

These are the Appendices to the paper “Electoral Participation and Satisfaction with Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe”

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Appendix A: The context of the 2023 Czech Presidential Election


The constitutional role of the Czech president is largely representative, however, the introduction of direct election in 2013, and the general prominence of the office give the presidency a high level of prestige, visibility, and popular legitimacy. The 2023 presidential election to replace the outgoing incumbent Miloš Zeman (who served two terms and thus could not run again), took place about a year and a half after the 2021 legislative election. These legislative elections saw the victory of established center-right political parties over the incumbent populist movement ANO of Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, an ally of Zeman. The legislative election was consequently framed and understood as a contest between the ‘liberal democratic’ center-right and the ‘populist’ ANO.

The 2023 presidential election was in many ways seen as a second act of the contest between liberal democracy and populism in the country. According to pre-election polls, the main favorite before the first round was the former Prime Minister and leader of the populist opposition party ANO, Andrej Babiš. He was trailed by two independents. First, Petr Pavel, a retired army general and chairman of the NATO Military Committee, endorsed by the center-right governing alliance. Second, university professor and only female candidate, Danuše Nerudová,

avored mostly by younger, educated, and urban electorate. The electoral campaign saw a deepening divide between Babiš, who incarnated the populist, authoritarian, and eastward looking approach of the incumbent Zeman, on the one hand, and Pavel and Nerudová, representing pro-western, liberal democratic positions on the other. Perceived by observers as a choice between democratic liberalism and authoritarian leaning populism, the election campaign received extensive media coverage, and resulted in the highest voter turnout rates (68.2% in round 1 and 70.2% in round 2) in 25 years. Strong performance in presidential debates, where Nerudová underperformed and which Babiš eschewed before the first round, helped Pavel narrowly win the first round (35.4% vs. 34.99%) and clearly defeat Babiš in the second.

Appendix B: Levels of SWD in Eastern and Western Europe

Figure A1: Satisfaction with Democracy in ESS rounds



Note: Thick lines indicate average SWD by region (with countries weighted equally). Thin lines indicate average SWD in a particular country. The figure demonstrates a persistent gap in satisfaction with democracy between CEE and Western Europe between 2002 and 2020. The included countries from CEE are Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine and Kosovo. From Western Europe, the figure includes Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Greece, Cyprus.

Appendix C: Design of panel surveys and covered elections

Table A1: Elections overview

Country	Election Year	Type of Election	Date Election	Turnout (%)	Date 2nd Round	Turnout (%)
Czechia	1996	parliamentary	31/5/96-1/6/96	76.4		
Romania	2012	parliamentary	9/12/12	41.8		
East Germany	2017	parliamentary	24/9/17	73.9		
Romania	2009	presidential	22/11/09	54.4	6/12/09	58.0
Czechia	2023	presidential	13/1/23-14/1/23	68.2	27/1/23-28/1/23	70.2
Poland	2019	EP	26/5/19	45.7		
Hungary	2019	EP	26/5/19	43.6		

Table A2: Design of panel surveys

Country	Election Year	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5	Design
Czechia	1996	1/4/96-11/4/96	9/6/96-19/6/96				two-wave pre-post
Romania	2012	30/10/12-10/11/12	29/11/12-8/12/12	10/1/13-20/1/13			two-wave pre, one-wave post
East Germany	2017	17/8/17-28/8/17	27/9/17-9/10/17				two-wave pre-post
Romania	2009	1/11/09-21/11/09	7/12/09-30/12/09				two-wave pre-post
Czechia	2023	25/11/22-6/12/22	9/1/23-13/1/23	16/1/23-22/1/23	30/1/23-6/2/23	19/6/23-3/7/23	five-wave panel: two waves pre, one wave post 1st round, one wave post 2nd round, one wave later
Poland	2019	2/4/19-18/4/19	27/5/19-25/6/19				two-wave pre-post
Hungary	2019	3/4/19-21/4/19	27/5/19-26/6/19				two-wave pre-post

Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics

Table A3: Descriptive Statistics:
Czech Presidential Election of 2023 (Study 1)

Variable	mean	SD	min	Q1	median	Q3	max	N
Voted (1st round)	0.68	0.47	0	0.00	1.00	1.00	1	1326
Voted (2nd round)	0.70	0.46	0	0.00	1.00	1.00	1	1326
Stable winner	0.25	0.43	0	0.00	0.00	1.00	1	615
Duty to vote	0.34	0.47	0	0.00	0.00	1.00	1	1326
SWD difference	0.05	0.24	-1	0.00	0.00	0.20	1	1326
Pre-election SWD	0.41	0.28	0	0.20	0.50	0.60	1	1326
Post-election SWD	0.47	0.26	0	0.30	0.50	0.70	1	1326
Female	0.50	0.50	0	0.00	0.00	1.00	1	1326
Age	0.52	0.23	0	0.36	0.52	0.69	1	1326
Post-secondary education	0.24	0.43	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	1	1326
Political interest	0.52	0.30	0	0.33	0.67	0.67	1	1326
Political knowledge	0.45	0.28	0	0.17	0.50	0.67	1	1326
Close to a party	0.60	0.49	0	0.00	1.00	1.00	1	1326
Voter type (3 cat.)								
<i>Abstainer</i>								143
<i>Winner</i>								597
<i>Loser</i>								586
Voter type (5 cat.)								
<i>Abstainer</i>								81
<i>Full winner</i>								301
<i>Sub-optimal winner</i>								296
<i>Partial loser</i>								194
<i>Full loser</i>								454

Table A4: Descriptive Statistics:
Pooled Dataset (Study 2)

Variable	mean	SD	min	Q1	median	Q3	max	N
Voted	0.56	0.50	0	0.00	1.00	1.00	1	8126
SWD difference	0.02	0.21	-1	0.00	0.00	0.10	1	8126
Pre-election SWD	0.39	0.26	0	0.25	0.33	0.50	1	8126
Post-election SWD	0.41	0.26	0	0.25	0.50	0.60	1	8126
Female	0.53	0.50	0	0.00	1.00	1.00	1	8126
Age	0.39	0.22	0	0.21	0.43	0.58	1	8126
Post-secondary education	0.27	0.44	0	0.00	0.00	1.00	1	8126
Political interest	0.50	0.30	0	0.33	0.67	0.67	1	8126
Close to a party	0.56	0.50	0	0.00	1.00	1.00	1	8126
Voter type								
<i>Winner</i>								2112
<i>Loser</i>								4251
<i>Abstainer</i>								1332

Appendix E: Pre-registered Hypothesis 5

In the preregistration, we included an additional Hypothesis 5, which we relegated to the Appendix in the manuscript based on the suggestions by the editors and reviewers. Its justification was as follows: “The effect of winning may also depend on the sincerity of one’s vote choice. The existing literature finds that the election-related boost in satisfaction tends to be moderated by ideological proximity and identification with the given party or candidate (Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2012; Singh 2014). We thus postulate that the positive effect of voting for a winning candidate is stronger for respondents who supported the given candidate at the start of the election campaign than for those who move to support the candidate later on, a shift often motivated by strategic considerations.”

Hypothesis 5 *The effect of winning is stronger for respondents with stable preferences.*

The empirical results presented in Table A5 do not support the hypothesis. There is no difference in satisfaction change between winners who supported the winning candidate from the first wave of the panel (several months before the election) and those who joined the winning camp only later on.

Table A5: Test of Hypothesis 5

	(1)
Stable winner	0.01 (0.01)
Pre-election SWD	-0.40*** (0.04)
Female	-0.01 (0.02)
Age	-0.02 (0.03)
Post-secondary education	-0.01 (0.01)
Pol. interest	0.05 (0.03)
Pol. knowledge	0.05 (0.03)
Feels close to a party	0.04* (0.02)
Duty to vote	0.00 (0.02)
Intercept	0.20*** (0.04)
N	597
R2 Adj.	0.25

Note: OLS coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Appendix F: Robustness Checks: Study 1

Table A6: Replication of Table 3: Satisfaction from Wave 2

	Round 1				Round 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pre-election satisfaction (Wave 2)	0.62*	0.97***		0.41	0.63*	1.14***		0.37
	(0.28)	(0.25)		(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.25)		(0.32)
Post-election satisfaction (Wave 4)	1.06***		1.30***	1.03**	1.27***		1.65***	1.41***
	(0.30)		(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.31)		(0.28)	(0.35)
Female		0.95***	0.91***	0.93***		0.36*	0.32*	0.33*
		(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Age		-0.45	-0.33	-0.33		-0.04	0.13	0.13
		(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)		(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Post-secondary education		0.39*	0.40*	0.38*		-0.14	-0.14	-0.15
		(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)		(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Duty to vote		1.12***	1.14***	1.14***		1.06***	1.10***	1.09***
		(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)		(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Interest in politics		1.91***	1.94***	1.94***		1.59***	1.64***	1.64***
		(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)		(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Political knowledge		1.39***	1.28***	1.28***		1.54***	1.40***	1.40***
		(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)		(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Feels close to a party		0.96***	0.96***	0.96***		0.74***	0.73***	0.73***
		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
(Intercept)	0.02	-2.35***	-2.54***	-2.59***	0.02	-1.87***	-2.17***	-2.21***
	(0.12)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.12)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)
N	1326	1326	1326	1326	1326	1326	1326	1326
Pseudo-R2	0.03	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.06	0.21	0.22	0.22

Note: Logit coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The table shows that when we use satisfaction from Wave 2 (instead of satisfaction from Wave 1), the results are substantively the same as in the main section.

Table A7: Replication of Table 4: Satisfaction from Waves 2 and 3 & 3 and 4

	Round 1				Round 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pre-election satisfaction (Wave 2, before Round 1)	1.00*** (0.28)	0.97*** (0.25)		0.67* (0.31)				
Post-election satisfaction (Wave 3, after Round 1)	0.44 (0.29)		1.03*** (0.28)	0.86* (0.35)				
Pre-election satisfaction (Wave 3, before Round 2)					0.18 (0.34)	1.29*** (0.28)		0.28 (0.39)
Post-election satisfaction (Wave 4, after Round 2)					1.57*** (0.34)		1.65*** (0.28)	1.46*** (0.40)
Female		0.95*** (0.16)	0.94*** (0.16)	0.37* (0.15)		0.36* (0.15)	0.32* (0.15)	0.33* (0.15)
Age		-0.45 (0.32)	-0.42 (0.32)	0.01 (0.32)		0.00 (0.32)	0.13 (0.32)	0.13 (0.32)
Post-secondary education		0.39* (0.18)	0.40* (0.18)	-0.15 (0.18)		-0.13 (0.18)	-0.14 (0.18)	-0.14 (0.18)
Duty to vote		1.12*** (0.16)	1.14*** (0.16)	1.09*** (0.16)		1.10*** (0.16)	1.10*** (0.16)	1.10*** (0.16)
Interest in politics		1.91*** (0.30)	1.97*** (0.30)	1.66*** (0.29)		1.69*** (0.29)	1.64*** (0.29)	1.66*** (0.30)
Political knowledge		1.39*** (0.30)	1.33*** (0.30)	1.46*** (0.30)		1.46*** (0.30)	1.40*** (0.30)	1.39*** (0.31)
Feels close to a party		0.96*** (0.15)	0.96*** (0.15)	0.73*** (0.15)		0.73*** (0.15)	0.73*** (0.15)	0.73*** (0.15)
N.	1326	1326	1326	1326	1326	1326	1326	1326
Pseudo-R2	0.02	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.03	0.19	0.20	0.20

Note: Logit coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The table demonstrates that when we use satisfaction from Waves 2 and 3 or 3 and 4 (instead of satisfaction from Waves 1 and 4), the results are substantively the same as in the main section.

Table A8: Replication of Table 3: Additional Controls

	Round 1				Round 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pre-election satisfaction (Wave 1)	0.68 (0.51)	1.03* (0.42)		0.53 (0.50)	0.49 (0.51)	1.11** (0.41)		0.36 (0.51)
Post-election satisfaction (Wave 4)	1.03* (0.50)		1.31** (0.44)	0.99 (0.54)	1.38** (0.50)		1.71*** (0.44)	1.49** (0.56)
Female		1.05*** (0.23)	1.04*** (0.23)	1.05*** (0.23)		0.40 (0.22)	0.39 (0.22)	0.39 (0.22)
Age		-0.59 (0.56)	-0.46 (0.56)	-0.46 (0.57)		-0.01 (0.54)	0.18 (0.54)	0.19 (0.55)
Post-secondary education		0.31 (0.29)	0.31 (0.29)	0.30 (0.29)		-0.20 (0.26)	-0.22 (0.26)	-0.23 (0.26)
Duty to vote		1.27*** (0.26)	1.25*** (0.26)	1.27*** (0.27)		1.15*** (0.25)	1.15*** (0.26)	1.16*** (0.25)
Interest in politics		1.95*** (0.45)	1.98*** (0.45)	1.98*** (0.45)		1.61*** (0.44)	1.65*** (0.45)	1.65*** (0.44)
Political knowledge		1.53*** (0.41)	1.43*** (0.41)	1.43*** (0.42)		1.63*** (0.40)	1.51*** (0.40)	1.51*** (0.40)
Feels close to a party		0.97*** (0.23)	0.98*** (0.23)	0.97*** (0.23)		0.73** (0.24)	0.75** (0.24)	0.74** (0.24)
Economic precariousness		-0.08 (0.28)	-0.08 (0.28)	-0.04 (0.28)		0.10 (0.27)	0.13 (0.27)	0.16 (0.27)
Class: Unemployed		-1.88*** (0.54)	-1.90*** (0.52)	-1.89*** (0.53)		-1.49* (0.61)	-1.54** (0.57)	-1.52** (0.58)
Class: Econ. inactive		0.24 (0.80)	0.29 (0.82)	0.28 (0.81)		0.41 (0.79)	0.49 (0.81)	0.48 (0.80)
Class: Pensioner		-0.16 (0.32)	-0.16 (0.32)	-0.18 (0.32)		-0.19 (0.31)	-0.20 (0.31)	-0.21 (0.31)
Class: Manager/Businessperson		-0.47 (0.32)	-0.51 (0.32)	-0.50 (0.32)		-0.09 (0.33)	-0.13 (0.33)	-0.13 (0.33)
Class: Freelancer		-0.21 (0.44)	-0.18 (0.43)	-0.21 (0.43)		-0.26 (0.42)	-0.25 (0.42)	-0.26 (0.43)
(Intercept)	0.02 (0.17)	-2.16*** (0.45)	-2.37*** (0.48)	-2.46*** (0.49)	0.05 (0.17)	-1.87*** (0.45)	-2.26*** (0.47)	-2.32*** (0.47)
Pseudo-R2	0.03	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.04	0.20	0.21	0.21
N	1324	1324	1324	1324	1324	1324	1324	1324

Note: Logit coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The table demonstrates that when we include additional controls (social class and economic precariousness), the results are substantively the same as in the main section.

Table A9: Replication of Table 4: Additional Controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voted (R1)	0.00 (0.03)		
Voted (R2)	0.05* (0.03)		
Winner		0.12*** (0.02)	
Loser		0.00 (0.02)	
Full winner (A)			0.12*** (0.03)
Sub-optimal winner (B)			0.10*** (0.03)
Partial loser (C)			-0.02 (0.03)
Full loser (D)			0.00 (0.03)
Pre-election SWD	-0.47*** (0.03)	-0.52*** (0.03)	-0.52*** (0.03)
Female	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Age	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.10** (0.04)
Post-secondary education	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Pol. interest	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Pol. knowledge	0.09** (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Feels close to a party	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Duty to vote	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Economic precariousness	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Class: Unemployed	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)
Class: Econ. inactive	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Class: Pensioner	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Class: Manager/Businessperson	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Class: Freelancer	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Intercept	0.28*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.04)
N	1324	1324	1324
R2 Adj.	0.29	0.32	0.32

Note: OLS coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The table demonstrates that when we include additional controls (social class and economic precariousness), the results are substantively the same as in the main section.

Table A10: Replication of Table 4: Interaction between party closeness and voter subgroup

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voted (R1)	0.00 (0.03)		
Voted (R2)	0.05* (0.03)		
Winner		0.06* (0.03)	
Loser		0.00 (0.04)	
Winner $\times$ Feels close to a party		0.11** (0.04)	
Loser $\times$ Feels close to a party		0.03 (0.04)	
Full winner (A)			0.08* (0.03)
Sub-optimal winner (B)			0.04 (0.03)
Partial loser (C)			0.00 (0.05)
Full loser (D)			-0.02 (0.03)
Full winner (A) $\times$ Feels close to a party			0.09 (0.05)
Sub-optimal winner (B) $\times$ Feels close to a party			0.11* (0.05)
Partial loser (C) $\times$ Feels close to a party			-0.01 (0.06)
Full loser (D) $\times$ Feels close to a party			0.04 (0.05)
Pre-election SWD	-0.46*** (0.03)	-0.52*** (0.03)	-0.52*** (0.03)
Female	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Age	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)
Post-secondary education	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Pol. interest	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Pol. knowledge	0.09*** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
Feels close to a party	0.00 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Duty to vote	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Intercept	0.25*** (0.04)	0.27*** (0.04)	0.27*** (0.04)
N	1326	1326	1326
R2 Adj.	0.28	0.33	0.33

Note: OLS coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The table demonstrates including the interaction between party closeness and voter subgroup, the results are substantively the same as in the main section.

Table A11: Replication of Table 4: Dependent variable: difference between SWD in Wave 2 and Wave 4

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voted (R1)	0.01 (0.03)		
Voted (R2)	0.04 (0.03)		
Winner		0.11*** (0.02)	
Loser		0.00 (0.02)	
Full winner (A)			0.12*** (0.03)
Sub-optimal winner (B)			0.10*** (0.03)
Partial loser (C)			-0.01 (0.03)
Full loser (D)			-0.01 (0.02)
Pre-election SWD (Wave 2)	-0.43*** (0.04)	-0.47*** (0.04)	-0.47*** (0.04)
Female	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Age	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)
Post-secondary education	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Pol. interest	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Pol. knowledge	0.09*** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
Feels close to a party	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Duty to vote	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Intercept	0.21*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.04)
N	1326	1326	1326
R2 Adj.	0.26	0.30	0.30

Note: OLS coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A12: Additional Analyses: Within-Individual Change in Satisfaction


	Round 1			Round 2		
	Turnout (1)	Turnout change (2)	Turnout change (3)	Turnout (4)	Turnout change (5)	Turnout change (6)
SWD change (W2 - W1)	-0.13 (0.40)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.04 (0.24)	0.03 (0.41)	0.00 (0.08)	0.05 (0.29)
Female	0.89*** (0.22)	0.10* (0.04)	0.20 (0.13)	0.30 (0.21)	0.00 (0.04)	0.07 (0.16)
Age	-0.56 (0.45)	-0.17* (0.08)	-0.50 (0.32)	-0.17 (0.43)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.61 (0.32)
Post-secondary education	0.45 (0.29)	0.09** (0.03)	0.38 (0.23)	-0.05 (0.26)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.23)
Duty to vote	1.11*** (0.25)	0.10** (0.03)	0.24 (0.18)	1.05*** (0.24)	0.09** (0.03)	0.30 (0.19)
Interest in politics	1.88*** (0.45)	0.05 (0.08)	0.17 (0.22)	1.57*** (0.45)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.27)
Political knowledge	1.49*** (0.41)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.38 (0.33)	1.65*** (0.41)	0.07 (0.07)	0.26 (0.34)
Feels close to a party	0.98*** (0.23)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.14)	0.76*** (0.23)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.16)
Intercept	-1.89*** (0.34)	-0.20** (0.07)	-0.50* (0.20)	-1.36*** (0.34)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.17 (0.23)
N	1326	1326	122	1326	1326	122
Pseudo-R2	0.20			0.18		
Adj. R2		0.04	0.02		0.01	0.01

Note: Logit (models 1 and 4) / OLS coefficients (models 2-3, 5-6). Significance levels:

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The table displays the effect of within-individual change in satisfaction (Wave 1 subtracted from Wave 2) on turnout (Models 1 and 4) and change between intention to vote and actual behaviour (Models 2, 3, 5, 6). Models 2 and 3 include all individuals, Models 5 and 6 focus on those who declared an intention to vote in Wave 1, but abstained later or the other way around. None of these models suggests any link between (dis)satisfaction and participation.

Figure A2: Satisfaction with Democracy by Respondent Subgroup and Wave, Abstainers only



Note: 95% confidence intervals. Predicted values based on a linear regression of satisfaction with democracy on the respondent subgroup, wave dummies, and their interactions. Model estimated on abstainers only.

Appendix G: Additional Robustness Checks: Models without controls

Table A13: Analysis of Change in Satisfaction with Democracy: Czech Presidential Election of 2023

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voted (R1)	0.01 (0.03)		
Voted (R2)	0.05 (0.03)		
Winner		0.13*** (0.02)	
Loser		0.00 (0.02)	
Full winner (A)			0.14*** (0.02)
Sub-optimal winner (B)			0.12*** (0.02)
Partial loser (C)			-0.02 (0.03)
Full loser (D)			0.00 (0.02)
Pre-election SWD	-0.44*** (0.03)	-0.50*** (0.03)	-0.50*** (0.03)
Intercept	0.19*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.03)
N	1326	1326	1326
R2 Adj.	0.26	0.31	0.31

Note: OLS coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A14: Analysis of Change in Satisfaction with Democracy: Pooled Dataset

	(1)	(2)
Voted	0.02*** (0.01)	
Winner		0.09*** (0.01)
Loser		-0.01 (0.01)
Pre-election SWD	-0.37*** (0.01)	-0.40*** (0.01)
Intercept	0.20*** (0.01)	0.21*** (0.01)
Country FE	Yes	Yes
N	8126	7695
Adj. R2	0.20	0.22

Note: OLS coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Appendix H: Robustness Checks: Study 2

Figure A3: Replication of Figure 4 by Election




Table A15: Replication of Table 5: Robustness Check with Political Knowledge

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pre-election satisfaction	0.27 (0.21)	0.57*** (0.16)		0.20 (0.23)
Post-election satisfaction	0.57** (0.21)		0.70*** (0.16)	0.58* (0.23)
Female		0.16 (0.09)	0.17 (0.09)	0.17 (0.09)
Age		1.56*** (0.23)	1.55*** (0.23)	1.57*** (0.23)
Post-secondary education		0.41*** (0.10)	0.42*** (0.10)	0.42*** (0.10)
Interest in politics		1.67*** (0.19)	1.67*** (0.19)	1.66*** (0.19)
Political knowledge		1.47*** (0.18)	1.49*** (0.19)	1.49*** (0.18)
Feels close to a party		0.86*** (0.10)	0.86*** (0.10)	0.85*** (0.10)
Intercept	0.76*** (0.16)	-1.77*** (0.22)	-1.86*** (0.22)	-1.89*** (0.23)
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	5789	5789	5789	5789
Pseudo-R2	0.04	0.18	0.18	0.18

Note: Logit coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The table demonstrates that when we include an additional control (political knowledge), which drops the Romanian legislative election of 2012 due to missing data, the results remain substantively the same as in the main section.

Table A16: Replication of Table 6: Robustness Check with Political Knowledge

	(1)	(2)
Voted	0.02** (0.01)	
Winner		0.12*** (0.01)
Loser		-0.01 (0.01)
Pre-election SWD	-0.36*** (0.01)	-0.41*** (0.02)
Female	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Age	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Post-secondary education	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Pol. interest	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Pol. knowledge	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Feels close to a party	0.02 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Intercept	0.20*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)
Country FE	Yes	Yes
N	5576	5576
Adj. R2	0.18	0.21

Note: OLS coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The table demonstrates that when we include an additional control (political knowledge), which drops the Romanian legislative election of 2012 due to missing data, the results remain substantively the same as in the main section.

Table A17: Replication of Table 6: Interaction between party closeness and voter subgroup

	(1)	(2)
Voted	0.02** (0.01)	
Pre-election SWD	-0.38*** (0.01)	-0.41*** (0.01)
Female	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Age	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Post-secondary education	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Pol. interest	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Feels close to a party	0.02** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Winner		0.07*** (0.01)
Loser		-0.01 (0.01)
Winner $\times$ Feels close to a party		0.03 (0.01)
Loser $\times$ Feels close to a party		0.00 (0.01)
Intercept	0.20*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.02)
Country FE	Yes	Yes
N	7695	7695
R2 Adj.	0.20	0.22

Note: OLS coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The table demonstrates including the interaction between party closeness and voter subgroup, the results are substantively the same as in the main section.

Appendix I: Panel attrition

Table A18: Panel Attrition in 2023 Czech Election Study

Number of respondents				
Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5
1501	1411	1358	1326	1172

Dependent variable: 1 = panel attrition, 0 = respondent remained in the panel.

Table A19: Panel Attrition in 2023 Czech Election Study

	Attrition in Wave 2	Attrition in Wave 3	Attrition in Wave 4	Attrition in Wave 5
Pre-election SWD (Wave 1)	0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
(Intercept)	-2.99*** (0.22)	-2.28*** (0.16)	-2.07*** (0.15)	-1.35*** (0.12)
Num.Obs.	1501	1501	1501	1501
Pseudo-R2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Logit coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A20: Panel Attrition in all panel studies

	All panels	CZ 1996	CZ 2023	East Germany 2017	Hungary 2019	Poland 2019	Romania 2009	Romania 2012
Pre-election SWD	0.03 (0.08)	-0.77*** (0.22)	0.10 (0.29)	-0.32 (0.37)	0.20 (0.15)	0.00 (0.16)	0.36 (0.38)	0.62* (0.25)
Intercept	0.34*** (0.07)	0.71*** (0.12)	-2.07*** (0.15)	-2.86*** (0.20)	-0.78*** (0.07)	-0.54*** (0.09)	-2.38*** (0.15)	-1.70*** (0.10)
Election FE	Yes							
Num.Obs.	13225	1393	1501	2549	2012	2000	1392	2378
Pseudo-R2	0.15	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Logit coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Appendix J: Comparison of reported behaviour and election results

Table A21: 1996 Czech parliamentary election

Vote choice	Reported behaviour	Results
ODS	33.69	22.6
CSSD	23.76	20.2
KSCM	6.21	7.9
KDU-CSL	5.14	6.2
SPR-RSC	6.03	6.1
ODA	7.62	4.9
DZJ	2.13	2.4
Others	5.50	6.2
Did not vote	9.93	23.6

Table A22: 2023 Czech presidential election

Vote choice	Reported behaviour (Round 1)	Results (Round 1)	Reported behaviour (Round 2)	Results (Round 2)
Petr Pavel	24.06	24.16	45.02	40.97
Andrej Babiš	34.46	23.88	44.19	29.27
Danuše Nerudová	14.86	9.50		
Pavel Fischer	4.52	4.61		
Jaroslav Bašta	6.71	3.04		
Marek Hilšer	3.77	1.75		
Karel Diviš	1.66	0.92		
Tomáš Zima	0.75	0.38		
Did not vote	9.20	31.76	10.78	29.75

Table A23: 2017 German parliamentary election

Vote choice	Reported behaviour	Results
CDU	12.26	19.83
DIE LINKE	15.92	10.08
SPD	9.54	9.25
AfD	14.53	8.58
FDP	6.33	5.70
GRUENE	3.92	4.01
Others	7.36	16.02
Did not vote	29.60	26.52
No answer	0.53	

Note: Results from former East German states only

Table A24: 2019 Hungarian EP election

Vote choice	Reported behaviour	Results
FIDESZ-KNDP	17.50	22.85
Demokratikus Koalíció (DK)	16.74	6.98
Momentum Mozgalom (MM)	10.58	4.32
JOBBIK	4.41	2.76
MSZP-PM	5.48	2.87
Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (MH)	2.44	1.43
Lehet Más a Politika (LMP)	1.29	1.14
Others	2.74	1.13
Did not vote	26.94	56.52
Refuse	11.80	
Don't know	0.08	

Table A25: 2019 Polish EP election

Vote choice	Reported behaviour	Results
PiS/Zjednoczona Prawica	19.59	20.74
PSL-PO-.N-SLD-Zieloni	28.82	17.58
Wiosna	9.80	2.77
Kukiz'15	3.43	1.69
Wolność (KORWIN)-Ruch Narodowy	4.24	2.08
Partia Razem	1.31	0.57
Others	2.61	0.28
Did not vote	25.55	54.30
Refuse	4.33	
Don't know	0.33	

Table A26: 2009 Romanian presidential election

Vote choice	Reported behaviour (Round 1)	Results (Round 1)	Reported behaviour (Round 2)	Results (Round 2)
Traian Basescu	29.14	18.48	40.04	28.82
Mircea Geoana	26.62	17.74	44.34	28.44
Crin Antonescu	16.25	11.40		
Kelemen Hunor	2.10	2.18		
Sorin Oprescu	2.83	1.82		
Corneliu Vadim Tudor	3.04	0.32		
George Becali	0.84	0.11		
Others/Invalid vote	0.94	2.31	0.31	0.75
Did not vote	12.58	45.63	9.85	41.98
No response	5.45		5.14	
Don't know	0.21		0.31	

Table A27: 2012 Romanian parliamentary election

Vote choice	Reported behaviour	Results
Uniunea Social-Liberala (USL: PSD+PNL+PC+UNPR)	49.01	23.58
Alianta România Dreapta (ARD: PDL+PNT-CD+FC)	8.32	6.64
Partidul Poporului - Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD)	5.81	5.62
Uniunea Democrata a Maghiarilor din România (UDMR)	2.90	2.06
Partidul România Mare (PRM)	0.33	0.50
Others/Invalid vote	0.88	3.35
Did not vote	20.81	58.24
No answer/Refuse	11.34	
Don't know	0.60	

Appendix K: Wording of questions and answer categories

Analysis 1. Czech Presidential Election Panel Survey 2023 (CPEPS 2023)

As a general rule, question wording in the CPEPS 2023 follows the CSES project and previous Czech national election studies (CNES). The civic duty question is adapted from Achen-Blais (2019) and political knowledge questions come from a battery of six true-false questions used in the CNES since 2006. Here, we provide translations from Czech to English. We do not provide exact wording for the following variables: gender, age, post-secondary education.

Electoral participation

Q: The first round of Presidential election were held on 13th and 14th January 2023. Did you take part?

Q: The second round of Presidential election were held on 27th and 28th January 2023. Did you take part?

A: no (0) – yes (1) – without voting right (misval)

Satisfaction with democracy

Q: On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the Czech Republic?

A: 11-point scale: very dissatisfied (0) – very satisfied (10).

Rescaled into 0 (very dissatisfied) to 1 (very satisfied).

Interest in Politics

Q: How interested are you in politics?

A: 4-point scale: very interested - somewhat interested - not very interested - not at all interested. Rescaled into 0 (not at all interested) to 1 (very interested).

Duty to vote

Q: Different people feel differently about voting in elections. For some, voting is a civic duty, for others voting is a right. For you personally, is voting in elections duty or right?

A: right (0) – duty (1)

Political knowledge

Two questions with two answer categories and four true-false questions.

Q: Are Czech MPs elected based on PR or majority electoral system?

A: majority (0) – PR (1)

Q: Is the president of European Commission elected by EU citizens?

A: no (0) – yes (1)

Q: The Czech Republic was formally established in 1989. (False)

Q: Currently, the EU has 25 member states. (False)

Q: Members of regional assemblies are elected based in the results for regional elections. (True)

Q: Canada is a permanent member of UN Security Council. (False)

Right or true answers were counted together and rescaled into 0 (no political knowledge) to 1 (high political knowledge).

Close to party

Q: Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?

A: no (0) – yes (1)

Q: Which party do you feel closest to?

A: open question

Naming a party in the second question was required to code a respondent as close to party.

Stable winner

Q: Which candidate do you intend to vote for in the 1 st round of presidential election?

A: list of candidates

Q: Which candidate did you vote for in the 2 nd round of pres-

idential election?

A: Andrej Babiš (0) – Petr Pavel (1)

To code a respondent as stable winner, she had to mention Petr Pavel as preferred candidate in both questions.

Analysis 2. Pooled analysis of 6 panels surveys from CEE

The question wording and answer categories slightly varied across six panel surveys. Here, we provide English translations from original languages. We do not provide exact wording for following variables: electoral participation, gender, age, post-secondary education.

Satisfaction with democracy

CZE 1996, ROM 2009, ROM 2012

Q: On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the Czech Republic?

A: 4-point scale: very satisfied – fairly satisfied – not very satisfied – not at all satisfied. Rescaled into 0 (not at all satisfied) to 1 (very satisfied).

GER 2017

Q: On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the

way democracy works in Germany?

A: 5-point scale: very satisfied – fairly satisfied – neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied – not very satisfied – not at all satisfied. Rescaled into 0 (not at all satisfied) to 1 (very satisfied).

HUN 2019, POL 2019

Q: On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?

A: 11-point scale: very dissatisfied (0) – very satisfied (10). Rescaled into 0 (very dissatisfied) to 1 (very satisfied).

Interest in Politics

CZE 1996, HUN 2019, POL 2019

Q: How interested are you in politics?

A: 4-point scale: very interested – somewhat interested – not very interested – not at all interested. Rescaled into 0 (not at all interested) to 1 (very interested).

ROM 2009, ROM 2012

Q: How interested are you in politics?

A: 4-point scale: not at all interested – not very interested – somewhat interested – very interested. Rescaled into 0 (not at all interested) to 1 (very interested).

GER 2017

Q: Quite generally, how interested are you in politics?

A: 5-point scale: very interested – somewhat interested – in between – not very interested – not at all interested. Rescaled into 0 (not at all interested) to 1 (very interested).

Close to party

CZE 1996

Q: Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?

A: no (0) – yes (1)

Q: Which party do you feel closest to?

A: open question

Naming a party in the second question was required to code a respondent as close to party.

GER 2017

Q: In Germany, many people lean towards a particular party for a long time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. How about you, do you in general lean towards a particular party? If so, which one?

HUN 2019, POL 2019

Q: Some people are close to a specific political party, even if they also vote for another party from time to time. In general, do you feel close to a particular party?

A: no (0) – yes (1)

Q: Which party is that?

A: list of parties

Naming a party in the second question was required to code a respondent as close to party.

ROM 2009, ROM 2019

Q: Would you tell about yourself that you feel close to a certain political formation?

A: no (0) – yes (1)

Q: What is the political formation you feel the nearest?

A: list of parties

Naming a party in the second question was required to code a respondent as close to party.

Appendix L: Anonymized Pre-Registration

Project pre-registered on 17/01 (i.e., before accessing data from Wave 2).

Project Overview

Does democratic dissatisfaction fuel electoral abstentionism in Central and Eastern Europe? So far, this common assumption, frequently echoed in the media and pundits' accounts, has received little empirical scrutiny. In particular, it has not been studied using panel data that would measure satisfaction with democracy both before and after elections. Individual-level evidence, if any, has mostly come from post-election surveys in which association between participation and satisfaction may stem from a causally reversed relationship (i.e., from participation to satisfaction).

Our pre-registered study fills this gap and investigates the relationship between voter turnout and satisfaction in the post-communist context. Drawing on the existing literature, it formulates five hypotheses and tests them using an original four-wave panel dataset collected around the 2023 Czech presidential election.

Literature Review

The average voter turnout in Central and Eastern Europe is significantly lower than in Western Europe (Barnes 2006; Bernhagen and Marsh 2007; Kostelka 2014, 2017), which scholars and pundits often attribute to citizen dissatisfaction with post-communist democracy (Kostadinova 2003; Kostadinova and Power 2007; Karp and Milazzo 2015). Although this explanation looks compelling on face value, it may be more problematic than meets the eye. Its theoretical weakness lies in the fact that democratic dissatisfaction may be as demobilizing as mobilizing (Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker 2009, 474). While some dissatisfied citizens may withdraw from politics and stop participating, others may want to vote in order to sanction under-performing politicians and parties, and/or support anti-system op-

tions. The negative and positive effects of dissatisfaction may thus cancel out. Empirically, previous macro-level studies did not find evidence of association between dissatisfaction and turnout. If anything, high levels of satisfaction correlate with low turnout (Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker 2009; Ezrow and Xezonakis 2016). At the micro-level, Kostadinova (2009) studied corruption perception and discovered that, in line with our theoretical caveat mentioned above, it exerts both positive and negative effects on turnout that cancel out. Using survey data, Karp and Milazzo (2015) did find that democratic satisfaction was negatively associated with turnout in European countries and that this could in part account for the difference in turnout levels between the East and the West. However, their research drew on post-election surveys. Using data from 17 elections in five western democracies, Kostelka and Blais (2018) demonstrated that using post-election satisfaction for explaining turnout may be problematic. In their analyses, elections legitimize the political system in voters' eyes while exerting no effect on abstainers. Consequently, the association between satisfaction and turnout in post-election surveys may thus reflect the effect of elections on satisfaction rather than the effect of satisfaction on participation. Plescia, Daoust, and Blais (2021) replicated the study in the context of European Parliament elections and, again, found that they increase satisfaction with democracy. However, none of these studies covered national elections from Central and Eastern Europe, where the negative effect of democratic satisfaction on participation is often assumed.

Hypotheses

Following the theorizing and findings by Kostelka and Blais (2018), we hypothesize that pre-election satisfaction does not matter for voter turnout, especially when other correlates and drivers of participation are controlled for. Instead, turnout should be strongly associated with post-election satisfaction thanks to the legitimating effect of elections. Election should increase satisfaction among voters, but exert no effect on abstainers. There is abundant evidence that election winners typically tend to be more satisfied than election losers (Banducci and Karp

2003; Blais and G  lineau 2007; Esaiasson 2011; Singh, Karakoc, and Blais 2012; Beaudonnet et al. 2014; Kostelka and Blais 2018; Plescia, Daoust, and Blais 2021). We thus hypothesize that the strongest pre-post-election increases in satisfaction can be observed among respondents who voted for candidates who won or qualified to the second round of elections. The existing literature suggests that the election-related boost in satisfaction tends to be moderated by ideological proximity and identification with the given party or candidate alternative (Curini, Jou, and Memoli 2012; Singh 2014; Meer and Steenvoorden 2018). We thus postulate that the positive effect of voting for a winning candidate is stronger for respondents who strongly supported the given candidate from Wave 1.

Hypothesis 1 *Pre-Election satisfaction does not matter for participation when socio-demographic controls and other attitudinal drivers of participation are controlled for.*

Hypothesis 2 *Voter Turnout is more strongly associated with post-election satisfaction than pre-election satisfaction.*

Hypothesis 3 *Elections increase satisfaction with democracy among voters, but exert no effect on abstainers.*

Hypothesis 4 *The strongest increase is among those, whose preferred candidates qualified for the 2nd round (1st round of voting) or won the second round (2nd round of voting).*

Hypothesis 5 *The effect of winning is stronger for respondents with stable preferences.*

Analysis

To test our hypotheses, we leverage data from a four-wave panel study of a representative sample of the Czech population (N=1200) conducted in the context of

the 2023 Czech presidential election. The data will be collected 2 months before the first round (wave 1), 1 week before the first round (wave 2), between the first and second rounds (wave 3), and one week after the second round (wave 4). In every round, satisfaction with democracy will be measured on a 0-10 scale. We preregister the research design before accessing data from waves 2 to 4.

The test of Hypotheses 1 and 2 follows the research design in Kostelka and Blais 2018. We will regress turnout on pre-election satisfaction, post-election satisfaction, and control variables in four ordinary least square model specifications. The controls will include sociodemographics (gender, age, education, social class, economic precariousness²³) and usual predictors of turnout (feeling that voting is a duty, interest in politics, political knowledge,²⁴ and party proximity).

The dependent variable in Hypotheses 2 to 5 will be measured as change in satisfaction with democracy between waves 2 and 3, 3 and 4, and 2 and 4. The main independent variables will be voter turnout and voting for candidates who qualified or won the second round. The model will include satisfaction from earlier waves to account for ceiling effects.

23. Response to the following question: “How difficult is it for your household to cope with increasing energy bills?”

24. This control will not be included in all models as it is measured only in wave 4 of the panel.

Appendix M: Models with Data Weighted by Election Results

The following analyses demonstrate that, when our Analysis 1 is weighted by the official election results, the results are almost identical.

Table A28: Predicting Turnout with Satisfaction with Democracy (Replication of Table 3; weighted by election results)

	Round 1				Round 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pre-election satisfaction (Wave 1)	0.78 (0.52)	1.31** (0.41)		0.73 (0.51)	0.63 (0.53)	1.34** (0.41)		0.54 (0.53)
Post-election satisfaction (Wave 4)	1.31* (0.52)		1.57*** (0.44)	1.12* (0.54)	1.66** (0.52)		1.90*** (0.43)	1.57** (0.55)
Female		0.89*** (0.23)	0.87*** (0.23)	0.88*** (0.23)		0.41 (0.22)	0.39 (0.22)	0.40 (0.22)
Age		-0.35 (0.47)	-0.19 (0.48)	-0.20 (0.48)		-0.30 (0.45)	-0.09 (0.47)	-0.10 (0.47)
Post-secondary education		0.43 (0.29)	0.45 (0.29)	0.43 (0.29)		-0.11 (0.27)	-0.11 (0.26)	-0.13 (0.27)
Duty to vote		1.18*** (0.26)	1.14*** (0.26)	1.17*** (0.26)		1.10*** (0.25)	1.07*** (0.26)	1.09*** (0.25)
Interest in politics		1.89*** (0.43)	1.91*** (0.44)	1.92*** (0.43)		1.62*** (0.43)	1.65*** (0.44)	1.66*** (0.44)
Political knowledge		1.45*** (0.43)	1.34** (0.43)	1.33** (0.43)		1.73*** (0.42)	1.59*** (0.42)	1.57*** (0.42)
Feels close to a party		0.88*** (0.23)	0.88*** (0.23)	0.87*** (0.23)		0.72** (0.24)	0.73** (0.24)	0.72** (0.24)
Intercept	-0.17 (0.18)	-2.49*** (0.40)	-2.71*** (0.42)	-2.79*** (0.43)	-0.16 (0.18)	-1.93*** (0.39)	-2.30*** (0.42)	-2.36*** (0.42)
N	1326	1326	1326	1326	1326	1326	1326	1326
Pseudo-R2	0.04	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.05	0.19	0.20	0.20

Note: Logit coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A29: Predicting Change in Satisfaction with Democracy (Replication of Table 4; weighted by election results)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Voted (R1)	0.01 (0.03)		
Voted (R2)	0.05* (0.03)		
Winner		0.11*** (0.02)	
Loser		0.00 (0.02)	
Full winner (A)			0.11*** (0.02)
Sub-optimal winner (B)			0.10*** (0.03)
Partial loser (C)			-0.02 (0.03)
Full loser (D)			-0.01 (0.03)
Pre-election SWD	-0.46*** (0.03)	-0.51*** (0.03)	-0.51*** (0.03)
Female	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Age	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)
Post-secondary education	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Pol. interest	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Pol. knowledge	0.10*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)
Feels close to a party	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Duty to vote	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Intercept	0.24*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.04)
N	1326	1326	1326
R2 Adj.	0.283	0.320	0.320

Note: OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A30: Test of Hypothesis 5 (Replication of Table A5; weighted by election results)

	(1)
Stable winner	0.01 (0.02)
Pre-election SWD	-0.45*** (0.04)
Female	-0.01 (0.02)
Age	-0.04 (0.03)
Post-secondary education	-0.01 (0.01)
Pol. interest	0.05 (0.03)
Pol. knowledge	0.09** (0.03)
Feels close to a party	0.04* (0.02)
Duty to vote	0.00 (0.02)
Intercept	0.24*** (0.03)
N	597
R2 Adj.	0.305

Note: OLS coefficients. Significance levels: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Appendix N: Further Discussion of the Limitations of Our Findings

We cannot be certain that the observed shifts in satisfaction are causal in that our analyses are not causally identified. That said, any results that are not based on full real-life randomization should typically come with caveats. We believe that our analysis leveraging panel data strikes the right balance between internal and external validity. The fact that we consistently observe de facto identical shifts in satisfaction in democracy around elections, that these shifts are systematically stronger for winners across seven different panels from CEE, and that similar phenomena have been consistently found in Western democracies constitute strong evidence for the legitimizing effect of elections.

Appendix O: Appendix Bibliography

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