

Online Appendix

A Additional details on the data

Our data comes from the American National Election Study (ANES), which is run after each election in the US—be they midterm or Presidential. These studies often include a pre-election and a post-election wave. In this paper, since we are mostly interested in whether respondents turned out to vote, we focus solely on the post-election waves, where the turnout question is asked. Our final dataset pools all datasets available in the ANES website. Each respondent is included in the sample only once, after the election where their outcome (turnout) was registered. This also means that we only have one outcome per respondent: whether or not they voted in the most recent election, which preceded their ANES interview. We do not have data on whether respondents voted in the most recent midterm and presidential election—just on whether they voted in the most recent election, whatever its type.

We use data on the birth year of each respondent to know which election they were first eligible for. Respondents first eligible for a given election were often interviewed in different waves of the ANES. By calculating how many elections had gone by since a respondent’s first eligible election and the election for which we have evidence on their turnout, we can infer how the persistent the effect is across the lifetime—or, to put it differently, how the effect changes as we increase the distance between the election that provides the treatment and the election where the outcome is measured.

B Tables of the main findings

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Same	0.038*** (0.006)	0.041*** (0.009)	-0.001 (0.022)	0.039 (0.045)
Presidential	0.168*** (0.008)	0.171*** (0.008)	0.167*** (0.008)	0.189*** (0.045)
Same x Pres. Election		-0.006 (0.009)		-0.071 (0.059)
2nd Election	0.959*** (0.139)	0.958*** (0.139)	0.893*** (0.129)	0.775*** (0.137)
3rd Election	0.875*** (0.125)	0.874*** (0.125)	0.805*** (0.120)	0.710*** (0.132)
4th Election	0.783*** (0.114)	0.782*** (0.114)	0.702*** (0.107)	0.583*** (0.118)
5th Election	0.684*** (0.102)	0.683*** (0.101)	0.603*** (0.097)	0.490*** (0.103)

6th Election	0.604*** (0.093)	0.603*** (0.093)	0.517*** (0.088)	0.434*** (0.096)
7th Election	0.513*** (0.088)	0.512*** (0.088)	0.423*** (0.083)	0.333*** (0.091)
8th Election	0.436*** (0.079)	0.435*** (0.079)	0.348*** (0.078)	0.290*** (0.089)
9th Election	0.370*** (0.069)	0.369*** (0.069)	0.290*** (0.074)	0.265*** (0.078)
10th Election	0.303*** (0.063)	0.302*** (0.063)	0.221*** (0.063)	0.204*** (0.066)
9th Election	0.236*** (0.057)	0.235*** (0.056)	0.168*** (0.058)	0.141** (0.066)
12th Election	0.202*** (0.045)	0.201*** (0.044)	0.145*** (0.045)	0.151*** (0.047)
13th Election	0.159*** (0.041)	0.158*** (0.041)	0.107** (0.045)	0.093* (0.053)
14th Election	0.099*** (0.030)	0.099*** (0.030)	0.062* (0.032)	0.057 (0.053)
15th Election	0.080*** (0.025)	0.079*** (0.025)	0.040 (0.035)	0.075 (0.017)
Presidential x 2nd Election				0.058 (0.050)
Presidential x 3rd Election				0.011 (0.044)
Presidential x 4th Election				0.049 (0.051)
Presidential x 5th Election				0.031 (0.045)
Presidential x 6th Election				-0.020 (0.049)
Presidential x 7th Election				-0.004 (0.052)
Presidential x 8th Election				-0.054 (0.054)
Presidential x 9th Election				-0.092** (0.045)
Presidential x 10th Election				-0.096** (0.045)
Presidential x 11th Election				-0.067

		(0.048)
Presidential x 12th Election		-0.100* (0.052)
Presidential x 13th Election		-0.054 (0.048)
Presidential x 14th Election		-0.049 (0.062)
Presidential x 15th Election		-0.093* (0.050)
Same x 2nd Election	0.049* (0.025)	-0.008 (0.043)
Same x 3rd Election	0.041* (0.024)	-0.023 (0.044)
Same x 4th Election	0.051* (0.026)	0.015 (0.051)
Same x 5th Election	0.042 (0.026)	0.002 (0.048)
Same x 6th Election	0.046** (0.021)	0.017 (0.045)
Same x 7th Election	0.049** (0.022)	0.012 (0.052)
Same x 8th Election	0.047* (0.023)	0.001 (0.050)
Same x 9th Election	0.032 (0.030)	-0.040 (0.046)
Same x 10th Election	0.043* (0.025)	0.000 (0.050)
Same x 11th Election	0.027 (0.025)	0.019 (0.060)
Same x 12th Election	0.017 (0.022)	-0.020 (0.057)
Same x 13th Election	0.021 (0.024)	-0.024 (0.047)
Same x 14th Election	0.010 (0.024)	-0.016 (0.064)
Same x 15th Election	0.035 (0.039)	0.001 (0.067)
Pres. x Same x 2nd Election		0.098

				(0.061)
Pres. x Same x 3rd Election				0.112 (0.067)
Pres. x Same x 4th Election				0.057 (0.071)
Pres. x Same x 5th Election				0.070 (0.061)
Pres. x Same x 6th Election				0.055 (0.063)
Pres. x Same x 7th Election				0.066 (0.075)
Pres. x Same x 8th Election				0.081 (0.071)
Pres. x Same x 9th Election				0.117* (0.061)
Pres. x Same x 10th Election				0.074 (0.058)
Pres. x Same x 11th Election				0.0230 (0.070)
Pres. x Same x 12th Election				0.062 (0.077)
Pres. x Same x 13th Election				0.071 (0.059)
Pres. x Same x 14th Election				0.036 (0.080)
Pres. x Same x 15th Election				0.051 (0.070)
Age	0.054*** (0.006)	0.054*** (0.006)	0.059*** (0.007)	0.062*** (0.007)
Age squared	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
High school	0.149*** (0.015)	0.149*** (0.015)	0.149*** (0.015)	0.154*** (0.016)
Some college	0.283*** (0.017)	0.283*** (0.017)	0.283*** (0.017)	0.289*** (0.017)
College or advance degree	0.360*** (0.018)	0.360*** (0.018)	0.360*** (0.018)	0.365*** (0.018)
Dummy female	-0.027***	-0.027***	-0.027***	-0.027***

	(0.00633)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Dummy white	0.050*** (0.009)	0.050*** (0.009)	0.049*** (0.009)	0.048*** (0.009)
Constant	-1.951*** (0.234)	-1.954*** (0.235)	-1.967*** (0.244)	-1.964*** (0.254)
<i>N</i>	47987	47987	47987	47987

Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors are clustered by state

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Same	0.035*** (0.011)	0.044*** (0.015)	-0.017 (0.049)	0.055 (0.068)
Presidential	0.171*** (0.015)	0.178*** (0.013)	0.171*** (0.015)	0.281*** (0.078)
Same x Pres. Election		-0.014 (0.018)		-0.104 (0.089)
2nd Election	0.713*** (0.157)	0.712*** (0.157)	0.606*** (0.154)	0.619*** (0.158)
3rd Election	0.589*** (0.150)	0.588*** (0.150)	0.471*** (0.151)	0.480*** (0.154)
4th Election	0.444*** (0.138)	0.443*** (0.139)	0.321** (0.140)	0.371** (0.141)
5th Election	0.359*** (0.130)	0.358*** (0.130)	0.234* (0.137)	0.241* (0.137)
6th Election	0.274** (0.122)	0.273** (0.122)	0.155 (0.130)	0.187 (0.138)
7th Election	0.183 (0.114)	0.181 (0.115)	0.070 (0.123)	0.142 (0.126)
8th Election	0.148 (0.107)	0.146 (0.107)	0.042 (0.119)	0.0827 (0.124)
9th Election	0.079 (0.095)	0.077 (0.095)	-0.029 (0.111)	0.054 (0.115)
10th Election	0.091 (0.090)	0.089 (0.089)	-0.034 (0.109)	-0.003 (0.112)
9th Election	0.034 (0.080)	0.033 (0.080)	-0.072 (0.095)	-0.026 (0.098)
12th Election	0.081 (0.065)	0.079 (0.065)	-0.034 (0.087)	0.032 (0.094)
13th Election	0.056	0.055	-0.036	0.063

	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.075)	(0.082)
14th Election	-0.010 (0.044)	-0.011 (0.044)	-0.086 (0.064)	-0.036 (0.079)
15th Election	0.003 (0.036)	0.003 (0.036)	-0.014 (0.058)	0.071 (0.087)
Presidential x 2nd Election				-0.080 (0.086)
Presidential x 3rd Election				-0.070 (0.077)
Presidential x 4th Election				-0.134 (0.082)
Presidential x 5th Election				-0.062 (0.079)
Presidential x 6th Election				-0.097 (0.095)
Presidential x 7th Election				-0.158* (0.079)
Presidential x 8th Election				-0.103 (0.087)
Presidential x 9th Election				-0.160* (0.084)
Presidential x 10th Election				-0.081 (0.091)
Presidential x 11th Election				-0.098 (0.087)
Presidential x 12th Election				-0.121 (0.083)
Presidential x 13th Election				-0.165* (0.084)
Presidential x 14th Election				-0.086 (0.097)
Presidential x 15th Election				-0.132 (0.100)
Same x 2nd Election			0.092* (0.053)	-0.004 (0.082)
Same x 3rd Election			0.087 (0.064)	0.004 (0.075)
Same x 4th Election			0.076	-0.036

	(0.056)	(0.071)
Same x 5th Election	0.067 (0.052)	0.039 (0.064)
Same x 6th Election	0.043 (0.054)	0.023 (0.094)
Same x 7th Election	0.027 (0.054)	-0.048 (0.077)
Same x 8th Election	0.011 (0.051)	-0.041 (0.075)
Same x 9th Election	0.018 (0.054)	-0.096 (0.072)
Same x 10th Election	0.061 (0.058)	0.025 (0.088)
Same x 11th Election	0.039 (0.063)	0.010 (0.083)
Same x 12th Election	0.073 (0.064)	0.036 (0.095)
Same x 13th Election	0.053 (0.056)	-0.072 (0.075)
Same x 14th Election	0.048 (0.061)	0.002 (0.088)
Same x 15th Election	-0.028 (0.068)	-0.111 (0.110)
Pres. x Same x 2nd Election		0.138 (0.100)
Pres. x Same x 3rd Election		0.117 (0.100)
Pres. x Same x 4th Election		0.165 (0.099)
Pres. x Same x 5th Election		0.033 (0.094)
Pres. x Same x 6th Election		0.022 (0.120)
Pres. x Same x 7th Election		0.110 (0.091)
Pres. x Same x 8th Election		0.071 (0.111)
Pres. x Same x 9th Election		0.163*

				(0.097)
Pres. x Same x 10th Election				0.051 (0.110)
Pres. x Same x 11th Election				0.043 (0.114)
Pres. x Same x 12th Election				0.053 (0.114)
Pres. x Same x 13th Election				0.182* (0.102)
Pres. x Same x 14th Election				0.063 (0.115)
Pres. x Same x 15th Election				0.116 (0.132)
Age	0.066*** (0.007)	0.066*** (0.006)	0.073*** (0.008)	0.073*** (0.008)
Age squared	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
High school	0.275*** (0.019)	0.275*** (0.019)	0.275*** (0.019)	0.276*** (0.019)
Some college	0.502*** (0.022)	0.502*** (0.021)	0.503*** (0.022)	0.504*** (0.021)
College or advance degree	0.625*** (0.022)	0.625*** (0.022)	0.626*** (0.022)	0.627*** (0.022)
Dummy female	-0.104*** (0.009)	-0.104*** (0.009)	-0.104*** (0.009)	-0.104*** (0.009)
Dummy white	-0.049*** (0.014)	-0.049*** (0.014)	-0.050*** (0.014)	-0.050*** (0.014)
Constant	-0.578** (0.257)	-0.585** (0.255)	-0.616** (0.259)	-0.646** (0.268)
<i>N</i>	49393	49393	49393	49393

Standard errors in parentheses

Standard errors are clustered by state

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C Additional figures and tables




Figure C1: Effect of experiencing the same type of election as the first eligible election on the probability of being contacted by party canvassers.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on contacts to vote in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on contacts to vote in subsequent Midterm elections.

Figures C2 and C3 show the results from a placebo test. We recode type-of-election eligibility by simply shifting both groups by one year. For example, in the actual treatment variable, cohorts born in 1930, 1931, 1934 and 1935 are coded as Presidential eligibles while cohorts born in 1932, 1933, 1936 and 1937 are coded as midterm eligibles. We change the coding by shifting each group by one year. In this way the placebo eligibles become those born in 1931 and 1932, while the midterm eligibles become those born in 1933 and 1934. This exercise randomizes the initial election experience, half of each group now experiencing a presidential election before a midterm election and half having the opposite experience. The new groups retain the same zig-zagging pattern we observed in the first panel Figure 1 as well as the average age differences, without now being systematically different in terms of type-of-election eligibility. We replicate our analyses using these new placebo groups as comparison groups, employing as outcomes both turnout (Figure C2) and interest in the election (C2). Both sets of results point to the same conclusion. We find no significant same-type eligibility effects, either when it comes to Presidential or Midterm elections. Looking at the way the effects span across the life trajectory yields a pattern that is far from consistent, with the effects changing sign and magnitude across elections. The overall pattern strengthens our confidence that the observed differences found in the previous analyses are indeed due to the type of first-election eligibility.




Figure C2: Placebo Effect of being first eligible to vote in a same-type election on probability of voting in future elections.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on voting in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on voting in subsequent Midterm elections.




Figure C3: Placebo Effect of being first eligible to vote in a same-type election on interest in the current election.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on interest in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on interest in subsequent Midterm elections.




Figure C4: Replicating the main analysis shown in Figure 3, adding state-fixed effects. *Note:* The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on voting in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on voting in subsequent Midterm elections.




Figure C5: Replicating the main analysis shown in Figure 4, adding state-fixed effects. *Note:* The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on interest in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on interest in subsequent Midterm elections.




Figure C6: Replicating the main analysis shown in Figure 3 without additional covariates. *Note:* The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on voting in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on voting in subsequent Midterm elections. The analysis differs from 3 in that it does not include race and gender as covariates.




Figure C7: Replicating the main analysis shown in Figure 4 without additional covariates. *Note:* The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on voting in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on voting in subsequent Midterm elections. The analysis differs from 3 in that it does not include race and gender as covariates.




Figure C8: Replicating the main analysis shown in Figure 3 collapsing all post-secondary-school categories together.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on voting in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on voting in subsequent Midterm elections. Education is recoded into the following categories: 8 grades or less ('grade school'); 9-12 grades ('high school'); 12 grades, diploma or equivalency or above.




Figure C9: Replicating the main analysis shown in Figure 4 collapsing all post-secondary-school categories together.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on voting in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on voting in subsequent Midterm elections. Education is recoded into the following categories: 8 grades or less ('grade school'); 9-12 grades ('high school'); 12 grades, diploma or equivalency or above.




Figure C10: Replicating the main analysis shown in Figure C6 collapsing all post-secondary-school categories together.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on voting in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on voting in subsequent Midterm elections. Education is recoded into the following categories: 8 grades or less ('grade school'); 9-12 grades ('high school'); 12 grades, diploma or equivalency or above.




Figure C11: Replicating the main analysis shown in Figure C7 collapsing all post-secondary-school categories together.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on voting in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on voting in subsequent Midterm elections. Education is recoded into the following categories: 8 grades or less ('grade school'); 9-12 grades ('high school'); 12 grades, diploma or equivalency or above.




Figure C12: Replicating the main analysis shown in Figure 3 extending the list of control variables to contemporaneous demographics.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on voting in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on voting in subsequent Midterm elections. Apart from education, age, race and gender, we also include region of residence; *Urbanism*; and a dummy for high income. All variables are included fully factorized.




Figure C13: Replicating the main analysis shown in Figure 4 extending the list of control variables to contemporaneous demographics.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on voting in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on voting in subsequent Midterm elections. Apart from education, age, race and gender, we also include region of residence; *Urbanism*; and a dummy for high income. All variables are included fully factorized.




Figure C14: Replicating the main analysis shown in Figure 3, excluding respondents coming of age in an election year.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on voting in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on voting in subsequent Midterm elections.




Figure C15: Replicating the main analysis shown in Figure 4, excluding respondents coming of age in an election year.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Effects are broken down into the overall effect of same-type eligibility, the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Presidential election on voting in subsequent Presidential elections; and the effect of being first eligible to vote for a Midterm election on voting in subsequent Midterm elections.




Figure C16: Same-type eligibility effects on future turnout, excluding sequentially one survey from the estimation.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals.




Figure C17: Same-type eligibility effects on future turnout across the life-span, excluding sequentially one survey from the estimation, Presidential elections.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals.




Figure C18: Same-type eligibility effects on future turnout across the life-span, excluding sequentially one survey from the estimation, Midterm elections.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals.




Figure C19: Same-type eligibility effects on future interest in election, excluding sequentially one survey from the estimation.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals.




Figure C20: Same-type eligibility effects on future interest in election across the life-span, excluding sequentially one survey from the estimation, Presidential elections.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals.




Figure C21: Same-type eligibility effects on future interest in election across the life-span, excluding sequentially one survey from the estimation, Midterm elections.

Note: The vertical spikes denote the 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Change	-0.0795*** (0.0208)	-0.0686*** (0.0222)	-0.0625*** (0.0230)
Change x Presidential	0.0986*** (0.0254)	0.0858*** (0.0263)	0.0773*** (0.0268)
Observations	21,278	21,266	21,266
Necessary Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Necessary Controls interacted	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Additional Controls Interacted	No	Yes	Yes
State dummies	No	No	Yes
State dummies interacted	No	No	Yes
Election pair fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election pair interacted	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C1: Effect of changing one's first election type from Midterm to Presidential on voting for subsequent elections.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.0184 (0.116)	-0.125 (0.130)	0.0550* (0.0318)	-0.0450 (0.0291)
Treatment x Presidential	-0.0185 (0.111)	0.120 (0.133)	-0.0358 (0.0383)	0.0153 (0.0353)
Observations	6,756	7,694	13,182	13,941
Necessary Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Necessary Controls interacted	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Additional Controls Interacted	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State dummies interacted	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election pair fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election pair interacted	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C2: Placebo: Impact of age differences on subsequent turnout rates for groups experiencing the same first election

Notes: Models (1) and (2) compare individuals who turned 18 and 19 year old in election years post reform and who experienced the same type of first election. Column (1) focuses on individuals experiencing mid-term elections first while model (2) focuses on the group experiencing Presidential elections. In both models, 19 year olds are considered the treated group. Conversely, models (3) and (4) compare 21 and 22 year olds who experience the same first election pre-reform. Treatment here refers 21 year olds while column (3) presents results for mid-term elections and column (4) for presidential elections.