**Supplementary Online Materials for:**

**When and Why Does Observability Increase Honesty?**

**The Role of Gossip and Reputational Concern**

This file contains supplementary materials for a manuscript entitled “When and Why Does Observability Increase Honesty? The Role of Gossip and Reputational Concern”. In the following, we will provide (a) the main analyses based on only those participants who completed the manipulation check correctly (as pre-registered), as well as an overview across both studies and the pooled dataset (b) further exploratory analyses, and (c) all gossip statements generated by participants in Study 1 and the way in which they were coded. The pre-registration, the data, and the analyses can be found at the open science framework (<https://osf.io/verzn/?view_only=4b0bc2be8f964872af679c1a1f178324>).

**A – Main analyses with only those who completed the manipulation check correctly**

Here, we report the tests of Hypotheses 1-3 for only those participants who answered the manipulation check questions correctly. We pre-registered in Study 1 that we would analyze the data with all participants, as well as only with those participants who filled in the manipulation check correctly. Because the results are similar across both sets of analyses, we decided to report the analyses based on all available data in the main article and report the analyses for only those participants who correctly filled in the manipulation check items in the supplementary materials.

**Manipulation check.** After having completed the trust game, participants were asked to indicate which of the following sentences best described the situation during Part 1 of the study (the die rolling task). Die rollers could choose between: During Part 1 of the study (the die rolling task): (1) I rolled the die and only reported the outcomes to the experimenter (not additionally to another participant from MTurk), (2) I rolled the die and reported my outcomes to another participant from MTurk, and (3) I rolled the die and reported my outcomes to another participant from MTurk, who could write a note about my behavior, which was sent to the person with whom I interacted in Part 2 of the study. 202 of 227 participants in the individual condition correctly chose item 1. In the observation condition, 105 of 174 participants correctly chose item 2, but 50 participants incorrectly chose item 1, i.e., they indicated that they only reported their outcomes to the experimenter (not additionally to another participant from MTurk). Lastly, in the gossip condition, 156 out of 166 participants correctly chose item 3.

For Study 2, we asked the die rollers two questions at the end of the study that could be answered with true or false. The first question was whether they were observed, which is false in the individual condition, but correct in the three other conditions. In the individual condition, 92% of the participants indicated this manipulation check correctly. In the observability condition, 77% of the participants correctly answers this question, 78% in the gossip to relevant others answers correctly, and 90% in the gossip to irrelevant others condition answered correctly to this question. The second question was whether they could earn money in Part 2. Part 2 refers to the trust game. In the individual, observability and gossip to relevant others condition 98% of the participants indicated it correctly, while in the gossip to irrelevant others condition only 49% of the participants indicated it correctly, see Table 1 for an overview.

Table 1. Participants indicating the correct situation they were in in Study 1 and Study 2

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Individual | Observability | Gossip to relevant others | Gossip to irrelevant others |
| Study 1 | 202/227 (89%) | 105/174 (60%) | 156/166 (94%) |  |
| Study 2 – MC1 | 109/118 (92%) | 86/110 (78%) | 95/123 (77%) | 103/114 (90%) |
| Study 2 – MC2 | 116/118(98%) | 108/110 (98%) | 121/123 (98%) | 56/114 (49%) |

Note. Study 2 Manipulation Check 1 (MC1) asked whether participants were observed by another participant. Study 2 Manipulation Check 2 (MC2) asked whether participants could earn a bonus in Part 2.

One possible explanation for the relatively large number of participants in the gossip to irrelevant others condition choosing a wrong answer for manipulation check question 2 (MC2) is that we still displayed experimenter credit units (ECUs) in the trust game in all three conditions. Only in the individual, the observability and the gossip to relevant others, these ECUs were converted to an actual bonus at the end, while in the gossip to irrelevant others, they were not converted to a bonus at the end. Potentially, seeing the ECUs one earned could have led participants to believe that in the end, they also earned a bonus in Part 2.

However, it is important to note that we included a mandatory comprehension check that participants had to answer correctly prior to continuing the study. If they responded incorrectly, participants received an error message, were presented with the instructions they had received earlier once again, and could answer the question again until they answered it correctly. We implemented this comprehension check to make sure that participants understood the characteristics of the experimental condition they were in before entering the phase of the experiment where the key dependent variables were measured. One of the questions in the mandatory comprehension question check was whether participants could earn money in Part 2 (the trust game), which is the same question as they were asked as MC2 in Study 2. Thereby, we can be sure that prior to participating in the study, all participants correctly answered this question. As such, we are confident that at the point in the study where we collected the key dependent variables, participants understood the key features of the experimental condition they were placed in. That the results hold when including all participants (irrespective to how they responded to the manipulation checks at the end), as the results reported in the paper show, as well as when only including those participants who correctly filled in the manipulation checks, as the analyses reported below show, attests to this.

**(Dis-)honesty levels for those who filled in the manipulation check correctly.** We tested the hypotheses for only those participants who filled in the manipulation check correctly (i.e. those who chose the item that correctly described their situation in Phase 1 of the experiment) in the same way as we analyzed the data generated by all participants, i.e., we fitted mixed-effect-regression models (also called multilevel regression; Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2019) and accounted for the nested structure of our data (observations nested within a participant) by specifying one intercept for each participant (with multiple observations for all 30 die rolls). Supporting Hypothesis 1a, participants were more honest in the gossip condition (*M* = 3.82, 95% CI [3.72, 3.93]), than in the individual condition (*M* = 3.97, 95% CI [3.86, 4.08]), *b* = -0.15, 95% CI [-0.28, -0.02], *p* = .030, one-sided. In addition, supporting Hypothesis 1b, participants were more honest in the gossip condition than in the observation condition (*M* = 4.05, 95% CI [3.89, 4.20]), *b* = -0.22, 95% CI [-0.37, -0.07], *p* = .007, one-sided. The individual and the observation condition did not differ from one another, *b* = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.13], *p* = .425.

**Mediation analysis**. We additionally tested whether the mediation analyses lead to the same conclusions if we analyze the results for only the subsample of participants who chose the correct situation in the manipulation check. In this subsample, participants reported higher reputational concerns in the gossip condition (*M* = 3.77, 95% CI [3.51, 4.04]) in comparison to the observation condition (*M* = 3.09, 95% CI [2.77, 3.42], *t*(212) = 3.19, *p* < .001, *d* = 0.40, one sided) as well as higher reputational concerns in the gossip in comparison to the individual condition (*M* = 3.34, 95% CI [3.08, 3.61], *t*(350)= 2.28, *p* = .012, *d* = 0.24, one sided). The observation and individual condition did not differ from one another (*t*(230) = -1.18, *p* = .238, *d* = 0.14). To test for the mediating impact of reputational concerns, we again used the “mediation” package in R (Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014). Results indicate that reputational concerns mediate the impact of condition for the contrast between the individual and the gossip condition. Ten thousand bootstrap samples revealed that the estimates of the indirect effect were significant, *b* = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.00, -0.06], *p* = .020. The direct effect of condition on (dis-)honesty levels was non-significant, *b* = -0.12 , 95% CI [-0.28, 0.02], *p* = .100, suggesting full mediation. Furthermore, reputational concerns mediate the impact of condition for the contrast between the gossip and observation condition. Ten thousand bootstrap samples revealed that the estimates of the indirect effect were significant, *b* = 0.05, 95% CI [0.01, 0.10], *p* = .014. The direct effect of condition on (dis-)honesty levels was reduced, *b* = 0.18 , 95% CI [-0.00, 0.36], *p* = .054, suggesting full mediation.

In summary, analyses including only those participants that answered the manipulation check question correctly led to similar results and identical conclusions as analyses including all participants in Study 1, see Tables 2-4 for an overview and comparison for Study 1

Table 2: Study 1 – Hypothesis 1a: The difference between gossip and individual

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Individual | Gossip to relevant others | Signifcant difference |
| All participants | *M* = 3.93, 95% CI [3.85, 4.02] | *M* = 3.81, 95% CI [3.73, 3.90] | *b* = -0.12, 95% CI [-0.22, -0.02], p = .026, one-sided |
| Only those who answered the MC correctly | *M* = 3.97, 95% CI [3.86, 4.08]) | *M* = 3.82, 95% CI [3.72, 3.93] | *b* = -0.15, 95% CI [-0.28, -0.02], *p* = .030, one-sided |

Table 3: Study 1 – Hypothesis 1b: The difference between gossip and observability

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Observability | Gossip to relevant others | Signifcant difference |
| All participants | *M* = 4.02  , 95% CI [3.93, 4.11] | *M* = 3.81, 95% CI [3.73, 3.90] | *b* = -0.21, 95% CI [-0.31, -0.10], p < .001, one-sided |
| Only those who answered the MC correctly | *M* = 4.05, 95% CI [3.89, 4.20] | *M* = 3.82, 95% CI [3.72, 3.93] | *b* = -0.22, 95% CI [-0.37, -0.07], *p* = .007, one-sided |

Study 4. Study 1 - Hypothesis 3: The mediation analysis

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mediation test | Conclusion |
| All participants | *„*The indirect effect was significant, *b* = 0.04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.08], *p* = .003, but the direct effect of condition on (dis-)honesty remained significant, *b* = 0.23, 95% CI [0.07, 0.38], *p* = .004, indicating partial mediation” | Partial mediation |
| Only those who answered the MC correctly | Ten thousand bootstrap samples revealed that the estimates of the indirect effect were significant, *b* = 0.05, 95% CI [0.01, 0.10], *p* = .014. The direct effect of condition on (dis-)honesty levels was reduced, *b* = 0.18, 95% CI [-0.00, 0.36], *p* = .054, suggesting full mediation. | Full mediation |

For Study 2, the results are again similar when we only analyze the data for those participants who answered the manipulation check correctly, and lead to identical conclusions as those derived from analyses of the full sample. The results are summarized in Tables 5-10.

Table 5: Study 2 – Hypothesis 1: The difference between gossip to relevant others and individual

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Individual | Gossip to relevant others | Signifcant difference |
| All participants | *M* = 3.67, 95% CI [3.59, 3.76] | *M* = 3.56, 95% CI [3.50, 3.63] | *b* = -0.11, 95% CI [-0.01, -0.22], *p* = .02, one-sided |
| Only those who answered the MC correctly | *M* = 3.68, 95% CI [3.59, 3.77] | *M* = 3.57, 95% CI [3.50, 3.65] | *b* = -0.10, 95% CI [-0.02, -0.22], *p* = .046, one-sided |

Table 6: Study 2 – Hypothesis 2: The difference between gossip to relevant others and observability

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Observability | Gossip to relevant others | Signifcant difference |
| All participants | *M* = 3.64, 95% CI [3.56, 3.72] | *M* = 3.56, 95% CI [3.50, 3.63] | *b* = -0.08, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.02], *p* = .07, one-sided |
| Only those who answered the MC correctly | *M* = 3.64, 95% CI [3.56, 3.73] | *M* = 3.57, 95% CI [3.50, 3.65] | *b* = -0.07, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.04], *p* = .12, one-sided |

Study 7. Study 2 - Hypothesis 3: The mediation analysis

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mediation test | Conclusion |
| All participants | Estimates based on 10.000 bootstrap samples revealed that the indirect effect was non-significant, *b* = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.01], *p* = .530 for the contrast of gossip to RO vs. observation, as well as for the contrast of gossip to RO vs. individual, *b* = 0.02, 95% CI [0.00, 0.04], *p* = .115. | No indirect effect |
| Only those who did the MC correctly | There was no indirect effect of reputational concerns for either contrast. | No indirect effect |

Table 8: Study 2 – Hypothesis 4: The difference between gossip to irrelevant others and individual

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Individual | Gossip to irrelevant others | Signifcant difference |
| All participants | *M* = 3.67, 95% CI [3.59, 3.76] | *M* = 3.63, 95% CI [3.57, 3.70] | No significant difference |
| Only those who did the MC correctly | *M* = 3.68, 95% CI [3.59, 3.77] | *M* = 3.63, 95% CI [3.54, 3.72] | No significant difference |

Table 9: Study 2 – Hypothesis 5: The difference between gossip to irrelevant others and observability

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Observability | Gossip to irrelevant others | Signifcant difference |
| All participants | *M* = 3.64, 95% CI [3.56, 3.72] | *M* = 3.63, 95% CI [3.57, 3.70] | No significant difference |
| Only those who did the MC correctly | *M* = 3.64, 95% CI [3.56, 3.73] | *M* = 3.63, 95% CI [3.54, 3.72] | No significant difference |

Study 10. Study 2 - Hypothesis 6: The mediation analysis

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mediation test | Conclusion |
| All participants | There was no indirect effect of reputational concerns for either contrast *p*s > 31. | No indirect effect |
| Only those who did the MC correctly | There was no indirect effect of reputational concerns for either contrast. | No indirect effect |

**B - Further exploratory analyses**

**Study 1**

**Bonus earned.** Similarly to the dishonesty levels, we estimated the impact of condition on the bonus the die rollers earned in the die-rolling task. Participants earned significantly less bonus in the gossip condition (*M* = 1.15, 95% CI [1.12, 1.17]) than in the observation condition (*M* = 1.21, 95% CI [1.18, 1.23], *b* = 0.06, 95% CI [0.02, 0.10], *p* = .002), and marginally less in than in the individual condition (*M* = 1.18, 95% CI [1.15, 1.21], *b* = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.00], *p* = 0.06). Bonusses earned in the observation and individual condition did not differ from each other, *b* = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.03], *p* = .197.

**Alternative mediating mechanism.** We measured expected indirect benefits using two scales. First, we included a scale used in previous research (Wu, Balliet & Van Lange, 2015). Example items include: “I thought my interaction partner in Part 2 would trust me completely” and “My interaction partner in Part 2 would think I consider his/her interest at all times”. This scale is reported in the main manuscript. Because we think this scale perhaps does not optimally capture considering indirect benefits, we developed a second scale which specifically includes items that measure whether participants took into consideration that their decisions could lead to indirect benefits (or not). This scale contained four items and had adequate reliability (Cronbach's alpha = 0.83). Example items are: “When making decisions in Part 1 of the study (the die-rolling task), I took into consideration how these decisions could benefit me in Part 2.”, and “When making decision in Part 1 of the study (the die-rolling task), I considered how certain decisions in Part 1 might harm me in Part 2”. Analyses on both scales lead to identical conclusions. On the first scale, participants reported higher expected indirect benefits in the gossip condition (M = 4.41, 95% CI [4.16, 4.67]) than in the observation condition (M = 4.03, 95% CI [3.75, 4.30], *t*(338) = 2.03, *p* = .043, *d* = 0.22, and there were no differences between the gossip and individual conditions (M = 4.15, 95% CI [3.90, 4.39], *t*(376) = 1.47, *p* = .144, *d* = 0.15, nor between the individual and observation conditions, *t*(378) = 0.65, *p* = .517, *d* = 0.07. We used the “mediation” package in R (Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014) in order to test for the mediation of expected indirect benefits. A mediation analysis revealed that expected indirect benefits as measured with the first scale partially mediated the contrast between the gossip and the observation condition. One thousand bootstrap samples revealed that the estimates of the indirect effect were non-significant, *b* = 0.04, 95% CI [0.00, 0.09], *p* = .056, suggesting no mediation. The contrast between the gossip and the individual condition was also not mediated by expected indirect benefits as measured with the first scale. One thousand bootstrap samples revealed that the estimated of the indirect effect was non-significant, *b* = -0.02, 95% CI -0.5, 0.01], *p* = 0.156.

On the second scale, participants reported higher expected indirect benefits in the gossip condition (*M* = 4.78, 95% CI [4.32, 4.79]) than in the individual condition (*M* = 4.29, 95% CI [4.05, 4.53], *t*(377) = 2.81, *p* = .005, *d* = 0.28. There were no differences between the gossip and observation conditions (*M* = 4.55, 95% CI [4.53, 5.02], *t(*337*) =* 1.29, *p = .*200, *d =* 0.14*,* nor between the individual and observation conditions, *t*(393) = -1.56, *p* = .119, *d* = 0.15. Results indicate that expected indirect benefits as measured via the second scale do not mediate the impact of condition for the contrast between the observation and the gossip condition. One thousand bootstrap samples revealed that the estimates of the indirect effect were non-significant, *b* = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.02], *p* = .860. Furthermore, expected indirect benefits did not mediate the impact of condition for the contrast between the gossip and individual condition. One thousand bootstrap samples revealed that the estimates of the indirect effect was non-significant, *b* = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.00, 0.04], *p* = .256. Therefore, indirect benefits as measured with the first scale as well as second scale did not mediate the impact of gossip on honesty.

**Trust**. We examined whether gossip influenced subsequent trust. We first estimated the overall effect of condition on trust, and then examined whether, in the gossip condition, people conditioned their trust on the type of gossip they received (i.e., statements about honesty or dishonesty). There was no overall impact of condition on trust. Participants trusted the other participant similarly in the gossip condition (M = 5.78, 95% CI [5.21, 6.35]) as in the individual condition (M = 5.51, 95% CI [4.71, 6.31], b = 0.27, 95% CI [-0.71, 1.24], p = .590), and the observation condition (M = 6.24, 95% CI [5.69, 6.79], b = 0.46, 95% CI [-0.33, 1.26], p = .253). The observation and the individual condition also did not differ from each other, b = 0.37, 95% CI [-0.11, 0.84], p = .135. This suggests that receiving gossip did not influence trust in a subsequent interaction on average in comparison to the individual and observation condition.

**Study 2**

**Bonus earned.** As in Study 1, we also estimated the impact of condition on the bonus the die rollers earned in the die-rolling task. Participants earned significantly less bonus in the gossip to relevant others condition (*M* = 1.07, 95% CI [1.05, 1.09]) than in the individual condition (*M* = 1.10, 95% CI [1.08, 1.13], *b* = -3.37, *p* = .038). There was no difference between the gossip to relevant others and the observation condition (*M* = 1.09, 95% CI [1.07, 1.12]), *b* = 2.351, *p* = .137) and the gossip to irrelevant others condition (*M* = 1.09, 95% CI [1.07, 1.11]), *b* = 1.102, *p* = .133).

**Alternative mediation.** Identical to Study 1, we measured indirect benefits using two scales. Both scales did not mediate the impact of gossip to relevant others on honesty. On the first scale, there was no significant difference between the gossip to relevant others (*M* = 4.70 95% CI [4.46, 4.95]) condition and the observation condition (*M* = 4.52, 95%CI [4.24, 4.80], *t*(223) = 0.97, *p* = .334), and the gossip to irrelevant others condition (*M* = 4.49, 95% CI [4.25, 4.74], *t*(235) = 1.18, *p* = .237). Participants reported marginally higher expected benefits in the gossip to relevant others condition than in the individual condition (*M* = 4.34, 95% CI [4.08, 4.61], *t*(237) = 1.95, *p* = .052). We used the “mediation” package in R (Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014) in order to test for the mediation of expected indirect benefits. A mediation analysis revealed that expected indirect benefits as measured with the first scale partially mediated the contrast between the gossip to relevant others and the observation condition. Five thousand bootstrap samples revealed that the estimates of the indirect effect were non-significant, *b* = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.02], *p* = .420, suggesting no mediation. The contrast between the gossip to relevant others and the individual condition was also not mediated by expected indirect benefits as measured with the first scale. Five thousand bootstrap samples revealed that the estimated of the indirect effect were non-significant, *b* = 0.01, 95% CI -0.1, 0.03], *p* = 0.296. For the second scale, there was no difference in expected benefits between any conditions. Participants reported similar expected indirect benefits in the gossip to relevant others condition (*M* = 4.62, 95% CI [4.33, 4.91]) than in the individual (*M* = 4.45, 95% CI [4.21, 4.69], *t*(237) = 1.95, *p* = .052), observation (*M* = 4.43, 95% CI [4.18, 4.67], *t*(231) = 0.49, *p* = .622) and gossip to irrelevant others (*M* = 4.19, 95% CI [3.94, 4.45], *t*(231) = 0.65, *p* = .514). Results indicate that expected indirect benefits as measured via the second scale does not mediate the impact of condition for the contrast between the observation and the gossip to relevant others condition. Five thousand bootstrap samples revealed that the estimates of the indirect effect were non-significant, *b* = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.01], *p* = .344. Furthermore, expected indirect benefits did not mediate the impact of condition for the contrast between the gossip to relevant others and individual condition. Five thousand bootstrap samples revealed that the estimates of the indirect effect were non-significant, *b* = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.02], *p* = .441. Therefore, indirect benefits as measured with the first scale as well as second scale did not mediate the impact of gossip on honesty.

**Additional variables measured for Study 1 and Study 2.**

For exploratory purposes, we measured two dispositional variables: social value orientation (Murphy, Ackermann & Handgraaf, 2011) and personality (HEXACO; Ashton & Lee, 2009). We also measured participants' perceptions of the situation: perceived unethical behavior (i.e., whether participants thought that reporting a higher die roll than rolled in the die-rolling task was unethical), expected direct benefits, perceived descriptive norm (i.e., participants' expectation with regards to what other people normally do), and the perceived injunctive norm (i.e. participants' assessment of what others deem to be appropriate behavior). Additionally, we asked participants who played the die-rolling task to indicate whether they cheated and why, and we asked observers in the gossip condition (a) why they wrote the content they wrote and (b) to indicate their as well as the note sender’s motives of the received gossip message for sending the gossip content. For an overview of all measured variables and the instructions we gave participants, see the file “Materials” on the open science framework.

**Trust**. We examined whether gossip influenced subsequent trust. We first estimated the overall effect of condition on trust, and then examined whether, in the gossip to RO condition, people conditioned their trust on the type of gossip they received (i.e., statements about honesty or dishonesty).2 There was no overall impact of condition on trust. Participants trusted the other participant similarly in the gossip to RO condition (*M* = 6.95, 95% CI [6.54, 7.37]) as in the individual condition (*M* = 7.00, 95% CI [6.51, 7.49], *b* = -0.04, 95% CI [-0.70, 0.61], *p* = .885), and the observation condition (*M* = 6.78, 95% CI [6.39, 7.17], *b* = -0.17, 95% CI [-0.74, 0.40], *p* = .561). The observation and the individual condition also did not differ from each other, *b* = -0.11, 95% CI [-0.43, 0.21], *p* = .508. Similarly, there was no difference between the gossip to irrelevant others condition (*M* = 6.51, 95% CI [6.13, 6.89]) and the gossip to relevant others (*b* = --0.22, 95% CI [-0.50, 0.06], *p* = .125), nor the individual (*b* = -0.16, 95% CI [-0.38, 0.05], *p* = .132) or observation condition, *b* = -0.27, 95% CI [-0.82, 0.28], *p* = .328. This suggests that gossip did not influence trust in a subsequent interaction on average in comparison to the individual and observation condition, as in Study 1.

**C - All gossip statements & their coding of Study 1**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Gossip | Dishonest/Honest/Unclear |
| 1 | Player A appears to be honest and reporting his die rolls accurately. | Honest |
| 2 | seems they were honest in their rolls and didn't just put all 6's. | Honest |
| 3 | Player A seemed to report the actual outcome of each die roll mostly. There was an unusually high occurrence of rolling 6. Player A reported that they rolled a 6 11 times. | Unclear |
| 4 | Player A seemed to getting higher numbers on their die alot more than what they should have. | Dishonest |
| 5 | There is good task  good played in game  nice bonus in task | Unclear |
| 6 | This person seemed to be really honest. Their results were consistent with what you\'d expect a fair result to be -- they didn\'t artificially report higher values. | Honest |
| 7 | The outcomes for Player A diverge from the outcomes if a fair die was used. There are higher numbers of the number 6 reported than the expected number if a fair die was used. | Dishonest |
| 8 | The participant reports accurately | Honest |
| 9 | Player A was fair in his/her dice roll. The numbers reported were consistent with someone who did not cheat. | Honest |
| 10 | Player A rolled a 1 3 times, a 2 six times, a 3 six time, a 4 three times, a 5 six time and a 6 six times. | Unclear |
| 11 | the player seemed to honestly report their Die rolls | Honest |
| 12 | It appears that player 1 was fair in the die rolls. There was a variety of outcomes. Although 3 seemed to be a little high. But because of being middle of the road. Little to no abuse would be expected. | Honest |
| 13 | Player A seemed to honestly report the results of their die rolls as far as I can tell. | Honest |
| 14 | The feedback is always high which seems bias to me. | Dishonest |
| 15 | Player A rolled a 6 sided die 30 times with the following outcomes:  Die times  1 3  2 3  3 8  4 9  5 3  6 4  Player A earned 108 ECU which is $1.08 bonus  Player A\'s behavior while throwing the die was straightforward and apparently honest... | Honest |
| 16 | Good job | Unclear |
| 17 | There is a high probability that player A is not being truthful in reporting their rolls. They seem to be skewing the numbers in order to increase their bonus. | Dishonest |
| 18 | Hard to tell, but I believe that player A reported correct numbers on rolls. Nothing sticks out of the ordinary wit their behavior | Honest |
| 19 | Slightly lied and reported higher numbers than average. | Dishonest |
| 20 | I feel confident that Player A honestly reported the numbers on the die. Well done! | Honest |
| 21 | It seemed the dice rolls were completely random and honest. I don\'t think the player cheated. | Honest |
| 22 | i think Player A was honest about his report. he never tried to manipulate the final outcome of the rolled die to his advantage. | Honest |
| 23 | A plays good enough for the task | Unclear |
| 24 | Behavior is normal. | Unclear |
| 25 | Player A played safely or lets say averagely nothing to extreme or too low. | Honest |
| 26 | Player A seems honest | Honest |
| 27 | Don`t know if he wanted to do this, but he did. I would have reported the normal number. | Unclear |
| 28 | Player A rolled a die 30 times where the outcome was not bad a 6 was managed six times and several 4\'s and 5\'s. According to the game, player A earned a total of 124 which translates to a bonus of $124. | Unclear |
| 29 | This person played very fair and I would trust them. | Honest |
| 30 | I think player A behaved normally in this task. | Unclear |
| 31 | Player A rolled a pretty weird numbers in my opinion. The numbers seemed way to even for a dice roll. All the reported numbers have somehow equally became the outcome. I felt that Player A didn\'t roll dice and just put in random numbers. | Unclear |
| 32 | The reported their actions rather fairly! I don\'t see any trickery here. | Honest |
| 33 | Everything appears pretty random. | Unclear |
| 34 | Player A was sincere and Player A gave exact outcome of the die. | Honest |
| 35 | Player A seems to be fairly consistent with the numbers reported. I think he is honest | Honest |
| 36 | Player A\'s behavior was very good and honest during the task. | Honest |
| 37 | This person seems to be honest and they are accurately reporting the results. They\'re not giving themselves 5 and 6\'s across the board, for example. | Honest |
| 38 | I think player A was very honest. They took a very long time meaning they really did 30 rolls. Also they did not exaggerate as much as the could have on their earnings. | Honest |
| 39 | 1 and 4 are favorite numbers. | Unclear |
| 40 | Player A seems really honest in the dice rolling, because it was close to the average of how many for each number you\'d roll. | Honest |
| 41 | Player A very likely reported results that were actually obtained. They reported results that were slightly higher (i.e. less 1\'s,2\'s,3\'s than 4\'s,5\'s, and 6\'s) numbers than a truly fair die might give, but the results reported are definitely possible. | Unclear |
| 42 | person was quite good | Unclear |
| 43 | I don\'t think it\'s possible to roll 8 sixes out of 30.  You might be misleading the judges based on the knowledge that they will never know. | Dishonest |
| 44 | Player A is very talent person | Unclear |
| 45 | it was all over the place but they did okay | Unclear |
| 46 | This person seemed to roll the dice and report honestly. They had a variety of responses all the way from the low to the high end which varies their pay. If they were dishonest, I think they would have reported all high numbers. They did not do that. They played fair | Honest |
| 47 | He rolled quite a bit of number 4, but did not roll number 1 very much. I think he was reported it correctly | Honest |
| 48 | Player A reported earning $1.02 which was a below average bonus of $1.05. I think they were using the dice properly. | Honest |
| 49 | Player A reported a lot of instances of rolling the number 3-5 | Unclear |
| 50 | Player A performed better than the average person | Dishonest |
| 51 | The player seems to roll inconsistent in comparison to a fair die. However the inconsistency made for lower rather than higher score. | Unclear |
| 52 | Player A seems to be reporting his rolls honestly. | Honest |
| 53 | They seem very honest, especially reporting 1 so many times. | Honest |
| 54 | Player A reports a 6 on 100% of his 30 rolls of a fair die. I find that impossible to believe. | Dishonest |
| 55 | player A is good | Unclear |
| 56 | This person has a very good strategy to play so he has won a considerable bonus at least in my opinion | Unclear |
| 57 | A reported rolls honestly | Honest |
| 58 | Player one appeared to be reporting honestly. Had even mix of high and low numbers. | Honest |
| 59 | Player A could\'ve been a little deceptive | Dishonest |
| 60 | It seems like player A was truthful as the number reported is close to the fair die average | Honest |
| 61 | Player A magically rolled a six 30 times in a roll, AMAZING!!! | Dishonest |
| 62 | Be careful with this guy. He has the best luck in the world, according to him rolling 6, 30 times in a row. | Dishonest |
| 63 | Player A was a honest person. | Honest |
| 64 | I think Player A may not have been accurately reporting all of the die rolls. The numbers 5 and 6 were reported much higher than average - 8 and 12 times respectively. The numbers 1 and 2 were only reported once. I would use caution when dealing with Player A because their reporting does not seem to have been honest in this case and I think they may have been out to maximize their profit. | Dishonest |
| 65 | Player A seems like an honest person. They rolled a \'1\' more than any other number, and \'2\' was tied with \'4\' for the second highest number rolled. | Honest |
| 66 | I believe Player A did a good job on this task. While they reported quite a few sixes, they also reported an equal number of twos, which makes me think they were probably pretty honest. I don\'t believe they padded their results to earn a higher bonus. | Honest |
| 67 | I believe Player A did not cheat on this task. His score was only slightly above average and he seemed to score an equal number of high numbers and low numbers. I believe he is being honest." | Honest |
| 68 | It seems like they did this very fairly, and I believe their outcomes. They earned less than a person does on average. | Honest |
| 69 | Player A appears to have honestly reported the results of their die rolls. | Honest |
| 70 | Player A achieved a perfectly average score. It seems like they were being honest in regards to their dice rolls. | Honest |
| 71 | Player A is fairly deceitful. He is not to be trusted. He often over-reports his numbers. | Dishonest |
| 72 | It does seem suspect that player A rolled a 6 so many times, but it is possible. They did report lower numbers a few times. | Dishonest |
| 73 | good job | Unclear |
| 74 | Reporting seems honest, great job. | Honest |
| 75 | well done work | Unclear |
| 76 | This player\'s behavior was fine, and above average." | Unclear |
| 77 | I believe this player is honest | Honest |
| 78 | I feel that Player A was very honest with their answer and will be a great player to interact with. | Honest |
| 79 | Player\'s performance seems relatively fair. Mostly equal instances of each number. | Honest |
| 80 | Player A seemed to report a variety of dice rolls, mostly with the middle numbers 3 & 4. The only suspcion appears to be that they only reported the number 1 once in 30 tries. | Unclear |
| 81 | He is a fair person and accurately reported his numbers. | Honest |
| 82 | Player A tossed 30 six\'s I would say he is not a very honest person. | Dishonest |
| 83 | Player A seemed to submit an honest and varied response on what the dice rolled. Their total bonus was $1.02 over 30 rolls. | Honest |
| 84 | I\'m not sure that Player A was using a fair die because they instantly rolled 7 \6\'s\ at the beginning, which seems to me to be highly unlikely. However, the numbers are relatively even in terms of what was reported. I did notice that it often moved 1-2-3 very frequently, so that also made me think they may not be using a real/fair die. | Unclear |
| 85 | I believe Player A is honest, and did not cheat or try to create a more favorable outcome to themselves. I believe they wrote down their die rolls as they happened. They only made slightly more than the average, and the only number they rolled that seems slightly high is number 4 which was rolled 8 times. I believe this person truly did write down what their rolls were. They did not rush through the task either, which further leads me to believe this is true. | Honest |
| 86 | player A behavior was based on consistency | Unclear |
| 87 | Player A seems to be honest about his/her rolls. I\'m surprised by how little the number \1\ was rolled, but if Player A were lying, I would not expect so many rolls of \2\ and \3\. The results seem sound to me." | Honest |
| 88 | You seem very honest. | Honest |
| 89 | He seemed to play fair and by the rules. I would say you can trust this person! | Honest |
| 90 | Player A cheated on the task. | Dishonest |
| 91 | Player A is fair and honest. | Honest |
| 92 | Player A rolled 1s and 5s way more than you\'d expect for a fair die, and significantly less 2s and 3s. However, the overall average was very similar to what you\'d expect for a fair die (106 ECU rolled vs 105 ECU expected). If you have to guess their roll, guess 1 and 5 more often. If you have to guess their overall total, guess close to the average. | Honest |
| 93 | I believe player A\'s behavior in this task is overall consistent with what would have happened in 30 dice rolls. I believe player A honestly rolled the dice 30 times and got the numbers they reported. I would trust player A to do a good job. | Honest |
| 94 | It seems like they had a balanced amount of die rolls based on the different numbers. Overall seems like a legit roll and this player is fair. | Honest |
| 95 | It\'s above average to get 9 rolls of a 6 and 1 roll of a 1, but it\'s also very plausible. Lucky! | Unclear |
| 96 | Player A seemed to report a perfectly normal random variety of results throughout the 30 dice rolls. Whether luck was involved or not, 25 of the rolls were 3-6. But the heaviest numbers were just 3 and 4. I would imagine these were overall very honest results reported by Player A. | Honest |
| 97 | I thought that player A was honest in their reporting of the die and their outcomes were about what is expected. | Honest |
| 98 | Player A is very honest | Honest |
| 99 | Player As behavior seems typical and nothing is out of ordinary | Honest |
| 100 | I think player A reported fair die rolls based on the average bonus payment. They seem to be honest in reporting the die rolls. I don\'t see anything that indicates cheating where player A was trying to game the system to make the most bonus money. | Honest |
| 101 | All I can say is that I waited way too long for Player A to show up. Pretty inconsiderate. I could\'ve been working on other HITs. | Unclear |
| 102 | Player 2 did whatever they could to maximize their earning potential, so sometimes they were not honest about the real number. | Dishonest |
| 103 | This player rolled 30 times and got various outcomes that seem to be legit. | Honest |
| 104 | This player seemed to be rolling the die fairly. Their distribution was relatively even and expected. | Honest |
| 105 | They seemed to have fairly reported their earnings and I don\'t see any problems with their work. | Honest |
| 106 | Based on what I\'m told, the player\'s outcome is average of what a fair player would do. Player A did make me wait around for a long time before he started rolling the dice though, so that\'s a bit of a negative." | Honest |
| 107 | player A is a very honest person that is easy to relate with. he isn\'t selfish. | Honest |
| 108 | rolled fair dice | Honest |
| 109 | Thanks | Unclear |
| 110 | Player A appeared to inflate their die rolls so out of 30 rolls, they got a 6 a total of 28 times. 2 of the 30 rolls were 5s. This seems statistically impossible. But they have to self-report, so I don\'t necessarily blame them for doing so. | Dishonest |
| 111 | Player A was quite likely honest about the rolls of the die. While there were a lot of 6 rolls, there were also a lot with different numbers of pips. | Honest |
| 112 | Clearly cheated to get a high paying outcome. These reports were impossible and he tried masking it a little but gave up half way through | Dishonest |
| 113 | I have no basis to disagree with this. Had you cheated, then all of the die rolls would have been 5\'s and 6\'s. So nothing here gives me cause to doubt the report. | Honest |
| 114 | I believe Player A was honest as he/she reported rolling \'2\' nine times, and more than any other number rather than 5\'s or 6\'s. | Honest |
| 115 | Player A seems to report honest die rolls. | Honest |
| 116 | Reported numbers were a significantly higher than expected. | Dishonest |
| 117 | You done good! Congrats on the bonus and reporting honestly. You rock!" | Honest |
| 118 | During the experiment, I saw player \A\ roll the dice 30 times and it seems that they reported the average estimated outcomes. | Honest |
| 119 | Your choices were nice. | Unclear |
| 120 | this player seemed to be honest | Honest |
| 121 | It appears that Player A was very dishonest in reporting their rolls as they never reported rolling a 1 or 2 and only rolled a 3 two times. It appears they lied to gain a larger bonus for themselves. The numbers reported are extremely unlikely for 30 rolls, statistically speaking. | Dishonest |
| 122 | I think that think they were truthful and honest with his answers and I do appreciate that. | Honest |
| 123 | I think Player A reported his rolls accurately. I do not think Player A fabricated any of his die rolls. I think Player A was honest about what his die rolls were. | Honest |
| 124 | player A is played well and earned 128 ECU | Unclear |
| 125 | I do not believe Player A is actually reporting rolling the die. Out of 30 rolls he had maybe 3 that were below 4, where you would expect to see 15. So player A is not ethical or honest. | Dishonest |
| 126 | Out of 30 rolls, Player A claims to have rolled a six 26 times on a six-sided die. This isn\'t possible in an unloaded die, but since the researcher made the results wholly up to Player A, I can\'t say that I blame them." | Dishonest |
| 127 | I think this person is being honest with the numbers they reported. There doesn\'t seem to be an over reporting of higher numbers. | Honest |
| 128 | Player A clearly lied for their own benefit in their dice reports. The distribution of their dice rolls has a likelihood of a 10,000th of a percent on a fair die. | Dishonest |
| 129 | Player A was fair in their reporting behavior. | Honest |
| 130 | It seems like player A is provide accurate numbers. It is very close to ideal. | Honest |
| 131 | It seemed as if Player A reported more that half  of their rolls at higher numbers to boost their bonus. | Dishonest |
| 132 | The player reported an equal amount of high and low scores. I believe that they reported fairly truthfully. | Honest |
| 133 | Player A is playing the game very well.  Its appeared nice behavior in the task time. | Unclear |
| 134 | Player A seems to be honest and accurate in reporting process. | Honest |
| 135 | i feel like Player A honestly reported their die rolls. They reported several high rolls (worth more ECUs), but also several lows as well, so I feel like they were telling the truth and not just trying to pad their earnings. I feel like their behaviors reported their actual rolls. | Honest |
| 136 | Player A seems rather honest. Instead of falsely reporting a higher number seems to have reported actually roll. | Honest |
| 137 | The numbers that Player A reported seemed in line with expected outcomes, if you look at the distribution. So, I believe that he was honest in reporting the outcomes despite his having incentive to report otherwise. | Honest |
| 138 | Player A rolled the number six, 26 times out of 30. | Dishonest |
| 139 | I feel that player A is a honest person and has been honest with their answers | Honest |
| 140 | I think he was fair | Honest |
| 141 | I think for the most part Player A told the truth during their die rolls. I would trust them. | Unclear |
| 142 | player A seems to have told the truth about their rolls they look completely random and not over exaggerated | Honest |
| 143 | I think that player A was pretty honest. He seems to report accurately. | Honest |
| 144 | The actual numbers reported are reasonably close to the odds for a fair die. I would say that Player A is reporting truthfully. | Honest |
| 145 | Player A play a fair game and honest. The player tries very hard to focus on the game. | Honest |
| 146 | Player A had good luck in this game but not so good that I am suspicious about their honesty. So they were either lucky of clever. | Unclear |
| 147 | It seem\'s they may have answered honestly. I\'m just a tad skeptical on the amount of 5 and 6\'s rolled. | Unclear |
| 148 | I think Player A was honest about the outcomes. | Honest |
| 149 | The player appeared to report the die rolls honestly. There was a rather typical mix of numbers. | Honest |
| 150 | Player A performed honestly and admirably. | Honest |
| 151 | There is a clear leaning towards the higher numbers in the dice rolls. 23 of the 30 rolls were 4 and above. They may not be so honest about the die rolling. | Dishonest |
| 152 | I think Player A is fairly honest, though they may have reported a few more 6s in this task than they actually rolled, in order to get a slightly higher bonus. But they also reported plenty of lower rolls, so they may have been completely honest. | Unclear |
| 153 | Based on my observations, it seems that Player A was following the instructions and was reporting their rolls of the die honestly. While they did roll 3,4,5, and 6 slightly more frequently than I would have expected, there was nothing suspicious about their behavior. | Honest |
| 154 | I believe that Player A is honest at least half of the time. | Unclear |
| 155 | The player reported the highest maximum roll on every turn. | Dishonest |
| 156 | Player A rolled pretty consistent with the average of a fair dice roll. | Honest |
| 157 | I think they did a grest job of reporting their roles and dont think they would be cheating at all | Honest |
| 158 | Great work Player A. I think that you did a nice job. It looks like you got a bonus payment that was fair and well deserved. I\'d happily work with you again. | Unclear |
| 159 | I think that this player was honest in their reporting of the dice rolls. They could have said they rolled all high numbers in order to earn more money, but they didn\'t. Their list of numbers rolled seems legit. | Honest |
| 160 | Player A is not honest with their rolls, they are trying to maximize their bonus | Dishonest |
| 161 | It appears to me that player A padded their results. The number of 5\'s and 6\'s that they reported are nearly twice as many as all the other numbers combined. | Dishonest |
| 162 | Player A was unlucky in his rolls, therefore he/she was likely being honest in reporting. | Honest |
| 163 | Player A is playing great, keep up the good work. | Unclear |
| 164 | Overall Player A\'s behavior has been very ethical and in my opinion reported the outcomes accurately. You can trust that they are approaching the task objectively and reporting the results of the die rolls truthfully. | Honest |
| 165 | These are pretty good numbers. | Unclear |
| 166 | Player A seems honest. | Honest |
| 167 | Player A seems to have reported honestly about the number they rolled. If I had to guess, I would say they were pretty honest. | Honest |
| 168 | As far as I can tell, A reported his rolls accurately and honestly. The earnings were very close to expected averages with a fair die. I don\'t believe they misrepresented in order to earn more money. I believe they reported honestly. | Honest |
| 169 | Player A seemed to have reported within the average outcomes so I think they\'re honest | Honest |
| 170 | I like what you are doing, Keep rolling high or at least put in high numbers, Thank you. | Unclear |
| 171 | Player A had twice as many 6\'s than any other number. However, the player also reported outcomes similar to the estimates for most of the other numbers. | Unclear |
| 172 | Player A did better than expected, but not by a huge amount. The reports 6s were 9 instead of expected 5, which explains the outperformance. The 1s were 3 instead of expected 5. With a small sample space, we can\'t say this wasn\'t random. If there were cheating, they were pretty smart about it. | Unclear |
| 173 | The player seemed to have reported the dice rolls fairly. The ECU player A received is close to the average expected ECU amount. | Honest |
| 174 | I think player A\'s behavior in this task was honest. | Honest |
| 175 | I think they either reported fairly, or they tried to make it look fair. | Unclear |
| 176 | Overall, the numbers reported by Player A seems fairly consistent with the \estimated outcomes based on a fair die\. | Honest |
| 177 | Player A seemed to have reported honestly as there is no real trend among the rolls reported and they are fairly average. | Honest |
| 178 | Player A took way too long to complete the task. Other than that it is good to see that he has rolled higher than the average. | Dishonest |
| 179 | Player A seems to be honest | Honest |
| 180 | Player A seems to be honest. I watched his behavior and it seems fair. | Honest |
| 181 | None | Unclear |
| 182 | Player A reported a fair set of numbers, Player A\'s average was below the expected amount submitted. | Honest |
| 183 | Player A rolled less on all rolls than the average number. They rolled as many 1\'s as they did 6\'s. They rolled as many lower numbers as they did higher numbers, therefore I think Player A did not cheat. | Honest |
| 184 | it looks like this person used a real or website dice. The numbers look random and not all high numbers. You are not going to get 5 for all but I do trust these numbers | Honest |
| 185 | I believe player A was honest in their reporting numbers. Itis consistent with what was expected of them. | Honest |
| 186 | Participant is very honest in reporting for rolls, trustworthy. | Honest |
| 187 | I don\'t feel this player is honest and wants more bonus than he should get | Dishonest |
| 188 | Rolling 6 three times consecutively for the first three rolls seems statistically unusual. Rolling 7 ones out of 30 seems a bit high too. | Unclear |
| 189 | you got a lot of 6s! | Unclear |
| 190 | Player A\'s behavior did not stand out to me as being overly sneaky or dishonest in nature. There were a reasonable amount of reported 1s and 2s rolled (5 and 4 of each), which is realistic compared to the estimated amounts of those low numbers. However the most frequent reported numbers were 5 and 6 (8 each), which seems a bit unrealistic and could have been manufactured in order for the person to receive a higher bonus. | Unclear |
| 191 | I did find it a bit suspicious that 20 out 30 rolls were either 4,5, and 6. Occasionally, a 2 or 1 would be thrown in. It almost seemed as if the person didn\'t want to report many below the the number 3. | Dishonest |
| 192 | Player A did not accurately report die rolls. There is no way Player A landed on 6 every time out of 30 rolls. Player A is lying." | Dishonest |
| 193 | This took a long time. They seemed trustworthy. A lot of randomness and rolled more 2\'s than anything. | Honest |
| 194 | Player seems honest, averaged a roll of 4. | Honest |
| 195 | Player A reported the same number each time. | Unclear |
| 196 | I watched the report of numbers A wrote:  There is no sign, that A behaved dishonest.  All the 30 numbers are equally divided between 1-10.  He can be trusted. | Honest |
| 197 | An average fair die would supposedly earn 105 with only small variation and player A has earned 114. Player A may have over reported higher numbers than what they actually rolled but there's no way to know for sure. | Unclear |
| 198 | They did a great job. | Unclear |