

Supplemental Appendix:

“Social Desirability and Satisfaction with Democracy”

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A Variables Coding

Satisfaction with Democracy: VCF9254

1. Not at all satisfied
2. Not very satisfied
3. Fairly satisfied
4. Very satisfied

Mode: VCF0017

1. Face-to-face
2. Internet

Age: VCF0101 — measured in years

Income: VCF0114

1. 0 to 16 percentile
2. 17 to 33 percentile
3. 34 to 67 percentile
4. 68 to 95 percentile
5. 96 to 100 percentile

Sex: VCF0104

1. Male
2. Female

Marital status: VCF0147

- Married
- Never married
- Divorced
- Separated
- Widowed
- Partners

Education: VCF0110

1. Less than high school
2. High school
3. Some college
4. College or advanced degree

Race: VCF0105b

- White
- Black
- Latino
- Other

Census Bureau region: VCF0112

- Northeast (excluded reference category)
- Midwest
- South
- West

Interest: VCF0310

1. Not much interested
2. Somewhat interested
3. Very interested

Perceptions of the economy: VCF0112

1. Much worse
2. Somewhat worse
3. Stayed same
4. Somewhat better
5. Much better

Ideology: VCF0112

1. Extremely liberal
2. Liberal

3. Slightly liberal
4. Moderate, middle of the road
5. Slightly conservative
6. Conservative
7. Extremely conservative

B Full Results and Balance Tests

Here we present the full results from the models in Table 1 in the main text as well as the balancing test for each year. Table B.1 presents the full results from Table 1. Table B.2 presents the results of the balance test where the dependent variable is coded one for those who were interviewed by the internet and zero for those interviewed face-to-face (the model is estimated with logistic regression). None of the demographic variables are related to mode in either year at the 5% significance level.

Table B.1: The relationship between survey mode and satisfaction with democracy. Full results from Table 1 in the main text.

	2012	2016	Pooled
Internet	-0.165*	-0.075*	-0.130*
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.014)
Age	0.002*	0.003*	0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Income	0.026*	0.049*	0.036*
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Female	0.032	-0.004	0.016
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.013)
Never married	0.064*	-0.028	0.025
	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.020)
Divorced	0.023	0.001	0.012
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.021)
Separated	0.017	0.005	0.011
	(0.053)	(0.074)	(0.044)
Widowed	0.056	0.024	0.040
	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.029)
Partner	0.015	-0.074*	-0.023
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.024)
Midwest	-0.016	-0.016	-0.015
	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.021)
South	-0.033	0.001	-0.019
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.019)
West	-0.011	-0.081*	-0.040
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.021)
Black	0.164*	-0.023	0.092*
	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.022)
Latino	0.186*	0.033	0.125*
	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.021)
Other	0.028	-0.031	0.006
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.027)
Education	0.029*	0.004	0.019*
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.008)
1.y			0.011
			(0.013)
Constant	0.453*	0.435*	0.439*
	(0.060)	(0.069)	(0.046)
<i>n</i>	5,183	3,413	8,596
<i>R</i> ²	0.056	0.054	0.040

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table B.2: Balance test.

	2012	2016
Age	0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)
Income	0.012 (0.041)	0.047 (0.045)
Female	-0.003 (0.079)	-0.015 (0.087)
Never married	0.193 (0.112)	-0.102 (0.138)
Divorced	0.107 (0.126)	0.104 (0.136)
Separated	-0.203 (0.255)	-0.152 (0.291)
Widowed	-0.040 (0.175)	0.178 (0.188)
Partner	-0.166 (0.137)	0.002 (0.150)
Midwest	-0.001 (0.126)	-0.010 (0.145)
South	0.037 (0.116)	-0.024 (0.132)
West	0.100 (0.129)	0.000 (0.148)
Black	0.024 (0.116)	-0.071 (0.156)
Latino	0.052 (0.116)	0.018 (0.141)
Other	-0.147 (0.166)	0.005 (0.161)
Education	0.006 (0.050)	-0.073 (0.056)
Constant	0.445 (0.256)	1.330* (0.291)
<i>n</i>	5,594	3,997

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

C Models Estimated with Logistic Regression

In this section we estimate the treatment effect of survey mode using logistic regression. While linear regression can be suitable to uncover a treatment effect when the dependent variable is binary, it is possible that the estimated treatment effect can differ when estimating the model with logistic regression. Reassuringly, that is not the case here. We replicate the models partially presented Table 1 of the main text, which are presented in full in Table B.1. The estimated treatment effect with a 95% confidence interval is presented in Table C.1. In two of three cases, the results are identical to those presented in B.1 and in the third case nearly so: in 2012 OLS returns a coefficient of -0.165 compared to a shift of -0.164 in Table C.1. Table C.2 presents the full results of the models used to calculate the quantities in C.1.

Table C.1: Treatment effect.

	Shift	95% CI	
2012	-0.164	-0.200	-0.129
2016	-0.075	-0.116	-0.034
Pooled	-0.130	-0.157	-0.103

Generated from models in Table C.2

Table C.2: The relationship between survey mode and satisfaction with democracy estimated with logistic regression.

	2012	2016	Pooled
Internet	-0.796*	-0.361*	-0.622*
	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.071)
Age	0.009*	0.016*	0.012*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Income	0.121*	0.224*	0.164*
	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.032)
Female	0.149	-0.020	0.075
	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.061)
Never married	0.299*	-0.111	0.115
	(0.124)	(0.136)	(0.092)
Divorced	0.106	-0.009	0.056
	(0.131)	(0.152)	(0.099)
Separated	0.088	0.014	0.056
	(0.267)	(0.332)	(0.209)
Widowed	0.279	0.125	0.202
	(0.189)	(0.237)	(0.146)
Partner	0.065	-0.316*	-0.101
	(0.154)	(0.150)	(0.108)
Midwest	-0.083	-0.079	-0.075
	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.097)
South	-0.157	0.001	-0.095
	(0.121)	(0.139)	(0.090)
West	-0.057	-0.378*	-0.188
	(0.133)	(0.150)	(0.099)
Black	0.796*	-0.105	0.428*
	(0.145)	(0.157)	(0.105)
Latino	0.917*	0.152	0.591*
	(0.144)	(0.160)	(0.107)
Other	0.123	-0.144	0.025
	(0.179)	(0.168)	(0.123)
Education	0.138*	0.018	0.093*
	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.039)
2016			0.051
			(0.061)
Constant	-0.244	-0.335	-0.310
	(0.283)	(0.321)	(0.212)
<i>n</i>	5,183	3,413	8,596

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

D Models Estimated Excluding Alaska and Hawaii

The sampling frame for the face-to-face samples in both 2012 and 2016 differed slightly from the internet sample as Alaska and Hawaii were excluded in the face-to-face sample. As noted in the main text, a small proportion of respondents are from those states. As such, the results are nearly identical when estimating models that exclude respondents from those states. A replication of Table 1 in the main text excluding respondents from Alaska and Hawaii is presented in Table D.1. In each case, the coefficient for survey mode is identical to that presented in Table 1.

Table D.1: The relationship between survey mode and satisfaction with democracy; models estimated without Hawaii and Alaska.

	2012	2016	Pooled
Internet	-0.165*	-0.075*	-0.130*
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.014)
Age	0.002*	0.003*	0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Income	0.026*	0.049*	0.036*
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Female	0.031	-0.004	0.016
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.013)
Never married	0.065*	-0.028	0.025
	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.020)
Divorced	0.024	0.001	0.013
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.021)
Separated	0.017	0.001	0.009
	(0.053)	(0.075)	(0.044)
Widowed	0.055	0.024	0.039
	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.029)
Partner	0.015	-0.074*	-0.024
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.024)
Midwest	-0.016	-0.016	-0.015
	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.021)
South	-0.033	0.001	-0.019
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.019)
West	-0.011	-0.081*	-0.039
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.021)
Black	0.164*	-0.023	0.092*
	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.022)
Latino	0.186*	0.033	0.125*
	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.021)
Other	0.028	-0.028	0.007
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.028)
Education	0.029*	0.004	0.020*
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.008)
2016			0.011
			(0.013)
Constant	0.450*	0.435*	0.438*
	(0.060)	(0.069)	(0.046)
<i>n</i>	5,174	3,404	8,578
<i>R</i> ²	0.056	0.054	0.040

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

E Models Estimated Without Survey Weights

In the main text we present models using the survey weights provided by the Center for Political Studies. We view weighting the data as essential to properly estimate the average treatment effect given the oversampling of Black and Latino Americans in 2012. Nevertheless, we can be particularly confident that our results are not an artifact of modeling choices if our results hold without survey weights. In this section we replicate each of our main models as well as the balance tests.

Let us first discuss the balancing tests for the unweighted data. These results are displayed in Table E.2, where the dependent variable is coded one for those interviewed via the internet and zero for face-to-face; the models are estimated using logistic regression. In 2016, we observe only slight imbalances: widowers, Latinos, and respondents in the South are less likely to be interviewed by the internet; in each case the relationship is small—for example compared to whites Latinos are 0.064 less likely to be interviewed by the internet.

Given the oversampling of Black and Latinos for the face-to-face sample in 2012, we unsurprisingly identify imbalances with the unweighted data. This arises from other demographic characteristics correlating with race. In this case, the relationships are large substantively. For example, Figure E.1 displays the probability of being interviewed over the internet by age and Figure E.2 displays the probability by marital status. Education, income, and sex also share a relationship with survey mode.

Reassuringly, our results are substantively identical when we estimate the models with unweighted data. For example, the coefficient on survey mode is -0.168 in column 1 of Table E.1, compared to -0.162 in the same model in Table 1 of the main text. Likewise, we observe a coefficient of -0.132 for the pooled model with unweighted data compared to -0.130 when using weights. In short, our results do not depend on our decision to use weights.

Each of our robustness checks presented in this document are also identical when we estimate the models without weights. These results are available from the authors upon request.

Table E.1: The relationship between survey mode and satisfaction with democracy; estimated without survey weights.

	2012	2016	Pooled
Internet	-0.153*	-0.071*	-0.132*
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.011)
Age	0.002*	0.003*	0.002*
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Income	0.015*	0.046*	0.026*
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Female	0.024	-0.009	0.011
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.010)
Never married	0.022	-0.026	0.001
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.015)
Divorced	-0.006	0.004	-0.003
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.016)
Separated	-0.010	-0.033	-0.020
	(0.040)	(0.058)	(0.033)
Widowed	0.019	0.037	0.023
	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.023)
Partner	-0.024	-0.064*	-0.042*
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.019)
Midwest	-0.012	0.003	-0.010
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.016)
South	-0.021	0.017	-0.009
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.015)
West	-0.013	-0.091*	-0.045*
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.016)
Black	0.172*	-0.030	0.112*
	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.015)
Latino	0.161*	0.046	0.127*
	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.016)
Other	-0.006	-0.041	-0.018
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.021)
Education	0.026*	0.004	0.018*
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.006)
2016			0.000
			(0.010)
Constant	0.533*	0.428*	0.507*
	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.034)
Observations	5,183	3,413	8,596
R-squared	0.058	0.052	0.040

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table E.2: Unweighted Balance test.

	2012	2016
Age	0.024*	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	0.092*	0.031
	(0.030)	(0.037)
Female	-0.252*	0.063
	(0.061)	(0.073)
Never married	-0.036	-0.026
	(0.088)	(0.110)
Divorced	-0.366*	-0.136
	(0.096)	(0.114)
Separated	-0.646*	-0.400
	(0.179)	(0.237)
Widowed	-0.594*	-0.377*
	(0.136)	(0.155)
Partner	-0.251*	-0.015
	(0.110)	(0.131)
Midwest	0.096	-0.176
	(0.101)	(0.118)
South	-0.044	-0.275*
	(0.090)	(0.109)
West	-0.001	-0.129
	(0.100)	(0.121)
Black	-0.784*	-0.099
	(0.082)	(0.124)
Latino	-0.588*	-0.427*
	(0.084)	(0.116)
Other	-0.515*	-0.037
	(0.127)	(0.135)
Education	0.214*	0.086
	(0.039)	(0.047)
Constant	-0.814*	0.884*
	(0.198)	(0.243)
	(0.198)	(0.243)
<i>n</i>	5,594	3,997

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$




Figure E.1: The relationship between age and survey mode, 2012.




Figure E.2: The relationship between marital status and survey mode, 2012.

F Ordinal Coding

In this section we replicate each of our main analyses presented in Table 1 of the main text using the four ordered categories of the satisfaction variables: (1) “very unsatisfied,” (2) “somewhat unsatisfied,” (3) “somewhat satisfied,” (4) “very satisfied.” We display the distribution of the variable by mode for each year in Figure F.1. Models estimated with linear regression are presented in Table F.1. Models estimated with ordered logit are presented in Table F.2. Predicted probabilities are presented in Figure F.2. In all three models we observe that the probability of being both “somewhat” and “very satisfied” is lower for those interviewed via the internet; we see a corresponding increase in the probability of being “somewhat” and “very dissatisfied.”




Figure F.1: Satisfaction with democracy conditioned on survey mode.

Table F.1: The relationship between survey mode and satisfaction with democracy; ordinal coding of satisfaction estimated with linear regression.

	2012	2016	Pooled
Internet	-0.244*	-0.130*	-0.200*
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.024)
Age	0.003*	0.006*	0.004*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.028	0.076*	0.048*
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.011)
Female	0.010	-0.031	-0.009
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.021)
Never married	0.073	-0.020	0.033
	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.032)
Divorced	0.043	-0.048	0.007
	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.036)
Separated	0.115	0.159	0.127
	(0.106)	(0.124)	(0.080)
Widowed	0.139*	-0.008	0.077
	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.048)
Partner	0.051	-0.085	-0.010
	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.038)
Midwest	-0.044	-0.022	-0.033
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.033)
South	-0.081	-0.023	-0.058
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.031)
West	-0.050	-0.130*	-0.083*
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.035)
Black	0.306*	-0.036	0.174*
	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.034)
Latino	0.274*	0.131*	0.219*
	(0.043)	(0.059)	(0.035)
Other	0.008	-0.086	-0.028
	(0.071)	(0.059)	(0.047)
Education	0.039*	-0.000	0.025
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.014)
2016			0.004
			(0.021)
Constant	2.458*	2.327*	2.398*
	(0.098)	(0.115)	(0.075)
<i>n</i>	5,183	3,413	8,596
<i>R</i> ²	0.053	0.059	0.041

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table F.2: The relationship between survey mode and satisfaction with democracy; ordinal coding of satisfaction and estimated with ordinal logit.

	2012	2016	Pooled
Internet	-0.714*	-0.411*	-0.603*
	(0.085)	(0.097)	(0.065)
Age	0.007*	0.017*	0.013*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Income	0.054	0.196*	0.128*
	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.030)
Female	0.032	-0.097	-0.018
	(0.074)	(0.082)	(0.055)
Never married	0.254*	-0.098	0.075
	(0.103)	(0.132)	(0.082)
Divorced	0.139	-0.124	0.004
	(0.123)	(0.144)	(0.095)
Separated	0.508	0.320	0.333
	(0.299)	(0.392)	(0.236)
Widowed	0.369*	-0.006	0.178
	(0.172)	(0.190)	(0.131)
Partner	0.212	-0.249	-0.048
	(0.137)	(0.146)	(0.100)
Midwest	-0.155	-0.061	-0.095
	(0.116)	(0.130)	(0.087)
South	-0.096	-0.036	-0.139
	(0.112)	(0.119)	(0.083)
West	-0.041	-0.294*	-0.206*
	(0.118)	(0.136)	(0.091)
Black			0.474*
			(0.094)
Latino			0.600*
			(0.097)
Other			-0.016
			(0.120)
Education	0.041	-0.024	0.053
	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.035)
2016			0.011
			(0.055)
κ_1	-2.410*	-1.875*	-1.887*
	(0.254)	(0.321)	(0.202)
κ_2	-0.511*	0.120	0.048
	(0.244)	(0.310)	(0.195)
κ_3	2.311*	3.170*	2.960*
	(0.251)	(0.324)	(0.202)
Observations	5,191	3,422	8,596

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$




Figure F.2: The relationship between mode and satisfaction; predicted values calculated from models in Table F.2.

G Models Adjusting for Partisanship, Ideology, and Vote Choice

Our primary models do not adjust for measures that may themselves be influenced by survey mode. However, it is possible that different partisan groups (or supporters of a particular candidate) may prefer different survey modes. For example, perhaps Trump voters preferred to be interviewed online in 2016.

We can be more confident in our results if we find they hold when adjust for partisanship, ideology, and vote choice. We first note that none of these variables predict survey mode in either year. Results of the balance test are presented in Table G.1. Most importantly, the estimated effect of survey mode in each year as well as in a pooled model is quite similar to that presented in Table 1 of the main text. Results are presented in Table G.2.

Table G.1: Balance test, including partisanship, ideology, and vote choice.

	2012	2016
Age	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Income	-0.040 (0.057)	0.044 (0.067)
Female	0.094 (0.103)	-0.002 (0.123)
Never married	0.316* (0.151)	-0.246 (0.200)
Divorced	0.303 (0.159)	0.119 (0.193)
Separated	-0.409 (0.326)	-0.436 (0.488)
Widowed	0.101 (0.215)	0.227 (0.279)
Partner	-0.096 (0.179)	-0.186 (0.208)
Midwest	-0.068 (0.158)	0.275 (0.196)
South	0.047 (0.146)	0.180 (0.179)
West	0.160 (0.164)	0.090 (0.203)
Black	0.140 (0.162)	-0.153 (0.245)
Latino	0.187 (0.161)	-0.107 (0.226)
Other	-0.250 (0.220)	0.050 (0.253)
Education	-0.094 (0.069)	-0.144 (0.082)
Ideology	-0.007 (0.046)	0.051 (0.058)
Partisanship	0.013 (0.040)	0.011 (0.044)
Vote choice	-0.043 (0.168)	-0.335 (0.210)
Constant	1.276* (0.383)	1.259* (0.473)
<i>n</i>	3,817	2,075

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

Table G.2: The relationship between survey mode and satisfaction with democracy, adjusting for partisanship, ideology, and vote choice.

	2012	2016	Pooled
Internet	-0.147*	-0.084*	-0.120*
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.018)
Age	0.001	0.004*	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	0.033*	0.048*	0.039*
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Female	-0.007	0.045	0.010
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.016)
Never married	0.027	-0.047	0.002
	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.025)
Divorced	0.010	0.018	0.009
	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.026)
Separated	0.014	-0.114	-0.029
	(0.064)	(0.113)	(0.056)
Widowed	0.069	0.023	0.049
	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.035)
Partner	-0.000	-0.094*	-0.042
	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.030)
Midwest	0.002	0.023	0.010
	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.025)
South	-0.023	0.006	-0.014
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.023)
West	0.005	-0.027	-0.006
	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.025)
Black	0.054	-0.034	0.039
	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.029)
Latino	0.131*	0.064	0.122*
	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.028)
Other	0.041	-0.035	0.012
	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.034)
Education	0.019	-0.003	0.015
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.010)
Vote choice	0.125*	-0.054	0.154*
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.016)
Partisanship	-0.019*	0.008	-0.015*
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Ideology	0.011	0.046*	0.019*
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.007)
2016			0.038*
			(0.016)
Constant	0.487*	0.232*	0.358*
	(0.091)	(0.099)	(0.063)
<i>n</i>	3,573	2,064	5,637
<i>R</i> ²	0.074	0.090	0.066

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

H Alternative Dependent Variables

As noted in the main text, substantial debate exists regarding what precisely the satisfaction with democracy measure captures. As such, we examine the relationship between mode and two other measures that capture attitudes about the democratic system. First, a measure of trust in government. In particular, respondents are asked if they think the government is “pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?” (VCF0605) resulting in a dichotomous variable. We next create a scale of political efficacy. We include two items: respondents are asked if it matters who is in power (VCF9253) and if their vote makes a difference (VCF9250). Each is a five-point scale. The resulting index is marginally reliable ($\alpha = 0.679$).

We estimate the models on each year as well as a pooled model. We include an identical set of covariates as in our main model. The first three columns in Table H.3 present models for trust in government. Columns 4–6 present models for efficacy. In each of the six models the coefficient for internet is negative and statistically significant.

We note that the ANES unfortunately does not include any specific measures of illiberal policies. As we note in the main text, future work might seek out data sources that allow for an examination of mode on such measures.

Table H.3: The relationship between survey mode and political trust and efficacy.

	Trust in Government			Efficacy		
	2012	2016	Pooled	2012	2016	Pooled
Internet	-0.087*	-0.036*	-0.068*	-0.333*	-0.116*	-0.251*
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.029)
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001*	0.010*	0.010*	0.010*
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Income	-0.000	-0.030*	-0.012*	0.038	0.091*	0.060*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.014)
Female	0.053*	-0.001	0.031*	0.130*	0.161*	0.142*
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.028)
Never married	0.006	-0.001	0.002	0.052	0.106	0.074
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.043)
Divorced	0.052	-0.011	0.027	0.009	-0.075	-0.018
	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.047)
Separated	0.046	0.009	0.033	0.205*	0.204	0.206*
	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.103)	(0.156)	(0.086)
Widowed	-0.040	0.012	-0.017	-0.044	-0.099	-0.067
	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.022)	(0.086)	(0.099)	(0.065)
Partner	-0.020	-0.031	-0.023	-0.129	-0.032	-0.088
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.052)
Midwest	-0.034	-0.047*	-0.040*	-0.060	-0.052	-0.056
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.058)	(0.063)	(0.043)
South	-0.058*	-0.012	-0.039*	-0.026	0.024	-0.003
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.039)
West	-0.050*	0.000	-0.029	-0.050	0.053	-0.010
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.044)
Black	0.140*	0.156*	0.146*	0.390*	-0.033	0.222*
	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.062)	(0.073)	(0.048)
Latino	0.159*	0.178*	0.166*	0.197*	-0.060	0.092*
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.047)
Other	0.028	0.044	0.035	-0.044	-0.112	-0.070
	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.097)	(0.085)	(0.066)
Education	-0.014	-0.002	-0.010	0.067*	0.061*	0.064*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.018)
2016			-0.019			0.206*
			(0.010)			(0.028)
Constant	0.305*	0.306*	0.319*	3.127*	3.044*	3.023*
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.037)	(0.124)	(0.139)	(0.094)
<i>n</i>	5,477	3,959	9,436	5,223	3,433	8,656
<i>R</i> ²	0.048	0.057	0.047	0.065	0.060	0.063

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$

I Does the Winner-Loser Satisfaction Gap Vary by Mode?

Here we present a standard model that estimates the relationship between winner-loser status and satisfaction where we interact winner-loser status with survey mode. We estimate a model for each year as well as a pooled model. The interaction term fails to reach significance in any of the three models. We do note that winner-loser status is unrelated to satisfaction for both modes in 2016. Though this substantive finding is beyond the scope of this paper, we note the winner-loser gap fails to emerge in 2020 as well (though in this case, we are limited to respondents interviewed over the internet).

Table I.4: The relationship between winner-loser status and satisfaction, conditional on survey mode.

	2012	2016	Pooled
Winner	0.131*	0.049	0.158*
	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.030)
Internet	-0.153*	-0.057	-0.108*
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.028)
Winner \times internet	0.016	-0.041	-0.015
	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.035)
Interest	-0.035*	0.015	-0.016
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.013)
Economic perceptions	0.052*	0.047*	0.057*
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.008)
Ideology	0.009	0.055*	0.020*
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Income	0.020*	0.053*	0.031*
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.008)
Age	0.002*	0.004*	0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.007	-0.005	0.003
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.010)
Female	-0.007	0.051*	0.013
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.016)
2016			0.027
			(0.016)
Constant	0.448*	-0.070	0.231*
	(0.088)	(0.109)	(0.068)
n	3,582	2,072	5,654
R^2	0.074	0.091	0.069

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$