Appendices

Monitoring Coalition Partners in the EU: Strategic Committee Appointments in the European Parliament

Appendix A.   Descriptive Statistics

Tables A1 and A2 contain summary statistics on the variables used in the analysis of committee appointments and rapporteur assignments, respectively.

	n	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Committee member	9,742	0.337	0.473	0	1
Outsider	9,742	0.152	0.359	0	1
Insider	9,742	0.258	0.437	0	1
Opposition	9,742	0.590	0.492	0	1
Δ_{policy}	9,742	0.073	1.000	-4.517	4.592
Δ_{rile}	9,742	0.137	1.000	-2.810	2.958
$\widetilde{\Delta}_{\text{policy}}$	9,552	0.122	1.000	-4.916	5.821

Table A1: Descriptive statistics of committee appointment data.

	n	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Rapporteur	61,925	0.070	0.255	0	1
Outsider	61,925	0.162	0.369	0	1
Insider	61,925	0.412	0.492	0	1
Opposition	61,925	0.426	0.495	0	1
Strength in committee	61,925	1.713	1.258	0.588	10.101
Δ_{policy}	61,925	0.123	1.000	-3.608	5.483
Δ_{rile}	61,925	0.289	1.000	-2.530	3.339
$\widetilde{\Delta}_{\text{policy}}$	58,969	0.119	1.000	-5.415	8.298
Bill disagreement	61,925	0.126	0.171	0.000	1.000

Table A2: Descriptive statistics of rapporteur assignment data.

Appendix B. Analysis of MEP Survey

To better understand the motivations and behavior of MEPs, I analyze four waves of elite surveys of MEPs conducted by Hix et al. (2016). Each wave of the survey was conducted one or two years after the EP elections between 1999 and 2014 and thus overlap for three waves with the data studied in the main analysis of this paper. In total, the data set consists of 969 responses. In line with the processing of the main data, I only keep observations of MEPs where the national government was a coalition at the time of their committee appointment, resulting in 732 observations. With response rates around 30% and high levels of representativeness this data enables a thorough understanding of MEP's attitudes and behavior (Whitaker et al., 2017). For several reasons that are discussed below, it is not possible to credibly compare insiders, outsiders, and opposition MEPs. However, the substantive responses and comparisons of governing and opposition parties provide pervasive evidence that MEPs are in frequent contact with their party back home and that national partisan considerations matter for their committee choice.

I first leverage this data to provide evidence for the claim that MEPs have the necessary information links to their party back home. MEPs were asked how frequently they are in contact with a variety of people, groups or institutions. Three items are of particular interest. Respondents were asked how frequently they are in contact with their national party leadership, members of their national party, and finally with national ministers.[24] Unfortunately, MEPs were not asked about the party affiliation of the ministers they're in contact with. Notwithstanding, both meetings with ministers belonging to the same coalition party and with ministers of their coalition partner are relevant.

The distributions of responses in Figure A1 show that MEPs are in very frequent contact with their party back home. More than half of MEPs belonging to government parties interface with their party (leadership) at least once a month. Almost 60% of MEPs are in contact with national party members on a weekly basis. Further, differences between MEPs from government and opposition parties indicate that MEPs from governing parties are in less frequent contact with party leadership. However, this may be explained by the fact that governing parties tend to be larger. In contrast, these MEPs communicate with national ministers considerably more frequently. Taken together, these figures demonstrate that MEPs are deeply embedded in networks with their national party and the national government. This very much lends credence to the argument that MEPs do have the nec-

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[24]Respondents were not asked about contact with national party members in the first wave. The other two items were included in all waves.

Figure A1: Frequency of contact with various party and government actors.

essary information channels to contribute to reducing information asymmetries arising from policymaking in the Council.

Another item in the survey helps gauge the credibility of the argument that MEPs take into account national party and coalition considerations when pursuing committees. Respondents were given a list of reasons for choosing a committee and asked to rate their importance for their own choice. One of the provided reasons was "I was asked to serve on the committee by my national party". This item should give clear insights into the leverage that national parties and thus domestic coalition dynamics have over the committee choice of MEPs. However, this is not the only reason why MEPs may pursue a committee in which they are misaligned outsiders. MEPs likely also have intrinsic motivations to seek out these committees as it may provide career opportunities and heightened attention within the party as well as the broader public. While the importance of personal and constituency interests are also rated by MEPs, it is less clear to what extent they are affected by coalition dynamics. As a result, analyzing the importance of national party requests is a conservative test of the credibility of the argument.

The left panel of Figure A2 shows the distribution of the importance that MEPs attribute to their national party requesting them to join a specific committee. More than half of MEPs from governing parties say that their national party asking them to join a specific committee was somewhat important for them and only one quarter say that their national party is not important at all. Importance of the national party is also slightly higher among MEPs from governing parties than among the

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opposition. To qualify this, the right panel provides insights into the importance of the EP group for committee choice. The importance of national parties and EP groups appears to be very much on par with one another. Any notion that MEPs do not take their national parties concerns seriously when choosing which committee to pursue are thus baseless. For the vast majority of MEPs, their national party is an important factor for committee choice.


Figure A2: Importance of national parties and party groups for committee choice.

With the exception of the most recent wave, the MEP survey does not include information on the actual committee that MEPs served on. Consequently, I cannot distinguish between the party status as an insider or outsider in the committee for a large share of the data. This would result in a very small sample size of about 70 MEPs belonging to coalition parties. Moreover, several MEPs sit on committees where their party is an outsider and on another where they are insiders. This makes it difficult to infer differences between insider and outsider committee members because MEPs are not asked questions specific to each committee they sit on. Consequently, analyzing MEP-Committee dyads and comparing outsiders and insiders is biased against finding any differences as the same MEP responses will appear in both camps. These issues cast doubt on the validity of such an analysis and I thus refrain from reporting it in great detail. Despite these difficulties, MEPs sitting on committees where they are outsiders tend to view their national party as more important for committee choice and report that they meet more frequently with their party members, leadership, as well as national ministers. However, none of these differences are statistically significant.

Appendix C.   Matching Committees and Council Configurations

As described in the main paper, I obtain information on all legislative files proposed during the EP's 6th through 8th term that are included on the EP's legislative observatory.[25] For each of the 10,435 pieces of legislation, I determine the lead committee and the Council configuration in which most debates took place. Analyzing these pairs, I then consider the 5 most frequent committees that correspond to each of the Council configurations. Committees that appear in the top 5 of multiple or none of the configurations are assigned to a single configuration on theoretical grounds. The result of this procedure is summarized in Table A3.

Council configuration	EP Committee
AGRIFISH	Agriculture and Rural Development
	Fisheries
COMPET	Industry, Research and Energy
	Internal Market and Consumer Protection
ECOFIN	Budgets
	Budgetary Control
	Economic and Monetary Affairs
	Tax Matters
ENVIR	Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
EPSCO	Employment and Social Affairs
	Women's Rights and Gender Equality
	Public Health
EYCS	Culture and Education
FAC	Foreign Affairs
	Development
	Security and Defence
	International Trade
GAC	Constitutional Affairs
	Regional Development
JHA	Legal Affairs
	Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs
	Human Rights
	Petitions
TTE	Transport and Tourism

Table A3: Matching table for Council configurations and EP committees.

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[25] Accessed 30 June 2022.

Appendix D. Matching Policy Scales and Council Configurations

Council configuration	Policy dimension	Source
AGRIFISH	freemarket & environment	Lowe et al. (2011)
COMPET	freemarket	Lowe et al. (2011)
ECOFIN	stateeconomy	Benoit and Laver (2007)
ENVIR	environment	Lowe et al. (2011)
EPSCO	stateservices	Lowe et al. (2011)
EYCS	libcons	Benoit and Laver (2007)
FAC	internationalism	Volkens et al. (2019)
GAC	eu	Volkens et al. (2019)
JHA	libcons	Benoit and Laver (2007)
TTE	freemarket	Lowe et al. (2011)

Table A4: Matching table for policy scales and Council configurations.

Appendix E. Measuring Bill Disagreement

To describe the process by which I obtain the measure of bill disagreement, I begin with a formal discussion of the approach for full transparency. I then discuss the individual data components used to obtain empirical measures from them. Throughout, I consider one country as an example to avoid unnecessary indices.

I begin by describing the process of measuring voting agreement on a single RCV. Let party j be a party with n_j MEPs and let G be the set of coalition parties. Let k be a RCV that took place while government G was in office so that we can disregard changes in parties' governing status. For each k, let $v_{k,j} \in \{yay, nay, abstain\}$ denote the majority vote among j's MEPs. Likewise, $v_{k,G \setminus j}$ is the majority vote among all coalition parties excluding j itself (in case $j \in G$). The voting agreement for party j at the vote-level is defined as

$$\psi_{jk} = w_{k,G \setminus j} \mathbb{1}_{\{v_{k,j} = v_{k,G \setminus j}\}}$$

where $\mathbb{1}$ is an indicator function that equals 1 if the two majority votes align and which is weighted by a modified version of Attina's (1990) index of agreement

$$w_{k,G \setminus j} = \frac{3}{4} \left(\frac{2 \max(yay_{k,G \setminus j}, nay_{k,G \setminus j}, abstain_{k,G \setminus j})}{n_{G \setminus j}} - \frac{2}{3} \right) \in [0,1].$$

where $yay_{k,G\setminus j} = \sum_{i \in G\setminus j} yay_{k,i}$ is the sum of yay votes among $G \setminus j$. Nays and abstentions are defined analogously.

This weight captures the idea that agreement with (other parties in) the coalition matters more when they are unified themselves. In other words, when the party vote aligns with that of the others, this is weighed highest if the others are unified. An alternative operationalization of ϕ could be based on this index of agreement. However, the index itself is not well suited to accommodate differences in party sizes within the coalition. I thus only use it as a weight here.

Using this measure of agreement, I generate subject-specific agreement scores. For subject i, let $S_i = \{k : \text{subject } i \text{ relates to RCV } k\}$ be the set of relevant RCVs that relate to the subject. We can thus define the agreement at the subject level as

$$\zeta_{ji} = \frac{1}{|S_i|} \sum_{k' \in S_i} \psi_{k',j}.$$

Finally, to obtain the final measure of disagreement at the bill level, I aggregate the subject-specific agreement scores for all subjects relating to the bill. For bill b, let $S_b = \{i : \text{bill } b \text{ relates to subject i}\}$ denote the set of subjects that relate to the bill. Then the bill-specific agreement is

$$\phi_{jb} = 1 - \frac{1}{|S_b|} \sum_{i' \in S_b} \phi_{ji'}.$$

To obtain an empirical measures of this, I match the final votes provided by VoteWatch with the data set of proposals from the legislative observatory by interinstitutional file numbers and ParlGov party IDs. The national party IDs are obtained by handcoding the unique national party labels in the VoteWatch data set. I remove all observations for which no match could be found.

Using this data set, I first aggregate all votes to the party-vote level and compute the index of agreement and vote-level agreement score. For each subject code, I then select the relevant votes. The legislative observatory's subject codes are composed of digits and are of the hierarchical form *d.dd*, *d.dd.dd*, or *d.dd.dd.dd*, depending on their depth. Agreement at the subject level is initially calculated at the deepest level of this hierarchy. Then at the medium level, including all votes belonging to the corresponding lower levels, and again at the highest level. Because the subject-specific agreement depends on G, the aggregation needs to take into account the current governing status. I thus compute them for each unique combination of party, cabinet, and subject which takes care of the timing of these votes. This is the main source of missing data for this variable because some cabinet-party combinations simply are not in office long enough to participate in sufficient votes.

Yet, this cannot be avoided as it is crucial to take into account the timing.

Finally, I merge these agreement scores with the complete dyadic data set of rapporteur assignments by party and cabinet IDs as well as the subject codes of the proposed bill. When no match is found for a subject code, I reduce the depth until a match is found. When multiple subjects relate to the bill, I take the average as described above.

Figure A3 shows the distribution of the final measure by party status.

Figure A3: Distribution of bill disagreement by party status. Dots represent sample means.

Appendix F. Full Regression Results for Rapporteur Assignment

F.1 Main Model

Table A5: Binary logistic regression estimates. DV: Rapporteur assignment. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(A1)	(A2)	(A3)	(A4)
Outsider	0.021	−0.012	−0.047	−0.067
	(0.059)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.074)
Opposition	0.265***	0.092	0.082	0.299
	(0.044)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.291)
Δ_{policy}	−0.048+	−0.041	−0.032	−0.021
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Bill disagreement	0.204	−0.371+	−0.385+	−0.405*
	(0.164)	(0.198)	(0.199)	(0.203)
Strength in committee	0.347***	0.263***	0.217***	0.235***
	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.022)
$\Delta_{policy} \times$ bill disagreement	−0.029	−0.075	−0.091	−0.102
	(0.159)	(0.178)	(0.177)	(0.180)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{policy}$	−0.225**	−0.133	−0.126	−0.144+
	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.083)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{policy}$	−0.053	−0.076	−0.066	−0.079
	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Outsider $\times$ bill disagreement	0.599*	0.663*	0.667*	0.746*
	(0.262)	(0.296)	(0.298)	(0.303)
Opposition $\times$ bill disagreement	0.229	−0.265	−0.236	−0.171
	(0.206)	(0.265)	(0.266)	(0.270)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{policy} \times$ bill disagreement	1.280***	1.498***	1.486***	1.530***
	(0.316)	(0.370)	(0.371)	(0.375)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{policy} \times$ bill disagreement	0.136	0.560*	0.571*	0.550*
	(0.196)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.231)
Intercept	−3.447***			
	(0.041)			
Party $\times$ Cabinet FE		✓	✓	✓
Committee FE			✓	✓
Committee $\times$ term FE				✓
Party $\times$ cabinet $\times$ term FE				✓
Log. Lik.	-15074.416	-13482.897	-13435.128	-13270.446
Num.Obs.	61 925	61 925	61 925	61 925

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

F.2 Models Ignoring Party Strength in Committee

Table A6: Binary logistic regression estimates. DV: Rapporteur assignment. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(A5)	(A6)	(A7)	(A8)
Outsider	-0.105+	-0.029	-0.050	-0.078
	(0.058)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.074)
Opposition	0.021	0.052	0.047	0.276
	(0.043)	(0.223)	(0.224)	(0.290)
Δ_{policy}	-0.037	-0.043	-0.039	-0.037
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Bill disagreement	-0.143	-0.411*	-0.406*	-0.426*
	(0.166)	(0.196)	(0.198)	(0.201)
$\Delta_{policy} \times$ bill disagreement	-0.051	-0.011	-0.057	-0.055
	(0.164)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.178)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{policy}$	-0.289***	-0.137+	-0.130	-0.141+
	(0.070)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.083)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{policy}$	-0.092*	-0.064	-0.043	-0.045
	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Outsider $\times$ bill disagreement	0.830**	0.738*	0.724*	0.804**
	(0.266)	(0.296)	(0.298)	(0.303)
Opposition $\times$ bill disagreement	0.513*	-0.230	-0.196	-0.140
	(0.207)	(0.263)	(0.265)	(0.269)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{policy} \times$ bill disagreement	1.320***	1.443***	1.445***	1.467***
	(0.314)	(0.369)	(0.371)	(0.375)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{policy} \times$ bill disagreement	0.259	0.532*	0.550*	0.517*
	(0.200)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.230)
Intercept	-2.614***			
	(0.030)			
Party $\times$ Cabinet FE		✓	✓	✓
Committee FE			✓	✓
Committee $\times$ term FE				✓
Party $\times$ cabinet $\times$ term FE				✓
Log. Lik.	-15618.657	-13587.43	-13493.055	-13327.383
Num.Obs.	61 925	61 925	61 925	61 925

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

Appendix G. Alternative Statistical Models

G.1 Linear Probability Models

Because logistic regression models – especially those including interaction terms – can be difficult to interpret and because the significance tests of their coefficients may be misleading, I re-estimate all main models as linear probability models. The results summarized below are virtually identical to the main findings of the paper.


Figure A4: Average marginal effects of Δ_{policy} on committee appointment. Estimates based on linear probability model A12 in Table A7. Thick and thin lines indicate 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively. Shaded eyes represent confidence distributions.

Table A7: Linear regression estimates. DV: Committee appointment. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(A9)	(A10)	(A11)	(A12)
Outsider	−0.115***	−0.006	−0.004	−0.002
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Opposition	−0.098***			
	(0.011)			
Insider $\times \Delta_{policy}$	0.008	0.001	0.003	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{policy}$	0.034**	0.032*	0.034**	0.035**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{policy}$	−0.009	−0.005	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Intercept	0.413***			
	(0.009)			
Party $\times$ Cabinet FE		✓	✓	✓
Committee FE			✓	✓
Committee $\times$ term FE				✓
Party $\times$ cabinet $\times$ term FE				✓
Num.Obs.	9742	9742	9742	9742
R2	0.010	0.278	0.325	0.331
R2 Adj.	0.010	0.245	0.292	0.293

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

Table A8: Linear regression estimates. DV: Rapporteur assignment. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(A13)	(A14)	(A15)	(A16)
Outsider	0.003	−0.001	−0.002	−0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Opposition	0.016***	0.004	0.004	0.014
	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Δ_{policy}	−0.003+	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Bill disagreement	0.016	−0.020+	−0.020+	−0.020+
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Strength in committee	0.030***	0.025***	0.021***	0.022***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
$\Delta_{\text{policy}} \times$ bill disagreement	−0.002	−0.004	−0.004	−0.003
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{\text{policy}}$	−0.012**	−0.007	−0.007	−0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{\text{policy}}$	−0.003	−0.004	−0.004	−0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Outsider $\times$ bill disagreement	0.045*	0.049**	0.049**	0.052**
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Opposition $\times$ bill disagreement	0.015	−0.016	−0.016	−0.013
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{\text{policy}} \times$ bill disagreement	0.087***	0.096***	0.096***	0.096***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{\text{policy}} \times$ bill disagreement	0.008	0.031*	0.032*	0.030*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Intercept	0.007**			
	(0.003)			
Party $\times$ Cabinet FE		✓	✓	✓
Committee FE			✓	✓
Committee $\times$ term FE				✓
Party $\times$ cabinet $\times$ term FE				✓
Num.Obs.	61 925	61 925	61 925	61 925
R2	0.023	0.096	0.097	0.104
R2 Adj.	0.023	0.088	0.089	0.093

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

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Figure A5: Marginal effects of Δ_{policy} on rapporteur assignment. Estimates based on model A16 in Table A8. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

G.2 Conditional Logistic Regression Models

Another concern arising from the use of binary logistic regression models regards incidental parameter bias due to the relatively low incidence rate of committee appointments and especially rapporteur assignments in combination with a large number of fixed effects dummies. To alleviate these concerns, models 4 and A4 are replicated as conditional logistic regression models with strata defined as party $\times$ cabinet $\times$ term. The results, presented in Tables A9 and A10, are very much in line with those presented in the papers – suggesting that the models do not suffer from major incidental parameter bias.

Table A9: Conditional logistic regression estimates. Replication of model 4. DV: Committee appointment. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(A17)
Outsider	-0.042
	(0.095)
Insider $\times \Delta_{\text{policy}}$	0.009
	(0.055)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{\text{policy}}$	0.186*
	(0.075)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{\text{policy}}$	-0.023
	(0.039)
Log. Lik.	-4126.8
Num.Obs.	9742

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A10: Conditional logistic regression estimates. Replication of model A4. DV: Rapporteur assignment. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(A18)
Outsider	−0.018
	(0.065)
Opposition	0.284
	(0.267)
Δ_{policy}	−0.035
	(0.032)
Bill disagreement	−0.330+
	(0.178)
Strength in committee	0.235***
	(0.017)
$\Delta_{\text{policy}} \times$ bill disagreement	−0.034
	(0.160)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{\text{policy}}$	−0.103
	(0.074)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{\text{policy}}$	−0.075
	(0.048)
Outsider $\times$ bill disagreement	0.658*
	(0.268)
Opposition $\times$ bill disagreement	−0.194
	(0.235)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{\text{policy}} \times$ bill disagreement	1.244***
	(0.316)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{\text{policy}} \times$ bill disagreement	0.469*
	(0.204)
Log. Lik.	-22589.573
Num.Obs.	61 925

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

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# Appendix H. Robustness of Interactions

Figure A6: Binning and kernel estimates for the main interaction of interest in the analysis of committee appointment. Based on model 4 in Table 1.

Figure A7: Binning and kernel estimates for the main interaction of interest in the analysis of rapporteur assignment. Based on model A4 in Table A5.

Appendix I.   Alternative Versions of △

I.1   Using General RILE Positions

Models A11 and A12 below replicate the main analysis after replacing the policy positions used to compute $\triangle$ with generic left-right positions, namely RILE positions, obtained from parties' manifestos (Volkens et al., 2019). As discussed in the main text, the findings for committee appointment largely conform with the main findings while rapporteur assignment cannot be explained by RILE-based misalignment. This suggests that the patterns uncovered in the paper largely relate to actual policy disagreements rather than broader left-right positions.


Figure A8: Average marginal effects of $\triangle_{\mathrm{rile}}$ on the predicted probability of committee appointment. Estimates based on model A22 in Table A11. Thick and thin lines indicate 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively. Shaded eyes represent confidence distributions.

Table A11: Binary logistic regression estimates. DV: Committee appointment. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(A19)	(A20)	(A21)	(A22)
Outsider	−0.489***	−0.044	−0.035	−0.013
	(0.070)	(0.087)	(0.091)	(0.093)
Opposition	−0.421***	−0.078	−0.077	−0.065
	(0.050)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.085)
Insider $\times \Delta_{\text{rile}}$	0.151***	−0.056	−0.063	−0.044
	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.057)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{\text{rile}}$	0.146**	0.065	0.081	0.101
	(0.054)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{\text{rile}}$	0.059*	0.088+	0.098+	0.100+
	(0.030)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Intercept	−0.371***			
	(0.041)			
Party FE		✓	✓	✓
Committee FE			✓	✓
Term FE				✓
Committee $\times$ term FE				✓
Log. Lik.	-6169.023	-5027.416	-4727.065	-4691.47
Num.Obs.	9742	9742	9742	9742

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

Table A12: Binary logistic regression estimates. DV: Rapporteur assignment. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(A23)	(A24)	(A25)	(A26)
Outsider	0.034	0.019	−0.022	−0.038
	(0.059)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.075)
Opposition	0.298***	0.120	0.102	0.364
	(0.047)	(0.235)	(0.235)	(0.304)
Δ_{rile}	0.071**	0.125	0.109	0.093
	(0.027)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.191)
Bill disagreement	0.308+	−0.257	−0.278	−0.295
	(0.164)	(0.198)	(0.200)	(0.203)
Strength in committee	0.352***	0.264***	0.218***	0.235***
	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.022)
$\Delta_{\text{rile}} \times$ bill disagreement	−0.428*	−0.393*	−0.397*	−0.414*
	(0.170)	(0.196)	(0.196)	(0.199)
Outsider $\times$ bill disagreement	0.729**	0.711*	0.713*	0.782**
	(0.261)	(0.295)	(0.297)	(0.301)
Opposition $\times$ bill disagreement	0.201	−0.304	−0.271	−0.221
	(0.209)	(0.269)	(0.271)	(0.275)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{\text{rile}}$	−0.139*	−0.174*	−0.168*	−0.171*
	(0.061)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.075)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{\text{rile}}$	−0.060	−0.060	−0.041	−0.108
	(0.044)	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.240)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{\text{rile}} \times$ bill disagreement	−0.127	0.198	0.246	0.261
	(0.280)	(0.316)	(0.318)	(0.321)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{\text{rile}} \times$ bill disagreement	0.157	0.374	0.374	0.402
	(0.220)	(0.281)	(0.282)	(0.286)
Intercept	−3.490***			
	(0.042)			
Party $\times$ Cabinet FE		✓	✓	✓
Committee FE			✓	✓
Committee $\times$ term FE				✓
Party $\times$ cabinet $\times$ term FE				✓
Log. Lik.	-15078.765	-13494.789	-13446.187	-13280.821
Num.Obs.	61 925	61 925	61 925	61 925

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

Figure A9: Marginal effects of Δ_{rile} on the predicted probability of rapporteur assignment. Estimates based on model A26 in Table A12. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

I.2 Misalignment with Insider

As mentioned in the paper, an alternative specification of misalignment incorporates parties' position relative to the insider, i.e. the minister, in a given Council configuration. Formally,

$$\widetilde{\Delta}_j = \left|\theta_j - \theta_{\text{insider}}\right| - \left|\theta_j - \theta_{\text{Council}\backslash G}\right|. \tag{2}$$

For policy areas where party j is an outsider in a two-party coalition, this measure is identical to the misalignment measure in the main analysis. However its benefit is that it more directly incorporates an outsiders' distance to the minister when there are more than three parties in the coalition. Yet, it also creates a number of issues – both methodologically and conceptually – making it less suitable than the version used in the paper.

In particular, while this alternative measure captures the incentives created by the risk of ministerial drift when applied to outsiders, the first term trivially collapses to zero where party j is a sole insider. This is problematic because a central feature of the research design is the comparison between insider and outsider status. This distinction is crucial: parties make strategic decisions about committee assignments across different Council configurations, in which they may be insiders

in some cases and outsiders in others. To capture these choices correctly, committee selection is modeled at the party level, including all committee choices a party faces, regardless of its insider or outsider status. This, in turn, demands a misalignment measure that is defined consistently across both types of status. Defining the measure in this way also ensures that the key independent variables in the analysis remain independent.

A second problem is conceptual: $\widetilde{\Delta}$ implicitly assumes that the coalition partner $G \setminus \{j, \text{insider}\}$ will take no steps to prevent ministerial drift of its own. This is a strong assumption. In contrast, Δ reflects more realistically the uncertainty about how much oversight or constraint the other coalition partners might exercise. Suppose party j is an outsider, and the other non-insider coalition partner is ideologically close to j. In that case, it is reasonable to assume that the fear of drift is smaller because the outsider is not alone in keeping tabs on the insider. Conversely, if the other partner is more aligned with the insider, the outsider has more reason to worry. This logic is captured by the baseline misalignment measure Δ, which incorporates distance to the coalition excluding the party in question.

That said, the alternative measure should still produce comparable results. I thus replicate the main models 1-4 and A1-A4 and present the findings in Tables A13 and A14. The findings are broadly consistent with the main results, albeit somewhat weaker. Notably, in the analysis of committee appointments, the coefficient of interest falls just short of conventional levels of statistical significance. This suggests that Δ and the policy distance to all coalition partners more accurately capture the concerns driving committee choices when parties are sidelined in the Council. At the same time, the alternative measure still produces substantively similar results, indicating that the findings are not overly sensitive to the specific operationalization.

Table A13: Binary logistic regression estimates. DV: Committee appointment. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(A27)	(A28)	(A29)	(A30)
Outsider	−0.573***	−0.070	−0.059	−0.046
	(0.072)	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.109)
Opposition	−0.427***			
	(0.050)			
Outsider $\times \widetilde{\Delta}_{\text{policy}}$	0.097+	0.105	0.100	0.105
	(0.052)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Opposition $\times \widetilde{\Delta}_{\text{policy}}$	−0.045+	−0.011	−0.020	−0.021
	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Intercept	−0.348***			
	(0.041)			
Party $\times$ Cabinet FE		✓	✓	✓
Committee FE			✓	✓
Committee $\times$ term FE				✓
Party $\times$ cabinet $\times$ term FE				✓
Log. Lik.	-6046.482	-4706.891	-4388.814	-4346.995
Num.Obs.	9552	9552	9552	9552

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

Table A14: Binary logistic regression estimates. DV: Rapporteur assignment. Standard errors in parentheses.

	(A31)	(A32)	(A33)	(A34)
Outsider	0.014	−0.058	−0.101	−0.111
	(0.064)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.081)
Opposition	0.255***	0.139	0.135	0.345
	(0.045)	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.290)
Bill disagreement	0.225	−0.354+	−0.365+	−0.374+
	(0.164)	(0.197)	(0.198)	(0.201)
Strength in committee	0.349***	0.256***	0.206***	0.224***
	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Outsider × bill disagreement	0.579*	0.633*	0.642*	0.708*
	(0.275)	(0.308)	(0.309)	(0.314)
Opposition × bill disagreement	0.238	−0.314	−0.284	−0.234
	(0.209)	(0.268)	(0.269)	(0.273)
Outsider × $\widetilde{\Delta}_{\text{policy}}$	−0.073	−0.013	0.007	0.007
	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Opposition × $\widetilde{\Delta}_{\text{policy}}$	−0.095***	−0.074*	−0.067*	−0.069*
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Outsider × $\widetilde{\Delta}_{\text{policy}}$ × bill disagreement	0.448*	0.715**	0.688**	0.731**
	(0.210)	(0.261)	(0.258)	(0.259)
Opposition × $\widetilde{\Delta}_{\text{policy}}$ × bill disagreement	0.080	0.305**	0.314**	0.299**
	(0.086)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.113)
Intercept	−3.463***			
	(0.041)			
Party × Cabinet FE		✓	✓	✓
Committee FE			✓	✓
Committee × term FE				✓
Party × cabinet × term FE				✓
Log. Lik.	-14224.806	-12709.183	-12646.118	-12482.148
Num.Obs.	58 969	58 969	58 969	58 969

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

Figure A10: Average marginal effects of $\widetilde{\Delta}_{\text{policy}}$ on the predicted probability of committee appointment. Estimates based on model A30 in Table A13. Thick and thin lines indicate 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively. Shaded eyes represent confidence distributions.


Figure A11: Marginal effects of $\widetilde{\Delta}_{\text{policy}}$ on the predicted probability of rapporteur assignment. Estimates based on model A34 in Table A14. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

Appendix J.   Sensitivity to Influential Observations

Given the heavy right-skew in the distribution of bill disagreement, there is a concern that the findings on rapporteur assignments may be driven by a small number of highly influential observations. To investigate this, I examine the Cook's distance values for observations in Model A4 (Table A5). As shown in Figure A12, all Cook's distance values fall well below conventional thresholds (e.g., 0.5), providing reassurance that no single observation unduly influences the results.


Figure A12: Distribution of Cook's distance from model A4. Vertical lines mark the 95th and 99th percentile.

To further address this concern, I re-estimate model A4 after removing the most influential observations. The results, presented in Table A15, indicate that excluding these observations does not weaken the main findings—in fact, it strengthens them. This pattern may stem from an increasingly acute rare-events problem, since the removed influential observations tend to correspond disproportionately to positive cases of rapporteur assignment (i.e., 1's). Overall, this analysis confirms that the results are not driven by a handful of unusual cases.

Table A15: Binary logistic regression estimates. DV: Rapporteur assignment. Standard errors in parentheses.

	A4	A4 [99% low CD]	A4 [97.5% low CD]	A4 [95% low CD]
Outsider	−0.067	−0.064	−0.117	−0.326*
	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.094)	(0.150)
Opposition	0.299	0.403	0.897+	−15.709
	(0.291)	(0.328)	(0.541)	(1124.962)
Δ_{policy}	−0.021	−0.006	−0.005	0.195**
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.071)
Bill disagreement	−0.405*	−0.382+	−0.965**	−1.170*
	(0.203)	(0.220)	(0.295)	(0.463)
Strength in committee	0.235***	0.224***	0.218***	0.341***
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.037)
$\Delta_{policy} \times$ bill disagreement	−0.102	−0.041	−0.160	−0.503
	(0.180)	(0.196)	(0.270)	(0.511)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{policy}$	−0.144+	−0.215*	−0.294*	−0.385+
	(0.083)	(0.095)	(0.118)	(0.223)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{policy}$	−0.079	−0.134*	−0.238***	−0.605***
	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.069)	(0.126)
Outsider $\times$ bill disagreement	0.746*	0.689*	1.789***	2.406***
	(0.303)	(0.332)	(0.413)	(0.637)
Opposition $\times$ bill disagreement	−0.171	−0.340	0.121	0.392
	(0.270)	(0.300)	(0.399)	(0.666)
Outsider $\times \Delta_{policy} \times$ bill disagreement	1.530***	1.865***	2.557***	4.138***
	(0.375)	(0.433)	(0.601)	(1.061)
Opposition $\times \Delta_{policy} \times$ bill disagreement	0.550*	0.634*	0.975**	1.610*
	(0.231)	(0.255)	(0.342)	(0.658)
Party $\times$ Cabinet FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Committee FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Committee $\times$ term FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Party $\times$ cabinet $\times$ term FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log. Lik.	-13270.446	-11050.356	-7893.168	-3663.187
Num.Obs.	61 925	61 269	60 340	58 793

+ p <0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001

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