

Supplemental Information for “Redistricting and Policy
Responsiveness to African Americans in the U.S.
House.”

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A Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1 and Table A.2 report descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses. To give a sense for how our measures of responsiveness changed between the 112th and 113th congress, Table A.2 reports the standard deviations for each of our dependent variables as well as the change in an MC's Black constituency. Since we expect responsiveness to vary by the party of the MC, we also report the number of MCs by party who are above one standard deviation of each variable.

Table A.1: District and Legislator Characteristics

Characteristic	Range	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
$\vec{\Delta}$ LCCR Voting Score	-16 to 30	-0.003	6.45	343
112 LCCR Civil Rights Score	0 to 100	44.89	45.01	343
113 LCCR Civil Rights Score	0 to 100	44.89	46.52	343
$\vec{\Delta}$ Civil Rights Bill Sponsorship	-2 to 2	0.041	0.40	343
112 Civil Rights Bill Sponsorship	0 to 4	0.079	0.36	343
113 Civil Rights Bill Sponsorship	0 to 4	0.12	0.47	343
$\vec{\Delta}$ Civil Rights Bill Co-Sponsorship	-3 to 10	0.73	1.71	343
112 Civil Rights Bill Co-Sponsorship	0 to 11	1.80	2.28	343
113 Civil Rights Bill Co-Sponsorship	0 to 17	2.53	3.12	343
$\vec{\Delta}$ Civil Rights Floor Speeches	-20 to 7	-.325	2.08	320
112 Civil Rights Floor Speeches	0 to 28	1.11	2.91	320
113 Civil Rights Floor Speeches	0 to 35	0.78	2.5	320
$\vec{\Delta}$ % Black people in MC district	-17.1 to 45.8	0.05	4.05	343

Table A.2: Variable Change Descriptive Statistics

Variable	SD	>1SD Dems	>1 SD Reps	0-1 SD	Total
Black Difference	4.05	12	9	322	343
LCCR Difference	6.45	8	16	319	343
COSP Difference	0.40	16	7	320	343
Spon Difference	1.71	47	1	295	343
FS Difference	2.08	16	5	299	320
DC Inbox Difference	0.09	15	2	285	302
Ad Difference	0.37	4	11	84	99

B Alternative Model Specifications

Table B.3 reports the results of four regressions. These models are similar to those reported in the manuscript except instead of using a lagged dependent variable to predict behavior during the 113th Congress, we use the change in behavior from the 112th to 113th Congress.

Table B.4 reports the results of three regressions using the change in floor speech dependent variable. The first subsets the sample to include only non-Black Democrats, the second only Democrats, and the third to include only Republicans. The results of these regressions suggest that the change in mention of civil rights during floor speeches was driven primarily by non-Black Democrats.

Table B.5 displays the results of the primary analysis, except that instead of interacting the MC's change in district Black population with their party the MC's party enters the model as a control. From this, we see that a change in an MC's Black population still significantly predicts an increase in MC LCCR scores and an increase in the number of times an MC mentions civil rights during floor speeches.

Table B.3: Redistricting Effect on Legislative Responsiveness

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	LCCR Change	Bills Sponsored Change	Bills Co-Sponsored Change	CR Floor Speeches Change
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Change in Black Pop.	0.007 (0.101)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.013 (0.026)	0.043 (0.033)
Republican MC	-3.210*** (0.734)	-0.058 (0.047)	-1.485*** (0.186)	0.317 (0.253)
District Proportion Black 113	-0.029 (0.034)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.018 (0.011)
Black MC	0.647 (1.727)	-0.237** (0.110)	-0.276 (0.438)	-0.868 (0.566)
Change in Black Pop. * Republican MC	0.509*** (0.186)	0.007 (0.012)	0.043 (0.047)	-0.051 (0.061)
Constant	2.196*** (0.688)	0.053 (0.044)	1.618*** (0.174)	-0.181 (0.243)
Observations	343	343	343	320
R ²	0.091	0.017	0.172	0.080
Adjusted R ²	0.077	0.002	0.159	0.065

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Similar to Table B.5, Table B.6 runs an analysis similar to the primary one reported in the manuscript, except the MC party does not enter the model in these regressions. Looking at Table B.6, we see that when we do not control for MC party, the coefficient for change in Black population goes from having a significant effect on MC LCCR scores to only having a marginally significant effect ($b = 0.15$, $p = 0.081$). Change in the Black population still has a significant effect on MC floor speeches when we do not control for party ($b = 0.02$, $p = 0.02$).

In Figure 1 of the manuscript, we plot the conditional effects of change in a district's Black population on LCCR scores for Republican MC's. Figure 1 included the distribution of change in Black population scores for our sample, removing one outlier. This outlier is Gary Peter's whose district went from being 11.4% Black in 2010 to 57.2% Black in 2012

Table B.4: Redistricting Effect on Civil Rights Floor Speech

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	CR Floor Speeches Change		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Change in Black Pop.	0.056* (0.033)	0.054 (0.048)	−0.008 (0.025)
District Proportion Black 113	−0.038** (0.016)	−0.034** (0.013)	−0.015* (0.009)
Black MC	0.049 (0.265)	−0.076 (0.374)	0.111 (0.107)
Sample	Non-Black Democrats	Democrats	Republicans
Observations	97	130	190
R ²	0.063	0.052	0.016
Adjusted R ²	0.043	0.037	0.005

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.5: Primary Analysis Controlling for Party

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	LCCR Score 113	Bills Sponsored 113	Bills Co-Sponsored 113	CR Floor Speeches 113
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>negative binomial</i>	<i>Poisson</i>	<i>Poisson</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Change in Black Pop.	0.166** (0.078)	−0.023 (0.050)	0.00000 (0.007)	0.018** (0.009)
Republican MC	−28.372*** (3.341)	−1.013** (0.441)	−1.306*** (0.105)	−1.044*** (0.175)
District Proportion Black 113	−0.017 (0.023)	0.001 (0.012)	0.0003 (0.002)	0.010*** (0.004)
112 LCCR Score	0.718*** (0.037)			
112 CR Bill Sponsorships		1.309*** (0.264)		
112 CR Bill Co-sponsorships			0.177*** (0.013)	
112 CR Floor Speeches				0.114*** (0.008)
Constant	29.081*** (3.565)	−2.145*** (0.332)	0.866*** (0.074)	−0.411*** (0.127)
Observations	343	343	343	320
R ²	0.985			
Adjusted R ²	0.985			
θ		0.741* (0.442)		
Akaike Inf. Crit.		223.911	1,058.628	703.247

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

after redistricting. We report the regression used to generate Figure 1 in Table B.7. The results are still significant with the inclusion of Gary Peter.

Table B.6: Primary Analysis Without Party Control

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	LCCR Score 113	Bills Sponsored 113	Bills Co-Sponsored 113	CR Floor Speeches 113
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>negative binomial</i>	<i>Poisson</i>	<i>Poisson</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Change in Black Pop.	0.150* (0.086)	-0.029 (0.053)	0.002 (0.007)	0.021** (0.009)
District Proportion Black 113	-0.016 (0.025)	0.009 (0.012)	0.003 (0.002)	0.018*** (0.004)
112 LCCR Score	1.025*** (0.008)			
112 CR Bill Sponsorships		1.502*** (0.282)		
112 CR Bill Co-sponsorships			0.268*** (0.011)	
112 CR Floor Speeches				0.120*** (0.009)
Constant	-0.918* (0.528)	-2.725*** (0.269)	0.123** (0.057)	-0.998*** (0.103)
Observations	343	343	343	320
R ²	0.981			
Adjusted R ²	0.981			
θ		0.591* (0.324)		
Akaike Inf. Crit.		227.300	1,224.719	739.176

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.8 reports the results of the LCCR and floor speech analyses separately for MCs who are above and below one standard deviation. Looking at columns one and three of the table, we see that not many MCs fell above a single standard deviation and thus these results should be interpreted as suggestive since there is not proper power. With this in mind, we see that the results do not differ in meaningful ways that suggest our significant findings are driven by those above a single standard deviation.

Table B.7: Outlier Removed LCCR Analysis

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	LCCR Score 113
Change in Black Pop.	0.092 (0.131)
Republican MC	−28.202*** (3.318)
District Proportion Black 113	−0.010 (0.023)
112 LCCR Score	0.719*** (0.037)
Change in Black Pop. * Republican MC	0.415** (0.195)
Constant	28.883*** (3.540)
Observations	342
R ²	0.985
Adjusted R ²	0.985
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.8: Redistricting Effect on Responsiveness

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	113 LCCR Score		113 CR Floor Speeches	
	<i>OLS</i>		<i>Poisson</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Change in Black Pop.	−0.012 (0.212)	0.132 (0.166)	0.014 (0.014)	0.037 (0.031)
Republican MC	−17.173 (28.755)	−28.861*** (3.289)	−3.647 (5.735)	−1.066*** (0.180)
District Proportion Black 113	0.005 (0.126)	−0.014 (0.023)	0.028* (0.015)	0.005 (0.005)
112 LCCR Score	1.004** (0.344)	0.716*** (0.036)		
112 CR Floor Speeches			0.096*** (0.021)	0.129*** (0.011)
Change in Black Pop. * Republican MC	3.831 (2.407)	0.182 (0.229)	0.339 (0.925)	−0.025 (0.065)
Constant	0.363 (33.965)	29.331*** (3.507)	−1.024 (0.719)	−0.310** (0.131)
Sample	> 1SD	< 1SD	> 1SD	< 1SD
Observations	21	322	20	300
R ²	0.980	0.986		
Adjusted R ²	0.973	0.985		
Akaike Inf. Crit.			49.732	659.291

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C Investigating Other Forms of Responsiveness

In the manuscript we examine four forms of representation to capture responsiveness including MC' LCCR scores, the number of civil rights related bills the MC sponsored and co-sponsored, and whether the MC mentions civil rights during their floor speeches. We argue that sponsoring civil rights related bills is relatively more costly to the MC because it requires resources in terms of time and staffing and that the other forms of representation we examine is relatively low-cost. Still, compared to other forms of representation, roll call voting, co-sponsorships, and floor speech may still be costly.

To lower the bar for representation, we conduct two additional analyses using MC newsletters and their campaign advertisements. For the newsletter analysis, we used DC Inbox data to gather each newsletter sent during the 112th and 113th congressional sessions for each MC in our data. For each session, we identified the number of newsletters that mentioned either diversity, African Americans, and civil rights. We then estimated the proportion of all newsletters that mentioned either or any of these terms. Table C.9 reports the results of four regressions, one for each of our variables. We find no significant effects across all four analyses. We run several versions of these models and in each specification we find no evidence of responsiveness in newsletter communications.

Table C.9: Redistricting Effect on Newsletter Mentions Responsiveness

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Civil Rights 113 (1)	Diversity 113 (2)	African American 113 (3)	Any Mention 113 (4)
Change in Black Pop.	0.004* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)
Republican MC	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.027*** (0.010)
District Proportion Black 113	0.001*** (0.0004)	0.0003** (0.0001)	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.002*** (0.0005)
112 Civil Rights	0.138 (0.132)			
112 Diversity		0.112* (0.062)		
112 African American			0.328*** (0.074)	
112 Any Mention				0.183* (0.100)
Black MC	0.040* (0.023)	0.018** (0.007)	0.007 (0.008)	0.067** (0.026)
Change in Black Pop. * Republican MC	-0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.003)
Constant	0.015* (0.009)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.023** (0.010)
Observations	302	302	302	302
R ²	0.185	0.161	0.308	0.285
Adjusted R ²	0.169	0.144	0.293	0.271

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The campaign ad data comes from the Wesleyan Media Project. We identified every campaign advertisement each MC in our data ran leading up to the elections prior to the 112th and 113th congressional sessions. The MCs in our data aired a total of 1,203 unique advertisements during this time period. We hired two undergraduate research assistants to code whether each advertisement featured a Black person in the ad that was not Barack Obama or the candidate themselves. Each RA was assigned to code approximately 635 unique videos, 62 of which were assigned to both RAs so that we could test for inter-coder reliability. The Cohen’s Kappa for the two RAs was 0.764. The authors then identified the videos that had disagreement and coded the videos themselves.

Table C.10 reports the results from two regressions. For the first model, we identified how many unique advertisements each MC created for each congressional session. Then using the advertisement coding, we calculated the proportion of unique advertisements that featured at least one Black person for each MC. The second model in the table is similar except we use the total number of times an ad is aired. So essentially this is a weighted mean where the weights are the number of times the ad was aired. In both analyses we find no evidence of responsiveness in the featuring of Black people in campaign advertisements.

Table C.10: Redistricting Effect on Campaign Ad Responsiveness

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	113 Black Avg	113 Aired Black Avg
	(1)	(2)
Change in Black Pop.	0.007 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)
Republican MC	-0.096 (0.074)	-0.103 (0.077)
District Proportion Black 113	0.006* (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)
112 Avg Black	0.407*** (0.104)	
112 Avg Black Aired		0.342*** (0.106)
Black MC	0.117 (0.218)	0.133 (0.227)
Change in Black Pop. * Republican MC	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.020 (0.014)
Constant	0.196*** (0.073)	0.211*** (0.075)
Observations	99	99
R ²	0.403	0.371
Adjusted R ²	0.364	0.330

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D 111th Congress Robustness Check

One concern readers might have when interpreting our results is that district demographic change is not fully exogenous and thus our significant results are not due to MC responsiveness but instead is strategic positioning on the part of the MC. To try and address this concern, we collected data on MC behavior and MC district demographics for the 111th Congress. MCs in the 111th Congress are going to be less likely to know what their district demographics will look like after redistricting and thus cannot make strategic moves in anticipation of this change. One drawback to this analysis is that it further decreases our number of observations since it requires that the MCs were also in office during the 111th Congress.

Table D.11 shows the results of the main analysis in the manuscript except that we use data from the 111th Congress instead of the 112th Congress. Turning to the first model examining MC LCCR scores, we see that the interaction coefficient is similar in size and is in the same direction except it no longer reaches conventional levels of statistical significance ($b = 0.392$, $p = 0.099$). Despite not reaching conventional levels of statistical significance, we believe that this is still proof that MCs exhibit responsiveness. The p-value is still marginally significant and we cannot rule out that the loss of significance is primarily due to the decrease in the number of our observations.

Table D.11: Redistricting Effect on Legislative Responsiveness

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	LCCR Score 113	Bills Sponsored 113	Bills Co-Sponsored 113	CR Floor Speeches 113
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>negative binomial</i>	<i>Poisson</i>	<i>Poisson</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Change in Black Pop.	0.070 (0.107)	-0.042 (0.046)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.018** (0.009)
Republican MC	-67.031*** (3.431)	-0.994* (0.524)	-1.634*** (0.114)	-0.868*** (0.187)
District Proportion Black 113	0.016 (0.030)	0.018* (0.011)	0.004** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.004)
111th LCCR Score	0.282*** (0.037)			
111th CR Bill Sponsorships		0.595*** (0.159)		
111th CR Bill Co-sponsorships			0.093*** (0.008)	
111th CR Floor Speeches				0.111*** (0.009)
Change in Black Pop. * Republican MC	0.392* (0.237)	0.124 (0.160)	0.025 (0.039)	-0.058 (0.047)
Constant	69.968*** (3.614)	-2.383*** (0.354)	0.680*** (0.090)	-0.372*** (0.128)
Observations	265	267	267	248
R ²	0.977			
Adjusted R ²	0.977			
θ		0.705 (0.469)		
Akaike Inf. Crit.		201.353	920.649	630.833

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

From Table [D.11](#), we see that an increase in an MC's Black constituency is still significantly associated with an increase in the number of times the MC mentions civil rights during floor speeches. This gives us confidence that our results are driven by MC responsiveness as opposed to some strategic considerations.