Government Ideology and Support for Redistribution among the Wealthy
Supplementary Information*

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Contents

*All replication material, including `R` code and data, are available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/1KEFJ5.

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S1 Descriptive Statistics

In this section, we present descriptive data of our samples. Sample 1 refers to respondents surveyed before the first election round (April 2022). Sample 2 contains respondents surveyed during the run-off (June 2022). Overall, the distribution of both samples is similar in several characteristics since we recontacted most respondents during the second survey. In figure S2, we report respondents perception of Hernández's ideological placement.



Figure S1: Descriptive Statistics.
Note. This figure shows the distribution of demographics characteristics and vote intention in samples 1 and 2.



Figure S2: Respondents' Perception of Hernández' Ideology Position.
Note. This figure shows how respondents from Study 2 perceived the ideological position of Rodolfo Hernández

S2 External Validity

We employ data from a recent nationally representative survey to check how our sample compares to the population in SEL 5 or 6. Specifically, we use data from the 2021 Political Culture Survey (ECP) by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE, 2021). Figure S3 shows that our respondents are similar to the broad upper-class population in terms of gender ($p > 0.55$), modal age ($p > 0.64$), and marital status ($p > 0.07$). However, our sample is more educated ($p < 0.01$) and less catholic ($p < 0.01$).



Figure S3: External Validity.
Note. This figure compares respondents from our online sample (grey) and a nationally representative sample from SEL 5 or 6 (black) based on several sociodemographic characteristics. All estimates are presented with 95% CIs.

S3 Vignettes and Survey Questions

In this section, we present the vignettes, questions, and response options we employed in the experimental module of the survey. To avoid repetition, we use [T0/T1] to indicate the part we randomized in the vignettes. T0 refers to the left-wing candidate, Gustavo Petro. T1 refers to the right-wing candidate: Federico Gutiérrez in Study 1 and

Rodolfo Hernández in Study 2.

Progressive Taxation:*In Colombia, income tax is progressive: people with higher incomes pay more taxes. For example, a person earning 2.5 million per month pays an income tax of 10%, while a person earning 15 million per month pays an income tax of 24.5%. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the income tax for this second group going from 24.5 to 29.5 under a [T0/T1] government, i.e., that those earning 15 million would go from paying 3.7 to 4.4 million in taxes?*

Response options: 1 strongly disagree - 5 strongly agree

Subsidies:*To what extent do you agree or disagree with implementing a tax for strata 5 and 6 to subsidize 10% of the utility spending of strata 1 and 2 under a government of [T0/T1]?*

Response options: 1 strongly disagree - 5 strongly agree

Uncertainty:*Several candidates have considered implementing taxes to solve the State's fiscal deficit. One of the proposals is to increase the tax on income received by corporate shareholders. Currently this tax is 10%. Imagine that [T0/T1] proposes to increase this tax to 13%, if [T0/T1] is elected president, do you expect him to implement exactly the tax he proposes, or do you expect the tax implemented to be lower or higher than the one proposed?*

Response options: Please, use the slider to indicate the tax you expect the candidate to implement[1].

Efficiency:*How likely do you think it is that the money to help the poor will actually be spent on the poor under [T0/T1]'s government?*

Response options: 1 not at all likely - 3 very likely

Instability:*How likely do you think it is that the social policies of [T0/T1]'s government will put Colombia's economic stability at risk?*

Response options: 1 not at all likely - 3 very likely

We also included questions to measure the following pre-treatment covariates:

Age
Female
Capital: *In what city do you live?*. Coded as 1 if respondent lived in a capital city.
White: *Do you consider yourself a white, mestizo, indigenous, Afro-descendant, mulato or other?* Coded as 1 if respondent answered 'white', 0 otherwise.
Catholic: *If you are a member of any religion, please indicate which one.* Coded as 1 if respondent answered 'catholic', 0 otherwise.
Married: *What is your marital status?* Coded as 1 if respondent answered 'married'.
University degree: *What is the last grade of education you completed?* Coded as 1 if respondent answered 'college (university)', 0 otherwise.
Employed: *What is your occupation?* Coded as 1 if respondent answered 'business owner', 'salaried worker' or 'self-employed', 0 otherwise.
Exposure to crime: *Have you been a victim of robbery, assault, extortion, threats or any other type of criminal act in the last 12 months?* Coded as 1 if respondent answered 'yes', 0 otherwise.
Guerrilla threat: *Which of the following groups represents the greatest threat to your security? Please indicate all that apply.* Coded as 1 is respondent's selection included 'guerrilla', 0 otherwise.
Intention to migrate: *Do you intend to move to live or work in another country in the next three*

[1]The slider goes from 3 to 23

years? Coded as 1 if respondent answered 'yes', 0 otherwise.

Trust in institutions: *How much confidence do you have in the Congress/politcal parties/armed forces?* We built an index by averaging responses from the three questions.

Vote intention: *For whom do you plan to vote?*

Ideology: *Nowadays when talking about political trends, many people talk about those who sympathize more with the left or with the right. Depending on what you mean by the terms 'left' and 'right' when you think about your political views, would you describe yourself as right-wing, center-right, center, center-left, or left-wing?* Response options went from 1 (Left) to 5 (Right).

Resentment: *Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: There is a lot of social resentment in the country.* Here, higher values indicate a higher perception of social resentment (from 1 to 5).

Trust Hernández: *How much confidence do you have in Rodolfo Hernández as a possible president of Colombia?* Higher values indicate a higher trust in the candidate (from 1 to 3).

S4 Equivalence Tests

In this section, we show results from equivalence tests. These tests allow us to check if respondents exposed to the left-wing candidate (T0) and those exposed to the right-wing candidate (T1) are equivalent across several covariates. Because we use 5 experimental vignettes in both studies, we report 10 equivalence tests. In these analyses, p-values indicate whether we reject the null of nonequivalence between treatment groups. Specifically, we report equivalence in terms of age, gender (female), place of residence (capital city), race (white), religion (catholic), marital status (married), education (university degree), and employment (employed).

Table S1: Equivalence Table (Study 1) - T0 vs T1

Variable	Mean Difference	CI (+/-)	p-val
Progressive Taxation			
age	-0.120	0.269	0.000
female	0.005	0.047	0.005
capital	0.054	0.107	0.245
white	-0.027	0.085	0.037
catholic	-0.045	0.099	0.156
married	-0.021	0.077	0.027
university_degree	0.017	0.073	0.020
employed	-0.039	0.090	0.179
right_ideology	-0.026	0.090	0.050
Subsidies			
age	0.022	0.150	0.000
female	-0.048	0.106	0.122
capital	0.038	0.091	0.118
white	0.033	0.092	0.055
catholic	-0.010	0.058	0.015
married	-0.023	0.080	0.033
university_degree	-0.071	0.129	0.311
employed	0.023	0.073	0.072
right_ideology	0.002	0.002	0.003
Uncertainty			
age	0.072	0.228	0.000
female	0.021	0.081	0.032
capital	0.037	0.094	0.127
white	-0.052	0.113	0.153
catholic	-0.100	0.157	0.738

married	-0.044	0.104	0.117
university_degree	0.032	0.093	0.063
employed	0.047	0.100	0.254
right_ideology	0.018	0.083	0.036
Efficiency			
age	0.059	0.206	0.000
female	-0.001	0.001	0.001
capital	0.027	0.080	0.063
white	-0.041	0.100	0.084
catholic	0.016	0.069	0.027
married	0.014	0.068	0.016
university_degree	-0.039	0.097	0.079
employed	-0.009	0.055	0.023
Instability			
right_ideology	0.010	0.065	0.014
age	-0.004	0.004	0.000
female	-0.049	0.107	0.127
capital	0.022	0.075	0.046
white	-0.001	0.001	0.001
catholic	-0.015	0.068	0.025
married	0.000	0.000	0.000
university_degree	0.009	0.060	0.009
employed	0.023	0.073	0.072
right_ideology	0.011	0.069	0.017

Table S2: Equivalence Table (Study 2) - T0 vs T1

Variable	Mean Difference	CI (+/-)	p-val
Progressive Taxation			
age	-0.082	0.226	0.000
female	0.025	0.081	0.030
capital	0.009	0.057	0.011
white	-0.012	0.065	0.011
catholic	-0.011	0.060	0.018
married	-0.054	0.110	0.160
university_degree	-0.002	0.002	0.002
employed	-0.002	0.002	0.004
right_ideology	0.023	0.084	0.035
Subsidies			
age	-0.046	0.187	0.000
female	-0.059	0.116	0.193
capital	0.054	0.108	0.202
white	0.029	0.086	0.039
catholic	0.035	0.088	0.098
married	-0.004	0.034	0.003
university_degree	0.053	0.110	0.151
employed	-0.032	0.080	0.130
right_ideology	0.062	0.123	0.225
Uncertainty			
age	-0.013	0.116	0.000
female	0.050	0.106	0.126
capital	-0.033	0.087	0.071
white	-0.068	0.125	0.263

catholic	0.040	0.092	0.124
married	0.028	0.084	0.040
university_degree	-0.013	0.066	0.012
employed	-0.003	0.026	0.007
right_ideology	0.022	0.083	0.033
Efficiency			
age	0.144	0.288	0.000
female	0.075	0.132	0.344
capital	0.009	0.057	0.011
white	0.025	0.081	0.029
catholic	0.004	0.038	0.006
married	0.045	0.101	0.104
university_degree	-0.047	0.104	0.113
employed	-0.033	0.081	0.140
Instability			
right_ideology	-0.018	0.077	0.024
age	0.093	0.237	0.000
female	-0.044	0.101	0.095
capital	0.005	0.041	0.005
white	0.025	0.082	0.031
catholic	-0.043	0.096	0.150
married	-0.045	0.101	0.104
university_degree	0.026	0.083	0.034
employed	-0.045	0.093	0.248
right_ideology	0.002	0.002	0.002

S5 Regression Results - Survey Experimental Data

Table S3: Regression Results - Study 1 (without covariates)

	Pro. Tax.	Subsidies	Uncertainty	Efficiency	Instability
Base category					
(T0 = Leftwing Candidate)	0.395^{***}	0.196^{***}	-1.143^{***}	0.164^{***}	0.518^{***}
	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.271)	(0.019)	(0.026)
T1 = Rightwing Candidate	0.094^{***}	0.042	-0.649^{*}	0.169^{***}	-0.259^{***}
	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.365)	(0.031)	(0.034)
R^2	0.009	0.003	0.004	0.038	0.071
Adj. R^2	0.008	0.001	0.003	0.037	0.070
Num. obs.	760	773	723	764	746
RMSE	0.495	0.412	4.939	0.424	0.470

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors.

Table S4: Regression Results - Study 1 (with covariates)

	Pro. Tax.	Subsidies	Uncertainty	Efficiency	Instability
Base category					
(T0 = Leftwing Candidate)	0.450^{***}	0.289^{**}	1.872	-0.113	0.126
	(0.173)	(0.140)	(1.610)	(0.136)	(0.153)
T1 = Rightwing Candidate	0.105^{***}	0.073^{**}	-0.607	0.175^{***}	-0.286^{***}

	Pro. Tax.	Subsidies	Uncertainty	Efficiency	Instability
	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.412)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Age(25-34)	0.154	−0.025	0.134	0.054	0.025
	(0.119)	(0.099)	(1.033)	(0.094)	(0.095)
Age(35-44)	0.162	−0.046	0.005	0.044	0.171*
	(0.120)	(0.099)	(1.073)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Age(45-54)	0.214*	0.038	0.777	0.088	0.074
	(0.119)	(0.102)	(1.107)	(0.096)	(0.099)
Age(55+)	0.111	0.026	0.235	0.094	0.130
	(0.116)	(0.097)	(1.037)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Female	−0.026	−0.112***	−0.593	−0.012	−0.014
	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.413)	(0.037)	(0.040)
Capital	−0.020	−0.043	−0.350	−0.022	0.035
	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.447)	(0.038)	(0.042)
White	−0.072*	0.016	0.030	0.034	−0.021
	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.436)	(0.038)	(0.040)
Catholic	−0.074	−0.073*	−0.138	−0.061	0.114***
	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.447)	(0.040)	(0.043)
Married	−0.016	−0.054	−0.052	0.003	0.002
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.431)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Education	−0.024	0.027	−0.157	−0.033	−0.004
	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.420)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Employed	−0.048	0.025	−0.695	0.021	0.075
	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.525)	(0.045)	(0.048)
Guerrilla threat	−0.064	−0.018	−0.333	0.046	0.017
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.461)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Trust inst.	−0.011	0.043	0.059	0.100**	0.011
	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.503)	(0.043)	(0.047)
Ideology (Right)	−0.198***	−0.125***	−1.931***	−0.034	−0.035
	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.497)	(0.040)	(0.050)
Percep. of resent.	0.037*	0.002	−0.196	0.012	0.030
	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.209)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Vote (Right)	0.013	−0.010	0.156	0.084**	0.071
	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.541)	(0.042)	(0.053)
R^2	0.095	0.067	0.061	0.085	0.130
Adj. R^2	0.066	0.037	0.028	0.055	0.101
Num. obs.	609	606	565	606	594
RMSE	0.483	0.413	4.732	0.428	0.461

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors.



Figure S4: Dependent Variables in Original Scales - Study 1.
Note. This figure shows the effect of the treatment (proposal by the right-wing candidate) on the dependent variables at their original scales. DVs in a 5-point scale go from *strongly disagree* (1) to *strongly agree* (5), DVs in a 3-point scale go from *not at all likely* (1) to *very likely* (3), and the DV in a 20-point scale goes from 3 to 23. OLS models with robust standard errors. Confidence intervals: 95%.

Table S5: Regression Results - Study 2 (without covariates)

	Pro. Tax.	Subsidies	Uncertainty	Efficiency	Instability
Base category					
(T0 = Leftwing Candidate)	0.380^{***}	0.181^{***}	-1.121^{***}	0.193^{***}	0.568^{***}
	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.239)	(0.020)	(0.026)
T1 = Rightwing Candidate	0.089^{**}	0.048^{*}	-0.320	0.179^{***}	-0.337^{***}
	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.316)	(0.031)	(0.033)
R^2	0.008	0.004	0.001	0.039	0.119
Adj. R^2	0.007	0.002	0.000	0.038	0.118
Num. obs.	797	819	832	804	798
RMSE	0.493	0.403	4.560	0.444	0.458

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors.

Table S6: Regression Results - Study 2 (with covariates)

	Pro. Tax.	Subsidies	Uncertainty	Efficiency	Instability
Base category					
(T0 = Leftwing Candidate)	0.204	0.463^{***}	2.306^{*}	0.277^{*}	0.465^{***}
	(0.139)	(0.130)	(1.327)	(0.151)	(0.151)
T1 = Rightwing Candidate	0.091^{**}	0.027	-0.246	0.171^{***}	-0.346^{***}
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.341)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Age(25-34)	0.188^{**}	-0.177^{*}	-0.608	-0.103	-0.016

	Pro. Tax.	Subsidies	Uncertainty	Efficiency	Instability
	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.803)	(0.104)	(0.099)
Age(35-44)	0.100	−0.180*	−0.147	−0.053	0.077
	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.816)	(0.107)	(0.102)
Age(45-54)	0.145	−0.189**	−0.637	−0.059	0.081
	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.848)	(0.106)	(0.100)
Age(55+)	0.123	−0.218**	−1.411*	−0.026	0.025
	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.791)	(0.101)	(0.096)
Female	−0.025	−0.050	−1.036***	−0.055	−0.011
	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.352)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Capital	−0.057	0.017	0.556	0.057	−0.019
	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.363)	(0.038)	(0.037)
White	−0.044	0.006	0.136	−0.040	0.049
	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.359)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Catholic	−0.015	−0.027	−0.394	−0.005	0.086**
	(0.046)	(0.038)	(0.416)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Married	−0.006	0.034	0.143	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.377)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Education	0.073*	0.009	−0.829**	−0.000	0.038
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.346)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Employed	−0.084	−0.019	−0.544	−0.001	−0.024
	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.441)	(0.051)	(0.048)
Guerrilla threat	−0.023	−0.041	−0.432	−0.043	−0.013
	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.373)	(0.038)	(0.040)
Trust inst.	0.004	0.017	−0.493	0.038	−0.066
	(0.049)	(0.038)	(0.451)	(0.047)	(0.045)
Percep. of resent.	0.047***	−0.000	0.048	−0.014	0.012
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.182)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Ideology (Right)	−0.254***	−0.217***	−1.731***	0.007	0.091**
	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.398)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Hernández Id.	0.118***	0.074**	0.670*	0.019	−0.025
	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.364)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Vote (Right)	−0.034	0.027	−0.000	0.019	0.034
	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.429)	(0.046)	(0.049)
R^2	0.124	0.095	0.104	0.062	0.164
Adj. R^2	0.096	0.066	0.075	0.031	0.137
Num. obs.	640	642	643	638	634
RMSE	0.470	0.394	4.264	0.448	0.455

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Robust standard errors.



Figure S5: Dependent Variables in Original Scales - Study 2.
Note. This figure shows the effect of the treatment (proposal by the right-wing candidate) on the dependent variables at their original scales. DVs in a 5-point scale go from *strongly disagree* (1) to *strongly agree* (5), DVs in a 3-point scale go from *not at all likely* (1) to *very likely* (3), and the DV in a 20-point scale goes from 3 to 23. OLS models with robust standard errors. Confidence intervals: 95%.

Table S7 reports treatment effects on *Uncertainty*, alternatively coded.[2] Specifically, we coded the outcome variable so that it takes a value of -1 when respondents expected a lower tax rate, 0 when they expected the same, and 1 when they expected a higher rate. Results are statistically significant and consistent with our theoretical predictions.

Table S7: Effect on Uncertainty (Alternative coding)

	Study 1		Study 2	
	1	2	3	4
Base category				
(T0 = Leftwing Candidate)	-0.244^{***}	0.331	-0.240^{***}	0.497^{**}
	(0.047)	(0.312)	(0.043)	(0.252)
T1 = Rightwing Candidate	-0.154^{**}	-0.171^{**}	-0.114^{*}	-0.121^{*}
	(0.066)	(0.074)	(0.059)	(0.065)
Covariate Adjustment	No	Yes	No	Yes
Num. obs.	694	543	804	625
RMSE	0.866	0.840	0.833	0.811

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS models with robust standard errors.

S5.1 Alternative Explanation

Petro is a former guerrilla member and has been often linked to former radical-left Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez. Petro's candidacy in 2018 and 2022 triggered fears of potential property rights violations and expectations of macroeconomic mismanagement given the candidate's promises of social spending and public sector expansion. Therefore, our results might be about fears of and opposition to Petro rather than general opposition to the Left. Since Petro was the only left-wing candidate in the 2018 and 2022 presidential elections, we could not test whether

[2]This analysis was not pre-registered.

results held with a different left-wing candidate. We thus use existing survey data and present evidence that suggests that people oppose the Left in general rather than Petro in particular. We take advantage of a survey conducted by LAPOP in Colombia 2018, the presidential election year. This survey asked respondents about their perceived candidates' ideological position on a left-right scale (from 1 to 10). Likewise, the survey asked respondents how often they felt fear of something Gustavo Petro (the left-wing candidate) did during the political campaign. Respondents answered the same question for the right-wing candidate, Iván Duque. Response options for these questions were: never, sometimes, half of the time, most of the time, and always. We use questions about fear to build the outcome variables, which take on 1 when people felt fear toward the candidate (Petro or Duque) most of the time or always and 0 otherwise. We use the ideological placement questions to build our independent variables: *Petro - Left* takes on 1 when the candidate is perceived as being between 1 and 3 in the 1-10 ideological scale and 0 otherwise. *Petro - Right* takes on 1 when people perceive Petro as being between 8 and 10 in the ideological spectrum and 0 otherwise. To conduct a placebo test, we build *Duque - Left* following the same approach we used with *Petro - Left*.

If what triggers fears among Colombians is the figure of Petro himself rather than his ideological position is what triggers fears among Colombians, we should observe that fear toward Petro is positive regardless of Petro's ideological placement. Likewise, if people fear the Left itself, we should see a positive association between *Duque - Left* and fear toward Duque. Figure S6 shows that the Left rather than Petro is what triggers fears among Colombians. These results do not support the alternative explanation that negative attitudes towards Petro are driving the results.



Figure S6: Effect of Candidate's Ideological Placement on Fear of the Candidate.
Note. In this figure, we use LAPOP data and show the probability of fearing the 2018 presidential candidate (Petro or Duque) as a function of the perceived candidate's ideological placement. OLS models include control variables and robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Confidence intervals: 95%. Regression reported in table S17 in the online SI.

The existing scholarship demonstrates that welfare states in this region tend to have an upward bias. Specifically, social policies disproportionately target urban formal workers while excluding poor informal sectors (Holland and Schneider, 2017). As Holland (2018) argues, these truncated welfare states diminish expectations of redistribution. Therefore, our findings could be driven by these diminished redistributive expectations: the affluent support redistribution because they expect social spending to be limited and biased in their favor. However, as Ballard-Rosa, Martin and Scheve (2017) highlight, redistribution involves spending and taxation. While the empirical evidence about the truncated welfare states focuses on the former, our experimental evidence refers to the latter. In particular, our survey vignettes *Progressive Taxation* and *Subsidies* measure expectations about taxation and emphasize that the wealthy are the target of the increased taxation.

If our respondents support redistribution under the Right because they consider it cheap talk, we should observe that they do not trust the right-wing candidate presenting the redistributive policies. We use our survey data collected during the run-off election to test this implication. In the survey, we asked respondents about their level of trust in the right-wing candidate (Rodolfo Hernández) as a possible president of Colombia. Because this is a post-treatment measure and the vignettes showing redistributive proposals under the Right/Left were randomly assigned, we can estimate the average causal effect of a right-wing redistributive proposal on trust in the right-wing candidate. We assume that people do not trust candidates whose proposals are perceived as cheap talk. Table S8 shows that Hernández's redistributive proposals do not affect respondents' trust in him ($p > 0.05$). Therefore, there is no evidence to consider the cheap talk as a valid alternative explanation of our findings.

Table S8: Effect of Redistributive Proposal on Trust

	1	2	3	4
(Intercept)	1.980***	1.305***	2.047***	1.321***
	(0.038)	(0.177)	(0.038)	(0.176)
Tax (T1)	0.033	0.027		
	(0.055)	(0.044)		
Subsidy (T1)			−0.105*	−0.003
			(0.055)	(0.044)
Covariate Adjustment	No	Yes	No	Yes
Num. obs.	787	631	787	631
RMSE	0.769	0.544	0.768	0.545

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS models with robust standard errors.

S5.2 Adjusted p-values

Since we test multiple hypotheses, we control the false discovery rate (FDR) using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure and report the adjusted p-values in this section[3].

Table S9: Adjusted p-values - Study 1

	Estimate	Unadjusted	FDR
Progressive Taxation	0.0937223	0.009	0.016
Subsidies	0.0424166	0.154	0.154
Uncertainty	-0.6486714	0.076	0.089
Efficiency	0.1688425	0.000	0.000
Instability	-0.2591360	0.000	0.000
Police	0.0830918	0.013	0.018
Visa	0.0899280	0.007	0.016

Table S10: Adjusted p-values - Study 2

	Estimate	Unadjusted	FDR
Progressive Taxation	0.0886047	0.011	0.027
Subsidies	0.0481207	0.089	0.124
Uncertainty	-0.3203190	0.311	0.311
Efficiency	0.1787202	0.000	0.000
Instability	-0.3372355	0.000	0.000
Police	0.0474136	0.138	0.161
Visa	0.0571197	0.082	0.124

S5.3 Heterogeneous Effects

In this section, we report regression tables for the heterogeneous analyses presented in the main text (Figure 5 and 6). In the interaction terms, 'Ideology (Right)' is a discrete variable that equals 1 when respondents self-identified as right-wing (i.e., values 4 or 5 in the 5-point ideological scale) and 0 when respondents self-identified as left-wing (i.e., values 1 or 2 in the 5-point ideological scale), thus excluding centrist respondents. We also report results using vote intention rather than ideology as the moderator. In the analyses using vote intention, 'Vote (Right)' equals 1 when a respondent intends to vote for the right-wing candidate and 0 otherwise

Additionally, we present results using different coding schemes for ideology. First, instead of excluding centrist respondents, we do a data-driven classification. Specifically, we classify as left-wing/right-wing those respondents

[3]The FDR correction is a less conservative approach than the Bonferroni correction.

below/above the average ideological score.[4] Second, we use three ideological groups, left-, center-, and right-wing, corresponding to values 1-2, 3, and 4-5 in the 5-point ideological scale, respectively.

Figures S7 and S8 show results consistent with the heterogeneous effects reported in the main text. Figures S9 and S10 suggest that the effects found in the pooled analyses are driven by center- and right-wing respondents. Specifically, we find that centrist respondents, similarly to those self-identified as right-wing, are more likely to support redistribution under the Right.

Table S11: Heterogeneous Effects (Ideology = Right) - Study 1

	Pro. Tax.	Subsidies	Uncertainty	Efficiency	Instability
Base category					
(T0 = Leftwing Candidate)	0.765^{***}	0.493^{***}	0.500	0.528^{***}	0.219^{***}
	(0.047)	(0.058)	(0.393)	(0.059)	(0.049)
T1 = Rightwing Candidate	-0.279^{***}	-0.249^{***}	-0.113	-0.504^{***}	0.142^{**}
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.759)	(0.062)	(0.072)
T1 X Ideology (Right)	0.610^{***}	0.460^{***}	0.103	1.063^{***}	-0.683^{***}
	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.918)	(0.073)	(0.085)
Ideology (Right)	-0.564^{***}	-0.424^{***}	-2.599^{***}	-0.504^{***}	0.474^{***}
	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.583)	(0.060)	(0.061)
R^2	0.162	0.113	0.060	0.360	0.232
Adj. R^2	0.157	0.108	0.053	0.356	0.227
Num. obs.	500	498	462	497	489
RMSE	0.457	0.400	4.715	0.364	0.427

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS models with robust standard errors.

Table S12: Heterogeneous Effects (Ideology = Right) - Study 2

	Pro. Tax.	Subsidies	Uncertainty	Efficiency	Instability
Base category					
(T0 = Leftwing Candidate)	0.771^{***}	0.438^{***}	1.014^{**}	0.608^{***}	0.347^{***}
	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.467)	(0.057)	(0.055)
T1 = Rightwing Candidate	-0.278^{***}	-0.150^{*}	-1.697^{**}	-0.531^{***}	0.030
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.673)	(0.065)	(0.078)
T1 X Ideology (Right)	0.526^{***}	0.265^{***}	1.483^{*}	1.022^{***}	-0.561^{***}
	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.826)	(0.076)	(0.090)
Ideology (Right)	-0.585^{***}	-0.373^{***}	-2.902^{***}	-0.567^{***}	0.384^{***}
	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.612)	(0.059)	(0.065)
R^2	0.170	0.111	0.053	0.297	0.210
Adj. R^2	0.165	0.106	0.047	0.293	0.205
Num. obs.	515	518	520	514	513
RMSE	0.449	0.371	4.504	0.389	0.441

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS models with robust standard errors.

[4] In both studies, the average ideological score is 3.4. Therefore, the data-driven classification includes centrist respondents in the left-wing group.

Table S13: Heterogeneous Effects (Vote Intention = Right-wing) - Study 1

	Pro. Tax.	Subsidies	Uncertainty	Efficiency	Instability
Base category					
(T0 = Leftwing Candidate)	0.540***	0.304***	−0.682**	0.284***	0.355***
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.317)	(0.031)	(0.034)
T1 = Rightwing Candidate	−0.111**	−0.119***	−0.838*	−0.225***	−0.020
	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.495)	(0.035)	(0.047)
T1 X Vote (Right)	0.462***	0.357***	0.437	0.861***	−0.528***
	(0.069)	(0.058)	(0.733)	(0.050)	(0.065)
Vote (Right)	−0.338***	−0.236***	−1.046*	−0.278***	0.358***
	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.561)	(0.031)	(0.049)
R^2	0.075	0.054	0.012	0.315	0.152
Adj. R^2	0.071	0.051	0.008	0.312	0.149
Num. obs.	760	773	723	764	746
RMSE	0.479	0.402	4.927	0.359	0.450

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS models with robust standard errors.

Table S14: Heterogeneous Effects (Vote Intention = Right-wing) - Study 2

	Pro. Tax.	Subsidies	Uncertainty	Efficiency	Instability
Base category					
(T0 = Leftwing Candidate)	0.598***	0.323***	−0.410	0.416***	0.339***
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.324)	(0.038)	(0.037)
T1 = Rightwing Candidate	−0.110**	−0.108**	−0.668	−0.318***	−0.014
	(0.055)	(0.048)	(0.483)	(0.045)	(0.052)
T1 X Vote (Right)	0.337***	0.259***	0.570	0.842***	−0.563***
	(0.070)	(0.059)	(0.634)	(0.056)	(0.065)
Vote (Right)	−0.368***	−0.234***	−1.209***	−0.393***	0.412***
	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.466)	(0.040)	(0.047)
R^2	0.078	0.045	0.012	0.250	0.214
Adj. R^2	0.075	0.042	0.009	0.248	0.211
Num. obs.	797	819	832	804	798
RMSE	0.476	0.395	4.541	0.392	0.433

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS models with robust standard errors.



Figure S7: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects (Preferences).
Note. This figure shows the estimated change in the probability respondents support redistributive policies proposed by the right-wing (T1) vs left-wing (T0) by ideology. Respondents are classified in two ideological groups: left- and center-wing respondents are included in group L, and right-wing respondents in group R. OLS models with robust standard errors and without covariate adjustment. Confidence intervals: 95%.



Figure S8: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects (Expectations).
Note. This figure shows the estimated change in the probability respondents expect efficiency/instability under the right-wing (T1) vs left-wing (T0) by ideology. Respondents are classified in two ideological groups: left- and center-wing respondents are included in group L, and right-wing respondents in group R. OLS models with robust standard errors and without covariate adjustment. Confidence intervals: 95%.



Figure S9: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects (Preferences).
Note. This figure shows the estimated change in the probability respondents support redistributive policies proposed by the right-wing (T1) vs left-wing (T0) by ideology. Respondents are classified in three ideological groups: left-, center-, and right-wing. OLS models with robust standard errors and without covariate adjustment. Confidence intervals: 95%.



Figure S10: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects (Expectations).
Note. This figure shows the estimated change in the probability respondents expect efficiency/instability under the right-wing (T1) vs left-wing (T0) by ideology. Respondents are classified in three ideological groups: left-, center-, and right-wing. OLS models with robust standard errors and without covariate adjustment. Confidence intervals: 95%.

S6 Subgroup Analysis

In this section, we replicate our main analyses, focusing on the subgroup of respondents likely to be the most affluent in our sample.[5] Although we did not measure income, we collected data on the level of education. We assume that

[5]The analyses reported in this section were not pre-registered.

education is a good proxy for socioeconomic status, and that respondents with post-graduate education are more affluent than those without it.

Figures S11 and S12 show that the direction of the effects holds for this subgroup. However, given the reduced sample size, the effects are less precisely estimated. Tables S15 and S16 show consistent results in terms of expectations.



Figure S11: Preferences for Redistribution in Wealthy Colombians (Subgroup) - Study 1.
Note. This figure shows the estimated change in the probability respondents with post-graduate education support redistributive policies proposed by the right-wing (T1) vs left-wing (T0). OLS models with robust standard errors. Confidence intervals: 95%.



Figure S12: Preferences for Redistribution in Wealthy Colombians (Subgroup) - Study 2.
Note. This figure shows the estimated change in the probability respondents with post-graduate education support redistributive policies proposed by the right-wing (T1) vs left-wing (T0). OLS models include with robust standard errors. Confidence intervals: 95%.

Table S15: Testing Theoretical Explanations in Subgroup - Study 1

	Uncertainty		Efficiency		Instability	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Base category						
(T0 = Leftwing Candidate)	-1.313^{**}	1.257	0.196^{***}	-0.093	0.539^{***}	-0.752^{**}
	(0.552)	(4.647)	(0.038)	(0.415)	(0.050)	(0.337)
T1 = Rightwing Candidate	0.023	-0.259	0.187^{***}	0.186^{**}	-0.321^{***}	-0.399^{***}
	(0.733)	(0.972)	(0.060)	(0.086)	(0.063)	(0.073)
Covariate Adjustment	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Num. obs.	212	132	219	138	221	140
RMSE	5.386	5.353	0.445	0.456	0.457	0.406

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS models with robust standard errors.

Table S16: Testing Theoretical Explanations in Subgroup - Study 2

	Uncertainty		Efficiency		Instability	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Base category						
(T0 = Leftwing Candidate)	−0.260	5.290*	0.180***	0.242	0.600***	0.454
	(0.458)	(2.808)	(0.035)	(0.355)	(0.047)	(0.289)
T1 = Rightwing Candidate	−0.819	−1.729**	0.227***	0.224***	−0.397***	−0.484***
	(0.586)	(0.744)	(0.056)	(0.080)	(0.058)	(0.075)
Covariate Adjustment	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Num. obs.	258	133	252	132	248	131
RMSE	4.722	4.242	0.445	0.447	0.445	0.425

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. OLS models with robust standard errors.

S7 Non-redistributive Policies

In this section, we report results of the effect of who is in power on two policies where material implications might be less salient to the wealthy: increasing the police force in urban places and implementing visas for Venezuelans. As in the main analyses, we randomized the candidate (left- or right-wing) proposing the policy: the control group read the policy as advance by the left-wing candidate, and the treatment group read the same policy, but proposed by the right-wing candidate.

First, we measure the level of support for increasing police force in urban areas. Criminal activity in Latin America signals the state's failure to provide public security and reduces the demand for such services (Altamirano, Berens and Ley, 2020). Consistently, instead of relying on public security, the wealthy tend to invest in private security services (Phillips, 2017). We therefore expect the wealthy's support for public security to be low, regardless of the ideological position of the government proposing the policy. Importantly, one could argue that security policies vary by government ideology. The right-wing might pursue 'iron fist policies', and the left-wing might prefer social investments as a preemptive approach. However, we remind the reader that respondents read the same specific security policy: increasing police force in cities.

Second, we measure the level of support for a restrictive migration policy: implementing visas for Venezuelans. For this policy, we expect null treatment effects for several reasons. Despite the large number of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, migration remains a low-salience issue for Colombians.[6] Existing evidence suggests that the low salience of immigration negatively correlates with support for it (Kustov, 2023). This association holds across countries, regardless of the ideological position of their governments. Therefore, given the likely low-salience of immigration among our respondents[7], we expect them to oppose the visa policy, regardless of the ideological position of the candidate presenting the policy. An additional reason to expect null effects is that the material implications of the visa policy for the wealthy are less clear, making the preferences unlikely to operate under our theorized expectations (uncertainty, efficiency, and instability).

Contrasting our expectations, Figure S13 shows that who is in power also affects policies with less salient redistributive implications. The probability that the wealthy support these policies increases when it is the right-wing rather than the left-wing who implements them. Figure S14 shows significant heterogeneous effects as well.

These unexpected results indicate that the wealthy are sensitive to the ideological position of the government when it comes to supporting policies with or without redistributive implications. Future research should explore whether government ideology affects the wealthy's preferences across policy domains. Likewise, more work is needed to understand why the government ideology affects perceptions of state failure in providing security and support for anti-migration policies, even in contexts where migration is a low-salience issue.

[6]LAPOP 2021 shows that less than 2% of the Colombian public ranks immigration as the most important issue in the country.

[7]In our survey, we did not measure the salience of immigration. However, we can use our question on the intention to migrate as a proxy. We assume that issue salience is likely low among those who do not plan to migrate. Reassuringly, 70% of respondents did not plan to migrate in the next three years.



Figure S13: Non-Redistributive Policies.
Note. This figure shows the estimated change in the probability respondents support non-redistributive policies proposed by the right-wing (T1) vs left-wing (T0). OLS models with robust standard errors. Confidence intervals: 95%.



Figure S14: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects (Preferences).
Note. This figure shows the estimated change in the probability respondents support non-redistributive policies proposed by the right-wing (T1) vs left-wing (T0) by ideology OLS models with robust standard errors. Confidence intervals: 95%.

S8 Regression Results - Observational Data

In this section, we report complete regression tables of the analyses conducted to rule out the left-wing candidate's figure as an alternative explanation of our findings.

Table S17: Regression Results - Left-Wing Candidate

	Fear of Petro	Fear of Petro	Fear of Duque
(Intercept)	0.146*	0.219**	0.226**
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.083)
Petro Left	0.104***		
	(0.021)		
Petro Right		−0.097***	
		(0.030)	
Duque Left			0.158***
			(0.036)
Low income	0.007	0.007	0.065*
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.035)
Stable income	−0.026	−0.030	−0.034
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.024)
Pop. size	0.007	0.001	0.007
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)
Urban	−0.026	−0.022	−0.024
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.033)
Big city	0.023	0.030	−0.002
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Female	−0.009	−0.010	−0.053**
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.020)
Age	0.002*	0.002*	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	−0.011**	−0.010**	−0.007**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Catholic	0.026	0.025	−0.073*
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.036)
Religiosity	0.017	0.017	−0.050*
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Employed	−0.006	−0.009	0.018
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.030)
Married	0.059**	0.065**	−0.041
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.041)
Race	−0.008	−0.009	0.010
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Num. kids	0.022**	0.023**	−0.001
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Sec. perception	0.029	0.032	−0.017
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Victim del.	0.011	0.013	0.012
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)
Media consumption	0.025	0.026	0.012
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Media exposure	0.025**	0.025**	0.034**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Trust Cong.	0.082*	0.075*	−0.005
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Ideology	−0.034	−0.032	0.042
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Interest in pol.	0.001	0.006	0.018
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.021)
Machismo	0.020	0.016	0.001
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)

	Fear of Petro	Fear of Petro	Fear of Duque
R^2	0.085	0.079	0.065
Adj. R^2	0.069	0.063	0.048
Num. obs.	1320	1320	1334
RMSE	0.410	0.412	0.395
N Clusters	47	47	47

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.

S9 Cross-country Regressions

Here, we report regression results for the cross-country analysis. Countries in our sample: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay.

Table S18: Regression Results - Cross-country Analyses

	Model 1	Model 2
Decile 2	0.015	0.018
	(0.023)	(0.022)
Decile 3	0.012	0.013
	(0.028)	(0.028)
Decile 4	−0.000	0.002
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Decile 5	0.011	0.015
	(0.026)	(0.026)
Decile 6	−0.001	0.003
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Decile 7	0.005	0.006
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Decile 8	0.021	0.023
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Decile 9	−0.000	0.003
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Decile 10	−0.068***	−0.066**
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Pop. size	0.003	0.009
	(0.009)	(0.011)
Urban	0.004	−0.012
	(0.010)	(0.011)
Big city	−0.002	−0.006
	(0.011)	(0.012)
Female	−0.019**	−0.018**
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	−0.003***	−0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Catholic	−0.004	−0.006
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Sec. perception	0.021**	0.029***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Religiosity	0.018**	0.027***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Employed	0.007	0.009

	Model 1	Model 2
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Married	0.001	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Race	0.009***	0.005*
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Media consumption	0.014*	0.008
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Victim del.	0.008	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Stable income	−0.010	−0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Trust Cong.	0.012	0.011
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Trust parties	0.056***	0.057***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Trust president	0.018	0.005
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Gov. assistance	0.004	−0.025***
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Stable cnt econ	−0.026***	−0.021**
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Stable ind econ	−0.008	−0.011
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Voted	0.012	−0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Decile 2 X Right	−0.013	−0.015
	(0.031)	(0.031)
Decile 3 X Right	−0.018	−0.017
	(0.034)	(0.035)
Decile 4 X Right	0.005	0.006
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Decile 5 X Right	0.019	0.019
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Decile 6 X Right	0.029	0.029
	(0.033)	(0.033)
Decile 7 X Right	0.015	0.017
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Decile 8 X Right	−0.010	−0.006
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Decile 9 X Right	0.048	0.049
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Decile 10 X Right	0.084**	0.089***
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Country FE	Yes	No
R^2	0.032	0.013
Adj. R^2	0.028	0.010
Num. obs.	16415	16415
RMSE	0.454	0.458
N Clusters	963	963

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.

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