**Supplementary Material for the paper**

***The role and capacities of large-scale actor coalitions in shaping sustainability transformations***

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# Methodology

This section describes in detail the methodological steps undertaken in this study - Phases A and B (see manuscript Figure 1).

## Phase A

The project started as an exploratory research inquiry, aiming to understand the role of an increasing number of coalitions that aspire and promise to transform the way their members and industries impact sustainability. The first phase of our research design consisted of a mapping activity of 8 coalitions (from the food, finance, fashion and ocean and multi-sector partnerships) and took place in Spring-Summer 2020 (see manuscript, Table 1). These eight LSACs share some similarities in regards to their control over monetary and natural resources (Avelino, 2017), associations with actors who can influence processes due to their connections (Moore et al., 2014), engagement with both social and environmental SDGs, as well as similar temporal and spatial scales of operation.

Data for each of these coalitions was collected through their websites during the months April 2020 - June 2020. The data was collected in the form of secondary textual data and was mapped onto a matrix consisting of some categories such as ‘Mission’ (*What does the coalition aspire to do?*), ‘Actor diversity’ (*How diverse is the group of actors?*) and ‘Challenge’ (*What type of challenges does the coalition address?*). We followed an abductive approach (Dubois & Gadde, 2002), meaning that the framework was developing during, and according to, the data analysis process. We used thematic analysis, defined by Braun and Clarke (Braun & Clarke, 2006) as a method for ‘*identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data*’. After an initial round of thematic coding, emergent themes were captured and the matrix was expanded via reviewing relevant literature and existing mapping projects on Transformations (Seeds of Good Anthropocene), Management studies / Corporate Responsibility with a focus on coalitions (Grayson & Nelson, 2020; The Cranfield Taxonomy), as well as discussing the empirical observations during weekly meetings with our research team. The initial matrix and coding were used to develop an extended analytical framework which included approximately 50 questions (see Table S2) and a thematic map (Figure S1). The themes were grouped into broader categories and overarching codes, based on similarities among the variables.

The findings of Phase A (extended framework and thematic map) were presented at two consultation sessions in June 2020 with 5 researchers from the *Stockholm Resilience Centre* and the *Global Economic Dynamics and Biosphere* research programme with experience ranging from sustainability science, science-private sector collaborations, economics, social innovations and transformations. The received feedback was used to further develop the extended analytical framework.

## Phase B

For the second phase of the project (Phase B) we decided to focus on coalitions from the food and finance sectors due to their critical position in impacting sustainability, so the sample was reduced to 5 LSACs. The website information for each of the five LSACs was coded thematically, applying the extended framework as a coding structure (Table S2). We used the web collector tool from the MAXQDA software to ‘capture’ all website information present in the partnership´s websites during the months October 2020 - May 2021. After this round of coding, we classified the questions of the extended framework according to how they could be answered (open answers, numerical, binary, ordinal and non-ordinal categorical answers). We then selected a subset that could be answered categorically or numerically (see Table 2 of the manuscript and Table S3 for more information on how each variable is defined, see Table S4 for final scores). Based on this selection of 20 variables, five themes were inductively developed to categorize the variables into groupings that share characteristics (e.g. all the variables that referred to linkages with external actors were grouped under the theme “networking”). For variables that could be answered categorically, we used established frameworks to categorize our data. This categorization process allowed us to operationalize the framework for rapid assessment. The rapid assessment (Table 2, see manuscript) was then performed using secondary and publicly available data from the partnerships´ websites.

## Datasets

We normalized the rapid assessment subset (Table S4) on a scale from 0 to 1 in order to enable comparison of categorical, numerical and binary variables on a common scale (hereafter, ‘normalized dataset’), with higher values indicating larger transformative capacity for that particular variable. An exception to this interpretation are for categorical nominal answers (e.g. regulation type, economic growth), where there is no direct association between the score and its alignment with transformations. However, for these questions the normalization is still useful for visual comparison across answers.

We also derived another dataset from the normalized dataset, hereafter called 'deviation-adjusted' dataset. To do so, we converted the normalized data scores into scores that are 'standardized' against the mean value of each meta-category. This means that for each variable, we estimated the mean score of the 5 data points (from the five partnerships). Finally, a ‘deviation-adjusted’ dataset was created, by subtracting the 5-coalition mean score from the score/data point of each coalition. This adjustment allows for a better comparison of where coalitions fall relatively to other coalitions within our sample. Preliminary results of Phase B were presented to a second consultation meeting, hosted by the *Stockholm Resilience Centre´s* ‘Anthropocene Dynamics’ research theme in January 2021 with approx. 15 participants.

## LSAC inclusion criteria – Table S1

**Table S1**. Preliminary criteria for inclusion of relevant coalitions.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Unit of analysis** | **Dimension** | **Criterion** | **Description** | **Motivation** | **Limitations** |
| LSAC | Collaborative | At least two LSAs | A minimum of two LSAs need to be present for an initiative to be considered a collaborative effort. | We exclude single LSA and non-LSA actor (e.g. a company collaborates with a local NGO to improve agriculture) initiatives. | Need for clear criteria of what constitutes an LSA. |
|  |  |  | For an actor to be considered an LSA, they need to have the following characteristics: monetary, political, natural, global scale |  |  |
| LSA | Monetary | Financially established | assets under management – funds, cash, financial stock | Members that hold a large market share in their sector are considered ‘powerful’ due to their ability to influence the existing system dynamics (Avelino 2017). | Financial information may not always be publicly available |
| LSA | Political | Political influence | Actors can access political spheres | Political connections allow powerful actors access to regime-level institutions, enabling them to influence the system at scale (Moore et al. 2014). | Lobbying and other political activities may not be publicly disclosed. |
| LSA | Natural | Natural capital | Raw materials, physical space, organic life | Actors have direct and/or indirect influence of resource flows of natural capital, their operations have impacts on the “real” economy. | Difficult to define “real” impact on the economy. |
| LSA and LSAC | Scale (spatial) | Global scale | Activities and operations of LSAs are beyond one nation state.  LSAC´s activities, impact and mission is beyond a specific location | Anthropocene challenges are global and actors who can influence social-ecological systems in different regions can enable or hinder large-scale transformations. |  |
| LSAC | Scale (temporal) | Initiation year | Since 2000 | Need to see a demonstration of commitment by actors to work together beyond a singular call/campaign action and mobilization | Coalitions may take a longer time to become active or take collective action. |
| LSAC | Issue-based | Ecological or Social-ecological | Engagement with both social and environmental SDGs. | They respond to a sustainability challenge and use words that indicate | No clear limitation. Stipulation of SDG may be a narrow definition of the issue a coalition is working towards. |
| LSAC | Impact at large | Sectoral impact aspirations | The aspiration of the LSAC is to have impact that is beyond their sector. | Impact at large |  |

**1.5. Methodological and analytical limitations**

Our research design is bound to some limitations. First, since we only use data from the coalition´s websites, the data availability (in terms of quantity and/or quality of information) differs among partnerships for several reasons e.g. due to a later initiation date, or they might not put much emphasis on communicating their work via their website. As a result, partnerships might score low because of less publishing on their website, not because they do not consider some of the framework´s variables. Some other challenges relate to the design of the analytical framework. For example, there were some epistemological challenges of bringing together different theoretical frameworks, conceptualizations and bodies of work, and of organizing them in ordinal categories. Moreover, it is a challenge to balance the inclusion of all relevant features while designing an operational (condensed) framework which is also comprehensive. Another limitation relates to the level of analysis. Since coalitions consist of LSAs, and LSAs consist of several departments/individuals, when we examine the coalition level, we treat each coalition as homogenous, whereas in reality there is diversity within the chosen focal point.

## 1.6. Set-up, action and capacities

A diagram of a process

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**Figure S1.** “Set-up” refers to the Rapid Assessment Framework (“*What are the key features of the LSAC*?”), “Action” refers to the tactics LSACs undertake to reach their stated objectives (“*How is change realized/enacted in the system*?”), “Capacities” refer to the knowledge, skills, attitudes and resources necessary to realize transformative change (IPBES 2024) (“*What enables impact strategies*?”).

Figure S1 illustrates how we conceptualize the links between the set-up actions and capacities. The set-up of a coalition is statically captured by the operationalization of the Rapid Assessment Framework. A certain set-up enables certain actions. A set-up does not directly imply that specific actions will take place. Capacities emerge from the interplay between set-up and actions, and are context- and phase specific. .

For example, networking with public actors (a feature of the set-up of a LSAC), enables engagement in high level processes (action), which indicates that a gathering momentum/orchestrating capacity can potentially be enacted. If this action is undertaken (engagement in high level processes), then it can reinforce the capacity of gathering momentum/orchestrating. This capacity can thus be nurtured through the set-up and action interaction.

# Appendix

## A.1. Table S2. Extended analytical framework, developed in collaboration with Nadja Naijar and Stephen Mejia

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Level** | **Question** | **Code** | **Theme** | **Variable categorization** |
| L1 | 1.              **What are the actions of the coalition?** | Current projects | Actions | String |
| Usually found under “What do we do” - might include specific projects |
| o   Do they have a single or multiple focus as far as their actions are concerned? |
| 2.                   **Who are the key actors involved in the coalition?** (Seeds of Good Anthropocene, 2020) | Type of actor | Actor characteristics | String |
|  |
| o   E.g. for-profit private businesses, non-for-profit businesses, religious groups, multi-national corporations, international organizations (e.g. UN), grassroots organizations, NGOs, national governments, municipal/local governments etc (Cranfield Taxonomy, 2014) |
|  |
| 3.                   **How many actors are involved in the suggested coalition?** (Seeds of Good Anthropocene, 2020) | Number of actors | Actor characteristics | Numerical (# actors) |
| o   Provide a number, if available |
| 4.              **How diverse are these actors?** | Diversity of actors | Actor characteristics | Numerical (# of actor categories) |
| o   Is it a homogeneous or heterogeneous group? |
| 5.              **Which actor initiated the coalition?** | Initiator of coalition | Actor characteristic | String |
| 6.              **Does the coalition disclose financial information? (transparency)** (anoher question that can be added in the framework regards leverage i.e. info on AUM, market share) | Monetary power (actor) |  | 0 = they do not disclose 1 = they disclose (AUM) |
| Actor characteristics  \*Selection criteria |
| 7.              **Are the coalition´s agreements voluntary or binding?** If binding, in what ways? | Commitment (actors) | Actor characteristics | 1 = binding 0= voluntary or NA |
|  |
| 8.              **What is the agenda of this initiative? What are the objectives/goals/mission of the coalition?** (Cranfield Taxonomy, 2020) | Objective/goals | Change process | String |  |
| o   What does the coalition aspire to do? |  |
| 9.                   **What type of challenges does the coalition address in terms of global sustainable development?** (Seeds of Good Anthropocene, 2020) | Type of challenge | Challenge | String |  |
| o   e.g. challenges related to climate change, global social injustices, biodiversity loss, migration, water, food, etc | \*Selection criteria |  |
| o   Relate to SDGS |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| 10.           **What is the coalitions´ funding model?** Is there a funder(s) that supports the coalition?  (Grayson and Nelson, 2013) | Funding model (coalition) | Funding | String |  |
| 11.           **What type of knowledge does the coalition have?** | Type of knowledge (coalition) | Learning | String |  |
|  |  |
| ·       E.g. Ecological knowledge |  |
| ·       Look for “regenerative” keyword |  |
|  |  |
| 12.           **Who are knowledge partners of the coalition?** | Knowledge partners (coalition) | Learning | String |  |
| 13.           **What kind of knowledge does each actor bring?** (identify knowledge that comes into the project) | Types of knowledge (actors) | Learning | String |  |
|  |
| 14.           **Who are knowledge partners of the actors?** | Knowledge partners (actors) | Learning | String |  |
|  |
| 15.           **What is the motivation of the initiator?** | Initiator motivation | Motivation | String |  |
| 16.           **What brings this coalition together?** (Grayson and Nelson 2013) | Reasons for cooperation (coalition) | Motivation | String |  |
|  |  |
| E.g. “Fashion pact” coalition **share the same challenge** ( the companies are actually competitors) VS the “Global alliance for the future of food” philanthropic organization coalition´s members **share values** VS the “SOS - investing in Ocean futures” members that **share an interest** in the ocean and its resources. |  |
| 17.           **Why now? What are the reasons behind their recent mobilization?** (Grayson and Nelson, 2013) | Reasons for mobilization | Motivation | String |  |
| 18.           **Does the coalition publically report on their progress?** | Progress reporting | Monitoring | 1= Yes 0= No or NA |  |
| o   Check for annual reports, progress/impact reports |  |
| 19.           **Who is monitoring the progress of the coalition?** (third party, coalition member, coalition leaders?) | Progress Monitoring | Monitoring | String |  |
| 20.           **What is the current development of the coalition, when did it start (year)?** | Scale (temporal) | Scale | numerical |  |
| ·       Aim to understand how well-established the coalition is, find starting year | \*Selection criteria |  |
|  |  |  |
| 21.           **Is the coalition acting on the local or international level?** | Scale (geographical) | Scale | 2 = cross-level (all levels)  1 = international / supranational 0 = Local |  |
| o   Geographic spread – generic, regional, global? | \*Selection criteria |  |
| o   Mainly acting in Global North or Global South? |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| 22.           **Who is included in the coalitions board?** (Grayson and Nelson, 2013) | Coalition board | Organization characteristics | String |  |
| 23.           **In which country are the headquarters?** | Headquarter location | Organization characteristics | String |  |
| **24.   What are membership standards? (effort beyond what government regulations require)** | Membership standards | Organization characteristics | Categorical  2= strong  1= lenient 0 = no requirements |  |
|  |  |
| o   Strong or lenient membership (Prakash & Potoski, 2007) |  |
| **25.   Which sector do the members of the coalition belong to?** Single industry, single issue – industry and issue specific coalition (Grayson and Nelson, 2013) | Sector | Organization characteristics | String |  |
|  |
| **26.   Who are the coalitions partnering with?** | Coalition partners | Organization characteristics | String |  |
| **Where are they situated geographically?** |  |
| **27.   Are there any good popular or scientific articles on this coalition?** (Seeds of Good Anthropocene, 2020) | Publications |  | NA |  |
| ·       Search the coalition name in Google scholar / scopus |  |
| ·       If yes, provide the link/save the document |  |
|  |  |
| L2 | **28.   What is viewed as a successfully implemented project by the coalition?** | Successful projects | Actions | String |  |
| **29.   What type of solutions does the coalition propose?** | Type of solution | Change process | Categorical  1 = bricolage 0 = one size fits all |  |
| o   bricolage solutions VS single variable solutions (one-size fits all solutions) (Olsson, Moore, Westley, & McCarthy, 2017) |  |
| **30.   How has the coalition developed? Has it changed throughout the years?** | Change through time | Change process | String |  |
| o   Understand the history of the coalition, the dynamic nature of initiative |  |
| o   Include interactions, changes, evolution |  |
| **31. What sort of change is envisaged? What is their theory of change?** | Theory of change | Change process | Categorical  0 = incremental change 1 = reformist change 2 = transformational |  |
|  |  |
| Is the objective of the coalition transformative or adaptive? Incremental vs radical change |  |
| incremental change (adjustments to maintain BAU), reformist change (changing features that cause problems but not systemic structures), transformational (changing system dynamics, world views, socio-ecological interactions) (Heikkinen, Ylä-Anttila, & Juhola, 2019) |  |
|  |  |
| **32.   How does the coalition envision the role of legislation to promote transformation?** | Role of legislation change | Change process | Categorical  2= laissez-faire 1 = little regulation 0=strong regulation |  |
| **Is self-regulation the dominant theme?** |  |
| If not, what changes in legislation, trade agreements, and business regulations are envisioned? Does the coalition welcome such changes, i.e. will not resist them?   Or does the coalition believe that voluntary agreements including business codes are better strategies? (see Q50) |  |
| **33.   What is attempted to be transformed?** | Transformation of what | Change process | String |  |
| o   Natural capital, ecosystem service, authority and power, roles and routines, resource flows, norms/beliefs/values/mindsets (Moore et al. 2014) |  |
| **34.   What legislation and regulation are they working towards? What kinds of regulations or policy do they want to enable or constrain?** | Change in legislation | Change process |  |  |
| **35.   What role does economic growth play for the coalition to achieve a transformation?** | Role of Economic growth | Change process | categorical  0 = pro-growth (incl. green growth) 1 = a-growth  2 = degrowth |  |
| o   pro-growth, a-growth, green growth, degrowth strategies (Van Den Bergh & Kallis, 2012) |  |
|  |  |
| **36.   What is the dominant scaling strategy of the coalition?** | Scaling strategy | Change process | 0 = scale up 1 = scale out 2 = scale deep  3 = cross-cutting |  |
|  |  |
| o   Scaling deep, out and up (Moore, Riddell, & Vocisano, 2015; Olsson et al., 2017; Westley et al., 2013) |  |
| **37.   What is the innovative aspect of the coalition? Is the problem they are addressing (or with their approach) to the problem unique?** (Seeds of Good Anthropocene, 2020) | Innovation (coalition) | Challenge | String |  |
| **38.   Does the coalition address challenges from a social, environmental or integrated approach?** (Seeds of Good Anthropocene, 2020) | Socio-ecological challenge | Challenge | String |  |
| o   Triple bottom line thinking and trade-offs between ecological, social and economic VS economic and social elements nested in ecosystem (Olsson et al. 2017) |  |
|  |  |
| **39.   How does the coalition define and conceptualize sustainability?** | Definition sustainability | Sustainability | Categorical  0 = do not define 1 = weak sustainability 2 = strong sustainability |  |
| o   strong or weak sustainability, substitutability of natural capital, Brundtland etc. |  |
| **40.   Does the coalition aknowledge complexity and/or interconnectedness? How does the coalition conceptualize, “complexity”?** (Blue Marble Evaluation, 2020) | Definitions complexity | Sustainability | Categorical/binary  1 = yes, 0 = no |  |
| **41.   Which (scientific) frameworks and concepts are (mainly) used to describe and conceptualize sustainability** | Scientific framework for sustainability | Sustainability | String |  |
|  |  |
| o   e.g. planetary boundaries, ecosystem services, green growth, nature-based solutions, resilience, nature’s rights, ecological modernization, regime shifts/tipping points |  |
| o   Looking for scientific references/referencing a scientific framework |  |
| **42.   How are they conceptualizing ecological sustainability?** | Resilience Ecological Sustainability | Sustainability | String |  |
| o   Dynamic vs static/linear view of ecosystems (Blue Marble Evaluation, 2020) |  |
| **43.   How does the coalition talk about inequality and equity?** | Definition equity | Sustainability | categorical  distributional  procedural  recognitional |  |
|  |  |
| o   Equity of what |  |
| o   Equity between whom |  |
|  |  |
| o   Equitable recognition, rights and access expressed as inputs (to economic conditions, physical conditions, such as water, sanitation, energy, infrastructure and land, and processes such as education and justice) |  |
| o   Procedural aspects of equitable participation and opportunity (across gender, in law and policy, and the international trading system) |  |
| o   As distributional outcomes expressed as fair sharing of benefits (of use of genetic resources, and in wages or pay) |  |
|  |  |
| (Leach et al., 2018) |  |
| **44.   Does the coalition acknowledge there are biophysical limits to our global economy?** | Biophysical limits | Sustainability | 1 = Yes 0 = No, or NA |  |
|  |  |
| o   Accepting doughnut economy (Raworth, 2017) or the Planetary Boundaries (which inspired Raworth) – PB as an indicator of recognizing biophysical limits |  |
|  |  |
| **45.   How is scientific language used? (Is it used as legitimator for coalitions actions?)** | Scientific language | Sustainability | String |  |
|  | \*selection criteria? |  |
| o   business associations use technocratic rationality to legitimate their policy input and to avoid environmental accountability (Eden, 1999) |  |  |
| **46.   How are the sanctioning mechanisms designed and (en)forced?** | Sanctioning mechanisms | Monitoring | # mechanisms (out of 3) 0 = NA 1 = weak sword (only audits) 2 = medium sword (audits and disclosure) 3 = strong sword (audits, disclosure, sanctioning mechanisms) |  |
|  |  |
| Sanctioning mechanisms (Prakash & Potoski, 2007) |  |
| o   weak sword |  |
| o   medium sword |  |
| o   strong sword |  |
| **47.   What are the decision-making structures and processes of the coalition?** | Decision-making structure | Organization characteristics | String |  |
|  |
| **48.   Does the coalition partner with governments and if yes, at which scale (local, national, international or cross-scale)?** | Government partners | Networking | 0 = No, or NA (# out of 3) # Local  # national # international / supranational |  |
|  | **49. In how many phases are mechanisms in place to strengthen the link between sector monitoring and better and more structured learning in the sector?** (close the monitoring–learning loop) (Da Silva Wells, Van Lieshout, & Uytewaal, 2013)  Social learning through monitoring, evaluation and benchmarking against sustainability vision in diverse formal and informal reflexivity formats | Learning mechanisms | Learning and Self-reflexiveness | tools for monitoring, assessment, evaluation  1= planning,  2 = implementation,  3 = monitoring  4= cross-cutting |  |
| Indicators (Brodnik & Brown, 2018; Wolfram, 2016) |  |
|  |  |
| • Availability of tools and processes that allow monitoring and assessment of old and new practices |  |
|  | **50. Which type of (co)regulation is reflected in the coalition?" (focused on actors and tools used)** | Regulation type | Change process / Actors | 0= firm self-regulation 1 = industry self-regulation  2 = private co-regulation  3 = public co-regulation  4 = tripartite co-regulation  5 = government soft regulation  6 = government hard regulation |  |
|  | **51. Is civil society involved in the coalition´s projects?** | Civil society | Networking | yes = 1  no= 0 |  |
|  | **52. How does the coalition conceptualize "uncertainty"?** (Pahl-Wostl, 2009) | Uncertainty | Uncertainty |  |  |

A mind map with colorful lines

Description automatically generated

A.2. Figure S1. Thematic map showing themes and subthemes of features included in the extended framework (Table S2). Figure designed by Nadja Naijar.

A.3. Table S3. Analytical framework categories and definitions. For binary data (yes/no questions), “yes” is annotated with 1 and “no” with 0. The scale is from 0 to max number, where 0 means the greatest distance from the transformations definition employed in this paper (by Moore and Milkoreit 2020) and max number means the closest proximity to the definition, as explained in the “motivation” column.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Code** | **Framework - reference** | **Motivation** | **Ordinal scale** | **Variable** | **Short definition** | **Long definition** |
| **Scaling strategy** | Lam et al., 2020; Moore et al., 2015 | Scaling strategies that are cross-cutting are most effective in achieving fundamental systems changes | 0 | scale up | To impact “higher levels of institutions through policy change” | ***“To impact “higher levels of institutions through policy change”*** *(Moore et al. 2015, p. 79) by codifying innovative approaches into law, policy and institutions. Scaling up consists of one cross-scale strategy with two approaches: “Policy or legal change efforts. New policy development, partnering, advocacy” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 77). 1. Shifting “work to higher levels in government in order to address root causes in larger-scale institutions” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 79) that affect an entire population. This often entails “leaving behind the initial innovative initiative, and starting an entirely new initiative focused on policy change” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 79). 2. Linking “together community-level policy interventions into a more coherent movement” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 79).”* |
|  |  |  | 1 | scale out | To impact greater numbers of people or communities. | **“*To impact greater numbers of people or communities****. Scaling out consists of two strategies: 1. “Deliberate replication. Replicating or spreading programmes geographically and to greater numbers while protecting the fidelity and integrity of the innovation” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 77). 2. “Spreading principles. Disseminate principles, but with an adaptation to new contexts via co-generation of knowledge, leveraging social media and learning platforms: ‘open scaling’” (Moore et al. 2015, p.77). Open scaling means spreading “the core principles and approach of the innovation […], leaving it to the local community to adapt it to local conditions” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 78).”* |
|  |  |  | 2 | scale deep | To impact cultural roots. | ***“To impact cultural roots.*** *This is based “on the recognition that culture plays a powerful role in shifting problem-domains, and change must be deeply rooted in people, relationships, communities and cultures” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 77). Scaling deep consists of two strategies: 1. “Spreading big cultural ideas and reframing stories to change beliefs and norms. Intensively share knowledge and new practices via learning communities, distributed learning platforms and participatory approaches” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 77). 2. “Invest in transformative learning, networks and communities of practice” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 77). Learning is “a specific strategy used to build shared mindsets across a range of sectors and organizations, to ensure the impact of […] initiative is scaled deep into the defining routines and practices and beliefs of partners and collaborators. […] [L]earning processes […] can be supported by a range of methods, including: mentorship, deliberate transfer of practices, capturing and sharing organizational or community culture, and shared reflection and evaluation practices” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 80).”* |
|  |  |  | 3 | cross-cutting | Broaden the problem frame: To adopt “a systems-change perspective” is critical to build “consciousness and intention to change” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 76) | “*Broaden the problem frame: To adopt “a systems-change perspective” is critical to build “consciousness and intention to change” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 76). This strategy reveals systemic or root causes of problems, leads organizations to re-conceptualize their goals, and enables “organizational leaders to consider different types of scales (e.g. organizational scales, temporal scales, political scales), and to understand the complex interrelated layers of variables and phases of change” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 76). Seek alternative resources: To find “new funding, or entirely new funding models” because it is “a necessary precursor to scaling” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 76). Build networks and partnerships: To network across sectors is specifically “valuable for focused collaboration, resource-pooling, extending the organization’s sphere of influence, and developing unusual alliances.” (Moore et al. 2015, p. 75). Networks are also important to generate coherence (Moore et al. 2015).”* |
| **Role of Economic growth** | van de Berg and Kallis 2012 | Degrowth is explicitly aligned with economic downscaling and fundamental changes in system dynamics. | 0 | pro-growth | GDP growth is necessary for welfare and employment, decoupling, | includes green-growth and multi-level governance |
|  |  |  | 1 | a-growth | "proposes to ignore GDP information and focus instead on sound environmental,  social, and economic policies independently of their effects on economic growth" | *"“a-growth”, a perspective which proposes to ignore or even “abolish” GDP as a welfare and progress indicator, and focusing, in this way, on sound environmental, social, and economic policies independently of their effects on economic growth (van den Bergh 2011). "* |
|  |  |  | 2 | degrowth | "recommends a downscaling of the economy so as to make it consistent with biophysical boundaries. " | "*Degrowth is the intentional limiting and downscaling of the economy to make it consistent with biophysical boundaries (Kallis 2011)."* |
| **Theory of change** | Heikkinen et al. 2019**,** they focus on cities and look at three components: economy, physical infrastructure, and socio-political structures | Transformational changes are aligned with fundamental changes in system mechanisms. | 0 | incremental change | adjustments to maintain BAU | *Incremental change: In terms of incremental change, the target is to make adjustments to maintain business as usual (Howden, Crimp, & Nelson, 2010; cf. ‘resistance’ in Pelling et al., 2015). In the context of economy, this can mean that companies earn the right to continue emitting by paying compensations. When it comes to physical structures, incremental changes can be an increase in carbon sinks or the construction of flood defence structures. With regards to socio-political structures, incremental change refers e.g. to awareness-raising concerning climate change risks. Incremental changes do not change entire systems, e.g. the water treatment system or economic structures.* |
|  |  |  | 1 | reformist change | changing features that cause problems but not systemic structures | *Reformistic change: Reformistic change means changing features that cause the problems, but without fundamentally changing the systemic structures (Basset & Fogelman, 2013; Pelling, 2011, cf. ‘incremental adjustment’ in Pelling et al., 2015). For example, if the combustion fuel to produce energy is changed or the capacity of a water system is increased, the fundamental structures and functions of the system remain the same. Reformistic economic change refers to actions through which the environmental performance of companies may change, but their economic function and market fundamentally remains the same, e.g. a city supporting clean tech. A city actively offering demand management tools to adapt or mitigate climate change and intending to change the behaviour of its citizens can also be categorised as reformistic change in terms of socio-political structures. This can be e.g. changing tariffs to encourage behaviour that saves water.* |
|  |  |  | 2 | transformational | changing system dynamics, world views, socio-ecological interactions | *Transformational change: In transformations, the patterns, elements and interrelations of the city system change more comprehensively. Transformation has many definitions, but it is broadly considered to be a fundamental change that is distinguished from minor and marginal adjustments (Basset & Fogelman, 2013; Kapoor, 2007; O’Brien, 2012; Pelling et al., 2015). Transformation is not something that happens through an individual action. However, it may happen through the accumulation of actions (Pelling, 2011; Pelling et al., 2015; Rotmans, Kemp, & van Asselt, 2001). These processes of structural change are not limited to technical aspects, but also require the involvement of social and symbolic changes. This means fundamental alterations in e.g. sense-making, world views, political and power relations, social networks and ecosystems, physical infrastructure and technology (Feola, 2015). Transformational change would mean changes in the rules of business-making. It would also involve rethinking the way physical structures work and a city is planned, and even rethinking the division between urban and nature and the definition of a city. In addition, this*  *type of change would mean fundamental changes e.g. in citizen lifestyles or in city governance.* |
| **Membership standards** | Prakash and Potoski 2007 | Generally, stringent memberships indicate high member commitment and can reduce the risk of greenwashing. | 0 | lenient | Lenient club standards require little effort beyond what government regulations require. | *Lenient club standards require little social externality production from members beyond what government regulations require. These are low-cost voluntary clubs for the members but create marginal levels of social externalities, and therefore the value of their brand among stakeholders is relatively low. Of course, even lenient club standards must mandate that members produce some positive social externality, or else the voluntary club would be a mere empty gesture (as some voluntary clubs indeed are). [...] In some instances, policymakers might favor lenient standard clubs to attract a large roster as opposed to stringent standard clubs with limited membership. In other instances, lenient standard clubs might be labeled as greenwashes and attract few members simply because they cannot generate significant branding benefits.* |
|  |  |  | 1 | stringent | Stringent club standards require members to produce high levels of positive social externalities, well beyond what government regulations require. | *Stringent club standards require members to produce high levels of positive social externalities, well beyond what government regulations require. For potential participants, these can be high-cost clubs. The advantage of stringent standards is that the club’s brand would be more credible and serve as a low-cost tool for signaling voluntary club members’ commitment to the club’s social objective.* |
| **Sanctioning mechanisms (Enforcement and Monitoring)** | Prakash and Potoski 2007, based on E. Ostrom´s work | Generally, audits, disclosures, and sanctioning increase monitoring and reduce greenwashing risks. | 0 | no mechanisms |  | *It should be noted, however, that some voluntary environmental clubs have none of these components—the Sustainable Slopes Program (Rivera & de Leon, 2004) is an example. Based on the design features, we expect such clubs to exhibit high levels of shirking and therefore generate very small amounts of positive externalities, if any. Indeed, Rivera and de Leon (2004) report that club Sustainable Slopes’ participants were no greener than nonparticipants.* |
|  |  |  | 1 | weak sword | Weak sword clubs require **only third-party audits**. | *Weak sword clubs require only third-party audits. ISO 14001 is an example of a “weak sword” club.* |
|  |  |  | 2 | medium sword | Medium sword clubs require **third-party audits and public disclosure** of the audit findings. (it is not clear whether stakeholders have the willingness and resources to sanction shirkers/free-riders) | *Medium sword clubs require third-party audits and public disclosure of the audit findings. Although they do not provide for sanctioning by the sponsoring organization, they are likely to curb shirking because with public disclosure of audit information, external stakeholders can punish the shirkers for failing to live up to their commitments as program members. The EPA’s 33/50 program and the European Union’s EMAS are examples of medium sword clubs. In both these voluntary clubs, firms are subjected to third-party audits and the information on their environmental performance is available to the public. Because it is not clear whether stakeholders have the willingness and resources to sanction shirkers, we place them in the medium sword category.* |
|  |  |  | 3 | strong sword | Strong sword clubs have all three components—**audits, disclosure, and sanctioning** mechanisms (sponsors may expel participants from the program). | *Strong sword clubs have all three components—audits, disclosure, and*  *sanctioning mechanisms—and are most likely to curb shirking because they provide for a monitoring mechanism, mitigate information asymmetries between participants and club sponsors/stakeholders, and create a mechanism for sponsors to sanction shirkers. In extreme cases, sponsors may expel participants from the program, an undesirable outcome for firms if they value the benefits of voluntary club membership.* |
| **Type of solution** | Olsson et al, 2017 | Bricolage solutions can enable innovations that are necessary for major system changes. | 0 | single variable solutions | ideas and initiatives that are too narrow in scope | *Single variable interventions, even if an original idea, cannot begin to address root causes, and may even accelerate the dynamics described in the Anthropocene concept. Yet, the typical focus on individual inventors and “hero” entrepreneurs in social innovation has led to a fixation on ideas and initiatives far too narrow in scope. Thus, the vast majority of the ideas that are currently documented in social innovation literature could be characterized as “single variable solutions.” [an example of a single variable solution given in the paper is biofuels]* |
|  |  |  | 1 | bricolage solutions | an approach that brings together very different ideas, concepts, philosophies to form something novel | *Instead, social innovations typically involve the recombination of pre-existing and new ideas, concepts or technologies to form something novel (Murray et al. 2010). This act of recombination has been termed bricolage, drawn from the junk collectors in France and defined as making creative and resourceful use of whatever materials are at hand, regardless of their original purpose (Westley 2013)" [...]* ***Bricolage is an approach that brings together very different ideas, concepts, philosophies and when paired with the notion of path dependence can enable innovators to break from existing system pathways that may reinforce the Anthropocene. Initiatives that do not embody this kind of critical reflection on the path dependence are not likely to be truly transformative.*** |
| **Regulation type** | Steurer 2013, governance triangle from Abbott and Snidal 2009  (range from *laissez-faire* to strong government regulation) | We make the assumption that 1) the more actors are engaged in regulation, the more diverse and engaged actor groups, increasing the capacity for systems change and 2) a strong government regulation creates a level playing field for corporate actors in adopting practices aligned with sustainability objectives. | 0 | firm self regulation | Firm self-regulation refers to a firm's commitment to control its own conduct beyond what is required by the law (Christmann and Taylor 2006) | *The self-regulation of single firms, on the other hand, encompasses various voluntary practices of triple-bottom line management, such as applying environmental management systems, developing and implementing company codes of conduct or more comprehensive CSR strategies, reporting on CSR (Post et al. 2002; Halme and Laurila 2008).* |
|  |  |  | 1 | industry self regulation | Industry self-regulation means that a group of major companies or a trade association establishes agreements, standards, codes of conduct or audit programmes that address all firms of a particular industry with varying degrees of formalisation and bindingness. | *Industry self-regulation means that a group of major companies or a trade association establishes agreements, standards, codes of conduct or audit programmes that address all firms of a particular industry with varying*  *degrees of formalisation and bindingness. Although more stringent (or ‘‘hard’’) types of industry self-regulation usually do not force companies to participate, they at least monitor compliance and sanction non-compliance, for example with exclusion from the initiative (Christmann and Taylor 2006; Prakash and Potoski 2007).* |
|  |  |  | 2 | private co-regulation | co-regulation by civil society and businesses | *Well-known and extensively researched (not to say iconised) instruments of private co-regulation involving civil society actors and businesses are voluntary certification schemes such as the Forest Stewardship Council (Cashore and Vertinsky 2000; Cashore 2002) and the Marine Stewardship Council (Cummins 2004).* |
|  |  |  | 3 | public co-regulation | co-regulation between governments and businesses | *Apart from partnerships and certification schemes, public co-regulation between governments and businesses also relies strongly on negotiated environmental agreements (for the numerous examples in the Netherlands, see Bressers et al. 2009).* |
|  |  |  | 4 | tripartite co-regulation | actors from all three societal domains (civil, business, governments) engage in co-regulation | *Examples for tripartite co-regulation defined by actors from all three societal domains are the Kimberley Process CS that certifies diamonds that have been produced in socially responsible ways (Wright 2004; Yaziji and Doh 2009,162–165), standards or guidelines such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which guides CSR reporting (Brown et al. 2009),13 the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) (Sandberg et al. 2009) and the ISO 26000 guideline for social responsibility (Ward 2011).* |
|  |  |  | 5 | Soft government regulation | Soft government regulation suggests (or facilitates) certain behaviours politically rather than prescribing and enforcing them legally with sanctions (Morth 2004b, 1–6). | *examples: Organisation in the form of monitoring and benchmarking capacities or as a means to lead by example, fiscal means (economic incentives) dorsing statements, benchmarking reports, brochures, guidelines, websites and media campaigns [...] In addition, soft governmental regulation can also make use of hybrid instruments such as labels (combining legal, informational and economic incentive aspects) and public voluntary programmes (often combining informational and economic incentive aspects; for more details, see Steurer 2010).* |
|  |  |  | 6 | Hard government regulation | Hard regulation means that legislatures, ministries or public agencies define rules that are binding for all (or for all members of a particular group) and that the executive and judicial branches of government (or the agencies themselves) monitor and enforce compliance. | *Hard regulation means that legislatures, ministries or public agencies define rules that are binding for all (or for all members of a particular group) and that the executive and judicial branches of government (or the agencies themselves) monitor and enforce compliance. The obvious tools of hard governmental regulation are laws, decrees or (in the EU context) directives (metaphorically also referred to as ‘‘sticks’’) and, less obvious, economic instruments (also referred to as ‘‘carrots’’) such as taxes, fees and cap-and-trade schemes (Hood 1986).* |
| **Sustainability definition** | SDG report, citing (Mancebo, 2013) | Strong sustainability is more aligned with fundamental system changes. | 0 | weak | substitution of natural capital with - more technical approach | *Weak sustainability assumes that natural capital and manufactured capital are essentially substitutable and considers that there are no essential differences between the kinds of well-being they generate (Ekins et al., 2003; Neumayer, 2003; Neumayer, 2012)* |
|  |  |  | 1 | strong | non-substitutability - more scientific approach | *Authors writing on strong sustainability demonstrate that natural capital cannot be viewed as a mere stock of resources. Rather natural capital is a set of complex systems consisting of evolving biotic and abiotic elements that interact in ways that determine the ecosystem’s capacity to provide human society directly and/or indirectly with a wide array of functions and services (Noël and O’Connor, 1998; Ekins et al., 2003; De Groot et al., 2003; Brand, 2009). The proponents of strong sustainability invoke several reasons to demonstrate the nonsubstitutability of natural capital.* |
| **Geographical scale** | Own interpretation | The more geographical scales the coalition works on, the higher the information flow and coordination between scales. | 0 | local | Only local work |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | international | Only international work |  |
|  |  |  | 2 | cross-scale | Both local and international work |  |
| **Diversity of actors** | modified from *Cranfield Taxonomy (2014)* | In general, a high diversity of actors, ways of thinking and doing is a precondition for innovation/novelty, which is especially needed in experimenting when building new systems. | # types of actors | Diversity | the range of different member actors that are part of the coalition | * *Business (incl. multi-national corporations)* * *Foundations: YES (phillanthropic Foundations)* * *Finance* * *Academic* * *Law* * *Civil Society (incl. NGO, grassroots)* * *Faith based* * *National government* * *municipal/local governments* * *Multi-national govt* * *Multi-stakeholder* * *international organizations (e.g. UN)* |
| **Direction** | Bull & Brownlie, 2017 | A net positive objective is more aligned with green and just futures. | 0 | net loss | Loss of biodiversity |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | no net loss | the loss of biodiversity values must be fully compensated by commensurate gains in those values. | *The objective is to permit development whilst retaining overall levels of biodiversity, by applying a mitigation hierarchy (e.g. avoid, minimize, restore, offset; BBOPa) in relation to negative impacts of development on nature.* |
|  |  |  | 2 | net gain | Improve the biodiversity status quo | *To achieve the more positive objective of a Net Gain, the biodiversity status quo must be improved, either by over compensating for loss in the biodiversity values affected, or by ensuring no net loss in those values and then providing additional gains in other biodiversity values.* |
| **Learning** | da Silva et al. 2013 | The greater the types of learning mechanism used, the greater the potential for fundamental changes in current system dynamics. | 0 | No learning mechanisms |  |  |
|  | # different dimensions/types of learning that are mentioned |  |  | planning phase | Make learning, reflection and innovation explicit goals of the process |  |
|  |  |  |  | implementation phase | Consideration of practical issues around the design of platform meetings and their facilitation | *Consider practical issues around the design of platform meetings and their facilitation (for instance the number and kind of participants, the agenda for the platform meeting, their timing, location and duration) (Kahangire, 2013).* |
|  |  |  |  | monitoring phase | Working groups, consisting of representatives of various state and non-state actors are part of the process | *Working groups, consisting of representatives of various state and non-state actors, are a potential mechanism to strengthen learning in the sector monitoring process* |
|  |  |  | 4 | cross-cutting | A combination of all of the above |  |
| **Government partners** | Own interpretation | The higher the institutional level, the greater the impact changes in system dynamics might have. | 0 | no public partners |  |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | local | Partnering only with local public authorities |  |
|  |  |  | 2 | national | Partnering only with national public authorities |  |
|  |  |  | 3 | international-supranational | Partnering only with international-supranational bodies | *E.g. EU* |
|  |  |  | 4 | cross-cutting | >1 types of government partners |  |
| **Equity** | Leach et al., 2018 | The greater number of equity dimensions are considered, the more aligned with fundamental changes in the current system | 0 | no reference to equity or justice |  |  |
|  | different dimensions/types of equity |  | 1 | distributional | Distributional equity refers to how resources, costs and benefits are allocated or shared amongst people and groups. | *As distributional outcomes expressed as fair sharing of benefits (of use of genetic resources, and in wages or pay)* |
|  |  |  | 2 | recognitional | Recognitional equity thus refers to acknowledgement of and respect for identity, values and associated rights. Recognitional equity especially emphasizes cultural and political domination and discrimination as forms of inequity and injustice. | *Equitable recognition, rights and access expressed as inputs (to economic conditions, physical conditions, such as water, sanitation, energy, infrastructure and land, and processes such as education and justice)* |
|  |  |  | 3 | procedural | Procedural equity draws on literatures on institutions, governance and participation to highlight how decisions are made, and the extent to which different people and groups are able to influence these or have their perspectives represented or incorporated | *Procedural aspects of equitable participation and opportunity (across gender, in law and policy, and the international trading system)* |
|  |  |  | 4 | cross-cutting | A combination of 2 or 3 of the above |  |

## A.4. Qualitative synthesis - full summaries of LSACs

This section presents information from the qualitative coding process, using each coalition as a unit of analysis.

1. **Global Investors for Sustainable Development**

The GISD alliance consists of 30 CEOs from financial institutions and other corporates, which were invited and convened by the UN in 2019. This geographically diverse but otherwise relatively homogeneous group of actors represented US$ 16 trn in 2020. GISD is set up with a 2-year action plan (2019 - 2021) and aims to shape the global investment landscape to contribute to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, more specifically to “*scale-up and speed-up our efforts to align business with the SDGs*" (GISD-joint-statement, 2019). GISD focuses on removing the barriers in SDG investing, such as the inconsistency in metrics and taxonomies, improving the regulatory framework, and transforming the investment landscape as illustrated by the following quote “*we are committed to transform the finance and investment ecosystem*” (GISD-joint-statement, 2019).

GISD envisions a future of inclusive growth, decoupled from environmental impacts within a governance paradigm characterized by “*long- term thinking and sustainability commitments into core corporate practices and investment behaviour.*” In this future, the Paris Agreement target of limiting global warming to 1.5C is met. Moreover, science-based transitions, long-term profit, opportunities created by the SDGs, stakeholder benefits, Public-Private Partnerships, and multi-stakeholder capitalism are mentioned in the material published by GISD, but potential trade-offs among these objectives are not explicitly acknowledged. Since GISD is convened by the UN, it is well-connected within the UN environment, as well as other international agencies such as the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) and World Bank (WB). As stated in GISD´s website, the alliance "*is supported by a core group of stakeholders from the UN System, including UN Global Compact, PRI, UNEP FI, UNDP, UNCDF and the Regional Economic Commissions, as well as the World Bank Group and the International Finance Corporation. These actors are coordinated by UN DESA and UNCTAD*" (Members Financing for Sustainable Development Office).

In the “Renewed, Recharged and Reinforced” (2020) report, which was written as input to the EU Commission’s *Renewed Sustainable Finance Strategy* consultation process where GISD was invited by the EU Commission to participate, GISD argues that regulatory processes are essential for allowing the sustainable finance transition to take place. GISD works toward legislation that enables such a transition (e.g. use of fiscal tools to enable sustainable finance). The following quote exemplifies the above (our emphasis):

“*To leverage available support,* ***governments must act now****. Developing a predictable regulatory framework is essential for the deployment of private capital. The threat of sudden regulatory change, lack of policy predictability and uncertain legal frameworks make regulatory risk difficult to calculate and difficult to price.* ***The more predictable and coherent the direction of relevant regulatory policy, the******easier it will be for private actors to engage in financing the transition.***” (Renewed, Recharged and Reinforced (GISD 2020)\_vF, P. 27: 3176).

GISD´s scaling strategy refers to both scaling up and out. Their primary objective is to “scale up” by affecting the investment landscape at the global level, but they also put emphasis on “scaling out” objectives e.g. they mention that joining CA100+ (which we also include in our case study) is a good amplification strategy which contributes to the coalition´s mission.

Last, it is important to highlight that GISD refers to their members CEOs as “*business giants*”, “*recognized leaders*”, “*leaders of the world’s investment and business community*”, which is an indication of the coalition´s communication strategy, as well as of how they understand themselves and their members within the system they try to change (e.g. in terms of power and responsibility to act).

1. **Climate Action 100+**

CA100+ consists of 545 institutional investor signatories (e.g. investment managers, asset owners, engagement service providers) who collectively represented USD $47 trillion in assets under management in 2020. This coalition´s aim is to put pressure on investee companies to reduce GHGs emissions. Specifically, CA100+ aims to *“improve corporate climate governance, curb greenhouse gas emissions in line with the Paris Agreement, and strengthen climate‑related financial disclosures*" (Progress report 2019). The proposed solution is engagement with the companies to pressure and support them to decarbonize, which will in turn decarbonize their members’ (investors) investment portfolios. The awareness that portfolios are facing climate change risks has been critical in the decision of the signatories to transition away from fossil-fuel investments (FAQ\_CLIMATEACTION100.ORG, P. 2: 2231). The focus of CA100+ is strongly on responding to the climate change challenge and meeting the Paris Agreement 1.5C target.

CA100+ was initiated in 2017 and has a 5-year timeline. The initiators were *“Investor representatives from AustralianSuper, California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), HSBC Global Asset Management, Ircantec and Manulife Asset Management have designed and developed the initiative*”. CA100+ is funded by grants from its partner organizations and other interested parties. CA100+ has an extended network of academic and investor partners, including the Carbon Tracker Initiative (CTI), CDP, Science Based Targets Initiative (SBTi), and PRI, to name a few. Moreover, they have five regional organization partners that are based around the world. There is no cost to join the initiative, but members are expected to invest resources into their engagement with investee companies, and as a result CA100+ is has had a rapid increase of signatories and new companies in their “decarbonization” list (167 companies in 2021).

Similarly to GISD, CA100+ also push for legislation and fast implementation of policies, exemplified in the following quote: "*Conversely, delayed implementation of climate policies or the absence of effective climate policy* ***impacts on investor confidence and risks increasing the levels of long‑term economic damage from climate change***" (Progress report 2019). However, CA100+ does not make specific references to the public sector.

The above quote also illustrates that the impacts of the climate crisis on economic operations (i.e. not only on the impact of economic operations on climate) are important, which in combination with statements such as "*maximising the opportunities presented by climate change*" indicate that CA100+ is aligned green growth objectives.

1. **Global Alliance for the Future of Food**

GA is an alliance consisting of 27 philanthropic private organizations. It convenes a relative homogenous group of actors, most of which are civic and social organizations and foundations related to food companies (e.g. Barilla, Kellogg´s) while some others are general philanthropic foundations (e.g. Rockefeller Foundation). GA was initiated in 2012, aiming to develop four objectives “*1. Develop research, 2. Facilitate dialogue, 3. Connect global and local for transformative change, focusing on four key impact areas: 1. agroecology, 2. health and well-being, 3. true cost accounting, 4. climate resilience*” [source: <https://futureoffood.org/about-us/what-we-do/>].

The challenges GA responds to are related to the food system reform, and their work aspires to contribute to the transformation of the food system, as illustrated in the following quote: "*Profound changes in the way food is grown, processed, distributed, consumed, and wasted, threatens a future of food that is sustainable, equitable, and secure, particularly when coupled with climate change and shifting global economics, politics, and demographics*" [source: <https://futureoffood.org/principles-and-the-future-of-food/>].

The coalition is acting both on the local and global scales. They state that "*we have the privilege, the responsibility, and the opportunity* ***to leverage our resources and networks to get sustainable food systems on the political, economic, and social agenda****"* (our emphasis). Several of the members also act on the local scale. Depending on the project, GA partners with other actors. For example, for the project “Resilient Seed Systems: Shared Action Framework” GA mobilized "*key stakeholders in philanthropy, farmer and civil society organizations, policy and research institutions, the private sector, donor agencies, and more*".

Although GA does not have a specific knowledge partner of the organization, they have project-specific knowledge partners. An example is that of “The Beacons of Hope” report which was co-developed with the organization BIOVISION. For another project titled "Food Systems of the Future: A Synthesis of Reports on Food Systems Transformation” GA partnered with the Meridian institute, a non-profit consultancy.

Moreover, GA has a quite developed monitoring process aiming at improving their learning process, which uses the following three approaches: Developmental Evaluation; Principles-Focused Evaluation; Blue Marble Evaluation (see <https://futureoffood.org/our-approach/monitoring-and-evaluation/> for more details).

In terms of knowledge systems, GA uses transformation knowledge (incl. Descriptions on their Theory of Change webpage) and agro-ecology know-how, as indicated by the terms used on their website and reports.

Since 2020, GA has formally adopted a theory of transformational change, which is the following: "*The Global Alliance’s strategy is aimed at stimulating local and global action and interaction for transformational change in collaboration with other committed stakeholders. To this network of allies,* ***transformation means realizing healthy, equitable, renewable, resilient, and culturally diverse food systems shared by people, communities, and their institutions****. This strategy is encapsulated in the Global Alliance’s theory of transformation: Genuine food systems transformation takes place when diverse actions, networks, and individuals intersect across sector and issue silos, the global and local, the macro and the micro. These intersections facilitate convergence around shared visions and values and, ultimately, build critical mass and momentum behind tipping points that lead to healthy, equitable, renewable, resilient, and culturally diverse food systems that dynamically endure over time*." [our emphasis, source: <https://futureoffood.org/the-global-alliance-makes-history-with-formal-adoption-of-a-theory-of-transformation/> ]

GA follows a cross-scale strategy, meaning that they adopt a systems perspective with intention to change. Innovative aspects of this coalition include their endeavours to operationalize frameworks for transformation - see [Frameworks For Transformation Report](https://futureoffood.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/GA_FrameworksForTransformationReport_30320Web.pdf), as well as their advanced developmental evaluation process.

According to GA, the food system is to be transformed, but to enable such a transformation issues of power inequities and values are to be considered. Moreover, several solutions are proposed to the challenges GA addresses, and their work stems from the understanding that the problems and the solutions are multiple, complex and interconnected.

Complexity, specifically "Dynamic and complex" is one of the 7 principles for resilient seed systems in the "Resilient seed systems shared action framework". Also, in the GA “Climate food” report it is mentioned that "*A system as vastly complex as food requires that we apply a* ***systems approach****".*

In addition to complexity, ‘equity’ is also specifically emphasized and defined in the “Principles and the Future of Food” report as "***Equitable****: Promote sustainable livelihoods and access to nutritious and just food systems for all. Our food systems must be equitable so that no one is left behind and so that those upon whom our food systems depend – especially women and smallholders – have the ability to achieve a decent livelihood and food security. This means that we must work to: eliminate poverty; ensure our food systems continue to provide jobs to the 1.6 billion smallholder farmers in need of fair employment; and ensure local communities’ control over the means of production, such as opportunities to land, to production subsidies, to capital, and to control over their own spiritual and material relationships to their lands and nature*" [source: https://futureoffood.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Principles-and-the-Future-of-Food-2020-03-10.pdf]

GA uses several frameworks such as “Framework #1 | Global Alliance Principles; Framework #2 | Blue Marble Evaluation; Framework #3 | Beacons of Hope - with Biovision; Framework #4 | TEEBAgriFood; [source: GA Frameworks For Transformation 2020, see"Resilient seed systems shared action framework"] to guide their work.

Our analysis did not identify many specific actions aiming to affect legislation. Only one project ("Seeds diversity") explicitly suggests some policies to promote seed diversity [see more: <https://futureoffood.org/report/the-future-of-food-seeds-of-resilience/synthesis-of-findings/> ].

Last, regarding the coalition´s organization, for new members to join they need to be philanthropic foundations, and contact GA to see overlap with the alliance´s mission. Each member supports the work of GA because “*The Global Alliance does not have a centralized fund and does not accept unsolicited proposals, however several of the foundations involved in the Global Alliance have spearheaded the creation of pooled funds to connect and strengthen the work of organizations with shared interests on food system reform*”. There is no information on sanctioning mechanisms.

1. **Sustainable Food Lab**

SFL consists of 20 members that are private companies (e.g. Starbucks) and other actor types (e.g. Catholic aid org, Rainforest Alliance) from the civil society as well as faith-based organizations. SFL aims to improve sustainability in the food sector, and has four main objectives “*1. Facilitating pre-competitive collaborations to address large scale challenges across regions and sectors; 2. Offering professional development through systems leadership training, immersive events and convenings; 3. Building and utilizing tools for quantifying impacts and implementing best practices; and 4. Conducting values driven consulting to develop and implement sustainability initiative*s” [source: <https://sustainablefoodlab.org/how-we-work/>].

SFL is based in Vermont, USA. It was initiated in 2004 by Hal Hamilton, the former executive director of the Sustainability Institute (founded by Donella Meadows), and current senior advisor of SFL. SFL draws upon systems thinking, systems leadership and innovation types of knowledge to address sustainability within the food sector.

Membership is open to “*companies and organizations committed to pursuing sustainability goals and shared learning. All members contribute time and money to the work of the Sustainable Food Lab*” [source: https://sustainablefoodlab.org/join-the-food-lab/ ]. Members pay fees (different rates according to revenue) and support the SFL. They also network through the SFL and receive consultation services. Consequently, SFL is different compared to the other case studies (does not fit in a narrow “coalition” definition, it resembles a consultancy since members pay to get services) and there are no (binding) agreements.

SFL´s work is both on the international and local level. An example of a project is the “Vanilla in Madagascar”, which included training at the international level as well as collaboration with the local public authorities (public authorities are mentioned as part of the engaged stakeholders) [source: https://sustainablefoodlab.org/initiatives/sustainable-vanilla-initiative/ ].

SFL is partnering with several actors, depending on the project. For example, for the project “Cool Farming Options” SFL created a tool to measure GHG at the farm level with companies, researchers and technical experts (e.g. Univeler, University of Aberdeen).

Successful projects are those that achieve learning outcomes, as well as positive impact on the large scale for both farmers and commercial actors, as expressed by SFL and exemplified by the following quote: “*For environmental outcomes, the* ***large scale*** *of many Food Lab companies enables* ***greater positive impact****. When Sysco, the largest food distributor in the US established a pesticide and materials reduction program for fruits and vegetables, more than 350,000 pounds of active ingredients in pesticides were eliminated on almost 700,000 acres during the first year. That program has continued and become quite a sophisticated* ***learning community*** *of growers practicing in sustainable agriculture. When PepsiCo used a greenhouse gas approach developed in the Food Lab, they were able to commit to a fifty percent reduction in five years for all production in Europe.* ***These results are multiplied across the spectrum of companies engaged in the Food Lab****.*” [source: Hamilton, 2013].

In regard to the solutions proposed, Hamilton acknowledges that one-size-fits-all solutions are not appropriate and trade-offs do exist. He *argues that “Looking around the larger network of sustainable agriculture programs, no one project, partnership or multi-sector initiative should be expected to deliver the full spectrum of desirable results*” [source: Hamilton, 2013].

According to the SFL´s founder Hamilton, the change SFL envisions is not revolutionary "*The Sustainable Food Lab* ***is not revolutionary.*** *Its mission is to accelerate progress, and its primary point of leverage is to build on the needs of food companies to demonstrate sustainable production of ingredients. The Food Lab creates a pre-competitive innovation space for these innovations.*" [source: Hamilton, 2013].

The Sustainable Food Lab is also working to institutionalize the conditions needed to support such activities within organizations, conditions that include formal targets and incentives to meet those targets. [source: https://sustainablefoodlab.org/the-food-lab/our-history/ ].

A quote that emphasizes the view that large-scale action has more impact compared to bottom-up approaches is stated by Hamilton (2013): "*The Sustainable Food Lab does indeed incubate* ***business-driven partnerships****. Below is a bit of history and accomplishments [...].* ***We can’t help but ask to what degree bottom-up “governance” of food supply chains is practical, under what conditions, and to what degree is this notion utopian beyond the scale and scope of local markets?***"

However, they state that public policy has ‘failed’, but also the risks of corporate-led initiatives "*One could argue that all of these projects* ***strengthen the position of global corporations and ignore the public sector’s traditional roles****. In many ways* ***the public sector has failed*** *to generate the degree of innovative and positive development that the private sector is creating, but it’s certainly true that these* ***corporate led initiatives are unconstrained by any checks and balances of democratic process****.*" [source: Hamilton, 2013].

Some other characteristics worth highlighting when describing this coalition is that learning objectives are very central in SFL´s work, and a lot of emphasis is placed on this topic. Moreover, there is a great focus on the individual level, e.g. providing support to the sustainability manager of member companies. SFL´s scaling strategy is primarily to scale-out, and multiply successful approaches. Last, complexity is mentioned as an attribute that should be embraced "*The cornerstones of our approach are: Harnessing a long-view and embracing the complexity of the whole system to foster unlikely partnerships*" [source: https://sustainablefoodlab.org/the-food-lab/about/ ].

1. **One Planet Business for Biodiversity**

OP2B consists of 21 CEOs from private companies from the food, textile, cosmetics and medicinal sector, and an EU fund. The group is quite homogenous in terms of member characteristics. The coalition is hosted by the WBCSD and was launched in 2019 within “*French President Macron’s One Planet Lab framework”* at the UN Climate Action Summit in NY.

Their aim is to transform the food and agriculture system and their focus is on biodiversity loss, small-scale farmers livelihoods, and climate change with the specific targets of: “*1. scaling up regenerative agricultural practices; 2. boosting cultivated biodiversity and diets through product portfolios; and 3. protecting high-value natural ecosystems by enhancing their management and mitigating deforestation”* [source: https://op2b.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/OP2B\_Ambition\_Statement.pdf ].

OP2B responds to the challenge of biodiversity loss, but also climate change emissions and inclusive supply chains. In addition to the specific targets mentioned above, the coalition states that: “***The coalition is determined to drive transformational systemic change and catalyze action to protect and restore cultivated and natural biodiversity within the value chains, engage institutional and financial decision-makers, and develop and promote policy recommendations for the 2021 CBD COP15 framework****.*" [source: https://op2b.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/OP2B\_Statement\_May\_20-1.pdf ].

OP2B acts throughout the supply chain, both on the global and local levels. Regarding the global level, they suggest specific enabling conditions, such as a shift in agricultural subsidies. Each member is involved in local projects (see <https://op2b.org/actions/>), which are either funded by one company or co-funded by several of the OP2B member companies. For each project there is information on what are their aims, who are the partners, when is the starting/finishing day and more. Depending on the project, OP2B members might be partnering with NGOs, academia, consultancies, foundations, local governments (see Barry Callebaut project on drone - seeding approach in Ivory coast). Consequently, each project expresses different “solutions” to the biodiversity challenges. Their strategy of "scaling up" solutions is explicitly mentioned as a goal "*We are committed to scaling up alternative farming practices*" [ source: [Ambition\_Statement](https://op2b.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/OP2B_Ambition_Statement.pdf) ].

The members of this coalition state that they “*look forward to working with public sector institutions, suppliers, farmers, retailers and consumers in making this strategy a success*" [source: [OP2B\_Statement\_May\_20-1.pdf](https://op2b.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/OP2B_Statement_May_20-1.pdf) ].

Moreover, they support the view that collaboration with the public authorities is essential for the success of the transformation they work towards as exemplified in the following text "***a strong regulatory framework is essential*** *for preserving biodiversity*" [Source: https://op2b.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/OP2B\_Statement\_May\_20-1.pdf ].

Moreover, the coalition aims to provide **policy recommendations** to *the 2021 CBD COP15.* The legislation they are working towards is "*In the near time we will collectively achieve the following milestones: By October 2020: Disclose ambitious, timebound and measurable commitments during CBD COP15, with policy asks which support the enabling environment for success. In particular, we will advocate for nature-based solutions, a shift in agricultural subsidies to support biodiversity, and the creation of soil-based carbon market to monetize the positive externalities of regenerative agriculture practices that restore soil organic matter*" [source: [Ambition\_Statement](https://op2b.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/OP2B_Ambition_Statement.pdf) ].

The “Boston Consulting Group” is their knowledge partner. They use the One Planet (Lab) Framework. Many scientific terms are being used such as ‘nature-based solutions’, ‘regenerative agriculture’, ‘resilience’ of food systems, ‘ecosystem services’ indicating that scientific knowledge is part of the coalition´s knowledge system. However, wording that refers to ‘biophysical limits’ is lacking.

Last, the coalition states that they are reporting/being monitored, but no reports are available on their website during until May 2021 and were not included in our analysis.

## A.5. Quantitative data – Table S4

**Table S4.** LSAC scores

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Code** | **GISD** | **CA 100+** | **GA** | **SFL** | **Op2b** | **max value** |
| Number of actors | 30 | 545 | 28 | 17 | 21 | 545 |
| Diversity of actors | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 12 |
| Disclose assets | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Scale (geographical) | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Regulation type | 5 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 6 |
| Progress reporting | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Sanctioning mechanisms | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Membership standards | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Theory of change | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Type of solution | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Learning mechanisms | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| Scaling strategy | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Government partners | 3 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 |
| Civil society | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Sustainability | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Biophysical limits | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Role of Economic growth | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Direction | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Complexity | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Equity | 4 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |

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| Keeping Change Moving When Everything Stops Sustainable Food L | https://sustainablefoodlab.org/keeping-change-moving-when-everything-stops/ |
| Hospice in the time of COVID Sustainable Food Lab | https://sustainablefoodlab.org/hospice-in-the-time-of-covid/ |
| System leadership is not just desirable; it’s necessary to deli | https://sustainablefoodlab.org/system-leadership-is-not-just-desirable-its-necessary-to-deliver-impact/ |
| Scale Lab Sustainable Food Lab | https://sustainablefoodlab.org/scale-lab/#1585854336034-845de88a-fb44d4df-47f1acf8-9071 |
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| Professional Development in Systems Leadership Sustainable Foo | https://sustainablefoodlab.org/how-we-work/professional-development-in-systems-leadership/ |
| Work With Us Sustainable Food Lab | https://sustainablefoodlab.org/how-we-work/ |
| Become a Member Sustainable Food Lab | https://sustainablefoodlab.org/join-the-food-lab/ |
| Members & Leadership Circle Sustainable Food Lab | https://sustainablefoodlab.org/the-food-lab/member-advisory-board/ |
| Our Approach Sustainable Food Lab | https://sustainablefoodlab.org/the-food-lab/about/ |
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| **One Planet Business for Biodiversity** |  |
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| **Global Alliance for the Future of Food** |  |
| BeaconsOfHope\_COVIDStories\_2021 | <https://futureoffood.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/BeaconsOfHope_COVIDStories_2021.pdf> |
| Resilient Seed Systems Shared Action Framework Future of Food | https://futureoffood.org/research-and-tools/resilient-seed-systems-saf/ |
| Principles-and-the-Future-of-Food-2020-03-10 |  |
| GA\_TCA\_Booklet\_2019\_Digital |  |
| GA-Meridian-Synthesis-Reports-FINAL-2020-03-16 |  |
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| Blue Marble Evaluation Without principles and frameworks we can | https://futureoffood.org/blue-marble-evaluation-without-principles-and-frameworks-we-can-miss-out-on-the-learning/ |
| The Global Alliance formally adopts a Theory of Transformation | https://futureoffood.org/blue-marble-evaluation-without-principles-and-frameworks-we-can-miss-out-on-the-learning/ |
| Who We Are Future of Food Future of Food | https://futureoffood.org/blue-marble-evaluation-without-principles-and-frameworks-we-can-miss-out-on-the-learning/ |
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| What We Do Future of Food Future of Food | https://futureoffood.org/about-us/what-we-do/ |
| Monitoring & Evaluation Future of Food Future of Food | https://futureoffood.org/about-us/what-we-do/ |
| Beacons of Hope Future of Food Future of Food | https://futureoffood.org/impact-areas/agroecology/beacons-of-hope/ |
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| GA\_Climate\_Food |  |
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| Future of Food A more sustainable secure and equitable future | https://futureoffood.org/ |
| COVID RESPONSE CATALYZES LOCAL FOOD SYSTEMS TRANSFORMATION - Gl | https://futureoffood.org/insights/covid-response-catalyzes-local-food-systems-transformation/ |