

Online Appendix to “The Racial Geography of U.S. Public Opinion at the Punitive Turn”

Appendix is for online publication only.

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A Summary Statistics

This appendix presents summary statistics and source data for the variables used in the analysis in Table A1. Second, it presents cell shares for race and region (South, non-South), the two main variables of interest for each survey.

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
favor death penalty	0.643	0.479	0.000	1.000	40089
favor death penalty (w/ don't know)	0.588	0.492	0.000	1.000	43846
region south (combined)	0.309	0.462	0.000	1.000	43846
region south atlantic	0.164	0.371	0.000	1.000	43846
region east south central	0.060	0.238	0.000	1.000	43846
region west south central	0.085	0.279	0.000	1.000	43846
region northeast	0.053	0.225	0.000	1.000	43846
region mid-atlantic	0.184	0.387	0.000	1.000	43846
region east north central	0.185	0.388	0.000	1.000	43846
region west north central	0.103	0.303	0.000	1.000	43846
region mountain	0.042	0.200	0.000	1.000	43846
region pacific	0.124	0.330	0.000	1.000	43846
white	0.888	0.315	0.000	1.000	43846
age	45.346	16.787	17.000	94.000	43846
male	0.465	0.499	0.000	1.000	43846
city pop <2,500	0.383	0.486	0.000	1.000	43846
city pop 2,500-50k	0.145	0.352	0.000	1.000	43846
city pop 50k-100k	0.145	0.259	0.000	1.000	43846
city pop 100k-500k	0.154	0.361	0.000	1.000	43846
city pop >500k	0.246	0.431	0.000	1.000	43846
education no high school	0.219	0.414	0.000	1.000	43846
education some high school	0.172	0.377	0.000	1.000	43846
education high school grad	0.311	0.463	0.000	1.000	43846
education some post-high school	0.298	0.458	0.000	1.000	43846

Notes: Summary statistics are calculated for 1953-1985 using both Gallup and GSS data.

The *South* is defined as in the Census as a combination of the East South Central Region, the West South Central Region, and the South Atlantic Region. The South Atlantic is: Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia and DC. The East South Central is: Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky and Tennessee. The West South Central is: Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma. The *Pacific* is defined as Alaska, Washington, Oregon and Hawaii. The *Mountain West* is defined as Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, Arizona and New Mexico. The *West North Central* is defined as North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, Iowa and Minnesota. The *East North Central* is defined as Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. The *Mid-Atlantic* is defined as New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The *Northeast* is defined as Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island.

The number of survey respondents by race and region is presented below.

Table A2: Count of Respondents by Race and Region, 1936-1985

Survey Year	GSS	Respondents	Respondent Count			
			White South	Non-White South	White Non-South	Non-White Non-South
1936	N	2,192	542	17	1,550	15
1953	N	1,475	343	33	946	60
1956	N	1,939	406	50	1,134	105
1957	N	1,527	278	40	865	50
1960	N	2,976	462	154	1,874	154
1965	N	3,474	841	85	1,908	238
1966	N	3,365	840	130	2,071	64
1967	N	3,365	840	130	2,071	64
1969	N	1,493	375	53	894	43
1971	N	1,544	338	63	924	57
1972a	N	1,492	391	66	876	46
1972b	N	1,441	331	49	841	74
1974	Y	1,477	386	62	854	96
1975	Y	1,486	387	68	847	77
1976a	N	1,523	369	79	908	67
1976b	Y	1,490	389	58	905	65
1977	Y	1,515	366	95	883	64
1978a	N	932	114	133	244	341
1978b	Y	1,516	395	76	887	72
1980	Y	1,458	396	72	841	53
1982	Y	1,833	386	241	862	225
1983	Y	1,581	387	75	968	76
1984	Y	1,421	369	82	806	72
1985a	N	1,483	375	80	851	66
1985b	N	978	265	32	571	44
1985c	Y	1,490	430	63	852	66

Notes: The Respondents column presents the total respondents in the survey. Respondents are calculated from the data as downloaded, not from the survey descriptions. The count of respondents by type presents the count who answered the death penalty question. Therefore, the sum of the count columns may not add up to the respondents column.

B Gallup Poll Sources

This appendix presents the sources for the Gallup polls that I use between 1953 and 1985. All polls were downloaded from the Roper iPoll database.

The death penalty question is asked with a minimally necessary degree of frequency. As compared to other work in the 1953-66 period, I have access to 5 surveys that ask the death penalty question. As a point of comparison, [Casacio and Shenhav \(2020\)](#), who also use Gallup data, have access to 45 surveys during that same pre-1967 period that ask their questions of interest. This means that I am limited in the additional questions that I have access to *consistently* across repeated cross-sections. This imposes limits both on heterogeneity analyses that I might conduct and control variables that I might include.


Finally, I also include information on the 1936 Gallup poll that asks about the death penalty in the case of murder. As I note in the main text, the inclusion of respondents from this survey is made difficult because of a lack of comparable control variables to later surveys (and the challenge in constructing post-stratification survey weights (Appendix [E](#))). However, in Appendix [K](#) I do include it (with adjustments to the covariates and without weights).

Table B1: Gallup Polls

Year	Month	Poll Number	Poll Title	Respondents
1936	Dec	#0059	<i>Prohibition/Republican Party/Death Penalty/War Debts/College Education</i>	2,201
1953	Nov	#0522	Employment/Korea/Death Penalty/Political Parties	1,475
1956	Mar-Apr	#0562		1,939
1957	Aug-Sept	#0588	Asian Flu/Labor Unions/Teenager's Rights/Automobiles	1,527
1960	Mar	#0625		2,976
1965	Jan	#0704		3,474
1966	May	#0729	Vietnam/1968 Presidential Election	3,365
1967	June	#0746	Vietnam/Middle East/1968 Presidential Election	3,365
1969	Jan	#0774	Israel and Middle East Nations/China/Environment	1,493
1971	Oct-Nov	#0839		1,544
1972	Mar	#0846		1,492
1972	Jan	#0860		1,441
1976	Apr	#0949		1,523
1978	Mar	#0995		932
1985	Jan	#1248G		1,483
1985	Nov	#0841	Reagan/Death Penalty/Homosexuality	978

Notes: Not all polls have a title beyond "Gallup Poll" and the number. Respondents are calculated from the data as downloaded, not from the survey descriptions.

Figure C1: Structural break in aggregate support for the death penalty, 1953-1985



Notes: The above plot (a) shows the population weighted trends in the percentage of respondents supporting the death penalty. Plot (b) presents the Wald test statistic for a single structural break at each year against the null hypothesis of no structural break. The vertical line indicates the most likely break year.

C The Inflection Point of the Punitive Turn

This appendix discusses the breakpoint in the death penalty time series. A visual inspection of punitiveness as measured by the death penalty trend indicates an inflection point around the mid-to-late 1960s (Figure C1 a). During the 1950s death penalty support was declining. The public reached its least supportive of the death penalty in the 1960s (1966 is the year of lowest measured support), from which point support increased.

I augment a simple visual inspection by formally inductively searching for a single structural break ($s = 1$) at unknown year $t = t^*$ in punitiveness.³⁹ Ideally, high frequency data on punitive opinion would be available to undertake a precise search for such a break. Absent such data, the formal estimation can be considered a more rigorous *corroboration* of the visual inspection, though inherently sensitive given the data density and small sample. For example, additional data covering years in which data is currently unavailable might shift this breakpoint, though absent such data it's not possible to know how the results would change.

Formally evaluating the break, I assume that the first difference in average support for the death penalty ($support_t - support_{t-1}$) in year t varies stochastically with respect to a constant long-run mean (null hypothesis $H_0: s = 0$):


$$support_t - support_{t-1} = \beta_0 + \epsilon_t \quad (1)$$

Relative to this null, I evaluate the hypothesis $H_1: s = 1$ modeled as:

$$support_t - support_{t-1} = \beta_{1,j} + \beta_{2,j} + \epsilon_t \quad (2)$$

where $\epsilon_t \sim IID(0, \sigma^2)$ and $j = t < t^*$ and $k = t \geq t^*$. I conduct a Wald supremum test (see Andrews (1993)).⁴⁰ I reject the null hypothesis of no structural break (support for H_0). The Wald test statistic is $\tau = 7.5$, corresponding to a p-value of 0.100. I estimate the most likely break year as $t^* = 1967$. Figure 2 (b) plots the Wald statistic across all possible break points. When I include “don’t know” responses as indicative of a lack of support, I identify the same break (Appendix J). Moreover, when I extend the time series and conduct a test for additional breaks (Bai and Perron, 1998) yields two breaks corresponding to the punitive

Figure C2: Structural break in support for the death penalty by race, 1953-1985



Notes: The above plots (a) and (b) show the population weighted trends in the percentage of respondents indicating support for the death penalty in the case of murder. Plots (c) and (d) present the test statistic from the Wald supremum test for a single structural break at each year against the null hypothesis of no structural break. The vertical lines indicate the most likely break year.


turn and the later “innocence turn” identified by Baumgartner, Boef and Boydston (2008).

These results compliment a visual inspection of the trends, increasing our confidence that the *most likely* inflection point in punitive attitudes, as measured by death penalty support, occurred in the mid-to-late 1960s. However, given the available data, these results cannot not be interpreted as the precise *moment* when death penalty support, nor punitiveness more broadly changed.

I identify 1967 as the most likely structural break in each series. The break for White respondents is statistically significant at the 10% level ($p=0.052$), however the break for Black respondents is not. This may reflect a more modest transformation in the attitudes of Black respondents, or sample size and sampling error.

I also present the results from estimating the structural break tests by geography (South as compared to the non-South). The graphical evidence is presented in Figure ???. In the case of the South and other regions, I find that 1967 is the most likely year of the structural break. This visual evidence is confirmed by the same structural break tests conducted in the main paper on the aggregate trend and the race-specific trends. I fail to reject the null hypothesis of a single structural break (at the 5% level), and estimate 1967 as the most likely year in the case of both regions.

Figure C3: Structural break in support for the death penalty by race including with un-weighted data, 1936-1985



Notes: The above plots (a) and (b) show the population weighted trends in the percentage of respondents indicating support for the death penalty in the case of murder. Plots (c) and (d) present the test statistic from the Wald supremum test for a single structural break at each year against the null hypothesis of no structural break.


D Executions by Race

Figure D1 presents trends in executions by race since 1910 from Espy and Smykla (2016). The execution rates are presented as the rate per 100,000 using census data.⁴¹ Executions include both those conducted by the federal government and those conducted by the states. As a consequence of the *Furman v. Georgia* Supreme Court decision, no executions were carried about between 1972 and 1976. The *Gregg v. Georgia* Supreme Court decision restored the use of the death penalty in 1976. The data includes only executions that were carried out, not death sentences that were not, or have not been completed.

As Figure D1 illustrates, Black people were executed at significantly higher rates as a share of their population than White people in the vast majority of years. In those years where they are not, the rate is equal to that of Whites. Scholars like Garland (2010) connect the legacy of state sanctioned executions and extra-judicial killings during the Jim Crow era in blunt terms: “many of the social and political dynamics that produced lynchings in the early 20th century continue to produce death penalties” to this day (p. 34).

Although it is not possible with the public opinion data available in the paper to understand *to whom* respondents expect punishment to be applied, the findings here suggest that insofar as respondents were drawing from information on *actual* rates of death penalty application, they would have expected the death penalty in all years to be at least as likely (and indeed more often *more likely*) to be applied to Black people.

Figure D1: Trends in executions by race, 1910-2010



Notes: The above figure plots the raw data trends in execution rates per 100,000 by race. Executions include all that were carried out by both the states and the federal government. Between 1967 and 1976 no executions took place as a result of the *Furman v. Georgia* Supreme Court decision.

The trend in executions, support for the death penalty amongst the public, and public policy allowing for (or abolishing the death penalty) are consistent with a model in which policymakers and other political institutions (namely the judiciary) respond to public opinion (see e.g., Banner (2002); Sarat (2006); Gottschalk (2006); Steiker and Steiker (2020)). Public support for the death penalty declined during the 1950s and early 1960s, as did executions. The *Furman* Supreme Court decision formalized that decline in abolishment. As public support began to increase, so too did explicit attempts to reinstate the death penalty,

culminating in the *Gregg* Supreme Court decision. That decision is notable for having explicitly mentioned increased public support as a rationale for the Court's reinstatement; that of "evolving standards of decency" (Garland, 2010). As Gottschalk (2006) writes: the Supreme Court's decision-making "essentially legitimized public sentiment as the main political terrain on which the death penalty would be contested and on which the carceral state would be constructed and legitimized over the coming decades" (p. 218).

From the 2000s, executions and public support for the death penalty have declined. Baumgartner, Boef and Boydston (2008) provide an important explanation for this so-called *Innocence Turn*. Although the Supreme Court's decision in *Gregg* still holds, many states have abolished the death penalty themselves. Since the 1976 Supreme Court decision, 15 states have abolished the death penalty (8 had previously done so). Of those, 80% did so after the year 2000.⁴² Virginia (2021) is the only Southern state to have abolished the death penalty.


E Sampling and Weights

Gallup polls constitute the core of the public opinion data used in this paper’s analysis, including all of the crucial pre-1970s data. In the pre-1950 era—before the first survey that I use—Gallup polls were conducted using quota sampling with significant issues in their ability to represent the population as a whole (Berinsky, 2006). Since 1950, Gallup polls have proceeded with random probability sampling using blocs—dividing the US into community size strata, then geographic regions, before pairs of localities are selected, and so forth.

Despite the use of bloc random probability sampling, there are still potential issues with the way the earliest Gallup polls represented the population as a whole, particularly in terms of groups by region (the South) and race (Black people) that are crucial for the analysis in this paper. The data from some early Gallup polls comes “weighted” via duplicate observations.⁴³ While data in other surveys are not duplicated and do not provide a weight variable.⁴⁴ I attempt to improve on this weighting and correct for a lack of included weights by constructing my own weights using the cell-weighting technique of Berinsky (2006). Cell-weighting is a post-stratification weighting scheme that is simple to implement and requires minimal assumptions. Recent work applying this method to early Gallup poll data is found in Kuziemko and Washington (2018) and Cascio and Shenhav (2020).

I use a cell weighting scheme involving four variables: region (South, not), race (White, Black), education (high school graduate, not), and gender (male, female).⁴⁵ I use these variables because they represent important and known ways that early surveys may have deviated in their sampling from population shares. In addition, these four variables are available across all surveys that I use, and return cell sizes that are sufficiently large to construct weights. Appendix A includes race-region respondent counts.

Figure E1: Structural break in aggregate support for the death penalty with unweighted data, 1953-1985




Notes: The above plot (a) shows the unweighted trends in the percentage of respondents indicating support for the death penalty in the case of murder. Plot (b) presents the Wald test statistic (τ) from the Wald supremum test for a single structural break at each year against the null hypothesis of no structural break. The vertical line indicates the most likely break year.

I use Census microdata and code provided in the replication package for Cascio and Shenhav (2020). I adjust the authors’ code to reflect their different interest in the voting age population, their interest in post-election years, and their larger sample of surveys allowing them to use year-of-birth cohorts. Their supplemental online appendix provides a detailed description of their data collection and weight construction, and their code is publicly available.

I apply these weights to all data for a consistent weighting scheme, including the GSS data. I find very modest differences between my parameter estimates using weighted and unweighted data (surely reflecting that those variables that I use to weight are also included as regressors).

I present the main figures and tables from the paper analyzed on unweighted data in this appendix. In the case of the structural break, I find that the aggregate results in the paper hold in substantive and statistical terms (Figure E1). There is likely to be one structural break, and that break is likely to be at 1967. In the case of the race-specific trends, however, I find again, 1967 is the most likely single structural break in the case of White respondents (Figure E1). But the estimate I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no break. I find no evidence of a structural break for Black respondents

Figure E2: Structural break in support for the death penalty by race including with unweighted data, 1953-1985



Notes: The above plots (a) and (b) show the unweighted trends in the percentage of respondents indicating support for the death penalty in the case of murder. Plots (c) and (d) present the Wald test statistic for a single structural break at each year against the null hypothesis of no structural break. The vertical lines indicate the most likely break year.

Finally, Tables E1 and E2 present the main estimations from the paper. Again, the main qualitative results hold—White punitiveness grew more after 1967 despite already being higher on average; punitiveness in the South grew more post-1967, despite being initially lower (especially amongst White respondents); and the post-1967 Black-White difference between South and non-South respondents is positive and of similar magnitude, though not different from zero at the 10% level in either model (5 and 6).

Table E1: Death penalty support as a function of race pre to post-1967 with unweighted data

	% Support Death Penalty	
	(1)	(2)
White	0.14*** (0.023)	0.14*** (0.023)
White \times Post	0.13*** (0.024)	0.13*** (0.024)
Homicide rate (W)		-0.0081 (0.0090)
Homicide rate (NW)		-0.00011 (0.0019)
Year Period	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓
Crime Control		✓
Observations	40089	40089

Notes: The above table presents estimates of equation 1. Standard errors are clustered at the region. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table E2: Death penalty support as a function of race and geography pre to post-1967 with unweighted data

	% Support Death Penalty					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White					0.12*** (0.010)	0.12*** (0.0093)
South	-0.086*** (0.023)	-0.15** (0.051)	-0.067** (0.027)	-0.13** (0.057)	-0.068* (0.036)	-0.14** (0.045)
South \times Post	0.061** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.020)	0.081** (0.026)	0.10*** (0.026)	-0.0071 (0.043)	0.014 (0.040)
White \times South					0.0018 (0.055)	0.0055 (0.055)
White \times Post					0.099*** (0.019)	0.10*** (0.016)
White \times South \times Post-1967					0.090 (0.054)	0.084 (0.054)
Homicide rate (W)		0.0032 (0.0065)		0.0011 (0.0058)		0.0018 (0.0059)
Homicide rate (NW)		0.0038 (0.0020)		0.0045* (0.0023)		0.0040* (0.0021)
Year Period	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W&B	W-only	W-only	W&B	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Crime Control		✓		✓		✓
Observations	40089	40089	35749	35749	40089	40089


Notes: The above table presents OLS estimates of equation 2. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust to regional-clustering. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

F Dynamic Estimates

The main paper presents estimates of the pre-post (inductively determined) punitive turn differences by race and geography in punitive attitudes. The estimation pools pre and post changes into average relationships. Here, I unpack the dynamics of those averages and present plots of individual survey year effects over time plots to show whether and how those estimated relationships change.

To do so, I interact indicators of the survey-year with race and region variables. I estimate for all years to capture total effects for each year, rather than omitting a base year to which the other estimates are compared. To better visualize the dynamics, I present the analysis as a series of plots in Figure F1. Each plot represents the coefficient estimates from a single specification. In plots (a) and (b), the results are total effects. In plot (c), the estimates are heterogeneous relationships that account for whether White respondents in the South differed from White respondents, generally, and Black respondents in the South.

Figure F1: Dynamic relationship in punitive attitudes by race and region



Notes: The above plots present estimates of partial correlations. Each plot presents estimates from a single model with the main parameter of interest interacted with individual survey-year indicators.

In plot (a), where the coefficients are around 10% 1967, afterwards they are nearly all twice as large. The range of those estimates is quite narrow, suggesting that the racial heterogeneity appeared, and remained stable thereafter. In plot (b), a similar pattern obtains. Where the pre-turn relationship between region and punitiveness amongst White respondents is inconsistently negative (approximately -15 percentage points), afterwards the relationship is half as small and consistently located around zero. Moreover, there is no dramatic trend suggesting that the regional relationship evolved slowly over time or attenuated. Instead,

the point estimates are quite stable. Finally, this is also true in plot (c) that evaluates the triple interaction. There is a stable null relationship pre-1967, and, although noisy, a positive moderation afterwards exhibiting relative stability.

G Parallel Pre-1967 Trends

The paper presents a set of descriptive facts about racial and geographic patterns in punitive opinion as measured by support for the death penalty. Given the lack of a randomized or quasi-randomized experiment, it is extremely difficult to make a causal claim about *precisely* why race and geography played the role that they did in the punitive turn. This is compounded by the bundled nature of the temporal (i.e., post turn) treatment.

More thoroughly, in order to treat the estimated relationships in the main paper as causal, it’s necessary to assume that—conditional on the covariates—the change in death penalty support would have been the same for these racial sub-populations after 1967 in the absence of the changes in the period. In addition, one needs to define *what* the theoretical quantity is that is being captured by this year as a temporal “treatment.” Anything about this year that affects White people (differentially from Black people, or in the South differentially from the non-South) constitutes a potential treatment. Nevertheless, demonstrates that White attitudes in the South and non-South were parallel prior to 1967, and trends in Black-White differences in the South as compared to non-South were also parallel. Finally, in the case of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), I must assume away geographic interference, for example, that Black civil and voting rights didn’t cause people to move from or to the South (the most plausible form of interference).

Still, readers might be interested in whether Black and White respondents and by region experienced different trends in their punitive attitudes prior to the inductively determined turn. To examine this, I present the results from a formal test that trends in death penalty support were following similar trends by race and geography in the period prior to 1967. When a counterfactual parallel trends assumption is invoked, it is fundamentally untestable—as it is about counterfactual trends that can never be observed. However, pre-treatment trends can be potentially dispositive.

Formally, I use OLS to estimate

$$Pr(\text{support}_{irt}) = \beta_1 T + \beta_2(\text{south}_r \times T) + \beta_3(\text{white}_i \times T) + \quad (3)$$

$$\beta_4(\text{white}_i \times \text{south}_r \times T) + \phi \mathbf{X}_{zirt} + \epsilon_{irt} \quad (4)$$

where T is a linear time trend (centered at zero in 1967), X is a matrix of z covariates including separate indicators for *south* and *white*. The residual category is a non-Southern Black respondent. In addition, I estimate the above restricted to White respondents only (thus dropping the *white* term and its interactions). Various parameters in the models estimated in the paper allow me to see the combined level and trend differences in the pre-period. Here I can separate those level differences from differing *trends* (albeit parametrically assumed linear trends), which are the primary threat to inference.

Model 1 of Table [G1](#) shows that White respondents were, in level terms, were more supportive of the death penalty than Black respondents. Crucially, however, I find no *differential* pre-1967 trends between respondents by race and region. The final interaction with T is very small in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, when I consider the White-only sample in column 2, I once again I find that the magnitude of the differential trend for Whites in the South relative to the non-South is small (a tenth of one percentage point) and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The results provide evidence that there were not statistically nor substantively meaningful differences in trends in death penalty support by race and region prior to the punitive turn.

Table G1: Death penalty support by race and geography pre-1967

	% Support Death Penalty	
	(1)	(2)
T	-0.024*** (0.0068)	-0.016*** (0.0033)
South	-0.30*** (0.053)	-0.33*** (0.061)
White	0.19*** (0.047)	
White \times T	0.0092* (0.0048)	
South \times T	0.0014 (0.0063)	-0.0018 (0.0038)
White \times South \times T	-0.0032 (0.0075)	
Homicide rate (W)	0.0074 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)
Homicide rate (NW)	0.013*** (0.0025)	0.012*** (0.0023)
Year Period	1953-1965	1953-1965
Sample	W&B	White-only
Survey FE	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓
Crime Control	16005	16005

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: The above equation estimates equation 3 for the pre-1967 period only.

H Crime Rates

In the main paper, I present and utilize race and region homicide rates as an indicator of violent crime. Homicides are the crime relevant to the death penalty, they are available by the separate race of victims, and they are available prior to the punitive turn. Thus, the value of these trends is that they allow me to examine not just trends by region, but also trends by race, which speaks to which racial groups were experiencing the most crime as well as which regions. The downside of using homicide rates is that homicide is just one aspect of crime, though it is a crime least likely to be manipulated in official statistics (see e.g., (Eckhouse 2021)).

Table H1: Sources of race-by-region homicide totals

Year	Report	Publication Year	Start Page
1986	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1986, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1988	196
1984	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1984, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1987	196
1982	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1982, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1986	196
1980	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1980, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1985	156
1978	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1978, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1981	7-152
1976	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1976, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1979	7-152
1974	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1974, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1976	7-168
1972	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1972, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1975	7-168
1970	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1970, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1974	7-168
1968	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1968, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1971	7-129
1966	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1966, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1968	7-134
1964	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1964, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1966	7-132
1962	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1962, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1964	7-114
1960	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1960, Volume II—Mortality, Part B	1963	7-125
1958	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1958, Volume II, Mortality Data	1960	322
1956	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1956, Volume II, Mortality Data	1958	184
1954	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1954, Volume II, Mortality Data	1956	174
1952	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1952, Volume II, Mortality Data	1955	96
1950	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1950, Volume III, Mortality Data	1953	246
1946	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1946, Part II, Natality and Mortality Data for the United States Tabulated by Place of Residence	1948	250
1942	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1942, Part II, Natality and Mortality Data for the United States Tabulated by Place of Residence	1944	217
1940	Vital Statistics of the United States, 1940, Part I, Natality and Mortality Data for the United States Tabulated by Place of Occurrence with Supplemental Tables for Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands	1943	268


Notes: Regional homicide rates were constructed by aggregating totals from individual state reports and normalizing by the relevant population from NHGIS census data. I try to use place of occurrence when tables/reports are differentiated by occurrence and residence, but occurrence is not always available. Start page refers to the page on which the relevant table starts. Otherwise, I assume that people are victimized in their state of residence. Reports in many cases are available annually. Due to resource limitations, I collect reports every other year and linearly impute intermediate years.

As noted in the main paper, I collect homicide rates from vital statistics reports published by the Centers for Disease Control. The sources of the homicide rates are provided in Table H1. Due to resource limitations, I collect reports every even numbered year during my primary period of interest (1953-1985) and linearly impute odd numbered years. The data are published by state, which I aggregate to the region because region is the lowest level of geographic aggregation consistently available across my punitive attitude data. The racial breakdowns available in the reports are White and non-White, with some (but not all) years

breaking non-White into both Black and Other racial categories. In none of the relevant years are hispanic breakdowns available.

In the main paper, I use homicide victim rates per 100,000 of the race relevant population. To calculate those normalized rates, I collect decennial census data from the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS). I calculate the White and non-White population, and linearly interpolate non decennial years. In some years there is a non-White population count given, while in other years I construct it from population counts across racial groups (i.e., Black, Asian, Native American). In this appendix, I also present results using the growth rate in the event that attitudes are formed, not in response to deviations from a long-run average, but instead relative to deviations from a long-run growth rate (trend).

Figure H1: Regional homicide rates by victim rate, 1953-1985




Notes: The above plots present the homicide rate by race of the victim by region. The y-axis are the same for all plots.

Figures [H1](#) and [H2](#) present the regional trends in the homicide rate and growth rate, respectively, by victim race. The plots consistently demonstrate that non-White victimization rates are higher in levels than White rates. However, although in levels the rates by race are different, the growth rates are much more comparable. The distinction in growth rates is that, with only some exceptions, the non-White homicide rate led the White homicide rate—growing earlier and delining earlier than.

In addition to homicide rates, in this appendix, I also use the standard UCR crime measures (Kaplan 2021). Geographically-disaggregated indexes of violent and property crime are available from 1960 on, thus, using this measure limits the pre-turn data by 50%. This crime measure also does not capture victim race. Figure H4 presents the graphical evidence of the trends. I find few differences in trends in either violent crime or property crime between the South and non-South. In the crucial pre-1967 period, the graphical evidence displays no differences in pre-trends. In terms of violent crime, the South and non-South have the same level in the pre-period and trend the same. In terms of property crime, the South had lower crime in the pre-period, but both regions were trending slightly upwards.


Figure H2: Regional homicide growth rates by victim rate, 1953-1985



Notes: The above plots present the homicide growth rate by race of the victim by region. The y-axis are the same for all plots.

Here I present the main results from the paper (Tables 1 and 2) with alternative measures of time-varying crime—the UCR measures of violent and property crime, and the homicide victim growth rate by race, each measured at the region. I present these in Tables H2 and H3. All tables demonstrate that the results are robust to the alternative crime measures. In addition, only the property crime rate is consistently distinguishable from zero. In the estimates in Table H3, I find that after accounting for changes in regional violent crime,

Figure H3: Regional crime rates, 1960-2010



Source: Kaplan (2021).

Notes: Above plots present trends in violent crime index and property crime index for the South and non-South per 100,000. I use the *actual* crime indexes from Jacob Kaplan's cleaned version of the FBI's Uniform Crime Report data. State-level data (to construct regions) are not available prior to 1960. Note the scales are different for plots (a) and (b).

property crime increases support for the death penalty. This is suggestive of the notion that death penalty support was not merely a rational response to the crime for which the death penalty was applicable, but instead, was a more generalized reaction to changing crime rates.

Table H4 presents the results from Table 3 in the main paper restricted to respondents in cities with at least 500,000 people. The sign and significance of the results are consistent with those estimated on the full sample. However, the magnitude is much larger. White respondents were negatively responsive to the White homicide rate prior to 1967; however after the punitive turn, they became more responsive. Still, their overall punitive attitudes after the punitive turn were *negatively* related to the White homicide rate (and entirely unresponsive to the non-White homicide rate).

Table H2: Relationship between race and punitiveness post-1967 with alternative regional time-varying measures of crime (Table 1)

	% Support Death Penalty	
	(1)	(2)
White	0.18*** (0.031)	0.16*** (0.024)
White × Post	0.087** (0.036)	0.12*** (0.029)
Violent crime rate	-0.00020* (0.000090)	
Property crime rate	0.000025 (0.000027)	
Homicide growth rate (W)		-0.31** (0.13)
Homicide growth rate (NW)		0.21* (0.11)
Year Period	1960-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓
Crime Control	✓	✓
Observations	33773	40089

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: The above table presents estimates of equation 1 with alternative measures of crime. Standard errors are clustered at the region. Data are weighted using post-stratification census constructed weights (Appendix E).


Table H3: Relationship between race, region and punitiveness post-1967 with alternative regional time-varying measures of crime (Table 2)

	% Support Death Penalty					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White	0.25*** (0.014)	0.23*** (0.014)			0.19** (0.059)	0.16*** (0.044)
South	-0.029 (0.028)	-0.060* (0.028)	-0.037 (0.026)	-0.072* (0.032)	-0.020 (0.084)	-0.057 (0.062)
South × Post	0.040 (0.027)	0.049** (0.020)	0.065** (0.025)	0.075** (0.024)	-0.044 (0.088)	-0.020 (0.059)
White × South					-0.034 (0.076)	-0.016 (0.063)
White × Post					0.044 (0.066)	0.080 (0.049)
White × South × Post-1967					0.12 (0.083)	0.096 (0.065)
Violent crime rate	0.000044 (0.000083)		0.000052 (0.000083)		0.000036 (0.000080)	
Property crime rate	0.000021** (0.0000084)		0.000021** (0.0000088)		0.000021** (0.0000067)	
Homicide growth rate (W)		-0.15 (0.18)		-0.13 (0.17)		-0.15 (0.17)
Homicide growth rate (NW)		0.065 (0.14)		0.067 (0.14)		0.050 (0.15)
Year Period	1960-85	1953-85	1960-85	1953-85	1960-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W&B	W-only	W-only	W&B	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Crime Control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	33773	40089	30130	35749	31290	38730

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: The above table presents estimates of equation 1 with alternative measures of crime. Standard errors are clustered at the region. Data are weighted using post-stratification census constructed weights (Appendix E).

Figure H4: Dynamic relationship between homicide rates and death penalty support



Notes: The above plots each present the total effects by year for the relationship between regional homicide rates and death penalty support. Thus, there is no omitted year. Each plot presents estimates for White and non-White homicide rates from a single specification on respondents from the given racial group. The vertical dashed line is at 1967.

Table H5 examines how responsiveness to the homicide rate changed by region amongst only respondents in large cities. I find no evidence amongst White respondents that death penalty support in the South become more closely coupled with the homicide rate (of either race). Thus, these results do not suggest that the reason the South became more punitive

Table H4: Death penalty support as a function of heterogenous responses to race-specific regional crime before to after 1967 by race, large cities only (Table 3)

	% Support Death Penalty		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Homicide rate (W)	-0.065** (0.026)	-0.030 (0.055)	-0.075 (0.061)
Homicide rate (NW)	0.0064 (0.0043)	0.0030 (0.010)	-0.00028 (0.0062)
Homicide rate (W) \times Post	0.048* (0.025)	0.061 (0.045)	0.065 (0.055)
Homicide rate (NW) \times Post	-0.0021 (0.0021)	-0.00076 (0.0085)	0.0021 (0.0077)
White			-0.048 (0.21)
White \times Post			0.20 (0.19)
Homicide rate (W) \times White			0.029 (0.047)
Homicide rate (NW) \times White			0.0062 (0.0089)
Homicide rate (W) \times White \times Post			-0.027 (0.040)
Homicide rate (NW) \times White \times Post			-0.0036 (0.0089)
Year Period	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W-only	B-only	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Crime Control	✓	✓	✓
Observations	8096	1690	9786

Notes: The above table presents OLS estimates of equation [1](#) with additional interactions of race-by-region homicide rate per 100,000 of the race relevant population. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust to regional clustering. Data are weighted using post-stratification census weights (Appendix [E](#)). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

is because people in the South were differentially responsive to regional changes in crime, as measured by the homicide victimization rate.

Table H5: Death penalty support as a function of heterogenous responses to race-specific regional crime before to after 1967 by race and region, large cities only (Table 3)

	% Support Death Penalty	
	(1)	(2)
South	-0.048 (0.044)	-0.18** (0.075)
Homicide rate (W)	-0.075** (0.030)	-0.023 (0.071)
Homicide rate (NW)	0.0073*** (0.0017)	-0.0042 (0.0054)
Homicide rate (W) × Post	0.053* (0.024)	0.0090 (0.060)
Homicide rate (NW) × Post	-0.0011 (0.0016)	0.0051 (0.0051)
Homicide rate (W) × South	0.012 (0.022)	0.098* (0.047)
Homicide rate (NW) × South	-0.00100 (0.00097)	-0.0082 (0.0050)
Homicide rate (W) × South × Post	0.0069 (0.016)	-0.078 (0.043)
Homicide rate (NW) × South × Post	-0.0019* (0.00093)	0.0083* (0.0042)
Year Period	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W-only	B-only
Survey FE	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓
Crime Control	✓	✓
Observations	35749	4340

Notes: The above table presents OLS estimates of equation [1](#) with additional interactions of race-by-region homicide rate per 100,000 for the race relevant population. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust to regional clustering. Data are weighted using post-stratification census weights ([Appendix E](#)). Average death penalty support over the above analysis period is 0.64 (sd= 0.48). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

I Black Respondents-Only Results

In this appendix, I consider the South-non-South differences in Black support for the death penalty pre-post 1967. I find that the differential post-1967 response by Black people in the south was small—1 percentage point—and statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels (Table I1). Thus, there is little evidence of regional differences in the pre-to-post punitive turn death penalty support amongst Black people. The dynamic relationship plotted in Figure I1 does not suggest a trend hiding behind the aggregated relationship of Table I1

Table I1: Death penalty support amongst Black respondents only as a function of geography pre to post-1967


	% Support Death Penalty	
	(1)	(2)
South	-0.056 (0.030)	-0.062** (0.025)
South × Post	-0.019 (0.043)	-0.025 (0.044)
Homicide rate (W)		0.0044 (0.0048)
Homicide rate (NW)		-0.00076 (0.0013)
Year Period	1953-85	1953-85
Survey FE	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓
Crime Control		✓
Observations	4340	4340

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: The above table presents estimates of equation I1 for the sub-sample of black respondents only. Standard errors are clustered at the region. Data are weighted using post-stratification census constructed weights (Appendix E).

Figure I1: Dynamic relationship for region for Black respondents only

(a) Table I1, Model 1
south × year




Notes: The above plots present estimates of partial correlations for Black respondents only. The plot presents estimates from a single model with the main parameter of interest interacted with individual survey-year indicators. These are total effects with no omitted year.

J Results Including ‘Don’t Know’ Responses

This appendix presents estimates measuring the outcome variable of death penalty support as a binary variable where I code 1 for responses in support of the death penalty in the case of murder, and 0 for responses not in support, *as well as* “don’t know” and non-responses. Whereas the results in the main paper leave out don’t know and non-responses, here I consider avowed support as compared to a grouped category of non-support, ambivalence and unwillingness to respond.


Figure J1: Structural break in aggregate support for the death penalty including don’t know responses, 1953-1985



Notes: The above plot (a) shows the population weighted trends in the percentage of respondents indicating support for the death penalty in the case of murder with the inclusion of “don’t know” responses as “no” responses. Plot (b) presents the Wald test statistic (τ) from the Wald supremum test for a single structural break at each year against the null hypothesis of no structural break. The vertical line indicates the most likely break year.

Figure [J1](#) and the associated analysis find the same structural break year in the aggregate trend excluding don’t know responses. The race-specific trends also identify 1967 as a possible break year (Figure [J2](#)), though the test statistics are smaller than the aggregate. In the case of White respondents, there is also evidence that a break may have come earlier in the 1960s.

Figure J2: Structural break in support for the death penalty by race including don't know responses, 1953-1985



Notes: The above plots (a) and (b) show the population weighted trends in the percentage of respondents indicating support for the death penalty in the case of murder with the inclusion of “don’t know” responses as “no” responses. Plots (c) and (d) present the Wald test statistic from the Wald supremum test of a single structural break at each year against the null hypothesis of no structural break. The vertical lines indicate the most likely break year.

Table J1: Death penalty support as a function of race pre to post-1967 including don't know responses

	% Support Death Penalty	
	(1)	(2)
White	0.15*** (0.023)	0.15*** (0.023)
White × Post	0.12*** (0.024)	0.12*** (0.025)
Year Period	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓
Crime Control		✓
Observations	43846	43846

Notes: The above table presents estimates of equation 1 with the inclusion of “don’t know” responses as “no” responses. Standard errors are clustered at the region. Data are weighted using post-stratification census weights (Appendix E). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table J2: Death penalty support as a function of race and geography pre to post-1967 with the inclusion of don't know responses

	% Support Death Penalty					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White					0.15*** (0.030)	0.17*** (0.034)
South	-0.13*** (0.021)	-0.13*** (0.016)	-0.11*** (0.025)	-0.095*** (0.013)	-0.087* (0.046)	-0.095 (0.053)
South \times Post	0.063*** (0.018)	0.053** (0.017)	0.075*** (0.018)	0.065*** (0.018)	-0.0018 (0.054)	-0.0079 (0.060)
White \times South					-0.016 (0.055)	0.00072 (0.048)
White \times Post					0.100** (0.038)	0.075 (0.043)
White \times South \times Post-1967					0.077 (0.055)	0.071 (0.055)
Violent crime rate		-0.00014** (0.000059)		-0.000071 (0.000060)		-0.000088 (0.000064)
Year Period	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W&B	W-only	W-only	W&B	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Crime Control		✓		✓		✓
Observations	43846	36641	38935	32548	43846	36641


Notes: The above table presents OLS estimates of equation 2 with the inclusion of “don't know” responses as “no” responses. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust to regional-clustering. Data are weighted using post-stratification census weights (Appendix E). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

K Results Including 1936

In the paper, I use data from as early as 1953. However, as I note in the paper, and indicate in Appendix [A](#), there is one earlier survey that includes the question about the death penalty in the case of murder: a survey from 1936. The challenge in using this survey is both in applying survey weights and in the lack of comparable covariates. In this appendix, I include the 1936 survey in the results using unweighted data and any covariates that are available on this and other surveys comparably.⁴⁶

One of the challenges with including data from 1936, beyond those noted above, is that there is a large gap—17 years—between 1936 and the next available year of data, 1953. In no other part of the series is there a gap of such magnitude.

Figure K1: Structural break in aggregate support for the death penalty with unweighted data, 1936-1985




Notes: The above plot (a) shows the unweighted trends in the percentage of respondents indicating support for the death penalty in the case of murder. Plot (b) presents the Wald test statistic for a single structural break at each year against the null hypothesis of no structural break. The vertical line indicates the most likely break year.

Table K1: Death penalty support as a function of race pre to post-1967 with unweighted data including 1936

% Support Death Penalty	
(1)	
White	0.13*** (0.026)
White × Post	0.12*** (0.023)
Year Period	1936-85
Race Sample	W&B
Survey FE	✓
Controls	✓
Crime Control	
Observations	40197

Notes: The above table presents estimates of equation [1](#). Standard errors are clustered at the region. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure K2: Structural break in support for the death penalty by race including with un-weighted data, 1936-1985



Notes: The above plots (a) and (b) show the unweighted trends in the percentage of respondents indicating support for the death penalty in the case of murder. Plots (c) and (d) present the Wald test statistic from the test for a single structural break at each year against the null hypothesis of no structural break. As the result of standard trimming, there are no test statistics calculated before the 1950s data enters.

Table K2: Death penalty support as a function of race and geography pre to post-1967 with unweighted data including 1936

	% Support Death Penalty		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
South	-0.11*** (0.022)	-0.10*** (0.027)	-0.10** (0.033)
South × Post	0.060** (0.022)	0.084** (0.026)	-0.0030 (0.039)
White			0.12*** (0.010)
White × South			0.0040 (0.051)
White × Post			0.098*** (0.018)
White × South × Post-1966			0.089 (0.050)
Year Period	1936-85	1936-85	1936-85
Race Sample	W&B	W-only	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Crime Control			
Observations	40197	35845	40197

Notes: The above table presents OLS estimates of equation 2. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust to regional-clustering. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


L Additional Results for Partisanship and Punitiveness

This appendix describes the measurement of partisanship and presents additional partisan-related analyses.

In terms of measurement, the question wording of the partisanship question is: “As of today, do you consider yourself. . . ?” Only in 1967 was the question wording different, asking “As of today, which party has your best interests at heart?” The 1967 question and the GSS questions ask about strength of affiliation (i.e., “strong Democrat” or “lean Democrat”), while the others do not.

I also consider the vote support for three Presidents that used significant law and order rhetoric. The candidates are Barry Goldwater, who ran in 1964; George Wallace, who ran in 1968; and Richard Nixon who ran in 1968 and 1972. Law and order was by no means the only policy on which these candidates ran, their platforms were certainly distinct, and they faced off against different candidates. However, law and order was an important issue for each candidate. It must be noted that I do not have earlier Nixon vote information, and that Wallace and Nixon ran against each other in 1972. Given that, in the estimation I consider having voted for either candidate.

Figure L1: Dynamic relationship between partisanship and punitiveness, 1953-1985



Notes: The above plots present the trends in punitiveness by partisanship (plot a), point estimates of the total effect from a single specification (plot b), individual estimates of presidential vote and punitiveness from separate specifications for each candidate (plot c), and differential by south (plot d).

In the candidate specific responses, I exclude respondents who do not recall their vote, or who did not or were unable to vote for a given election. I include questions from both the survey in the year immediately following the Presidential election and more distant retrospective questions (available from the GSS only). For example, the GSS asks about vote choice in 1972 from as late as 1977. The Gallup question wording is: “In the election in [date], when [candidate] ran against [candidate], did things come up which kept you from voting, or did you happen to vote? For whom?” The GSS question wording is: “In [date], you

remember that [candidate] ran for President on the Democratic ticket against [candidate] for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election? Did you vote for [candidate] or [candidate]??”

I present the results in plots c and d of Figure L1 and Table L1. I find that White respondents who voted for one of the law and order candidates are more likely to support the death penalty (plot c). However, I do not find consistent regional variation in that support. Wallace supporters in the South were significantly *less* supportive of the death penalty, while for most other candidates in most years, there is no regional moderation that is distinguishable from zero.

Table L1: Heterogeneity in death penalty support by region and partisanship for particular Presidential vote shares

	% Support Death Penalty		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
South	0.64** (0.20)	-2.17*** (0.13)	-0.054 (0.044)
Goldwater vote	0.053 (0.039)		
Goldwater vote \times South	-0.00036 (0.042)		
Wallace vote		0.26*** (0.054)	
Wallace vote \times South		-0.25** (0.087)	
Nixon vote			0.15*** (0.023)
Nixon vote \times South			0.029 (0.043)
Homicide rate (W)	-0.22*** (0.031)	0.36*** (0.024)	0.028* (0.013)
Homicide rate (NW)	-0.011 (0.0080)	0.084*** (0.0047)	-0.00019 (0.0031)
Year	1965	1969	1969-77
Race Sample	W-only	W-only	W-only
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Crime	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1923	430	3860

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: The above table presents OLS estimates of equation 1. The years are the years that the questions about Presidential vote were asked. They may not be the same year as the actual campaign.

M Additional Results for Urban and Punitiveness

Is it the case that urban environments, where crime is largest are driving increased punitiveness? This conjecture is rooted in the idea that genuine victimization risk, shaped by proximity to violence, which is higher in very urban areas, is the source of punitiveness. If it's the case that some urban areas—like those in the South—are more dangerous, or that the victimization risk (or elasticity relative to the baseline risk) is higher for certain racial groups, then urban areas could be associated with increased punitiveness and with heterogeneity by race and region.

Table M1: Heterogeneity in death penalty support by race, region and urban, 1953-1967

	% Support Death Penalty				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Urban	0.054** (0.017)	0.049** (0.016)	0.047** (0.019)	0.041* (0.020)	-0.0033 (0.080)
White	0.23*** (0.014)	0.16*** (0.028)	0.23*** (0.014)		0.13** (0.050)
South	-0.028 (0.019)	-0.028 (0.019)	-0.054 (0.030)	-0.068* (0.033)	-0.073* (0.035)
White × Post		0.13*** (0.037)			0.16** (0.049)
South × Post			0.040 (0.022)	0.071** (0.022)	0.065** (0.027)
White × Urban					0.040 (0.084)
South × Urban					0.041 (0.024)
Urban × Post-1967	-0.058*** (0.014)	-0.0042 (0.028)	-0.051** (0.016)	-0.041** (0.014)	0.056 (0.077)
White × Urban × Post		-0.054 (0.033)			-0.100 (0.079)
South × Urban × Post			0.014 (0.037)	0.000054 (0.042)	-0.038 (0.025)
White × South × Urban × Post					0.0057 (0.044)
Year	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W&B	W&B	W-only	W&B
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Crime Control					
Observations	40089	40089	40089	35749	40089

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: The above table presents OLS estimates of an augmented version of equation [1](#). Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust clustered at the region. Data are weighted using post-stratification census weights ([Appendix E](#)).

Ideally, I would have data on individuals by city and urban-specific crime rates along with punitive attitudes. Unfortunately, this data is not available. I therefore use a proxy for cities experiencing more crime by using a measure of whether respondents in my sample live in the largest cities—those with 500,000 or more residents.⁴⁷ This measure is available across both Gallup and GSS surveys. A measure of larger cities is not available. For reference, in 1970, the population of Portland, OR was around 380,000; the population of Atlanta, GA was around 490,000; the population of St. Louis, MO was around 620,000; the population of Washington, DC was around 760,000; and the population of Los Angeles, CA was around 2.8 million. There are many aspects to being a city of this size, and crime is just one aspect of that (and may display significant variation across cities of that size and overtime).

To understand the urban areas where crime was highest around the punitive turn, I

Table M2: Heterogeneity in death penalty support by race, region and urban including time-varying crime, 1953-1967

	% Support Death Penalty				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Urban	0.051** (0.015)	0.046** (0.015)	0.046** (0.018)	0.040* (0.019)	-0.0030 (0.079)
White	0.23*** (0.014)	0.16*** (0.028)	0.23*** (0.014)		0.13** (0.050)
South	-0.048* (0.022)	-0.048* (0.023)	-0.068* (0.034)	-0.082* (0.037)	-0.086* (0.038)
White × Post		0.13*** (0.036)			0.16** (0.048)
South × Post			0.031 (0.024)	0.062** (0.023)	0.056* (0.030)
White × Urban					0.038 (0.084)
South × Urban					0.044 (0.024)
Urban × Post-1967	-0.060*** (0.012)	-0.00053 (0.026)	-0.055*** (0.014)	-0.046*** (0.013)	0.056 (0.076)
White × Urban × Post		-0.060 (0.032)			-0.10 (0.079)
South × Urban × Post			0.013 (0.034)	-0.000036 (0.039)	-0.045 (0.025)
White × South × Urban × Post					0.0098 (0.045)
Homicide rate (W)	0.0090* (0.0046)	0.0090 (0.0048)	0.0086* (0.0039)	0.0087* (0.0040)	0.0085* (0.0038)
Homicide rate (NW)	-0.00088 (0.00059)	-0.00098 (0.00061)	-0.00077 (0.00060)	-0.00083 (0.00062)	-0.00083 (0.00063)
Year	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W&B	W&B	W-only	W&B
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Crime Control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	40089	40089	40089	35749	40089

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: The above table presents OLS estimates of equation 1 for the sub-sample of black respondents only. Standard errors are clustered at the region. Data are weighted using post-stratification census constructed weights (Appendix E).

examine information from the midcentury uniform crime reports (FBI 1974) (pgs. 77-95). Using the Index of Total Crime, the highest crime Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area was Phoenix in 1973. The other top 10 were: Daytona Beach, Las Vegas, Fort Lauderdale, Fresno, San Francisco, West Palm Beach, Reno, Albuquerque, and Stockton.⁴⁸


Table M1 presents the main analyses using an interaction between Urban (cities with more than 500,000 residents), the post punitive turn indicator (*post*), the race indicator (*White*), and the region of interest indicator (*South*).⁴⁹ Table M2 presents the same results with the time-varying region-specific homicide rate by race. The estimation strategy asks: was death penalty support different among White respondents, respondents in the South, and both, when the respondents were in large urban areas? If White respondents in urban areas, or those in urban areas of the South are more punitive after 1967, it would be suggestive (though not conclusive) that localized exposure to crime is one of the roots of punitive attitudes. However, the fact that White people experienced the differential change, or Southern White people would still require additional explanation.⁵⁰

There is relatively limited evidence that urban has that expected relationship. Although on its own living in a city of more than 500,000 residents is associated with higher death penalty support in the pre-1967 period (by 3-4 percentage points), post-1967 the estimated relationship is negative (models 1, 3, 4), small (model 2), or not at all statistically significant

(model 5). Thus, urban respondents were becoming, if anything, less punitive after 1967 than before. This is also true for White urban respondents, specifically, after 1967 by 6-10 percentage points (models 2, 5). The one place where the relationship seems potentially consistent with proximate experience of urban crime driving the relationship is that those in urban areas in the South post-1967 become more punitive by around 4 percentage points (models 3, 4). Because of the multiple cuts to the data, I am generous in thinking about statistical significance.

Obviously, one of the challenges in interpreting results that differentiate between urban and non-urban, and which collapse the post-1967 period into a single parameter estimate is that there was a well-known process of suburbanization and White flight that occurred during this period, that was in part driven by high crime and a decaying urban landscape (Frey, 1979; Kruse, 2005). If it is the case that White people most likely to have high punitiveness left urban areas because of high crime, then we would not expect the above relationship to hold.

Figure M1: Dynamic relationships between race, region and urban, 1953-1985



Notes: The above plots present estimates of dynamic partial correlations. Each plot presents estimates from a single model with the main parameter of interest interacted with individual survey-year indicators. The correlations are total effects and there is no omitted year.

Absent a true panel, evaluating this possibility is challenging. Moreover, neither Gallup nor the GSS has a “suburban” variable. However, in addition to the main estimates, I also consider a model of the dynamic relationship overtime (see Appendix F). Because White flight was a process that arguably resulted *from* high crime that might have driven punitiveness, we would expect earlier post-1967 periods to have higher death penalty support associated with urban areas, and for the relationship to weaken over time.

Figure M1 presents those dynamic plots. Indeed, there is evidence of this pattern. From 1967 to the early 1970s, the relationship between urban and death penalty support is modestly positive (plot a). Afterwards, however, the relationship is consistently more negative. Plot b suggests that this relationship is could be more pronounced amongst White respondents, as we might expect. While plots c and d provides little evidence of a consistent differential pattern overtime between how urban moderates the relationship between punitiveness and the South, or the South and White combined.

One interpretation of that relationship is that those more supportive of the death penalty left urban areas, leaving those less supportive of the death penalty behind. An additional pattern of sorting could also be at play—in addition to a “remain” factor, cities may also have begun to draw in ideologically liberal residents towards the end of the period.

N Additional Results for Prejudice, Welfare and Punitiveness

In this appendix, I present additional details about measurement and the results examining racial prejudice, welfare support and death penalty support.

The existing literature suggests that White punitiveness is frequently linked to racial prejudice. To understand the role of prejudice, I focus on available surveys that ask *both* about punitiveness *and* about racial attitudes. I collect nine measures of racial prejudice across twelve surveys from 1966 to 1985. I measure prejudice along the extensive margin for ease of interpretation—if a respondent indicated the prejudicial response to any of the available nine survey questions in a given survey.

Table N1: Questions related to racial prejudice, 1953-1985

Variable	Years	Question	GSS
Black Neighbor	1966	How likely would you be to move if a Black person moved next door to you?	N
Black Neighborhood	1966	How likely would you be to move if many Black people moved to your neighborhood?	N
Interracial Marriage	1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985	Do you think there should be laws against marriages between Black people and whites?	Y
Interracial Dinner	1974, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985	How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a Black friend home to dinner?	Y
Integrate Club	1977, 1985	If you and your friends belonged to a social club that would not let Black people join, would you try to change the rules so that Black people could join?	Y
Integrated School	1974, 1975, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985	Would you yourself have any objection to sending your children to a school where a few of the children are of the opposite race?	Y
Neighborhood Segregation	1976, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985	<i>[How strongly do you agree with the following statement:]</i> White people have a right to keep Black people out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and Black people should respect that right.	Y
Vote Black President	1974, 1975, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1985	If your party nominated a Black person for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?	Y
Bussing	1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1985	In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of Black and White school children from one school district to another?	Y


Notes: The racial terms differ by year (e.g., Black, Negro, African American).

Ideally, the same question(s) would be available both before and after the punitive turn in order to assess whether White respondents in the South more strongly associated death penalty support and prejudice from before to after 1967—the implication that derived from prejudice among White Southerners driving the punitive turn. Unfortunately, there is only one question related to prejudice from before 1967, and the question was only asked once, making inter-temporal comparisons deeply confounded by changing questions. Therefore, I examine heterogeneity in the relationship between region, prejudice and support for the death penalty, not pre-to post turn heterogeneity.

I use the following nine questions in Table [N1](#). I focus on questions that ask as directly as possible about racial attitudes without other confounding factors (e.g., questions about driving through a particular neighborhood, or questions about sending one’s child to a school dominated by another race.)⁵¹ I code the prejudice variable such that an indication of prejudice for *any* question in a given survey (e.g., agreeing with segregation or laws against interracial marriage) is coded as 1 and other avowed responses are coded as zero (I exclude “don’t know”).

Absent substantial data from before the punitive turn, the aim with this correlational analysis is to understand whether, on average, the South is more likely to exhibit positive heterogeneity between South and prejudice. Although this on its own cannot answer whether that relationship was higher or lower in the re-turn period, it would nevertheless only be *suggestive* that punitive support is related to prejudice.

Figure N1: Relationship between racial prejudice and punitiveness by year, 1966-1985



Notes: The above plots present estimates partial correlations by year. Each plot presents estimates from one model. The estimates are total effects, thus there is no omitted year. Plot b presents the differential relationship by region, after accounting for the general prejudice relationship over time.

Figure [N1](#) presents the dynamic relationship over time for White respondents only. I estimate the direct effect of my prejudice variable by year (plot a), and a separate model with the interaction with the South (plot b). These models present total effects, thus there is no omitted base year against which the estimates should be compared. I include the time varying regional crime control in all specifications in this appendix.


I find that White respondents who exhibit more prejudice are more likely to support the death penalty—by about 8.5 percentage points—consistent with existing literature.⁵² However, I find little evidence that White voters in the South who hold more prejudicial attitudes are differentially more likely to support the death penalty than those in the North. After accounting for the relationship between prejudice and death penalty support in each year, the South either negatively or fails to moderate the relationship (plot b).

With only one pre-1967 measure, it’s impossible to assess change in this moderation from before to after 1967 and the punitive turn. However, if anything I find that racially prejudicial White respondents in the South are less likely than their Northern counterparts to support the death penalty over the available surveys. On its own, these results cannot falsify the prediction that White Southerners *changed* in the role of prejudice in their punitive attitudes. However, the lack of any differential regional relationship in the post period suggests that the relationship between prejudice and punitiveness in the pre-punitive turn period would have had to have been negative in order for a strengthened moderation play an important role.

Thus, these results indicate the expected relationship between prejudice and punitive-

ness, as measured by death penalty support, but cannot resolve the regional variation. In absolute terms, the South is no more or less likely to have a relationship between prejudice and death penalty support—on average, for all measures in all years, the relationship is basically zero. Still, it’s unknown whether this relationship was significantly different in the pre-punitive turn period given the single pre-1967 survey with measures of prejudice and punitiveness—e.g., although there is a null relationship during this period, it’s possible that the pre-1967 relationship was decidedly *negative*, indicating a pre-to-post turn *change* in the relationship.

Figure N2: Relationship between generalized welfare support and punitiveness by year, 1966-1985



Notes: The above plots present estimates partial correlations by year. Each plot presents estimates from a separate model, thus there is no omitted variable. Plot b presents the differential relationship by region, after accounting for the general welfare relationship over time.


In order to understand the relationship between welfare support, race, region and punitiveness, I use two GSS question: *i)* is the government spending too much, too little, or about the right amount of money on welfare; and *ii)* Some people think that Black people have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. . . Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to Black people. . . Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you made up your mind on this? In the case of *i)*, I code government spending as doing enough or should do more as 1, and zero if the government is doing too much. In the case of *ii)*, which approximates an affirmative action question, I code as 1 if the government should help to “some extent” and zero if Black people should be given no special treatment.

Figure N2 presents the results for the relationship between welfare support, region and death penalty support amongst White respondents. Plot a shows a consistent negative relationship between support for more welfare and death penalty support from a specification absent regional heterogeneity. Respondents who believe the government is spending too much on welfare are also those more likely to support the death penalty. However, plot b shows no evidence of a negative moderated relationship for the South. Instead, White respondents in the South are more supportive of welfare policies. Those that support the death penalty in the South are not consistently more or less likely to support more government welfare. Finally, in terms of support for Black people (a measure of government support or affirmative action), I find similar results (Figure N3). Those who support affirmative action are less likely to support the death penalty. But there is no difference in that support between White respondents in the South and non-South.

Once again, it would be ideal to be able to analyze a *change* in welfare support to best understood whether the punitive turn was accompanied by a change in the relationship

between welfare support and region. Unfortunately, I can say that there is no general post-turn regional pattern consistent with a lack of welfare support being the reason for more punitive support.

Figure N3: Relationship between affirmative action/welfare support and punitiveness by year, 1966-1985



Notes: The above plots present estimates partial correlations by year. Each plot presents estimates from a separate model, thus there is no omitted variable. Plot b presents the differential relationship by region, after accounting for the general affirmative action relationship over time.

I summarize the results in the figures above in the following table. They largely confirm the evidence presented in the plots. The only exception is that I estimate a 6 percentage point difference that is statistically significant between support for the death penalty amongst those with prejudicial attitudes in the South as compared to the non-South. Racially-prejudicial White people in the South are less likely to support the death penalty. This is not what one would predict if prejudice is shaping differential support in the South. However, again, this is an average in the post-turn period, rather than an estimate of change.

Table N2: Death penalty support as a function of prejudice and welfare support amongst White respondents

	% Support Death Penalty					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
South	-0.0089 (0.040)	0.0033 (0.020)		-0.014 (0.012)		-0.032* (0.015)
Prejudice	0.088*** (0.013)	0.11*** (0.010)				
Prejudice \times South		-0.079*** (0.018)				
Welfare support			-0.13*** (0.015)	-0.13*** (0.020)		
Welfare support \times South				0.011 (0.023)		
Affirm. action					-0.18*** (0.014)	-0.20*** (0.016)
Affirm. action \times South						0.031 (0.026)
Homicide rate (W)	-0.0018 (0.0094)	0.0069* (0.0037)	-0.0068 (0.0079)	0.0064 (0.0036)	-0.019* (0.0097)	0.0098** (0.0042)
Homicide rate (NW)	-0.0031 (0.0035)	-0.0019** (0.00069)	0.0013 (0.0031)	-0.0011 (0.00090)	0.0036 (0.0042)	-0.0023* (0.0011)
Race Sample	W-only	W-only	W-only	W-only	W-only	W-only
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Crime Control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	15400	15400	10667	10667	2684	2684

Notes: The above table presents estimates of equation [1](#). Standard errors are clustered at the region. Data are weighted using post-stratification census weights ([Appendix E](#)). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

O Full Results

This appendix presents the results from the main paper with the inclusion of all covariate parameter estimates. The omitted categories for the indicators are: female, NE region, city size below 20k, and no high school.

Table O1: Death penalty support as a function of race pre to post-1967 (Table 1 full)

	% Support Death Penalty	
	(1)	(2)
White	0.16*** (0.025)	0.16*** (0.026)
White × Post	0.12*** (0.030)	0.12*** (0.030)
Male	0.099*** (0.0033)	0.099*** (0.0034)
Age	0.0062*** (0.0017)	0.0062*** (0.0017)
Age ²	-0.000053*** (0.000016)	-0.000053*** (0.000016)
Educ: some HS	-0.0060 (0.014)	-0.0071 (0.014)
Educ: HS grad	0.051** (0.022)	0.050* (0.022)
Educ: Some college+	-0.018 (0.025)	-0.019 (0.025)
City size: 25-50k	0.0043 (0.011)	0.0043 (0.011)
City size: 50-100k	0.0066 (0.014)	0.0046 (0.011)
City size: 100-500k	0.0030 (0.011)	0.0024 (0.011)
City size: 500k+	0.019 (0.011)	0.018 (0.011)
Region: Mid Atlantic	0.065** (0.028)	0.061** (0.020)
Region: E North Central	0.027 (0.027)	0.018 (0.033)
Region: W North Central	-0.0035 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.036)
Region: S Atlantic	0.022 (0.027)	0.031 (0.024)
Region: W South Central	0.035 (0.027)	0.064 (0.038)
Region: Mountain	0.11*** (0.028)	0.13*** (0.026)
Region: Pacific	0.066** (0.027)	0.081** (0.032)
Homicide rate (W)		-0.0081 (0.0092)
Homicide rate (NW)		0.00019 (0.0020)
Year Period	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓
Crime Control		✓
Observations	40089	40089

Notes: The above table presents estimates of equation 1. Standard errors are clustered at the region. Data are weighted using post-stratification census weights (Appendix E). Average death penalty support over the above analysis period is 0.64 (sd= 0.48). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table O1 presents the results of Table 1. The magnitude of the race and racial interaction

Table O2: Death penalty support as a function of race and geography pre to post-1967 (Table 2 full)

	% Support Death Penalty					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White	0.23*** (0.014)	0.23*** (0.015)			0.16*** (0.038)	0.16*** (0.038)
South	-0.060* (0.029)	-0.073* (0.033)	-0.072* (0.032)	-0.085** (0.036)	-0.050 (0.064)	-0.064 (0.061)
South × Post	0.051* (0.023)	0.043 (0.024)	0.078** (0.024)	0.070** (0.025)	-0.024 (0.065)	-0.031 (0.068)
White × South					-0.023 (0.066)	-0.020 (0.066)
White × Post					0.084* (0.044)	0.084* (0.045)
White × South × Post-1967					0.10 (0.067)	0.10 (0.066)
Male	0.099*** (0.0033)	0.099*** (0.0033)	0.11*** (0.0047)	0.11*** (0.0047)	0.099*** (0.0032)	0.099*** (0.0032)
Age	0.0061*** (0.0017)	0.0062*** (0.0017)	0.0058** (0.0019)	0.0059** (0.0018)	0.0062*** (0.0017)	0.0062*** (0.0017)
Age ²	-0.000052** (0.000016)	-0.000052** (0.000016)	-0.000051** (0.000018)	-0.000051** (0.000018)	-0.000053** (0.000016)	-0.000053** (0.000016)
Educ: some HS	-0.0063 (0.015)	-0.0068 (0.014)	-0.00060 (0.016)	-0.0013 (0.016)	-0.0038 (0.014)	-0.0044 (0.014)
Educ: HS grad	0.050* (0.022)	0.050* (0.022)	0.055** (0.024)	0.055* (0.024)	0.051** (0.022)	0.051** (0.022)
Educ: Some college+	-0.016 (0.025)	-0.018 (0.026)	-0.014 (0.028)	-0.016 (0.028)	-0.014 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.026)
City size: 25-50k	0.0044 (0.011)	0.0021 (0.012)	0.0088 (0.011)	0.0061 (0.011)	0.0055 (0.011)	0.0032 (0.011)
City size: 50-100k	0.0065 (0.011)	0.0028 (0.013)	0.011 (0.012)	0.0072 (0.014)	0.0064 (0.012)	0.0026 (0.014)
City size: 100-500k	0.0014 (0.011)	-0.00066 (0.012)	-0.0014 (0.010)	-0.0040 (0.011)	0.0024 (0.012)	0.00031 (0.013)
City size: 500k+	0.023* (0.011)	0.019 (0.012)	0.023 (0.012)	0.018 (0.013)	0.022* (0.011)	0.017 (0.011)
Homicide rate (W)		0.0079* (0.0039)		0.0080* (0.0040)		0.0077* (0.0039)
Homicide rate (NW)		-0.00084 (0.00066)		-0.00088 (0.00069)		-0.00089 (0.00066)
Year Period	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W&B	W-only	W-only	W&B	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Crime Control		✓		✓		✓
Observations	40089	40089	35749	35749	40089	40089

Notes: The above table presents OLS estimates of equation 2. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust to regional clustering. Data are weighted using post-stratification census weights (Appendix E). Average death penalty support over the above analysis period is 0.64 (sd= 0.48). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

are striking. In magnitude, there is no other predictor that is as strong—White respondents are on average approximately 25 percentage points more likely to support the death penalty than Black respondents. The magnitude of the post-1967 difference (9-12 percentage points) is similar in magnitude to relationship between identifying as male and support for the death penalty (men are 9 percentage points more likely to support the death penalty). There is no statistically significant nor substantively meaningful role for regional crime in punitive attitudes, as measured by death penalty support.

Table O2 presents the results of Table 2. Consistently men are more supportive of the death penalty across the specifications in magnitude that is on par with the racial and regional variation. For example, in model 5, the differential post-1967 punitiveness for White respondents in the South is 9.7 percentage points, effectively the same as the general

9.7 percentage point difference between men and women. No factor is as important as race (15-18 percentage points). Finally, it's worth noting that regional violent crime is negatively related to support for the death penalty.

P Additional Results for Region

This appendix considers additional regional analyses in two ways. First, I consider the constituent regions of the South; and second, I use Gallup data, which is available by state, in order to compare the Sunbelt (South including the Southwest) to the South (H5).

In the main analyses of the paper, I use the census region that constitutes the South (see Appendix [A](#)).⁵³ This Census region is comprised of three sub-regions: the South Atlantic, the SE Central and the SW Central. In Table [P1](#) I present the main regional results of the paper broken down to the sub-regional level. In all analyses, the reserved category is the non-South.

I find that across all of the specifications, the SE Central and the SW Central experience higher support for the death penalty in the post-1967 period than in the pre-1967 period. In addition, restricting the analysis to White respondents only (models 3 and 4), the South Atlantic also exhibits higher post-1967 support relative to the non-South. However, it is the least supportive of all the regions—by 2-7 percentage points. At the same time, like all of the sub-regions, it was also the least supportive in the pre-1967, and fully closed the gap in death penalty support, just as the other sub-regions. The magnitudes are comparable to those estimates that group the sub-regions.

In terms of comparing the regions, the SE Central has the highest estimated post-1967 change in death penalty support (8-12 percentage points). And the difference in the pre-post change between Black and White respondents is highest—24 percentage points, two thirds more than the estimate for the SW Central (I reject the null hypothesis that the estimates are the same, $p = 0.000$). This suggests that the Central South experienced the largest changes in punitiveness and those that were most different between Black and White people at the punitive turn.

In Table [P2](#) I consider Gallup data alone, which is available by state and ask whether the inclusion of the Sunbelt states of California, Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada with the states in the South alters the results. Because of the smaller sample size—approximately half as large—the results are much noisier than the main results in the paper. However, the inclusion of the additional Sunbelt states (columns 2, 4 and 6) does not strengthen the results relative to the main results for the South (columns 1, 3 and 5), and if anything marginally reduces the magnitude of the regional effects.

Because the South contains states that are not always included as part of the Sunbelt (e.g., Virginia), I also estimate specifications that compare the Sunbelt states in the South, to the broader Sunbelt (Table [P3](#)).⁵⁴ The Sunbelt states in the South-only are: Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina. While the full Sunbelt also includes those states mentioned in the previous paragraph.

I find once again stronger (and more statistically significant) results for the South-only part of the Sunbelt, although again the results are much noisier than the main results in the paper given the smaller sample size. The most meaningful difference between the results is that in the pre-period, the full Sunbelt were experiencing no change in their punitiveness on average (estimate on *Sunbelt*), while the South-only part of the Sunbelt was experiencing a decline in punitiveness (estimate on *Sunbelt(South - only)*).

Finally, I estimate combined specifications that don't ask readers to compare across models, but instead evaluate whether the two regions of the Sunbelt—the South and the Southwest—experienced different pre and post-1967 trends in death penalty support relative

Table P1: Death penalty support as a function of race and geography pre to post-1967 with sub-regions

	% Support Death Penalty					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White	0.23*** (0.015)	0.23*** (0.015)			0.16*** (0.038)	0.16*** (0.037)
S Atlantic	-0.042* (0.023)	-0.048* (0.024)	-0.042* (0.020)	-0.049* (0.022)	-0.095 (0.059)	-0.10 (0.058)
SE Central	-0.13*** (0.025)	-0.14*** (0.027)	-0.16*** (0.023)	-0.18*** (0.026)	0.013 (0.057)	-0.0037 (0.057)
SW Central	-0.052* (0.023)	-0.063** (0.027)	-0.067** (0.022)	-0.079** (0.026)	-0.014 (0.054)	-0.027 (0.054)
S Atlantic × Post	0.031 (0.019)	0.027 (0.022)	0.049*** (0.015)	0.045** (0.019)	0.016 (0.060)	0.012 (0.063)
SE Central × Post	0.075*** (0.020)	0.077** (0.023)	0.12*** (0.017)	0.12*** (0.021)	-0.11 (0.059)	-0.11 (0.062)
SW Central × Post	0.073*** (0.019)	0.047* (0.023)	0.10*** (0.016)	0.072** (0.022)	-0.038 (0.055)	-0.064 (0.058)
S Atlantic × White					0.053 (0.043)	0.056 (0.043)
SE Central × White					-0.18*** (0.038)	-0.17*** (0.037)
SW Central × White					-0.053 (0.037)	-0.050 (0.036)
S Atlantic × White × Post					0.030 (0.048)	0.030 (0.048)
SE Central × White × Post					0.23*** (0.044)	0.23*** (0.044)
SW Central × White × Post					0.14*** (0.041)	0.14*** (0.041)
Homicide rate (W)		0.0069 (0.0053)		0.0077 (0.0056)		0.0068 (0.0053)
Homicide rate (NW)		-0.0011 (0.00072)		-0.0011 (0.00074)		-0.0011 (0.00071)
Year Period	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W&B	W-only	W-only	W&B	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Crime Control		✓		✓		✓
Observations	40089	40089	35749	35749	40089	40089

Notes: The above table presents OLS estimates of equation 2. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust to regional clustering. Data are weighted using post-stratification census weights (Appendix E). Average death penalty support over the above analysis period is 0.64 (sd= 0.48). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

to the remainder of the country (Table P4). I find that the Southwest states in the Sunbelt were more supportive of the death penalty in the pre-1967 period, but did not become increasingly supportive in the subsequent decades relative to the Southern states in the Sunbelt or to the remainder of the country (model 1). Thus the Southwest did not undergo a *turn* in punitiveness in the way that the South did. This result holds when restricting the analysis to White respondents only (model 2). Once again, in that model, I find that the Southwest was more supportive of the death penalty in the pre-1967 period (estimate on *Sunbelt (Southwest-only)*), but did not become more punitive in the decades afterwards (the estimate on *Sunbelt (Southwest-only) × Post* is small in magnitude—~1 percentage point

Table P2: Death penalty support as a function of race and geography pre to post-1967 comparing the South and the Sunbelt

	% Support Death Penalty					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White	0.20*** (0.021)	0.20*** (0.021)			0.16*** (0.039)	0.16*** (0.040)
South	-0.082** (0.035)		-0.090** (0.039)		-0.066 (0.063)	
South × Post	0.033 (0.026)		0.052* (0.023)		-0.013 (0.062)	
White × South					-0.024 (0.068)	
White × Post					0.077 (0.042)	0.079 (0.042)
South (+Sunbelt)		-0.075* (0.035)		-0.080* (0.037)		-0.064 (0.063)
South (+Sunbelt) × Post		0.029 (0.026)		0.047* (0.023)		-0.011 (0.062)
South (+Sunbelt) × White						-0.017 (0.067)
White × South × Post					0.064 (0.050)	
White × South (+Sunbelt) × Post						0.058 (0.049)
Homicide rate (W)	0.012* (0.0059)	0.010 (0.0062)	0.012 (0.0063)	0.0099 (0.0066)	0.012* (0.0059)	0.010 (0.0061)
Homicide rate (NW)	-0.00099 (0.0011)	-0.0012 (0.0012)	-0.00081 (0.0012)	-0.0011 (0.0013)	-0.00097 (0.0012)	-0.0012 (0.0012)
Year Period	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W&B	W-only	W-only	W&B	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Crime Control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	25833	25833	23231	23231	25833	25833

Notes: The above table presents OLS estimates of equation 2 on Gallup data only because GSS public use data does not contain state identifiers. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust to regional clustering. Data are weighted using post-stratification census weights (Appendix E). The South is defined as in the paper (Appendix A). The Sunbelt is defined as the South plus the following states: California, Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

and not statistically distinguishable from zero). If the Southwest underwent a *turn* in their punitive opinion, these results indicate both that it must have occurred in a different period and that it therefore did not reflect the broader national turn that occurred in the 1960s.

Finally, in the fully saturated model (model 3) that evaluates whether there were different trends in death penalty support by race by region, there is no evidence that White people in the Southwest became differentially more supportive of the death penalty after 1967 (estimate on the triple interaction term). Instead, White people in the Southwest were already more supportive of the death penalty in the pre-1967 period relative to White people in other regions (by approximately 8 percentage points). Once again, this suggests that White people in the Southwest may have played a role in crafting national-level punitive policy—indeed, on average throughout the period theirs was the highest regional *level* of support—but not because their punitive attitudes, as measured by their death penalty support, underwent a

Table P3: Death penalty support as a function of race and geography pre to post-1967 comparing the Sunbelt (South-only) and the full Sunbelt

	% Support Death Penalty					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
White	0.20*** (0.019)	0.20*** (0.020)			0.15*** (0.029)	0.16*** (0.026)
Sunbelt	-0.0068 (0.036)		-0.00040 (0.034)		-0.026 (0.093)	
Sunbelt \times Post	0.049 (0.033)		0.066* (0.033)		0.029 (0.087)	
White \times Post					0.084** (0.034)	0.084** (0.033)
Sunbelt (South-only)		-0.069** (0.024)		-0.075** (0.028)		-0.048 (0.093)
Sunbelt (South-only) \times Post		0.069* (0.030)		0.089*** (0.026)		0.024 (0.093)
Sunbelt \times White					0.020 (0.087)	
Sunbelt (South-only) \times White						-0.027 (0.097)
White \times Sunbelt \times Post					0.029 (0.078)	
White \times Sunbelt (South-only) \times Post						0.061 (0.082)
Homicide rate (W)	-0.0074 (0.0073)	0.0022 (0.0060)	-0.011 (0.0081)	0.0016 (0.0073)	-0.0078 (0.0073)	0.0020 (0.0060)
Homicide rate (NW)	-0.0023 (0.0013)	-0.0019 (0.0012)	-0.0020 (0.0013)	-0.0018 (0.0013)	-0.0023 (0.0013)	-0.0019 (0.0012)
Year Period	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W&B	W-only	W-only	W&B	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Crime Control	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	25833	25833	23231	23231	25833	25833

Notes: The above table presents OLS estimates of equation 2 on Gallup data only because GSS public use data does not contain state identifiers. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust to regional clustering. Data are weighted using post-stratification census weights (Appendix E). The Sunbelt is defined as the South plus the following states: California, Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

significant *change* in the mid 1960s.

Table P4: Death penalty support as a function of race, the South and the Southwest pre to post-1967

	% Support Death Penalty		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
White	0.20*** (0.019)		0.15*** (0.023)
Sunbelt (South-only)	-0.056* (0.025)	-0.058* (0.026)	-0.045 (0.11)
Sunbelt (Southwest-only)	0.068** (0.025)	0.078*** (0.022)	-0.0056 (0.042)
Sunbelt (South-only) × Post	0.079** (0.029)	0.10*** (0.023)	0.037 (0.10)
Sunbelt (Southwest-only) × Post	0.0012 (0.032)	0.010 (0.029)	0.011 (0.046)
White × Post			0.039 (0.032)
Sunbelt (South-only) × White			-0.014 (0.11)
Sunbelt (Southwest-only) × White			0.079** (0.025)
White × Sunbelt (South-only) × Post			0.062 (0.092)
Sunbelt (Southwest-only) × White × Post			-0.0059 (0.038)
Homicide rate (W)	-0.0032 (0.0068)	-0.0055 (0.0075)	-0.0044 (0.0069)
Homicide rate (NW)	-0.00067 (0.0012)	-0.00025 (0.0011)	-0.00079 (0.0012)
Year Period	1953-85	1953-85	1953-85
Race Sample	W&B	W-only	W&B
Survey FE	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Crime Control	✓	✓	✓
Observations	25833	23231	25833

Notes: The above table presents OLS estimates of equation 2 on Gallup data only because GSS public use data does not contain state identifiers. Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust to regional clustering. Data are weighted using post-stratification census weights (Appendix E). The Sunbelt (Southwest-only) is defined as California, Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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