

Appendices and Supplemental Material:

(Mis)perception of Party Congruence and Satisfaction with Democracy

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A Data Structure

In our main analysis presented in the main text, we have included 13 waves of the panel for analysis in Table 1, comprising 289,157 respondents, and 10 waves of the panel are used in Table 2. Individual analyses are restricted to waves including the required variables. The data structure for this and the associated CHES data is detailed in Table A.1.

Table A.1: DATA STRUCTURE OF BRITISH ELECTION SURVEY AND CHAPEL HILL EXPERT SURVEY

	BES Respondents	Administered in	CHES Experts	Administered in
Waves 4 - 6	92,080	2015	7	Dec 2014 – Feb 2015
Waves 7 - 10	124,752	2016	7	Dec 2014 – Feb 2015
Waves 15	30,842	2019	14	2017
Waves 16 - 19	72,325	2019	17	Feb – May 2020
	289,157			

Source: British Election Study (Schmitt et al., 2021) and Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Jolly et al., 2022).

Table A.2: DATA STRUCTURE OF BRITISH ELECTION SURVEY RESPONDENTS AND BRITISH ELECTION SURVEY EXPERTS

	BES Respondents	Administered in	BES Experts	Administered in
Waves 15	30,842	11 Mar - 29 Mar 2019	74	Dec 2019
Waves 16	37,959	24 May - 18 Jun 2019	74	Dec 2019
Waves 17	34,366	1 Nov - 13 Nov 2019	74	Dec 2019
Waves 18	37,825	13 Nov - 11 Dec 2019	74	Dec 2019
Waves 19	32,177	13 Dec - 23 Dec 2019	74	Dec 2019
	173,169			

Source: British Election Study (Schmitt et al., 2021) and BES Expert Survey (Schmitt et al., 2020).

Table A.3: DATA STRUCTURE OF COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS - MODULE 5 2016-2020, EU COUNTRIES

Year	Total Respondents	Countries
2016	1,188	Greece, Ireland, Lithuania
2017	3,753	Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands
2018	3,615	Italy, Sweden
2019	3,369	Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Portugal
2020	379	Slovakia
	12,304	

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 2023)

In addition, Table A.2 presents the data set used for our jointly scaled estimation in Appendix C.3, along with the data set for performing robustness analyses on four issues (redistribution, immigration, EU integration, and environmental growth) from BES waves 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19

in Appendix C.8, all from 2019. The table also includes the BES expert data structure from the 2019 structure, corresponding to a total sample size of 173,167.

Table A.3 shows the data structure of Module 5 in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. In our sample, we utilize the sample of responses during 2016-2020 across 14 European countries (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 2023).

B Survey Questions and Wording

B.1 Misperception

Misperception is measured by the difference between BES respondent placements on general left-right positions and CHES expert placements of political party positions.

- *CHES experts' general placements of political party positions*: position of the party in 2014 (2017 and 2019) in terms of its overall ideological stance (from 0 extreme left, 5 center, to 10 extreme right) (Bakker et al., 2015, 2018, 2020, pp14, Chapel Hill Expert Survey).
- *BES respondent's general placements about party positions*: In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place the following parties on this scale (0 left to 10 right) (Schmitt et al., 2021, 161, British Election Study)?

B.2 Actual Incongruence

Actual incongruence is measured by the difference between BES respondents' self-placement on general left-right positions and CHES expert placements of political party positions.

- *CHES experts' general placements of political party positions*: position of the party in 2014 (2017 and 2019) in terms of its overall ideological stance (from 0 extreme left, 5 center, to 10 extreme right) (Bakker et al., 2015, 2018, 2020, pp14, Chapel Hill Expert Survey).
- *BES respondents' self-placement on general left-right positions*: In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale? (0 left to 10 right) (Schmitt et al., 2021, 160, British Election Study)?

B.3 Perceived Incongruence

Perceived incongruence is measured as the distance between a BES respondent's self-placement on the left-right scale and the respondent's general placement about party position.

- *BES Respondent's general placement about party position*: In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place the following parties on this scale? (from 0 left to 10 right) (Schmitt et al., 2021, p161, British Election Study).
- *BES respondent's self-placement on the left-right scale* In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale? (0 left to 10 right) (Schmitt et al., 2021, p160, British Election Study).

B.4 Control Variables (BES)

- *Self-placement Deviation*: Self-placement deviation is measured by the absolute value of BES respondents' self-placement on general left-right value -5.
- *Perceived Polarization*: Perceived polarization is measured by the difference of BES respondents' placement on general left-right on Conservative Party and Labour Party, respectively.
- *Party Affiliation*: And if there were a UK General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for? (I would not vote; Conservative; Labour; Liberal Democrat; Scottish National Party SNP; Plaid Cymru; United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP; Green Party; British National Party BNP; Change UK – The Independent Group; Brexit Party; Other; Don't know) (Schmitt et al., 2021, p18, British Election Study).
- *Income Level*: Gross household income is the combined income of all those earners in a household from all sources, including wages, salaries, or rents and before tax deductions. What is your gross household income? (Respondents are then provided with a scale of 1 to 15 ranging from “under £5,000 per year” to “£150,000 and over per year” in an ascending order. We re-categorize each respondent into either the top, or the middle or the low income group based on the percentile along the self-reported income distribution in the survey: we recode the top one-thirds as “Top”, the middle one-thirds as “Middle” and the bottom one-thirds as “Bottom”.)(Schmitt et al., 2021, p34, British Election Study)
- *Gender*: Are you...? (Female or Male) (Schmitt et al., 2021, p450, British Election Study)?
- *Attention to Politics*: How much attention do you generally pay to politics? (0 left to 10 right) (Schmitt et al., 2021, 160, British Election Study)?
- *News Sources*: During the last seven days, on average how much time (if any) have you spent per day following news about politics or current affairs from each of these sources? (Television; Newspaper including online; Radio; Internet Talking to other people) (Schmitt et al., 2021, p160, British Election Study)?
- *Job Occupation*: National Statistics Socio-economic classification analytic classes based on Standard Occupational Classifications 2010 (Employers in large organisations and higher managerial; Higher professional occupations; Lower professional and managerial and higher supervisory; Intermediate occupations; Employers in small organisations and own account workers; Lower supervisory and technical occupations; Semi-routine occupations; Routine occupations) (Schmitt et al., 2021, p160, British Election Study)?

B.5 Four Issues: BES Survey Respondents and Experts

Regarding the selection of four issue questions, we aim to match questions from both the BES and BES expert surveys that share similar concepts. These questions include topics such as Immigration, Redistribution, EU Integration, and the Environment. In evaluating party placement among BES survey respondents and BES experts, our focus is only on the Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrats, Brexit, and Green parties across these five waves in 2019. It is noteworthy that we reverse the immigration scale to align with the responses of BES survey respondents, ensuring that the responses are consistent in the same direction.

- **Immigration**

- BES Respondents (*immigGrid*): Some people think that the UK should allow many more immigrants to come to the UK to live and others think that the UK should allow many fewer immigrants. Where would you place yourself and the parties on this scale? (Party: Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrats, Brexit, Green) 0 = Many fewer and 10 = Many more.
- BES Experts (*immigecon*): Please place the following parties on a scale where: (Party: Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrats, Brexit, Green) 1 = Immigration is bad for the economy, and 7 = Immigration is good for the economy.

- **Redistribution**

- BES Respondents (*redistSelf*): Some people feel that government should make much greater efforts to make people's incomes more equal. Other people feel that government should be much less concerned about how equal people's incomes are. Where would you place yourself and the political parties on this scale? (Party: Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrats, Brexit, Green) 0 Government should try to make incomes equal, and 10 Government should be less concerned about equal incomes
- BES Experts (*redist*): Please place the following parties on a scale where (Party: Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrats, Green): 0 = Government should try to make people's incomes more equal, and 10=Government should be less concerned about equal incomes.

- **EU Integration**

- BES Respondents (*EUIntegration*): Some people feel that Britain should do all it can to unite fully with the European Union. Other people feel that Britain should do all it can to protect its independence from the European Union. Where would you place

yourself and the political parties on this scale? (Party: Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrats, Brexit, Green) 0 = Unite fully with the European Union, and 10 = Protect our independence

- BES Experts (*EUindependence*): Please place the following parties on a scale where: (Party: Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrats, Green): 0 = Unite fully with the European Union, and 10 = Protect our independence from the European Union.

- **Environment**

- BES Respondents (*enviroGrowth*): Some believe that protecting the environment should have priority even if that reduces economic growth. Others believe that economic growth should have priority even if that hinders protecting the environment. What is your opinion? (Party: Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrats, Brexit, Green) 0 = Economic growth should have priority, and 10 = Protecting the environment change should have priority
- BES Experts (*econvenvir*): Question: Some believe that protecting the environment should have priority even if that reduces economic growth. (Party: Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrats, Brexit, Green) 0 = Economic growth should always have priority over the environment, and 10 = The environment should always have priority over economic growth.

C Robustness Estimation

C.1 Models Controlling for Misperception

In this Appendix, we examine the robustness of the analysis of BES data presented in Table C.4 by additionally including the misperception of respondents' corresponding party's position as a control variable to establish the robustness of the effect of perceived incongruence. We estimate the following fixed effects model:

$$\hat{y}_{i,t} = \alpha_1 \gamma_{i,t} + \alpha_2 \hat{\gamma}_{i,t} + \alpha_3 \pi_{i,t} + \theta C_{i,t} + \epsilon_i + w_t + u_{it}, \quad (\text{C.1})$$

where $\pi_{i,t}$ represents the degree of misperception. The rest of the notation is identical to that used in Table 2. The results in Column (3) show that our results are robust after controlling for misperception, and misperception is not a significant determinant of voters' satisfaction with democracy when accounting for the congruence measures. This suggests that the effects of perceived incongruence are separate from any direct effect of inaccuracy.

Table C.4: PANEL REGRESSION: EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED INCONGRUENCE AND ACTUAL INCONGRUENCE ON SATISFACTION, BES PANEL

Dependent Variable:	Satisfaction with Democracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Actual Incongruence	-0.007** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)
Perceived Incongruence		-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.003)
Misperception			-0.003 (0.003)
Constant	-0.469*** (0.010)	-0.455*** (0.010)	-0.453*** (0.010)
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	93213	93026	93026
Adjusted R^2	0.069	0.069	0.069

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

We also examine the robustness of our CSES analysis presented in Table 3 by similarly including the control for misperception. We estimate the following model using pooled OLS:

$$\hat{y}_i = a_1 \gamma_i + a_2 \hat{\gamma}_i + a_3 \pi_i + \theta \tilde{C}_i + \eta X_t + \phi Y_i + \epsilon_i, \quad (\text{C.2})$$

where $\pi_{i,t}$ represents the misperception. The rest of the notation is identical to Table 3. This analysis shows the effects of perceived incongruence are almost unchanged and there is no significant effect of misperception, beyond that accounted for in perceived incongruence.

Table C.5: REGRESSION: EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED INCONGRUENCE AND ACTUAL INCONGRUENCE ON SATISFACTION, EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES (CSES)

Dependent Variable:	Satisfaction with Democracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Actual Incongruence	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.016 (0.010)
Perceived Incongruence		-0.041*** (0.009)	-0.042*** (0.009)
Mispercetion			0.008 (0.010)
Constant	-1.043*** (0.210)	-1.031*** (0.219)	-1.035*** (0.219)
Year dummies	✓	✓	✓
Country dummies	✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls	✓	✓	✓
Observations	9327	8664	8664
Adjusted R^2	0.221	0.220	0.220

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.2 Cross-sectional Analysis of BES

In this appendix, we conduct additional analyses to test the robustness of our main findings by employing cross-sectional models with the same BES data used in the main analysis. This allows us to examine the sensitivity of the results to a different model specification.

First, we present cross-sectional regression results in Table C.6 that focus on party misperception, investigating both perceived and actual incongruence while controlling for relevant demographic variables. The reference group used in the analysis consists of female respondents from high-income groups possessing postgraduate and higher education degrees.

Furthermore, we provide regression results in Table C.7 that examine the relationship between satisfaction with democracy and perceived and actual incongruence, while also controlling for the same set of demographic variables. Each of the cross-sectional results is consistent with the findings obtained from the panel regression models presented in the main text.

Table C.6: REGRESSION ON PARTY MISPERCEPTION FOR PERCEIVED AND ACTUAL VOTER-PARTY INCONGRUENCE WITH CONTROLS, POOLED

Dependent Variable:	Actual Incongruence ($\gamma_{i,t}$)	Perceived Incongruence ($\hat{\gamma}_{i,t}$)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Misperception	0.391*** (0.004)	0.349*** (0.005)	0.208*** (0.007)
Actual Incongruence ($\gamma_{i,t}$)			0.361*** (0.007)
Self-placement deviation	0.049*** (0.003)	-0.107*** (0.005)	-0.125*** (0.004)
Perceived Polarization	-0.044*** (0.002)	0.044*** (0.003)	0.060*** (0.003)
Income: Middle	-0.058*** (0.009)	-0.016 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)
Top	-0.094*** (0.009)	-0.025** (0.011)	0.009 (0.011)
Age	0.002 (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
Age ²	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Education: A-level	-0.109*** (0.010)	-0.028** (0.013)	0.012 (0.012)
Undergraduate	-0.136*** (0.009)	-0.008 (0.012)	0.041*** (0.011)
Postgrad	-0.144*** (0.013)	0.023 (0.016)	0.075*** (0.015)
Election Vote: Conservative	-0.174*** (0.015)	-0.315*** (0.018)	-0.252*** (0.017)
Labour	-0.047*** (0.015)	-0.225*** (0.019)	-0.208*** (0.018)
Liberal Democrat	-0.058*** (0.016)	-0.371*** (0.020)	-0.349*** (0.019)
UKIP	0.229*** (0.021)	-0.146*** (0.025)	-0.228*** (0.025)
Green Party	-0.056** (0.024)	-0.081*** (0.030)	-0.060** (0.028)
BNP	0.142 (0.358)	-0.552** (0.245)	-0.604** (0.304)
Brexit Party	-0.020 (0.033)	0.147*** (0.043)	0.155*** (0.040)
An Independent Candidate	-0.100 (0.094)	-0.101 (0.152)	-0.065 (0.147)
Change UK	0.297** (0.135)	0.127 (0.159)	0.020 (0.138)
Would / Did Not Vote	0.031 (0.036)	0.026 (0.046)	0.015 (0.044)
Other	-0.115*** (0.040)	-0.009 (0.052)	0.033 (0.048)
Gender: Male	0.047*** (0.007)	0.078*** (0.009)	0.061*** (0.009)
Attention to Politics	0.014*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.007*** (0.003)
News Sources	-0.007 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)
Job industry	✓	✓	✓
Wave	✓	✓	✓
Constant	1.121*** (0.057)	0.976*** (0.071)	0.571*** (0.069)
Adjusted R ²	0.200	0.115	0.188
N	95751	95751	95751

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.7: REGRESSION ON PERCEIVED AND ACTUAL INCONGRUENCE FOR SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY WITH CONTROLS

Dependent Variable:	Satisfaction with Democracy			
	(1) Ordered Logit	(2) Ordered Logit	(3) Semi-standardized	(4) Semi-standardized
Actual Incongruence	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)
Perceived Incongruence		-0.062*** (0.007)		-0.029*** (0.004)
Misperception	-0.002 (0.008)	0.012 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)
Income: Middle	0.125*** (0.027)	0.125*** (0.027)	0.060*** (0.013)	0.060*** (0.013)
Top	0.144*** (0.029)	0.145*** (0.029)	0.071*** (0.014)	0.071*** (0.014)
Age	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)
Age ²	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
Education: A-level	-0.022 (0.032)	-0.021 (0.032)	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)
Undergraduate	-0.112*** (0.031)	-0.109*** (0.031)	-0.054*** (0.015)	-0.053*** (0.015)
Postgrad	-0.311*** (0.044)	-0.307*** (0.044)	-0.153*** (0.022)	-0.151*** (0.022)
Party Affiliation: Conservative	1.021*** (0.034)	1.003*** (0.034)	0.493*** (0.017)	0.483*** (0.017)
Labour	-0.273*** (0.035)	-0.290*** (0.035)	-0.136*** (0.018)	-0.144*** (0.018)
Liberal Democrat	-0.069* (0.039)	-0.089** (0.040)	-0.037* (0.020)	-0.047** (0.020)
UKIP	-0.498*** (0.044)	-0.516*** (0.044)	-0.249*** (0.022)	-0.257*** (0.022)
Green Party	-0.783*** (0.056)	-0.792*** (0.056)	-0.397*** (0.028)	-0.402*** (0.028)
BNP	-0.371 (0.425)	-0.416 (0.417)	-0.178 (0.225)	-0.198 (0.221)
Change UK	0.328* (0.194)	0.335* (0.196)	0.165 (0.101)	0.166 (0.102)
Brexit Party	-0.549*** (0.061)	-0.542*** (0.061)	-0.272*** (0.030)	-0.268*** (0.030)
An Independent Candidate	-0.115 (0.381)	-0.109 (0.373)	-0.088 (0.194)	-0.085 (0.191)
I Would/Did Not Vote	-0.370*** (0.094)	-0.367*** (0.094)	-0.174*** (0.046)	-0.173*** (0.046)
Other	-0.640*** (0.084)	-0.638*** (0.084)	-0.323*** (0.042)	-0.323*** (0.042)
Gender: Male	-0.084*** (0.024)	-0.080*** (0.024)	-0.040*** (0.012)	-0.038*** (0.012)
Perceived Polarization	0.007* (0.004)	0.010** (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
Attention to Politics	-0.097*** (0.006)	-0.097*** (0.006)	-0.047*** (0.003)	-0.047*** (0.003)
News Sources	0.054*** (0.011)	0.054*** (0.011)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.006)
Occupation	✓	✓	✓	✓
Wave	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant			-0.188*** (0.058)	-0.153*** (0.058)
N	68042	67927	68042	67927
Adjusted R ²			0.153	0.154

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

C.3 Party Misperception on Perceived and Actual Voter-party Incongruence: Cross-national Evidence from Europe

In this section, we assess the generalizability of our findings on the relationship between misperception and congruence. To achieve this, we use the same cross-national sample of EU countries from the CSES survey previously described to estimate regressions of party misperception on perceived and actual voter-party incongruence, as shown in Table 1. In this analysis, we account for income, gender, education, marital status, employment, household size, year, country, age of the regime, and religious attributes. Our results are consistent with the BES panel regression analysis presented in the main text. This cross-national pattern indicates that the patterns observed in our panel study are likely not limited to the context of England.

Table C.8: REGRESSION PARTY MISPERCEPTION ON PERCEIVED AND ACTUAL VOTER-PARTY INCONGRUENCE, CSES

Dependent Variable:	Actual Incongruence ($\gamma_{i,t}$)		Perceived Incongruence ($\hat{\gamma}_{i,t}$)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Misperception ($\pi_{i,t}$)	0.549*** (0.016)	0.213*** (0.020)	0.113*** (0.032)	
Actual Incongruence ($\gamma_{i,t}$)			0.183*** (0.031)	
Constant	0.587* (0.323)	0.785* (0.465)	0.677 (0.468)	
Year dummies	✓	✓	✓	
Country dummies	✓	✓	✓	
Individual demographic controls	✓	✓	✓	
Observations	8721	8721	8721	

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

C.4 Supplementary Analysis with Lagged Measures

Although the analysis thus far has used the panel structure to isolate the individual-level correlation between incongruence and satisfaction, it is possible that the relationship between satisfaction with democracy and incongruence (actual and perceived) can run both ways for voters, with voter perceptions of parties following their attitudes toward democracy. In this appendix, we further make use of the structure of our BES panel survey data set to try to address the dynamics of the relationship by introducing lags of key variables. First, we add lags for perceived and actual incongruence. We estimate the following regression:

$$\hat{y}_{i,t} = \alpha_1 \gamma_{i,t-1} + \alpha_2 \hat{\gamma}_{i,t-1} + \theta C_{i,t} + \epsilon_i + w_t + u_{it}, \quad (\text{C.3})$$

where $\hat{\gamma}_{i,t-1}$ and $\gamma_{i,t-1}$ are the lagged perceived incongruence and lagged actual incongruence of voter i in wave t , respectively. The rest of the notation follows that in the main text. By using lagged independent variables, we aim to mitigate the possibility that current satisfaction directly influences the measures of incongruence. For comparability with the main results, the CHES expert placement of parties used for actual congruence is based on the closest year to the dependent variable, democratic satisfaction. Estimated coefficients are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table C.9.

We find that under these circumstances, the estimated coefficient of the lagged actual incongruence is no longer significant in column (1). However, the coefficient of the lagged perceived incongruence remains significant in column (2). While not definitive, this result corroborates the interpretation that the relationship between perceived incongruence and satisfaction is such that the latter is at least partly a function of the former.

When the lagged measure of perceived incongruence is used, its coefficient remains negative and statistically significant in predicting current satisfaction levels. However, the coefficient on lagged actual policy incongruence is not statistically significant. This pattern may indicate that while objective representation gaps could shape perceived incongruence over time, their direct influence on present satisfaction judgments is more limited and indirect, operating chiefly through the more proximal effects of perceived incongruence.

Considering that endogeneity concerns primarily arise for perceived incongruence, the main results focusing on the contemporaneous effects of actual incongruence may be the most appropriate for isolating the impact of this variable. In models combining current perceived incongruence with actual incongruence measured concurrently rather than lagged, actual incongruence is not statistically significant. The coefficient on current perceived incongruence remains negative and significant at the 5% level, mirroring the main findings.

Table C.9: PANEL REGRESSION: DYNAMICS BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND (ACTUAL AND PERCEIVED) INCONGRUENCES, BES PANEL

Dependent Variable:	Satisfaction with Democracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged Perceived Incongruence		-0.010** (0.005)	-0.030*** (0.007)
Perceived Incongruence			-0.033*** (0.007)
Lagged Actual Incongruence	0.005 (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)	0.014 (0.009)
Actual Incongruence			0.003 (0.010)
Lagged Satisfaction			0.029** (0.012)
Constant	-0.033*** (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.070*** (0.021)
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	38911	38897	28465
Adjusted R^2	0.068	0.069	0.005

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

To further study the dynamics of the relationship between party congruence and satisfaction with democracy, we next include a lagged dependent variable together with lagged and current actual and perceived distances as independent variables. By controlling for lagged satisfaction, this model accounts for the effects of previous satisfaction levels on those in the present due to enduring personal attitudes or external circumstances not captured in the model. Here we can only include those waves where the dependent variable exists in the preceding wave. We estimate the following regression:

$$\hat{y}_{i,t} = \beta_1 \hat{y}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \gamma_{i,t} + \beta_3 \gamma_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 \hat{\gamma}_{i,t} + \beta_5 \hat{\gamma}_{i,t-1} + \phi C_{i,t} + \epsilon_i + w_t + u_{it},$$

where $\hat{y}_{i,t-1}$ is the lagged satisfaction with democracy of voter i . The rest of the notation follows that in the previous regression model. The results are reported in column (3) of Table C.9.

The coefficients for contemporary and lagged perceived incongruence are statistically significant and the coefficients corresponding to both current and lagged actual incongruence lack statistical significance, corroborating findings from previous analyses.

We also examined a model of satisfaction with democracy as a function of lagged satisfaction, current and lagged perceived incongruence, and current and lagged actual incongruence employing the ML-SEM approach (Allison, Williams and Moral-Benito, 2017), which treats the intercept as a latent variable. With this approach, the results are similar to those above, with lagged perceived incongruence again associated with reduced satisfaction and lagged actual incongruence not correlated at statistically significant levels when included in the same model.

Although these additional findings do not rule out the potential effects of dissatisfaction on perceptions, and reverse effects are likely present, the results add some support to the interpretation that subjective perceptions of congruence are driving satisfaction, at least in part.

C.5 Supplementary Analysis with Changes in Satisfaction with Democracy

Further we construct a variable that corresponds to changes in respondents' satisfaction with democracy over time, $\Delta\hat{y}_{i,t} = \hat{y}_{i,t} - \hat{y}_{i,t-1}$. Then we estimate the following regression using changes in satisfaction as the dependent variable:

$$\Delta\hat{y}_{i,t} = \kappa_1\gamma_{i,t} + \kappa_2\hat{\gamma}_{i,t} + \kappa_4\hat{y}_{i,t-1} + \theta C_{i,t} + \epsilon_i + w_t + u_{it}, \quad (\text{C.4})$$

where the rest of the notation follows that in the main text. The estimated results are reported in column (1) of Table C.10. Consistent with our analysis in the main text, a higher level of perceived incongruence reduces respondents' satisfaction with democracy, while the impact of actual incongruence remains insignificant. Additionally, we also run a lagged version of the regression C.4 with lagged independent variables (lagged perceived and actual incongruence, and lagged misperception), and report the results in column (2) of Table C.10. The results are robust under the lagged specification.

Table C.10: PANEL REGRESSION: CHANGE IN SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND (PERCEIVED AND ACTUAL) INCONGRUENCE, BES PANEL

Dependent Variable:	Δ Satisfaction with Democracy	
	(1)	(2)
Perceived Incongruence	-0.020*** (0.006)	
Actual Incongruence	0.002 (0.009)	
Lagged Perceived Incongruence		-0.014** (0.006)
Lagged Actual Incongruence		0.005 (0.009)
Constant	-0.460*** (0.019)	-0.479*** (0.018)
Individual FE	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓
Lagged Satisfaction	✓	✓
Observations	29565	29738
Adjusted R^2	0.516	0.513

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.6 Supplementary Analysis Using An Instrumental Variable Approach

The wave 10 BES questionnaire includes a series of questions to capture respondents' knowledge about politics. The series of questions asks respondents about the political role held by international political figures. We construct a factor score that corresponds to the standardized number of questions that each respondent answers correctly. Since this factor score is closely related to respondents' knowledge, attention, and sophistication, it is relevant to respondents' ideological placements. However, it is likely to be exogenous to respondents' future democratic satisfaction. Then, we treat this factor score as the baseline measurement of respondents' political knowledge (collected in Wave 10) and analyze the sample of survey responses from Wave 10 onward. We estimate the following equation using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{First stage: } \hat{\gamma}_{i,t} &= a_0 + a_1 \text{score}_i^{\text{baseline}} + a_2 \gamma_{i,t} + \theta C_{i,t} + z_{i,t} \\ \text{Second stage: } \hat{y}_{i,t} &= b_0 + b_1 \gamma_{i,t} + b_2 \hat{\gamma}_{i,t} + \phi C_{i,t} + v_{i,t}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{score}_i^{\text{baseline}}$ represents the baseline score of political knowledge of respondents i . The rest of the notation remains identical to the main-text analysis. Under this setup, we instrument respondents' perceived incongruence with $\text{score}_i^{\text{baseline}}$. Table C.11 reports the estimation results.

Table C.11: PERCEIVED INCONGRUENCE AND ACTUAL INCONGRUENCE ON SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY: AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE APPROACH

	Satisfaction with Democracy	
	(1)	(2)
Second stage	OLS	o-logit
Actual Incongruence	0.129 (0.081)	0.267 (0.172)
Perceived Incongruence ($\hat{\gamma}_{i,t}$)	-0.391* (0.193)	-0.824** (0.409)
Constant	0.560* (0.244)	
Controls	✓	✓
First-stage χ^2	12.90***	12.90***
Observations	6845	6845

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Columns (1) and (2) of Table C.11 show the estimation results when the second stage is esti-

mated using OLS and ordered logit, respectively. The first-stage χ^2 strongly suggests that voters' political knowledge is a strong predictor of their perceived incongruence and misperception. Both columns indicate that a higher level of perceived incongruence leads to a significantly lower satisfaction with democracy of voters, while the coefficients of the actual incongruence are not statistically significant. This result is consistent with the findings in the main analysis.

C.7 Jointly Scaled Estimates from Issue Scales Using BES Experts

As our theoretical framework centers on the concept of general orientation mismatch, our main analysis utilizes left-right self-placement as it provides a parsimonious and widely-used means to capture respondents' overall ideological positions that is widely used in existing literature on representation. This approach operationalizes the notion that dissatisfaction stems primarily from a perceived broad ideological disconnect.

As an alternative to left-right self-placement that retains this conceptual approach, we also estimate a latent ideological position based on responses to multiple issue scales, which provides an alternative means to achieve comparability between experts' and citizens' perceptions. To do this, we employ the blackbox scaling procedure (Poole, 1998; Poole et al., 2016) to derive an alternative measure that does not rely on the placement of the left-right. The blackbox scaling method uses survey response data to estimate ideological positions based on responses to multiple issue scales and allows the estimation of respondent positions on a single continuous scale reflecting latent ideological structure underpinning responses to the BES issue questions. This technique estimates the ideological locations underlying positions on specific issues, allowing us to place the expert ratings of parties, respondent ratings of parties, and respondent self-placements within the same scale.

We make use of the BES expert ratings for party positions, which provide the multiple common issues necessary for this approach. This approach is possible only for waves 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 of BES, which include four issues with the same survey responses from both respondents and BES experts from 2019. These issues are immigration, redistribution, environmental protection, and EU integration.

The issue scales perform well in capturing an overarching latent dimension to distinguishing respondents in terms of ideology. The first dimension explains 64.4% of the variation, with a substantial drop off to 18.9% for the next dimension. The model fit statistics show that the issue scales perform well in separating respondents on the primary latent ideological dimension. The R-squared values, representing the proportion of variance in each issue scale explained by the model, range from 0.438 to 0.796 across the issues. Consistent with the salience of cultural issues in the UK, EU integration and Immigration loads strongly on the latent dimension, with an R-squared of 0.796 and 0.722, respectively. Meanwhile, redistribution and environment still have substantial R-squared values of 0.505 and 0.447, respectively.

The use of these estimates for the expert and respondent locations from this jointly common scale has some advantage over left-right placements because these are based on more concrete questions than the left-right scale and can be aggregated into a single overarching latent dimension of policy preferences to capture party and voter positions from which we can measure

incongruence.

As shown in the table below, the regression analysis based on this approach yields results consistent with the analysis in the main text and the cross-sectional results using the left-right measure. Although available only for a small cross-section of the BES panel data, the supplementary use of these data can improve our confidence in the comparability of party placements across survey respondents. In this robustness analysis, the control variables are not depicted in the table but remain the same as the cross-sectional analysis presented earlier, including income, party affiliation, gender, age, education level, number of news sources, political attention, and a dummy for each wave included.

Table C.12: PERCEIVED INCONGRUENCE AND ACTUAL INCONGRUENCE ON SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY: LATENT IDEOLOGICAL MEASURE

	Satisfaction with Democracy	
	(1)	(2)
Actual Incongruence	-0.349*	-0.365
	(0.206)	(0.257)
Perceived Incongruence ($\hat{\gamma}_{i,t}$)		-0.400**
		(0.173)
Constant	-0.504***	-0.522***
	(0.036)	(0.043)
Controls	✓	✓
Observations	59355	45788
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.003

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.8 Additional Analyses of Specific Policy Areas

To further supplement our analysis of how democratic satisfaction is influenced by perceived incongruence on policy issues, we replicate our analyses utilizing four issues separately. We separately examine actual and perceived incongruence in four issues for which the necessary placement scale data are available – immigration, redistribution, the environment, and EU integration. In the regression analysis below, we independently analyze models for perceived incongruence and democratic satisfaction for each policy issue.¹¹

Across all four issues, the results confirm the patterns seen in the main results. That is, greater misperception of party positions predicts higher perceived incongruence, and higher perceived incongruence correlates with lower democratic satisfaction. While the magnitude of the effects varies by issue – with incongruence on EU integration having the largest effect on reducing democratic satisfaction – the direction and statistical significance remain consistent across all policy issues.

These additional analyses reinforce the main conclusions and provide evidence that the relationships between misperception, perceived incongruence, and democratic satisfaction extend beyond left-right ideology to domain-specific policy areas. Although exploring differences across issues is outside the scope here, the robustness across multiple policy domains underscores the broad relevance of the theorized linkages beyond general ideological orientations.

¹¹For the questionnaire wordings related to the four issues, please see Appendix B.5.

Table C.13: INCONGRUENCE - REDISTRIBUTION

Dependent Variable:	Actual Incongruence (1)	Perceived Incongruence (2)	Perceived Incongruence (3)
Misperception ($\pi_{i,t}$)	0.116*** (0.003)	0.079*** (0.004)	0.026*** (0.005)
Actual Incongruence ($\gamma_{i,t}$)			0.107*** (0.004)
Constant	1.667*** (0.075)	1.565*** (0.090)	1.408*** (0.091)
Wave dummies	✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls	✓	✓	✓
Observations	65281	65983	65634
Adjusted R^2	0.052	0.028	0.041

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.14: INCONGRUENCE - IMMIGRATION

Dependent Variable:	Actual Incongruence (1)	Perceived Incongruence (2)	Perceived Incongruence (3)
Misperception ($\pi_{i,t}$)	0.096*** (0.004)	0.171*** (0.006)	0.146*** (0.006)
Actual Incongruence ($\gamma_{i,t}$)			0.079*** (0.005)
Constant	1.898*** (0.092)	1.560*** (0.106)	1.418*** (0.106)
Wave dummies	✓	✓	✓
Individual-level controls	✓	✓	✓
Observations	45224	46105	45904
Adjusted R^2	0.040	0.053	0.060

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.15: INCONGRUENCE - EU INTEGRATION

Dependent Variable:	Actual Incongruence		Perceived Incongruence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(3)
Misperception ($\pi_{i,t}$)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.030*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	
Actual Incongruence ($\gamma_{i,t}$)			0.052*** (0.003)	
Constant	1.982*** (0.047)	1.913*** (0.090)	2.065*** (0.090)	
Wave dummies	✓	✓	✓	
Individual-level controls	✓	✓	✓	
Observations	96373	69749	69264	
Adjusted R^2	0.029	0.024	0.030	

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ **Table C.16: INCONGRUENCE - ENVIRONMENTAL GROWTH**

Dependent Variable:	Actual Incongruence		Perceived Incongruence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(3)
Misperception ($\pi_{i,t}$)	0.081*** (0.013)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.047*** (0.016)	
Actual Incongruence ($\gamma_{i,t}$)			0.032*** (0.012)	
Constant	2.197*** (0.278)	1.493*** (0.281)	1.377*** (0.282)	
Wave dummies	✓	✓	✓	
Individual-level controls	✓	✓	✓	
Observations	6936	6868	6764	
Adjusted R^2	0.038	0.019	0.020	

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.17: SATISFACTION - IMMIGRATION

Dependent Variable:	Satisfaction with Democracy	
	(1)	(2)
Actual Incongruence	-0.011*** (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)
Perceived Incongruence		-0.031*** (0.002)
Constant	-0.224*** (0.068)	-0.173*** (0.072)
Wave dummies	✓	✓
Individual-level controls	✓	✓
Observations	50788	44754
Adjusted R^2	0.140	0.148

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.18: SATISFACTION - REDISTRIBUTION

Dependent Variable:	Satisfaction with Democracy	
	(1)	(2)
Actual Incongruence	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Perceived Incongruence		-0.012*** (0.002)
Constant	-0.208*** (0.059)	-0.216*** (0.040)
Wave dummies	✓	✓
Individual-level controls	✓	✓
Observations	64379	55859
Adjusted R^2	0.151	0.155

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.19: SATISFACTION - EU INTEGRATION

Dependent Variable:	Satisfaction with Democracy	
	(1)	(2)
Actual Incongruence	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Perceived Incongruence		-0.036*** (0.002)
Constant	-0.150*** (0.007)	-0.085*** (0.080)
Wave dummies	✓	✓
Individual-level controls	✓	✓
Observations	84456	74802
Adjusted R^2	0.147	0.156

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.20: SATISFACTION - ENVIRONMENTAL GROWTH

Dependent Variable:	Satisfaction with Democracy	
	(1)	(2)
Actual Incongruence	-0.018*** (0.003)	0.010 (0.007)
Perceived Incongruence		-0.020*** (0.006)
Constant	-0.208** (0.081)	-0.358*** (0.108)
Wave dummies	✓	✓
Individual-level controls	✓	✓
Observations	32422	10628
Adjusted R^2	0.132	0.026

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.9 Using Respondents' Average Perceived Positions to Measure 'Actual' Positions

While expert surveys provide a useful reference point for parties' positions, an alternative approach is to use average placements from voters themselves to capture parties' "actual" stances. As a further robustness check on this measurement choice, we substitute the expert left-right party placements with the mean perceived positions from BES respondents. This allows us to construct a measure of actual incongruence based on average voter perceptions rather than expert judgments.

We calculate each party's mean left-right position in a given wave based on the average placement from all BES respondents. We then use this mean perceived position as the benchmark for the party's actual stance when calculating incongruence measures. If a voter's individual placement diverges from the mean perceived position, this represents misperception of the party's actual position under this approach.

We replicate our main democratic satisfaction models using this voter-average based measure of actual incongruence rather than the expert survey positions. This provides a test of whether the findings hold when relying purely on respondents' overall perceptions to capture parties' objective positions, rather than expert judgments.

Since the respondent sample can be seen as potentially reflecting the overall views of the electorate, we first use the average placement of parties as an alternative measure of actual locations. As shown in the tables below, the regression analysis employing the average BES respondent placement as actual placement yields results that are consistent with those shown in the main text using the left-right measure.

Table C.21: REGRESSION PARTY MISPERCEPTION ON PERCEIVED AND ACTUAL VOTER-PARTY INCONGRUENCE, BES PANEL USING AVERAGE PERCEIVED POSITIONS

Dependent Variable:	Actual Incongruence (1)	Perceived Incongruence (2)	Perceived Incongruence (3)
Misperception ($\pi_{i,t}$)	0.176*** (0.005)	0.339*** (0.008)	0.269*** (0.009)
Actual Incongruence ($\gamma_{i,t}$)			0.398*** (0.009)
Constant	1.310*** (0.023)	0.774*** (0.031)	0.252*** (0.036)
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓	✓
N	130305	130305	130305

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

The overall voter mean provides one estimate of parties' "actual" positions, this measure may

Table C.22: PANEL REGRESSION: EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED INCONGRUENCE AND ACTUAL INCONGRUENCE ON SATISFACTION, BES PANEL USING AVERAGE PERCEIVED POSITIONS

Dependent Variable:	Satisfaction with Democracy	
	(1)	(2)
Actual Incongruence	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Perceived Incongruence		-0.014*** (0.003)
Constant	-0.496*** (0.013)	-0.480*** (0.014)
Individual FE	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓
Observations	94684	94485
Adjusted R^2	0.067	0.067

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

still contain noise from respondents with less political knowledge. As an additional check, we construct an alternate measure of actual positions using the average placements only among more politically sophisticated respondents.

Specifically, we calculate each party’s mean left-right position using only respondents with a postgraduate degree or above. The assumption is that these highly educated respondents have greater capacity to place parties accurately (Alvarez and Franklin, 1994; Alvarez and Nagler, 2004; Golder and Stramski, 2010; Carroll and Kubo, 2017). Their mean perceived placements should reflect a more informed estimate of the “true” party positions.

We then utilize this sophisticated respondent average as the benchmark for actual party positions when calculating our incongruence measures and use these in the models predicting incongruence and democratic satisfaction. This allows us to test if results are consistent when relying on arguably more informed perceptions of party stances, rather than the overall voter mean.

In both Table C.23 and Table C.24, we observe that the models for satisfaction with democracy yield substantively similar results to the main analysis for perceived and actual incongruence using the mean placements of voters. As in the main results, perceived incongruence reduces democratic satisfaction, while actual incongruence is insignificant when accounting for perceived incongruence.

This lends further support that the key relationships remain robust to alternative measurements of actual party positions based on mean voter perceptions rather than expert surveys. It again highlights that perceived representation gaps are most associated with satisfaction with

democracy, regardless of the actual congruence.

Table C.23: REGRESSION PARTY MISPERCEPTION ON PERCEIVED AND ACTUAL VOTER-PARTY INCONGRUENCE, BES PANEL USING AVERAGE PERCEIVED POSITIONS BY HIGHER EDUCATED VOTERS

Dependent Variable:	Actual Incongruence	Perceived Incongruence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Misperception ($\pi_{i,t}$)	0.187*** (0.005)	0.315*** (0.008)	0.244*** (0.008)
Actual Incongruence ($\gamma_{i,t}$)			0.382*** (0.009)
Constant	1.353*** (0.024)	0.820*** (0.031)	0.304*** (0.036)
Individual FE	✓	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓	✓
N	130305	130305	130305

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table C.24: PANEL REGRESSION: EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED INCONGRUENCE AND ACTUAL INCONGRUENCE ON SATISFACTION, BES PANEL USING AVERAGE PERCEIVED POSITIONS BY HIGHER EDUCATED VOTERS

Dependent Variable:	Satisfaction with Democracy	
	(1)	(2)
Actual Incongruence	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)
Perceived Incongruence		-0.013*** (0.003)
Constant	-0.490*** (0.013)	-0.476*** (0.014)
Individual FE	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓
Observations	94684	94485
Adjusted R^2	0.067	0.067

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

D Correlates of Misperception

While the primary analysis examines the effects of misperceptions on perceived incongruence and democratic satisfaction, here we report some individual correlates of inaccurate party placements themselves. In this appendix, we conduct a basic analysis of individual-level factors correlated with party position misperceptions among voters. We again use the BES data to examine which individual-level factors correlate with misperception among voters. Existing literature provides expectations regarding influences on citizens' political knowledge and sophistication more broadly (e.g., Banducci, Giebler and Kritzing, 2015; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1990; Meirick, 2013; Palfrey and Poole, 1987; Carroll and Kubo, 2017; Busch, 2016; Nasr, 2020; Dahlberg, 2013; Bartels, 1996). If voters with lower education levels or political knowledge would tend to place party ideology less accurately, we may thus expect misperceptions to be lower among those with greater political interest, more education, and more resources for acquiring information. In addition, partisan identities can influence information processing, resulting in motivated reasoning influencing voters understanding of policy issues (Bartels, 2002, 2008; Carsey and Layman, 2006; Evans and Andersen, 2004, 2006; Evans and Pickup, 2010; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011; Jerit and Barabas, 2012) which may skew their understanding of party policy positions. Partisan biases could thus potentially color perceptions of affiliated parties' positions.

In the following analysis, we examine correlates of party position misperceptions among BES respondents, relying on several proxies for political sophistication and partisan attachment. The variable "Party Identity Strength" gauges the level of attachment a voter has to their own political party.¹² Respondents indicate their strength of affiliation by selecting "Not very strong," "Fairly strong," or "Very strong," with these choices recoded as 1, 2, and 3, respectively. "Attention to Politics" measures the respondents' general attention to politics on a scale ranging from 0 (pay no attention) to 10 (pay a great deal of attention), as derived from the question, "How much attention do you generally pay to politics?" The variable "Number of Information Sources" measures the amount of media outlets from which voters gather information.¹³

In Table D.25, we observe a positive association between strong partisanship and the extent of misperception about one's own affiliated party, indicating higher misperception levels among stronger partisans who may exhibit bias. Meanwhile, various factors associated with capacity or sophistication are associated with less misperception. Respondents who exhibit greater attention to politics and access information from multiple sources tend to have lower misperceptions about their own party. Additionally, voters with higher income and education levels report

¹² Respondents are asked "Would you call yourself very strong, fairly strong, or not very strong *respondent's own party?*" in the survey.

¹³ Respondents are asked if they obtain information and news from newspaper, radio, TV and internet, respectively in the survey.

significantly smaller misperceptions about the party they support.

The results correspond to findings in the literature that various attributes related to sophistication are correlated with lower misperceptions, including greater political interest, more comprehensive media consumption, higher education, and higher income. Stronger partisanship shows a positive association, suggesting the potential for partisan-motivated reasoning (Grand and Tiemann, 2013; Tiemann, 2022; Lenz, 2012). While not intended to be definitive or comprehensive, these exploratory findings illuminate some individual-level correlates of inaccurate party placements that may inform our theoretical understanding of the pathway through which the factors behind misperceptions influence the downstream consequences.

Table D.25: CORRELATES OF VOTERS' MISPERCEPTION OF OWN PARTIES

Dependent Variable:	Misperception	
	(1)	(2)
Party Identity Strength	0.088*** (0.006)	0.070*** (0.007)
Attention to Politics	-0.050*** (0.002)	-0.036*** (0.003)
Number of Information Sources	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.021*** (0.005)
Income		
Middle	-0.135*** (0.009)	-0.111*** (0.011)
High	-0.246*** (0.009)	-0.172*** (0.010)
Education		
A-level	-0.229*** (0.011)	-0.162*** (0.013)
Undergraduate	-0.330*** (0.009)	-0.290*** (0.011)
Postgrad and above	-0.390*** (0.012)	-0.330*** (0.015)
Constant	2.009*** (0.027)	1.986*** (0.053)
Wave dummies		✓
Individual-level controls		✓
Observations	120365	87403
Adjusted R^2	0.037	0.056

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$