International Reputation Costs and Assurances: A Case of East Asia
Appendix

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Appendix

Instrument for the Survey Experiment

PRETREATMENT VARIABLE QUESTIONS

Gender: What is your gender?
- Male
- Female
- Others
- Prefer not to answer

Age: What is your age (in years)? (Eg. 22) (Type numbers)

Race: What is your race?
- White
- Black
- Asian
- Mixed
- Other
- Prefer not to answer

Ideology: Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?
- Extremely liberal
- Liberal
- Slightly liberal
- Moderate, middle of the road
- Slightly conservative
- Conservative
- Extremely conservative
- Don't know
- Prefer not to answer

Partisanship: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an independent, or what?
- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- Other party
- Don't know
- Prefer not to answer

Income: Please mark the answer that includes the income of all members of your family living here in 2023 before taxes.

• Less than $25,000
• $25,000 - $49,999
• $50,000 - $74,999
• $75,000 - $99,999
• $100,000 - $124,999
• $125,000 - $149,999
• $150,000 - $174,999
• $175,000 - $199,999
• More than $200,000
• Don't know
• Prefer not to answer

Voting: Did you vote in the 2020 presidential election?
• Yes
• No
• Prefer not to answer

Education: What is the highest level of education you have completed?
• Less than high school
• High school
• Some college
• Bachelor's degree or higher
• Prefer not to answer

Attention Question: Please check "No" for this question.
• Yes
• No
• Don't Know

Feeling (China): How do you feel about China?
• Very unfavorably
• Somewhat unfavorably
• Slightly unfavorably
• Neither unfavorably nor favorably • Slightly favorably
• Somewhat favorably
• Very favorably

Feeling (Japan): How do you feel about Japan?
• Very unfavorably
• Somewhat unfavorably
• Slightly unfavorably
• Neither unfavorably nor favorably • Slightly favorably
• Somewhat favorably
• Very favorably

Knowledge (China): Who is the current leader of China? (Correct as of May 2024: Xi Jinping)
• Jiang Zemin
• Xi Jinping
• Hu Jintao
• Deng Xiaoping
• Don't know

Knowledge (Japan): Who is the current leader of Japan? (Correct as of May 2024: Fumio Kishida)
• Shinzo Abe
• Yoshishige Suga
• Fumio Kishida
• Yoshihiko Noda
• Don't know

GENERAL OPENING PROMPT PROVIDED TO ALL RESPONDENTS

China and Japan are engaged in conflict over several security-related issues in East Asia, chief among these include ownership over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and the status of Taiwan. In the latter case, China has not abandoned the use of force as an option for resolving the Taiwan issue while Japan has encouraged a peaceful resolution. Because of these Chinese-Japanese tensions, the stability of the East Asian region is of concern. Please read a hypothetical situation below and answer the following questions.

Prompt: Group #1 (China/No Commitment Information)

In 203X, China announced a massive military buildup. The Chinese leader stated that the decision to bolster their military capabilities was in response to the growing Japanese threat. In contrast, the Japanese government criticized China's move, arguing that it could destabilize international security in East Asia.

Prompt: Group #2 (China/Commitment Information)

In 203X, China announced a massive military buildup. The Chinese leader stated that the decision to bolster their military capabilities was in response to the growing Japanese threat. In contrast, the Japanese government criticized China's move, arguing that it could destabilize international security in East Asia.

Given China's prior commitment to its peaceful rise, this military buildup could be viewed as a breach of its dedication to promoting peace.

Prompt: Group #3 (Japan/No Commitment Information)

In 203X, Japan announced a massive military buildup. The Japanese leader stated that

the decision to bolster their military capabilities was in response to the growing Chinese threat. In contrast, the Chinese government criticized Japan's move, arguing that it could destabilize international security in East Asia.

Prompt: Group #4 (Japan/Commitment Information)

In 203X, Japan announced a massive military buildup. The Japanese leader stated that the decision to bolster their military capabilities was in response to the growing Chinese threat. In contrast, the Chinese government criticized Japan's move, arguing that it could destabilize international security in East Asia.

Given Japan's prior commitment to military restraint, this military buildup could be viewed as a breach of its dedication to promoting peace.

QUESTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION COSTS

Credibility (For Groups 1 and 2): How likely would you believe commitments made by China in the future?
- Very unlikely
- Somewhat unlikely
- Somewhat likely
- Very likely

Credibility (For Groups 3 and 4): How likely would you believe commitments made by Japan in the future? (For Groups 3 and 4)
- Very unlikely
- Somewhat unlikely
- Somewhat likely
- Very likely

Support (For Groups 1 and 2): Do you support or oppose China's change in its foreign policy?
- Strongly support
- Somewhat support
- Don't care/ Neither support nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Strongly oppose

Support (For Groups 3 and 4): Do you support or oppose Japan's change in its foreign policy?
- Strongly support
- Somewhat support
- Don't care/ Neither support nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Strongly oppose

Work With (For Groups 1 and 2): Do you agree or disagree that it is a good idea for the US government to work with the Chinese government on some international issues/foreign affairs in the future?
• Strongly agree
• Somewhat agree
• Don't care/ Neither agree nor disagree
• Somewhat disagree
• Strongly disagree

Work With (For Groups 3 and 4): Do you agree or disagree that it is a good idea for the US government to work with the Japanese government on some international issues/foreign affairs in the future?
• Strongly agree
• Somewhat agree
• Don't care/ Neither agree nor disagree
• Somewhat disagree
• Strongly disagree

Trust (Government) (For Groups 1 and 2): After the move made by the Chinese government on the expansion of military spending, do you trust the Chinese government?
• Strongly trust
• Somewhat trust
• Don't care/ Neither trust nor distrust
• Somewhat distrust
• Strongly distrust

Trust (Government) (For Groups 3 and 4): After the move made by the Japanese government on the expansion of military spending, do you trust the Japanese government?
• Strongly trust
• Somewhat trust
• Don't care/ Neither trust nor distrust
• Somewhat distrust
• Strongly distrust

Trust (Citizens) (For Groups 1 and 2): After the move made by the Chinese government on the expansion of military spending, do you trust Chinese citizens?
• Strongly trust
• Somewhat trust
• Don't care/ Neither trust nor distrust
• Somewhat distrust
• Strongly distrust

Trust (Citizens) (For Groups 3 and 4): After the move made by the Japanese government on the expansion of military spending, do you trust Japanese citizens?

- Strongly trust
- Somewhat trust
- Don't care/ Neither trust nor distrust
- Somewhat distrust
- Strongly distrust

Manipulaction Check 1: Did the previous scenario mention that the Japanese government was committed to military restraint?

Manipulaction Check 2: Did the previous scenario mention that the Chinese government was committed to its peaceful rise?

Variable Codings

Condition: Indicator for the experimental group, where 1 = China/No Information; 2 = China/Information on Commitment; 3 = Japan/No Information; 4 = Japan/Information on Commitment.

Credibility: How likely would you believe commitments made by [China/Japan] in the future? (1 = Very unlikely; 4 = Very likely.)

Support: Do you support or oppose [China's/Japan's] change in its foreign policy? (1 = Strongly oppose; 5 = Strongly support.)

Work With: Do you agree or disagree that it is a good idea for the US government to work with the [Chinese/Japanese] government on some international issues/foreign affairs in the future? (1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree.)

Trust (Government): After the move made by the [Chinese/Japanese] government on the expansion of military spending, do you trust the [Chinese/Japanese] government? (1 = Strongly distrust; 5 = Strongly trust.)

Trust (Citizens): After the move made by the [Chinese/Japanese] government on the expansion of military spending, do you trust the [Chinese/Japanese] citizens? (1 = Strongly distrust; 5 = Strongly trust.)

Male: 1 = Male; 0 = Female.

Age: 1 = 18-24 years; 2 = 25-34 years; 3 = 35-44 years; 4 = 45-54 years; 5 = 55-64 years; 6 = 65 years or older.

White: 1 = White, 0 = Otherwise.

Ideology: 1 = Extremely Conservative, 2 = Conservative, 3 = Slightly Conservative, 4 = Moderate, Middle of the Road, 5 =Slightly Liberal, 6 =Liberal, 7 =Extremely Liberal.

Democrat: 1 = Democrat, 0 = Otherwise.

Republican: 1 = Republican, 0 = Otherwise.

Voting (2020 Presidential Election): 1 = Yes, 0 = No.

Income: 1 = Less than $25,000, 2 =$25,000 - $49,999, 3 =$50,000 -$74,999, 4 =$75,000 - $99,999, 5 =$100,000 - $124,999, 6 =$125,000 - $149,999, 7 =$150,000 - $174,999, 8 =$175,000 - $199,999, 9 =More than $200,000

Education: 1 = Bachelor's degree or higher, 0 = Otherwise.

Feeling (China): 1 = Strongly unfavorably, 7 = Strongly favorably.

Feeling (Japan): 1 = Strongly unfavorably, 7 = Strongly favorably.

Knowledge (China): Who is the current leader of China? (Choice: Jiang Xemin, Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, Deng Xiaoping, Don't know.) 1 = Xi Jinping, 0 = Otherwise.

Knowledge (Japan): Who is the current prime minister of China? (Choice: Shinzo Abe, Yshihide Suga, Fumio Kishida, Yoshihiko Noda, Don't know.) 1 = Fumio Kishida, 0 = Otherwise.

Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Group 1	1,515	.250165	.4332509	0	1
Group 2	1,515	.2475248	.4317167	0	1
Group 3	1,515	.2521452	.4343876	0	1
Group 4	1,515	.250165	.4332509	0	1
Credibility	1,507	2.453218	.9188349	1	4
Support	1,515	2.685149	1.316699	1	5
Work With	1,515	3.674587	1.155817	1	5
Trust (Government)	1,515	2.689769	1.234733	1	5
Trust (Citizens)	1,515	3.469307	1.034837	1	5
Male	1,494	.5060241	.5001311	0	1
Age	1,515	3.183498	1.294993	1	6
White	1,507	.6834771	.4652739	0	1
Ideology	1,509	4.245858	1.817938	1	7
Democrat	1,511	.347452	.4763184	0	1
Republican	1,511	.3163468	.465204	0	1
Voting (2020 Presidential Election)	1,511	.8570479	.3501404	0	1
Income	1,490	4.083221	2.190964	1	9
Education	1,490	.5890139	.4921756	0	1
Feeling (China)	1,490	3.354497	1.466139	1	7
Feeling (Japan)	1,515	5.468647	1.265136	1	7
Knowledge (China)	1,515	.7617162	.4261743	0	1
Knowledge (Japan)	1,515	.3240924	.4681893	0	1

Balance Check

Table A2 presents a series of t-tests examining the balance across demographic and attitudinal variables. The results indicate that the randomization of the treatment was successful. Of the 39 coefficients tested, only 4 are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, suggesting that any observed imbalances are likely due to chance. Furthermore, the main results reported in the text remain robust when controlling for these variables in the regression models, as shown in Table A3.

Table A2: Difference in Means of the 4 Point Scale Credibility Measure (with T-test P-values) between Covariate Mean for Respondents in Group 1 and....

Covariants	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4
Male	-0.031	0.000	0.007
Age	-0.047	-0.048	0.005
White	0.020	0.071*	0.026
Democrat	-0.027	-0.080*	-0.044
Republican	0.039	0.081*	0.054
Ideology	-0.001	-0.190	-0.090
Voting (2020 Presidential Election)	0.024	0.010	0.029
Income	-0.011	-0.073	-0.132
Education	-0.019	-0.054	-0.039
Feeling (China)	0.214*	-0.079	0.191
Feeling (Japan)	0.040	-0.062	0.005
Knowledge (China)	-0.000	-0.012	-0.005
Knowledge (Japan)	-0.019	0.018	-0.008

Note: * $p < 0.05$

Table A3: Controlling for Demographic and Attitudinal Variables

	(1) Continuous	(2) Dichotomous	(3) Continuous	(4) Dichotomous
China/Commitment	-0.343**	-0.161**		
	(0.0528)	(0.0295)		
Japan/Commitment			-0.162**	-0.0496
			(0.0473)	(0.0284)
Male	0.0974	0.0624*	0.0851	0.0309
	(0.0558)	(0.0311)	(0.0496)	(0.0298)
Age	-0.0555**	-0.0265*	0.0146	0.00125
	(0.0213)	(0.0119)	(0.0195)	(0.0117)
White	-0.0692	-0.0466	0.0660	0.0510
	(0.0603)	(0.0337)	(0.0530)	(0.0318)
Ideology	0.0423	-0.00625	-0.0278	-0.00699
	(0.0245)	(0.0137)	(0.0224)	(0.0134)
Democrat	-0.137	-0.00682	-0.0139	-0.0206
	(0.0751)	(0.0419)	(0.0649)	(0.0389)
Republican	0.0982	0.0278	-0.0877	-0.0357
	(0.0830)	(0.0463)	(0.0750)	(0.0450)
Income	-0.00375	-0.00547	-0.00408	-0.00260
	(0.0131)	(0.00732)	(0.0116)	(0.00696)
Voting_Pres20	0.0257	0.0414	-0.0109	0.00864
	(0.0802)	(0.0448)	(0.0698)	(0.0419)
Education	0.107	0.0288	-0.0565	-0.0207
	(0.0587)	(0.0328)	(0.0527)	(0.0316)
Feeling_China	0.212**	0.0678**	-0.0506**	-0.0212*
	(0.0197)	(0.0110)	(0.0170)	(0.0102)
Feeling_Japan	-0.0733**	-0.0284*	0.193**	0.0823**
	(0.0209)	(0.0117)	(0.0201)	(0.0120)
Knowledge_China	-0.0944	-0.0457	-0.0333	-0.0400
	(0.0695)	(0.0388)	(0.0627)	(0.0376)
Knowledge_Japan	0.0620	0.0537	0.0534	0.0312
	(0.0611)	(0.0341)	(0.0551)	(0.0330)
Constant	1.764**	0.322**	2.267**	0.489**
	(0.201)	(0.112)	(0.193)	(0.116)
Observations	718	718	721	721
R^2	0.258	0.137	0.168	0.086

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Conditional Effects

Table A4 shows the results for the test of the conditional hypothesis (i.e., H2). The first two models report the OLS models I proposed in the pre-registration. They include three independent variables: China_Commitment, Japan_NoCommitment, and Japan_Commitment. The base category is China/No Commitment. The dependent variable of the first model is the continuous measure of credibility, and the second is dichotomous. The results are comparable to the t-tests reported in the main text. Taking an example of the first model, the coefficient of China_Commitment is -0.397, which means that the information on China's previous commitment results in a 0.40-point drop in China's credibility of future commitments. On the other hand, Japan's reputation costs are 0.802 - 0.968 $\approx$ -0.17. To test whether the difference in international reputation costs between China and Japan is statistically significant, I use the command in Stata as follows after running the OLS model:

```
. lincom _b[China_Commitment]-(_b[Japan_Commitment]-_b[Japan_NoCommitment])
```

The linear combination of China's reputation costs minus Japan's is -0.232, which means that the former's reputation costs are higher than the latter by 0.232 points. This difference is statistically significant as reported in the main text (p=0.003). The same test is conducted for the dichotomous measure, and there is a statistically discernible difference between China and Japan by 12.4 percentage points (p=0.002).

While not preregistered, I also report the results of OLS models including the dummy variables of whether China builds up, whether commitment information is informed, and their interactions. This approach may be more intuitive for many readers. They present the same information as the first two models: The coefficients of the interaction terms are -0.232 for the continuous variable and -0.124 for the dichotomous variable, and both are statistically significant. This suggests that China suffers from higher reputation costs than Japan.

Table A5 shows the results of the alternative measures of international reputation costs. As reported in the main text, I cannot find any evidence for H2 with these measures. None of the linear combinations of China's reputation costs minus Japan's is statistically significant (p=0.527 for Support, p=0.573 for Work With, p=0.813 for Trust (Government), and p=0.390 for Trust (Citizens)).

Table A4: Testing Conditional Effects

	(1) Continuous	(2) Dummy	(3) Continuous	(4) Dummy
China_Commitment	-0.397**	-0.178**		
	(0.0533)	(0.0291)		
Japan_NoCommitment	0.968**	0.532**		
	(0.0528)	(0.0288)		
Japan_Commitment	0.802**	0.478**		
	(0.0529)	(0.0289)		
China			-0.968**	-0.532**
			(0.0528)	(0.0288)
Commitment			-0.166**	-0.0540
			(0.0528)	(0.0288)
China × Commitment			-0.232**	-0.124**
			(0.0750)	(0.0410)
Constant	2.103**	0.309**	3.071**	0.840**
	(0.0374)	(0.0204)	(0.0373)	(0.0203)
Observations	1507	1507	1507	1507
R^2	0.373	0.368	0.373	0.368

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A5: Testing Conditional Effects (Alternative Measures)

	(1) Support	(2) Work With	(3) Trust (Gov.)	(4) Trust (Civ.)
China_Commitment	-0.0949	-0.00111	-0.163*	-0.117
	(0.0713)	(0.0818)	(0.0676)	(0.0659)
Japan_NoCommitment	1.789**	0.589**	1.613**	0.963**
	(0.0710)	(0.0814)	(0.0673)	(0.0656)
Japan_Commitment	1.631**	0.522**	1.472**	0.926**
	(0.0711)	(0.0816)	(0.0674)	(0.0657)
Constant	1.850**	3.396**	1.955**	3.024**
	(0.0503)	(0.0577)	(0.0477)	(0.0465)
Observations	1515	1515	1515	1515
R^2	0.448	0.058	0.437	0.237

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Attentiveness

All subjects correctly answered the attention check question, indicating a high level of attentiveness. As additional exploratory analyses, I ran the models excluding participants with response times below the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile. Whether or not demographic and attitudinal variables are controlled for, as shown in Tables A6 and A7, the main results remain robust

Table A6: Excluding Inattentive Subjects (DV=Credibility, Continous)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
China/Commitment	-0.397**	-0.338**		
	(0.0595)	(0.0546)		
Japan/Commitment			-0.130*	-0.138**
			(0.0518)	(0.0507)
Male		0.0855		0.0794
		(0.0578)		(0.0531)
Age		-0.0541*		0.0132
		(0.0220)		(0.0208)
White		-0.0939		0.0733
		(0.0631)		(0.0569)
Ideology		0.0530*		-0.0316
		(0.0252)		(0.0242)
Democrat		-0.152		-0.0186
		(0.0777)		(0.0692)
Republican		0.134		-0.0757
		(0.0854)		(0.0800)
Income		-0.00456		0.00116
		(0.0136)		(0.0124)
Voting (2020 Presidential Election)		-0.00609		0.00252
		(0.0825)		(0.0751)
Education		0.110		-0.0690
		(0.0606)		(0.0561)
Feeling_China		0.214**		-0.0673**
		(0.0205)		(0.0182)
Feeling_Japan		-0.0818**		0.185**
		(0.0219)		(0.0214)
Knowledge_China		-0.0642		-0.0185
		(0.0715)		(0.0666)
Knowledge_Japan		0.0565		0.0156
		(0.0634)		(0.0587)
Constant	2.093**	1.778**	3.059**	2.346**
	(0.0420)	(0.207)	(0.0365)	(0.208)
Observations	685	659	677	640
R^2	0.061	0.268	0.009	0.164

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Excluding Inattentive Subjects (DV=Credibility, Dichotomous)

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
China/Commitment	-0.175**	-0.154**		
	(0.0308)	(0.0305)		
Japan/Commitment			-0.0351	-0.0349
			(0.0295)	(0.0300)
Male		0.0544		0.0226
		(0.0322)		(0.0314)
Age		-0.0268*		0.00475
		(0.0122)		(0.0123)
White		-0.0544		0.0415
		(0.0352)		(0.0336)
Ideology		-0.000359		-0.00747
		(0.0140)		(0.0143)
Democrat		-0.0158		-0.0159
		(0.0433)		(0.0409)
Republican		0.0390		-0.0182
		(0.0476)		(0.0473)
Income		-0.00356		-0.00438
		(0.00756)		(0.00734)
Voting (2020 Presidential Election)		0.0259		0.0225
		(0.0460)		(0.0444)
Education		0.0197		-0.0177
		(0.0338)		(0.0332)
Feeling_China		0.0655**		-0.0272*
		(0.0114)		(0.0107)
Feeling_Japan		-0.0319**		0.0788**
		(0.0122)		(0.0127)
Knowledge_China		-0.0295		-0.0343
		(0.0398)		(0.0394)
Knowledge_Japan		0.0556		0.00844
		(0.0353)		(0.0347)
Constant	0.303**	0.329**	0.839**	0.515**
	(0.0217)	(0.115)	(0.0208)	(0.123)
Observations	685	659	677	640
R^2	0.045	0.136	0.002	0.084

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Manipulation Check

As manipulation checks, I asked whether the previous scenario indicated that the Chinese government was committed to its peaceful rise (the correct answer is "No" for Groups 1, 3, and 4, and "Yes" for Group 2) and whether the previous scenario indicated that the Japanese government was committed to military restraint (the correct answer is "No" for Groups 1, 2, and 3, and "Yes" for Group 4). Table A8 reports the results of these manipulation checks. The passing rate is significantly lower in Group 2 than in the other groups ($\tilde{\chi}^2 = 162.14$, $p = 0.029$). According to feedback from some respondents, confusion arose regarding whether "committed" referred to prior commitment or current behavior. Dropping participants who fail manipulation checks can introduce bias, especially when a large number of subjects are excluded and when exclusion rates vary across conditions (Aronow, Baron and Pinson 2019). Fortunately, exploratory models excluding these participants, shown in Tables A9 and A10, yield results comparable to those reported in the main text.

Table A8: Manipulation Check

Group	Which Country Builds Up?	Commitment Information?	N (All)	N (Pass)	%
Group 1	China	No	379	185	49
Group 2	China	Yes	375	65	17
Group 3	Japan	No	382	222	58
Group 4	Japan	Yes	379	211	56
Total			1,515	683	45

Table A9: Excluding Those Who Fail to Pass Manipulation Checks (DV=Credibility, Continous)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
China/Commitment	-0.431**	-0.338**		
	(0.116)	(0.110)		
Japan/Commitment			-0.222**	-0.178**
			(0.0612)	(0.0598)
Male		0.137		0.0706
		(0.104)		(0.0636)
Age		-0.117**		0.000589
		(0.0397)		(0.0239)
White		0.0530		0.0815
		(0.117)		(0.0672)
Ideology		0.0967*		-0.0153
		(0.0449)		(0.0274)
Democrat		-0.0971		-0.0330
		(0.135)		(0.0806)
Republican		0.286		-0.109
		(0.152)		(0.0929)
Income		-0.00146		0.00340
		(0.0240)		(0.0144)
Voting (2020 Presidential Election)		0.117		-0.0111
		(0.152)		(0.0903)
Education		0.134		-0.197**
		(0.106)		(0.0671)
Feeling_China		0.183**		-0.0502*
		(0.0359)		(0.0240)
Feeling_Japan		-0.0541		0.156**
		(0.0367)		(0.0257)
Knowledge_China		-0.0502		0.0723
		(0.129)		(0.0831)
Knowledge_Japan		-0.0556		0.0653
		(0.108)		(0.0680)
Constant	2.076**	1.416**	3.104**	2.442**
	(0.0581)	(0.378)	(0.0427)	(0.251)
Observations	247	236	433	410
R^2	0.053	0.261	0.030	0.178

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Excluding Those Who Fail to Pass Manipulation Checks (DV=Credibility, Dichotomous)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
China/Commitment	-0.200**	-0.170**		
	(0.0607)	(0.0615)		
Japan/Commitment			-0.0971**	-0.0693
			(0.0369)	(0.0376)
Male		0.0926		0.0239
		(0.0585)		(0.0400)
Age		-0.0552*		0.00426
		(0.0223)		(0.0150)
White		0.0859		0.0666
		(0.0657)		(0.0422)
Ideology		0.0201		-0.00460
		(0.0252)		(0.0172)
Democrat		-0.00997		-0.0151
		(0.0758)		(0.0506)
Republican		0.113		-0.0610
		(0.0855)		(0.0583)
Income		-0.00248		-0.00323
		(0.0135)		(0.00904)
Voting (2020 Presidential Election)		0.0882		-0.0121
		(0.0854)		(0.0567)
Education		0.0468		-0.0516
		(0.0595)		(0.0422)
Feeling_China		0.0532**		-0.0167
		(0.0201)		(0.0151)
Feeling_Japan		-0.00773		0.0734**
		(0.0206)		(0.0161)
Knowledge_China		-0.0499		-0.00251
		(0.0721)		(0.0522)
Knowledge_Japan		-0.00598		0.0353
		(0.0607)		(0.0427)
Constant	0.281**	0.0263	0.865**	0.521**
	(0.0304)	(0.212)	(0.0258)	(0.158)
Observations	247	236	433	410
R^2	0.043	0.142	0.016	0.092

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

The Heterogeneous Effect of Demographic and Attitudinal Variables

Since my sample is representative in terms of gender, race, and partisanship, the effect reported in the main analysis should approximate the population average treatment effect. Nonetheless, international reputation costs may be driven by specific subpopulations. I report the results of a series of exploratory analyses examining heterogeneous effects across demographic and attitudinal variables, as shown in Figures A1 to A11 for China and Figures A12 to A22 for Japan.

The results indicate that a few variables produce heterogeneous effects. For China, males (p=0.047) and non-democrats (p=0.029) exhibit larger audience costs. Additionally, international reputation costs for Japan emerge only among respondents who voted in the 2020 presidential election (p=0.045) or who have a favorable attitude toward Japan (p=0.008). However, overall, the findings suggest that the effect of information regarding a previous commitment to peace is largely homogeneous.

Figure A1: The Heterogeneous Effects of Gender (China)



Figure A2: The Heterogeneous Effects of Age (China)



Figure A3: The Heterogeneous Effects of Race (China)



Figure A4: The Heterogeneous Effects of Ideology (China)



Figure A5: The Heterogeneous Effects of Democrat (China)



Figure A6: The Heterogeneous Effects of Republican (China)



Figure A7: The Heterogenous Effects of Voting (China)



Figure A8: The Heterogenous Effects of Income (China)



Figure A9: The Heterogenous Effects of Education (China)



Figure A10: The Heterogeneous Effects of Feeling toward China (China)



Figure A11: The Heterogeneous Effects of Knowledge on China (China)



Figure A12: The Heterogeneous Effects of Gender (Japan)



Figure A13: The Heterogeneous Effects of Age (Japan)



Figure A14: The Heterogeneous Effects of Race (Japan)



Figure A15: The Heterogeneous Effects of Ideology (Japan)



Figure A16: The Heterogeneous Effects of Democrat (Japan)



Figure A17: The Heterogeneous Effects of Republican (Japan)



Figure A18: The Heterogeneous Effects of Voting (Japan)



Figure A19: The Heterogeneous Effects of Income (Japan)



Figure A20: The Heterogeneous Effects of Education (Japan)



Figure A21: The Heterogeneous Effects of Feeling toward Japan (Japan)



Figure A22: The Heterogeneous Effects of Knowledge on Japan (Japan)



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