Appendix

Contents

A Regression Discontinuity Design Assumptions

I present the results of a McCrary density test for no sorting across the extremist victory threshold. Specifically, this investigates whether there exists a discontinuity in the number of extremist versus moderate primary victories at the cutpoint, which would suggest a potential violation of the assumption that potential outcomes are continuous at the threshold. Using one percentage point vote share bins, I present the results graphically in the figure above, with observations falling to the left representing primaries with extremist two-candidate vote shares of less than 50% (moderate victory) and those to the right representing primaries with extremist vote shares of more than 50%. As suggested by the heavily overlapping confidence intervals around the nonparametric estimates and lack of jump at the 50% threshold, no evidence of sorting is detected. This is reinforced by the p-value of more than 0.6 associated with the estimated difference between the intercepts of the regression lines above and below the cutoff.

Another important assumption of the regression discontinuity design is that observations immediately on either side of the treatment threshold are balanced with regard to pre-treatment covariates. In this context, places where an extreme candidate was just barely nominated over a moderate candidate should look similar to places where the moderate just barely won over the extremist. To evaluate the plausibility of this assumption, I plot the extreme candidate's vote share against nine key pre-treatment covariates. I present the raw data fit with a loess curve for the sake of maximal transparency and minimal parametric assumptions.

I examine pre-treatment covariates related to district partisanship, extremist primary fundraising, district income, and primary field size. These pose the greatest threat to inference because of their potential relationship with both nominee ideology and general election contributions. Across all covariates, there is little evidence of imbalance immediately on either side of the cutoff. In each case, the 95% confidence intervals of lines fit on either side of the cutoff overlap, and the substantive sizes of the gaps between points where the lines approaches the limit are small.

Figure A1. McCrary Density Test for No Sorting



Note: Figure plots the sample density of moderate nominees to the left of 50% and extreme nominees to the right of 50% on either side of the 50% winning threshold using `rdd` package in `R`. Points represent 1% bins, with the horizontal axis plotting extremist share of top-two primary candidate vote and the vertical axis plotting the density of observations.

Figure A2. Pre-Treatment Covariate Balance



Note: Figures plot relationship between extremist share of top-two primary vote and pre-treatment covariates. Gray dots are raw data points with black loess curves fitted separately on each side of 50% victory threshold, with 95% CI shaded in gray.

B Alternative Specifications: Main Primary-Level Results

B.1 Including Opposite-Side Candidates

Table B1. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on General Election Contributions, Including Opposite-Side Candidates

	Individual Contributions				Corporate PAC Contributions			
	Top 25% Distance		Top 50% Distance		Top 25% Distance		Top 50% Distance	
Extremist Win	0.1261	0.1010	0.0005	0.0360	-1.1872**	-1.0342*	-0.7946***	-0.7382*
	(0.2884)	(0.2966)	(0.1574)	(0.1808)	(0.3655)	(0.4845)	(0.1737)	(0.3109)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	IK	CCT	IK	CCT	IK	CCT	IK	CCT
Observations	513	438	1,556	1,239	620	395	1,906	769

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

B.2 Alternative Dependent Variable: Number of Contributors

Table B2. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on General Election Contributors

	Number of Individual Donors				Number of Corporate PACs			
	Top 25% Distance		Top 50% Distance		Top 25% Distance		Top 50% Distance	
Extremist Win	-0.4619	-0.5129	-0.0721	0.1446	-0.6829*	-0.5259	-0.5377***	-0.4117
	(0.3188)	(0.3439)	(0.3148)	(0.3910)	(0.3095)	(0.4297)	(0.1364)	(0.2618)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	IK	CCT	IK	CCT	IK	CCT	IK	CCT
Observations	475	370	1,185	919	499	299	1,680	682

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

B.3 Including Quadratic Specification of Running Variable

Table B3. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on General Election Contributions, Including Quadratic Specification of Running Variable

	Individual Contributions				Corporate PAC Contributions			
	Top 25% Distance		Top 50% Distance		Top 25% Distance		Top 50% Distance	
Extremist Win	-0.2645	-0.2488	-0.0340	-0.0076	-1.3272*	-1.3522*	-0.6919*	-0.6928
	(0.3754)	(0.3849)	(0.2343)	(0.2435)	(0.5878)	(0.6862)	(0.3368)	(0.3583)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	IK	CCT	IK	CCT	IK	CCT	IK	CCT
Observations	505	413	1,233	1,127	501	409	1,229	1,122

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

B.4 Estimates Across Candidate Distance Cutoffs

Figure B1. RDD Estimates of Nominating an Extremist on General Election Contributions Across 5% Candidate Distance Percentiles



Note: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from Poisson QMLE regressions using sample primaries where distance between candidates is greater than each percentile of distance between candidates. Results reported from samples ranging from 5th percentile of distance between candidates to 95th percentile of distance between candidates by 5%. Bandwidth fixed at .19 in all regressions.

B.5 Estimates Across Bandwidths

Figure B2. RDD Estimates of Nominating an Extremist on General Election Contributions Across Bandwidths



Note: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from Poisson QMLE regressions with bandwidth of running variable ranging from 0.03 to 0.5 by .01 on samples of primaries in top 25% and top 50% of distance between candidates.

C Alternative Samples: Main Primary-Contributor-Level Results

C.1 Including Opposite-Side Candidates

The main specification excludes Democratic primaries with a top-two candidate with a "conservative" CF Score and Republican primaries with a top-two candidate with a "liberal" CF Score. The following table reports estimates including these races.

Table C1. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on Likelihood of General Election Contribution

	Indivs > 1 Race	Indivs > 5 Races	Pure Partisans	Corporate PACs
Extremist Win	0.0001***	0.0003**	0.0001**	-0.0008***
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	0.073	0.069	0.044	0.102
Baseline	0.0004	0.0014	0.0005	0.0037
Observations	26,040,217	2,517,228	5,398,803	3,182,000
R-Squared	0.0003	0.0009	0.0007	0.0008

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

C.2 Top 50% Ideological Distance

The main specification includes primaries in the top quartile of ideological distance between top-two candidates. The following table reports estimates with primaries in the top median of ideological distance between top-two candidates.

Table C2. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on Likelihood of General Election Contribution

	Indivs > 1 Race	Indivs > 5 Races	Pure Partisans	Corporate PACs
Extremist Win	0.0013***	0.0037***	0.0037***	-0.0010***
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	0.023	0.024	0.023	0.078
Baseline	0.0008	0.0017	0.0015	0.0033
Observations	21,000,175	2,350,269	7,308,588	5,600,750
R-Squared	0.0020	0.0063	0.0071	0.0005

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

C.3 Top 50% Ideological Distance Including Opposite-Side Candidates

The main specification includes primaries in the top quartile of ideological distance between top-two candidates, excluding primaries with a candidate on the opposite side of zero. The following table reports estimates with primaries in the top median of ideological distance between top-two candidates, including those with candidates on opposite sides of zero.

Table C3. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on Likelihood of General Election Contribution

	Indivs $>$ 1 Race	Indivs $>$ 5 Races	Pure Partisans	Corporate PACs
Extremist Win	0.0017***	0.0050***	0.0047***	-0.0011***
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	0.023	0.025	0.024	0.058
Baseline	0.0007	0.0015	0.0013	0.0032
Observations	22,080,184	2,530,071	7,658,502	4,289,250
R-Squared	0.0019	0.0060	0.0071	0.0004

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

D Alternative Logged Dependent Variable: Primary-Contributor-Level Results

The main results use a binary dependent variable for whether a contributor gave to a particular nominee. The following tables report estimates with the main sample and alternative samples using the log of the amount given as the dependent variable.

D.1 Main Sample

Table D1. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on Logged General Election Contributions

	Indivs > 1 Race	Indivs > 5 Races	Pure Partisans	Corporate PACs
Extremist Win	-0.0021***	-0.0061***	-0.0002	-0.0119***
	(0.0001)	(0.0007)	(0.0002)	(0.0012)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	0.029	0.040	0.056	0.050
Baseline	0.0026	0.0122	0.0057	0.0221
Observations	10,200,085	1,399,886	6,200,158	1,451,241
R-Squared	0.0004	0.0017	0.0008	0.0017

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

D.2 Including Opposite-Side Candidates

Table D2. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on Logged General Election Contributions

	Indivs > 1 Race	Indivs > 5 Races	Pure Partisans	Corporate PACs
Extremist Win	0.0001	-0.0002	-0.0036***	-0.0112***
	(0.0001)	(0.0006)	(0.0003)	(0.0010)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	0.051	0.047	0.031	0.079
Baseline	0.0025	0.0097	0.0026	0.0225
Observations	17,880,130	1,798,013	3,990,692	2,493,975
R-Squared	0.0003	0.0012	0.0011	0.0011

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

D.3 Top 50% Ideological Distance

Table D3. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on Logged General Election Contributions

	Indivs > 1 Race	Indivs > 5 Races	Pure Partisans	Corporate PACs
Extremist Win	0.0026***	0.0081***	0.0084***	-0.0064***
	(0.0001)	(0.0007)	(0.0003)	(0.0005)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	0.028	0.032	0.026	0.133
Baseline	0.0034	0.0118	0.0050	0.0284
Observations	24,240,174	2,889,657	7,919,940	9,072,897
R-Squared	0.0005	0.0015	0.0023	0.0006

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

D.4 Top 50% Ideological Distance Including Opposite-Side Candidates

Table D4. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on Logged General Election Contributions

	Indivs > 1 Race	Indivs > 5 Races	Pure Partisans	Corporate PACs
Extremist Win	0.0043***	0.0136***	0.0128***	-0.0087***
	(0.0001)	(0.0006)	(0.0003)	(0.0006)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	0.027	0.034	0.024	0.081
Baseline	0.0030	0.0111	0.0041	0.0244
Observations	25,200,183	3,133,671	7,871,286	6,030,691
R-Squared	0.0005	0.0014	0.0025	0.0004

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

E Alternative Samples: Heterogeneous Effects By Race Type and Safety

The heterogeneous results by race type and safety includes primaries in the top quartile of ideological distance between top-two candidates, excluding primaries with a candidate on the opposite side of zero. The following tables report results using alternative samples.

E.1 Including Opposite-Side Candidates

Table E1. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on General Election Contributions

	Indivs > 1 Race		Indivs > 5 Races		Pure Partisans		Corporate PACs	
Extremist Win	0.0001**	-0.0001***	0.0002	-0.0004***	0.0001*	-0.0002**	-0.0019***	-0.0015***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Safe District	0.0003***		0.0002		0.0002**		-0.0016***	
	(0.0000)		(0.0002)		(0.0001)		(0.0003)	
Extremist Win x Safe	-0.0001		0.0005		0.0002		0.0056***	
	(0.0001)		(0.0003)		(0.0001)		(0.0004)	
Open Seat		-0.0001***		-0.0007***		-0.0005***		-0.0019***
		(0.0000)		(0.0001)		(0.0001)		(0.0002)
Extremist Win x Open		0.0006***		0.0025***		0.0011***		0.0029***
		(0.0000)		(0.0002)		(0.0001)		(0.0002)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	0.073	0.069	0.044	0.102	0.073	0.069	0.044	0.102
Observations	25,800,215	26,040,217	2,491,542	2,517,228	5,360,568	5,398,803	3,149,750	3,182,000
R-Squared	0.0003	0.0003	0.0009	0.0011	0.0007	0.0008	0.0013	0.0009

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

E.2 Top 50% Ideological Distance

Table E2. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on General Election Contributions

	Indivs ¿ 1 Race		Indivs ¿ 5 Races		Pure Partisans		Corporate PACs	
Extremist Win	0.0015***	0.0021***	0.0043***	0.0059***	0.0043***	0.0062***	-0.0005***	-0.0010***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Safe District	0.0006***		0.0010***		0.0011***		0.0044***	
	(0.0000)		(0.0003)		(0.0001)		(0.0003)	
Extremist Win x Safe	-0.0016***		-0.0047***		-0.0036***		-0.0045***	
	(0.0001)		(0.0003)		(0.0001)		(0.0004)	
Open Seat		0.0007***		0.0010***		0.0021***		0.0007***
		(0.0000)		(0.0002)		(0.0001)		(0.0002)
Extremist Win x Open		-0.0029***		-0.0078***		-0.0087***		0.0002
		(0.0001)		(0.0004)		(0.0002)		(0.0002)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	0.023	0.024	0.023	0.078	0.023	0.024	0.023	0.078
Observations	21,000,175	21,000,175	2,350,269	2,350,269	7,308,588	7,308,588	5,590,000	5,600,750
R-Squared	0.0020	0.0023	0.0064	0.0071	0.0072	0.0083	0.0008	0.0006

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

E.3 Top 50% Ideological Distance Including Opposite-Side Candidates

Table E3. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on General Election Contributions

	Indivs > 1 Race		Indivs > 5 Races		Pure Partisans		Corporate PACs	
Extremist Win	0.0022***	0.0029***	0.0063***	0.0087***	0.0060***	0.0081***	-0.0008***	-0.0008***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Safe District	0.0013***		0.0032***		0.0028***		0.0041***	
	(0.0000)		(0.0002)		(0.0001)		(0.0003)	
Extremist Win x Safe	-0.0025***		-0.0073***		-0.0064***		-0.0032***	
	(0.0001)		(0.0003)		(0.0001)		(0.0004)	
Open Seat		0.0013***		0.0034***		0.0033***		0.0009***
		(0.0000)		(0.0002)		(0.0001)		(0.0002)
Extremist Win x Open		-0.0041***		-0.0124***		-0.0114***		-0.0009***
		(0.0001)		(0.0004)		(0.0002)		(0.0002)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	0.023	0.025	0.024	0.058	0.023	0.025	0.024	0.058
Observations	21,960,183	22,080,184	2,517,228	2,530,071	7,620,267	7,658,502	4,267,750	4,289,250
R-Squared	0.0020	0.0023	0.0062	0.0071	0.0074	0.0085	0.0007	0.0005

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

F Alternative Samples: Heterogeneous Effects Pre-Post-1994

The heterogeneous results before and after 1994 include primaries in the top quartile of ideological distance between top-two candidates, excluding primaries with a candidate on the opposite side of zero. The following tables report results using alternative samples.

F.1 Including Opposite-Side Candidates

Table F1. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on General Election Contributions

	Indivs > 1 Race	Indivs > 5 Races	Pure Partisans	Corporate PACs
Extremist Win	0.0002***	0.0008***	0.0003***	0.0014***
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0002)
Post-1994	0.0004***	0.0017***	0.0004***	0.0008***
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0002)
Extremist Win x Post-1994	-0.0001***	-0.0006**	0.0000	-0.0037***
	(0.0000)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Bandwidth	0.073	0.069	0.044	0.102
Observations	26,040,217	2,517,228	5,398,803	3,182,000
R-Squared	0.0001	0.0004	0.0003	0.0005

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

F.2 Top 50% Ideological Distance

Table F2. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on General Election Contributions

	Indivs > 1 Race	Indivs > 5 Races	Pure Partisans	Corporate PACs
Extremist Win	0.0000	0.0002	0.0001	-0.0003*
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Post-1994	-0.0002***	0.0010***	-0.0008***	-0.0003
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Extremist Win x Post-1994	0.0019***	0.0049***	0.0053***	-0.0010***
	(0.0000)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Bandwidth	0.023	0.024	0.023	0.078
Observations	21,000,175	2,350,269	7,308,588	5,600,750
R-Squared	0.0005	0.0015	0.0016	0.0002

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

F.3 Top 50% Ideological Distance Including Opposite-Side Candidates

Table F3. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on General Election Contributions

	Indivs > 1 Race	Indivs > 5 Races	Pure Partisans	Corporate PACs
Extremist Win	0.0003***	0.0009***	0.0004***	-0.0001
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0002)
Post-1994	-0.0001***	0.0005***	-0.0008***	-0.0009***
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0002)
Extremist Win x Post-1994	0.0020***	0.0057***	0.0059***	-0.0017***
	(0.0000)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Bandwidth	0.023	0.025	0.024	0.058
Observations	22,080,184	2,530,071	7,658,502	4,289,250
R-Squared	0.0006	0.0019	0.0020	0.0003

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

G Additional Analyses

G.1 Incumbent Nominees Only

Table F4. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on Corporate PAC General Election Contributions

	Candidate-Level	Candidate-PAC Level
Extremist Win	-0.9462**	-0.0058***
	(0.3045)	(0.0003)
Year FE	✓	✓
Bandwidth	IK	IK
Observations	401	4,289,250

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

G.2 Alternative Measures of Candidate Ideology

CF scores are not a perfect measure of candidate ideology, and although this paper uses them for the relatively coarse purpose of identifying primaries between the most different candidates and classifying such candidates as either extreme or moderate, two particular aspects of these uses remain worrisome. First, CF scores are calculated based on the contributions that a candidate receives over her entire career, for any office. This means that, for candidates who move on to the general election, their post-treatment general election contributions are included in the calculation of their ideology during their primary. Second, if donors engage in giving behavior which is not entirely expressive, contribution-based estimates of candidate ideology may be problematic — especially when the estimates are used in analyses of relationships between candidate ideology and donations.

While CF scores offer the best data coverage — an extremely important consideration in a regression discontinuity setting — examining the relationships between CF scores and other measures can help us determine how dependent our results may be on the use of CF scores specifically. I consider two alternative measures of candidate ideology, both of which are modeled after DW-NOMINATE scores.

The first methodology is akin to the one used in Hall (2015), Hall and Snyder (2015), Hall and Thompson (2018), and Lockhart and Hill (2023). Primary-specific psuedo–NOMINATE scores are created by imputing donors' ideologies as the average of the incumbents' DW-NOMINATE scores to which they contributed, and then in turn calculates candidates' ideologies as the average of their primary donors' ideologies. To maximize the number of usable cases, I place no restrictions on the number of donations necessary to be included in the estimation. This measure is primary-specific, which helps to ameliorate the post-treatment bias baked into contribution-based scaling which includes contributions over candidates' whole careers.

The second methodology attempts to create a measure that is entirely separate from candidates' contributions. However, existing non-contribution alternatives offer highly

limited coverage of the universe of primary candidates, especially primary losers which are necessary for all analyses in the paper. The two main publicly available measures are DW-NOMINATE, which cover all members of Congress, and Shor-McCarty NP Scores (Shor and McCarty 2011, 2022), which cover state legislators from the 1990s through 2020. To maximize the number of usable cases, I regressed DW-NOMINATE onto NP for candidates who had both scores in order to use the resulting coefficients to calculate psuedo-NOMINATE scores for candidates who have NP scores but not DW-NOMINATE scores.

As reported below, more than a quarter of opposed primaries over the period have a top-two candidate with a Hall-Snyder score missing due to not raising primary funds from any donors who have given to incumbents with DW-NOMINATE scores. Additionally, less than 15% of opposed primaries over the period were contested between candidates who held federal and/or state legislative offices. In races where scores were available, there are extremely strong correlations between the CF scores and alternative measures of both primary winners and runners-up.

Likewise, the correlations between top-two candidates' ideological differences as measured by CF scores versus alternative scores is quite strong considering that this is a within-district and within-party quantity. This is further supported by the 75% overlap in the measures' classification of primaries falling into the top quartile of candidate distance. Finally, there is a very high level of agreement about which of the top two candidates in a primary is more extreme versus moderate considering that the majority of primaries are contested between candidates who are relatively similar. Despite the fact that these alternative scores capture a very different sample of primaries than the overall sample, and are arguably meant to capture something different than CF scores, they exhibit strong agreement about whether primaries are between a moderate and extremist — as well as which candidate is which.

Table F5. Relationships Between CF Scores and Pseudo-NOMINATE Scores

	Hall-Snyder	Shor-McCarty NP
Coverage of all opposed primaries, 1980-2020	72%	12%
Primary winner score correlation	.93	.93
Primary runners-up score correlation	.89	.90
Top-two candidate score distance correlation	.65	.45
Top quartile distance classification agreement	75%	72%
Extreme vs. moderate classification agreement	72%	67%

Differences in sample coverage preclude apples-to-apples comparisons of RDD results using alternative measures versus CF scores. That is, because other contribution based measures — such as Hall-Snyder and DW-DIME — only offer coverage of a particular subset of the sample covered by CF Scores, results using alternative measures of candidate ideology may differ because of either disagreement between measures' classification of extreme versus moderate candidates, or because of sample differences, which then affect which races are included in the sample and bandwidth/weighting schemes for the RDD.

Nevertheless, we can try to pinpoint the source of differences in order to examine the robustness of the main results to alternative contribution-based measures of candidate ideology. To do so, I separately re-run the main RD analysis with pre-primary contribution-

based (i.e. Hall-Snyder) scores and DW-DIME scores (contribution-based scores meant to mirror DW-NOMINATE as closely as possible using machine learning — see Bonica 2018 for details). In each case, the "universe" of primaries is necessarily restricted to those in which both of the top-two candidates have a non-missing score, which then influences the downstream RDD sample selection.

The below tables report the main RD results using Hall-Snyder and DW-DIME scores, as well as results with the original CF Scores using the alternative measures' respective samples, weights, and bandwidth selections. This holds constant the observations used for analysis and allows us to see how much the differences between the results using CF Scores versus alternative measures are due to differences in classification of extreme versus moderate candidates (versus including and differentially weighting different primaries).

Across the main results, alternative measures, and original measures with alternative samples, consistently negative coefficients (of various sizes and levels of significance, however) suggest that corporate PACs penalize extreme nominees. Even measuring extremist versus moderate victories using CF Scores, the corporate PAC penalty to extremists is estimated to be quite a bit smaller within the Hall-Snyder and DW-DIME samples compared to the full sample in the main results. This suggests that, holding the measure of candidate ideology constant, the negative effect of nominating extremists on corporate PAC contributions are smaller within the sample covered by Hall-Snyder scores and DW-DIME scores.

Results regarding individual donors' responses to the nominations of extreme candidates are much less consistent, which is relatively unsurprising given the small and highly imprecisely estimated main results. The estimates across different measures, specifications, and samples vary in their signs, sizes, and levels of significance. Most of the individual contribution estimates using CF Scores on samples covered by Hall-Snyder and DW-DIME scores are highly different from the estimates using CF Scores on the entire sample as reported in the main analysis, suggesting again that these observations are meaningfully different from the observations on which the main analysis is based.

Table F6. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on General Election Contributions Using Hall-Snyder Scores

	Individual Contributions				Corporate PAC Contributions			
	Top 25% Distance		Top 50% Distance		Top 25% Distance		Top 50% Distance	
Hall-Snyder	0.4411*	0.5412	0.3093*	0.1670	-0.7378*	-0.5066	-0.4063	-0.2754
	(0.2217)	(0.3139)	(0.1559)	(0.1961)	(0.3041)	(0.3780)	(0.2161)	(0.2939)
CF Score	0.2700	0.1761	0.2365	0.0895	-0.7031	-0.5692	-0.5024*	-0.3999
	(0.2931)	(0.4516)	(0.1929)	(0.2397)	(0.3709)	(0.4740)	(0.2532)	(0.3472)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	IK	CCT	IK	CCT	IK	CCT	IK	CCT
Observations	285	172	781	492	277	210	721	487

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table F7. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on General Election Contributions Using DW-DIME Scores

	Individual Contributions				Corporate PAC Contributions			
	Top 25% Distance		Top 50% Distance		Top 25% Distance		Top 50% Distance	
DW-DIME	0.1043	-0.0337	-0.1696	-0.1493	-0.6576*	-0.8071*	-0.3088	-0.3089
	(0.2238)	(0.2971)	(0.1576)	(0.1851)	(0.3270)	(0.3875)	(0.2294)	(0.2280)
CF Score	0.0833	0.0781	-0.2659	-0.2321	-0.6480	-0.8725*	-0.6583*	-0.6583*
	(0.2453)	(0.2788)	(0.1763)	(0.2044)	(0.3414)	(0.4152)	(0.2948)	(0.2928)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	IK	CCT	IK	CCT	IK	CCT	IK	CCT
Observations	293	168	529	382	223	172	461	465

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

G.3 Two-Way Fixed Effects Models

Table F8. Relationship Between Nominee Extremism and General Election Contributions

	Individual Contributions	Corporate PAC Contributions
|CF Score|	-0.4809***	-1.9996***
	(0.1246)	(0.1550)
District-Party-Census Cycle FE	✓	✓
State-Year FE	✓	✓
Observations	15,323	14,214

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

G.4 Citizens United and Independent Expenditures

Table F9. Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Effect of Nominating Extremist on General Election Corporate Contributions

	Direct + Indirect Corporate $	Pre-CU Direct Corporate $	Post-CU Direct Corporate $
Extremist Win	-1.0177**	-0.7435*	-1.7031**
	(0.3926)	(0.3073)	(0.5644)
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Bandwidth	IK	IK	IK
Observations	502	404	163

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$