Supporting information for: "Pandemics meet democracy: The footprint of COVID-19 on democratic attitudes"

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A Sample descriptive statistics by wave

In Table A1 we report the main descriptive statistics by individual characteristics and individual partisanship across waves. As expected, there are not significant differences across waves in basic individual characteristics as age, gender, or education. Interestingly, there are also no significant differences in the left-right scale across individuals between Wave 1 and Wave 2. That is, comparing ideology at the very onset of the pandemic versus pre-shock values. We observe, however, a gradual right-wing shift in ideology in subsequent waves.

Table A1: Sample descriptive statistics by wave

		Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6	Wave 7	Wave 8
Gender (Women)	Prop.	.511	.508	.486	.511	.491	.472	.512	.492
Age	Mean	45.4	45.5	47	46	46.9	48.2	48.6	50.5
Age (Under-35)	Prop.	.269	.271	.232	.265	.239	.224	.246	.2
Age (35-60)	Prop.	.537	.529	.549	.521	.54	.517	.45	.471
Age (Over-60)	Prop.	.194	.2	.219	.215	.222	.259	.304	.328
Education (Primary or less)	Prop.	.435	.435	.398	.422	.397	.367	.434	.386
Education (Secondary)	Prop.	.263	.264	.284	.274	.276	.242	.262	.283
Education (Tertiary)	Prop.	.303	.301	.318	.303	.326	.391	.304	.331
Incumbent supporter (PSOE)	Prop.	.201	.182	.199	.174	.187	.168	.183	.193
Left-right	Mean	4.28	4.37	4.42	4.5	4.5	4.61	4.63	4.57
Left-right (Left: 0-4)	Prop.	.565	.522	.506	.481	.485	.478	.437	.462
Left-right (Center: 5)	Prop.	.197	.225	.245	.26	.253	.234	.282	.254
Left-right (Right: 6-10)	Prop.	.239	.253	.249	.259	.262	.288	.281	.285
N		1,008	1,606	1,349	1,608	1,253	773	1,602	2,198

B Measurement of technocratic attitudes

In the main text we measure technocratic preferences using three survey questions that address different aspects of the same concept, using 1 to 7 scales:

- Management-based voting: position in a scale from 1 "I would always vote for the political party that shares my ideas, even if it has not managed public affairs well" to 7 "I would always vote for a political party that has managed public affairs well, even if it does not share my ideas".
- Technical management: degree of agreement with the sentence *Some people believe that politicians should put aside their political agenda and tackle public problems from a technical point of view*, from 1 "Totally disagree" to 7 "Totally agree".
- Experts, not politicians: degree of agreement with the sentence *It is better to have experts, and not politicians, deciding which policies are best for the country*, from 1 "Totally disagree" to 7 "Totally agree".

In order to benchmark our survey questions with some other state-of-the art measures of technocratic attitudes, in waves 6 (September 2021), 7 (November 2022), and 8 (January 2024) we compare them with a battery of survey items designed to tap into citizens' elitism, preference for expertise, and anti-politics attitudes phrased as statements with which respondents can agree/disagree on a 7-point scale (Bertsou and Caramani 2022):

For elitism:

EL1 Ordinary people don't know what policies are good for them.

EL2 Political leaders should make decisions according to their best judgment, not the will of the people.

EL3 I'd rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than the opinions of experts. (Reverse coded)

EL4 If people were knowledgeable enough, everyone would agree on the political decisions that are best for the country

For expertise:

EXP1 Politicians should be like managers and fix what does not work in society.

EXP2 The leaders of my country should be more educated and skilled than ordinary citizens.

EXP3 Social problems should be addressed based on scientific evidence, not ideological preferences.

EXP4 The problems facing my country require experts to solve them.

For anti-politics:

AP1 The best political decisions are taken by experts who are not politicians.

AP2 Political parties do more harm than good to society.

AP3 Politicians just want to promote the interests of those who vote for them and not the interest of the whole country.

AP4 Politicians spend all their time seeking re-election instead of fixing problems.

Table B1 shows the pairwise Pearson's correlation coefficients between our survey questions and those designed by Bertsou and Caramani (2022). Our measures strongly and consistently correlate with preferences for expertise and anti-politics attitudes. On the contrary, the correlation with measures of elitism is much less clear and not always consistent (negative signs). Given that our goal was to capture people's *technocratic* attitudes, the strong correlation of our measures with survey items tapping into the need of expertise and problem-solving skills for modern governance, the need for leaders with superior education and a scientific approach to society's problems, and dissatisfaction with representative politics and preferences for experts over elected politicians, makes us confident that our measurements are valid.

Table B1: Measurement of technocratic attitudes (correlation matrix)

	Management-based voting	Technical management	Experts not politicians	Average
Elitism 1	-0.018	0.021	0.063***	0.026*
Elitism 2	-0.033**	-0.052***	-0.059***	-0.064***
Elitism 3	0.005	0.040***	0.027**	0.031**
Elitism 4	0.051***	0.071***	0.079***	0.090***
Expertise 1	0.154***	0.280***	0.297***	0.324***
Expertise 2	0.113***	0.189***	0.206***	0.226***
Expertise 3	0.196***	0.296***	0.352***	0.376***
Expertise 4	0.158***	0.312***	0.387***	0.378***
Anti-politics 1	0.177***	0.332***	0.468***	0.430***
Anti-politics 2	0.174***	0.267***	0.378***	0.363***
Anti-politics 3	0.099***	0.167***	0.229***	0.219***
Anti-politics 4	0.180***	0.258***	0.321***	0.338***

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C Comparison panelists vs rest of respondents

Our empirical analysis of the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on technocratic attitudes is based on the comparison of survey responses in eight different waves (one pre-covid and seven post-covid). In our main econometric specification we include individual-fixed effects that absorb all time-invariant heterogeneity between individuals and allow us to exploit the within-individual variation of preferences over time. However, differences between the composition of the samples of the different waves are likely to be present. In Figure C1, we explore these differences and how they could affect our estimations.

Figure C1: Comparison panelists vs rest of respondents



Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions. Estimates in the left panel employ individual fixed effects: $Y_{it} = \delta_t + \gamma_i$, where δ_t and γ_i are vectors of wave-specific and individual fixed-effects, respectively. Estimates in the right panel substitute γ_i with a vector of control variables including gender, age, age^2, and education level. Outcome variable refers to respondents' technocratic preferences and is the average of the three outcome variables (vote based on management, not ideas; technical management, not ideological; and experts, not politicians), ranging from 1 "Totally disagree" to 7 "Totally agree". Question wordings in Appendix G and full model results in Table F4 in the Supporting Information.

Using individual fixed effects, in the left panel we compare the over-time evolution of preferences of those respondents that we were able to interview before the outbreak of the pandemic (January 2020) and those that were willing to answer our survey after (March 2020 - January 2024). We see that technocratic preferences of respondents that were in our panel since the first wave evolve in a similar way than the rest.

In the right panel, we offer another angle to this question. We compare the answers of respondents that were interviewed for the first time (all of them in wave 1, 49% in wave 2, 26% in wave 4, 39% in wave 7, and 37% in wave 8) and the answers of respondents that were being interviewed for the second time or more. Necessarily, our estimations here do not employ individual fixed effects, as no within-individual over-time variation can be exploited for first-timers, but instead include socio-demographic controls like gender, age, age^2, and education level. What we see in the right panel is that the answers of respondents that are interviewed for the first time are a bit more volatile than the answers of those that have been interviewed in a previous wave. The latter are more slightly more likely to stick to their opinions. This could happen either because certain kinds of individuals are more likely to be willing to respond to new waves (sampling) or because the very fact of answering the same interview months ago makes them more likely to show consistent preferences over time. In any case, though, even if we just zoom in on first-timers, the conclusion remains that the shift in technocratic preferences that the COVID-19 outbreak generated outlives the pandemic itself.

D Initial shift and persistence

In Figure D1 we take the average level of agreement with technocratic measures, and split the sample between those that become more favorable to technocracy immediately following the pandemic (i.e., from January to March 2020), and those that either do not change their mind or become less technocratic. The left panel of the figure shows that those becoming more technocratic due to the pandemic had lower initial levels of agreement with technocracy than the average, and that they end up converging in technocratic preferences with the rest, who had higher initial levels of agreement with technocracy. Indeed, Figure D3 shows that the change in technocratic preferences following the outbreak was inversely proportional to pre-existing levels of technocratic preferences. However, even adjusting for pre COVID-19levels, we find a sharp and persistent increase in technocratic preferences. This can be seen in the right panel. Here, we split the sample by a measure of immediate change in technocratic preferences which is net of pre-existing preferences. The results show a very similar pattern. For many, the pandemic leads to an increase in technocratic preferences that largely persists over time. For some others, there is a transitory decline, which quickly reverts to pre COVID-19levels. Figure D5 reports the very same pattern when focusing on each of the measures of technocratic preferences separately.

Figure D1: Technocratic preferences by initial shift



Controlling for pre-covid levels: sample split by the residuals of a regression of the initial shift on pre-covid levels

Figure D2: Immediate change in technocratic attitudes (March - January 2020)



Figure D3: Immediate change in technocratic attitudes vs. pre-existing levels



Figure D4



Note: Full model results in Table F5 in the Supporting Information.

Figure D5



Controlling for pre-covid levels: sample split by the residuals of a regression of the initial shift on pre-covid levels

Figure D6: Permutation tests: distribution of placebo pandemic effects



E Heterogeneity

E.1 Heterogeneity in technocratic preferences

In this section we explore whether change and persistence in technocratic preferences is different across social groups, defined in terms of socio-demographic characteristics, preexisting political attitudes, and vulnerability to the pandemic, both in health and economic terms.[1]

Figure E1 shows a relevant degree of heterogeneity. First, the pre COVID-19 levels show that demands for technocratic rule –averaging the three dimensions of representation, management, and voting described above– were initially lower among women than men, among younger people, among the more educated, among incumbent voters, and among left-wing citizens. However, the outbreak of the pandemic generated such an impact that it virtually wiped out some of these differences. In particular, the preference for technocratic governance increased both for men and women, but the larger initial boost for the latter has caused men and women to converge in their technocratic preferences. All of them want now more technocracy than before the pandemic in such a way that gender differences have vanished. Something similar happens for younger and older people: the substantially lower demand for technocracy among youngsters quickly reached similar levels, possibly due to their being more "impressionable" than their older counterparts. Likewise, the initial shift toward preferring more technocracy was larger among the more educated, which made them converge with less educated groups.

This picture of a heterogeneous and persistent impact of the pandemic that has led to a great deal of convergence in technocratic preferences across socio-demographic groups looks fairly different if we define these groups along political lines. In general, we see that demands for technocracy are higher for all groups than before the COVID-19 crisis started, but the highly interested in politics and incumbent (PSOE) supporters continue

[1]For heterogeneity analyses on the willingness to sacrifice liberties and the demand for strong leaders see Appendix E.

Figure E1: Heterogeneity of effects on technocratic attitudes (panel evidence, individual fixed effects)



Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions with individual fixed effects: $Y_{it} = \delta_t + \gamma_i$, where δ_t and γ_i are vectors of wave-specific and individual fixed-effects, respectively, for different subsamples of respondents. Outcome variable refers to respondents' technocratic preferences and is the average of the three outcome variables in **??** (vote based on management, not ideas; technical management, not ideological; and experts, not politicians), ranging from 1 "Totally disagree" to 7 "Totally agree". The different plots display heterogeneous effects based on subsamples by gender, age, education, political interest ('High' refers to a lot or quite, and 'Low' to little or no interest), incumbent support (PSOE party ID or not), and ideology (self-placement in a 0-10 scale: 0-4 for 'Left', 5 for 'Center', and 6-10 for 'Right'), and are fixed at the level reported in the first wave (January 2020). Question wordings in Appendix G and full model results in Table F6 and Table F7 in the Supporting Information.

to prefer less technocratic rule than the rest. The picture is even more different if we compare left-wing, center, and right-wing citizens. While the former have always wanted less technocracy than the latter, the differences are now larger than before the pandemic. Even if preferences for technocratic governance have increased for all, the pandemic crisis seems to have exacerbated differences along political lines, increasing polarization between the left and the right.

In Figure E2 we continue exploring heterogeneity in technocratic preferences across groups, but this time defined in terms of health and economic vulnerability. The distributional consequences of the COVID-19 crisis are undeniable, and the consequences of the pandemic have been very unequal both in health and economic terms. The fact that the pandemic generated a bigger threat for some groups could make us think that these would be, precisely, the people more likely to change their political preferences. What stands out the most from Figure E2 is that demand for technocratic rule sharply increased in the short-term among those that subjectively perceived that the coronavirus could severely affect their health and those that reported the pandemic to have negatively affected them economically. These differences, however, do not arise when we define exposure and vulnerability in more objective terms (i.e. when we take into account actual infections, age, health condition, position in the labor market, etc.).

Figure E2: Exposure to COVID-related risks and technocratic attitudes (panel evidence, individual fixed effects)



Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions with individual fixed effects: $Y_{it} = \delta_t + \gamma_i + \epsilon it$, where δ_t and γ_i are vectors of wave-specific and individual fixed-effects, respectively, for different subsamples of respondents. Outcome variable refers to respondents' technocratic preferences and is the average of the three outcome variables in **??** (vote based on management, not ideas; technical management, not ideological; and experts, not politicians), ranging from 1 "Totally disagree" to 7 "Totally agree". The different plots display heterogeneous effects by health exposure (having been infected with COVID-19 or not), objective health risk based on age (over or under 60 years old), subjective health risk (estimates at different values of perceived likelihood of experiencing severe symptoms if infected with COVID-19 on a 0-10 scale –p10 (value 1) for 'Low', p90 (value 8) for 'High'–), subjective economic risk (perceived effect of the COVID-19 crisis on personal economic situation: 'Low' for very/somewhat badly, and 'High' otherwise), predicted subjective health risk (predicted values of the model $SubjectiveHealthRisk_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Age_{it} + \beta_2 Age^2_{it} + \beta_3 Gender_{it} + \beta_4 SelfreportedHealthCondition_{it} + e_{it}$ –p10 (value 3.4) for 'Low', p90 (value 6.4) for 'High'–, on a 0-10 scale from 'no probability of experiencing severe symptoms' to 'absolute certainty of experiencing severe symptoms'), and predicted subjective economic risk (predicted values of the model $SubjectiveEconomicSituation_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Age_{it} + \beta_2 Age^2_{it} + \beta_3 Gender_{it} + \beta_4 Education_{it} + \beta_5 EmploymentStatus_{it} + e_{it}$ –p10 (value 2.3) for 'Low', p90 (value 1.7) for 'High', on a 1-5 scale from 'very negative' to 'very positive'–). Values for wave 1 are set at the levels of wave 2. Question wordings in Appendix G and full model results in Table F8 and Table F9 in the Supporting Information.

E.2 Heterogeneity in the 3 threats experiment

Figures E3-E6 explore heterogeneity in demand for strong leadership and support for drastic measures that limit individual liberties in exchange for protection as a consequence of the COVID-19 crisis. Relative to other crises like the climate emergency or international terrorism, the pandemic generated a stronger willingness to sacrifice basic rights and freedoms and more intense demand for strong leaders, but similarly for different social groups. The progressive convergence between the responses to the different threats over time was also similar across groups.

Figure E3: Heterogeneity of effects on willingness to sacrifice liberties (experimental evidence)



Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions: $Y_{it} = \beta_j Threat_{it} + \delta_t + \beta_{jt} * \delta_t + \epsilon it$, where $Threat$ is a categorical variable that identifies whether the questions the respondent was randomly exposed to referred to the j threat COVID, climate change, or international terrorism, and δ_t is a vector of wave-specific fixed-effects, respectively. Estimates refer to the marginal effect of being randomly exposed to the COVID-related questions (instead of climate change or international terrorism) on the degree of agreement with the claim "Drastic measures must be taken to stop [the coronavirus/climate change/international terrorism], even if it limits individual freedom", on a 0-10 scale (see **??**). The different plots display heterogeneous effects based on subsamples by gender, age, education, political interest ('High' refers to a lot or quite, and 'Low' to little or no interest), incumbent support (PSOE party ID or not), and ideology (self-placement in a 0-10 scale: 0-4 for 'Left', 5 for 'Center', and 6-10 for 'Right'), and are fixed at the level reported in the first wave (January 2020). Question wordings in Appendix G and full model results in Table F10 and Table F11 in the Supporting Information.

Figure E4: Heterogeneity of effects on need of a strong leader (experimental evidence)



Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions: $Y_{it} = \beta_j Threat_{it} + \delta_t + \beta_{jt} * \delta_t + \epsilon it$, where $Threat$ is a categorical variable that identifies whether the questions the respondent was randomly exposed to referred to the j threat COVID, climate change, or international terrorism, and δ_t is a vector of wave-specific fixed-effects, respectively. Estimates refer to the marginal effect of being randomly exposed to the COVID-related questions (instead of climate change or international terrorism) on the degree of agreement with the claim "In order to tackle a challenge like [the coronavirus/climate change/international terrorism], we need to unite around a strong leader", on a 0-10 scale (see **??**). The different plots display heterogeneous effects based on subsamples by gender, age, education, political interest ('High' refers to a lot or quite, and 'Low' to little or no interest), incumbent support (PSOE party ID or not), and ideology (self-placement in a 0-10 scale: 0-4 for 'Left', 5 for 'Center', and 6-10 for 'Right'), and are fixed at the level reported in the first wave (January 2020). Question wordings in Appendix G and full model results in Table F12 and Table F13 in the Supporting Information.

Figure E5: Exposure to COVID-related risks and willingness to sacrifice liberties (experimental evidence)



Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions: $Y_{it} = \beta_j Threat_{it} + \delta_t + \beta_{jt} * \delta_t + \epsilon it$, where $Threat$ is a categorical variable that identifies whether the questions the respondent was randomly exposed to referred to the j threat COVID, climate change, or international terrorism, and δ_t is a vector of wave-specific fixed-effects, respectively. Estimates refer to the marginal effect of being randomly exposed to the COVID-related questions (instead of climate change or international terrorism) on the degree of agreement with the claim "Drastic measures must be taken to stop [the coronavirus/climate change/international terrorism], even if it limits individual freedom", on a 0-10 scale (see **??**). The different plots display heterogeneous effects by health exposure (having been infected with COVID-19 or not), objective health risk based on age (over or under 60 years old), subjective health risk (estimates at different values of perceived likelihood of experiencing severe symptoms if infected with COVID-19 on a 0-10 scale –p10 (value 1) for 'Low', p90 (value 8) for 'High'–), subjective economic risk (perceived effect of the COVID-19 crisis on personal economic situation: 'Low' for very/somewhat badly, and 'High' otherwise), predicted subjective health risk (predicted values of the model $SubjectiveHealthRisk_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Age_{it} + \beta_2 Age^2_{it} + \beta_3 Gender_{it} + \beta_4 SelfreportedHealthCondition_{it} + e_{it}$ –p10 (value 3.4) for 'Low', p90 (value 6.4) for 'High'–, on a 0-10 scale from 'no probability of experiencing severe symptoms' to 'absolute certainty of experiencing severe symptoms'), and predicted subjective economic risk (predicted values of the model $SubjectiveEconomicSituation_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Age_{it} + \beta_2 Age^2_{it} + \beta_3 Gender_{it} + \beta_4 Education_{it} + \beta_5 EmploymentStatus_{it} + e_{it}$ –p10 (value 2.3) for 'Low', p90 (value 1.7) for 'High', on a 1-5 scale from 'very negative' to 'very positive'–). Values for wave 1 are set at the levels of wave 2. Question wordings in Appendix G and full model results in Table F14 and Table F15 in the Supporting Information.

Figure E6: Exposure to COVID-related risks and need of a strong leader (experimental evidence)



Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions: $Y_{it} = \beta_j Threat_{it} + \delta_t + \beta_{jt} * \delta_t + \epsilon it$, where $Threat$ is a categorical variable that identifies whether the questions the respondent was randomly exposed to referred to the j threat COVID, climate change, or international terrorism, and δ_t is a vector of wave-specific fixed-effects, respectively. Estimates refer to the marginal effect of being randomly exposed to the COVID-related questions (instead of climate change or international terrorism) on the degree of agreement with the claim "In order to tackle a challenge like [the coronavirus/climate change/international terrorism], we need to unite around a strong leader", on a 0-10 scale (see **??**). The different plots display heterogeneous effects by health exposure (having been infected with COVID-19 or not), objective health risk based on age (over or under 60 years old), subjective health risk (estimates at different values of perceived likelihood of experiencing severe symptoms if infected with COVID-19 on a 0-10 scale –p10 (value 1) for 'Low', p90 (value 8) for 'High'–), subjective economic risk (perceived effect of the COVID-19 crisis on personal economic situation: 'Low' for very/somewhat badly, and 'High' otherwise), predicted subjective health risk (predicted values of the model $SubjectiveHealthRisk_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Age_{it} + \beta_2 Age^2_{it} + \beta_3 Gender_{it} + \beta_4 SelfreportedHealthCondition_{it} + e_{it}$ –p10 (value 3.4) for 'Low', p90 (value 6.4) for 'High'–, on a 0-10 scale from 'no probability of experiencing severe symptoms' to 'absolute certainty of experiencing severe symptoms'), and predicted subjective economic risk (predicted values of the model $SubjectiveEconomicSituation_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Age_{it} + \beta_2 Age^2_{it} + \beta_3 Gender_{it} + \beta_4 Education_{it} + \beta_5 EmploymentStatus_{it} + e_{it}$ –p10 (value 2.3) for 'Low', p90 (value 1.7) for 'High', on a 1-5 scale from 'very negative' to 'very positive'–). Values for wave 1 are set at the levels of wave 2. Question wordings in Appendix G and full model results in Table F16 and Table F17 in the Supporting Information.

F Complete regression estimates

Table F1: Regression estimates on the effect of outbreak of COVID-19 on technocratic attitudes (full models for ?? in the main text)

	Management-based voting	Technical management	Experts not politicians	Average
Intercept (January 2020)	4.584***	4.990***	4.734***	4.782***
	(.047)	(.044)	(.035)	(.030)
March 2020	.449***	.225***	.293***	.307***
	(.056)	(.057)	(.044)	(.037)
June 2020	.346***	.268***	.263***	.276***
	(.061)	(.059)	(.047)	(.038)
November 2020	.431***	.317***	.334***	.348***
	(.061)	(.057)	(.048)	(.039)
March 2021	.505***	.213***	.280***	.306***
	(.061)	(.058)	(.049)	(.040)
September 2021	.465***	.117*	.237***	.241***
	(.070)	(.063)	(.051)	(.043)
November 2022	.406***	.099*	.173***	.206***
	(.066)	(.060)	(.047)	(.041)
January 2024	.414***	.067	.172***	.205***
	(.065)	(.057)	(.046)	(.039)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	8,936	9,445	9,427	9,663
N. of unique respondents	2,073	2,174	2,172	2,216
R^2	.601	.508	.614	.630

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions with individual fixed effects: $Y_{it} = \delta_t + \gamma_i + \epsilon it$, where δ_t and γ_i are vectors of wave-specific and individual fixed-effects, respectively. Outcome variables Y_{it} are the following: for the blue estimates it ranges from 1 "I would always vote for the political party that shares my ideas, even if it has not managed public affairs well" to 7 "I would always vote for a political party that has managed public affairs well, even if it does not share my ideas"; for the orange estimates it measures agreement with the following sentence "Some people believe that politicians should put aside their political agenda and tackle public problems from a technical point of view", ranging from 1 "Totally disagree" to 7 "Totally agree"; for the green estimates it measures agreement with the following sentence "It is better to have experts, and not politicians, deciding which policies are best for the country", ranging from 1 "Totally disagree" to 7 "Totally agree".

Table F2: Regression estimates on the effect of outbreak of COVID-19 on preferences for politicians' qualities (full models for ?? in the main text)

	Honesty	Capacity	Ideology	Training	Approach
Intercept (January 2020)	.548***	.145***	.032***	.218***	.057***
	(.015)	(.012)	(.006)	(.013)	(.007)
March 2020	-.102***	.074***	-.004	.049***	-.018**
	(.019)	(.015)	(.007)	(.016)	(.008)
June 2020	-.113***	.078***	-.004	.050***	-.011
	(.019)	(.016)	(.007)	(.017)	(.009)
November 2020	-.091***	.082***	.004	.026	-.021**
	(.020)	(.016)	(.008)	(.017)	(.009)
March 2021	-.102***	.092***	.009	.019	-.019**
	(.021)	(.017)	(.008)	(.018)	(.009)
September 2021	-.089***	.082***	.004	.016	-.013
	(.023)	(.018)	(.009)	(.019)	(.010)
November 2022	-.078***	.068***	-.006	.037**	-.021**
	(.021)	(.017)	(.008)	(.018)	(.009)
January 2024	-.064***	.062***	.003	.013	-.014
	(.021)	(.017)	(.008)	(.017)	(.009)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	10,032	10,032	10,032	10,032	10,032
N. of unique respondents	2,287	2,287	2,287	2,287	2,287
R^2	.444	.395	.361	.407	.363

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions with individual fixed effects: $Y_{it} = \delta_t + \gamma_i$, where δ_t and γ_i are vectors of wave-specific and individual fixed-effects, respectively. Outcome variables Y_{it} identify whether honesty, capacity, ideology, expertise and training, or approachability are ranked first as the most important for a politician.

Table F3: Regression estimates of effect of different threats on willingness to sacrifice liberties and support for a strong leader (full models for ?? in the main text)

	Sacrifice liberties		Strong leader	
Intercept	8.215***	8.328***	7.841***	7.808***
	(.105)	(.128)	(.107)	(.099)
Threat (Covid)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Threat (Climate change)	-2.083***	-2.280***	-.595***	-.534***
	(.160)	(.188)	(.148)	(.149)
Threat (International terrorism)	-2.706***	-2.682***	-.744***	-.675***
	(.162)	(.188)	(.149)	(.150)
March 2020	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
June 2020	-1.831***	-1.852***	-.572***	-.401***
	(.164)	(.177)	(.148)	(.142)
November 2020	-1.738***	-1.734***	-.664***	-.552***
	(.154)	(.166)	(.142)	(.137)
March 2021	-2.153***	-2.243***	-1.237***	-1.128***
	(.175)	(.186)	(.162)	(.152)
September 2021	-2.742***	-2.888***	-1.558***	-1.518***
	(.206)	(.206)	(.188)	(.166)
November 2022	-3.694***	-3.764***	-2.136***	-2.074***
	(.158)	(.179)	(.155)	(.149)
January 2024	-3.761***	-3.833***	-2.164***	-2.181***
	(.151)	(.190)	(.145)	(.159)
Threat (Climate) × June 2020	.536**	.735***	.091	-.215
	(.238)	(.252)	(.213)	(.207)
Threat (Climate) × November 2020	.550**	.515**	.074	-.083
	(.228)	(.236)	(.209)	(.203)
Threat (Climate) × March 2021	1.250***	1.430***	.383	.179
	(.249)	(.253)	(.234)	(.217)
Threat (Climate) × September 2021	1.901***	2.168***	.669**	.647***
	(.302)	(.296)	(.277)	(.251)
Threat (Climate) × November 2022	2.859***	2.999***	1.322***	1.193***
	(.232)	(.259)	(.223)	(.222)
Climate change × January 2024	2.541***	2.514***	1.290***	1.106***
	(.219)	(.265)	(.204)	(.226)
Threat (Terrorism) × June 2020	.965***	.849***	.203	-.009
	(.241)	(.254)	(.225)	(.207)
Threat (Terrorism) × November 2020	1.488***	1.360***	.490**	.359*
	(.237)	(.246)	(.215)	(.205)
Threat (Terrorism) × March 2021	1.105***	1.027***	.235	.153
	(.252)	(.266)	(.235)	(.221)
Threat (Terrorism) × September 2021	2.396***	2.307***	.908***	.795***
	(.303)	(.285)	(.270)	(.239)
Threat (Terrorism) × November 2022	2.968***	2.832***	1.284***	1.228***
	(.232)	(.254)	(.219)	(.215)
Threat (Terrorism) × January 2024	3.096***	3.147***	1.544***	1.683***
	(.218)	(.258)	(.202)	(.218)
Individual FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
N. of observations	10,389	9,041	10,389	9,041
N. of unique respondents	3,525	2,177	3,525	2,177
R^2	.089	.512	.041	.532

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions: $Y_{it} = \beta_j Threat_{it} + \delta_t + \beta_{jt} * \delta_t + \epsilon it$, where $Threat$ is a categorical variable that identifies whether the questions the respondent was randomly exposed to referred to the j threat COVID, climate change, or international terrorism, and δ_t is a vector of wave-specific fixed-effects, respectively. Outcome variables Y_{it} refer to the degree of agreement with the following claims: “Drastic measures must be taken to stop [the coronavirus/climate change/international terrorism], even if it limits individual freedom” –columns 1-2– and “In order to tackle a challenge like [the coronavirus/climate change/international terrorism], we need to unite around a strong leader” –columns 3-4–, both on a 0-10 scale.

Table F4: Regression estimates for attrition analyses (full models for Figure C1 in the supporting information)

	Wave 1 vs rest		First-time vs repeat	
	Since wave 1	Later	First-time	Repeater
Intercept	4.790***	5.126***	3.923***	4.165***
	(.027)	(.032)	(.157)	(.200)
January 2020	(ref.)		(ref.)	
March 2020	.271***	(ref.)	.395***	(ref.)
	(.040)		(.053)	
June 2020	.308***	-.107**		.016
	(.043)	(.044)		(.042)
November 2020	.316***	.021	.380***	.081*
	(.047)	(.044)	(.067)	(.045)
March 2021	.341***	-.068		.023
	(.047)	(.046)		(.045)
September 2021	.231***	-.102**		-.039
	(.053)	(.051)		(.051)
November 2022	.171***	-.134***	.162***	-.070
	(.051)	(.048)	(.060)	(.047)
January 2024	.275***	-.184***	.142***	-.084*
	(.045)	(.047)	(.052)	(.046)
Man			(ref.)	(ref.)
Woman			-.103**	-.020
			(.040)	(.046)
Age			.035***	.034***
			(.006)	(.008)
Age^2			-.000***	-.000***
			(.000)	(.000)
Education (Primary or less)			(ref.)	(ref.)
Education (Secondary)			-.010	.115**
			(.051)	(.051)
Education (Tertiary)			-.032	-.020
			(.046)	(.058)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	No	No
N. of observations	4,567	5,096	3,518	7,514
N. of unique respondents	855	1,361	3,518	2,245
R^2	.609	.649	.039	.014

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Table F5: Wave-by-initial shift coefficients (full models for Figure D4 in the supporting information)

	Tech. attitudes (avg).	Tech. attitudes (avg).
March 2020 × Initial Shift	1.000***	1.000***
	(.000)	(.000)
June 2020 × Initial Shift	.567***	.416***
	(.041)	(0.043)
November 2020 × Initial Shift	.524***	.364***
	(.054)	(0.058)
March 2021 × Initial Shift	.535***	.380***
	(.055)	(0.058)
September 2021 × Initial Shift	.472***	.363***
	(.056)	(0.058)
November 2022 × Initial Shift	.563***	.406***
	(.072)	(0.072)
January 2024 × Initial Shift	.548***	.349***
	(.053)	(.052)
Wave FE	Yes	Yes
Wave-by-Jan 2020 level FE	No	Yes
N. of observations	4,295	4,295

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Note: Base period: January 2020. Initial shift: March 2020 − Jan 2020 difference.

Table F6: Regression estimates for heterogeneity analyses (full models for top panels Figure E1 in the supporting information)

	Gender		Age		Education		
	Men	Women	Under-35	Over-35	<=Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Intercept (January 2020)	4.884***	4.692***	4.382***	4.910***	4.885***	4.803***	4.645***
	(.040)	(.035)	(.049)	(.031)	(.047)	(.046)	(.040)
March 2020	.161***	.383***	.474***	.204***	.234***	.209***	.377***
	(.059)	(.055)	(.075)	(.048)	(.072)	(.071)	(.059)
June 2020	.254***	.362***	.485***	.251***	.281***	.333***	.326***
	(.064)	(.057)	(.085)	(.050)	(.076)	(.082)	(.061)
November 2020	.228***	.408***	.495***	.261***	.287***	.321***	.354***
	(.071)	(.058)	(.088)	(.054)	(.082)	(.085)	(.066)
March 2021	.244***	.446***	.608***	.263***	.206**	.528***	.389***
	(.066)	(.065)	(.092)	(.054)	(.081)	(.081)	(.071)
September 2021	.189**	.264***	.455***	.166***	.158*	.281**	.296***
	(.077)	(.070)	(.095)	(.062)	(.094)	(.109)	(.072)
November 2022	.061	.296***	.457***	.100*	.075	.255***	.258***
	(.076)	(.065)	(.099)	(.058)	(.086)	(.096)	(.073)
January 2024	.140**	.427***	.452***	.224***	.245***	.238***	.351***
	(.065)	(.061)	(.097)	(.051)	(.073)	(.087)	(.076)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	2,408	2,159	988	3,579	2,017	1,149	1,401
N. of unique respondents	428	427	208	647	371	227	257
R^2	.604	.622	.591	.609	.553	.622	.708

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions with individual fixed effects: $Y_{it} = \delta_t + \gamma_i$, where δ_t and γ_i are vectors of wave-specific and individual fixed-effects, respectively, for different subsamples of respondents. Outcome variable refers to respondents' technocratic preferences and is the average of the three outcome variables in **??** (vote based on management, not ideas; technical management, not ideological; and experts, not politicians), ranging from 1 "Totally disagree" to 7 "Totally agree".

Table F7: Regression estimates for heterogeneity analyses (full models for bottom panels in Figure E1 in the supporting information)

	Political interest		Incumbent support		Ideology		
	Low	High	No	Yes	Left	Center	Right
Intercept (January 2020)	4.953***	4.616***	4.840***	4.595***	4.419***	4.919***	4.945***
	(.040)	(.034)	(.030)	(.057)	(.036)	(.058)	(.061)
March 2020	.216***	.330***	.253***	.347***	.294***	.380***	.319***
	(.061)	(.052)	(.046)	(.083)	(.057)	(.091)	(.095)
June 2020	.270***	.348***	.314***	.287***	.285***	.337***	.567***
	(.066)	(.055)	(.048)	(.098)	(.058)	(.112)	(.092)
November 2020	.255***	.380***	.347***	.198	.256***	.438***	.563***
	(.068)	(.063)	(.050)	(.120)	(.067)	(.096)	(.107)
March 2021	.279***	.404***	.365***	.249**	.315***	.267**	.599***
	(.071)	(.061)	(.052)	(.104)	(.064)	(.104)	(.105)
September 2021	.108	.352***	.250***	.156	.245***	.104	.510***
	(.081)	(.070)	(.057)	(.143)	(.073)	(.142)	(.119)
November 2022	.152**	.190***	.182***	.134	.165**	.183*	.363***
	(.077)	(.066)	(.058)	(.107)	(.066)	(.106)	(.128)
January 2024	.224***	.330***	.309***	.148	.213***	.348***	.472***
	(.069)	(.059)	(.051)	(.101)	(.070)	(.095)	(.095)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	2,365	2,202	3,628	939	1,994	758	876
N. of unique respondents	459	396	676	179	365	141	160
R^2	.537	.674	.627	.518	.602	.542	.576

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions with individual fixed effects: $Y_{it} = \delta_t + \gamma_i$, where δ_t and γ_i are vectors of wave-specific and individual fixed-effects, respectively, for different subsamples of respondents. Outcome variable refers to respondents' technocratic preferences and is the average of the three outcome variables in **??** (vote based on management, not ideas; technical management, not ideological; and experts, not politicians), ranging from 1 "Totally disagree" to 7 "Totally agree".

Table F8: Regression estimates for heterogeneity analyses (full models for top panels in Figure E2 in the supporting information)

	Health exposure		Health risk (obj)		Health risk (subj)
	Non-infected	Infected	Under-60	Over-60	
Intercept (January 2020)	4.809***	4.771***	4.774***	4.855***	4.726***
	(.031)	(.206)	(.029)	(.065)	(.074)
March 2020	.295***	.195	.314***	.098	.192**
	(.039)	(.209)	(.044)	(.100)	(.082)
June 2020	.276***	.169	.321***	.254**	.216**
	(.041)	(.233)	(.047)	(.104)	(.089)
November 2020	.328***	.297	.369***	.117	.390***
	(.042)	(.220)	(.050)	(.119)	(.090)
March 2021	.282***	.287	.364***	.253**	.268***
	(.043)	(.220)	(.050)	(.116)	(.094)
September 2021	.216***	.236	.287***	.032	.177*
	(.047)	(.224)	(.057)	(.133)	(.102)
November 2022	.235***	.178	.211***	.039	.222**
	(.055)	(.212)	(.056)	(.115)	(.095)
January 2024	.199***	.183	.298***	.187*	.225**
	(.057)	(.211)	(.050)	(.104)	(.094)
Subj. health risk					.009
					(.015)
Subj. health risk × March 2020					.023
					(.016)
Subj. health risk × June 2020					.014
					(.018)
Subj. health risk × November 2020					-.009
					(.017)
Subj. health risk × March 2021					.007
					(.018)
Subj. health risk × September 2021					.018
					(.020)
Subj. health risk × November 2022					-.006
					(.019)
Subj. health risk × January 2024					-.006
					(.019)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	7,177	1,860	3,563	1,004	7,916
N. of unique respondents	1,793	745	678	177	1,952
R^2	.632	.734	.608	.616	.638

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions with individual fixed effects: $Y_{it} = \delta_t + \gamma_i + \epsilon it$, where δ_t and γ_i are vectors of wave-specific and individual fixed-effects, respectively, for different subsamples of respondents. Outcome variable refers to respondents' technocratic preferences and is the average of the three outcome variables in **??** (vote based on management, not ideas; technical management, not ideological; and experts, not politicians), ranging from 1 "Totally disagree" to 7 "Totally agree".

Table F9: Regression estimates for heterogeneity analyses (full models for bottom panels in Figure E2)

	Economic risk (subj) Low	Economic risk (subj) High	Health risk (pred)	Economic risk (pred)
Intercept (January 2020)	4.791***	4.805***	4.366***	4.454***
	(.065)	(.034)	(.232)	(.352)
March 2020	.141*	.349***	.517**	.619*
	(.078)	(.042)	(.213)	(.370)
June 2020	.126	.329***	.467**	.518
	(.082)	(.045)	(.224)	(.399)
November 2020	.191**	.412***	.780***	.710*
	(.084)	(.047)	(.232)	(.400)
March 2021	.112	.376***	.710***	.779**
	(.080)	(.049)	(.209)	(.394)
September 2021	.128	.278***	.563**	.428
	(.085)	(.056)	(.230)	(.470)
November 2022	.149*	.203***	.698***	.538
	(.082)	(.052)	(.230)	(.455)
January 2024	.077	.251***	.714***	.497
	(.077)	(.054)	(.226)	(.433)
Pred. health risk			.098*	
			(.053)	
Pred. health risk × March 2020			-.056	
			(.048)	
Pred. health risk × June 2020			-.049	
			(.050)	
Pred. health risk × November 2020			-.101*	
			(.053)	
Pred. health risk × March 2021			-.095**	
			(.047)	
Pred. health risk × September 2021			-.075	
			(.052)	
Pred. health risk × November 2022			-.113**	
			(.051)	
Pred. health risk × January 2024			-.115**	
			(.050)	
Pred. econ. risk				.156
				(.166)
Pred. econ. risk × March 2020				-.150
				(.173)
Pred. econ. risk × June 2020				-.117
				(.186)
Pred. econ. risk × November 2020				-.173
				(.187)
Pred. econ. risk × March 2021				-.224
				(.183)
Pred. econ. risk × September 2021				-.093
				(.217)
Pred. econ. risk × November 2022				-.160
				(.210)
Pred. econ. risk × January 2024				-.141
				(.200)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	2,900	5,952	7,936	9,575
N. of unique respondents	902	1,577	1,724	2,187
R^2	.694	.627	.628	.630

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Note: Empirical models are OLS regressions with individual fixed effects: $Y_{it} = \delta_t + \gamma_i + \epsilon it$, where δ_t and γ_i are vectors of wave-specific and individual fixed-effects, respectively, for different subsamples of respondents. Outcome variable refers to respondents' technocratic preferences and is the average of the three outcome variables in **??** (vote based on management, not ideas; technical management, not ideological; and experts, not politicians), ranging from 1 "Totally disagree" to 7 "Totally agree".

Table F10: Regression estimates for heterogeneity analyses (full models for top panels in Figure E3)

	Gender		Age		Education		
	Men	Women	Under-35	Over-35	<=Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Intercept	5.912***	5.686***	5.735***	5.824***	6.084***	5.430***	5.690***
	(.162)	(.156)	(.232)	(.128)	(.175)	(.212)	(.203)
March 2020	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
June 2020	-.930***	-1.065***	-1.018***	-1.005***	-.828***	-.927***	-1.302***
	(.228)	(.222)	(.324)	(.182)	(.254)	(.327)	(.253)
November 2020	-.905***	-.363	-.748**	-.628***	-.407	-.548	-1.046***
	(.242)	(.230)	(.337)	(.192)	(.264)	(.341)	(.273)
March 2021	-1.354***	-.953***	-.934**	-1.236***	-1.347***	-.633*	-1.325***
	(.271)	(.269)	(.371)	(.221)	(.293)	(.368)	(.346)
September 2021	-.721***	-.476	.121	-.775***	-.965***	-.406	-.274
	(.274)	(.294)	(.378)	(.230)	(.316)	(.408)	(.337)
November 2022	-1.229***	-1.000***	-1.077**	-1.121***	-1.204***	-.778**	-1.255***
	(.279)	(.280)	(.475)	(.220)	(.288)	(.392)	(.403)
January 2024	-1.097***	-.942***	-.526	-1.121***	-.869***	-1.096***	-1.271***
	(.268)	(.281)	(.448)	(.215)	(.287)	(.372)	(.375)
Threat (Other)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Threat (Covid)	2.602***	2.896***	2.425***	2.840***	2.384***	3.307***	2.863***
	(.324)	(.282)	(.435)	(.249)	(.317)	(.480)	(.377)
June 2020 × Threat (Covid)	-1.111**	-.560	-.492	-.937***	-.719	-1.536**	-.497
	(.433)	(.398)	(.535)	(.349)	(.468)	(.630)	(.461)
November 2020 × Threat (Covid)	-1.291***	-1.431***	-1.278**	-1.346***	-1.652***	-2.299***	-.031
	(.443)	(.405)	(.540)	(.356)	(.462)	(.683)	(.434)
March 2021 × Threat (Covid)	-.975**	-1.279***	-1.532**	-1.047***	-.949*	-1.660**	-.980*
	(.467)	(.451)	(.637)	(.375)	(.520)	(.650)	(.545)
September 2021 × Threat (Covid)	-2.201***	-2.387***	-2.674***	-2.240***	-1.907***	-2.801***	-2.479***
	(.516)	(.513)	(.770)	(.415)	(.542)	(.957)	(.562)
November 2022 × Threat (Covid)	-2.559***	-3.333***	-2.085***	-3.154***	-3.000***	-3.694***	-2.369***
	(.470)	(.478)	(.739)	(.381)	(.487)	(.760)	(.607)
January 2024 × Threat (Covid)	-2.700***	-2.954***	-2.878***	-2.842***	-2.539***	-3.665***	-2.486***
	(.509)	(.477)	(.783)	(.394)	(.511)	(.691)	(.670)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	1,994	1,759	784	2,969	1,683	935	1,135
N. of unique respondents	390	381	175	596	339	201	231
R^2	.478	.495	.491	.485	.482	.479	.510

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Table F11: Regression estimates for heterogeneity analyses (full models for bottom panels in Figure E3)

	Political interest		Incumbent support			Ideology	
	Low	High	No	Yes	Left	Center	Right
Intercept	5.884***	5.720***	5.718***	6.146***	5.739***	5.429***	6.415***
	(.151)	(.169)	(.126)	(.246)	(.174)	(.288)	(.280)
March 2020	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
June 2020	-.842***	-1.183***	-.930***	-1.314***	-1.119***	-.600	-1.367***
	(.207)	(.245)	(.179)	(.338)	(.244)	(.407)	(.387)
November 2020	-.545**	-.768***	-.624***	-.786**	-.575**	-.051	-1.274***
	(.227)	(.247)	(.185)	(.390)	(.259)	(.332)	(.417)
March 2021	-1.153***	-1.191***	-1.220***	-.989**	-.991***	-.870*	-1.670***
	(.250)	(.294)	(.215)	(.417)	(.291)	(.449)	(.533)
September 2021	-.342	-.889***	-.631***	-.478	-.420	-.347	-.753
	(.275)	(.292)	(.228)	(.410)	(.303)	(.484)	(.502)
November 2022	-1.224***	-.997***	-1.053***	-1.392***	-.873***	-.700	-1.490***
	(.254)	(.315)	(.223)	(.436)	(.330)	(.521)	(.497)
January 2024	-.848***	-1.220***	-.975***	-1.187***	-1.004***	-.970**	-1.519***
	(.238)	(.313)	(.218)	(.414)	(.286)	(.417)	(.542)
Threat (Other)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Threat (Covid)	2.616***	2.888***	2.865***	2.283***	2.719***	3.771***	2.409***
	(.296)	(.314)	(.242)	(.476)	(.310)	(.543)	(.569)
March 2020 × Threat (Covid)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
June 2020 × Threat (Covid)	-.686*	-1.040**	-1.113***	.292	-.246	-2.055***	-.857
	(.378)	(.466)	(.326)	(.689)	(.444)	(.680)	(.793)
November 2020 × Threat (Covid)	-1.192***	-1.524***	-1.499***	-.678	-.850**	-2.418***	-1.274
	(.416)	(.431)	(.343)	(.619)	(.416)	(.780)	(.832)
March 2021 × Threat (Covid)	-1.150**	-1.124**	-1.242***	-.578	-.954**	-2.114***	-.678
	(.453)	(.474)	(.360)	(.763)	(.472)	(.772)	(.837)
September 2021 × Threat (Covid)	-2.549***	-2.062***	-2.435***	-1.805**	-2.076***	-3.503***	-3.402***
	(.507)	(.525)	(.415)	(.767)	(.529)	(.950)	(.984)
November 2022 × Threat (Covid)	-2.829***	-3.074***	-3.217***	-1.927***	-3.120***	-3.962***	-2.893***
	(.442)	(.511)	(.382)	(.709)	(.504)	(.792)	(.889)
January 2024 × Threat (Covid)	-3.131***	-2.486***	-3.056***	-1.975***	-2.116***	-2.563***	-3.269***
	(.463)	(.527)	(.395)	(.747)	(.505)	(.786)	(.886)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	1,980	1,773	3,000	753	1,610	608	700
N. of unique respondents	418	353	613	158	325	125	141
R^2	.495	.475	.485	.479	.479	.510	.452

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Table F12: Regression estimates for heterogeneity analyses (full models for top panels in Figure E4)

	Gender		Age		Education		
	Men	Women	Under-35	Over-35	<= Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Intercept	7.238***	7.079***	6.987***	7.201***	7.137***	7.012***	7.289***
	(.129)	(.123)	(.185)	(.102)	(.145)	(.160)	(.160)
March 2020	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
June 2020	-.471**	-.406**	-.603**	-.388***	-.146	-.608**	-.698***
	(.185)	(.170)	(.253)	(.145)	(.195)	(.265)	(.206)
November 2020	-.532***	-.073	-.770***	-.194	-.210	.014	-.704***
	(.205)	(.191)	(.293)	(.160)	(.227)	(.261)	(.244)
March 2021	-1.058***	-.706***	-.894***	-.891***	-.547**	-.801**	-1.460***
	(.221)	(.235)	(.323)	(.185)	(.225)	(.347)	(.296)
September 2021	-1.108***	-.233	-.646*	-.728***	-.490*	-.765**	-.969***
	(.230)	(.224)	(.390)	(.181)	(.258)	(.346)	(.275)
November 2022	-1.136***	-.617***	-1.161***	-.843***	-.633***	-1.044***	-1.172***
	(.246)	(.225)	(.394)	(.189)	(.239)	(.353)	(.342)
January 2024	-.699***	-.003	-.177	-.416**	.007	-.624*	-.812***
	(.225)	(.228)	(.415)	(.174)	(.229)	(.337)	(.299)
Threat (Other)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Threat (Covid)	.591**	.870***	.544	.790***	.928***	.886**	.362
	(.259)	(.221)	(.359)	(.196)	(.267)	(.345)	(.304)
June 2020 × Threat (Covid)	-.007	.207	.561	-.055	-.298	-.008	.677*
	(.356)	(.323)	(.491)	(.277)	(.375)	(.535)	(.381)
November 2020 × Threat (Covid)	.063	-.564*	.070	-.304	-.360	-1.130**	.696
	(.388)	(.327)	(.483)	(.299)	(.388)	(.509)	(.461)
March 2021 × Threat (Covid)	-.153	-.161	.132	-.244	-.790*	-.280	.771*
	(.398)	(.371)	(.557)	(.315)	(.405)	(.636)	(.453)
September 2021 × Threat (Covid)	-.224	-1.276***	-1.027	-.619*	-1.096**	-.401	-.323
	(.413)	(.433)	(.726)	(.323)	(.461)	(.706)	(.454)
November 2022 × Threat (Covid)	-.946**	-1.342***	-.406	-1.294***	-1.681***	-.801	-.628
	(.416)	(.386)	(.611)	(.321)	(.438)	(.607)	(.482)
January 2024 × Threat (Covid)	-1.415***	-1.735***	-1.507**	-1.581***	-2.077***	-1.414**	-.926*
	(.425)	(.369)	(.751)	(.305)	(.417)	(.550)	(.538)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	1994	1759	784	2969	1683	935	1135
N. of unique respondents	390	381	175	596	339	201	231
R^2	.507	.508	.507	.507	.511	.490	.522

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Table F13: Regression estimates for heterogeneity analyses (full models for bottom panels in Figure E4)

	Political interest		Incumbent support			Ideology	
	Low	High	No	Yes	Left	Center	Right
Intercept	7.040***	7.299***	7.136***	7.199***	6.775***	7.394***	8.102***
	(.118)	(.138)	(.101)	(.185)	(.146)	(.190)	(.199)
March 2020	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
June 2020	-.235	-.668***	-.571***	.153	-.215	-.026	-1.395***
	(.170)	(.186)	(.144)	(.245)	(.196)	(.281)	(.292)
November 2020	-.158	-.494**	-.377**	-.024	-.156	-.443	-.857**
	(.180)	(.220)	(.158)	(.309)	(.229)	(.297)	(.336)
March 2021	-.725***	-1.084***	-1.040***	-.270	-.478**	-.888***	-1.879***
	(.217)	(.238)	(.182)	(.337)	(.243)	(.303)	(.451)
September 2021	-.488**	-.971***	-.922***	.149	-.452*	-1.118***	-1.106***
	(.225)	(.241)	(.187)	(.323)	(.270)	(.369)	(.375)
November 2022	-.764***	-1.061***	-1.038***	-.307	-.371	-1.036***	-1.522***
	(.214)	(.272)	(.195)	(.326)	(.234)	(.383)	(.460)
January 2024	.009	-.831***	-.527***	.225	-.097	-.497	-1.222***
	(.206)	(.246)	(.187)	(.287)	(.247)	(.324)	(.393)
Threat (Other)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Threat (Covid)	.789***	.656**	.540***	1.525***	1.173***	.618	.353
	(.228)	(.263)	(.199)	(.325)	(.245)	(.388)	(.408)
Threat (Other) × March 2020	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Threat (Covid) × June 2020	-.072	.262	.322	-.916*	.069	-.657	.836
	(.312)	(.379)	(.272)	(.521)	(.366)	(.594)	(.540)
Threat (Covid) × November 2020	-.349	-.114	-.086	-.887*	-.534	-.101	.426
	(.340)	(.384)	(.291)	(.525)	(.388)	(.659)	(.633)
Threat (Covid) × March 2021	-.311	-.007	.124	-1.361**	-.489	-.338	.689
	(.392)	(.385)	(.303)	(.642)	(.396)	(.549)	(.698)
Threat (Covid) × September 2021	-1.058**	-.317	-.400	-1.861***	-1.133***	-.143	-.623
	(.439)	(.404)	(.339)	(.601)	(.421)	(.795)	(.805)
Threat (Covid) × November 2022	-1.160***	-1.073**	-1.032***	-1.683***	-1.966***	-.943	.197
	(.376)	(.439)	(.324)	(.588)	(.399)	(.698)	(.687)
Threat (Covid) × datewave=768	-2.142***	-.878**	-1.260***	-2.729***	-1.591***	-1.070	-1.253*
	(.369)	(.432)	(.331)	(.500)	(.404)	(.653)	(.643)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	1,980	1,773	3,000	753	1,610	608	700
N. of unique respondents	418	353	613	158	325	125	141
R^2	.475	.536	.504	.497	.534	.477	.459

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Table F14: Regression estimates for heterogeneity analyses (full models for top panels in Figure E5)

	Health exposure		Health risk (obj)		Health risk (subj)
	Non-infected	Infected	Under-60	Over-60	
Intercept	5.812***	6.161***	5.742***	5.975***	5.681***
	(.089)	(.581)	(.123)	(.271)	(.216)
March 2020	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
June 2020	-.975***	-1.975***	-1.134***	-.440	-.611**
	(.126)	(.650)	(.177)	(.359)	(.301)
November 2020	-.891***	-.876	-.774***	-.169	-.830***
	(.128)	(.589)	(.185)	(.389)	(.303)
March 2021	-1.078***	-1.355**	-1.243***	-.858*	-1.107***
	(.131)	(.657)	(.208)	(.468)	(.299)
September 2021	-.486***	-1.373**	-.541**	-.746	-.817**
	(.158)	(.650)	(.223)	(.451)	(.338)
November 2022	-.956***	-.890	-1.127***	-.965**	-.531*
	(.180)	(.614)	(.229)	(.415)	(.309)
January 2024	-.744***	-1.350**	-1.142***	-.556	-.762**
	(.188)	(.610)	(.216)	(.436)	(.308)
Threat (Other)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Threat (Covid)	2.551***	1.358	2.722***	2.848***	2.360***
	(.173)	(.994)	(.247)	(.431)	(.406)
June 2020 × Threat (Covid)	-.930***	1.319	-.747**	-1.247**	-1.484***
	(.234)	(1.190)	(.343)	(.552)	(.543)
November 2020 × Threat (Covid)	-.805***	-.046	-1.252***	-1.687**	-1.178**
	(.222)	(1.095)	(.337)	(.654)	(.572)
March 2021 × Threat (Covid)	-1.266***	.268	-1.040***	-1.427**	-.941
	(.244)	(1.101)	(.372)	(.673)	(.574)
September 2021 × Threat (Covid)	-2.440***	-1.005	-2.254***	-2.536***	-1.970***
	(.267)	(1.199)	(.403)	(.850)	(.602)
November 2022 × Threat (Covid)	-2.955***	-2.074**	-2.980***	-2.909***	-3.372***
	(.302)	(1.034)	(.389)	(.672)	(.534)
January 2024 × Threat (Covid)	-2.911***	-1.736*	-2.919***	-2.741***	-2.999***
	(.320)	(1.025)	(.408)	(.683)	(.556)
Subj. health risk					.036
					(.043)
June 2020 × Subj. health risk					-.058
					(.057)
November 2020 × Subj. health risk					.009
					(.056)
March 2021 × Subj. health risk					.014
					(.056)
September 2021 × Subj. health risk					.044
					(.065)
November 2022 × Subj. health risk					-.056
					(.061)
January 2024 × Subj. health risk					-.049
					(.063)
Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					.028
					(.076)
June 2020 × Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					.131
					(.104)
November 2020 × Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					.058
					(.106)
March 2021 × Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					-.034
					(.109)
September 2021 × Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					-.023
					(.114)
November 2022 × Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					.113
					(.106)
January 2024 × Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					.076
					(.111)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	6,518	1,885	2,929	824	7,333
N. of unique respondents	1,724	761	611	160	1,914
R^2	.533	.594	.477	.505	.517

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Table F15: Regression estimates for heterogeneity analyses (full models for bottom panels in Figure E5)

	Economic risk (subj)		Health risk (pred)	Economic risk (pred)
	Low	High		
Intercept	6.027***	5.853***	5.745***	6.138***
	(.239)	(.100)	(.639)	(.956)
March 2020	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
June 2020	-1.190***	-1.165***	-.395	-.546
	(.301)	(.140)	(.698)	(1.244)
November 2020	-.812***	-.897***	-.902	-2.015
	(.283)	(.144)	(.677)	(1.250)
March 2021	-1.193***	-1.064***	-.890	-2.087*
	(.285)	(.161)	(.677)	(1.203)
September 2021	-.990***	-.579***	.160	-.335
	(.312)	(.190)	(.755)	(1.467)
November 2022	-.913***	-.923***	-.600	-1.697
	(.297)	(.177)	(.737)	(1.470)
January 2024	-1.051***	-1.015***	-1.054	-4.266***
	(.286)	(.181)	(.739)	(1.468)
Threat (Other)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Threat (Covid)	1.727***	2.482***	2.944***	2.813*
	(.425)	(.203)	(.989)	(1.530)
Threat (Covid) × June 2020	.367	-.955***	-1.298	-3.227
	(.512)	(.275)	(1.264)	(2.213)
Threat (Covid) × November 2020	-.145	-.988***	-1.489	-1.162
	(.512)	(.262)	(1.259)	(2.087)
Threat (Covid) × March 2021	-.356	-1.319***	-1.722	-.276
	(.486)	(.308)	(1.286)	(2.279)
Threat (Covid) × September 2021	-1.532***	-2.340***	-4.609***	-4.661*
	(.534)	(.337)	(1.370)	(2.443)
Threat (Covid) × November 2022	-2.268***	-2.800***	-3.741***	-4.314*
	(.500)	(.302)	(1.246)	(2.231)
Threat (Covid) × January 2024	-2.414***	-2.937***	-4.590***	.418
	(.494)	(.317)	(1.304)	(2.460)
Pred. health risk			.016	
			(.141)	
Threat (Covid) × Pred. health risk			-.068	
			(.219)	
June 2020 × Pred. health risk			-.117	
			(.156)	
November 2020 × Pred. health risk			.034	
			(.150)	
March 2021 × Pred. health risk			-.010	
			(.150)	
September 2021 × Pred. health risk			-.167	
			(.165)	
November 2022 × Pred. health risk			-.049	
			(.157)	
January 2024 × Pred. health risk			.013	
			(.161)	
June 2020 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. health risk			.108	
			(.281)	
November 2020 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. health risk			.085	
			(.283)	
March 2021 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. health risk			.082	
			(.286)	
September 2021 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. health risk			.504*	
			(.304)	
November 2022 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. health risk			.149	
			(.271)	
January 2024 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. health risk			.364	
			(.283)	
Pred. econ. risk				-.136
				(.453)
Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ. risk				-.162
				(.725)
June 2020 × Pred. econ. risk				-.234
				(.577)
November 2020 × Pred. econ. risk				.563
				(.581)
March 2021 × Pred. econ. risk				.495
				(.561)
September 2021 × Pred. econ. risk				-.139
				(.676)
November 2022 × Pred. econ. risk				.390
				(.675)
January 2024 × Pred. econ. risk				1.480**
				(.673)
June 2020 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ. risk				1.135
				(1.027)
November 2020 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ. risk				.114
				(.971)
March 2021 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ. risk				-.432
				(1.059)
September 2021 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ. risk				1.123
				(1.138)
November 2022 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ. risk				.650
				(1.035)
January 2024 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ. risk				-1.458
				(1.129)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	2,814	5,352	7,627	9,041
N. of unique respondents	884	1,501	1,758	2,177
R^2	.566	.542	.504	.509

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Table F16: Regression estimates for heterogeneity analyses (full models for top panels in Figure E6)

	Health exposure		Health risk (obj)		Health risk (subj)
	Non-infected	Infected	Under-60	Over-60	
Intercept	7.209***	7.091***	7.138***	7.194***	6.917***
	(.073)	(.357)	(.099)	(.207)	(.175)
March 2020	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
June 2020	-.504***	-.378	-.500***	-.154	.049
	(.104)	(.420)	(.142)	(.268)	(.225)
November 2020	-.442***	-.428	-.426***	.121	-.302
	(.110)	(.407)	(.157)	(.315)	(.258)
March 2021	-.985***	-.957**	-.879***	-.918**	-.667**
	(.117)	(.446)	(.176)	(.384)	(.267)
September 2021	-.732***	-.667	-.751***	-.572	-.665**
	(.133)	(.456)	(.183)	(.369)	(.275)
November 2022	-.903***	-.587	-.959***	-.662**	-.512*
	(.163)	(.387)	(.201)	(.329)	(.267)
January 2024	-.931***	-.531	-.549***	.188	-.449*
	(.172)	(.375)	(.181)	(.341)	(.253)
Threat (Other)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Threat (Covid)	.562***	1.027*	.725***	.791**	.764***
	(.138)	(.591)	(.192)	(.384)	(.286)
March 2020 × Threat (Other)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
June 2020 × Threat (Covid)	.102	.411	.203	-.420	-.594
	(.194)	(.801)	(.270)	(.537)	(.430)
November 2020 × Threat (Covid)	-.021	-.355	-.204	-.362	-.685
	(.195)	(.737)	(.277)	(.635)	(.426)
March 2021 × Threat (Covid)	-.190	.137	-.143	-.295	-.600
	(.208)	(.666)	(.313)	(.563)	(.458)
September 2021 × Threat (Covid)	-.654***	-1.474*	-.748**	-.485	-1.031**
	(.228)	(.760)	(.327)	(.696)	(.461)
November 2022 × Threat (Covid)	-.956***	-1.925***	-1.026***	-1.502**	-2.049***
	(.264)	(.628)	(.306)	(.688)	(.430)
January 2024 × Threat (Covid)	-1.254***	-1.838***	-1.572***	-1.671***	-1.415***
	(.300)	(.629)	(.331)	(.563)	(.453)
Subj. health risk					.058*
					(.035)
Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					-.031
					(.058)
June 2020 × Subj. health risk					-.088**
					(.044)
November 2020 × Subj. health risk					-.018
					(.047)
March 2021 × Subj. health risk					-.066
					(.048)
September 2021 × Subj. health risk					-.024
					(.054)
November 2022 × Subj. health risk					-.072
					(.055)
January 2024 × Subj. health risk					-.065
					(.052)
June 2020 × Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					.121
					(.080)
November 2020 × Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					.107
					(.081)
March 2021 × Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					.104
					(.085)
September 2021 × Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					.079
					(.091)
November 2022 × Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					.222**
					(.090)
January 2024 × Threat (Covid) × Subj. health risk					.013
					(.096)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	6,518	1,885	2,929	824	7,333
N. of unique respondents	1,724	761	611	160	1,914
R^2	.543	.641	.515	.481	.553

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

Table F17: Regression estimates for heterogeneity analyses (full models for bottom panels in Figure E6)

	Economic risk (subj) Low	Economic risk (subj) High	Health risk (pred)	Economic risk (pred)
Intercept	7.165***	7.279***	7.469***	7.191***
	(.186)	(.082)	(.536)	(.782)
March 2020	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
June 2020	-.758***	-.560***	.113	-.044
	(.229)	(.121)	(.556)	(.999)
November 2020	-.116	-.540***	-.442	-2.941***
	(.229)	(.125)	(.592)	(1.048)
March 2021	-1.086***	-.958***	-.200	-1.391
	(.235)	(.136)	(.574)	(1.038)
September 2021	-.871***	-.810***	-.237	1.674
	(.248)	(.159)	(.637)	(1.235)
November 2022	-.943***	-.811***	-1.186*	-.808
	(.241)	(.154)	(.634)	(1.195)
January 2024	-.813***	-.757***	-.755	-.831
	(.235)	(.154)	(.648)	(1.193)
Threat (Other)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
Threat (Covid)	-.009	.591***	1.173	1.074
	(.375)	(.151)	(.764)	(1.143)
March 2020 × Threat (Other)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)	(ref.)
June 2020 × Threat (Covid)	1.172**	.090	-.670	-1.614
	(.463)	(.226)	(.980)	(1.867)
November 2020 × Threat (Covid)	.256	-.031	-.962	.496
	(.454)	(.216)	(.989)	(1.786)
March 2021 × Threat (Covid)	.635	-.219	-.437	-1.142
	(.444)	(.246)	(1.023)	(1.824)
September 2021 × Threat (Covid)	.079	-.755***	-1.623	-3.780*
	(.485)	(.277)	(1.212)	(1.969)
November 2022 × Threat (Covid)	-.405	-1.345***	-1.071	-.324
	(.438)	(.254)	(1.037)	(1.861)
January 2024 × Threat (Covid)	-1.036**	-1.529***	-2.340**	-3.194
	(.438)	(.271)	(1.123)	(1.984)
Pred. health risk			-.060	
			(.121)	
Threat (Covid) × Pred. health risk			-.120	
			(.173)	
June 2020 × Pred. health risk			-.118	
			(.124)	
November 2020 × Pred. health risk			.006	
			(.131)	
March 2021 × Pred. health risk			-.162	
			(.127)	
September 2021 × Pred. health risk			-.115	
			(.141)	
November 2022 × Pred. health risk			.086	
			(.138)	
January 2024 × Pred. health risk			.009	
			(.142)	
Threat (Covid) × June 2020 × Pred. health risk			.169	
			(.214)	
Threat (Covid) × November 2020 × Pred. health risk			.191	
			(.222)	
Threat (Covid) × March 2021 × Pred. health risk			.059	
			(.228)	
Threat (Covid) × September 2021 × Pred. health risk			.196	
			(.275)	
Threat (Covid) × November 2022 × Pred. health risk			-.034	
			(.232)	
Threat (Covid) × datewave=768 × Pred. health risk			.201	
			(.247)	
Pred. econ risk				.007
				(.371)
Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ risk				-.224
				(.542)
June 2020 × Pred. econ risk				-.217
				(.464)
November 2020 × Pred. econ risk				1.165**
				(.487)
March 2021 × Pred. econ risk				.195
				(.483)
September 2021 × Pred. econ risk				-1.128**
				(.571)
November 2022 × Pred. econ risk				-.029
				(.549)
January 2024 × Pred. econ risk				.021
				(.546)
June 2020 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ risk				.806
				(.863)
November 2020 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ risk				-.285
				(.829)
March 2021 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ risk				.459
				(.844)
September 2021 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ risk				1.404
				(.918)
November 2022 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ risk				-.391
				(.861)
January 2024 × Threat (Covid) × Pred. econ risk				.822
				(.910)
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. of observations	2,814	5,352	7,627	9,041
N. of unique respondents	884	1,501	1,758	2,177
R^2	.596	.547	.524	.533

Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01.

G Question wording

We reproduce here the wording of the survey questions that are used in the analyses.

G.1 Dependent variables

1. Some people prefer to vote for a party that shares their ideas, even if it has not managed public affairs well, while others prefer to vote for a party that has managed public affairs well, even if it does not share their ideas.

   Using a scale of 1 to 7 , where 1 is "I would always vote for the party that shares my ideas, even if its management has been bad" and 7 "I would always vote for the party that has managed well, even if it does not share my ideas", where would you locate?

   1 I would always vote for the party that shares my ideas, even if its management has been bad

   2

   3

   4

   5

   6

   7 I would always vote for the party that has managed well, even if it does not share my ideas

   98 I prefer not to answer

2. Some people believe that politicians should put aside their political agenda and approach public problems from a technical point of view. To what extent do you agree with this opinion?

1 Totally disagree

2 Strongly disagree

3 Disagree

4 Neither agree nor disagree

5 Agree

6 Strongly agree

7 Totally agree

98 I prefer not to answer

3. To what extent do you agree with the following statement? “It is better to have experts, and not politicians, deciding what policies are best for the country”

   1 Totally disagree

   2 Strongly disagree

   3 Disagree

   4 Neither agree nor disagree

   5 Agree

   6 Strongly agree

   7 Totally agree

   98 I prefer not to answer

4. Which of the following qualities do you consider important in a politician? Order them from 1 to 5, with 1 being the most important and 5 being the least important.

   (a) Honest

   (b) Shares my ideas

   (c) Competent manager

(d) Close to people

(e) Prepared and well-trained

5. To what extent do you agree with the following measures to fight [the coronavirus/-climate change/international terrorism]? Use a scale from 0 to 10, in which 0 means "completely disagree" and 10 "completely agree"

   (a) Drastic measures must be taken to stop [the coronavirus/climate change/international terrorism], even if this means a limitation on individual freedom.

   (b) To face a challenge like [the coronavirus/climate change/international terrorism], we need to unite around strong leadership.

G.2 Controls and moderators

1. And you, how likely do you think you would be to develop serious symptoms of Coronavirus ? Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is " I am not likely to develop serious symptoms" and 10 "I would definitely develop serious symptoms."

   Slider 0-10 + 98. I don't know

2. How do you think the coronavirus crisis will affect your personal and family economic situation?

   1 Very negatively

   2 Somewhat negatively

   3 It will not affect my economic situation

   4 Somewhat positively

   5 Very positively

3. When talking about politics, the expressions "left" and "right" are usually used. Where would you be located? Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is "Far left" and 10 "Far right."

0

10

99 I prefer not to answer

97 I do not feel identified with the previous options

4. Which of the following parties do you consider closest to your ideas?

- PSOE
- PP
- Ciudadanos
- Podemos
- VOX
- ERC
- JxCat
- PNV
- EH Bildu

96 Another one, which one?

97 I don't feel close to any party

98 I prefer not to answer

5. In general terms, how interested are you in politics?

(a) A lot

(b) Quite

(c) A Bit

(d) Nothing

98 I prefer not to answer

H Covid-19 effects across countries

The following graphs (source: Our World in Data) report cross-country comparisons of health and economic effects of the pandemic, as well as the stringency of government policies, suggesting that Spain was quite similar to Canada, France, Germany, the UK, or the US.













I Adherence to principles for human subjects research

The eight survey waves used in this paper were conducted through the online survey company Netquest between 2020 and 2024. Netquest is a leading market research company in Spain, that owns an online panel of respondents that complete different types of surveys in exchange for incentives. The incentives are a system of points that participants can exchange by different products from a catalogue. Participation in each individual study is voluntary. Netquest provides full details of their process of recruitment and compensation on request and on their website.

We discuss below how our research adheres to the 2020 APSA Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research. Given the context in which the key data collection was conducted, during the lockdown, we were not able to obtain an ex-ante IRB review. However, the anonymized nature of the data (we did not have access to any personal information of our respondents), the informed consent, the lack of deception and the minimal impact of the survey instruments used are all in accordance to the 2020 APSA Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research.

1. Consent: In our study, respondents were informed that they were responding to a survey about political issues commissioned by the University of Barcelona. Before accepting to respond, respondents were also informed that the survey included questions on different topics, some of which could be sensitive.

2. Deception: The embedded experiments did not include deception of any kind. The manipulations were based simply on the fact that respondents were asked about what kinds of governance modes or policies they preferred to respond to the coronavirus crisis / climate change / international terrorism.

3. Harm and trauma: Given the already high salience of the pandemic in the time frame in which the surveys were conducted, and the wide coverage of the pandemic (but also of climate change and terrorism) by the news media, the potential for

trauma of our specific experiment is small. Moreover, in the treatment conditions we use in this paper, we only made generic references to the coronavirus crisis, climate change, and international terrorism, with no explicit primes about direct victims.

4. Confidentiality. We did not have access to any personal information of our respondents, the company separates it from the survey results and provides anonymized data to the researchers.

5. Impact. The small number of participants and the nature of the treatments make it extremely unlikely that our experiment had any impact on the political process.

6. Compensation. All participants were compensated with incentives according to Netquest rules.

References in the Supporting Information

Bertsou, Eri and Daniele Caramani. 2022. "People haven't had enough of experts: Technocratic attitudes among citizens in nine European democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 66(1):5–23.