1,901	1,852	1,246	1,852	1,901

Note: Robust (heteroskedasticity-consistent) standard errors in parentheses. +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C4 Pooled Models: Executive Influence

Table C4: Determinants of Executive Influence (Pooled Models)

	Baseline Country Category			
	US (1)	DE (2)	HU (3)	PL (4)
Awareness	-0.056 (0.069)	-0.050 (0.046)	0.261*** (0.050)	0.247*** (0.053)
Germany (DE)	-0.111 (0.131)		0.234*** (0.054)	0.625*** (0.026)
Hungary (HU)	-0.345*** (0.082)	-0.234*** (0.054)		0.391*** (0.031)
Poland (PL)	-0.736*** (0.109)	-0.625*** (0.026)	-0.391*** (0.031)	
United States (US)		0.111 (0.131)	0.345*** (0.082)	0.736*** (0.109)
Awareness × DE	0.007 (0.039)		-0.311*** (0.032)	-0.297*** (0.034)
Awareness × HU	0.318*** (0.020)	0.311*** (0.032)		0.015*** (0.003)
Awareness × PL	0.303*** (0.018)	0.297*** (0.034)	-0.015*** (0.003)	
Awareness × US		-0.007 (0.039)	-0.318*** (0.020)	-0.303*** (0.018)
Constant	4.049*** (0.254)	3.938*** (0.130)	3.704*** (0.178)	3.313*** (0.148)
Observations	6,851	6,851	6,851	6,851
Adjusted R ²	0.327	0.327	0.327	0.327

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Controls: *Diffuse Support, Specific Support, Gov. Supporter, Ideology, Strong Leader, Knowledge of Court, Age, Gender.* ⁺p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

D CONSTRUCTION OF DIFFUSE SUPPORT VARIABLE

The variable *Diffuse Support* is a scale constructed from respondent’s answers to a well vetted battery of questions that is widely regarded to measure citizens’ institutional commitment (e.g., legitimacy or diffuse support) to judicial institutions (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird 1998; Driscoll and Nelson 2023). Each question was tailored to the country context such that respondents were queried regarding the court with constitutional jurisdiction in their home country, utilizing the colloquial but proper name for said institution. The five questions used to create this scale were as follows:

- If the [Constitutional Court/Tribunal] started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the [Constitutional Court/Tribunal] altogether.
- The right of the [Constitutional Court/Tribunal] to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced.
- The [Constitutional Court/Tribunal] gets too mixed up in politics.
- Judges on the [Constitutional Court/Tribunal] who consistently make decisions at odds with what a majority of the people want should be removed from their position as judge.
- The [Constitutional Court/Tribunal] ought to be made less independent so that it listens a lot more to what the people want.

The factor analytical solutions from an unrotated factor analysis of these items in each country is summarized in Table D1. Following the factor analyses, we generate predicted values using regression scoring to create a continuous variable scale of *Diffuse Support*.

Table D1: Diffuse Support Scale Factor Analysis Solutions

	US	DE	HU	PL
Multiple R square of scores with factors	0.84	0.88	0.76	0.82
Cronbach’s α	0.81	0.87	0.74	0.79
Factor 1 Eigenvalue	2.39	2.95	1.84	2.22
Factor Loadings				
Do Away	0.75	0.81	0.67	0.71
Jurisdiction Strip	0.74	0.78	0.67	0.70
Mixed Up	0.40	0.72	0.49	0.47
Remove Judges	0.74	0.80	0.66	0.77
Less Independent	0.75	0.72	0.51	0.65

Note: Loadings from the first factor of an unrotated solution of a common factor analysis.

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