

# **Online Appendix for**


Coup-Proofing: Latent Concept and Measurement

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
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Table 1: List of countries in IRT sample

Name of the Country	Years	Name of the Country	Years
Cuba	1965—2005	Haiti	1965—2005
Dominican Republic	1965—2005	Mexico	1965—2005
Guatemala	1965—2005	Honduras	1965—2005
El Salvador	1965—2005	Nicaragua	1965—2005
Panama	1965—2005	Ecuador	1965—2005
Peru	1965—2005	Brazil	1965—2005
Bolivia	1965—2005	Chile	1965—2005
Argentina	1965—2005	Spain	1965—2005
Portugal	1965—2005	Poland	1965—2005
Hungary	1965—2005	Czechoslovakia	1965—2005
Yugoslavia	1965—2005	Greece	1965—2005
Bulgaria	1965—2005	Romania	1965—2005
Russia	1965—2005	Georgia	1991—2005
Azerbaijan	1991—2005	Mali	1965—2005
Benin	1965—2005	Niger	1965—2005
Ivory Coast	1965—2005	Liberia	1965—2005
Sierra Leone	1965—2005	Ghana	1965—2005
Cameroon	1965—2005	Nigeria	1965—2005
Central African Republic	1965—2005	Chad	1965—2005
Uganda	1965—2005	Tanzania	1965—2005
Burundi	1965—2005	Rwanda	1965—2005
Djibouti	1977—2005	Ethiopia	1965—2005
Angola	1975—2005	Mozambique	1975—2005
South Africa	1965—2005	Swaziland	1968—2005
Morocco	1965—2005	Algeria	1965—2005
Tunisia	1965—2005	Sudan	1965—2005
Iran	1965—2005	Turkey	1965—2005
Iraq	1965—2005	Egypt	1965—2005
Syria	1965—2005	Lebanon	1965—2005
Jordan	1965—2005	Saudi Arabia	1965—2005
Bahrain	1971—2005	Afghanistan	1965—2005
Tajikistan	1991—2005	Kazakhstan	1991—2005
China	1965—2005	South Korea	1965—2005
Pakistan	1965—2005	Bangladesh	1971—2005
Myanmar	1965—2005	Sri Lanka	1965—2005
Nepal	1965—2005	Cambodia	1965—2005
Malaysia	1965—2005	Philippines	1965—2005
Indonesia	1965—2005	Fiji	1965—2005



(a) Item Easiness



(b) Item Discrimination

Figure 1: Estimates of easiness (a) and discrimination (b) parameters for each of the 13 indicators in the IRT Model. Dots represent means of posterior distribution, and bands represent 2.5%–97.5% highest posterior density credible intervals.




Figure 2: Correlations between coup-proofing and civilian control and power consolidation (Exclusion of Foreign, Justice, and Non-Security Cabinet Positions)

Table 2: The Effects of Coup-Proofing on Military Coups, 1965—2005 (Included GDP and Democracy Control)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Attempt	Success	Attempt	Success	Attempt	Success	Attempt	Success
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	LPM	LPM	LPM	LPM
Coup-Proofing	-0.39** (0.19)	-0.26 (0.22)	-0.47** (0.23)	0.24 (0.31)	-0.015* (0.0077)	-0.0098 (0.0095)	-0.023** (0.011)	0.0011 (0.014)
GDP (ln)	-0.31*** (0.098)	-0.28** (0.13)	-0.91** (0.37)	0.15 (0.40)	-0.0088*** (0.0028)	-0.0084** (0.0035)	-0.021** (0.010)	0.0060 (0.011)
Democracy	0.038 (0.29)	-2.35*** (0.74)	-0.36 (0.37)	-3.82*** (0.93)	0.0022 (0.0076)	-0.028*** (0.0063)	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.082*** (0.017)
Constant	-0.094 (0.72)	-0.38 (0.94)	3.18 (2.87)	-2.72 (3.22)	0.14*** (0.026)	0.14*** (0.030)	0.17* (0.087)	-0.033 (0.090)
<i>N</i>	2947	2947	1781	1708	2947	2947	2947	2947
Fixed-Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Log Lik.	-406.4	-396.8	-350.9	-325.4	894.6	887.0	953.3	962.2

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Controls for time dependence are included but not shown.

Table 3: The Effects of Coup-Proofing on Military Coups, 1965—2005 (Exclusion of Foreign, Justice, and Non-Security Cabinet Positions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Attempt	Success	Attempt	Success	Attempt	Success	Attempt	Success
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	LPM	LPM	LPM	LPM
Coup-Proofing	-0.41 (0.30)	-0.19 (0.33)	-1.02*** (0.37)	-0.81** (0.39)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.0064 (0.011)	-0.042*** (0.016)	-0.035* (0.019)
Constant	-2.35*** (0.25)	-2.63*** (0.23)	-3.83*** (0.47)	-2.18*** (0.24)	0.077*** (0.016)	0.068*** (0.013)	-0.0033 (0.016)	0.0078 (0.014)
<i>N</i>	2947	2947	1781	1708	2947	2947	2947	2947
Fixed-Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Log Lik.	-411.8	-416.4	-354.7	-354.8	889.2	873.5	949.6	933.7

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Controls for time dependence are included but not shown.

Figure 3: Visualization of the  $\hat{R}$  values of All Parameters

In the plot, we can see all  $\hat{R} < 1.05$ . Of course, we can also see  $\hat{R} < 1$  for some values (e.g., 9.94e-01, 9.96e-01, 9.97e-01), but this is not a problem because  $\hat{R}$  is estimated from the finite number of draws in Stan; thereby  $\hat{R}$  can be slightly less than 1 just by chance.




Figure 4: Summary of the posterior distribution of selected parameters and the MCMC chains obtained by 2PL IRT model

