Supplemental Material
Strengthening mainstream consensus? The effect of radical right parties on the defense policies of left parties

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Contents

A Supplemental Figures & Tables (Main Analysis)

A.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics (MARPOR)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Year	1,097	2,000.791	7.254	1,990	2,013
Party	1,097	53,294.120	31,402.830	11,110	97,952
parfam (party family)	1,097	47.485	25.077	10	98
per104 (military positive)	1,097	1.039	1.601	0.000	14.525
per105 (military negative)	1,097	0.501	1.144	0.000	12.108
per1011 (us positive)	1,097	0.061	0.374	0.000	6.931
per1012 (us negative)	1,097	0.044	0.301	0.000	6.364
per1021 (russia positive)	1,097	0.025	0.223	0.000	3.955
per1022 (russia negative)	1,097	0.004	0.108	0.000	3.509
dif_l1 (RRPP vote - threshold), t-1	947	3.283	9.185	−5.000	40.720
dif_fixed1 (RRPP vote - legal threshold) t-1	551	2.803	8.516	−5.000	31.350
military (defense position)	1,097	0.538	2.100	−12.108	14.525
military2 (defense salience)	1,097	1.541	1.824	0.000	14.525
russia (Russia salience)	1,097	0.086	0.450	0.000	6.931
us (US salience)	1,097	0.048	0.319	0.000	6.364
military_change (Δ defense position)	707	0.162	1.941	−14.525	10.599

Note: Defense position is the difference between per 104 and per 105. Defense salience is the sum of per 104 and per 105. US salience is the sum of per 1011 and per 1012 and Russia salience is the sum of per 1021 and per 1022.

A.2 Salience of Russia and the US Policy (1990-2013)

Figure A1: Salience of Foreign Powers

(a) Salience of Russia & CIS



(b) Salience of US & West



Table A2: Russia & US Salience: Fuzzy RDD

	Russia Salience		**US salience**	
	non-parametric	*parametric*	*non-parametric*	*parametric*
RD Estimate (conventional)	-0.148***	0.033*	-0.069***	0.011
	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.011)
RD Estimate (Bias-corrected)	-0.150***	-	-0.073***	-
	(0.005)		(0.003)	
RD Estimate (Robust)	-0.150***	-	-0.073***	-
	(0.005)		(0.004)	
N	112	947	179	947
BW est. (h)	1.328	Global	1.383	Global
BW bias (b) 4.130	-	3.036	-	
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cluster error	✓	✓	✓	✓

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: A running variable is lagged for an election term. Parametric RD is calculated with R package "rddtools" and Non-parametric RD is calculated with "rdrobust" package. Bandwidths are calculated by CCT. Polynomial order of parametric RD is 1 and that of non-parametric RD is 2.

Figure A1 show that the electoral breakthrough of RRPPs do not have substantive effects

on other parties' salience of Russia and the US. Since the relationship between those countries are relatively stable after the end of the Cold War, the results are reasonable. Yet, as mentioned in the main text, the effect has changed after the Russia's occupation of Crimea in 2014. Given the speculation of connection between RRPPs and Kremlin, established parties tended to increase salience of US and Russian relationship since then.

A.3 Change(Δ) of Defense Policy

Table A3: Defense Policy Position (MARPOR): **First Difference**

	non-parametric	*non-parametric*	*parametric*	*parametric*
RD Estimate (conventional)	0.954***	1.053***	0.319**	0.319**
	(0.129)	(0.304)	(0.129)	(0.129)
RD Estimate (Bias-corrected)	0.958***	1.059***	-	-
	(0.129)	(0.304)		
RD Estimate (Robust)	0.958***	1.059***	-	-
	(0.131)	(0.311)		
N	150	150	558	558
BW est. (h)	1.772	1.772	Global	Global
BW bias (b)	2.914	2.914	-	-
Country FE	✓		✓	
Cluster error	✓	✓	✓	✓

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Bandwidths are calculated by Imbens-Kalyanaraman method. Polynomial order is 2 in non-parametric models and 1 in parametric models. The first difference is calculated by subtracting values of period t from values of $t-1$.

Figure A2 depicts the result when we take a first difference of defense policy. As shown in Table A3, RD estimates are positive and significant in all models. This lends support to our argument.

Figure A2: Change(Δ) of Defense Policy



A.4 RD Robustness check w/ Covariates

Figure A3 illustrates the main result with covariates. Considering country heterogeneity. we added a East Europe dummy variable, a participation of international military intervention, and RRPPs' participation to government. As found in Table A4, the estimates are positive and statistically significant in all models. Note that since some countries formed government several times after the given election, the total number of observation increased after controlling RRPPs' participation to government.

Table A4: Party-level Shifts in Defense Policy (MARPOR): **w/ covariates**

	non-parametric	*non-parametric*	*parametric*	*parametric*
RD Estimate (conventional)	0.530***	0.350***	0.270***	0.270***
	(0.055)	(0.100)	(0.086)	(0.086)
RD Estimate (Bias-corrected)	0.588***	0.348***	-	-
	(0.055)	(0.100)		
RD Estimate (Robust)	0.588***	0.348***	-	-
	(0.057)	(0.102)		
N	245	245	896	896
BW est. (h)	1.844	1.844	Global	Global
BW bias (b)	4.057	4.057	-	-
Country FE	✓		✓	
Cluster error	✓	✓	✓	✓

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Bandwidths are calculated by CTT. Polynomial order is 2 in non-parametric models and 1 in parametric models. Covariates include East European dummy, war participation, and a dummy variable of whether to participate to government.

Figure A3: Analysis with Covariates



A.5 Analysis w/ Different Bandwidths

We checked the robustness of our main finding with different bandwidth. While our RD analysis presented in Table 1 in the manuscript employs CCT method calculate the optimal

Figure A4: Analysis w/ Different Bandwidths



bandwidth, we also performed RD models with different optimal bandwidths calculated by MSE, Imbens-Kalyanaraman method (IK), and CER. In all models, estimates are positive and statistically significant at more than the 95% significance level.

A.6 Different polynomial order

We test the robustness of the main models by applying different polynomial orders. Since larger polynomial order confuses the results, we tested 1, 2, 3, and 4 orders for fuzzy parametric and fuzzy non-parametric models, respectively. Throughout the robustness check, results are consistent expect for a model where fuzzy non-parametric model takes polynomial order 4.

Table A5: *F*uzzy Regression Discontinuity with Different Polynomial Order

Polynomial Order #	1	2	3	4
Position of National Defense Policy				
RD estimate (parametric)	0.439***	0.410***	0.631***	0.643***
	(0.094)	(0.136)	(0.172)	(0.215)
N	835	835	835	835
Bandwidth	Global	Global	Global	Global
RD estimate (non-parametric)	0.580***	0.693***	0.527***	0.231
	(0.067)	(0.238)	(0.189)	(0.227)
N	239	239	239	239
Bandwidth (h)	2.051	2.051	2.051	2.051
Bandwidth (b)	3.763	3.763	3.763	3.763

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Bandwidths are calculated by CCT. The estimates are clustered at the country level. RD estimates reported in non-parametric RD design are convntional estimates.

A.7 Placebo Test

Although our analyses set the cut-off point as zero, we performed placebo test by introducing different cut-off point. We expect that our results do not hold positive and statistically significant RD estimates when cut-off is not zero. Table A6 shows summarizes fuzzy RD estimates when the cut-off point is five. The results lend support to our expectation - results are not consistently positive nor statistically significant in both parametric and non-parametric models.

Table A6: Placebo Test

	non-parametric	*non-parametric*	*parametric*	*parametric*
RD Estimate (conventional)	0.336***	0.051	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.080)	(0.236)	(0.104)	(0.104)
RD Estimate (Bias-corrected)	0.323***	0.068	-	-
	(0.080)	(0.236)		
RD Estimate (Robust)	0.323***	0.068	-	-
	(0.085)	(0.253)		
N	215	215	835	835
BW est. (h)	4.628	4.628	Global	Global
BW bias (b)	6.646	6.646	-	-
Country FE	✓		✓	
Cluster error	✓	✓	✓	✓

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: We experimentally set a placebo cut-off point as 5 instead of 0. Placebo bandwidths are calculated by CCT. Polynomial order is 2 in non-parametric models and 1 in parametric models.

A.8 Legal Threshold

We tested the robustness of our model by dropping observations that do not implement legal electoral thresholds. Table A7 below presents the results. While the fuzzy non-parametric model without country fixed effect lose significance, given cross-national heterogeneity and the consistent direction of RD estimates, we overall find that the results align with our main finding.

Table A7: Position of National Defense Policy (w/ legally-fixed threshold)

	non-parametric	*non-parametric*	*parametric*	*parametric*
RD Estimate (conventional)	1.438***	0.313	0.326**	0.326**
	(0.262)	(0.279)	(0.134)	(0.128)
RD Estimate (Bias-corrected)	8.771***	0.259	-	-
	(0.262)	(0.279)		
RD Estimate (Robust)	8.771***	0.251	-	-
	(0.287)	(0.301)		
N	74	74	501	501
BW est. (h)	1.395	1.395	Global	Global
BW bias (b)	2.609	2.609	-	-
Country FE	✓		✓	
Cluster error	✓	✓	✓	✓

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.9 Defense Salience

Table A8: Party-level Shifts in Defense Policy (MARPOR): **Salience**

	non-parametric	*non-parametric*	*parametric*	*parametric*
RD Estimate (conventional)	0.048	0.222	0.083	0.083
	(0.119)	(0.184)	(0.066)	(0.066)
RD Estimate (Bias-corrected)	0.057	0.231	-	-
	(0.119)	(0.184)		
RD Estimate (Robust)	0.057	0.231	-	-
	(0.124)	(0.191)		
N	251	251	947	947
BW est. (h)			Global	Global
BW bias (b)			-	-
Country FE	✓		✓	
Cluster error	✓	✓	✓	✓

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Bandwidths are calculated by CCT. Polynomial order is 2 in non-parametric models and 1 in parametric models.

A.10 RD Robustness check with different time period (1990-2021)

Table A9: Party-level Shifts in Defense Policy (MARPOR): **1990-2021**

	non-parametric	*non-parametric*	*parametric*	*parametric*
RD Estimate (conventional)	0.322***	0.563**	0.493***	0.493***
	(0.094)	(0.222)	(0.085)	(0.085)
RD Estimate (Bias-corrected)	0.347***	0.580***	-	-
	(0.094)	(0.222)		
RD Estimate (Robust)	0.347***	0,580**	-	-
	(0.112)	(0.254)		
N	331	331	1155	1155
BW est. (h)	2.020	2.020	Global	Global
BW bias (b)	3.138	3.138	-	-
Country FE	✓		✓	
Cluster error	✓	✓	✓	✓

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Bandwidths are calculated by CCT. Polynomial order is 2 in non-parametric models and 1 in parametric models. Sharp results are in the appendix.

B Analysis with CHES Data

To check the robustness of the results to the use of alternative data, we draw on the *Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES)* (Bakker et al., 2020) that consists of survey waves in 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2019. We employ three questions corresponding, albeit not ideally in all cases, to salience of national defense policy, Russia's salience, and the United States' salience. While the CHES does not contain questions on defense *positions*, some questions might capture a mix of defense salience and positions (see below). The questions were only asked in selected years as specified below, so that the results depend on only a few cross-sectional observations. We do not distinguish left and right parties in this analysis to avoid splitting the few observations further. Moreover, the CHES data employs different definitions of radical right parties and the measurement of defense policy. However, obtaining similar results would strengthen confidence in the findings obtained so far (See Table A10 for descriptive statistics)

Table A10: Descriptive Statistics (CHES)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
party_id	883	1,562.597	977.832	201	3,807
Election year	883	2,008.196	6.697	1,996	2,019
international_salience	148	4.532	1.530	1.000	8.286
international_security	334	4.854	1.763	1.000	9.333
dif_l1 (RRPP vote - threshold), t-1	883	4.316	9.855	−5.000	65.810
treatment	883	0.484	0.500	0	1

We first implemented the additional sorting for CHES data. The result suggests that the p value of the test is 0.3087 and not statistically significant. Thus, the running variable does not violate the assumption.

Table A11 presents the result of salience of international security and peacekeeping policy. The dependent variable in the first model is the salience of international security and peacekeeping missions, where zero denotes "Not important at all" and ten denotes "Extremely important." This is mainly a salience measure. However, it seems likely that parties deeming

Table A11: Party-Level Shifts in Security Salience (CHES)

Importance/salience of International Security & Peacekeeping		
RD Estimate	0.339***	0.339***
	(0.082)	(0.082)
N	148	148
BW est. (h)	Global	Global
Country FE	✓	
Cluster error	✓	✓

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Survey was conducted in 2010. Respondents answered question with 0-10 points scale, where 0 represents "Not important at all" and 10 represents "Extremely important". Polynomial order is 1 in parametric models. Since optimal bandwidth is too small to secure enough observations for non-parametric analysis, we drop non-parametric RD results.

Table A12: Party-Level Shifts in Security Position (CHES)

Position towards International Security & Peacekeeping		
RD Estimate	-0.098*	-0.098*
	(0.058)	(0.058)
N	334	334
BW est. (h)	Global	Global
Country FE	✓	
Cluster error	✓	✓

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Survey was conducted in 2010 and 2014. Respondents answered question with 0-10 points scale, where 0 equals to "Strongly favors COUNTRY troop deployment" and 10 represents "Strongly opposes COUNTRY troop deployment". Polynomial order is 1 in parametric models. Since optimal bandwidth is too small to secure enough observations for non-parametric analysis, we drop non-parametric RD results.

security and peacekeeping very important might also be more willing than others to contribute assertively to such efforts. The question was asked in 2010 only. We obtain positive and statistically significant estimates in the parametric and parametric fuzzy RD models ($p < 0.01$).

Next, we examine the position towards international security and peacekeeping (International_Security). The likert question was asked in 2010 and 2014. In this variable, experts evaluate parties' position on security and peacekeeping with 0-10 points scale, where 0 equals to "Strongly favors COUNTRY troop deployment" and 10 represents "Strongly op-

poses COUNTRY troop deployment. Table A12 presents the results of parametric fuzzy RD analyses. The RD estimates (with and without country fixed effects) are negative and significant ($p < 0.1$), although the significance level is borderline. The negative estimates mean that established parties adopt more assertive security position after the electoral breakthrough of RRPPs.

Overall, while the CHES data has limits for our purpose in terms of data availability, these results strengthen our confidence in the main expectations. There is some evidence that parties might raise defense policy salience and, given that the questions might have a positional element as well, assertiveness in response to RRPP success. Regarding the salience of Russia and the US, the results remain ambivalent. For Russia, the CHES results are positive and thus in line with the findings from the previous section. In the case of the USA, the findings reinforce the impression of inconsistency from the previous section.

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URL: *https://www.chesdata.eu*