International Inequality and Demand for Redistribution in the Global South

ONLINE APPENDIX

1 Deviations from the pre-registration

The pre-registration plan is available through the Open Science Framework (osf.io/qkfgx).

- Data collection: As initial responses were about 10% short, reminders were sent out two weeks afterwards to achieve the target sample size and the survey closed within two days.

- Adjustment of exclusion criteria: In order to confirm the identity of the mobile phone users, they were asked about their year of birth and the response compared to the record by the market research company. Responses differed in 36.3% of the cases, which suggests that many mobile phones or cards are used by someone else than the registered user. The pre-registration specifies that these respondents should be removed from the data. However, the presence of these respondents does not interfere with the random treatment assignment, and instead their removal would significantly reduce statistical power. It was therefore decided to omit this exclusion criterion.

- The outcome variables are measured on a five-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, adding a neither option to the originally planned four-point scale.

2 Complementary Results

Table A1: Average Treatment Effects (LPM)

	Inequality Acceptance	Demand for aid	Aid (UK)	Aid (USA)	Aid (UK) - Aid (USA)
Treatment	0.086*	−0.008	0.034	−0.012	0.032
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.022)
R^2	0.008	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.002
Num. obs.	947	947	947	947	947

Note: Linear probability models (OLS). All dependent variables are dummy-coded. *Inequality Opposition* indicates opposition to income differences between Kenya and Western Europe; *Aid* indicates demand for international financial transfers; all dependent variables are dichotomized. (*=.05)

Table A2: Treatment Effects by Dosage (OLS)

	Inequality Acceptance	Demand for aid	Aid (UK)	Aid (USA)	Aid (UK) - Aid (USA)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	−0.162	−0.034	0.027	−0.095	0.121
	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.099)	(0.097)	(0.070)
Perceived Inequality (PI)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Treatment × PI	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
R^2	0.005	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.006
Num. obs.	838	838	838	838	838

Note: Ordinary least squares regression. *Perceived Inequality* indicates pretreatment perception of income differences between Kenya and Western Europe; *Inequality Acceptance* indicates acceptance to these income differences; *Aid* indicates demand for international financial transfers. (*=.05)

3   Exploratory Results

This section provides an exploratory analysis of two important determinants of redistributive preferences: Income and religion. The relevance of income is straightforward. People with lower incomes are less likely to pay for redistributive policies, e.g. through taxes, and at the same time, they are more likely to benefit from them, e.g. through transfers or social services. Numerous studies show that income and demand for redistribution are negatively correlated (Finseraas, 2009; Rueda & Stegmueller, 2019; Schmidt-Catran, 2016). Experimental studies confirm that individuals who learn that their position in the income distribution is lower than they thought become more supportive of redistribution (Cruces et al., 2012; Fernández-Albertos & Kuo, 2015; Kuziemko et al., 2013). Similarly, one might expect that relatively poor individuals in developing countries might be more concerned about international inequality and more likely to demand remedial policies.

Religion has also been shown to affect redistributive preferences. Here it is commonly argued that religion serves as a substitute for redistribution as religious people can draw on support from their communities in times of hardship or expect to be rewarded posthumously for a life of sacrifice. Studies on domestic redistribution support this argument (De La O & Rodden, 2008; Roemer, 1998; Scheve & Stasavage, 2006). In the context of international redistribution, one might therefore also expect individuals to be unconcerned about international inequality and to not demand redistribution through financial aid.

Figure A1 provides correlational evidence. *Economic standing* is captured with the following pre-treatment question: "How does your living standard compare to other people around the country?", and respondents can reply with "(1) Much lower", "(2) A bit lower", "(3) Same", "(4) A bit higher", or "(5) Much higher". The top-left panel shows that economic standing and demand for aid have the expected negative relationship. Relatively rich individuals are less likely to demand more aid. At the same time, the bottom left panel shows that economic standing is not associated with acceptance of international inequality. Another pre-treatment question inquires about *religiosity*: "How often do you attend religious services?", and respondents can reply with "(1) Never", "(2) A few times per year", "(3) Every month", "(4) Every week", or "(5) Every day". With regards to aid, the top-right panel shows that more religious individuals are–contrary to the expectation–more likely to demand more aid. However, they do not differ from less religious individuals in their acceptance of international inequalities.

Do income and religion condition how individuals respond to information about international inequality? The results of corresponding regression analyses are summarized in Table A3. The only significant relationship concerns the treatment effect on inequality acceptance

Figure A1: Economic Status, Religion, and Political Attitudes

Note: Frequency plots with univariate regression lines (95% confidence intervals).

Table A3: Treatment Effect Heterogeneity (OLS)

	Inequality Acceptance		Demand for aid	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.125	−0.767*	0.089	−0.273
	(0.223)	(0.310)	(0.213)	(0.297)
Economic Standing (ES)	0.016		−0.099	
	(0.069)		(0.066)	
Religiosity		−0.091		0.059
		(0.062)		(0.059)
Treatment × ES	−0.135		−0.047	
	(0.095)		(0.090)	
Treatment × Rel.		0.173*		0.065
		(0.088)		(0.084)
R^2	0.007	0.008	0.009	0.006
Num. obs.	899	939	899	939

Note: Ordinary least squares regression. *Inequality Acceptance* indicates acceptance of income differences between Kenya and Western Europe; *Aid* indicates demand for international financial transfers. (*=.05)

(see model 2). The main effect shows non-religious people react strongly to the treatment by increasing their opposition to international inequalities. However, the negative interaction term shows that this effect fades among more religious individuals. That being said, these effects do not translate into demand for aid (see model 4).

References

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