Online Appendix

Elections Improve Support for State Trial Court Judges in the United States

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Contents

A Study One: Survey Descriptive Statistics

A.1 Respondent Characteristics

TABLE A.1: Descriptive Statistics: July 2021 NORC Survey

Variable	N	Percent
Sex	1033	
... Female	565	55%
... Male	468	45%
Race or Ethnicity	1033	
... Asian	30	3%
... Black	126	12%
... Hispanic	166	16%
... Other/Multiple	54	5%
... White	657	64%
Party	1028	
... Democrat	492	48%
... Independent	163	16%
... Republican	373	36%
Education	1033	
... Less than High School	61	6%
... High School or Equivalent	184	18%
... Vocational School or Some College	444	43%
... Bachelor's Degree	209	20%
... Post-Graduate Study	135	13%
Income	1033	
... Less than $30,000	261	25%
... $30,000 to $60,000	275	27%
... $60,000 to $100,000	283	27%
... $100,000 or More	214	21%
Ideology	1019	
... Very Liberal	112	11%
... Somewhat Liberal	131	13%
... Moderate	497	49%
... Somewhat Conservative	158	16%
... Very Conservative	121	12%
Experience	1030	
... Any Court Elected in State	944	92%
... No Courts Elected in State	86	8%

Note: Table presents information on characteristics of sample respondents; N = 1,033.

A.2 Outcome Measure Text and Summary Statistics

TABLE A.2: Outcome Variables: Summary Statistics

Judge Support (N = 962)	Strongly oppose	Somewhat oppose	Neither support nor oppose	Somewhat support	Strongly support
On a scale from strongly oppose to strongly support, where would you place your level of support for this judge?	0.07	0.17	0.36	0.29	0.11

Judge Fairness (N = 960)	Very unfairly	Somewhat unfairly	Neither fairly nor unfairly	Somewhat fairly	Very fairly
Suppose that someone you know was accused of a crime, and his or her case was assigned to this judge. How fairly do you believe the case would be handled by this judge?	0.04	0.15	0.27	0.35	0.18

Legitimacy (N = 948 completed all)	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
If my state's highest court started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with it altogether.	0.19	0.23	0.36	0.17	0.05
I would support removing judges from their position on the courts in my state if they consistently made decisions at odds with what a majority of the people want.	0.08	0.13	0.29	0.33	0.17
The courts in my state have become too independent and should be seriously reigned in.	0.11	0.17	0.52	0.14	0.05
The courts in my state have become too mixed up in politics.	0.05	0.10	0.41	0.28	0.16

Note: Cell entries indicate sample proportions for each variable.

FIGURE A.1: Correlations between Study One Outcome Measures

Note: Correlations are for the 946 respondents who answered all six questions. Legitimacy questions have been scaled such that higher scores indicate greater perceived legitimacy of the courts.

# B Additional Information and Analyses from Study One

B.1 Balance Test

TABLE B.1: Balance Test Results

	Black	Hispanic	College	Married	Employed	Income	Internet	Democrat	Republican
	Dependent variable:								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Woman	−0.006	0.005	−0.016	−0.025	0.009	−0.199	0.013	0.002	−0.012
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.263)	(0.018)	(0.032)	(0.031)
White	−0.057*	−0.013	0.009	0.008	−0.010	0.146	0.003	−0.026	0.006
	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.329)	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Hispanic	−0.013	0.020	0.058	0.035	−0.073	−0.136	0.008	−0.013	0.025
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.320)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Appointed	−0.065*	0.026	−0.043	0.082*	0.001	0.064	0.018	−0.030	0.062
	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.280)	(0.018)	(0.034)	(0.033)
60% Margin	0.024	−0.0003	−0.049	−0.009	0.020	−0.184	−0.0004	−0.055	0.035
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.320)	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.038)
80% Margin	−0.046	−0.002	−0.030	0.032	−0.025	0.280	0.030	−0.030	0.007
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.332)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.038)
5 Year Tenure	0.007	0.010	0.031	−0.017	−0.023	0.185	−0.011	0.003	0.018
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.328)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.038)
15 Year Tenure	−0.040	0.019	0.024	−0.009	0.002	0.210	0.010	0.054	−0.008
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.318)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Democrat	−0.004	−0.013	−0.009	−0.030	0.018	−0.023	0.025	−0.013	0.003
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.324)	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Party Not Shown	0.030	0.017	−0.047	0.019	0.006	−0.323	0.035	−0.012	0.044
	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.321)	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.038)
6 Year Avg. Sentence	−0.015	0.003	−0.002	0.026	0.068	0.136	0.031	−0.081*	0.135*
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.323)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.038)
9 Year Avg. Sentence	−0.033	0.012	−0.017	0.013	0.046	−0.216	0.001	0.008	0.061
	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.324)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.037)
Constant	0.189*	0.137*	0.382*	0.430*	0.604*	10.189*	0.865*	0.532*	0.241*
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.483)	(0.034)	(0.056)	(0.054)
Observations	962	962	962	962	962	962	962	962	962
Adjusted R^2	0.018	−0.008	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.006	−0.002	−0.001	0.007

Note: Estimates are from OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of observation is the respondent. All outcomes are binary except income, which is measured on an 18-point scale and is treated as a continuous variable. $^*p < 0.05$.

B.2 Evaluations of Judge Fairness

FIGURE B.1: Judge Characteristics and Evaluations of Fairness

Note: The figure presents estimates of the conjoint design on evaluations of the judge's fairness (ranging from 1 to 5).

FIGURE B.2: Judge Characteristics and Evaluations of Fairness by Party

Note: The figure presents estimates of the conjoint design on evaluations of the judge's fairness (ranging from 1 to 5) separately by respondent partisanship.

## B.3 Alternative Measure of State Court Legitimacy

FIGURE B.3: Judge Characteristics and Evaluations of State Court Legitimacy, Omitting State Supreme Court Question from Legitimacy Index

Note: The figure presents estimates of the conjoint design on evaluations of state court legitimacy, using an additive index that omits our question on state supreme courts.

B.4 Partisan Evaluations of State Court Legitimacy

FIGURE B.4: Judge Characteristics and Evaluations of State Court Legitimacy by Party

Note: The figure presents estimates of the conjoint design on evaluations of state court legitimacy separately by respondent partisanship.

B.5 Respondent Knowledge and Support for Trial Court Judges

FIGURE B.5: Judge Characteristics and Support by Knowledge Level

Note: The figure presents estimates of the conjoint design on evaluations of trial court judge support separately by respondent knowledge. Respondents were classified as knowledgeable if they correctly answered all three knowledge questions. Knowledge questions ask about their state high court selection process (elected or appointed), the power of the U.S. Supreme Court to declare a law unconstitutional, and the name of the justice who most recently joined the U.S. Supreme Court. We code respondents who have retention elections for state high courts as elected.

C   Study Two: Survey Descriptive Statistics

C.1   Respondent Characteristics

TABLE C.1: Descriptive Statistics: July 2023 NORC Survey

Variable	N	Percent
Sex	1224	
... Female	597	49%
... Male	627	51%
Race or Ethnicity	1224	
... Asian	39	3%
... Black	139	11%
... Hispanic	193	16%
... Other/Multiple	47	4%
... White	806	66%
Party	1222	
... Democrat	579	47%
... Independent	212	17%
... Republican	431	35%
Education	1224	
... Less than High School	53	4%
... High School or Equivalent	209	17%
... Associates Degree or Some College	512	42%
... Bachelor's Degree	282	23%
... Post-Graduate Study or Professional Degree	168	14%
Income	1224	
... Less than $30,000	254	21%
... $30,000 to $60,000	285	23%
... $60,000 to $100,000	337	28%
... $100,000 or More	348	28%
Ideology	1205	
... Very Liberal	166	14%
... Somewhat Liberal	133	11%
... Moderate	543	45%
... Somewhat Conservative	211	18%
... Very Conservative	152	13%
Experience	1222	
... Any Court Elected in State	1133	93%
... No Courts Elected in State	89	7%

Note: Table presents information on characteristics of sample respondents; N = 1,224.

# D Additional Information and Analyses from Study Two

D.1 Balance Test Results

TABLE D.1: Balance Test Results: 2023 Survey

	Dependent variable:								
	Black	Hispanic	College	Married	Employed	Income	Internet	Democrat	Republican
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Woman	0.0003	0.017	−0.017	−0.004	0.061*	0.189	−0.012	−0.015	0.017
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.252)	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.027)
White	−0.011	−0.013	0.021	0.010	−0.025	−0.022	0.020	0.024	−0.044
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.319)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Hispanic	−0.001	−0.0004	0.030	−0.039	0.007	0.054	0.049*	−0.051	−0.009
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.316)	(0.021)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Appointed	−0.006	0.010	0.021	−0.034	0.044	0.083	0.005	0.016	−0.033
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.269)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.029)
60% Margin	0.027	0.057*	0.017	0.023	0.048	−0.156	−0.022	0.004	−0.020
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.303)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.033)
80% Margin	0.026	0.032	−0.005	0.054	0.021	−0.208	−0.005	0.062	−0.072*
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.314)	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.034)
5 Year Tenure	0.008	−0.002	−0.075*	0.023	0.010	−0.180	−0.039*	0.042	0.021
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.313)	(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.034)
15 Year Tenure	−0.010	−0.004	−0.045	0.015	0.024	0.197	−0.041*	0.033	0.041
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.307)	(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Democrat	−0.027	0.012	0.057	0.078*	−0.049	0.048	−0.004	−0.021	0.006
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.312)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Not Shown	−0.015	0.006	0.030	0.002	−0.003	0.240	0.009	−0.091*	0.079*
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.303)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.033)
6 Year Avg. Sentence	0.037	0.007	−0.019	0.015	−0.030	−0.408	−0.015	0.024	0.019
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.308)	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.034)
9 Year Avg. Sentence	0.012	0.017	−0.029	0.019	−0.050	−0.274	−0.015	−0.012	0.030
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.313)	(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Constant	0.099*	0.108*	0.375*	0.449*	0.598*	10.713*	0.933*	0.473*	0.336*
	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.438)	(0.029)	(0.051)	(0.049)
Observations	1,224	1,224	1,224	1,224	1,224	1,224	1,224	1,224	1,224
Adjusted R^2	−0.004	−0.004	−0.001	0.0004	0.003	−0.005	0.002	0.006	0.004

Note: Estimates are from OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of observation is the respondent. All outcomes are binary except income, which is measured on an 18-point scale and is treated as a continuous variable. $^*p < 0.05$.

D.2 Replication of Study One Main Results

FIGURE D.1: Judge Characteristics and Support: 2023 Survey


Note: The figure presents estimates of the relationship between electoral institutions and judge characteristics and evaluations of support (ranging from 1 to 5) for the judge. The results mirror those presented in the main text that come from the 2021 survey.

FIGURE D.2: Judge Characteristics and Partisan Support: 2023 Survey

Note: The figure presents estimates of the relationship between electoral institutions and judge characteristics and evaluations of support (ranging from 1 to 5) for the judge separately by respondent partisanship. The results mirror those presented in the main text that come from the 2021 survey.

FIGURE D.3: Judge Characteristics and Support by Knowledge Level: 2023 Survey

Note: The figure presents estimates of the conjoint design on evaluations of trial court judge support separately by respondent knowledge. Respondents were classified as knowledgeable if they correctly answered all three knowledge questions. Knowledge questions ask about their state high court selection process (elected or appointed), the power of the U.S. Supreme Court to declare a law unconstitutional, and the name of the justice who most recently joined the U.S. Supreme Court. We code respondents who have retention elections for state high courts as elected. We omitted respondents from New York from this analysis due to ambiguity with the meaning of "supreme court" (used in the state high court question) in that state.

D.3 Regression Results: Test of Efficacy and Democracy Mechanisms

TABLE D.2: Political Efficacy and Attitudes Toward Democracy as Moderators

	Dependent variable:				
			Support for Judge		
	External Efficacy	Internal Efficacy	Local Elections	Elections Force	Democracy Support
Moderator	0.045	0.016	0.073	0.045	0.078
	(0.058)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Elected	0.120	−0.067	0.053	0.100	0.241
	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.221)	(0.210)	(0.162)
Woman	0.070	0.078	0.081	0.073	0.076
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
White	−0.163**	−0.170**	−0.163**	−0.165**	−0.168**
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Hispanic	0.021	0.005	0.011	0.015	0.017
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)
60% Margin	−0.003	0.011	0.007	0.002	0.004
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)
80% Margin	0.120	0.130*	0.123	0.114	0.124
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.076)
5 Year Tenure	−0.003	−0.007	0.0001	−0.006	−0.003
	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.074)
15 Year Tenure	0.085	0.094	0.089	0.090	0.086
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Democrat	0.053	0.053	0.045	0.051	0.049
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.077)
No Party Listed	0.140**	0.143**	0.142**	0.143**	0.148**
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
6 Year Avg. Sentence	0.602**	0.599**	0.595**	0.599**	0.609**
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
9 Year Avg. Sentence	−0.033	−0.029	−0.020	−0.030	−0.023
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Moderator × Elected	−0.0002	0.065	0.014	0.007	−0.050
	(0.069)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Constant	2.804**	2.848**	2.614**	2.750**	2.699**
	(0.172)	(0.167)	(0.208)	(0.198)	(0.168)
Observations	1,169	1,169	1,165	1,167	1,170
Adjusted R^2	0.083	0.086	0.087	0.082	0.084

Note: Estimates are from OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. The unit of observation is the respondent. $^*p < 0.1$, $^*p < 0.05$.

D.4 Discrete Moderator Analyses

The analyses in this section treat each of the five levels of our moderator questions as their own discrete category. Treatment effects are calculated via linear regressions that include each moderator level as a separate predictor interacted with the election treatment indicator; we also control for all other nominee varying characteristics.


**FIGURE D.4:** External Efficacy; Treating Moderator as Discrete

**FIGURE D.5:** Internal Efficacy; Treating Moderator as Discrete

FIGURE D.6: Elections Force Government to Care; Treating Moderator as Discrete

**FIGURE D.7:** Local Elections are Worth It; Treating Moderator as Discrete

FIGURE D.8: Satisfaction with Democracy; Treating Moderator as Discrete

E Elections and Partisan Differences in Support for Judges

In our pre-analysis plan, we noted that we would explore various interactions between the treatment conditions in the conjoint profile. A particular interaction of interest that we specifically indicated was that we would explore "whether shared partisanship with the judge conditions support for the type of selection."[1] To explore this, in Figure E.1 we simply present the predicted support for co-partisan and out-partisan judges, separately by whether the judges were indicated to be appointed or elected.[2] As the figure demonstrates, in Study 1 we found that there is a significant gap in reported support for judges who share or do not share a respondent's party affiliation, regardless of the type of selection method, but that this gap does seem to be appreciably smaller for elected judges. While our regression results do not allow us to conclude that selection method matters differently for co- and out-partisans, they *do* allow us to conclude that out-partisans are substantially more favorably disposed to elected judges – to a statistically significant degree – than appointed judges.[3] As the right panel of the figure indicates, this result did not replicate in our second study, limiting our confidence in selection method's heterogeneous effects across partisanship.


(a) Study 1 (2021)   **(b)** Study 2 (2023)

FIGURE E.1: Electing Trial Court Judges May Moderate Partisan Differences in Support

Note: The figure presents predicted levels of judge support for copartisans and outpartisans of the judge. Separate predictions are presented for respondents who evaluated an elected judge and respondents who evaluated an appointed judge.

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[1]We did not pre-register a particular hypothesis for this analysis.

[2]These results are based on a simple linear regression with an indicator for whether the judge is a co-partisan with the respondent, an indicator for whether the judge is appointed or elected, and their interaction. The sample is limited to partisan respondents who saw a profile with a partisan judge.

[3]In the context of Figure E.1, there is a statistically distinguishable difference between the out-partisans point in the elected row and the out-partisans point in the appointed row; we cannot conclude, however, that the difference between out-partisans and co-partisans in the two rows are statistically distinguishable.

F Actual State Court Selection Methods

TABLE F.1: Familiarity with Judicial Elections by State

State	Any Court Elected	High Court Judges Elected
Alabama	✓(P)	✓(P)
Alaska	✓(N)	✓(N)
Arizona	✓(P)	✓(N)
Arkansas	✓(N)	✓(N)
California	✓(N)	✓(N)
Colorado	✓(N)	✓(N)
Connecticut	✓(P)	
Delaware		
Florida	✓(N)	✓(N)
Georgia	✓(P)	✓(N)
Hawaii		
Idaho	✓(N)	✓(N)
Illinois	✓(P)	✓(P)
Indiana	✓(P)	✓(N)
Iowa	✓(N)	✓(N)
Kansas	✓(P)	✓(N)
Kentucky	✓(N)	✓(N)
Louisiana	✓(P)	✓(P)
Maine	✓(P)	
Maryland	✓(P)	✓(N)
Massachusetts		
Michigan	✓(N)	✓(N)
Minnesota	✓(N)	✓(N)
Mississippi	✓(P)	✓(N)
Missouri	✓(P)	✓(N)
Montana	✓(N)	✓(N)
Nebraska	✓(N)	✓(N)
Nevada	✓(N)	✓(N)
New Hampshire		
New Jersey		
New Mexico	✓(P)	✓(P)
New York	✓(P)	
North Carolina	✓(P)	✓(P)
North Dakota	✓(N)	✓(N)
Ohio	✓(P)	✓(P)
Oklahoma	✓(N)	✓(N)
Oregon	✓(N)	✓(N)
Pennsylvania	✓(P)	✓(P)
Rhode Island		
South Carolina	✓(P)	
South Dakota	✓(N)	✓(N)
Tennessee	✓(P)	✓(N)
Texas	✓(P)	✓(P)
Utah	✓(N)	✓(N)
Vermont	✓(P)	
Virginia		
Washington	✓(N)	✓(N)
West Virginia	✓(N)	✓(N)
Wisconsin	✓(N)	✓(N)
Wyoming	✓(N)	✓(N)

Note: Table presents information on methods states use to select judges. Checkmarks indicate the state fulfills the criterion; "P" indicates that at least some elections are partisan, while "N" indicates that none are. Data come from Ballotpedia. We code any form of elections (including retention) as elected.

TABLE F.2: Effect of Election Treatment on Perceptions of Judicial Legitimacy Based on Actual State Judicial Institutions

	Yes	No
Full Sample	0.063 (p=0.213, n=945)	
Any Court Elected	0.053 (p=0.315, n=864)	0.170 (p=0.346, n=81)
High Court Judges Elected	0.036 (p=0.508, n=807)	0.220 (p=0.097, n=138)

Note: Estimates are differences-in-means comparing those that received an elected judge profile relative to an appointed judge profile, based on 2021 survey; higher values indicate greater perception of legitimacy of the state judiciary. Estimates in the "Yes" column are from states where the conditions indicated along the left margin are met; those in the "No" column are from states where that condition is not met. The unit of observation is the respondent.

F.1 Differences in Experience with Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections

We consider how respondents' real-world experience with partisan as compared to nonpartisan elections might differentially shape our treatment effects in two ways. First, in Table F.3, we present estimates of our election treatment effect (pooling partisan and nonpartisan elections) separately for respondents with and without real-world experience with *partisan* elections. We do so based upon whether respondents' state high court (bottom row) and any court in the state (top row) are elected in partisan elections (see Table F.1 for codings). We also present the treatment effect for respondents without real-world election experience ("No"), this is the same as we present in the main text. We find no clear substantive differences when looking by state high court experience. We find some substantive differences when looking by any state court experience (a smaller effect for no partisan than partisan), though the treatment effect remains positive and substantively and statistically significant (at $p < 0.1$) for both groups.

Second, in Table F.4, we present estimates of our election treatment effect for respondents who got an election treatment that matched their real-world institution (e.g., a partisan treatment for a respondent in a state with partisan elections) and those who got the election treatment that did not match their real-world institution. In both cases, the control group are those with the given "actual" condition but who received the appointed treatment. We find some limited substantive differences for respondents who received the election treatment that matched their real-world experience as compared with those who received the treatment that did not; the treatment effects are somewhat larger for those that got the match. This fits with the theoretical logic underlying our mechanism – respondents appear most positively responsive to the electoral institution they have experience with. Nevertheless, the treatment effects remain positive and substantively significant (and in most cases, statistically significant) for both groups.

TABLE F.3: Effect of Election Treatment Based on Type of State Judicial Election Institution

	Yes (Partisan)	Yes (No Partisan)	No
Full Sample	0.151 (p=0.002, n=2129)		
Any Court Elected	0.254 (p=0.001, n=989)	0.133 (p=0.061, n=971)	-0.269 (p=0.094, n=169)
High Court Judges Elected	0.186 (p=0.068, n=537)	0.199 (p=0.001, n=1293)	-0.139 (p=0.283, n=299)

Note: Estimates are differences-in-means comparing those that received an elected judge profile relative to an appointed judge profile; higher values indicate greater support for elected judges. Estimates in the "Yes (Partisan)" or "Yes (No Partisan)" columns are from states with those election characteristics where the conditions indicated along the left margin are met; those in the "No" column are from states where that condition is not met. For "Any Court Elected," we code "Yes (Partisan)" if any elected court in the state is elected via partisan elections and "Yes (No Partisan)" if no elected courts in the state are elected via partisan elections. The unit of observation is the respondent.

TABLE F.4: Effect of Election Treatment Based on Match With Own State Judicial Election Institution

Full Sample	0.151 (p=0.002, n=2129)	
	Partisan (Match)	**Partisan (Mismatch)**
Any Court Elected	0.260 (p=0.002, n=669)	0.247 (p=0.004, n=626)
High Court Judges Elected	0.222 (p=0.052, n=366)	0.143 (p=0.221, n=339)
	No Partisan (Match)	**No Partisan (Mismatch)**
Any Court Elected	0.171 (p=0.040, n=680)	0.093 (p=0.269, n=655)
High Court Judges Elected	0.235 (p=0.001, n=891)	0.161 (p=0.026, n=867)

Note: Estimates are differences-in-means comparing those that received an elected judge profile relative to an appointed judge profile; higher values indicate greater support for elected judges. We separately estimate effects for respondents who received a treatment that matched their real-world state institution ("Match") or one that did not ("Mismatch"). For "Any Court Elected," we code "Partisan" if any elected court in the state is elected via partisan elections and "No Partisan" if no elected courts in the state are elected via partisan elections. The unit of observation is the respondent.