

Status Threat, Partisanship, and Voters’ Conservative Shift
toward Right-wing Candidates
(Online supplement)

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A Compliance with the Principles and Guidance for Human
Subjects Research

All procedures in this study comply with ethical standards contained in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki, APSA’s Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research, approved on April 4th, 2020, and the HHS International Compilation of Human Research Standards.¹ It was also reviewed and approved by the IRB of the United States Naval Academy (USNA.2024.0007-IR-EM2-A). The full IRB approval form can be provided upon request.

The online survey was collected by Prolific.² The interviews were conducted online in in January, 2025 using Qualtrics. Participants were recruited by the survey firm, which sent survey invitations directly to

¹More information can be found at <https://www.hhs.gov/> and <https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/2020-international-compilation-of-human-research-standards.pdf>. Last access on January 20th, 2022.

²More information can be found at the website <https://www.prolific.com/>. Last access on February 9th, 2025.

participants who matched the study’s filters and quotas. People interested in participating in the study could click on a link in order to ‘accept’ the invitation. The link took people directly to the consent form. The informed consent explicates to the participants the research and its goals. Participants needed to mark an option in the informed consent to express their agreement to participate in the survey. Upon agreement, participants could start the survey.

Prolific sets a minimum payment of \$8.00 USD per hour for participants, and a recommended payment of \$12.00 USD per hour. Participants were paid based on the median completion time of the survey (which was about 13 minutes). The informed consent includes complete information about the compensation for participation.

All responses were anonymized, and no personally identifiable information was collected. The research did not include any special population, and the study was classified by IRB as ”minimal risk.”

In order to meet the goals of the study, participants were recruited through Prolific if they were US residents, over 18 years of age, non-Hispanic white, and US-born. To ensure a balanced sample, we recruited 50% male and 50% female, as well as 50% Democratic and 50% Republican. Responses were considered valid if the respondents accepted the informed consent, didn’t belong to any excluded demographics, and didn’t fail the survey attention checks (unrelated to the status threat manipulation). Details of the attention checks are presented in the questionnaire attached. The survey was immediately terminated if any one of those conditions that invalidated the response happened. No invalid response was recorded, and, per the informed consent, no compensation was offered for invalid responses. The survey does not contains deception. Participants had the ability to withdraw their data from analysis at the end of the survey after reading the debrief, without any impact on their compensation.

B Pre-registration and Pre-registration Reporting Table

The hypotheses, theoretical argument, and research design of this research were pre-registered at the Open Science Framework³ (OSF) prior to any data collection.

³Access at <https://osf.io/q5cha>

Table B.1: Pre-registration Reporting Table

	Specified in pre-registration?	Reported in manuscript?	Deviations
Sampling	Yes	Pg. 8	None
Sample Exclusions	Yes	Supplement, Pg. 34	None
Experimental Conditions	Yes	Pg. 5	None
Observed Measure 1 (Party Identification)	Yes	Pg. 8	None
Observed Measure 2 (Status Shift Perception)	Yes	Pg. 7	None
Observed Measure 3 (Status Threat Anxiety)	Yes	Pg. 7	None
Hypothesis 1	Yes	Pg. 3	None
Hypothesis 2	Yes	Pg. 4	None
Hypothesis 3	Yes	Pg. 4	None
Hypothesis 4	Yes	Pg. 5	None
Hypothesis 5	Yes	Pg. 5	None
Empirical Test of H1	Yes	Pg. 9	None
Empirical Test of H2	Yes	Pg. 10	None
Empirical Test of H3	Yes	Pg. 10	None
Empirical Test of H4	Yes	Pg. 10	None
Empirical Test of H5	Yes	Pg. 10	None
Were there studies included in pre-registration that are not reported in the manuscript?	No		

C Design Table

Table C.1 summarizes the analysis plan.

Table C.1: Design Table

Question	Hypothesis	Sampling plan	Analysis plan	Interpretation of the results
Does the threat to the social status of whites cause a shift among white voters toward more conservative candidates? If so, does this shift occur because it induces a general status quo bias among white voters, leading them to favor candidates who oppose social changes in general? Alternatively, does it occur because of the conservative candidates' positions that specifically target the source of the threat? How does this conservative shift manifest under party identification? Is the conservative shift among white partisans restricted to in-party candidates?	H_1 : Threats to the racial status of whites or the national status of Americans increase the electoral appeal of various candidates' conservative positions among white American voters, including conservative positions not directly related to the source of the status threat.; H_2 Threat to the racial status of whites increases the electoral appeal among white Americans of candidates' conservative positions against racial inclusion, but not the appeal of other unrelated conservative positions.; H_3 (same as H_2 but for threat to national status); H_4 : Party attachment is the main driver of partisans' candidate evaluation and selection, mitigating the effect of policy positions of the candidate, even when status threat becomes salient.; H_5 : The effect of status threat on voters' candidate preference is stronger for Democratic than Republican voters.	Based on a power analysis for a paired-profile forced-choice conjoint experiment, as outlined in Section D, the sample size required for the survey experiment is 2,080. This sample size provides 80% statistical power to detect a causal effect of candidates' conservative positions on their support, with a size of 0.1 for a binary outcome variable indicating white voters' choice of the candidates. This calculation uses a two-tailed test under the null hypothesis that there is no difference in support for candidates with liberal or conservative positions.	The study aims to examine whether candidates who adopt conservative positions on various policy issues receive increased electoral support among white voters when these voters are exposed to messages indicating that the esteem and prestige (i.e., social status) of whites in society is declining. We employ logistic regression models to analyze voters' candidate choices, focusing on the interaction between candidates' conservative positions (randomized in a conjoint experiment) on different issues and exposure to status threat messages (randomized as a vignette). A status reassurance vignette is used as the reference category. The hypotheses are tested using p-values and confidence intervals of the interaction coefficients.	If the impact of various candidates' conservative positions on their support increases under status threat conditions, then H_1 is supported. Conversely, if only the effect of those conservative positions on threat-related issues increases, this supports H_2 (for racial status threat) and H_3 (for national status threat), thereby providing evidence against H_1 . Should this effect occur exclusively when partisans compare in-party candidates, but vanish when comparing in-party against out-party candidates, then H_4 is corroborated. Furthermore, if these effects manifest among Democratic voters but not among Republican ones, then H_5 is substantiated.

D Sampling (planned)

According to a power analysis for conjoint experiments (Schuessler and Freitag 2020), we need 65 observations to identify an average marginal component effect (AMCE) of 0.1 with 80% power at an α -level of 0.05, for a six-tasks forced-choice paired-profile conjoint experiment with two attribute levels. The effect size is based on previous research (Mummolo, Peterson, and Westwood 2021) and budget limits. We will evaluate the Conditional Average Marginal Causal Effect (CAMCE) by treatment groups (four conditions) and party identification (two groups). Hence, we will collect $4 \times 2 \times 65 = 520$ interviews using a conjoint table without information about the party affiliation of the candidate.

For the conjoint table with information about the party affiliation of the candidate, we need enough cases in which candidates are both Democrats, both Republicans, and one is Democrat, and the other is Republican. These cases allow us to compare how partisans evaluate the candidates in each case under exposure to status threat. This means a sample of $4 \times 2 \times 3 \times 65 = 1560$. Therefore, the final sample size will have $520 + 1560 = 2080$ respondents.

See section H for the actual sample collected.

E Conjoint experiment

The values of the policy positions of the candidates for each policy area were sampled from the following list:

- Abortion rights
 - Liberal positions:
 1. I advocate for people’s right to make their own decisions about abortion.
 2. I am convinced that abortion must be a private decision, not a legal debate.
 3. I strongly believe that supporting abortion rights means supporting equality and freedom.
 4. I believe that abortion rights should be citizens’ rights.
 5. In my view, choice over abortion should be a fundamental human right.
 - Conservative positions:
 1. I strongly believe that abortion should be prohibited. We should protect human life at all stages.
 2. I believe that abortion is never a solution. Every unborn child has the inherent right to live.
 3. I am convinced that abortion undermines the value of human life. Therefore, I firmly believe that abortion should be restricted.
 4. If elected, I will defend my commitment to preserving the sanctity of life, not abortion.
 5. In my view, abortion is not a solution but another problem. I am in favor of protecting human life at all stages.
- Affirmative action
 - Liberal positions:
 1. I am certain that affirmative action is a necessary pathway to social and racial equality. Therefore, I support adopting more affirmative action policies that benefit African American and Latinos in this country.
 2. I stand for promoting diversity and inclusiveness through affirmative action to improve lives of African American and Latinos.
 3. I maintain that affirmative action rectifies historical injustices and systemic discrimination against minorities like African Americans and Latinos.
 4. I am convinced that affirmative action is a vital step toward a fair society with more inclusivity for African Americans and Latinos.
 5. I hold that supporting affirmative action means supporting equal opportunities for all, including minorities like African Americans and Latinos.
 - Conservative positions:

1. In my opinion, affirmative action can lead to reverse discrimination against whites. Therefore, affirmative action policies must be reduced.
 2. I firmly believe that selection should be based on individual merit, not affirmative action because affirmative action hurts white American majorities.
 3. In my view, affirmative action can undermine the principle of reward on merit and end up undermining chances of success for people in majority groups, like white Americans.
 4. In my view, affirmative action is detrimental to our society in the long run and hurt white American majorities. I believe in equal opportunity, not mandated equal results from affirmative action.
 5. I hold that affirmative action compromises standards of excellence and can reward minority groups even when they don't deserve it, at the expenses of deserving people among white Americans.
- Immigration policy
 - Liberal positions:
 1. In my view, opening our borders to immigrants is a testament to our values of compassion and equality.
 2. I am certain that immigrants contribute enormously to our economic growth and cultural diversity.
 3. I am convinced that more immigrants can lead to more diversity and richness in our culture and society.
 4. Immigration is the backbone of our nation's history and should be celebrated.
 5. Immigrants bring unique skills and perspectives that benefit our economy.
 - Conservative positions:
 1. A stricter immigration policy is necessary to protect our jobs and resources.
 2. I am certain that unregulated immigration could strain our public services and infrastructure.
 3. Protecting our borders is critical for our national security. We should have stronger policies against illegal immigration.
 4. The priority should be on taking care of our citizens before accepting more immigrants.
 5. It is crucial to control our borders and restrict immigration to protect our social values and culture.
 - Marriage and LGBT rights
 - Liberal positions:
 1. I strongly believe that equal rights and protections must include the LGBT community.
 2. I believe that LGBT individuals deserve the same legal protections as everyone else.
 3. I support LGBT rights because, for me, it means supporting human rights.
 4. I am convinced that if we respect human rights, we must respect LGBT rights.
 5. I believe that celebrating diversity means standing for LGBT rights.
 - Conservative positions:
 1. I believe marriage should remain between a man and a woman.
 2. I believe that preserving traditional family values includes opposing LGBT marriage laws.
 3. LGBT rights challenge the traditional structure of our society.
 4. I support upholding societal norms which preclude same-sex marriage.
 5. I strongly believe that endorsing LGBT rights might erode the family, cultural, and moral foundations of our society.
 - Redistribution
 - Liberal positions:
 1. I have no doubt that progressive taxation is an effective tool to reduce economic inequality. We must increase taxes on the rich and expand social programs.

2. I am certain that raising taxes on the wealthy is a good thing. It can help to improve society by funding social welfare programs.
 3. I maintain that increasing taxes on capital gains to create more welfare policies could reduce wealth disparities.
 4. I support increasing tax on the wealthy to redistribute income and curb extreme wealth inequalities in our nation.
 5. I believe that tax reform targeting the rich could help to adopt more programs to help the poor and alleviate economic inequality.
- Conservative positions:
 1. I am certain that high taxes can discourage investment and hinder economic growth. I firmly oppose it. We already spend too much on welfare programs.
 2. I have no doubt that increasing taxes on the wealthy might drive them to invest elsewhere, which will hurt our economy. We should reduce government spending on welfare, not increase it.
 3. I have no doubt that progressive taxation could punish successful entrepreneurs and business owners. We should avoid increasing taxes at all costs.
 4. I hold that addressing economic inequality should not be achieved at the expense of economic growth. So, I oppose expanding welfare programs.
 5. I am convinced that tax policies should not unduly penalize the wealthy for their success, so I oppose increasing taxes to pay for welfare programs.
- Trade policy
 - Liberal positions:
 1. If elected, I will support open trade with other countries, like China, because it stimulates economic growth and development.
 2. I am sure that increasing trade with China is good because it creates a wider market for our products.
 3. I support reducing trade barriers against China. This will benefit our economy.
 4. I support global trade with China because it brings opportunities for businesses in our country to grow and expand.
 5. I have no doubt that promoting free trade with China encourages economic activity and job creation.
 - Conservative positions:
 1. I support trade protectionism against China. We need to shield our local industries that make our country great.
 2. Increasing tariffs on Chinese products is needed to protect domestic jobs and our great economy.
 3. Stricter trade policies against China will prevent unfair competition from cheap foreign goods. This will help to maintain US economy, which is the leading in the world.
 4. I believe we need to prioritize our national industries before international trade with China to protect jobs and our world-leading economy.
 5. I am certain that free trade agreements with China can harm our local industries and employment. US has the largest economy in the world, and we must keep it that way.

We validated the ideological leaning of each statement using a large language model (OpenAI 2024) in two ways. First, for each topic (e.g., affirmative action), we created a list pairing each liberal statement with each conservative statement. This resulted in 25 pairs (5 liberal positions \times 5 conservative positions) for each one of the six topics. Then, we asked the model: "Which one of these statements is more politically conservative?" Here is an example of the exact prompt:

Which one of these statements is more politically conservative?

Statement 1: "I advocate for people's right to make their own decisions about abortion"

Statement 2: "I strongly believe that abortion should be prohibited. We should protect human life at all stages."

Give me only the number of the statement that is more conservative.

Second, we asked the model to classify each of the statements individually as conservative or liberal leaning and to rate it on a scale from -10 to 10. Here is an example:

Classify each statement as conservative or liberal, and attribute a score for each one from -10 to 10 where -10 means extremely conservative and 10 extremely liberal.

Statement: I advocate for people’s right to make their own decisions about abortion.

Give me only the classification and the score for each case.

Answer:

- **Statement:** "I advocate for people’s right to make their own decisions about abortion."
- **Classification:** Liberal
- **Score:** 8

Table E.1 shows the summary table with the classification results. All sentences were correctly classified by the large-language model as either conservative or liberal, matching our classification. The summary of the ideology score assigned by the model is on Table E.1.

Table E.1: GPT classification summary results

Leaning (classification)	Topic	Ideology score			
		mean	std	min	max
Conservative	Abortion rights	-8.20	0.45	-9.00	-8.00
	Affirmative action	-6.80	0.45	-7.00	-6.00
	Immigration policy	-7.40	0.55	-8.00	-7.00
	Marriage and LGBT rights	-7.60	0.89	-8.00	-6.00
	Redistribution	-7.60	0.55	-8.00	-7.00
	Trade policy	-6.40	0.55	-7.00	-6.00
Liberal	Abortion rights	8.00	0.00	8.00	8.00
	Affirmative action	8.00	0.00	8.00	8.00
	Immigration policy	8.00	0.00	8.00	8.00
	Marriage and LGBT rights	8.20	0.45	8.00	9.00
	Redistribution	8.00	0.00	8.00	8.00
	Trade policy	7.00	0.00	7.00	7.00

F Indexes

We created the following indices using the questions in the respective sections of the Questionnaire:

Party identity (ANES) ranging from strong Democrat (-1), to weak Democrat (-.5), weak Republican (.5) and strong Republican (1).

Party identification (social identity) average across questions, rescaled to the 0-1 interval.

Generalized prejudice (thermometer) average across questions about whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans rescaled to the 0-1 interval.

We used the indices for exploratory analyses.

G Demographics (Survey vs Census)

Tables G.1 to G.3 show the demographics of the samples compared to the distribution in the population using the most recent US Census.

Table G.1: Relative Frequencies for Education: Census vs survey

Group	N	Census	Survey	Difference
Less than high school graduate	14	9.7688	0.6856	9.0832
Complete high school (or equivalent, including GED)	265	27.8433	12.9775	14.8658
Some college or associates degree	577	27.5950	28.2566	-0.6616
Bachelors degree	739	22.1289	36.1900	-14.0611
Graduate or professional degree	447	12.6631	21.8903	-9.2272

Table G.2: Relative Frequencies for Income: Census vs survey

Group	N	Census	Survey	Difference
Less than 10,000	59	5.8000	2.8893	2.9107
10,000to14,999	53	4.0000	2.5955	1.4045
15,000to24,999	102	8.3000	4.9951	3.3049
25,000to34,999	169	8.4000	8.2762	0.1238
35,000to49,999	221	11.9000	10.8227	1.0773
50,000to74,999	379	17.4000	18.5602	-1.1602
75,000to99,999	292	12.8000	14.2997	-1.4997
100,000to149,999	432	15.7000	21.1557	-5.4557
150,000to199,999	203	7.2000	9.9412	-2.7412
200,000ormore	132	8.5000	6.4643	2.0357

Table G.3: Relative Frequencies for Age: Census vs survey

Group	N	Census	Survey	Difference
18 to 24 years	171	11.8984	8.3741	3.5242
25 to 29 years	242	9.1014	11.8511	-2.7497
30 to 34 years	323	8.7535	15.8178	-7.0643
35 to 39 years	276	8.5118	13.5162	-5.0043
40 to 44 years	213	7.9079	10.4310	-2.5231
45 to 49 years	236	7.9908	11.5573	-3.5665
50 to 54 years	195	8.0169	9.5495	-1.5326
55 to 59 years	121	8.4162	5.9256	2.4906
60 to 64 years	114	8.2203	5.5828	2.6375
65 to 69 years	70	6.8268	3.4280	3.3988
70 to 74 years	52	5.5425	2.5465	2.9960
75 to 79 years	22	3.8233	1.0774	2.7459
80 to 84 years	5	2.4995	0.2449	2.2546
85 years and over	2	2.4908	0.0979	2.3928

H Randomization, Pre-Treatment Covariates, Balance, and CONSORT Diagram

Tables H.1 to H.3 and Figure H.1 show the summary statistics, the balance of the covariates, and the sample size for each status threat condition. As we can see, the covariates are well balanced across treatment groups. Tables H.4 and H.5 display the sample size based on candidates' party affiliation pairs in the conjoint. For instance, our final sample contains 510 unique observations with independent *versus* independent candidate pairs.

Figure H.2 shows a CONSORT flow diagram of how participants proceeded through the study, including those who were excluded due to failure to complete attention checks or those who dropped out of the study early.

Table H.1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	N	Missing (%)	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	25%	50%	75%	Max
Age (std)	2042	0.00	-0.00	1.00	-1.44	-0.72	0.00	0.73	3.26
Candidate selected (original)	2042	0.00	1.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00
Education (std)	2042	0.00	-0.00	1.00	-2.70	-0.67	0.35	0.35	1.37
Generalized prejudice	2042	0.00	0.67	0.15	0.00	0.56	0.68	0.78	1.00
Left-Right (std)	2016	1.27	-0.00	1.00	-1.41	-0.85	-0.01	0.83	1.39
Liberal-conservative (std)	2034	0.39	-0.00	1.00	-1.36	-0.90	0.02	0.95	1.41
Male	2042	0.00	0.49	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Manipulation check (percentage correct)	2042	0.00	83.47	26.13	0.00	66.67	100.00	100.00	100.00
National identity	2042	0.00	0.78	0.18	0.25	0.67	0.83	0.92	1.00
Partisanship (Democratic voter)	1029		50.39	1.56					
Partisanship (Republican voter)	1013		49.61	1.57					
Partisanship (social identity)	2042	0.00	0.70	0.17	0.24	0.59	0.71	0.82	1.00
Partisanship (strenght)	2042	0.00	-0.02	0.85	-1.00	-1.00	-0.50	1.00	1.00
Passed attention check (post-conjoint)	2042	0.00	0.98	0.15	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
White identity	2042	0.00	0.70	0.18	0.25	0.58	0.67	0.83	1.00
income (12 levels, std)	2042	0.00	-0.00	1.00	-2.50	-0.67	0.25	0.71	1.63

Table H.2: Sample Balance. Estimates are coefficients of a multinomial regression of treatment condition on the pre-treatment covariates

Pre-treatment covariate	Coef.	Std.Err.	t	$P > t $	[0.025	0.975]	Exposure
Intercept	0.0991	0.0885	1.1190	0.2631	-0.0745	0.2726	Racial threat
Male	-0.2072+	0.1256	-1.6502	0.0989	-0.4534	0.0389	Racial threat
Age (std)	0.0043	0.0630	0.0677	0.9460	-0.1192	0.1277	Racial threat
Education (std)	-0.1173+	0.0697	-1.6829	0.0924	-0.2539	0.0193	Racial threat
income (12 levels, std)	-0.0056	0.0697	-0.0803	0.9360	-0.1422	0.1311	Racial threat
Intercept	0.0535	0.0895	0.5981	0.5498	-0.1219	0.2290	Nationality threat
Male	-0.1203	0.1255	-0.9587	0.3377	-0.3663	0.1257	Nationality threat
Age (std)	-0.0648	0.0638	-1.0157	0.3098	-0.1900	0.0603	Nationality threat
Education (std)	-0.0963	0.0698	-1.3793	0.1678	-0.2331	0.0405	Nationality threat
income (12 levels, std)	0.0798	0.0703	1.1345	0.2566	-0.0580	0.2175	Nationality threat
Intercept	0.0549	0.0895	0.6136	0.5395	-0.1205	0.2303	Racial and nationality threat
Male	-0.1404	0.1258	-1.1164	0.2642	-0.3870	0.1061	Racial and nationality threat
Age (std)	0.0911	0.0623	1.4616	0.1438	-0.0311	0.2133	Racial and nationality threat
Education (std)	-0.0179	0.0701	-0.2552	0.7986	-0.1553	0.1195	Racial and nationality threat
income (12 levels, std)	-0.0746	0.0699	-1.0671	0.2859	-0.2117	0.0624	Racial and nationality threat

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table H.3: Exposure sample size.

Exposure	N	Freq
Status reassuring	513	25.1224
Racial threat	511	25.0245
Nationality threat	511	25.0245
Racial and nationality threat	507	24.8286

Table H.4: Conjoint groups sample size.

Conjoint pair	N	Freq
DxD	362	17.7277
DxR	782	38.2958
IxI	510	24.9755
RxR	388	19.0010




Figure H.1: Sample Balance. Estimates are coefficients a multinomial regression of treatment condition on the pre-treatment covariates.

Table H.5: Conjoint groups sample size.

Conjoint pair	N	Freq
Non-partisan	510	24.9755
Partisan	1532	75.0245




Figure H.2: CONSORT Flow Diagram

I Regression Tables (Main Paper)

Tables [I.1](#) to [I.5](#) show the regression tables with the results presented in the main paper.

Table I.1: Linear probability model with IxI pairs.

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Intercept	0.1735*** (0.0477)	0.1736*** (0.0479)	0.8770*** (0.0443)	0.8773*** (0.0449)
Affirmative action (conservative)	0.1220*** (0.0337)	0.1227*** (0.0339)	-0.1164*** (0.0349)	-0.1163*** (0.0350)
Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	0.1221+ (0.0726)	0.1239+ (0.0731)	-0.0090 (0.0613)	-0.0088 (0.0615)
Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	0.0890 (0.0628)	0.0906 (0.0631)	0.0898 (0.0625)	0.0903 (0.0628)
Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0772 (0.0654)	0.0786 (0.0658)	0.0701 (0.0588)	0.0705 (0.0589)
Trade with China (conservative)	0.0463 (0.0350)	0.0467 (0.0351)	0.0113 (0.0379)	0.0110 (0.0380)
Abortion (conservative)	0.1621*** (0.0455)	0.1626*** (0.0457)	-0.2954*** (0.0342)	-0.2955*** (0.0343)
Immigration (conservative)	0.1641*** (0.0375)	0.1641*** (0.0376)	-0.0499 (0.0358)	-0.0499 (0.0359)
LGBT rights (conservative)	0.0809* (0.0358)	0.0811* (0.0359)	-0.1506*** (0.0405)	-0.1504*** (0.0407)
Redistribution (conservative)	0.0814** (0.0295)	0.0816** (0.0296)	-0.1611*** (0.0325)	-0.1612*** (0.0326)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.0120 (0.0493)	-0.0127 (0.0494)	-0.0020 (0.0492)	-0.0023 (0.0492)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.0365 (0.0475)	-0.0375 (0.0476)	0.0313 (0.0478)	0.0311 (0.0479)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0032 (0.0532)	0.0028 (0.0533)	0.0149 (0.0474)	0.0149 (0.0475)

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.1: Linear probability model with IxI pairs.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.0894+	-0.0895+	0.0051	0.0050
	(0.0528)	(0.0528)	(0.0525)	(0.0526)
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.0040	-0.0047	-0.0335	-0.0328
	(0.0486)	(0.0487)	(0.0505)	(0.0507)
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	-0.0151	-0.0155	-0.0475	-0.0474
	(0.0533)	(0.0534)	(0.0541)	(0.0542)
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.1034	-0.1037	0.0434	0.0436
	(0.0656)	(0.0658)	(0.0501)	(0.0501)
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.0906	-0.0909	0.0171	0.0171
	(0.0633)	(0.0635)	(0.0518)	(0.0518)
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	-0.0552	-0.0558	0.0549	0.0546
	(0.0585)	(0.0589)	(0.0468)	(0.0469)
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.0296	-0.0292	0.0342	0.0340
	(0.0534)	(0.0535)	(0.0503)	(0.0504)
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	0.0156	0.0158	-0.0606	-0.0604
	(0.0525)	(0.0525)	(0.0496)	(0.0497)
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	-0.0423	-0.0421	-0.0478	-0.0479
	(0.0531)	(0.0531)	(0.0495)	(0.0495)
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.0165	-0.0169	-0.0847	-0.0849
	(0.0561)	(0.0562)	(0.0569)	(0.0571)

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.1: Linear probability model with IxI pairs.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.0549 (0.0468)	-0.0549 (0.0468)	-0.1069* (0.0542)	-0.1071* (0.0543)
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0190 (0.0550)	0.0192 (0.0551)	-0.1219* (0.0519)	-0.1228* (0.0523)
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Racial threat)	0.0200 (0.0450)	0.0198 (0.0451)	0.0254 (0.0473)	0.0255 (0.0474)
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Nationality threat)	-0.0132 (0.0494)	-0.0134 (0.0494)	-0.0125 (0.0480)	-0.0122 (0.0481)
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Racial and nationality threat)	-0.0613 (0.0505)	-0.0610 (0.0506)	0.0298 (0.0493)	0.0300 (0.0495)
Male		-0.0020 (0.0048)		-0.0007 (0.0079)
Age (std)		0.0040+ (0.0022)		0.0033 (0.0041)
Education (std)		0.0001 (0.0023)		-0.0003 (0.0048)
Income (12 levels) (std)		-0.0021 (0.0024)		-0.0009 (0.0044)
N. Obs.	3096	3096	3024	3024
R2 (adj)	0.0496	0.0484	0.1659	0.1648
BIC	4534.6547	4566.5314	4038.3927	4070.3051
AIC	4365.5944	4373.3197	3869.9913	3877.8463
Std. Error	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table I.2: Linear probability model with DxR pairs.

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Intercept	0.1080** (0.0382)	0.1086** (0.0382)	0.9136*** (0.0348)	0.9100*** (0.0347)
Affirmative action (conservative)	0.0723** (0.0250)	0.0725** (0.0251)	-0.0446 (0.0273)	-0.0455+ (0.0274)
Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	0.0812 (0.0572)	0.0811 (0.0573)	0.0534 (0.0490)	0.0542 (0.0490)
Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	0.0679 (0.0554)	0.0680 (0.0555)	-0.0039 (0.0479)	-0.0036 (0.0480)
Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0388 (0.0571)	0.0384 (0.0572)	0.0201 (0.0478)	0.0203 (0.0478)
Trade with China (conservative)	0.0215 (0.0280)	0.0217 (0.0280)	0.0199 (0.0267)	0.0204 (0.0267)
Abortion (conservative)	0.0690* (0.0281)	0.0691* (0.0281)	-0.2732*** (0.0299)	-0.2733*** (0.0300)
Immigration (conservative)	0.1236*** (0.0267)	0.1236*** (0.0268)	-0.0064 (0.0257)	-0.0066 (0.0257)
LGBT rights (conservative)	0.1445*** (0.0310)	0.1447*** (0.0310)	-0.1365*** (0.0283)	-0.1367*** (0.0283)
Redistribution (conservative)	0.0469+ (0.0274)	0.0467+ (0.0274)	-0.1097*** (0.0282)	-0.1098*** (0.0283)
Party affiliation (Republican Party)	0.3048*** (0.0413)	0.3048*** (0.0413)	-0.2679*** (0.0395)	-0.2679*** (0.0395)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.0360 (0.0393)	-0.0363 (0.0393)	-0.0534 (0.0371)	-0.0526 (0.0372)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.0630 (0.0388)	-0.0631 (0.0388)	-0.0158 (0.0371)	-0.0140 (0.0372)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0146 (0.0388)	0.0148 (0.0388)	0.0066 (0.0371)	0.0080 (0.0372)

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.2: Linear probability model with DxR pairs.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0389) 0.0351	(0.0390) 0.0350	(0.0384) -0.0666+	(0.0384) -0.0672+
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	(0.0404) -0.0152	(0.0404) -0.0152	(0.0390) -0.0362	(0.0390) -0.0374
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0395) -0.0026	(0.0396) -0.0026	(0.0370) -0.0174	(0.0370) -0.0180
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0417) 0.0041	(0.0418) 0.0041	(0.0377) 0.0739+	(0.0378) 0.0729+
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	(0.0402) 0.0202	(0.0403) 0.0201	(0.0439) 0.0659	(0.0440) 0.0651
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0414) -0.0001	(0.0415) -0.0002	(0.0419) 0.0504	(0.0419) 0.0503
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0446) -0.0253	(0.0447) -0.0253	(0.0402) -0.1009**	(0.0403) -0.1016**
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	(0.0392) -0.0290	(0.0392) -0.0290	(0.0368) -0.0390	(0.0369) -0.0387
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0384) -0.0342	(0.0385) -0.0342	(0.0382) -0.0359	(0.0382) -0.0352
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0392) -0.1010*	(0.0393) -0.1013*	(0.0364) -0.0252	(0.0365) -0.0249

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.2: Linear probability model with DxR pairs.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	(0.0428) -0.0803+	(0.0428) -0.0807+	(0.0402) -0.0602	(0.0402) -0.0599
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0417) -0.0810+	(0.0418) -0.0812+	(0.0389) -0.0686+	(0.0389) -0.0684+
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Racial threat)	(0.0441) 0.0146	(0.0442) 0.0149	(0.0390) 0.0409	(0.0390) 0.0406
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Nationality threat)	(0.0394) -0.0195	(0.0394) -0.0193	(0.0403) -0.0291	(0.0404) -0.0294
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0375) -0.0489	(0.0376) -0.0487	(0.0391) 0.0159	(0.0392) 0.0159
Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0381) -0.0449	(0.0382) -0.0449	(0.0393) 0.0362	(0.0393) 0.0361
Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	(0.0615) 0.0488	(0.0615) 0.0488	(0.0568) 0.1165*	(0.0568) 0.1166*
Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0618) 0.0742	(0.0619) 0.0742	(0.0558) 0.0040	(0.0558) 0.0040
Male	(0.0615)	(0.0615) -0.0012 (0.0029)	(0.0557)	(0.0557) 0.0093+ (0.0049)
Age (std)		0.0016 (0.0013)		-0.0032 (0.0023)
Education (std)		-0.0012		-0.0031

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.2: Linear probability model with DxR pairs.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Income (12 levels) (std)		(0.0015) -0.0006 (0.0015)		(0.0027) -0.0002 (0.0026)
N. Obs.	4546	4546	4790	4790
R2 (adj)	0.1305	0.1297	0.1486	0.1480
BIC	6201.6463	6235.2145	6422.7635	6455.6625
AIC	5996.1422	6004.0224	6215.5863	6222.5882
Std. Error	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table I.3: Linear probability model with DxD pairs.

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Intercept	0.3638*** (0.0510)	0.3662*** (0.0516)	0.8166*** (0.0497)	0.8152*** (0.0502)
Affirmative action (conservative)	0.0394 (0.0395)	0.0396 (0.0396)	-0.0844* (0.0397)	-0.0843* (0.0398)
Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.0410 (0.0726)	-0.0417 (0.0728)	-0.0364 (0.0698)	-0.0359 (0.0701)
Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.0861 (0.0737)	-0.0869 (0.0739)	0.0182 (0.0685)	0.0184 (0.0686)
Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	-0.0782 (0.0710)	-0.0791 (0.0712)	-0.0668 (0.0695)	-0.0668 (0.0696)
Trade with China (conservative)	-0.0343 (0.0436)	-0.0346 (0.0437)	0.0147 (0.0410)	0.0143 (0.0411)
Abortion (conservative)	0.1000* (0.0406)	0.0998* (0.0407)	-0.2253*** (0.0421)	-0.2253*** (0.0421)
Immigration (conservative)	0.0492 (0.0357)	0.0497 (0.0358)	-0.0718+ (0.0381)	-0.0717+ (0.0382)
LGBT rights (conservative)	0.0436 (0.0446)	0.0433 (0.0447)	-0.1830*** (0.0430)	-0.1829*** (0.0430)
Redistribution (conservative)	0.0768+ (0.0398)	0.0765+ (0.0399)	-0.0909* (0.0401)	-0.0910* (0.0401)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	0.0924+ (0.0555)	0.0927+ (0.0556)	0.0120 (0.0606)	0.0121 (0.0607)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	0.0493 (0.0570)	0.0494 (0.0570)	-0.0338 (0.0560)	-0.0342 (0.0561)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0427 (0.0559)	0.0423 (0.0560)	0.0208 (0.0556)	0.0206 (0.0557)

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.3: Linear probability model with DxD pairs.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.0151 (0.0600)	-0.0148 (0.0601)	0.0513 (0.0567)	0.0516 (0.0568)
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	0.0798 (0.0604)	0.0796 (0.0605)	-0.0196 (0.0575)	-0.0195 (0.0577)
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.1013+ (0.0599)	0.1016+ (0.0601)	-0.0585 (0.0595)	-0.0581 (0.0596)
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.0331 (0.0627)	-0.0330 (0.0629)	0.0712 (0.0632)	0.0713 (0.0633)
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.0438 (0.0634)	-0.0440 (0.0636)	-0.0315 (0.0569)	-0.0317 (0.0569)
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	-0.0480 (0.0564)	-0.0478 (0.0565)	0.0152 (0.0588)	0.0152 (0.0589)
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	0.0410 (0.0522)	0.0404 (0.0524)	0.0118 (0.0525)	0.0116 (0.0527)
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	0.0811 (0.0576)	0.0812 (0.0579)	0.0807 (0.0558)	0.0806 (0.0559)
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.1043+ (0.0570)	0.1040+ (0.0571)	0.0761 (0.0574)	0.0761 (0.0575)
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	0.0028 (0.0610)	0.0031 (0.0611)	0.0025 (0.0609)	0.0022 (0.0610)

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.3: Linear probability model with DxD pairs.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	0.0926 (0.0656)	0.0932 (0.0658)	-0.0264 (0.0597)	-0.0262 (0.0597)
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0470 (0.0637)	0.0477 (0.0639)	-0.0106 (0.0600)	-0.0108 (0.0602)
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Racial threat)	-0.0013 (0.0536)	-0.0008 (0.0537)	-0.0642 (0.0573)	-0.0640 (0.0573)
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Nationality threat)	-0.0908 (0.0594)	-0.0908 (0.0595)	-0.0192 (0.0542)	-0.0198 (0.0544)
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Racial and nationality threat)	-0.0930 (0.0573)	-0.0927 (0.0574)	0.0853 (0.0579)	0.0849 (0.0580)
Male		-0.0036 (0.0047)		0.0022 (0.0073)
Age (std)		-0.0011 (0.0021)		0.0006 (0.0037)
Education (std)		0.0004 (0.0025)		0.0030 (0.0041)
Income (12 levels) (std)		-0.0033 (0.0026)		-0.0000 (0.0043)
N. Obs.	2296	2296	2282	2282
R2 (adj)	0.0295	0.0278	0.0964	0.0949
BIC	3453.6908	3484.5017	3270.4432	3301.2781
AIC	3293.0009	3300.8561	3109.9246	3117.8283
Std. Error	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table I.4: Linear probability model with RxR pairs.

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Intercept	0.3143*** (0.0590)	0.3181*** (0.0592)	0.8597*** (0.0452)	0.8586*** (0.0455)
Affirmative action (conservative)	0.0224 (0.0452)	0.0220 (0.0453)	-0.0774* (0.0383)	-0.0782* (0.0385)
Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	0.0791 (0.0810)	0.0787 (0.0813)	-0.0104 (0.0624)	-0.0068 (0.0626)
Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.0514 (0.0803)	-0.0521 (0.0804)	0.0143 (0.0654)	0.0141 (0.0656)
Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	-0.1052 (0.0767)	-0.1056 (0.0769)	0.0555 (0.0656)	0.0565 (0.0659)
Trade with China (conservative)	-0.0040 (0.0451)	-0.0038 (0.0452)	-0.0425 (0.0405)	-0.0421 (0.0406)
Abortion (conservative)	0.0938* (0.0461)	0.0936* (0.0463)	-0.2716*** (0.0430)	-0.2722*** (0.0431)
Immigration (conservative)	0.1716*** (0.0407)	0.1714*** (0.0407)	-0.0425 (0.0393)	-0.0428 (0.0394)
LGBT rights (conservative)	0.0966* (0.0409)	0.0968* (0.0410)	-0.1920*** (0.0432)	-0.1915*** (0.0432)
Redistribution (conservative)	-0.0198 (0.0441)	-0.0194 (0.0442)	-0.0863* (0.0433)	-0.0861* (0.0434)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	0.0593 (0.0617)	0.0598 (0.0618)	0.0042 (0.0602)	0.0054 (0.0605)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.0560 (0.0620)	-0.0560 (0.0620)	0.0128 (0.0537)	0.0129 (0.0538)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0984 (0.0608)	0.0991 (0.0610)	-0.0003 (0.0544)	0.0019 (0.0550)

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.4: Linear probability model with RxR pairs.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.0365 (0.0587)	-0.0369 (0.0588)	0.0382 (0.0556)	0.0364 (0.0556)
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	0.0468 (0.0675)	0.0465 (0.0677)	0.0733 (0.0567)	0.0743 (0.0568)
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0914 (0.0633)	0.0915 (0.0634)	-0.0230 (0.0559)	-0.0231 (0.0560)
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.1684** (0.0619)	-0.1686** (0.0621)	0.0540 (0.0631)	0.0532 (0.0632)
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	0.0552 (0.0651)	0.0556 (0.0653)	-0.0147 (0.0596)	-0.0155 (0.0597)
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	-0.0449 (0.0620)	-0.0447 (0.0622)	0.0310 (0.0618)	0.0319 (0.0620)
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.0109 (0.0549)	-0.0106 (0.0551)	-0.1058+ (0.0542)	-0.1050+ (0.0543)
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.0208 (0.0625)	-0.0206 (0.0627)	0.0096 (0.0532)	0.0089 (0.0533)
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	-0.0186 (0.0554)	-0.0182 (0.0555)	-0.0389 (0.0594)	-0.0396 (0.0596)
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	0.0091 (0.0574)	0.0089 (0.0576)	-0.0320 (0.0574)	-0.0339 (0.0575)

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.4: Linear probability model with RxR pairs.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.0156 (0.0614)	-0.0158 (0.0615)	-0.0596 (0.0566)	-0.0607 (0.0567)
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0111 (0.0593)	0.0108 (0.0593)	-0.0373 (0.0581)	-0.0372 (0.0582)
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Racial threat)	0.0060 (0.0618)	0.0055 (0.0619)	0.0173 (0.0611)	0.0176 (0.0613)
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Nationality threat)	0.1103 (0.0670)	0.1107 (0.0674)	-0.0281 (0.0563)	-0.0285 (0.0565)
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0692 (0.0575)	0.0686 (0.0575)	-0.0136 (0.0604)	-0.0143 (0.0605)
Male		-0.0068 (0.0053)		0.0012 (0.0083)
Age (std)		-0.0009 (0.0028)		-0.0048 (0.0040)
Education (std)		0.0014 (0.0029)		0.0066 (0.0049)
Income (12 levels) (std)		-0.0008 (0.0030)		0.0022 (0.0047)
N. Obs.	2218	2218	2252	2252
R2 (adj)	0.0454	0.0437	0.1301	0.1288
BIC	3305.0558	3335.7461	3144.1219	3174.1858
AIC	3145.3336	3153.2065	2983.9739	2991.1595
Std. Error	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table I.5: Linear probability model with DxR pairs and policy-party interactions.

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Intercept	0.1209*	0.1223*	0.8776***	0.8746***
	(0.0492)	(0.0494)	(0.0469)	(0.0469)
Affirmative action (conservative)	0.0735+	0.0740+	-0.0563	-0.0572
	(0.0391)	(0.0391)	(0.0380)	(0.0381)
Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	0.0472	0.0466	0.1198+	0.1205+
	(0.0739)	(0.0740)	(0.0660)	(0.0661)
Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	0.0310	0.0309	0.0308	0.0309
	(0.0751)	(0.0752)	(0.0667)	(0.0668)
Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0446	0.0438	0.0874	0.0867
	(0.0716)	(0.0717)	(0.0660)	(0.0661)
Trade with China (conservative)	-0.0192	-0.0193	0.0459	0.0460
	(0.0396)	(0.0396)	(0.0383)	(0.0383)
Abortion (conservative)	0.0523	0.0523	-0.2758***	-0.2763***
	(0.0376)	(0.0376)	(0.0362)	(0.0363)
Immigration (conservative)	0.1493***	0.1491***	0.0233	0.0228
	(0.0365)	(0.0366)	(0.0380)	(0.0380)
LGBT rights (conservative)	0.1610***	0.1613***	-0.0997*	-0.0993*
	(0.0390)	(0.0391)	(0.0424)	(0.0424)
Redistribution (conservative)	0.0386	0.0383	-0.1186**	-0.1183**
	(0.0392)	(0.0392)	(0.0389)	(0.0390)
Party affiliation (Republican Party)	0.2758***	0.2754***	-0.1901*	-0.1904*
	(0.0783)	(0.0784)	(0.0760)	(0.0761)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.0209	-0.0215	-0.0643	-0.0627
	(0.0559)	(0.0560)	(0.0524)	(0.0525)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.0682	-0.0685	-0.0002	0.0012
	(0.0556)	(0.0557)	(0.0533)	(0.0535)
Affirmative action (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0416	0.0414	0.0201	0.0213

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.5: Linear probability model with DxR pairs and policy-party interactions.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0557) 0.0628	(0.0557) 0.0627	(0.0538) -0.1108*	(0.0538) -0.1108*
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	(0.0572) -0.0193	(0.0572) -0.0190	(0.0526) -0.0781	(0.0526) -0.0789
Trade with China (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0559) 0.0473	(0.0560) 0.0477	(0.0519) -0.0884+	(0.0519) -0.0876+
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0590) 0.0752	(0.0591) 0.0759	(0.0514) 0.0595	(0.0515) 0.0592
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	(0.0540) 0.1159*	(0.0541) 0.1159*	(0.0552) 0.0893+	(0.0553) 0.0892+
Abortion (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0572) -0.0016	(0.0573) -0.0013	(0.0536) 0.0773	(0.0537) 0.0781
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0574) -0.0638	(0.0574) -0.0636	(0.0515) -0.1278*	(0.0516) -0.1288*
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	(0.0538) -0.0613	(0.0539) -0.0611	(0.0530) -0.0566	(0.0531) -0.0561
Immigration (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0530) -0.1489**	(0.0531) -0.1490**	(0.0549) -0.0550	(0.0549) -0.0542
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0538) -0.1324*	(0.0538) -0.1328*	(0.0506) -0.0908	(0.0507) -0.0910

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.5: Linear probability model with DxR pairs and policy-party interactions.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	(0.0567) -0.1170*	(0.0568) -0.1177*	(0.0583) -0.1153*	(0.0582) -0.1153*
LGBT rights (conservative) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0551) -0.0784	(0.0553) -0.0788	(0.0563) -0.1388*	(0.0563) -0.1387*
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Racial threat)	(0.0567) 0.0332	(0.0568) 0.0337	(0.0563) 0.0732	(0.0564) 0.0723
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Nationality threat)	(0.0568) 0.0306	(0.0569) 0.0310	(0.0556) -0.0205	(0.0558) -0.0207
Redistribution (conservative) x Status threat expo- sure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0543) -0.0297	(0.0544) -0.0293	(0.0554) 0.0047	(0.0556) 0.0041
Affirmative action (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party)	(0.0543) -0.0037	(0.0544) -0.0043	(0.0547) 0.0224	(0.0548) 0.0226
Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0548) 0.0189	(0.0549) 0.0195	(0.0542) -0.1086	(0.0544) -0.1080
Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	(0.1142) 0.1414	(0.1143) 0.1418	(0.1097) 0.0409	(0.1098) 0.0419
Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.1131) 0.0647	(0.1132) 0.0650	(0.1075) -0.1319	(0.1076) -0.1301
Trade with China (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party)	(0.1150) 0.0838	(0.1152) 0.0843	(0.1077) -0.0535	(0.1079) -0.0529

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.5: Linear probability model with DxR pairs and policy-party interactions.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Abortion (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party)	(0.0548) 0.0359	(0.0549) 0.0362	(0.0503) 0.0064	(0.0503) 0.0072
Immigration (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party)	(0.0501) -0.0521	(0.0501) -0.0518	(0.0485) -0.0642	(0.0486) -0.0635
LGBT rights (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party)	(0.0552) -0.0331	(0.0553) -0.0331	(0.0531) -0.0807	(0.0531) -0.0817
Redistribution (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party)	(0.0564) 0.0202	(0.0564) 0.0205	(0.0543) 0.0155	(0.0543) 0.0148
Affirmative action (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0527) -0.0277	(0.0527) -0.0272	(0.0517) 0.0234	(0.0518) 0.0216
Affirmative action (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	(0.0782) 0.0025	(0.0783) 0.0028	(0.0759) -0.0296	(0.0762) -0.0296
Affirmative action (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0783) -0.0571	(0.0783) -0.0562	(0.0762) -0.0315	(0.0763) -0.0316
Trade with China (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0820) -0.0620	(0.0821) -0.0619	(0.0742) 0.0916	(0.0743) 0.0906
	(0.0763)	(0.0764)	(0.0755)	(0.0755)

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.5: Linear probability model with DxR pairs and policy-party interactions.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Trade with China (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.0008 (0.0797)	-0.0014 (0.0798)	0.0895 (0.0709)	0.0891 (0.0709)
Trade with China (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	-0.1018 (0.0857)	-0.1026 (0.0858)	0.1427* (0.0701)	0.1404* (0.0702)
Abortion (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	-0.1474* (0.0730)	-0.1485* (0.0731)	0.0287 (0.0693)	0.0275 (0.0694)
Abortion (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	-0.1985* (0.0774)	-0.1985* (0.0775)	-0.0532 (0.0712)	-0.0542 (0.0714)
Abortion (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.0013 (0.0755)	0.0007 (0.0756)	-0.0577 (0.0703)	-0.0593 (0.0705)
Immigration (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	0.0846 (0.0776)	0.0841 (0.0777)	0.0658 (0.0800)	0.0663 (0.0801)
Immigration (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	0.0571 (0.0809)	0.0567 (0.0810)	0.0383 (0.0765)	0.0378 (0.0765)
Immigration (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	0.2333**	0.2331**	0.0463	0.0460

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.5: Linear probability model with DxR pairs and policy-party interactions.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
LGBT rights (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0801) 0.0720	(0.0802) 0.0720	(0.0721) 0.1386+	(0.0723) 0.1392+
LGBT rights (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	(0.0824) 0.0799	(0.0824) 0.0805	(0.0763) 0.1195	(0.0763) 0.1197
LGBT rights (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0790) -0.0065	(0.0790) -0.0062	(0.0748) 0.1463+	(0.0749) 0.1462+
Redistribution (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial threat)	(0.0797) -0.0405	(0.0797) -0.0407	(0.0760) -0.0661	(0.0762) -0.0646
Redistribution (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Nationality threat)	(0.0776) -0.1136	(0.0776) -0.1140	(0.0747) -0.0127	(0.0749) -0.0128
Redistribution (conservative) x Party affiliation (Republican Party) x Status threat exposure (Racial and nationality threat)	(0.0769) -0.0442	(0.0770) -0.0444	(0.0730) 0.0221	(0.0733) 0.0228
Male	(0.0759)	(0.0760) -0.0021 (0.0033)	(0.0730)	(0.0731) 0.0076 (0.0050)
Age (std)		0.0020 (0.0016)		-0.0033 (0.0024)
Education (std)		-0.0017		-0.0020

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
(continued ...)

Table I.5: Linear probability model with DxR pairs and policy-party interactions.

(continued)

	Republican voter (Not adjusted)	Republican voter (Adjusted)	Democratic voter (Not adjusted)	Democratic voter (Adjusted)
Income (12 levels) (std)		(0.0018) -0.0002 (0.0017)		(0.0029) -0.0008 (0.0028)
N. Obs.	4546	4546	4790	4790
R2 (adj)	0.1326	0.1319	0.1472	0.1466
BIC	6368.4715	6401.9645	6609.8162	6642.9925
AIC	6008.8393	6016.6443	6247.2563	6254.5354
Std. Error	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered	Clustered

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

J Manipulation and Attention Checks

Participants were asked to complete an attention check before the vignette manipulation. Participants who failed this attention check were given a second check, and were dropped from the survey if they failed again (Kane and Barabas 2019).

The manipulations checks indicate that status threat was successfully manipulated for the vast majority of the respondents. The evidence comes from two groups of manipulation checks. The first group captured *factual* manipulation. It was based on information exposure recall and we used a single question to capture that recall. We asked, "We're interested in what you can remember from earlier in the study. Note that this is not an attention check, and you will be able to complete the survey regardless of what you're able to remember. Earlier, we asked you to read a paragraph about how American society is changing. Please check all the boxes that correspond to a statement you remember from that paragraph." The options were 1: 'Some Americans are doing worse in the new economy,' 2: 'Some Americans are doing better in the new economy,' 3: 'Compared to other nations, the United States remains a global leader,' 4: 'Compared to other nations, the United States is losing status,' 5: 'White Americans are less valued today than in the past,' 6: 'Americans are leaders in innovation, education, and entertainment.'" For instance, people exposed to racial threat condition should check boxes 1 and 5, and people exposed to nationality threat should check 1 and 4. From that question we created two main indicators. One groups respondents by how many correct or incorrect items they chose. The second is a recall score with the difference between the proportion of correct and incorrect answers. This score goes from 100 (all correct) to -100 (all incorrect). The distribution of these two indicators are on tables J.1 and J.2.

In total, 55% of the respondents answered all items correctly, and 20% didn't answer any incorrectly and at least some correctly. The remaining 25% answered at least one incorrectly. Most of those (225 cases or 11%) are concentrated on people who answered two correctly and one incorrectly. Table J.3 break down those cases by exposure and the specific answer those subjects selected. Most of them (114 cases or 51%) are people who were exposed to the racial threat message and selected "Compared to other nations, the United States is losing status" (incorrectly) in addition to the racial threat and economic decline answers (correctly). Therefore, it seems that the racial threat for these cases also triggered perception of national status decline. This seems to be a treatment "dosage" issue. If we consider the recall score, the vast majority (1,807 cases or 92%) got a positive score.

These results give us confidence that most of the subject read and understood the status threat message. In the robustness check section, we repeat the analyses by subgroups based on the answers to the factual manipulation check. The results are basically the same as those found with the full sample.

The second group of manipulation checks we used is described in tables J.4 to J.6. They capture the effect of status threat exposure on respondents' perceptions about the social status of various groups, status anxiety, feeling thermometers, and generalized prejudice. As we can see, the treatment changed perceptions about which group is losing social status in society, as we should expect based on the content of the treatment. Those exposed to nationality status threat became more likely to respond that Americans are losing social status and that the US is no longer a global leader, but not that whites are losing status. Exposure to status threat for whites increased the perception that whites are losing status, but also that Americans and the US are also losing status internationally. As mentioned above, it seems that white status threat triggered that type of perception too. This was not caused by incorrect randomization, but actual activation of that type of perception with racial threat.

Table J.1: Factual manipulation check

Manipulation check (group)	N	Freq
All correct	1118	54.75
Correct: 1 of 2 (none incorrect)	153	7.49
Correct: 1 of 3 (none incorrect)	90	4.41
Correct: 2 of 3 (none incorrect)	170	8.33
Incorrect: 1 of 3 (correct 0 of 3)	11	0.54
Incorrect: 1 of 3 (correct 1 of 3)	33	1.62
Incorrect: 1 of 3 (correct 2 of 3)	43	2.11
Incorrect: 1 of 3 (correct 3 of 3)	25	1.22
Incorrect: 1 of 4 (correct 0 of 2)	14	0.69
Incorrect: 1 of 4 (correct 1 of 2)	55	2.69
Incorrect: 1 of 4 (correct 2 of 2)	225	11.02
Incorrect: 2 of 3 (correct 1 of 3)	16	0.78
Incorrect: 2 of 3 (correct 2 of 3)	5	0.24
Incorrect: 2 of 3 (correct 3 of 3)	3	0.15
Incorrect: 2 of 4 (correct 0 of 2)	8	0.39
Incorrect: 2 of 4 (correct 1 of 2)	29	1.42
Incorrect: 2 of 4 (correct 2 of 2)	15	0.73
Incorrect: 3 of 3 (correct 0 of 3)	4	0.20
Incorrect: 3 of 3 (correct 1 of 3)	5	0.24
Incorrect: 3 of 3 (correct 2 of 3)	1	0.05
Incorrect: 3 of 3 (correct 3 of 3)	1	0.05
Incorrect: 3 of 4 (correct 0 of 2)	7	0.34
Incorrect: 3 of 4 (correct 1 of 2)	8	0.39
Incorrect: 4 of 4 (correct 0 of 2)	1	0.05
Incorrect: 4 of 4 (correct 1 of 2)	2	0.10

Table J.2: Factual manipulation check: Scores distribution

Manipulation check score (% correct - % incorrect)	N	Freq
-100.00	5	0.24
-75.00	7	0.34
-66.67	5	0.24
-50.00	10	0.49
-33.33	27	1.32
-33.33	1	0.05
-25.00	22	1.08
0.00	68	3.33
25.00	55	2.69
33.33	3	0.15
33.33	133	6.51
50.00	168	8.23
66.67	25	1.22
66.67	170	8.33
75.00	225	11.02
100.00	1118	54.75

Table J.3: Factual manipulation check: Cases with 1 incorrect and 2 correct answers

Answer	Exposure	N	Freq
Incorrect: 1 of 4 (correct 2 of 2)			
1,5,6	Racial threat	4	1.7778
1,2,5	Racial threat	6	2.6667
1,3,5	Racial threat	17	7.5556
1,4,5	Racial threat	114	50.6667
1,3,4	Nationality threat	3	1.3333
1,2,4	Nationality threat	5	2.2222
1,4,6	Nationality threat	11	4.8889
1,4,5	Nationality threat	65	28.8889

Table J.4: Effect of status threat exposure on social status perceptions

	Whites becoming minority	Whites loosing social status	Whites loosing economic status	US no longer global leader	Americans loosing social status	Americans loosing economic status
Intercept	2.7719*** (0.0535)	2.9084*** (0.0556)	3.1170*** (0.0535)	2.1442*** (0.0550)	3.2593*** (0.0527)	3.7856*** (0.0487)
Racial threat	0.5588*** (0.0757)	0.3206*** (0.0786)	0.2138** (0.0758)	0.3606*** (0.0779)	0.3689*** (0.0746)	0.0833 (0.0690)
Nationality threat	0.0989 (0.0757)	0.0994 (0.0786)	0.1159 (0.0758)	0.9419*** (0.0779)	0.6292*** (0.0746)	0.1655* (0.0690)
Racial and nation- ality threat	0.6009*** (0.0759)	0.3894*** (0.0788)	0.2460** (0.0759)	0.7887*** (0.0781)	0.5672*** (0.0748)	0.0428 (0.0691)
N. Obs.	2042	2042	2042	2042	2042	2042
R2 (adj)	0.0453	0.0142	0.0048	0.0797	0.0393	0.0016
BIC	6606.4857	6759.8360	6607.2750	6721.5702	6545.4132	6224.2892
AIC	6583.9990	6737.3493	6584.7883	6699.0835	6522.9265	6201.8025
Std. Error	Classical	Classical	Classical	Classical	Classical	Classical

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table J.5: Effect of status threat exposure on status anxiety

	Feel threatened by ethnic diversity	Feel benefit from ethnic diversity	Feel threatened by other countries	Feel benefit from other countries
Intercept	2.4016*** (0.0634)	3.2456*** (0.0644)	2.8967*** (0.0611)	3.6862*** (0.0570)
Racial threat	0.1112 (0.0897)	0.0107 (0.0911)	0.1816* (0.0864)	0.0242 (0.0807)
Nationality threat	-0.0160 (0.0897)	-0.0891 (0.0911)	0.3108*** (0.0864)	0.1338+ (0.0807)
Racial and nationality threat	0.0777 (0.0899)	-0.0385 (0.0913)	0.3025*** (0.0866)	0.1679* (0.0809)
N. Obs.	2042	2042	2042	2042
R2 (adj)	-0.0001	-0.0007	0.0068	0.0015
BIC	7297.3157	7360.8417	7145.2791	6866.6822
AIC	7274.8290	7338.3550	7122.7924	6844.1955
Std. Error	Classical	Classical	Classical	Classical

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table J.6: Effect of status threat exposure on prejudice

	Feels toward white Americans	Feels toward black Americans	Feels toward Latino Americans	Feels toward Asian Americans	Feels toward The United States	Feels toward China	Feels toward The United Kingdom	Feels toward Japan	Generalized prejudice
Intercept	7.4405*** (0.1041)	7.0780*** (0.0995)	6.8012*** (0.0994)	7.0858*** (0.0895)	7.5224*** (0.1165)	4.4327*** (0.1114)	7.0078*** (0.0934)	6.6199*** (0.0935)	0.6749*** (0.0066)
Racial threat	-0.0609 (0.1473)	-0.0604 (0.1409)	0.0834 (0.1407)	0.1471 (0.1266)	-0.0195 (0.1649)	-0.0218 (0.1577)	-0.2739* (0.1322)	0.1609 (0.1323)	-0.0006 (0.0094)
Nationality threat	-0.3623* (0.1473)	-0.1465 (0.1409)	-0.0849 (0.1407)	-0.0329 (0.1266)	-0.3815* (0.1649)	-0.1490 (0.1577)	-0.2113 (0.1322)	0.0024 (0.1323)	-0.0171+ (0.0094)
Racial and nationality threat	-0.1940 (0.1476)	0.0009 (0.1411)	0.0272 (0.1410)	0.0661 (0.1269)	-0.1989 (0.1652)	-0.0126 (0.1580)	-0.0808 (0.1325)	0.0409 (0.1326)	-0.0044 (0.0094)
N. Obs.	2042	2042	2042	2042	2042	2042	2042	2042	2042
R2 (adj)	0.0020	-0.0008	-0.0007	-0.0003	0.0020	-0.0009	0.0011	-0.0005	0.0006
BIC	9322.6156	9140.3389	9135.3356	8705.7383	9783.5713	9601.2829	8882.0173	8884.0704	-1921.0414
AIC	9300.1289	9117.8522	9112.8489	8683.2516	9761.0846	9578.7961	8859.5305	8861.5836	-1943.5281
Std. Error	Classical	Classical	Classical	Classical	Classical	Classical	Classical	Classical	Classical

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

K Robustness Checks

This section presents results with different subsamples. Figures K.1 and K.2 show people who answered the manipulation check 100% correctly. Figure K.3 show results after removing speeders. Each y-axis value (e.g., Rac. Threat) includes estimates from four models: Full sample and three subsamples with only participants who completed the survey 50%, 40%, and 30% faster than the median response time. It is difficult to see all four models in the figure because the estimates basically overlap for all these subsets. Therefore, as we can see, the results are essentially the same based on manipulation checks and after speeders were removed.




Figure K.1: Point estimates (shapes) and 95% confidence intervals (bars) capturing the causal effect (x-axis) of status threat (shapes and colors) on voters' support for candidates due to their conservative policy position (y-axis). Estimates based on linear probability models using non-partisan candidate pairs only. Panels show subsamples by voters' partisanship and using pooled data. SE clustered by subject. Subsample: 100% correct answers in the manipulation check.




Figure K.2: Point estimates (shapes) and 95% confidence intervals (bars) capturing the causal effect (x-axis) of status threat (shapes and colors) on voters' support for candidates due to their conservative policy position (y-axis). Estimates based on linear probability models using partisan candidate pairs (column panels): Democratic vs Democratic (DxD); Democratic vs Republican (DxR); Republican vs Republican (RxR). Row panels show subsamples by voters' partisanship. SE clustered by subject. Subsample: 100% correct answers in the manipulation check.




Figure K.3: Point estimates (shapes) and 95% confidence intervals (bars) capturing the causal effect (x-axis) of status threat (shapes and colors) and conservative positions and their interaction with the conjoint task order. Estimates based on linear probability models. Each y-axis value (e.g., Rac. Threat) includes estimates from four models: Full sample and three subsamples with only participants who completed the survey 50%, 40%, and 30% faster than the median response time. SE clustered by subject.

L Supplementary Analyses

Figures L.1 to L.3 replicate Figure 1 of the main paper for the other groups. Table L.1 shows the effect of conservatism and status threat when we aggregated across issues and kept only the conservative-liberal position information. Standard errors were clustered at subject and issue levels. Again, the results are essentially the same, so the conservative shift does not happen in aggregation either, except for an increase of 10 percentage points in Democratic voters supporting Republican liberal candidates under nationality threat.

Table L.2 tests the difference in the effects of conservatism and status threat between Democratic and Republican voters. As the raw effects were not significant, this difference is less relevant. In any case, only one case, namely for abortion policy, the result was in the expected direction, but it was only significant at 0.1.




Figure L.1: Percentage of time (y-axis) voters who identify with the Democratic or Republican party (color code) chose candidates with conservative (top panels) or liberal positions (bottom panels) in various policy areas (x-axis). The left panels show cases in which choices involved candidates from difference parties. Right panels show choices between two independent candidates. Only racial threat exposure included.




Figure L.2: Percentage of time (y-axis) voters who identify with the Democratic or Republican party (color code) chose candidates with conservative (top panels) or liberal positions (bottom panels) in various policy areas (x-axis). The left panels show cases in which choices involved candidates from difference parties. Right panels show choices between two independent candidates. Only nationality threat exposure included.




Figure L.3: Percentage of time (y-axis) voters who identify with the Democratic or Republican party (color code) chose candidates with conservative (top panels) or liberal positions (bottom panels) in various policy areas (x-axis). The left panels show cases in which choices involved candidates from difference parties. Right panels show choices between two independent candidates. Only joint racial and nationality threat exposure included.

Table L.1: Causal effect of ideology position, candidates' party affiliation, and status threat exposure, aggregated across issues, on Democratic and Republican voters' probability of selecting the candidate (last two columns). Estimates use linear probability models estimated separately by voters' partisanship with clustered standard errors at the subject and issue levels (in parentheses)

Candidate			Causal Effects	
Position	Party	Exposure	Republican voter	Democratic voter
Non-partisan candidates pair (Independent x Independent)				
Conservative	Ind	Racial and nationality threat	-0.0171 (0.0224)	-0.0355 (0.0221)
Liberal	Ind	Racial and nationality threat	0.0094 (0.0112)	0.0188+ (0.0111)
Conservative	Ind	Nationality threat	-0.022 (0.0219)	-0.0242 (0.0223)
Liberal	Ind	Nationality threat	0.011 (0.0111)	0.0127 (0.0111)
Conservative	Ind	Racial threat	-0.0373+ (0.0225)	-0.0089 (0.0226)
Liberal	Ind	Racial threat	0.0195+ (0.0113)	0.0048 (0.0112)
Conservative	Ind	Status reassuring	0.1025*** (0.0152)	-0.1255*** (0.0158)
Liberal	Ind	Status reassuring (Ref.)	0.4484*** (0.0077)	0.5621*** (0.0078)
Partisan candidates pair (Democratic x Republican)				
Conservative	Rep	Racial and nationality threat	0.0037 (0.033)	0.0432 (0.0312)
Conservative	Dem	Racial and nationality threat	-0.0292 (0.0233)	-0.029 (0.0228)
Liberal	Rep	Racial and nationality threat	0.0602+ (0.0308)	-0.026 (0.0293)
Liberal	Dem	Racial and nationality threat	-0.0159 (0.0169)	0.0171 (0.0164)
Conservative	Rep	Nationality threat	-0.0314 (0.0326)	0.0204 (0.0317)
Conservative	Dem	Nationality threat	-0.019 (0.023)	-0.0322 (0.0231)
Liberal	Rep	Nationality threat	0.062* (0.0305)	0.1063*** (0.03)
Liberal	Dem	Nationality threat	-0.0133 (0.0169)	-0.0421* (0.017)
Conservative	Rep	Racial threat	-0.0201 (0.032)	0.0471 (0.0326)
Conservative	Dem	Racial threat	-0.0091 (0.0231)	-0.0501* (0.0235)
Liberal	Rep	Racial threat	-0.0412 (0.0303)	0.0129 (0.0306)
Liberal	Dem	Racial threat	0.0313+ (0.0168)	0.0078 (0.0172)
Conservative	Rep	Status reassuring	0.0132 (0.0224)	-0.0227 (0.0226)
Conservative	Dem	Status reassuring	0.0754*** (0.0161)	-0.0803*** (0.0165)
Liberal	Rep	Status reassuring	0.3035*** (0.0208)	-0.2457*** (0.0212)
Liberal	Dem	Status reassuring (Ref.)	0.3067*** (0.0115)	0.669*** (0.012)

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Table L.2: Difference (last column) between the causal effect of the interaction between threat to social status of whites and Americans and candidates' issue position in various areas on Democratic and Republican voters probability of selecting the candidate. Estimates from linear probability models with clustered SE by subject (in parenthesis). Candidate pair: IxI

Issue	Exposure	Democratic voter	Republican voter	Difference
Abortion	Nationality threat	0.0171 (0.0518)	-0.0906 (0.0633)	0.1077
Abortion	Racial and nationality threat	0.0549 (0.0468)	-0.0552 (0.0585)	0.11
Abortion	Racial threat	0.0434 (0.0501)	-0.1034 (0.0656)	0.1469+
Affirmative action	Nationality threat	0.0313 (0.0478)	-0.0365 (0.0475)	0.0678
Affirmative action	Racial and nationality threat	0.0149 (0.0474)	0.0032 (0.0532)	0.0117
Affirmative action	Racial threat	-0.002 (0.0492)	-0.012 (0.0493)	0.01
Immigration	Nationality threat	-0.0606 (0.0496)	0.0156 (0.0525)	-0.0762
Immigration	Racial and nationality threat	-0.0478 (0.0495)	-0.0423 (0.0531)	-0.0055
Immigration	Racial threat	0.0342 (0.0503)	-0.0296 (0.0534)	0.0638
LGBT rights	Nationality threat	-0.1069* (0.0542)	-0.0549 (0.0468)	-0.052
LGBT rights	Racial and nationality threat	-0.1219* (0.0519)	0.019 (0.055)	-0.1409+
LGBT rights	Racial threat	-0.0847 (0.0569)	-0.0165 (0.0561)	-0.0682
Redistribution	Nationality threat	-0.0125 (0.048)	-0.0132 (0.0494)	0.0007
Redistribution	Racial and nationality threat	0.0298 (0.0493)	-0.0613 (0.0505)	0.091
Redistribution	Racial threat	0.0254 (0.0473)	0.02 (0.045)	0.0054
Trade with China	Nationality threat	-0.0335 (0.0505)	-0.004 (0.0486)	-0.0295
Trade with China	Racial and nationality threat	-0.0475 (0.0541)	-0.0151 (0.0533)	-0.0324
Trade with China	Racial threat	0.0051 (0.0525)	-0.0894+ (0.0528)	0.0946

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

M Diagnostics

The figures in this section show that the results were not driven by the order of the candidates in the profile pairs (e.g., if a conservative feature appeared in the left or right profile) nor by the task number (e.g., in the earlier tasks but not in the later ones, or vice versa). The figures show results of interacting the candidate features and status threat conditions with the order of the profiles and the task number. There is no evidence that the results interact with the profile order or task number.




Figure M.1: Point estimates (shapes) and 95% confidence intervals (bars) capturing the causal effect (x-axis) of status threat (shapes and colors) and conservative positions and their interaction with the conjoint task order. Estimates based on linear probability models using non-partisan candidate pairs. Panels show subsamples by voters' partisanship. SE clustered by subject.




Figure M.2: Point estimates (shapes) and 95% confidence intervals (bars) capturing the causal effect (x-axis) of status threat (shapes and colors) and conservative positions and their interaction with the conjoint task order. Estimates based on linear probability models using partisan candidate pairs (column panels): Democratic vs Democratic (DxD); Democratic vs Republican (DxR); Republican vs Republican (RxR). Row panels show subsamples by voters' partisanship. SE clustered by subject.




Figure M.3: Point estimates (shapes) and 95% confidence intervals (bars) capturing the causal effect (x-axis) of status threat (shapes and colors) and conservative positions and their interaction with the conjoint profile order. Estimates based on linear probability models using non-partisan candidate pairs. Panels show subsamples by voters' partisanship. SE clustered by subject.




Figure M.4: Point estimates (shapes) and 95% confidence intervals (bars) capturing the causal effect (x-axis) of status threat (shapes and colors) and conservative positions and their interaction with the conjoint profile order. Estimates based on linear probability models using partisan candidate pairs (column panels): Democratic vs Democratic (DxD); Democratic vs Republican (DxR); Republican vs Republican (RxR). Row panels show subsamples by voters' partisanship. SE clustered by subject.

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