APPENDIX A: MEASUREMENT OF KEY CONCEPTS

Table A1. Loyalty Toward the United States Supreme Court

| | Level of Diffuse Support for the Supreme Court | | | | | |
| | Percentage | | | | | |
Indicator	Not Supportive	Undecided	Supportive	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Do away with the Court	13.1	26.9	60.0	3.7	1.1	1533
Restrict Court's Jurisdiction	24.8	32.3	43.0	3.3	1.1	1526
Too mixed up in politics	45.0	34.9	20.1	2.7	.9	1530
Remove judges who rule against majority	23.6	30.9	45.5	3.3	1.1	1531
Makes Court less independent	31.6	28.5	39.9	3.2	1.2	1521
Control the actions of the Supreme Court	34.4	31.8	33.7	3.0	1.1	1531

Note: The percentages are calculated on the basis of collapsing the five-point Likert response set (e.g., "agree strongly" and "agree" responses are combined), and sum to 100% across the three percentage columns (except for rounding errors). The percentage "Supportive" is the percentage of respondents giving a reply supportive *of the Court*, not of the statement itself. The means and standard deviations are calculated on the uncollapsed distributions. Higher mean scores indicate more institutional loyalty. The results reported here pertain to all respondents in our survey, irrespective of the question-wording condition to which they were assigned.

The propositions (asked with a five-point Likert response set) are:

Do away with the Court: If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Court altogether.

Restrict Court's Jurisdiction: The right of the U.S. Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced.

Too mixed up in politics: The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics.

Remove judges who rule against majority: Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court who consistently make decisions at odds with what the majority wants should be removed from their position.

Makes Court less independent: The U.S. Supreme Court ought to be made less independent so that it listens a lot more to what the people want.

Control the actions of the Supreme Court: It is inevitable that the U.S. Supreme Court gets mixed up in politics; we ought to have stronger means of controlling the Court.

Source: TAPS Survey, 2014

This set of indicators has very strong psychometric properties. Reliability is high – Cronbach's alpha = .89. So too is validity. The item set is strongly unidimensional (the second eigenvalue from a Common Factor Analysis (CFA) is a mere .74), and all items load well on the first unrotated factor (minimum loading = .55). Because a summated index is very strongly correlated with the factor score from the CFA (r = .996), we will use that index as the criterion variable for our analysis. Our measurement results clearly indicate that this summary measure is quite strong in terms of both validity and reliability.

Supreme Court Knowledge

We also measured knowledge of the Court with five conventional items. As with many internet

surveys,[17] knowledge is quite high, ranging from 91% knowing that the justices are appointed to

the Court to 68% knowing that the Court currently makes less than 100 decisions per year. More

than 36% of the respondents got all five knowledge questions correct; 3.8% missed all five.

Our survey reproduces the conventional finding about the relationship between

knowledge and Court attitudes. "To know the Court" is to love it – the correlation of knowledge

and diffuse support is .39. On the other hand, knowledge is only weakly related to performance

evaluations (r = .18) and even more weakly related to the specific support dichotomy (r = −.08).

This latter correlation indicates that those more knowledgeable about the institution are less

likely (slightly) to judge its decisions as "about right."

Belief in Legal Realism

We also included three indicators of perceptions of how decisions are made. Christenson and

Glick (2015) and Gibson and Nelson (2016) suggest that the effect of ideological proximity

might be mitigated by a belief that judicial decisions are made on the basis of ideology rather

than law (legal realism); at the same time, those who reject legal realism might be particularly

likely to reject the validity of the ideological proximity score because they reject the assumption

that the Court's decisions can be judged in ideological space.

We rely upon an index comprised of three statements. These measures, which can be

considered as indicating whether the respondent embraces legal realism or a legalistic view of

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[17] Internet surveys, of course, have no control over respondents who look up the answers on the

Internet so as to be able to answer the questions correctly.

judicial decision making, are all empirical, requiring no normative evaluations from the respondents. The statements are:

- The U.S. Supreme Court makes its decisions on a case-by-case basis, so it doesn't really make sense to think of it as either liberal or conservative. (Disagree: realist)

- Judges' values and political views have little to do with how they decide cases before the Supreme Court. (Disagree: realist)

- Judges' party affiliations have little to do with how they decide cases before the Supreme Court. (Disagree: realist)

This three-item set is reasonably reliable (Cronbach's alpha = .72), especially given that only three indicators are included in the scale. And when subjected to Common Factor Analysis (CFA), the item-set is shown to be clearly unidimensional (eigenvalue$_2$ = .67), with strong validity loadings for each of the three items. We created an index measuring belief in legal realism, and scaled it to range from 0 to 1 (with high scores indicating a more realistic understanding of judicial decision making).[18]

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[18] This index is correlated with the factor score from the CFA at r = .96, so it makes practically no difference which measure is used.

Table A2. Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Minimum	Maximum
Diffuse Support	0.55	0.22	0	1
Belief in Legal Realism	0.57	0.20	0	1
Job Performance	0.53	0.22	0	1
Supreme Court Knowledge	0.72	0.29	0	1
Party Identification	0.45	0.37	0	1
Age	0.32	0.18	0	1
Female	0.51	0.50	0	1
Black	0.11	0.31	0	1
Hispanic	0.15	0.35	0	1
Education	0.52	0.30	0	1
Own Home	0.68	0.47	0	1
Church Attendance	0.43	0.32	0	1

APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL MODEL RESULTS

This appendix contains full model details for those results only summarized in the body of the paper. The body of the paper discusses the bivariate and multivariate evidence (from linear regression models) to validate the reported self-validation measure. The full model estimates for the linear regression models, see Table B1.

As a final test of the reported self-validation measure, we divided the respondents based upon their reported self-validation and estimated separate ordinal logistic regression models (Table B2). The dependent variable in each model is the trichotomy answer (ranging from "too liberal" to "too conservative"), and the independent variables include the calculated difference score as well as a standard set of control and demographic variables.

For the purpose of validating the trichotomy as a measure of ideological proximity, our quantity of interest is the percentage of the trichotomy answers "correctly classified" by the model estimates. If the trichotomy is a more valid measure, the percent correctly classified should be higher as the reported self-validation increases. This is indeed the case. For the respondents who say the calculated score "definitely does not" or "does not" represent their view, the percentage of trichotomy scores predicted correctly is 63% and 66%, respectively. For the respondents who said the score "somewhat" represents their views, 73% of trichotomy answers were classified correctly. Finally, 90% of the respondents who said that the calculated score "definitely" represents them were correctly classified into their trichotomy score. Altogether, we regard these findings as strong evidence that the reported self-validation measure is a valid, accurate, and useful one.

Table B1: The Relationship between Ideological Proximity and the Trichotomy, by Reported Self-Validation.

	(1) "Extremely Well"			(2) "Fairly Well"		
	b	s.e.	p-value	b	s.e.	p-value
Difference Score	.09	.06	.12	.03	.04	.46
Legal Realism	-.03	.22	.88	**.21**	**.10**	**.04**
Difference Score X						
Realism	.13	.07	.08	**.46**	**.06**	**<.01**
Job Performance	**.13**	**.05**	**.01**	.01	.03	.87
Court Knowledge	.04	.20	.86	-.02	.07	.84
Party Identification	**-.96**	**.18**	**<.01**	-.03	.06	.61
Age	**.67**	**.21**	**<.01**	-.10	.11	.39
Female	-.10	.07	.15	.06	.04	.07
Black	**-.36**	**.14**	**.01**	.13	.07	.05
Hispanic	-.05	.14	.72	**.15**	**.05**	**<.01**
Education	.20	.15	.19	**.13**	**.07**	**.05**
Own Home	.06	.08	.45	**-.13**	**.04**	**<.01**
Religious Attendance	-.09	.11	.44	**-.14**	**.06**	**.02**
Intercept	**.73**	**.27**	**.01**	**1.00**	**.11**	**<.01**
R^2	.81			.56		
N	171			692		

	(3) "Not Very Well"			(4) "Not At All"		
	b	s.e.	p-value	b	s.e.	p-value
Difference Score	-.04	.07	.62	-.06	.17	.74
Legal Realism	.23	.21	.28	.26	.47	.59
Difference Score X						
Realism	**.41**	**.11**	**<.01**	**.49**	**.22**	**.03**
Job Performance	-.01	.04	.90	-.13	.10	.19
Court Knowledge	.15	.12	.21	-.36	.35	.31
Party Identification	**-.30**	**.11**	**.01**	.18	.30	.56
Age	-.20	.19	.29	.36	.58	.54
Female	**.20**	**.07**	**<.01**	-.16	.16	.34
Black	.15	.10	.14	.34	.25	.18
Hispanic	.07	.10	.47	.32	.23	.17
Education	.08	.11	.45	.43	.36	.23
Own Home	-.08	.07	.26	**-.37**	**.18**	**.05**
Religious Attendance	**-.33**	**.11**	**<.01**	.34	.26	.19
Intercept	**.95**	**.21**	**<.01**	**1.09**	**.35**	**<.01**
R^2	.46			.47		

N	418	140

Note: The models are linear regressions. The dependent variable is the trichotomy score. All independent variables range from 0 to 1 (see Table A2, Supplementary Appendices, for the summary statistics). Coefficients in bold indicate p < .05.

Table B2: The Relationship between Ideological Proximity and the Trichotomy, by Reported Self-Validation.

	(1) "Extremely Well"			(2) "Fairly Well"		
	b	s.e.	p-value	b	s.e.	p-value
Difference Score	.19	.48	.69	-.39	.25	.11
Legal Realism	**-7.04**	**2.71**	**.01**	**1.82**	**.61**	**<.01**
Difference Score X Realism	**2.59**	**.94**	**.01**	**3.58**	**.47**	**<.01**
Job Performance	1.09	.60	.07	.04	.19	.84
Court Knowledge	1.27	1.77	.47	-.10	.40	.81
Party Identification	-1.14	1.53	.46	.05	.34	.88
Age	**7.73**	**2.33**	**<.01**	-.47	.58	.42
Female	**-1.64**	**.79**	**.04**	.33	.19	.08
Black	**-2.52**	**1.13**	**.03**	**.76**	**.39**	**.05**
Hispanic	.27	1.28	.83	**.68**	**.27**	**.01**
Education	**3.83**	**1.80**	**.03**	**.94**	**.37**	**.01**
Own Home	-.47	.88	.59	**-.81**	**.23**	**<.01**
Religious Attendance	.59	1.16	.61	**-.75**	**.32**	**.02**
Cutpoint 1	2.37	2.58	.36	**-1.89**	**.65**	**<.01**
Cutpoint 2	4.49	2.60	.09	**2.77**	**.65**	**<.01**
BIC	198.25			973.98		
N	171			692		

Note: The models are ordinal logistic regressions. The dependent variable is the trichotomy score. All independent variables range from 0 to 1 (see Table A2, Supplementary Appendices, for the summary statistics). Coefficients in bold indicate p < .05.

	(3) "Not Very Well"			(4) "Not At All"		
	b	s.e.	p-value	b	s.e.	p-value
Difference Score	**-.78**	**.30**	**.01**	-1.56	.92	.09
Legal Realism	.82	.84	.33	.97	2.06	.64
Difference Score X Realism	**2.82**	**.56**	**<.01**	**4.46**	**1.63**	**.01**
Job Performance	.04	.18	.84	-.38	.34	.27
Court Knowledge	.52	.44	.24	-1.61	1.21	.18
Party Identification	**-.91**	**.41**	**.03**	.75	1.14	.51
Age	-1.08	.71	.13	.39	2.21	.86
Female	**.65**	**.25**	**.01**	-.94	.63	.13
Black	.55	.36	.12	1.07	.85	.21
Hispanic	.22	.37	.55	.98	.80	.22
Education	.30	.39	.45	2.57	1.35	.06
Own Home	-.33	.26	.22	**-1.37**	**.70**	**.05**
Religious Attendance	**-1.15**	**.41**	**.01**	1.67	1.06	.11
Cutpoint 1	-1.12	.82	.17	-1.11	1.25	.37
Cutpoint 2	1.55	.83	.06	1.05	1.24	.40
BIC	686.98			196.36		
N	418			139		

Table B3: The Effect of Ideological Proximity on Diffuse Support, by Reported Self-Validation.

	(1) Bartels & Johnston Original			(2) Bartels & Johnston Variant			(3) Christenson & Glick Original		
	b	s.e.	p-value	b	s.e.	p-value	b	s.e.	p-value
Reported Self-Validity	.09	.01	<.01	.09	.01	<.01	.10	.02	<.01
Ideological Proximity	.22	.06	<.01	.26	.09	<.01	.24	.08	<.01
Reported Self-Validation X Proximity	-.09	.02	<.01	-.14	.03	<.01	-.12	.03	<.01
Intercept	.33	.03	<.01	.34	.03	<.01	.33	.04	<.01
R^2	.06			.08			.07		
Adjusted R^2	.06			.08			.07		
N	657			659			640		

	(4) Gibson & Nelson Original			(5) Gibson & Nelson Variant			(6) Difference Score		
	b	s.e.	p-value	b	s.e.	p-value	b	s.e.	p-value
Reported Self-Validity	.17	.05	<.01	.19	.04	<.01	.09	.01	<.01
Ideological Proximity	.31	.23	.19	.42	.20	.04	.04	.06	.56
Reported Self-Validation x Proximity	-.12	.08	.15	-.19	.07	.01	-.07	.02	<.01
Intercept	.11	.13	.41	.06	.11	.55	.37	.03	<.01
R^2	.09			.11			.07		
Adjusted R^2	.08			.10			.07		
N	325			325			1,482		

Note: The models are linear regressions. The dependent variable is diffuse support. All independent variables range from 0 to 1 (see Table A2, Supplementary Appendices, for the summary statistics). Coefficients in bold indicate p < .05.