**Supporting information for:**

**Why Do Majoritarian Systems Benefit the Right?**

**Income Groups and Vote Choice across Different Electoral Systems**

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**APPENDIX A. Descriptive data and operazionalization**

**Figure A1. Countries and elections included in the cross-national analysis**

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**Figure A2. Distribution of right-wing vote in each country of study (cross-national analysis)**



**Figure A3. Distribution of income groups in each country of study (cross-national analysis)**

****

**Table A1. List of parties coded as right-wing in each country of study (cross-national analysis)**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PR** | **Maj.** |
| **Austria** | **Australia** |
| Austrian People's Party | Liberal Party |
| Freedom Party of Austria | National Party of Australia |
| Alliance for the Future | One Nation Party |
| Team Stronach | Christian Democratic Party |
|  | Family First Party |
|  | Katter's Australia Party |
|  | Palmer United Party |
|  | Australian Christians |
| **Belgium** | **Canada** |
| New Flemish Alliance | Conservative Party |
| Christian Democratic and Flemish | Reform Party |
| Flemish Block |  |
| Liberal Reformist Party |  |
| National Front |  |
| Christian Social Party |  |
| **Denmark** | **France** |
| Liberal Party | Union for a Popular Movement |
| Progress Party | Hunting, Fishing, Nature |
| Conservative People's Party | National Front |
| Christian Democrats | Movement for France |
| Danish People's Party |  |
| **Finland** | **UK** |
| National Coalition Party | Conservative Party |
| True Finns | UKIP |
| Christian Democrats |  |
| Liberal People's Party |  |
| Change 2011 |  |
| Freedom Party |  |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PR** | **Maj.** |
| **Germany** |  |
| Christian Democratic Union |  |
| The Republicans |  |
| National Democratic Party |  |
| Alternative for Germany |  |
| German People's Union |  |
| Ecological Democratic Party |  |
| Party of the Rule of Law |  |
| Free Voters |  |
| Animal Protection Party |  |
| Family Party |  |
| **Greece** |  |
| New Democracy |  |
| Golden Dawn |  |
| The Independent Greeks |  |
| Popular Orthodox Party |  |
| **Iceland** |  |
| Social Democratic Alliance |  |
| Right-Green People's Party |  |
| Households Party |  |
| **Ireland** |  |
| Fianna Fáil |  |
| Fine Gael |  |
| **Italy** |  |
| Forza Italia |  |
| Northern League/League |  |
| National Alliance |  |
| Christian Democracy - Network |  |
| Social Alternative |  |
| Tricolour Flame |  |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PR** | **Maj.** |
| **Netherlands** |  |
| People's Party for Freedom |  |
| Reformed Political Party |  |
| Party for Freedom |  |
| Proud of the Netherlands |  |
| One NL |  |
| List Pim Fortuyn |  |
| Livable Netherlands |  |
| Reformed Political Alliance |  |
| Reformatory Political Federation |  |
| **New Zealand** |  |
| National Party |  |
| Act New Zealand |  |
| Conservative Party |  |
| Christian Heritage Party |  |
| Kiwi Party |  |
| Family Party |  |
| Christian Coalition |  |
| **Norway** |  |
| Conservative Party |  |
| Progress Party |  |
| **Portugal** |  |
| Social Democratic Party |  |
| Democratic and Social Center |  |
| Portugal Ahead |  |
| People's Monarchist Party |  |
| Earth Party |  |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **PR** | **Maj.** |
| **Spain** |  |
| People's Party |  |
| Convergence and Union |  |
| Basque Nationalist Party |  |
| Canary Coalition |  |
| Aragoneses Party |  |
| Valencian Union |  |
| Navarrese People's Union |  |
| **Sweden** |  |
| Moderate Party |  |
| Liberal People's Party |  |
| Christian Democrats |  |
| Sweden Democrats |  |
| **Switzerland** |  |
| Swiss People's Party |  |
| The Liberals |  |
| Ticino League |  |
| Federal Democratic Union |  |
| Swiss Democrats |  |
| Freedom Party |  |
| Liberal Party |  |
| Christian People's Party |  |
| Green Liberal Party |  |
| Geneva Citizens' Movement |  |
| Radical Democratic Party |  |
| Conservative Democratic Party |  |

**Table A2. Operationalization and descriptive statistics of employed variables (cross-national analysis)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Wording / Coding** | **Mean** | **SD** | **Min** | **Max** |
| Right-wing vote | Recall vote in the last general elections (for the Lower House in all countries). Categorical variable that takes value 1 if the respondent has not voted for a liberal, social democratic, socialist, communist or radical left party, 0 otherwise. | .39 | .48 | 0 | 1 |
| Proportional Representation | Categorical variable capturing the electoral system employed in one country. It takes value 1 for all countries except for the First Past the Post (Canada and UK), and the Alternative Vote (Australia) systems. | .75 | .42 | 0 | 1 |
| Middle-income group | Categorical variable measuring the level of income of the respondent in 2 categories (0=she belongs either to the bottom quintile or the top quintile of the income scale; 1=she belongs to the three intermediate quintiles of the income scale). | .61 | .48 | 0 | 1 |
| High-income group | Categorical variable measuring the level of income of the respondent in 2 categories (0=she does not belong to the top quintile of the income scale; 1=she belongs to the top quintile of the income scale). | .19 | .39 | 0 | 1 |
| Left-right ideology | Continuous variable measuring each respondent’s placement on the 0-10 left-right scale. | 5.16 | 2.29 | 0 | 10 |
| Age (rescaled) | Age of respondents rescaled following Gelman (2008). | .01 | .48 | -.95 | 1.53 |
| Female | Categorical variable measuring the gender of the respondent in 2 categories (0=Male; 1=Female). | .49 | .49 | 0 | 1 |
| University | Categorical variable measuring the highest level of education obtained by the respondent in 2 categories (0=non-University degree; 1=University degree). | .25 | .43 | 0 | 1 |
| Social democrats’ left-right ideol. (rescaled) | Continuous variable measuring the left-right position of the main social democratic party in the country as given in Michael Laver and Ian Budge (1992) rescaled following Gelman (2008). *Source:* Comparative Manifesto Project. | .001 | .48 | -1.52 | .84 |
| Income inequality (rescaled) | Continuous variable that captures the level of income inequality within a country with the well-known Gini coefficient rescaled following Gelman (2008). *Source:* World Inequality Database. | -.08 | .44 | -.88 | .77 |

**Table A3. Operationalization and descriptive statistics of employed variables (New Zealand analysis)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Wording / Coding** | **Mean** | **SD** | | **Min** | **Max** |
| Right-wing vote | Recall (list) vote in the 1993, 1996 and 1999 general elections. Categorical variable that takes value 1 if the respondent has voted for the National party, 0 if she has voted for a different party. | .41 | .49 | | 0 | 1 |
| Right-wing vote\_1993 | Recorded vote in the 1993 general elections. Categorical variable that takes value 1 if the respondent has voted for the National party, 0 if she has voted for a different party. | .41 | .49 | | 0 | 1 |
| Right-wing vote\_1996 | Recorded list vote in the 1996 general elections. Categorical variable that takes value 1 if the respondent has voted for the National party, 0 if she has voted for a different party. | .41 | .49 | | 0 | 1 |
| Middle-income group | Categorical variable measuring the level of income of the respondent in 2 categories (0=she belongs either to the bottom tertile or the top tertile of the income scale; 1=she belongs to the intermediate tertile of the income scale). In the 1993 survey, there are 9 income categories: No income; $5,000 or less; $5,001-$15,000; $15,001-$25,000; $25,001-$30,000; $30,001-$40,000; $40,001-$50,000; $50,001-$70,000; and over $70,001. The intermediate tertile comprises respondents in the fourth and fifth groups. | .24 | .42 | | 0 | 1 |
| High-income group | Categorical variable measuring the level of income of the respondent in 2 categories (0=she belongs to the two bottom tertiles of the income scale; 1=she belongs to the top tertile of the income scale). In the 1993 survey, there are 9 income categories: No income; $5,000 or less; $5,001-$15,000; $15,001-$25,000; $25,001-$30,000; $30,001-$40,000; $40,001-$50,000; $50,001-$70,000; and over $70,001. The top tertile comprises respondents in the sixth, seventh, eighth and nineth groups. | .36 | .48 | | 0 | 1 |
| Treatment | Categorical variable that takes value 1 for the MMP/PR elections (1996 and 1999), and 0 otherwise. | .66 | .47 | | 0 | 1 |
| Treatment\_96 | Categorical variable that takes value 1 for the 1996 election (MMP/PR), and 0 otherwise. | .33 | .47 | | 0 | 1 |
| Treatment\_99 | Categorical variable that takes value 1 for the 1999 election (MMP/PR), and 0 otherwise. | .33 | .47 | | 0 | 1 |
| Day | Continuous variable capturing how many days after the election have passed when the respondent receives the questionnaire. The variable is fully factorized when estimating the models. | 15.18 | 7.93 | | 1 | 31 |
| Tax salience | Categorical variable measuring how important were tax rates when a respondent was deciding about how to vote. The variable is either grouped into 2 categories (0=not all important, not very important or moderately important; 1=very important or extremely important) or fully factorized when estimating the models. | 3.69 | .96 | | 1 | 5 |
| Tax position | Continuous variable measuring the respondents’ position regarding redistribution. It ranges from 1 (rich people should keep their wealth) to 7 (tax rich people more). The variable is fully factorized when estimating the models. | 4.49 | 1.54 | | 1 | 7 |
| Left-right ideology | Continuous variable measuring each respondent’s placement on a 1-7 left-right scale. The variable is fully factorized when estimating the models. | 4.05 | 1.26 | | 1 | 7 |
| Env.-growth attitudes (rescaled) | Continuous variable measuring the respondents’ position regarding redistribution. It ranges from 1 (increase protection of the environment) to 7 (protection of the environment should not be increased) and is rescaled following Gelman (2008) | -.01 | 0.48 | | -.95 | .92 |
| Rural-urban (rescaled) | Continuous variable measuring each respondent’s habitat size in 5 categories (1=countryside; 5=Auckland) rescaled following Gelman (2008). | .01 | .49 | | -.41 | .98 |
| Religiosity (rescaled) | Continuous variable capturing each respondent’s level of religiosity by measuring her level of Church attendance (1=never; 5=weekly) rescaled following Gelman (2008). | .06 | .48 | -.73 | | .67 |

**APPENDIX B. Cross-national analysis**

**Table B1. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.280\*\*\* (0.066) | 1.276\*\*\* (0.065) | 1.306\*\*\* (0.072) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 0.931 (0.102) | 0.872 (0.101) | 0.872 (0.161) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.870\*\*\* (0.036)** | **0.874\*\*\* (0.035)** | **0.885\* (0.043)** |
| High income | 1.567\*\*\* (0.104) | 1.564\*\*\* (0.105) | 1.508\*\*\* (0.080) |
| Income inequality |  | 0.906 (0.103) | 1.159 (0.196) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  | 0.959 (0.109) | 1.016 (0.190) |
| LR ideology |  |  | 1.857\*\*\* (0.053) |
| Age |  |  | 1.060 (0.058) |
| Female |  |  | 0.905\*\*\* (0.024) |
| University degree |  |  | 0.863\*\* (0.045) |
| Observations | 87,796 | 87,796 | 76,794 |
| Elections | 72 | 72 | 72 |
| AIC | 115,721 | 115,704.1 | 78,578.49 |
| BIC | 115,918 | 115,919.9 | 78,828.21 |
| Log-likelihood | -57,839.4 | -57,829.04 | -39,262.2 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered at the election level in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Figure B1. Estimates of the effects of “middle income\*PR” on the vote for the right excluding one country at a time**

*****Note:* All estimates are based on logistic models with aggregate-level covariates. That is, the estimates replicate the results of Model 2 of Table B1, excluding one country at a time.

**Table B2. Impact of income groups on the RILE position of the party voted for conditional on electoral system type and taking: OLS models**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.624\*\*\* (0.466) | 1.926\*\*\* (0.429) | 1.545\*\*\* (0.339) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | -11.535\*\* (3.679) | -7.655\* (2.950) | -6.532+ (3.321) |
| Middle income\*PR | **-1.212\* (0.525)** | **-1.276\*\* (0.434)** | **-0.950\* (0.378)** |
| High income | 3.337\*\*\* (0.547) | 3.862\*\*\* (0.521) | 2.896\*\*\* (0.425) |
| Income inequality |  | -1.982 (2.496) | -0.185 (2.562) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  | 14.091\*\*\* (2.304) | 14.377\*\*\* (2.479) |
| LR ideology |  |  | 17.035\*\*\* (1.205) |
| Age |  |  | 0.892\* (0.397) |
| Female |  |  | -0.964\*\*\* (0.227) |
| University degree |  |  | -1.281\*\* (0.471) |
| Constant | -4.284 (8.808) | -4.979 (3.802) | -5.686 (4.384) |
| Observations | 81,825 | 81,825 | 71,484 |
| Elections | 70 | 70 | 70 |
| AIC | 721,439.9 | 714,040.9 | 608,435 |
| BIC | 721,635.5 | 714,255.1 | 608,682.8 |
| Log-likelihood | -360,699 | -356,997.4 | -304,190.5 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered at the election level in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B3. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type: OLS models**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 0.057\*\*\* (0.012) | 0.056\*\*\* (0.012) | 0.042\*\*\* (0.009) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | -0.017 (0.026) | -0.033 (0.027) | -0.022 (0.032) |
| Middle income\*PR | **-0.032\*\* (0.010)** | **-0.031\*\* (0.009)** | **-0.021\* (0.008)** |
| High income | 0.106\*\*\* (0.015) | 0.106\*\*\* (0.016) | 0.071\*\*\* (0.009) |
| Income inequality |  | -0.023 (0.027) | 0.020 (0.029) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  | -0.009 (0.026) | 0.002 (0.032) |
| LR ideology |  |  | 0.106\*\*\* (0.003) |
| Age |  |  | 0.014 (0.009) |
| Female |  |  | -0.019\*\*\* (0.005) |
| University degree |  |  | -0.026\*\* (0.009) |
| Constant | 0.421\*\*\* (0.031) | 0.437\*\*\* (0.032) | -0.120\*\* (0.045) |
| Observations | 87,796 | 87,796 | 76,794 |
| Elections | 72 | 72 | 72 |
| AIC | 121,387.9 | 121,370.8 | 83,577.31 |
| BIC | 121,584.9 | 121,586.6 | 83,827.03 |
| Log-likelihood | -60,672.9 | -60,662.39 | -41,761.6 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered at the election level in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B4. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type: Mixed-effects linear models**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 0.053\*\*\* (0.007) | 0.053\*\*\* (0.007) | 0.036\*\*\* (0.007) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | -0.020 (0.030) | -0.022 (0.034) | -0.002 (0.035) |
| Middle income\*PR | **-0.025\*\* (0.008)** | **-0.025\*\* (0.008)** | **-0.014+ (0.008)** |
| High income | 0.108\*\*\* (0.005) | 0.108\*\*\* (0.005) | 0.070\*\*\* (0.005) |
| Income inequality |  | -0.003 (0.031) | 0.026 (0.033) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  | -0.001 (0.025) | 0.007 (0.026) |
| LR ideology |  |  | 0.108\*\*\* (0.001) |
| Age |  |  | 0.006+ (0.003) |
| Female |  |  | -0.019\*\*\* (0.003) |
| University degree |  |  | -0.024\*\*\* (0.004) |
| Constant | 0.421\*\*\* (0.051) | 0.423\*\*\* (0.054) | -0.127\* (0.057) |
| Election variance | -2.526\*\*\* (0.086) | -2.526\*\*\* (0.086) | -2.479\*\*\* (0.085) |
| Individual variance | -0.742\*\*\* (0.002) | -0.742\*\*\* (0.002) | -0.895\*\*\* (0.003) |
| Observations | 87,796 | 87,796 | 76,794 |
| Elections | 72 | 72 | 72 |
| AIC | 119,242.6 | 119,246.6 | 80,735.1 |
| BIC | 119,486.6 | 119,509.3 | 81,031.07 |
| Log-likelihood | -59,595.3 | -59,595.31 | -40,335.5 |

*Note:* Election random intercepts are included. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001.

**Table B5. Impact of income groups on the vote for the mainstream right conditional on electoral system type: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.313\*\*\*  (0.068) | 1.313\*\*\*  (0.068) | 1.340\*\*\*  (0.076) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 0.829+  (0.084) | 0.829+  (0.092) | 0.838  (0.084) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.872\*\*\***  **(0.035)** | **0.873\*\*\***  **(0.035)** | **0.887\***  **(0.043)** |
| High income | 1.672\*\*\*  (0.114) | 1.675\*\*\*  (0.115) | 1.597\*\*\*  (0.088) |
| Income inequality |  | 0.978  (0.113) | 1.252  (0.216) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  | 1.035  (0.115) | 1.094  (0.205) |
| LR ideology |  |  | 17.301\*\*\*  (2.325) |
| Age |  |  | 1.058  (0.056) |
| Female |  |  | 0.921\*\*  (0.025) |
| University degree |  |  | 0.934  (0.051) |
| Observations | 85,515 | 85,515 | 74,248 |
| Elections | 72 | 72 | 72 |
| AIC | 110,056.4 | 110,055.5 | 74,411.55 |
| BIC | 110,252.7 | 110,270.5 | 74,660.36 |
| Log-likelihood | -55,007.1 | -55,004.7 | -37,178.7 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Respondents that declare having voted for a radical right party are excluded from the analyses. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B6. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and excluding Christian-democrats: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.298\*\*\* (0.066) | 1.294\*\*\* (0.065) | 1.321\*\*\* (0.072) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 0.916 (0.101) | 0.843 (0.098) | 0.838 (0.158) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.877\*\* (0.036)** | **0.883\*\* (0.035)** | **0.892\* (0.045)** |
| High income | 1.611\*\*\* (0.102) | 1.610\*\*\* (0.104) | 1.548\*\*\* (0.083) |
| Income inequality |  | 0.852 (0.098) | 1.084 (0.188) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  | 1.002 (0.116) | 1.055 (0.212) |
| LR ideology |  |  | 16.835\*\*\* (2.136) |
| Age |  |  | 1.051 (0.058) |
| Female |  |  | 0.889\*\*\* (0.025) |
| University degree |  |  | 0.857\*\* (0.045) |
| Observations | 85,593 | 85,593 | 74,912 |
| Elections | 72 | 72 | 72 |
| AIC | 110,056.4 | 110,055.4 | 74,411.42 |
| BIC | 110,252.7 | 110,270.5 | 74,660.23 |
| Log-likelihood | -55,007.1 | -55,004.7 | -37,178.7 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Respondents that declare having voted for a Christian-democratic party are excluded from the analyses. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B7. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type with alternative operationalization of income groups: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.244\*\*\* (0.065) | 1.240\*\*\* (0.065) | 1.253\*\*\* (0.068) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 0.898 (0.097) | 0.841 (0.097) | 0.844 (0.155) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.877\*\* (0.039)** | **0.882\*\* (0.039)** | **0.895\* (0.046)** |
| High income | 1.375\*\*\* (0.077) | 1.373\*\*\* (0.078) | 1.381\*\*\* (0.066) |
| Income inequality |  | 0.903 (0.103) | 1.158 (0.196) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  | 0.959 (0.109) | 1.018 (0.190) |
| LR ideology |  |  | 16.691\*\*\* (2.153) |
| Age |  |  | 1.067 (0.059) |
| Female |  |  | 0.905\*\*\* (0.024) |
| University degree |  |  | 0.872\*\* (0.046) |
| Observations | 87,796 | 87,796 | 76,794 |
| Elections | 72 | 72 | 72 |
| AIC | 115,852.5 | 115,834.5 | 78,605.2 |
| BIC | 116,049.6 | 116,050.3 | 78,855 |
| Log-likelihood | -57,905.26 | -57,894.26 | -39,275.6 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered at the election level in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Income groups are coded as follows: high income (top and second quintiles), middle income (third and fourth quintiles) and low income (bottom quintile). Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B8. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type excluding majoritarian systems that are not First-Past-the-Post: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.308\*\*\* (0.100) | 1.307\*\*\* (0.100) | 1.424\*\*\* (0.125) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 1.287\* (0.127) | 1.343+ (0.230) | 1.677+ (0.468) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.864\* (0.057)** | **0.862\* (0.056)** | **0.807\*\* (0.066)** |
| High income | 1.609\*\*\* (0.118) | 1.604\*\*\* (0.120) | 1.517\*\*\* (0.088) |
| Income inequality |  | 1.062 (0.154) | 1.428+ (0.303) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  | 0.919 (0.113) | 0.948 (0.190) |
| LR ideology |  |  | 1.864\*\*\* (0.058) |
| Age |  |  | 1.052 (0.063) |
| Female |  |  | 0.892\*\*\* (0.026) |
| University degree |  |  | 0.836\*\*\* (0.042) |
| Observations | 78,462 | 78,462 | 68,998 |
| Elections | 67 | 67 | 67 |
| AIC | 102,448.9 | 102,429.8 | -34,854.63 |
| BIC | 102,643.6 | 102,643 | 69,763.27 |
| Log-likelihood | -51,203.4 | -51,191.89 | -70,010.1 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Observations from Australia and France are not taken into consideration. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B9. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and controlling for the LR position of the main center-right party: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Aggregate-level controls | 2.  Individual-level controls | 3. Aggregate-level controls | 4. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.276\*\*\* (0.066) | 1.304\*\*\* (0.076) | 1.273\*\*\* (0.066) | 1.301\*\*\* (0.076) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 0.969 (0.103) | 1.082 (0.191) | 0.946 (0.108) | 1.053 (0.198) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.875\*\* (0.036)** | **0.889\* (0.045)** | **0.877\*\* (0.036)** | **0.891\* (0.045)** |
| High income | 1.561\*\*\* (0.104) | 1.492\*\*\* (0.080) | 1.554\*\*\* (0.105) | 1.488\*\*\* (0.081) |
| Income inequality | 0.941 (0.109) | 1.265 (0.217) | 0.932 (0.109) | 1.256 (0.218) |
| Center-right’s LR | 1.159 (0.117) | 1.522\*\* (0.203) | 1.182 (0.121) | 1.554\*\* (0.220) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  |  | 0.920 (0.102) | 0.914 (0.161) |
| LR ideology |  | 17.226\*\*\* (2.162) |  | 17.205\*\*\* (2.164) |
| Age |  | 1.046 (0.057) |  | 1.043 (0.056) |
| Female |  | 0.909\*\*\* (0.024) |  | 0.909\*\*\* (0.024) |
| University degree |  | 0.855\*\* (0.043) |  | 0.851\*\* (0.043) |
| Observations | 87,796 | 76,794 | 87,796 | 76,794 |
| Elections | 72 | 72 | 72 | 72 |
| AIC | 115,637 | 78,201.82 | 115,618.2 | 78,188.34 |
| BIC | 115,852.8 | 78,451.54 | 115,843.4 | 78,447.31 |
| Log-likelihood | -57,795.5 | -39,073.91 | -57,785.1 | -39,066.17 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered at the election level in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B10. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and controlling for party system fragmentation: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.276\*\*\* (0.065) | 1.309\*\*\* (0.071) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 0.924 (0.107) | 0.924 (0.172) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.874\*\*\* (0.035)** | **0.884\* (0.043)** |
| High income | 1.569\*\*\* (0.106) | 1.518\*\*\* (0.081) |
| Income inequality | 0.869 (0.095) | 1.115 (0.192) |
| Social democrats’ LR | 0.913 (0.103) | 0.972 (0.181) |
| Effective number of electoral parties | 0.924\* (0.036) | 0.928 (0.056) |
| LR ideology |  | 16.601\*\*\* (2.136) |
| Age |  | 1.064 (0.058) |
| Female |  | 0.905\*\*\* (0.024) |
| University degree |  | 0.859\*\* (0.044) |
| Observations | 87,796 | 76,794 |
| Elections | 72 | 72 |
| AIC | 115,591.7 | 78,512.11 |
| BIC | 115,816.9 | 78,771.07 |
| Log-likelihood | -57,771.84 | -39,228.05 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered at the election level in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B11. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and including election fixed effects: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate |
|  |  |
| Middle income | 1.265\*\*\*  (0.064) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 0.881\*\*\* (0.022) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.896\*\***  **(0.036)** |
| High income | 1.601\*\*\* (0.109) |
| Observations | 87,796 |
| Elections | 72 |
| AIC | 113,217.9 |
| BIC | 113,246 |
| Log-likelihood | -56,605.9 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered at the election level in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Election fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B12. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and including presidential elections from France and the US: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.270\*\*\* (0.057) | 1.270\*\*\* (0.056) | 1.268\*\*\* (0.061) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 0.980 (0.103) | 0.899 (0.101) | 0.826 (0.150) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.893\*\* (0.034)** | **0.896\*\* (0.033)** | **0.958 (0.051)** |
| High income | 1.617\*\*\* (0.106) | 1.617\*\*\* (0.106) | 1.607\*\*\* (0.109) |
| Income inequality |  | 0.888 (0.086) | 0.851 (0.147) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  | 0.947 (0.097) | 0.896 (0.139) |
| LR ideology |  |  | 1.785\*\*\* (0.059) |
| Age |  |  | 1.119\* (0.063) |
| Female |  |  | 0.891\*\*\* (0.025) |
| University degree |  |  | 0.911+ (0.051) |
| Observations | 93,828 | 93,828 | 82,361 |
| Elections | 77 | 77 | 77 |
| AIC | 123,742.2 | 123,693.9 | 85,971.66 |
| BIC | 123,950.1 | 123,920.7 | 86,232.61 |
| Log-likelihood | -61,849 | -61,822.94 | -42,957.83 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Observations from France in 2012 and the US 1996, 2004, 2008 and 2012 are taken into consideration. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B13. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and using Iversen and Soskice’s sample: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.312\*\*\* (0.072) | 1.312\*\*\* (0.072) | 1.321\*\*\* (0.076) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 0.918 (0.110) | 0.875 (0.104) | 0.907 (0.160) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.892\*\* (0.037)** | **0.896\*\* (0.037)** | **0.911+ (0.044)** |
| High income | 1.644\*\*\* (0.126) | 1.655\*\*\* (0.128) | 1.563\*\*\* (0.096) |
| Income inequality |  | 0.844 (0.099) | 1.166 (0.193) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  | 1.136 (0.135) | 1.469\*\* (0.215) |
| LR ideology |  |  | 1.831\*\*\* (0.059) |
| Age |  |  | 1.004 (0.064) |
| Female |  |  | 0.904\*\*\* (0.027) |
| University degree |  |  | 0.861\*\* (0.047) |
| Observations | 70,429 | 70,429 | 60,428 |
| Elections | 52 | 52 | 52 |
| AIC | 92,511.28 | 92,421.19 | 62,580.37 |
| BIC | 92,694.52 | 92,622.76 | 62,814.61 |
| Log-likelihood | -46,235.6 | -46,188.6 | -31,264.18 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. The US is added, and Greece, Portugal, Spain, Iceland and Switzerland are excluded from the analyses. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B14. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and excluding Third Wave democracies: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.288\*\*\* (0.067) | 1.284\*\*\* (0.066) | 1.307\*\*\* (0.069) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 0.941 (0.112) | 0.848 (0.113) | 0.820 (0.170) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.873\*\*\* (0.034)** | **0.875\*\*\* (0.034)** | **0.881\*\* (0.041)** |
| High income | 1.586\*\*\* (0.110) | 1.585\*\*\* (0.111) | 1.518\*\*\* (0.083) |
| Income inequality |  | 0.856 (0.107) | 1.156 (0.228) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  | 0.949 (0.114) | 0.995 (0.196) |
| LR ideology |  |  | 1.836\*\*\* (0.055) |
| Age |  |  | 1.050 (0.062) |
| Female |  |  | 0.910\*\*\* (0.026) |
| University degree |  |  | 0.840\*\* (0.045) |
| Observations | 80,519 | 80,519 | 70,033 |
| Elections | 61 | 61 | 61 |
| AIC | 106,173.9 | 106,138.1 | 72,432.84 |
| BIC | 106,369.1 | 106,351.9 | 72,680.07 |
| Log-likelihood | -53,065.9 | -53,046.06 | -36,189.42 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Greece, Portugal and Spain are excluded from the analyses. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B15. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and excluding Iceland and Switzerland: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.302\*\*\* (0.071) | 1.302\*\*\* (0.071) | 1.322\*\*\* (0.078) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 0.911 (0.100) | 0.884 (0.092) | 0.931 (0.151) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.885\*\* (0.038)** | **0.889\*\* (0.038)** | **0.905\* (0.045)** |
| High income | 1.620\*\*\* (0.118) | 1.628\*\*\* (0.120) | 1.556\*\*\* (0.092) |
| Income inequality |  | 0.880 (0.094) | 1.130 (0.171) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  | 1.130 (0.123) | 1.456\*\* (0.196) |
| LR ideology |  |  | 1.854\*\*\* (0.056) |
| Age |  |  | 1.020 (0.060) |
| Female |  |  | 0.897\*\*\* (0.026) |
| University degree |  |  | 0.885\* (0.046) |
| Observations | 77,706 | 77,706 | 67,189 |
| Elections | 63 | 63 | 63 |
| AIC | 102,061.6 | 101,993.4 | 68,742.64 |
| BIC | 102,246.8 | 102,197.1 | 68,979.64 |
| Log-likelihood | -51,010.8 | -50,974.69 | -34,345.32 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Iceland and Switzerland are excluded because they were not in Iversen and Soskice’s original piece. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B16. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and following Iversen and Soskice’s codification: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Bivariate | 2. Aggregate-level controls | 3. Individual-level controls |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.273\*\*\* (0.066) | 1.270\*\*\* (0.065) | 1.306\*\*\* (0.072) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 0.945 (0.102) | 0.902 (0.106) | 0.872 (0.161) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.871\*\*\* (0.036)** | **0.874\*\*\* (0.035)** | **0.885\* (0.043)** |
| High income | 1.554\*\*\* (0.102) | 1.551\*\*\* (0.103) | 1.508\*\*\* (0.080) |
| Income inequality |  | 0.933 (0.107) | 1.159 (0.196) |
| Social democrats’ LR |  | 0.967 (0.111) | 1.016 (0.190) |
| LR ideology |  |  | 1.857\*\*\* (0.053) |
| Age |  |  | 1.060 (0.058) |
| Female |  |  | 0.905\*\*\* (0.024) |
| University degree |  |  | 0.863\*\* (0.045) |
| Observations | 87,796 | 87,796 | 76,794 |
| Elections | 72 | 72 | 72 |
| AIC | 115,703.3 | 115,683.3 | 78,620.4 |
| BIC | 115,900.3 | 115,899.1 | 78,870.12 |
| Log-likelihood | -57,830.6 | -57,818.6 | -39,283.2 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered by election in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. Contrary to Iversen and Soskice (2006), Ireland uses the Single Transferable Vote and has been considered as proportional in the other parts of the article. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B17. Impact of income groups on the vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and level of economic inequality: Logistic models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Aggregate-level controls  (Low Ec. Ineq.) | 2.  Individual-level controls  (Low Ec. Ineq.) | 3. Aggregate-level controls  (High Ec. Ineq.) | 4. Individual-level controls  (High Ec. Ineq.) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 1.186\*  (0.093) | 1.117+  (0.074) | 1.258\*\*  (0.100) | 1.415\*\*\*  (0.111) |
| Proportional Representation (PR) | 0.921  (0.220) | 0.880  (0.358) | 1.019  (0.133) | 1.264  (0.189) |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.961**  **(0.069)** | **0.981**  **(0.062)** | **0.881\***  **(0.055)** | **0.888+**  **(0.059)** |
| High income | 1.680\*\*\* (0.108) | 1.419\*\*\* (0.067) | 1.470\*\* (0.184) | 1.693\*\*\* (0.180) |
| Income inequality | 0.941 (0.109) | 0.932 (0.109) | 1.265 (0.217) | 1.256 (0.218) |
| Social democrats’ LR | 0.887 (0.163) | 0.791  (0.233) | 1.136  (0.125) | 1.539\*\*\*  (0.196) |
| LR ideology |  | 19.684\*\*\* (3.681) |  | 15.234\*\*\* (2.859) |
| Age |  | 0.947 (0.063) |  | 1.173\* (0.089) |
| Female |  | 0.863\*\*\* (0.032) |  | 0.947+ (0.031) |
| University degree |  | 0.894\* (0.048) |  | 0.839\* (0.059) |
| Observations | 45,565 | 42,588 | 42,231 | 34,206 |
| Elections | 38 | 38 | 34 | 34 |
| AIC | 59,284.07 | 41,983.58 | 55,907.96 | 35,843.46 |
| BIC | 59,406.25 | 42,139.45 | 56,046.37 | 36,012.26 |
| Log-likelihood | -29,628.03 | -20,973.79 | -27,937.98 | -17,901.73 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered at the election level in parentheses. + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001. High and low economic inequality depends on falling above or below a pre-tax Gini coefficient of 0.45, which is the median value of the distribution. Year fixed effects included but not shown.

**APPENDIX C. New Zealand analysis**

**Table C1. Impact of income groups on vote for the right conditional on electoral system type: Logit models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Short-term (Treatment=1996) | 2. Long-term (Treatment=1996+1999) | 3. Long-term het. (Treatment=1996 or 1999) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 2.30+ | 2.29+ | 2.29+ |
|  | (1.06) | (1.03) | (1.03) |
| PR (MMP) electoral system | 0.82 | 0.88 |  |
|  | (0.27) | (0.22) |  |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.33\*** | **0.39\*** |  |
|  | **(0.16)** | **(0.18)** |  |
| High income | 3.81\*\* | 3.52\*\*\* | 3.52\*\*\* |
|  | (1.56) | (1.28) | (1.28) |
| 1996 elections (PR) |  |  | 0.96 |
|  |  |  | (0.27) |
| 1999 elections (PR) |  |  | 0.79 |
|  |  |  | (0.22) |
| Middle income\*1996 elections (PR) |  |  | **0.34\*** |
|  |  |  | **(0.16)** |
| Middle income\*1999 elections (PR) |  |  | **0.46** |
|  |  |  | **(0.25)** |
| Environment-growth attitudes | 1.91+ | 1.87+ | 1.88+ |
|  | (0.66) | (0.63) | (0.63) |
| Religiosity | 2.12\* | 2.34\*\* | 2.34\*\* |
|  | (0.69) | (0.72) | (0.72) |
| Rural-urban | 0.76 | 0.81 | 0.80 |
|  | (0.24) | (0.25) | (0.25) |
| Observations | 514 | 771 | 771 |
| Individuals | 257 | 257 | 257 |
| AIC | 496.1785 | 698.5164 | 702.1459 |
| BIC | 708.2897 | 930.9008 | 943.8256 |
| Log-likelihood | -198.0893 | -299.2582 | -299.0729 |

*Note:* Figures 3 and 4 are based on these logistic models capturing the effect of belonging to the middle-income group on voting for the right depending on electoral system type (FPTP in 1993 and MMP in 1996 and 1999); Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Model 1 only covers 1993 and 1996 elections, whereas Models 2 and 3 also add the 1999 elections; Fully factorized controls for left-right ideology, attitudes towards redistribution, salience of tax rates and days after the elections included but not shown.

**Table C2. Impact of income groups on vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and tax rates salience: Logit models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Non-salient | 2. Salient | 3. Position |
|  |  |  |  |
| Vote 1993 elections | 43.94\*\* | 249.29\*\*\* | 36.26\*\*\* |
|  | (55.66) | (280.95) | (18.29) |
| Middle income | **1.59** | **0.06\*\*** | **3.90** |
|  | **(1.81)** | **(0.06)** | **(7.59)** |
| High income | 1.38 | 0.31 | 0.52 |
|  | (1.79) | (0.32) | (0.30) |
| Pro-redistribution attitudes |  |  | 0.70+ |
|  |  |  | (0.14) |
| Middle income\*Pro-redistr. |  |  | **0.56** |
|  |  |  | **(0.23)** |
| Environment-growth attitudes | 8.64\* | 4.85\* | 3.52\*\* |
|  | (8.75) | (3.43) | (1.57) |
| Rural-urban | 0.42 | 1.42 | 1.51 |
|  | (0.57) | (1.11) | (0.76) |
| Religiosity | 7.21 | 1.62 | 2.02 |
|  | (10.39) | (1.17) | (0.92) |
| Female | 1.12 | 0.81 | 0.82 |
|  | (1.21) | (0.59) | (0.37) |
| Age | 0.82 | 0.20\* | 0.49 |
|  | (0.92) | (0.16) | (0.22) |
| University degree | 1.31 | 7.22+ | 2.19 |
|  | (2.10) | (8.25) | (1.51) |
| Observations | 98 | 182 | 321 |
| AIC | 102.7539 | 159.833 | 265.2243 |
| BIC | 172.548 | 268.7693 | 416.0819 |
| Log-likelihood | -24.37695 | -45.91651 | -92.6121 |

*Note:* Figure 5 is based on Models 1 and 2 capturing the effect of belonging to the middle-income group on voting for the right depending on tax salience (0=moderately important, not very important or not at all important; 1=extremely important or very important); Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Fully factorized controls for left-right ideology, attitudes towards redistribution, and days after the elections included but not shown. We also control for gender (female), age and university degree.

**Figure C1. Marginal effects of middle-income group on vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and tax rates position**

*Note:* Logit models based on Model 3 of Table C2 capturing the effect (with 90% confidence intervals) of belonging to the middle-income group on voting for the right (National) in 1996 (MMP) controlling for the vote (FPP) in 1993 and conditional on tax position (continuous scale from 1 to 7 where 1 means that the respondent thinks taxes are too low and 7 means they are too high). The reference category is low-income group. These models include control variables at the individual level (specially, high-income group).

**Table C3. Impact of income groups on vote for the right conditional on electoral system type: OLS models**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Short-term (Treatment=1996) | 2. Long-term (Treatment=1996+1999) | 3. Long-term het. (Treatment=1996 or 1999) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 0.11+ | 0.10+ | 0.10+ |
|  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| PR (MMP) electoral system | -0.04 | -0.04 |  |
|  | (0.04) | (0.03) |  |
| Middle income\*PR | **-0.13\*** | **-0.11+** |  |
|  | **(0.06)** | **(0.06)** |  |
| High income | 0.18\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| 1996 elections (PR) |  |  | -0.03 |
|  |  |  | (0.04) |
| 1999 elections (PR) |  |  | -0.06 |
|  |  |  | (0.04) |
| Middle income\*1996 elections (PR) |  |  | **-0.12\*** |
|  |  |  | **(0.06)** |
| Middle income\*1999 elections (PR) |  |  | **-0.09** |
|  |  |  | **(0.07)** |
| Environment-growth attitudes | 0.08+ | 0.08+ | 0.08+ |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Religiosity | 0.10\* | 0.11\*\* | 0.11\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Rural-urban | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Constant | 0.92\*\*\* | 0.77\*\*\* | 0.77\*\*\* |
|  | (0.26) | (0.19) | (0.20) |
| Observations | 514 | 771 | 771 |
| Individuals | 257 | 257 | 257 |
| AIC | 507.7117 | 719.7895 | 723.3029 |
| BIC | 719.8229 | 952.1739 | 964.9827 |
| Log-likelihood | -203.8558 | -309.8947 | -309.6515 |

*Note:* OLS coefficients (linear probability models) with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Model 1 only covers 1993 and 1996 elections, whereas Models 2 and 3 also add the 1999 elections; Fully factorized controls for left-right ideology, attitudes towards redistribution, salience of tax rates and days after the elections included but not shown.

**Table C4. Impact of income groups on vote for the right (including Act in 1996 and 1999) conditional on electoral system type: Logit models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Short-term (Treatment=1996) | 2. Long-term (Treatment=1996+1999) | 3. Long-term het. (Treatment=1996 or 1999) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 2.46\* | 2.47\* | 2.45\* |
|  | (1.00) | (1.01) | (1.01) |
| PR (MMP) electoral system | 0.90 | 1.04 |  |
|  | (0.28) | (0.24) |  |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.47**+ | **0.51**+ |  |
|  | **(0.19)** | **(0.19)** |  |
| High income | 3.31\*\*\* | 3.05\*\*\* | 3.02\*\*\* |
|  | (1.19) | (1.01) | (1.00) |
| 1996 elections (PR) |  |  | 1.19 |
|  |  |  | (0.32) |
| 1999 elections (PR) |  |  | 0.89 |
|  |  |  | (0.22) |
| Middle income\*1996 elections (PR) |  |  | **0.48+** |
|  |  |  | **(0.19)** |
| Middle income\*1999 elections (PR) |  |  | **0.55** |
|  |  |  | **(0.23)** |
| Environment-growth attitudes | 2.05\* | 1.82\* | 1.82\* |
|  | (0.62) | (0.53) | (0.53) |
| Religiosity | 1.56 | 1.70+ | 1.71+ |
|  | (0.44) | (0.48) | (0.48) |
| Rural-urban | 0.68 | 0.70 | 0.70 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.19) |
| Observations | 602 | 903 | 903 |
| Individuals | 301 | 301 | 301 |
| AIC | 596.7447 | 836.5527 | 839.6474 |
| BIC | 816.7575 | 1,076.839 | 1,089.545 |
| Log-likelihood | -248.3723 | -368.2763 | -367.8237 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Model 1 only covers 1993 and 1996 elections, whereas Models 2 and 3 also add the 1999 elections; Fully factorized controls for left-right ideology, attitudes towards redistribution, salience of tax rates and days after the elections included but not shown.

**Table C5. Impact of income groups on vote for the right conditional on electoral system type: Logit models (alternative operationalization of middle income group)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Short-term (Treatment=1996) | 2. Long-term (Treatment=1996+1999) | 3. Long-term het. (Treatment=1996 or 1999) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 2.67\* | 2.73\* | 2.72\* |
|  | (1.14) | (1.11) | (1.11) |
| PR (MMP) electoral system | 0.82 | 0.90 |  |
|  | (0.28) | (0.24) |  |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.45+** | **0.49+** |  |
|  | **(0.20)** | **(0.19)** |  |
| High income | 3.35\*\* | 3.21\*\* | 3.19\*\* |
|  | (1.51) | (1.31) | (1.30) |
| 1996 elections (PR) |  |  | 0.96 |
|  |  |  | (0.29) |
| 1999 elections (PR) |  |  | 0.83 |
|  |  |  | (0.24) |
| Middle income\*1996 elections (PR) |  |  | **0.47+** |
|  |  |  | **(0.20)** |
| Middle income\*1999 elections (PR) |  |  | **0.52** |
|  |  |  | **(0.22)** |
| Environment-growth attitudes | 1.84+ | 1.86+ | 1.86+ |
|  | (0.63) | (0.62) | (0.62) |
| Religiosity | 1.88\* | 2.05\* | 2.05\* |
|  | (0.59) | (0.61) | (0.61) |
| Rural-urban | 0.80 | 0.82 | 0.82 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.25) | (0.25) |
| Observations | 514 | 771 | 771 |
| Elections | 257 | 257 | 257 |
| AIC | 500.1942 | 705.4574 | 709.301 |
| BIC | 712.3053 | 937.8418 | 950.9808 |
| Log-likelihood | -200.0971 | -302.7287 | -302.6505 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Model 1 only covers 1993 and 1996 elections, whereas Models 2 and 3 also add the 1999 elections; Fully factorized controls for left-right ideology, attitudes towards redistribution, salience of tax rates and days after the elections included but not shown. Like in the CSES analyses, the income distribution is divided into five quintiles and the intermediate three are respondents that are considered as middle-income, whereas the respondents in the top (bottom) quintile are considered as high-income (low-income).

**Table C6. Impact of income groups on vote for the right conditional on electoral system type: Logit models (additional control variables)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Short-term (Treatment=1996) | 2. Long-term (Treatment=1996+1999) | 3. Long-term het. (Treatment=1996 or 1999) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 2.32+ | 2.32+ | 2.32+ |
|  | (1.08) | (1.06) | (1.06) |
| PR (MMP) electoral system | 0.84 | 0.87 |  |
|  | (0.28) | (0.22) |  |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.33\*** | **0.40\*** |  |
|  | **(0.16)** | **(0.18)** |  |
| High income | 3.88\*\* | 3.63\*\* | 3.63\*\* |
|  | (1.82) | (1.48) | (1.48) |
| 1996 elections (PR) |  |  | 0.94 |
|  |  |  | (0.27) |
| 1999 elections (PR) |  |  | 0.80 |
|  |  |  | (0.22) |
| Middle income\*1996 elections (PR) |  |  | **0.34\*** |
|  |  |  | **(0.16)** |
| Middle income\*1999 elections (PR) |  |  | **0.46** |
|  |  |  | **(0.26)** |
| Environment-growth attitudes | 1.82+ | 1.84+ | 1.85+ |
|  | (0.63) | (0.60) | (0.60) |
| Religiosity | 2.03\* | 2.17\* | 2.17\* |
|  | (0.70) | (0.70) | (0.70) |
| Rural-urban | 0.73 | 0.74 | 0.74 |
|  | (0.24) | (0.24) | (0.24) |
| Female | 1.13 | 1.28 | 1.28 |
|  | (0.39) | (0.41) | (0.41) |
| Age | 1.16 | 1.10 | 1.10 |
|  | (0.41) | (0.36) | (0.36) |
| University degree | 1.65 | 1.71 | 1.71 |
|  | (0.77) | (0.75) | (0.75) |
| Observations | 508 | 762 | 762 |
| Elections | 254 | 254 | 254 |
| AIC | 492.4207 | 690.1611 | 693.8402 |
| BIC | 716.6362 | 935.8663 | 948.8172 |
| Log-likelihood | -193.2103 | -292.0806 | -291.9201 |

*Note:* Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Model 1 only covers 1993 and 1996 elections, whereas Models 2 and 3 also add the 1999 elections; Fully factorized controls for left-right ideology, attitudes towards redistribution, salience of tax rates and days after the elections included but not shown.

**Table C7. Impact of income groups on left-right ideology conditional on electoral system type: Logit models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Short-term (Treatment=1996) | 2. Long-term (Treatment=1996+1999) | 3. Long-term het. (Treatment=1996 or 1999) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Middle income | 0.93 | 0.89 | 0.89 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.16) | (0.16) |
| PR (MMP) electoral system | 0.97 | 0.94 |  |
|  | (0.10) | (0.07) |  |
| Middle income\*PR | **0.97** | **1.01** |  |
|  | **(0.11)** | **(0.09)** |  |
| High income | 1.02 | 1.06 | 1.06 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.17) |
| 1996 elections (PR) |  |  | 0.97 |
|  |  |  | (0.08) |
| 1999 elections |  |  | 0.89 |
|  |  |  | (0.08) |
| Middle income\*1996 elections (PR) |  |  | **1.00** |
|  |  |  | **(0.10)** |
| Middle income\*1999 elections (PR) |  |  | **1.02** |
|  |  |  | **(0.11)** |
| Environment-growth attitudes | 1.08 | 1.08 | 1.08 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.17) | (0.17) |
| Religiosity | 1.34\* | 1.37\* | 1.36\* |
|  | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.18) |
| Rural-urban | 0.95 | 0.92 | 0.92 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| Observations | 514 | 771 | 771 |
| Individuals | 257 | 257 | 257 |
| AIC | 1,631.078 | 2,412.732 | 2,416.294 |
| BIC | 1,826.22 | 2,626.525 | 2,639.383 |
| Log-likelihood | -769.539 | -1,160.366 | -1,160.147 |

*Note:* Logistic models capturing the effect of belonging to the middle-income group on respondents’ left-right position depending on electoral system type (FPTP in 1993 and MMP in 1996 and 1999); Odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Model 1 only covers 1993 and 1996 elections, whereas Models 2 and 3 also add the 1999 elections; Fully factorized controls for attitudes towards redistribution, salience of tax rates and days after the elections included but not shown.

**Table C8. Impact of income groups (high income) on vote for the right conditional on electoral system type: Logit models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Short-term (Treatment=1996) | 2. Long-term (Treatment=1996+1999) | 3. Long-term het. (Treatment=1996 or 1999) |
|  |  |  |  |
| High income | 4.16\*\* | 3.67\*\* | 3.63\*\* |
|  | (1.83) | (1.55) | (1.54) |
| Middle income | 1.35 | 1.24 | 1.24 |
|  | (0.52) | (0.46) | (0.46) |
| PR (MMP) electoral system | 0.65 | 0.69 |  |
|  | (0.23) | (0.20) |  |
| High income\*PR | **0.77** | **0.91** |  |
|  | **(0.35)** | **(0.33)** |  |
| 1996 elections (PR) |  |  | 0.74 |
|  |  |  | (0.24) |
| 1999 elections |  |  | 0.64 |
|  |  |  | (0.21) |
| High income\*1996 elections (PR) |  |  | **0.88** |
|  |  |  | **(0.37)** |
| High income\*1999 elections (PR) |  |  | **0.96** |
|  |  |  | **(0.39)** |
| Environment-growth attitudes | 1.86+ | 1.86+ | 1.86+ |
|  | (0.63) | (0.63) | (0.62) |
| Religiosity | 2.08\* | 2.29\*\* | 2.29\*\* |
|  | (0.67) | (0.71) | (0.71) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 514 | 771 | 771 |
| Individuals | 257 | 257 | 257 |
| AIC | 499.3003 | 701.8691 | 705.696 |
| BIC | 711.4115 | 934.2535 | 947.3758 |
| Log-likelihood | -199.6501 | -300.9345 | -300.848 |

*Note:* Logistic models capturing the effect of belonging to the middle-income group on voting for the right depending on electoral system type (FPTP in 1993 and MMP in 1996 and 1999); Odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Model 1 only covers 1993 and 1996 elections, whereas Models 2 and 3 also add the 1999 elections; Fully factorized controls for left-right ideology, attitudes towards redistribution, salience of tax rates and days after the elections included but not shown.

**Table C9. Impact of income groups on vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and tax rates salience (alternative and continuous operationalizations): Logit models (Odds ratios)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Alternative | 2. Continuous |
|  |  |  |
| Vote 1993 elections | 35.33\*\*\* | 49.23\*\*\* |
|  | (16.95) | (26.44) |
| **Middle income** | **0.31\*** | **0.23+** |
|  | **(0.17)** | **(0.17)** |
| High income | 0.40+ | 0.32\* |
|  | (0.22) | (0.18) |
| Salient | 0.90 |  |
|  | (0.48) |  |
| Medium-salient |  | 1.01 |
|  |  | (0.52) |
| High-salient |  | 0.80 |
|  |  |  |
| Middle income\*Salient | **0.02\*** |  |
|  | **(0.04)** |  |
| Middle income\*Medium-salient |  | **1.48** |
|  |  | **(1.47)** |
| Middle income\*High-salient |  | **0.03+** |
|  |  | **(0.06)** |
| Female | 1.32 | 1.12 |
|  | (0.52) | (0.46) |
| Age | 0.48+ | 0.36\* |
|  | (0.20) | (0.17) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 351 | 332 |
| AIC | 292.114 | 285.0183 |
| BIC | 438.8239 | 437.2237 |
| Log-likelihood | -108.057 | -102.5091 |

*Note:* These logistic models capture the effect of belonging to the middle-income group on voting for the right depending on an alternative operationalization of tax salience based on the question “Here are a number of policies which some people think might help solve New Zealand’s economic problems. For each one, please indicate whether you would support such a policy or oppose it, and if you feel strongly about it. Or don´t you have an opinion”. The answer options are: Strongly support, Support, Neutral, Oppose, Strongly Oppose and Can´t Say. In the first panel, “Non-salient taxes” takes value 1 if the respondent does not choose any of the “Strongly” options and “Salient Taxes” is otherwise. For the second panel, we create a “continuous” variable that still captures salience in a slightly different way: Non-salient taxes (“Neutral” or “Can´t Say”), Medium-salient taxes (“Support” or “Oppose”) and Salient taxes (“Strongly Support” or “Strongly Oppose”). Odds ratios with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses; + p<0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001; Fully factorized controls for left-right ideology, attitudes towards redistribution, and days after the elections included but not shown. We also control for gender (female), age and university degree.

**Figure C2. Impact of income groups on vote for the right conditional on electoral system type and tax rates salience (alternative and continuous operationalizations of tax salience): Logit models (Odds ratios)**

*Note:* See footnote of Table C9.