Online Appendix for: Intra-Ethnic Divisions and Disagreement over Self-Determination Demands in Ethnic Movements

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A   Summary Statistics

Table 1 provides summary statistics for our data. In the case of our binary disagreement measure, 56 percent of all group-organization clusters disagree on their secession and autonomy demands, thus providing us with a relatively balanced sample. With regard to the continuous indicator of disagreement, the mean value of 0.22 implies that, on average, 82 percent of organizations linked to the same group agree on either keeping the status quo or advancing demands of secessionism or autonomy. 1864 cases feature a value is 0, i.e. there is agreement on these demands within the cluster.

	Mean	Min	Max	SD	Observations
Disagreement	0.56	0	1.00	0.50	4273
Share Disagreement	0.22	0	0.67	0.22	4273
Natural resources and agriculture	0.29	0	1.00	0.45	356
No income streams	0.19	0	1.00	0.39	356
Single income stream	0.53	0	1.00	0.50	356
Both income streams	0.29	0	1.00	0.45	356
Number of religious segments	1.90	0	3.00	0.84	4273
Religious fractionalization (HHI)	0.37	0	0.89	0.25	4093
Several religious segments (0/1)	0.74	0	1.00	0.44	4093
N settlement areas	8.83	1	483.00	27.48	3807
Several settlement areas (0/1)	0.71	0	1.00	0.45	3807
Geographic fractionalization (HHI)	0.35	0	0.98	0.31	3663

Table 1: Summary statistics for variables in the analysis.

B Linear Probability Two-Way FE models: H1

Table 2 presents linear two-way (Year-Country) FE models testing H1. Other than this, the models are the same as in the main article.

	Disagreement (1/0)		Prop. Disagreement	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Natural resources and agriculture	0.29***		0.10***	
	(0.05)		(0.02)	
Neither resources nor agri (baseline: both)		−0.29**		−0.09*
		(0.10)		(0.05)
Resources or agri (baseline: both)		−0.29***		−0.10***
		(0.05)		(0.02)
Number of organizations	0.04***	0.04***	0.01˙	0.01˙
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.09	0.09	0.01	0.01
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Group share	−0.77**	−0.77**	−0.29*	−0.29*
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Violent conflict	−0.22˙	−0.22˙	−0.08	−0.08
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Power status (EPR)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
N kin groups	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.11	−0.11	−0.06	−0.06
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Num. obs.	356	356	356	356
Num. groups: year	7	7	7	7
Num. groups: countries_gwid	62	62	62	62
R^2	0.51	0.51	0.46	0.46
Adj. R^2	0.38	0.38	0.31	0.31

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{˙}p < 0.1$

Table 2: Linear Two-Way FE models testing H1

C   Two-Way FE Logistic Regression: H1

Table 3 presents logistic two-way FE models testing H1. Other than this, the models are the same as in the main part. Table 4 presents models for the same cases (i.e. including the "all-zero" group as described in the methods section) but fits linear probability models.

	Disagreement (1/0)	Disagreement (1/0)
Natural resources and agriculture	2.67***	
	(0.52)	
Neither resources nor agri (baseline: both)		−2.67*
		(1.06)
Resources or agri (baseline: both)		−2.67***
		(0.52)
Number of organizations	0.45***	0.45***
	(0.12)	(0.12)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	1.15	1.15
	(1.09)	(1.23)
Group share	−7.31**	−7.31*
	(2.79)	(2.85)
Violent conflict	−1.99˙	−1.99*
	(1.03)	(1.00)
Power status (EPR)	0.05	0.05
	(0.30)	(0.29)
N kin groups	0.09	0.09
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.84	−0.84
	(0.80)	(0.83)
Num. obs.	248	248
Num. groups: year	6	6
Num. groups: countries_gwid	29	29
Deviance	221.43	221.43
Log Likelihood	−110.72	−110.72
Pseudo R^2	0.07	0.06

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{˙}p < 0.1$

Table 3: Logistic Two-Way FE models testing H1

	Disagreement (1/0)		Prop. Disagreement	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Natural resources and agriculture	0.29***		0.11***	
	(0.05)		(0.02)	
Neither resources nor agri (baseline: both)		−0.36*		−0.10˙
		(0.13)		(0.06)
Resources or agri (baseline: both)		−0.35***		−0.11***
		(0.05)		(0.02)
Number of organizations	0.04***	0.05***	0.01˙	0.01˙
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.09	0.15	0.01	0.01
	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Group share	−0.77**	−1.00**	−0.35**	−0.34*
	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Violent conflict	−0.22˙	−0.28˙	−0.09	−0.09
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Power status (EPR)	0.00	−0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N kin groups	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.11	−0.16	−0.07	−0.06
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Num. obs.	356	252	303	303
Num. groups: year	7	7	7	7
Num. groups: countries_gwid	62	29	41	41
R^2	0.51	0.33	0.32	0.32
Adj. R^2	0.38	0.19	0.18	0.17

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ˙ $p < 0.1$

Table 4: Linear Two-Way FE models testing H1 excluding "All-Zero" groups

D   Multilevel Models: H1

Table 5 presents multilevel models testing H1. Observations are nested within countries and years.

	Disagreement (1/0)	Prop. Disagreement	Disagreement (1/0)	Prop. Disagreement
Natural resources and agriculture	1.13**	0.07*		
	(0.44)	(0.03)		
Neither resources nor agri (baseline: both)			−1.07˙	−0.06
			(0.58)	(0.04)
Resources or agri (baseline: both)			−1.15**	−0.07**
			(0.44)	(0.03)
Number of organizations	0.42***	0.02***	0.42***	0.02***
	(0.08)	(0.00)	(0.08)	(0.00)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.44	0.02	0.45	0.02
	(0.44)	(0.03)	(0.45)	(0.03)
Group share	−4.29***	−0.22**	−4.28***	−0.21**
	(1.19)	(0.07)	(1.19)	(0.07)
Violent conflict	−1.28*	−0.07˙	−1.26*	−0.07˙
	(0.58)	(0.04)	(0.59)	(0.04)
Power status (EPR)	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.16)	(0.01)	(0.16)	(0.01)
N kin groups	0.06˙	0.00	0.06˙	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.59	−0.05˙	−0.59	−0.05˙
	(0.40)	(0.03)	(0.40)	(0.03)
AIC	390.56	−74.36	392.53	−67.58
BIC	433.19	−27.86	439.03	−17.20
Log Likelihood	−184.28	49.18	−184.26	46.79
Num. obs.	356	356	356	356
Num. groups: countries_gwid	62	62	62	62
Num. groups: year	7	7	7	7
Var: countries_gwid (Intercept)	2.08	0.01	2.08	0.01
Var: year (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: Residual		0.03		0.03

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{˙}p < 0.1$

Table 5: Multilevel models for H1

E   Robustness Tests H1: Fourfold Comparison

Table 6 presents four models that add the income source (agricultural production or natural resources). Models 1 and 3 are cross-sectional models with country fixed effects, Models 2 and 4 are linear probability models with country and year fixed effects. All models cluster standard errors on the country level.

	Disagreement (1/0)		Prop. Disagreement	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Rents: Natural resources (baseline: none)	-0.43^{**}	0.04	-0.15^{*}	0.05
	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Rents: Agricultural Production	-0.54^{***}		-0.24^{***}	
	(0.13)		(0.05)	
Rents: Both income sources		0.30^{***}		0.12^{***}
		(0.05)		(0.03)
Number of organizations	-0.01	0.04^{***}	-0.01	$0.01^{\cdot}$
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	$0.31^{\cdot}$	0.09	0.07	0.00
	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Group share	-1.11^{***}	-0.77^{**}	-0.49^{***}	-0.28^{*}
	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Violent conflict	-0.15	$-0.22^{\cdot}$	-0.01	-0.08
	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Power status (EPR)	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group nightlights (log)	0.12		0.22	
	(0.42)		(0.25)	
N kin groups	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	-0.16	-0.10	-0.04	-0.06
	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Num. obs.	138	356	138	356
Num. groups: countries_gwid	62	62	62	62
R^2	0.72	0.51	0.65	0.46
Adj. R^2	0.41	0.38	0.27	0.31
Num. groups: year		7		7

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table 6: Models comparing income source constellations for H1

F Robustness Tests H1: Pasture Land / Livestock Cultivation

Table 6 presents four models that take pasture land as a proxy for livestock cultivation (threshold: 10 percent). All models are cross-sectional models with country fixed effects and standard errors clustered by country. Models 1 and 2 use our binary disagreement measure as the dependent variable, Models 3 and 4 use the share of disagreement.

	Disagreement (1/0)		Prop. Disagreement	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Natural resources and pasture	0.38*		0.22**	
	(0.18)		(0.07)	
Resources or pasture (baseline: both)		−0.31*		−0.18***
		(0.13)		(0.05)
Neither resources nor pasture (baseline: both)		−0.43*		−0.22**
		(0.19)		(0.06)
Number of organizations	0.01	0.01	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.28	0.25	0.07	0.06
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Group share	−0.93*	−0.97*	−0.45*	−0.46**
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Violent conflict	−0.09	−0.11	0.02	0.02
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Power status (EPR)	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group nightlights (log)	−0.00	0.01	0.17	0.19
	(0.37)	(0.44)	(0.24)	(0.27)
N kin groups	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.16	−0.15	−0.07	−0.06
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Num. obs.	138	138	138	138
Num. groups: countries_gwid	62	62	62	62
R^2	0.69	0.69	0.64	0.64
Adj. R^2	0.36	0.36	0.27	0.26

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Table 7: Models including pasture land as a proxy for livestock cultivation instead of agricultural production

G   Linear Probability Two-Way FE models: H2

Table 8 presents linear two-way (Year-Country) FE models testing H2. Other than this, the models are the same as in the main article.

	Disagreement (1/0)			Prop. Disagreement		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
More than one religious segment	−0.19˙			−0.06		
	(0.10)			(0.04)		
Number of religious segments		−0.07			−0.03	
		(0.06)			(0.03)	
Religious fractionalization (HHI)			−0.26			−0.07
			(0.20)			(0.09)
Number of organizations	0.05***	0.04***	0.05***	0.02**	0.01*	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.04	0.03	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Group share	−0.30	−0.31	−0.24	−0.06	−0.10	−0.04
	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Violent conflict	−0.05	−0.04	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.02
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Power status (EPR)	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N kin groups	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Num. obs.	4093	4273	4093	4093	4273	4093
Num. groups: year	72	72	72	72	72	72
Num. groups: countries_gwid	68	72	68	68	72	68
R^2	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.44	0.43	0.43
Adj. R^2	0.48	0.46	0.47	0.42	0.41	0.41

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{˙}p < 0.1$

Table 8: Linear Two-Way FE models testing H2

H   Two-Way FE logistic and Two-Way Linear: H2

Table 9 presents logistic two-way FE models testing H2. Other than this, the models are the same as in the main article. Table 10 presents models for the same cases (i.e. including the "all-zero" group as described in the methods section) but fits linear probability models.

	Disagreement (1/0)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
More than one religious segment	−1.59˙		
	(0.90)		
Number of religious segments		−0.72	
		(0.55)	
Religious fractionalization (HHI)			−1.91
			(1.58)
Number of organizations	0.57***	0.49***	0.53***
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	1.30	1.17	1.24
	(0.94)	(1.02)	(0.95)
Group share	−2.51	−2.78	−1.79
	(2.12)	(2.39)	(2.04)
Violent conflict	−0.24	−0.41	−0.19
	(0.76)	(0.86)	(0.82)
Power status (EPR)	−0.24	−0.17	−0.25
	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.29)
N kin groups	0.00	−0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Any multiethnic organizations	0.06	0.10	0.14
	(0.64)	(0.68)	(0.65)
Num. obs.	3194	3347	3194
Num. groups: year	68	68	68
Num. groups: countries_gwid	37	39	37
Deviance	2845.27	3068.92	2891.79
Log Likelihood	−1422.64	−1534.46	−1445.89
Pseudo R^2	0.28	0.26	0.27

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{˙}p < 0.1$

Table 9: Logistic Two-Way FE models testing H2

	Disagreement (1/0)			Prop. Disagreement		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
More than one religious segment	−0.22·			−0.07		
	(0.12)			(0.05)		
Number of religious segments		−0.09			−0.04	
		(0.08)			(0.04)	
Religious fractionalization (HHI)			−0.33			−0.09
			(0.25)			(0.11)
Number of organizations	0.06***	0.06***	0.05***	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Group share	−0.36	−0.26	−0.29	−0.07	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Violent conflict	−0.06	−0.04	−0.04	−0.03	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Power status (EPR)	−0.03	−0.04	−0.04	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N kin groups	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Num. obs.	3206	3206	3206	3484	3484	3484
Num. groups: year	72	72	72	72	72	72
Num. groups: countries_gwid	37	37	37	45	45	45
R^2	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.32	0.32
Adj. R^2	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{·}p < 0.1$

Table 10: Linear Two-Way FE models testing H2 excluding "All-Zero" groups

I Multilevel Models: H2

Table 11 presents multilevel models testing H2. Observations are nested within countries and years.

	Disagreement (1/0)			Prop. Disagreement		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
More than one religious segment	−1.47***			−0.06***		
	(0.17)			(0.01)		
Number of religious segments		−0.70***			−0.04***	
		(0.09)			(0.01)	
Religious fractionalization (HHI)			−1.81***			−0.07***
			(0.28)			(0.02)
Number of organizations	0.54***	0.48***	0.51***	0.02***	0.01***	0.02***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	1.12***	1.01***	1.07***	0.03***	0.03**	0.03***
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Group share	−2.22***	−2.48***	−1.54***	−0.04*	−0.08***	−0.02
	(0.38)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Violent conflict	−0.18	−0.43*	−0.16	−0.03**	−0.04***	−0.02*
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Power status (EPR)	−0.26***	−0.19**	−0.27***	−0.01***	−0.01**	−0.01***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N kin groups	0.00	−0.01	0.01	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.05	−0.03	0.01	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
AIC	3232.82	3471.32	3274.44	−2835.34	−2821.95	−2814.67
BIC	3302.31	3541.28	3343.93	−2759.54	−2745.62	−2738.87
Log Likelihood	−1605.41	−1724.66	−1626.22	1429.67	1422.97	1419.34
Num. obs.	4093	4273	4093	4093	4273	4093
Num. groups: year	72	72	72	72	72	72
Num. groups: countries_gwid	68	72	68	68	72	68
Var: year (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: countries_gwid (Intercept)	13.34	12.13	12.37	0.02	0.02	0.02
Var: Residual				0.03	0.03	0.03

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ·$p < 0.1$

Table 11: Multilevel models for H2

J Alternative Specifications: Religious Favoritism and Alignment (H2)

Table 12 and Table 13 present further results testing H2. For all models in these tables, the dependent variable is the binary disagreement measure. Further models can be found in the replication files. For both tables, Model 1 and 2 are cross-sectional model specifications as in the main analysis, Models 3 and 4 are two-way fixed effects (country and year) models with standard errors clustered within countries.

In Table 12, the variable "Religious alignment and multiple segments" is 1, if for a particular group-organization cluster the Ethnic Dimensions Dataset records several religious segments and one of these segments is aligned with the largest religious segment of the group in power. An alternative specification measures the exact constellation: If there is no religious fractionalization at all ("unity"), whether there is fractionalization but not alignment ("unaligned fractionalization"), and finally the baseline of aligned fractionalization.

In Table 13, a religious segment of a group is considered favored by the central government if it receives a score of one on the respective preference in the Government Religious Preference 2.0 (GRP 2.0), Regulatory Burdens dataset (Brown and James, 2022). If the group-organization cluster is also religiously fragmented, the "Group religion favored and fractionalization" variable is coded as 1. The constellation variable then works as above.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Religious alignment and multiple segments	−0.33**	−0.26*		
	(0.11)	(0.12)		
Constellation: Unity (baseline: aligned frac.)			0.36**	0.32˙
			(0.12)	(0.17)
Constellation: Unaligned Fractionalization			−0.08	0.09
			(0.21)	(0.10)
Number of organizations	0.03	0.05***	0.03	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.29	0.15	0.35	0.18
	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.17)
Group share	−0.72˙	−0.33	−0.70˙	−0.35
	(0.39)	(0.29)	(0.39)	(0.28)
Violent conflict	−0.57*	−0.10	−0.42˙	−0.08
	(0.22)	(0.07)	(0.22)	(0.07)
Power status (EPR)	0.12	−0.02	0.11	−0.03
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.05)
N kin groups	0.00	−0.01	0.00	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Any multiethnic organizations	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.05
	(0.22)	(0.11)	(0.23)	(0.11)
Num. obs.	104	2613	104	2613
Num. groups: countries_gwid	53	56	53	56
R^2	0.75	0.54	0.76	0.54
Adj. R^2	0.41	0.52	0.42	0.52
Num. groups: year		72		72

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{˙}p < 0.1$

Table 12: Models testing religious alignment (H2)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Group religion favored and fractionalization	−0.16	−0.10		
	(0.12)	(0.10)		
Constellation: Unity (baseline: favoristim and fractionalization)			0.21	0.20
			(0.14)	(0.13)
Constellation: Not favored and fractionalization			0.11	0.02
			(0.11)	(0.09)
Number of organizations	0.03˙	0.04***	0.03*	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.20	0.10	0.24˙	0.15
	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Group share	−0.58*	−0.32	−0.51˙	−0.30
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.24)
Violent conflict	−0.31	−0.06	−0.28	−0.05
	(0.25)	(0.09)	(0.27)	(0.08)
Power status (EPR)	0.04	−0.01	0.02	−0.02
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
N kin groups	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Any multiethnic organizations	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.02
	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Num. obs.	184	4273	173	4093
Num. groups: countries_gwid	71	72	67	68
R^2	0.65	0.48	0.65	0.50
Adj. R^2	0.38	0.46	0.39	0.48
Num. groups: year		72		72

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{˙}p < 0.1$

Table 13: Models testing religious favoritism (H2)

K Linear Probability Two-Way FE models: H3

Table 14 presents linear two-way (Year-Country) FE models testing H3. Other than this, the models are the same as in the main article.

	Disagreement (1/0)			Prop. Disagreement		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
No. settlement areas	−0.00			0.00		
	(0.00)			(0.00)		
Several settlement areas (0/1)		−0.04			−0.04	
		(0.08)			(0.05)	
Geographic fractionalization (HHI)			−0.11			−0.08
			(0.12)			(0.07)
Number of organizations	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.01˙	0.01˙	0.01˙
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Group share	−0.50	−0.50	−0.59˙	−0.18	−0.18	−0.23
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Violent conflict	−0.07	−0.06	−0.06	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Power status (EPR)	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
N kin groups	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.05	−0.04	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03	−0.02
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Num. obs.	3807	3807	3663	3807	3807	3663
Num. groups: year	72	72	72	72	72	72
Num. groups: countries_gwid	66	66	63	66	66	63
R^2	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.40	0.41	0.40
Adj. R^2	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.38	0.38	0.38

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; ˙ $p < 0.1$

Table 14: Linear Two-Way FE models testing H3

L   Two-Way FE logistic and Two-Way Linear: H3

Table 15 presents logistic two-way FE models testing H3. Other than this, the models are the same as in the main article. Table 16 presents models for the same cases (i.e. including the "all-zero" group as described in the methods section) but fits linear probability models.

	Disagreement (1/0)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
No. settlement areas	−0.00		
	(0.00)		
Several settlement areas (0/1)		−0.36	
		(0.77)	
Geographic fractionalization (HHI)			−0.86
			(1.10)
Number of organizations	0.42***	0.42***	0.42***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.90	0.92	0.92
	(0.77)	(0.68)	(0.73)
Group share	−3.89˙	−3.94˙	−4.77˙
	(2.34)	(2.31)	(2.67)
Violent conflict	−0.53	−0.50	−0.43
	(0.89)	(0.89)	(0.95)
Power status (EPR)	−0.04	−0.03	0.03
	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.27)
N kin groups	0.09˙	0.09˙	0.10˙
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.54	−0.49	−0.36
	(0.78)	(0.78)	(0.79)
Num. obs.	3006	3006	2876
Num. groups: year	68	68	68
Num. groups: countries_gwid	37	37	35
Deviance	2686.35	2681.21	2582.52
Log Likelihood	−1343.18	−1340.60	−1291.26
Pseudo R^2	0.25	0.25	0.24

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{˙}p < 0.1$

Table 15: Logistic Two-Way FE models testing H3

	Disagreement (1/0)			Prop. Disagreement		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
No. settlement areas	0.00			0.00		
	(0.00)			(0.00)		
Several settlement areas (0/1)		−0.04			−0.02	
		(0.14)			(0.05)	
Geographic fractionalization (HHI)			−0.11			−0.07
			(0.21)			(0.09)
Number of organizations	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Group share	−1.11**	−1.12**	−1.18**	−0.39**	−0.39**	−0.44**
	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Violent conflict	−0.09	−0.10	−0.09	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Power status (EPR)	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N kin groups	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.15	−0.14	−0.14	−0.03	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Num. obs.	1502	1502	1502	2055	2055	2055
Num. groups: year	24	24	24	24	24	24
Num. groups: countries_gwid	28	28	28	43	43	43
R^2	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.36	0.37
Adj. R^2	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.35	0.34	0.34

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{·}p < 0.1$

Table 16: Linear Two-Way FE models testing H3 excluding "All-Zero" groups

M Multilevel Models: H3

Table 17 presents multilevel models testing H3. Observations are nested within countries and years.

	Disagreement (1/0)			Prop. Disagreement		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
No. settlement areas	−0.00			0.00˙		
	(0.00)			(0.00)		
Several settlement areas (0/1)		−0.25˙			−0.04***	
		(0.14)			(0.01)	
Geographic fractionalization (HHI)			−0.74**			−0.07***
			(0.25)			(0.01)
Number of organizations	0.44***	0.43***	0.44***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.78***	0.78***	0.77***	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Group share	−3.77***	−3.78***	−4.71***	−0.17***	−0.17***	−0.22***
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.47)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Violent conflict	−0.65***	−0.61***	−0.49**	−0.04***	−0.04***	−0.03**
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Power status (EPR)	−0.04	−0.04	0.03	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N kin groups	0.09***	0.09***	0.10***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.62***	−0.59***	−0.44**	−0.03**	−0.03**	−0.02*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
AIC	3049.34	3047.64	2916.87	−2348.19	−2372.47	−2292.06
BIC	3118.03	3116.33	2985.14	−2273.25	−2297.53	−2217.59
Log Likelihood	−1513.67	−1512.82	−1447.44	1186.09	1198.23	1158.03
Num. obs.	3807	3807	3663	3807	3807	3663
Num. groups: year	72	72	72	72	72	72
Num. groups: countries_gwid	66	66	63	66	66	63
Var: year (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: countries_gwid (Intercept)	12.56	12.69	13.30	0.02	0.02	0.02
Var: Residual				0.03	0.03	0.03

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ˙$p < 0.1$

Table 17: Multilevel models for H3

N   Robustness Tests: No Organizations with Temporary Links

Table 18 presents models without organizations that have temporary links to groups. Except for the differing sample all models are equivalent to the ones presented in Tables 2-4 in the main article.

	H1		H2		H3	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Natural resources and agriculture	0.48***					
	(0.13)					
Neither resources nor agri (baseline: both)		−0.49**				
		(0.16)				
Resources or agri (baseline: both)		−0.46***				
		(0.12)				
More than one religious segment			0.00			
			(0.15)			
Religious fractionalization (HHI)				0.01		
				(0.25)		
No. settlement areas					−0.00	
					(0.00)	
Geographic fractionalization (HHI)						−0.03
						(0.14)
Number of organizations	0.00	−0.00	0.03*	0.03*	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.33˙	0.34˙	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.23
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.18)
Group share	−0.77˙	−0.76˙	−0.41	−0.41	−0.47	−0.39
	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Violent conflict	−0.13	−0.16	−0.29	−0.29	−0.28	−0.28
	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.28)
Power status (EPR)	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Group nightlights (log)	0.09	0.21	−0.25	−0.26	0.25	0.25
	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.73)	(0.63)
N kin groups	0.01	0.01	0.01˙	0.01˙	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.14	−0.16	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Num. obs.	133	133	148	148	156	147
Num. groups: countries_gwid	61	61	60	60	64	61
R^2	0.71	0.72	0.71	0.71	0.70	0.70
Adj. R^2	0.39	0.41	0.46	0.46	0.44	0.42

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ˙$p < 0.1$

Table 18: Main cross sectional models from data without organizations that have temporary links to groups

O Robustness Tests: No Organizations with Multiethnic Links

Table 19 presents models from data without organizations that have multiethnic links to groups. Except for the differing sample all models are equivalent to the ones presented in Tables 2-4 in the main article.

	H1		H2		H3	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Natural resources and agriculture	0.40***					
	(0.11)					
Neither resources nor agri (baseline: both)		−0.25				
		(0.22)				
Resources or agri (baseline: both)		−0.31***				
		(0.08)				
More than one religious segment			0.23			
			(0.17)			
Religious fractionalization (HHI)				0.29		
				(0.33)		
No. settlement areas					0.00*	
					(0.00)	
Geographic fractionalization (HHI)						−0.07
						(0.17)
Number of organizations	0.02	0.02	0.06***	0.06***	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.15	0.17	−0.03	−0.02	−0.04	−0.01
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.23)
Group share	−1.45**	−1.39**	−1.34**	−1.38**	−1.50**	−1.46**
	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.53)
Violent conflict	−0.17	−0.19	−0.34.	−0.37.	−0.33	−0.35
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.21)
Power status (EPR)	0.07	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.11
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Group nightlights (log)	−0.05	0.10	−0.42	−0.39	−0.93*	−0.00
	(0.43)	(0.49)	(0.53)	(0.58)	(0.45)	(0.74)
N kin groups	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	0.01	−0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. obs.	113	113	120	120	125	116
Num. groups: countries_gwid	56	56	58	58	60	57
R^2	0.71	0.71	0.72	0.71	0.72	0.69
Adj. R^2	0.34	0.32	0.38	0.36	0.38	0.31

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{.}p < 0.1$

Table 19: Main cross sectional models from data without organizations that have multiethnic links to groups

P Robustness Tests: No Organizations with Low Confidence Scores

Table 20 presents models from data without organizations that received low confidence scores from EPR-O coders. Except for the differing sample all models are equivalent to the ones presented in Tables 2-4 in the main article.

	H1		H2		H3	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Natural resources and agriculture	0.38**					
	(0.12)					
Neither resources nor agri (baseline: both)		−0.38*				
		(0.18)				
Resources or agri (baseline: both)		−0.45***				
		(0.11)				
More than one religious segment			0.04			
			(0.17)			
Religious fractionalization (HHI)				0.16		
				(0.32)		
No. settlement areas					−0.00	
					(0.00)	
Geographic fractionalization (HHI)						−0.11
						(0.14)
Number of organizations	0.01	−0.00	0.03˙	0.03˙	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.36˙	0.40*	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.25
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Group share	−0.86*	−0.94**	−0.60˙	−0.59˙	−0.78*	−0.78*
	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.37)
Violent conflict	−0.02	−0.05	−0.26	−0.26	−0.28	−0.25
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.25)
Power status (EPR)	−0.02	−0.01	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Group nightlights (log)	−0.10	0.01	−0.46	−0.50	0.25	0.14
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.68)	(0.53)
N kin groups	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01˙	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.24	−0.25	−0.07	−0.08	−0.13	−0.14
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Num. obs.	132	132	146	146	155	146
Num. groups: countries_gwid	60	60	59	59	63	60
R^2	0.72	0.74	0.69	0.69	0.68	0.67
Adj. R^2	0.41	0.45	0.42	0.43	0.40	0.38

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; ˙$p < 0.1$

Table 20: Main cross sectional models from data without organizations that have low confidence scores

Q Robustness Tests: Only Violent and Electoral Organizations

Table 21 presents models from data with organizations were EPR-O codes use of violence and/or participation in elections. Except for the differing sample all models are equivalent to the ones presented in Tables 2-4 in the main article.

	H1		H2		H3	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Natural resources and agriculture	0.39*					
	(0.17)					
Neither resources nor agri (baseline: both)		−0.36*				
		(0.16)				
Resources or agri (baseline: both)		−0.37**				
		(0.12)				
More than one religious segment			−0.17			
			(0.14)			
Religious fractionalization (HHI)				−0.08		
				(0.30)		
No. settlement areas					−0.00	
					(0.00)	
Geographic fractionalization (HHI)						−0.08
						(0.17)
Number of organizations	0.03	0.02	0.06˙	0.06	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.05	0.06	0.16	0.13	0.06	0.12
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.27)
Group share	−0.49	−0.52˙	−0.20	−0.16	−0.36	−0.40
	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.39)
Violent conflict	−0.15	−0.19	−0.22	−0.22	−0.18	−0.16
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.30)
Power status (EPR)	−0.06	−0.06	−0.07	−0.07	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Group nightlights (log)	−0.56	−0.55	−0.23	−0.42	0.80	0.95
	(0.58)	(0.62)	(0.69)	(0.68)	(1.64)	(1.47)
N kin groups	−0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.19	−0.20	−0.12	−0.11	−0.21	−0.20
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Num. obs.	93	93	98	98	104	97
Num. groups: countries_gwid	46	46	45	45	47	44
R^2	0.74	0.75	0.72	0.71	0.69	0.67
Adj. R^2	0.37	0.38	0.38	0.37	0.33	0.28

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{˙}p < 0.1$

Table 21: Main cross sectional models from data without organizations that have committed violence and/or participated in elections

R   Robustness Tests: Differing Thresholds for Agricultural Production

Table 22 presents models were different thresholds for the calculation of the income source variables for H1 was used. Except for the differing independent variable all models are equivalent to the ones presented in Table 2 in the main article. For Models 1 and 2, agricultural income sources are present if the area used for agricultural production in the group's settlement area from Geo-EPR exceeds 15 percent, for Models 3 and 4 this value is 20 percent. In our main section this value is 10 percent.

	Threshold: 15 perc		Threshold: 20 perc	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Natural resources and agriculture	0.38˙		0.51*	
	(0.21)		(0.21)	
Neither resources nor agri (baseline: single)		−0.02		−0.14
		(0.17)		(0.14)
Resources and agri (baseline: single)		0.35*		0.43**
		(0.15)		(0.13)
Number of organizations	0.01	0.00	0.00	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.29	0.30	0.32	0.30
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Group share	−0.99**	−1.01**	−0.95**	−1.04**
	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.32)
Violent conflict	−0.09	−0.09	−0.12	−0.14
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Power status (EPR)	0.01	0.00	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Group nightlights (log)	−0.10	−0.08	−0.26	−0.28
	(0.36)	(0.42)	(0.30)	(0.34)
N kin groups	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.12	−0.13	−0.09	−0.12
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Num. obs.	138	138	138	138
Num. groups: countries_gwid	62	62	62	62
R^2	0.68	0.68	0.69	0.70
Adj. R^2	0.34	0.34	0.37	0.38

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{˙}p < 0.1$

Table 22: Cross sectional models for different thresholds of agricultural production (15 and 20 percent instead of 10)

S Robustness Tests: Linguistic Cleavages (H2)

Table 23 displays additional two-way fixed effects linear probability models testing whether linguistic fragmentation is associated with a higher probability of disagreement. The models correspond to the ones in Table 8. There is no binary variable that measures whether several linguistic segments exist as this variable is constant in many countries leading to collinearity. The number of linguistic segments and linguistic fractionalization variables are constructed via the EPR-ED dataset using the same methodology as for religious segments.

	Disagreement (1/0)		Prop. Disagreement	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Number of linguistic segments	0.09*		0.04˙	
	(0.05)		(0.02)	
Linguistic fractionalization (HHI)		−0.10		−0.07
		(0.47)		(0.25)
Number of organizations	0.05***	0.04***	0.02**	0.01˙
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.13	0.12	0.03	0.03
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Group share	−0.21	−0.28	−0.04	−0.08
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Violent conflict	−0.03	−0.05	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Power status (EPR)	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N kin groups	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.00
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Num. obs.	4093	4273	4093	4273
Num. groups: year	72	72	72	72
Num. groups: countries_gwid	68	72	68	72
R^2	0.49	0.48	0.44	0.42
Adj. R^2	0.47	0.46	0.42	0.40

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{˙}p < 0.1$

Table 23: Linear probability models for testing whether linguistic fragmentation predicts disagreement in self-determination demands

T   Robustness Tests: Including Demands for Government Inclusion

Table 24 displays cross-sectional linear (probability) models where the disagreement variable includes a fourth demand that can be made by organizations and coded in EPR-O: Inclusion of the ethnic group in government. The disagreement variables (binary/share) are calculated as described in the main paper, but simply including this fourth type of demand in the calculations. Again, we find support for H1, but for none of the other hypotheses.[1]

	Disagreement (1/0)			Prop. Disagreement		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Natural resources and agriculture	0.43*			0.19**		
	(0.17)			(0.06)		
More than one religious segment		0.08			0.01	
		(0.14)			(0.07)	
No. settlement areas			−0.00			0.00
			(0.00)			(0.00)
Number of organizations	0.01	0.03˙	0.01	−0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.12	−0.09	−0.09	0.07	0.04	0.02
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Group share	−0.78*	−0.42	−0.48˙	−0.46**	−0.26	−0.34*
	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Violent conflict	0.02	−0.11	−0.11	0.00	−0.13	−0.13
	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Power status (EPR)	−0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Group nightlights (log)	−0.12	−0.35	0.22	0.18	−0.02	0.10
	(0.41)	(0.52)	(0.71)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.40)
N kin groups	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.16	0.17	0.16	−0.05	0.02	−0.01
	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Num. obs.	138	152	161	138	152	161
Num. groups: countries_gwid	62	61	65	62	61	65
R^2	0.69	0.64	0.63	0.63	0.59	0.59
Adj. R^2	0.36	0.33	0.32	0.23	0.25	0.25

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{˙}p < 0.1$

Table 24: Cross-sectional linear probability models with disagreement variables including demands for government inclusion as a fourth type of claims

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[1]We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

U Robustness Tests: Weighting Share of Disagreement by Organizational Age

Table 25 presents cross-sectional linear models where for each organization in the share of disagreement variable is weighted by its age (i.e. the years from foundation to dissolution or last year of coding). This serves as a proxy of institutionalization, i.e. the importance of an individual organization. The weight for each organization x is calculated as follows:

$$w_x = \frac{\text{age}_x}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{age}_i},$$

where age is the age (in years) of the individual organizations in a group-organization cluster with n organizations. The results in Table 25 provide further evidence for H1 (Model 1), and again null results for H2 and H3 (Models 2 and 3).

	DV: Weighted Share of Disagreement		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Natural resources and agriculture	0.18**		
	(0.06)		
More than one religious segment		−0.01	
		(0.07)	
No. settlement areas			0.00
			(0.00)
Number of organizations	0.00	0.02*	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	0.04	0.02	−0.00
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Group share	−0.36**	−0.20	−0.28*
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Violent conflict	0.00	−0.13	−0.13
	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Power status (EPR)	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group nightlights (log)	0.08	−0.16	−0.06
	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.44)
N kin groups	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Any multiethnic organizations	−0.05	−0.02	−0.04
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Num. obs.	138	152	161
Num. groups: countries_gwid	62	61	65
R^2	0.63	0.63	0.61
Adj. R^2	0.25	0.32	0.29

$^{***}p < 0.001; ^{**}p < 0.01; ^{*}p < 0.05; ^{.}p < 0.1$

Table 25: Cross-sectional linear probability models with share of disagreement variable weighted by organizational age

V Robustness Tests: Agreement on Direction of Change

Table 26 presents cross-sectional linear (probability) models where the disagreement variable includes a fourth demand that can be made by organizations and coded in EPR-O: Inclusion of the ethnic group in government. The disagreement variable (binary) is calculated as before, however, we measure general agreement on the direction of demands:

- **Centripetal**: Moving towards the center, includes demands for government inclusion *and* no demands

- **Centrifugal**: Moving away from center, includes separatist *and* regional autonomy demands

Hence, if all organizations in a cluster either issue autonomy or separatist demands, this would be coded as agreeing (centrifugal). The results in Table 26 provide further evidence for H1 (Model 1), and again null results for H2 and H3 (Models 2 and 3).

	DV: Directional Disagreement		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Natural resources and agriculture	−0.51***		
	(0.12)		
More than one religious segment		0.01	
		(0.15)	
No. settlement areas			0.00
			(0.00)
Number of organizations	0.01	−0.02	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Regional autonomy (EPR)	−0.37*	−0.23	−0.21
	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Group share	0.93**	0.55	0.69*
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Violent conflict	0.11	0.33	0.34
	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.31)
Power status (EPR)	−0.05	−0.04	−0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Group nightlights (log)	−0.29	0.11	−0.50
	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.66)
N kin groups	0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Any multiethnic organizations	0.04	−0.02	0.02
	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Num. obs.	138	152	161
Num. groups: countries_gwid	62	61	65
R^2	0.65	0.66	0.66
Adj. R^2	0.28	0.37	0.37

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{.}p < 0.1$

Table 26: Cross-sectional linear probability models with disagreement over the direction of change (centripetal vs. centrifugal) as the dependent variable

W   Relevant Changes to Pre-Analysis Plan

The following substantive changes have been made in comparison to our pre-analysis plan/pre-registration:

1. The preregistration envisioned multilevel methods in the main specification, but we deviate from this choice for three reasons: First, the estimation of these models often did not converge; estimating a three-level nested structure (groups, countries, and years) with a relatively small sample size led to unreliable results. Second, after further consideration there was no immediate need for multilevel models as there are no country-level covariates in our preregistered models. Third, there is little variation across time in many of our variables. For instance, the dependent variable of disagreement only changes for 26 out of 213 groups across our whole observation period from 1946 until 2019. Thus, cross-sectional models should be better suited.

2. The preregistration states that we include an organization's age as a control. However, as the unit of analysis are organization-group clusters this is not possible. Aggregate measures (e.g. mean) are not informative in our view.

3. The preregistration states that we include civil war as a control. This captures the same substantial effect as the group conflict variable and would be the only country-level variable. We thus exclude it.

4. The preregistration had overlooked that the nightlight variable is not available for years prior to 1992, i.e. removing almost half of our time series due to missingness. We thus exclude the variable from all regressions using time series.

5. The preregistration states that we include groups regardless of power status. Theoretically, this does not make sense for groups that hold a monopoly over the state or are dominant. These groups are thus excluded from the analysis.

6. The preregistration did not include plans to expand our analysis of H2 with additional ED variables (linguistic segments).

References

Brown, Davis and Patrick James. 2022. "Government Religious Preference 2.0 (GRP 2.0), Regulatory Burdens.".