

## Appendix

	Coef.	(S.E.)	p-value	Adjusted p-value
<b>Acquiescence</b>				
Circuit Dissent Rate	-0.653	(0.315)	0.038	0.958
Age	0.014	(0.018)	0.427	> 0.999
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.000	(0.000)	0.201	> 0.999
Senior Status	0.062	(0.054)	0.251	> 0.999
Caseload	0.011	(0.019)	0.543	> 0.999
<b>Acquiescence and/or Deliberation</b>				
Pr(Future Panel)	-0.172	(0.225)	0.444	> 0.999
Same City as Other Panel Judge(s)	-0.005	(0.031)	0.864	> 0.999
Sitting by Designation: Circuit	-0.114	(0.150)	0.448	> 0.999
Sitting by Designation: District	-0.030	(0.078)	0.699	> 0.999
<b>Deliberation</b>				
Cotenure with Other Panel Judges	0.009*	(0.002)	0.000	0.001
Counterjudge Subject Expertise	0.053	(0.037)	0.159	> 0.999
Majority Judge Subject Expertise	0.015	(0.031)	0.637	> 0.999
Counterjudge Elite Law School	0.070	(0.033)	0.033	0.815
Majority Judge Elite Law School	-0.006	(0.035)	0.847	> 0.999
Longest Tenure on Panel	-0.042	(0.042)	0.316	> 0.999
Shortest Tenure on Panel	0.019	(0.042)	0.649	> 0.999
<b>Strategy</b>				
CJ Aligned with Ruling Below	1.077*	(0.060)	< 0.001	< 0.001
ID Distance: Panel to Circuit	0.191	(0.114)	0.094	> 0.999
ID Distance: Panel to SCOTUS	0.621*	(0.153)	< 0.001	0.001
Alignment X ID Dist. to Circuit	0.336	(0.159)	0.034	0.850
Alignment X ID Dist. to SCOTUS	0.128	(0.211)	0.545	> 0.999
<b>Controls</b>				
Amicus Participation	-0.013	(0.094)	0.888	> 0.999
Civil Case	0.024	(0.035)	0.486	> 0.999
Per Curiam	0.033	(0.053)	0.542	> 0.999
Year > 1984	-0.289*	(0.050)	< 0.001	< 0.001
Intercept	-0.938	(0.580)	0.106	
N			8,509	
PRE			39.85%	
AIC			9,487.7	
BIC			9,748.5	

Table 5: Robustness Check with Additional Variables: Probit regression estimates of the effect of counterjudge, circuit, and case characteristics on whether a panel resolves the case in a manner consistent with the counterjudge's ideologically-preferred outcome. The model includes circuit fixed effects which are not shown and \* denotes a Bonferroni-adjusted p-value less than 0.05.

	Republican Panels			Democratic Panels		
	Coef.	p-value	Adjusted p-value	Coef.	p-value	Adjusted p-value
<b>Acquiescence</b>						
Age	-0.007	0.034	0.683	-0.004	0.206	> 0.999
Senior Status	0.043	0.534	> 0.999	0.027	0.732	> 0.999
<b>Acquiescence and/or Deliberation</b>						
Pr(Future Panel)	-0.045	0.900	> 0.999	-0.877*	0.004	0.070
Same City as Other Panel Judge(s)	-0.004	0.931	> 0.999	0.023	0.640	> 0.999
Sitting by Designation: Circuit	-0.166	0.415	> 0.999	-0.367	0.138	> 0.999
Sitting by Designation: District	-0.066	0.552	> 0.999	-0.136	0.260	> 0.999
<b>Deliberation</b>						
Cotensure with Other Panel Judges	0.002	0.505	> 0.999	-0.001	0.844	> 0.999
Counterjudge Subject Expertise	0.006	0.913	> 0.999	0.044	0.452	> 0.999
Counterjudge Elite Law School	0.068	0.150	> 0.999	0.097	0.051	> 0.999
Longest Tenure on Panel	0.025	0.665	> 0.999	-0.023	0.730	> 0.999
Shortest Tenure on Panel	0.077	0.198	> 0.999	-0.125	0.044	0.873
<b>Strategy</b>						
CJ Aligned with Ruling Below	0.623*	< 0.001	< 0.001	0.629*	< 0.001	< 0.001
ID Distance: Panel to Circuit	-0.162	0.249	> 0.999	-0.157	0.522	> 0.999
ID Distance: Panel to SCOTUS	-0.125	0.498	> 0.999	0.049	0.887	> 0.999
Alignment X ID Dist. to Circuit	0.107	0.699	> 0.999	0.475	0.072	> 0.999
Alignment X ID Dist. to SCOTUS	0.296	0.355	> 0.999	-0.238	0.523	> 0.999
<b>Controls</b>						
Amicus Participation	-0.223	0.106	> 0.999	0.229	0.103	> 0.999
Civil Case	0.353*	< 0.001	< 0.001	-0.357*	< 0.001	< 0.001
Per Curiam	-0.140	0.079	> 0.999	0.263*	0.001	0.020
Year > 1984	-0.191*	0.001	0.024	0.020	0.754	> 0.999
Intercept	-0.276	0.199		0.270	0.302	
N		5,024			3,745	
PRE		-0.94%			3.38%	
AIC		4,839.2			4,139.1	
BIC		5,047.9			4338.4	

Table 6: Probit regression estimates of the effect of counterjudge, circuit, and case characteristics on whether a panel resolves the case in a manner consistent with the counterjudge's ideologically-preferred outcome broken down separately by Republican and Democrat panels. The model includes circuit fixed effects which are not shown and \* denotes a Bonferroni-adjusted p-value less than 0.05.