

Online Appendix for:

Business versus Citizens: Legislators' Responsiveness in Trade Policy

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A Deviations from the pre-analysis plan

Our initial plan was to field the survey only in Latin America and the Caribbean, as for these countries we had data on one of the moderators we were interested in and because we could have surveyed these countries using only two languages. Because of a low response rate and difficulties in getting contact information for legislators in some of the countries initially included in the research (problems that we mentioned in the pre-registration as potentially limiting our sample size), however, one month into the study we had received only 89 responses. Seeing that this approach would not allow for a successful conclusion of our study, we decided to expand our research to democracies around the world. By doing so, we were able to achieve a sample size that allowed for a test of some of our expectations.

We pre-registered seven expectations prior to carrying out the survey (see the pre-analysis plan below). In this paper, we take up two of these. We did not pre-register the main effect but add it as a hypothesis. In a companion paper, we tackle the expectation relating to gender. The expectation about government and opposition is supported by two of the three experiments, but we do not report on this finding in the paper as we needed to shorten the paper.

Testing the remaining three expectations turned out to be problematic for reasons specific to each predictor. For one, as discussed above, initially we planned to limit the survey to Latin American countries, for most of which data on district trade competitiveness are available. With us expanding the research to cover more countries, we lack such data for nearly half of our respondents. Second, we ended up observing less variation than expected on the survey item capturing the importance of trade policy as an issue for legislators. Only 12 percent of legislators indicated that they attach low importance to trade policy (measured as a response below the middle point of the 11-point scale we used). Finally, coding the distinction between first-time and seasoned legislators turned out to be more difficult than expected. Some legislators return to parliament after a break; others move across chambers or across levels of government in federal countries. Empirically establishing “seasoned” legislators hence turned out to be very tricky. In short, testing these three expectations is not possible with the data we could collect.

B Semi-structured interviews

Below we reproduce the questions from the interview guide that we used in this paper (translated in different languages). The interview guide also contained a few questions for a companion paper. Note, however, that the interviews were semi-structured, meaning that we used follow-up questions to get a better understanding of legislators' answers.

1. How much contact do you have with companies or trade associations to get their views on international trade?

2. And how about citizens or other actors such as labour unions?
3. Are there any specific mechanisms or institutions through which these contacts take place?
4. Do you feel that you are well informed about the preferences of citizens, businesses, and interest groups concerning international trade policy?
5. How is your party's position on a trade agreement determined? What actors are involved?
6. In your role as a parliamentarian, do you think you should follow your judgment in debates on trade policy even if your stance is unpopular, or should you defend the position of your voters?

The respondents were 25 men and 5 women; and 7 were part of government coalitions, whereas the others are from opposition parties; 20 are from lower chambers; 10 are from the left, 6 center, and 14 from the right).

C Ethics

The study received ethics clearance as part of the ethical review of the [removed for anonymity] project. Respondents were asked for informed consent before starting the survey or doing the interviews. No deception was used either in the experiments or the interviews. Since we promised anonymity to our respondents, the interviews are cited only with a numeric ID. Respondents did not receive compensation. The respondents cannot be considered vulnerable or marginalized, as they are political elites in their respective countries.

The declaration of informed consent used in the survey looked as follows:

Information on the study: This survey is part of a project funded by [funding agency and project ID] that investigates [explanation of project contents]. In this part of the study, we are interested in better understanding the attitudes of members of parliament towards international trade agreements.

Process: We estimate that it takes about 3 minutes to complete this survey.

Rights: The participation in this survey is voluntary. The consent can be withdrawn at any time without further justification. You can ask us to delete your responses at any moment until the end of the study.

Obligations: For the success of this study it is very important that you closely read the instructions and respond to the questions contained in the survey to the best of your knowledge and belief.

Benefits: The research will lead to a better understanding of contemporary trade negotiations. Once the study is completed, we would be happy to share the results with you if you desire.

Risks: We do not anticipate that taking this survey will contain any risk or inconvenience to you.

Confidentiality: The online survey uses SSL/TLS encryption to transfer data between your computer and the server of the [University] where the survey is hosted. Your participation and all information collected through the online survey will be anonymized through a coding

system and will be treated with absolute confidentiality. There will be no connection to you specifically in the results or in future publications.

Contact: [full contact details]

Ethics clearance: The study has been positively evaluated by the ethics commission of the [University].

Further information on the project: [link to website].

By participating in this study, I confirm that I have fully read and understood the information on the research project. My participation is voluntary. I know that I can withdraw my consent at any time without any further justification, and no disadvantages will arise for me from this withdrawal of consent.

D Descriptive information and sample representativeness

Table D1: Descriptive statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Support for trade (Experiment 1)	1,001	5.842	2.607	0	10
Support for trade (Experiment 2)	894	4.822	2.818	0	10
Support for trade (Experiment 3)	995	5.589	3.444	0	10
Experiment 1: Citizens treatment	1,001	0.526	0.500	0	1
Experiment 2: Citizens treatment	894	0.463	0.499	0	1
Experiment 3: Citizens treatment	995	0.538	0.499	0	1
Experiment 3: Benefit Treatment	995	0.531	0.499	0	1
Age	998	52.839	11.407	22	96
Male legislator	1,057	0.675	0.468	0	1
Left-right ideology	1,020	3.030	1.297	1	5
Preference for trustee	864	0.168	0.374	0	1
Indifferent for trustee vs delegate	864	0.353	0.478	0	1
Preference for delegate	864	0.479	0.500	0	1
Government status	1,057	0.525	0.500	0	1
First term legislator	1,055	0.527	0.500	0	1

Table D2: Role conception by gender

Gender	Role Perception	N	Share in %
Female	Delegate	60	21.82
Female	Neutral	95	34.55
Female	Trustee	120	43.64
Male	Delegate	85	14.43
Male	Neutral	210	35.65
Male	Trustee	294	49.92

Figure D1: Descriptive information on the sample




Table D3: Role conception by political ideology			
LR ideology	Role Perception	N	Share in %
Left-wing	Delegate	80	24.32
Left-wing	Neutral	127	38.60
Left-wing	Trustee	122	37.08
Centre	Delegate	21	15.33
Centre	Neutral	52	37.96
Centre	Trustee	64	46.72
Right-wing	Delegate	38	10.35
Right-wing	Neutral	114	31.06
Right-wing	Trustee	215	58.58

E Sample representativeness

Figure E1: Response rate by country




Figure E2: Response rate by gender, government/opposition, ideology, and chamber





Figure E3: Comparison of shares by gender, government/opposition, ideology, and chamber



F Regression tables for figures in main paper

Table F1: Citizens, business, and PTA support

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	1.41*	2.32*	−1.29*
	[1.13; 1.70]	[2.03; 2.65]	[−1.77; −0.86]
Benefits			4.28*
			[3.87; 4.69]
Citizens × Benefits			1.28*
			[0.77; 1.86]
Intercept	5.19*	3.83*	3.72*
	[4.94; 5.44]	[3.56; 4.08]	[3.35; 4.09]
N	1001	894	995

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale.

Table F2: Citizens, business, left-right ideology, and PTA support

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	3.44*	4.23*	−2.45*
	[2.77; 4.14]	[3.47; 5.02]	[−3.39; −1.46]
Benefits			4.03*
			[2.89; 5.15]
Citizens × Benefits			2.98*
			[1.61; 4.32]
Left-right ideology	0.72*	0.70*	0.27
	[0.56; 0.89]	[0.51; 0.88]	[−0.01; 0.53]
Citizens × Ideology	−0.66*	−0.62*	0.42*
	[−0.88; −0.45]	[−0.87; −0.36]	[0.09; 0.77]
Benefits × Ideology			0.08
			[−0.26; 0.41]
Citizens × Benefits × Ideology			−0.58*
			[−1.03; −0.15]
Intercept	3.00*	1.68*	2.90*
	[2.44; 3.52]	[1.18; 2.21]	[2.10; 3.75]
N	966	862	960

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale.


Table F3: Citizens, business, role conceptions, and PTA support

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	3.47*	3.82*	-1.63*
	[2.77; 4.20]	[3.00; 4.65]	[-2.66; -0.54]
Benefits			4.27*
			[3.07; 5.39]
Citizens $\times$ Benefits			2.07*
			[0.59; 3.54]
Role conceptions (Neutral)	1.37*	1.59*	0.72
	[0.67; 2.05]	[0.97; 2.20]	[-0.35; 1.77]
Role conceptions (Trustee)	3.10*	2.24*	1.35*
	[2.41; 3.75]	[1.65; 2.80]	[0.25; 2.47]
Population $\times$ Neutral role	-1.50*	-1.83*	0.05
	[-2.40; -0.63]	[-2.87; -0.87]	[-1.30; 1.37]
Population $\times$ Trustee role	-3.17*	-1.75*	0.55
	[-4.03; -2.29]	[-2.71; -0.82]	[-0.83; 1.94]
Benefits $\times$ Neutral role			0.08
			[-1.13; 1.38]
Benefits $\times$ Trustee role			-0.03
			[-1.37; 1.33]
Citizens $\times$ Benefits $\times$ Neutral role			-0.74
			[-2.45; 0.95]
Citizens $\times$ Benefits $\times$ Trustee role			-1.13
			[-2.79; 0.60]
Intercept	3.22*	2.16*	2.89*
	[2.65; 3.81]	[1.70; 2.64]	[2.00; 3.77]
N	863	863	863

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Delegate role conceptions function as the reference category. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale.


G Predictions

Figure G1: Predicted values underlying the margins shown in Figure 1




Note: Table F1 displays the regression coefficients.

Figure G2: Predicted values underlying the margins shown in Figure 2



Note: Table F2 displays the regression coefficients.

Figure G3: Predicted values underlying the margins shown in Figure 3



Note: Table F3 displays the regression coefficients.


H Alternative Operationalization

Table H1: Robustness check: Table F2 with alternative operationalisation of political ideology

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	2.34*	3.67*	−2.26*
	[1.72; 2.94]	[3.04; 4.36]	[−3.15; −1.37]
Benefits			3.61*
			[2.70; 4.49]
Citizens × Benefits			2.70*
			[1.45; 3.90]
Cultural ideology	0.33*	0.44*	0.03
	[0.19; 0.48]	[0.28; 0.59]	[−0.23; 0.30]
Citizens × Ideology	−0.32*	−0.47*	0.35*
	[−0.52; −0.13]	[−0.69; −0.27]	[0.03; 0.68]
Benefits × Ideology			0.24
			[−0.08; 0.52]
Citizens × Benefits × Ideology			−0.49*
			[−0.91; −0.09]
Intercept	4.18*	2.52*	3.54*
	[3.69; 4.66]	[2.06; 3.04]	[2.78; 4.21]
N	924	825	917


* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale.

Figure H1: Robustness check: Alternative operationalisation of political ideology (Figure 2)



Note: Table H1 displays the regression coefficients.

Figure H2: Robustness check: Alternative operationalisation of political ideology (Figure 2)



Note: Table H2 displays the regression coefficients.

Table H2: Robustness check: Table F2 with alternative operationalisation of political ideology

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	2.44*	−1.73*	3.29*
	[2.08; 2.83]	[−2.30; −1.18]	[2.86; 3.71]
Benefits		4.22*	
		[3.59; 4.79]	
Citizens × Benefits		2.04*	
		[1.25; 2.89]	
Left-Conservative	0.35	−0.80	0.67
	[−1.11; 1.73]	[−2.23; 0.45]	[−0.65; 2.12]
Right-Liberal	2.80*	1.53*	2.20*
	[2.13; 3.44]	[0.62; 2.54]	[1.48; 2.91]
Right-Conservative	1.50*	0.67	1.93*
	[0.97; 2.00]	[−0.21; 1.50]	[1.45; 2.45]
Population × Left-Cons	−0.32	2.28*	−1.36
	[−2.01; 1.34]	[0.29; 4.38]	[−3.13; 0.24]
Population × Right-Lib	−2.97*	0.39	−1.71*
	[−3.75; −2.19]	[−0.87; 1.69]	[−2.56; −0.86]
Population × Right-Cons	−1.64*	0.87	−1.88*
	[−2.30; −1.02]	[−0.18; 1.99]	[−2.58; −1.20]
Benefits × Left-Cons		2.09*	
		[0.73; 3.51]	
Benefits × Right-Lib		−0.52	
		[−1.65; 0.68]	
Benefits × Right-Cons		0.18	
		[−0.80; 1.12]	
Citizens × Benefits × LC		−3.01*	
		[−5.24; −0.78]	
Citizens × Benefits × RL		−0.94	
		[−2.55; 0.74]	
Citizens × Benefits × RC		−1.41*	
		[−2.74; −0.10]	
Intercept	4.19*	3.18*	2.74*
	[3.86; 4.49]	[2.74; 3.67]	[2.43; 3.07]
N	919	911	820


* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale.

Table H3: Robustness check: Table F3 with alternative operationalisation of role conceptions

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	2.81*	2.20*	−0.42
	[2.02; 3.64]	[1.30; 3.08]	[−1.74; 0.91]
Benefits			4.10*
			[2.95; 5.24]
Citizens × Benefits			0.79
			[−1.00; 2.48]
Agree with T1	1.20*	0.39	1.24*
	[0.43; 1.94]	[−0.25; 1.02]	[0.13; 2.27]
Strongly agree with T1	2.24*	1.12*	1.12
	[1.46; 3.01]	[0.41; 1.80]	[−0.01; 2.21]
Population × Agree with T1	−1.00*	0.29	−1.37
	[−1.95; −0.10]	[−0.73; 1.24]	[−2.83; 0.09]
Population × Str. agree with T1	−2.03*	0.01	−0.81
	[−3.02; −1.09]	[−1.06; 1.04]	[−2.33; 0.79]
Benefits × Agree Unpopular			−0.23
			[−1.50; 1.12]
Benefits × Str. agree with T1			0.76
			[−0.51; 2.05]
Citizens × Benefits × Agree with T1			1.34
			[−0.53; 3.17]
Citizens × Benefits × Str. agree with T1			−0.25
			[−2.28; 1.65]
Intercept	3.65*	3.14*	2.77*
	[3.02; 4.33]	[2.61; 3.72]	[1.85; 3.72]
N	863	863	863

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale. Item T1 reads ‘Parliamentarians should act in the interest of the country even if that means making unpopular decisions.’

Figure H3: Robustness check: Alternative operationalisation of role conceptions (Figure 3)




Note: Table H3 displays the regression coefficients.

Table H4: Robustness check: Table F3 with alternative operationalisation of role conceptions

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	1.36*	2.44*	−1.47*
	[0.99; 1.70]	[2.13; 2.79]	[−2.04; −0.90]
Benefits			3.99*
			[3.43; 4.51]
Citizens × Benefits			1.43*
			[0.76; 2.11]
Agree with D1	0.04	0.04	−0.51
	[−0.62; 0.76]	[−0.63; 0.70]	[−1.45; 0.45]
Str. agree with D1	−1.05	−1.10*	−0.84
	[−2.22; 0.08]	[−2.15; −0.01]	[−2.07; 0.56]
Population × Agree with D1	−0.18	−0.85	0.01
	[−1.05; 0.70]	[−1.85; 0.07]	[−1.28; 1.35]
Population × Str. agree with D1	1.79*	0.55	0.91
	[0.42; 3.09]	[−0.89; 2.12]	[−1.12; 2.87]
Benefits × Agree with D1			0.54
			[−0.76; 1.77]
Benefits × Str. agree with D1			2.19*
			[0.80; 3.47]
Citizens × Benefits × Agree with D1			−0.24
			[−2.13; 1.47]
Citizens × Benefits × Str. agree with D1			−1.05
			[−3.24; 1.15]
Intercept	5.23*	3.91*	3.98*
	[4.93; 5.54]	[3.62; 4.19]	[3.52; 4.45]
N	863	863	863

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale. Item D1 reads ‘Parliamentarians should act according to public opinion even if it is at odds with their own opinion.’

Figure H4: Robustness check: Alternative operationalisation of role conceptions (Figure 3)




Note: Table H4 displays the regression coefficients.

Table H5: Robustness check: Table F3 with alternative operationalisation of role conceptions

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	1.23*	2.03*	-1.27*
	[0.71; 1.77]	[1.52; 2.59]	[-2.16; -0.40]
Benefits			4.02*
			[3.31; 4.72]
Citizens × Benefits			1.13*
			[0.14; 2.14]
Agree with D2	-0.30	0.03	-0.07
	[-0.83; 0.26]	[-0.53; 0.56]	[-0.92; 0.82]
Str. agree with D2	-0.29	0.01	-0.55
	[-0.98; 0.42]	[-0.64; 0.65]	[-1.49; 0.41]
Population × Agree with D2	0.23	0.21	-0.55
	[-0.51; 0.95]	[-0.58; 0.97]	[-1.69; 0.57]
Population × Str. agree with D2	0.64	0.87	0.84
	[-0.22; 1.49]	[-0.09; 1.76]	[-0.52; 2.10]
Benefits × Agree with D2			0.42
			[-0.55; 1.40]
Benefits × Str. agree with D2			0.54
			[-0.60; 1.62]
Citizens × Benefits × Agree with D2			0.44
			[-0.85; 1.81]
Citizens × Benefits × Str. agree with D2			-0.49
			[-2.00; 1.14]
Intercept	5.34*	3.77*	3.94*
	[4.89; 5.75]	[3.39; 4.18]	[3.29; 4.61]
N	863	863	863

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale. Item T2 reads ‘Demonstrations and letter-writing campaigns are legitimate ways to influence the decisions of parliamentarians.’

Figure H5: Robustness check: Alternative operationalisation of role conceptions (Figure 3)



Note: Table H5 displays the regression coefficients.

Table H6: Robustness check: Table F3 with alternative operationalisation of role conceptions

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	1.90*	2.70*	-1.70*
	[1.49; 2.33]	[2.26; 3.15]	[-2.39; -0.97]
Benefits			4.14*
			[3.46; 4.79]
Citizens × Benefits			1.60*
			[0.72; 2.44]
Agree with T2	0.95*	0.67*	0.03
	[0.38; 1.50]	[0.19; 1.15]	[-0.72; 0.88]
Str. agree with T2	0.33	0.45	0.12
	[-0.47; 1.16]	[-0.40; 1.29]	[-1.06; 1.53]
Population × Agree with T2	-1.20*	-0.62	1.02
	[-1.87; -0.51]	[-1.33; 0.04]	[-0.06; 2.07]
Population × Str. agree with T2	-0.15	-0.88	0.38
	[-1.19; 0.89]	[-2.09; 0.30]	[-1.55; 2.15]
Benefits × Agree with T2			0.28
			[-0.73; 1.26]
Benefits × Str. agree with T2			0.55
			[-1.00; 1.92]
Citizens × Benefits × Agree with T2			-1.12
			[-2.45; 0.17]
Citizens × Benefits × Str. agree with T2			-0.22
			[-2.10; 1.85]
Intercept	4.80*	3.49*	3.76*
	[4.43; 5.15]	[3.15; 3.85]	[3.18; 4.27]
N	863	863	863

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale. Item T2 reads ‘Trade agreements are so technical in nature that ordinary citizens cannot comprehend them.’

Figure H6: Robustness check: Alternative operationalisation of role conceptions (Figure 3)




Table H7: Robustness check: Table F3 with alternative operationalisation of role conceptions

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	−0.21 [−0.70; 0.33]	1.84* [1.30; 2.39]	−0.73 [−1.63; 0.10]
Benefits			4.12* [3.34; 4.87]
Citizens × Benefits			0.67 [−0.44; 1.71]
Agree with D3	−1.39* [−1.91; −0.88]	−0.80* [−1.38; −0.19]	−0.27 [−1.10; 0.58]
Str. agree with D3	−2.89* [−3.45; −2.29]	−1.99* [−2.58; −1.28]	−1.29* [−2.22; −0.36]
Population × Agree with D3	1.75* [1.02; 2.42]	0.36 [−0.38; 1.11]	−1.03 [−2.14; 0.04]
Population × Str. agree with D3	3.45* [2.65; 4.20]	1.17* [0.17; 2.04]	−0.43 [−1.71; 0.85]
Benefits × Agree with D3			0.02 [−0.95; 1.01]
Benefits × Str. agree with D3			0.76 [−0.41; 1.94]
Citizens × Benefits × Agree with D3			0.98 [−0.33; 2.28]
Citizens × Benefits × Str. agree with D3			0.49 [−1.19; 2.15]
Intercept	6.58* [6.19; 6.99]	4.66* [4.19; 5.12]	4.21* [3.61; 4.83]
N	863	863	863

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale. Item D3 reads ‘The influence of economic elites on trade negotiations is too big.’

Figure H7: Robustness check: Alternative operationalisation of role conceptions (Figure 3)




Note: Table H7 displays the regression coefficients.

Table H8: Robustness check: Table F3 with alternative operationalisation of role conceptions

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	2.20*	2.71*	−1.63*
	[1.57; 2.80]	[2.08; 3.36]	[−2.50; −0.78]
Benefits			3.82*
			[2.94; 4.63]
Citizens × Benefits			1.53*
			[0.43; 2.67]
Agree with T3	0.97*	0.78*	0.24
	[0.38; 1.54]	[0.18; 1.32]	[−0.66; 1.14]
Str. agree with T3	2.11*	1.51*	0.80
	[1.46; 2.75]	[0.82; 2.15]	[−0.19; 1.75]
Population × Agree with T3	−0.64	−0.27	0.47
	[−1.34; 0.10]	[−1.09; 0.54]	[−0.63; 1.58]
Population × Str. agree with T3	−1.45*	−0.69	0.64
	[−2.29; −0.60]	[−1.56; 0.24]	[−0.65; 1.89]
Benefits × Agree with T3			0.67
			[−0.39; 1.81]
Benefits × Str. agree with T3			0.85
			[−0.22; 2.01]
Citizens × Benefits × Agree with T3			−0.33
			[−1.75; 1.06]
Citizens × Benefits × Str. agree with T3			−0.89
			[−2.40; 0.56]
Intercept	4.03*	2.94*	3.35*
	[3.55; 4.55]	[2.48; 3.44]	[2.67; 4.06]
N	863	863	863

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale. Item T3 reads ‘Populists exploit the lack of knowledge of ordinary citizens about trade agreements.’

Figure H8: Robustness check: Alternative operationalisation of role conceptions (Figure 3)



Note: Table H8 displays the regression coefficients.


I Additional control variables and all interactions

Table I1: Robustness check: Table F1 with additional control variables

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	1.41*	2.41*	−1.24*
	[1.09; 1.72]	[2.09; 2.72]	[−1.72; −0.74]
Benefits			4.30*
			[3.86; 4.73]
Citizens × Benefits			1.17*
			[0.56; 1.76]
Age	−0.01	−0.03*	−0.01
	[−0.02; 0.01]	[−0.04; −0.01]	[−0.02; 0.01]
Male legislator	0.13	0.44*	0.15
	[−0.22; 0.45]	[0.11; 0.77]	[−0.12; 0.45]
Left-right ideology	0.24*	0.27*	0.28*
	[0.11; 0.36]	[0.14; 0.41]	[0.15; 0.41]
Trustee vs. delegate	0.46*	0.48*	0.49*
	[0.28; 0.64]	[0.29; 0.66]	[0.34; 0.66]
Government party	0.34	0.07	0.33
	[−0.02; 0.68]	[−0.29; 0.42]	[−0.01; 0.65]
Single member districts	0.40	0.51*	−0.14
	[−0.10; 0.88]	[0.04; 0.97]	[−0.56; 0.26]
Upper chamber	−0.39	−0.18	−0.12
	[−0.80; 0.06]	[−0.57; 0.25]	[−0.48; 0.24]
First term legislator	−0.04	−0.11	0.19
	[−0.38; 0.31]	[−0.48; 0.27]	[−0.13; 0.52]
Intercept	4.40*	3.81*	2.90*
	[3.42; 5.40]	[2.82; 4.67]	[1.99; 3.86]
N	789	789	789

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale.

Figure I1: Robustness check: Additional control variables (Figure 1)




Note: Table F1 displays the regression coefficients.

Table I2: Robustness check: All interactions

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	4.89*	5.25*	-1.98*
	[4.01; 5.78]	[4.23; 6.20]	[-3.33; -0.60]
Benefits			4.38*
			[2.91; 5.82]
Citizens $\times$ Benefits			2.82*
			[0.89; 4.65]
Citizens $\times$ L-R Ideology	-0.59*	-0.52*	0.28
	[-0.83; -0.35]	[-0.76; -0.24]	[-0.12; 0.68]
Benefits $\times$ L-R Ideology			-0.02
			[-0.38; 0.34]
Citizens $\times$ Benefits $\times$ L-R Ideology			-0.42
			[-0.90; 0.04]
Citizens $\times$ Role Perc.	-1.20*	-1.69*	-0.55
	[-2.12; -0.29]	[-2.61; -0.78]	[-1.92; 0.83]
Citizens $\times$ Role Perc.	-2.67*	-1.38*	0.33
	[-3.60; -1.79]	[-2.26; -0.44]	[-1.16; 1.71]
Benefits $\times$ Role Perc.			-0.12
			[-1.53; 1.21]
Benefits $\times$ Role Perc.			0.10
			[-1.21; 1.39]
Citizens $\times$ Benefits $\times$ Role Perc.			-0.09
			[-1.75; 1.68]
Citizens $\times$ Benefits $\times$ Role Perc.			-0.87
			[-2.65; 0.95]
Age	-0.01	-0.03*	-0.01
	[-0.02; 0.00]	[-0.04; -0.01]	[-0.02; 0.00]
Male legislator	0.13	0.46*	0.14
	[-0.21; 0.45]	[0.15; 0.79]	[-0.16; 0.44]
Left-right ideology	0.53*	0.52*	0.27
	[0.36; 0.71]	[0.34; 0.70]	[-0.07; 0.61]
Trustee vs. delegate	0.33	0.44*	0.61*
	[-0.01; 0.67]	[0.08; 0.82]	[0.26; 0.98]
Single member districts	0.40	0.44	-0.16
	[-0.07; 0.86]	[-0.01; 0.91]	[-0.59; 0.23]
Upper chamber	-0.33	-0.18	-0.13
	[-0.72; 0.07]	[-0.57; 0.23]	[-0.52; 0.24]
First term legislator	-0.04	-0.12	0.14
	[-0.37; 0.31]	[-0.47; 0.26]	[-0.16; 0.47]
Intercept	2.73*	2.46*	3.10*
	[1.51; 3.89]	[1.38; 3.55]	[1.48; 4.52]
N	789	789	789


* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale.

Figure I2: Robustness check: All interactions and additional control variables (Figure 2)



Note: Table I2 displays the regression coefficients.

Figure I3: Robustness check: All interactions and additional control variables (Figure 3)



Note: Table I2 displays the regression coefficients.

J Jackknifing

Figure J1: Robustness check: Jackknifing of main regression coefficients (Figure 1)




Figure J2: Robustness check: Jackknifing of main regression coefficients (Figure 2)





Figure J3: Robustness check: Jackknifing of main regression coefficients (Figure 1)




K No upper chambers

Table K1: Robustness check: Table F1 without upper chambers

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	1.26*	2.27*	−1.37*
	[0.91; 1.62]	[1.91; 2.64]	[−1.89; −0.85]
Benefits			4.17*
			[3.68; 4.66]
Citizens × Benefits			1.36*
			[0.72; 2.03]
Intercept	5.34*	3.90*	3.80*
	[5.05; 5.62]	[3.61; 4.17]	[3.38; 4.25]
N	772	684	768

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale.

Figure K1: Robustness check: Without upper chambers (Figure 1)




Note: Table [K1](#) displays the regression coefficients.

Table K2: Robustness check: Table F2 without upper chambers

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	3.17*	4.27*	−2.52*
	[2.35; 3.94]	[3.34; 5.15]	[−3.71; −1.26]
Benefits			3.76*
			[2.50; 5.07]
Citizens × Benefits			3.24*
			[1.53; 4.97]
Left-right ideology	0.74*	0.77*	0.31*
	[0.55; 0.92]	[0.58; 0.98]	[0.01; 0.63]
Citizens × Ideology	−0.61*	−0.65*	0.45*
	[−0.85; −0.36]	[−0.93; −0.38]	[0.04; 0.86]
Benefits × Ideology			0.12
			[−0.24; 0.50]
Citizens × Benefits × Ideology			−0.66*
			[−1.21; −0.19]
Intercept	3.04*	1.56*	2.85*
	[2.42; 3.71]	[0.94; 2.16]	[1.82; 3.75]
N	750	665	746

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale.

Figure K2: Robustness check: Without upper chambers (Figure 2)




Note: Table K2 displays the regression coefficients.

Table K3: Robustness check: Table F2 without upper chambers

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	3.25*	4.20*	−2.05*
	[2.34; 4.08]	[3.43; 5.02]	[−3.38; −0.67]
Benefits			4.16*
			[2.95; 5.34]
Citizens × Benefits			2.38*
			[0.80; 3.98]
Role conceptions (Neutral)	1.44*	1.91*	0.57
	[0.62; 2.21]	[1.26; 2.61]	[−0.66; 1.79]
Role conceptions (Trustee)	2.95*	2.52*	0.83
	[2.17; 3.71]	[1.85; 3.13]	[−0.55; 2.05]
Population × Neutral role	−1.33*	−2.41*	0.43
	[−2.32; −0.29]	[−3.44; −1.39]	[−1.19; 1.99]
Population × Trustee role	−3.09*	−2.24*	0.90
	[−4.06; −2.11]	[−3.18; −1.30]	[−0.65; 2.46]
Benefits × Neutral role			−0.09
			[−1.52; 1.26]
Benefits × Trustee role			0.21
			[−1.28; 1.64]
Citizens × Benefits × Neutral role			−1.07
			[−3.14; 0.94]
Citizens × Benefits × Trustee role			−1.35
			[−3.17; 0.59]
Intercept	3.43*	2.00*	3.28*
	[2.77; 4.12]	[1.53; 2.48]	[2.26; 4.34]
N	661	661	661

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale.

Figure K3: Robustness check: Without upper chambers (Figure 3)



Note: Table K3 displays the regression coefficients.

L Predictors of role conceptions

Table L1: Predictions of trustee/delegate preferences

	Delegate	Trustee
Age	−0.00 [−0.02; 0.02]	0.01 [−0.00; 0.03]
Male legislator	−0.24 [−0.72; 0.25]	0.05 [−0.33; 0.43]
Left-right ideology	−0.33* [−0.53; −0.13]	0.38* [0.23; 0.53]
Government party	−0.29 [−0.81; 0.23]	0.39* [0.00; 0.78]
Single member districts	−0.93* [−1.78; −0.08]	−0.27 [−0.89; 0.35]
Upper chamber	−0.39 [−1.00; 0.23]	−0.21 [−0.68; 0.26]
Intercept	−12.82* [−14.08; −11.57]	−1.54* [−3.06; −0.03]
AIC	1565.45	1565.45
BIC	2042.13	2042.13
Log Likelihood	−680.73	−680.73
Deviance	1361.45	1361.45
Num. obs.	791	791
K	3	3

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a multinomial regression model. Coefficients for countries have been omitted. Confidence intervals in parentheses. ‘Neutral’ functions as a reference category for the outcome variable.

M Alternative estimation strategy with country-fixed effects

Table M1: Citizens, business, and PTA support with country-fixed effects

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	1.42*	2.32*	−1.28*
	[1.11; 1.73]	[1.97; 2.66]	[−1.70; −0.86]
Benefits			4.29*
			[3.87; 4.72]
Citizens × Benefits			1.26*
			[0.68; 1.84]
Intercept	4.92*	4.45*	4.70*
	[3.67; 6.17]	[3.05; 5.84]	[3.48; 5.92]
R ²	0.17	0.23	0.59
Adj. R ²	0.13	0.18	0.57
Num. obs.	1001	894	995

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear regression model with country-fixed effects. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale.

Table M2: Robustness check: Table F1 with additional control variables and country-fixed effects

	Experiment 1	Experiment 2	Experiment 3
Citizens	1.34*	2.40*	−1.31*
	[1.01; 1.68]	[2.06; 2.74]	[−1.76; −0.86]
Benefits			4.24*
			[3.78; 4.70]
Citizens × Benefits			1.32*
			[0.70; 1.93]
Age	−0.01	−0.03*	−0.01
	[−0.02; 0.01]	[−0.04; −0.01]	[−0.02; 0.01]
Male legislator	0.21	0.43*	0.24
	[−0.15; 0.58]	[0.06; 0.80]	[−0.10; 0.57]
Left-right ideology	0.24*	0.25*	0.24*
	[0.11; 0.38]	[0.12; 0.39]	[0.12; 0.36]
Trustee vs. delegate	0.37*	0.46*	0.49*
	[0.20; 0.55]	[0.28; 0.63]	[0.33; 0.65]
Government party	0.42*	0.12	0.36*
	[0.07; 0.76]	[−0.22; 0.47]	[0.05; 0.67]
Single member districts	0.46*	0.39	0.05
	[0.06; 0.86]	[−0.01; 0.79]	[−0.31; 0.42]
Upper chamber	−0.47*	−0.26	−0.27
	[−0.87; −0.06]	[−0.66; 0.15]	[−0.64; 0.10]
First term legislator	0.00	−0.16	0.18
	[−0.36; 0.36]	[−0.52; 0.20]	[−0.14; 0.51]
Intercept	4.36*	3.78*	2.81*
	[3.33; 5.38]	[2.75; 4.81]	[1.85; 3.78]
R ²	0.15	0.27	0.60
Adj. R ²	0.14	0.26	0.59
Num. obs.	789	789	789

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale.

N Individual treatment arms for experiments

Table N1: Robustness check: Experiment 1 with individual treatment conditions

	Experiment 1	Experiment 1
Population opposed, business support	−0.31 [−0.80; 0.16]	−0.36 [−0.84; 0.12]
Business opposed, population support	1.02* [0.61; 1.45]	1.04* [0.60; 1.48]
Population support, business opposed	1.51* [1.10; 1.94]	1.45* [1.03; 1.89]
Age		−0.01 [−0.02; 0.01]
Male legislator		0.16 [−0.20; 0.48]
Left-right ideology		0.24* [0.12; 0.36]
Trustee vs. delegate		0.46* [0.28; 0.63]
Government party		0.32 [−0.04; 0.67]
Single member districts		0.44 [−0.07; 0.91]
Upper chamber		−0.39 [−0.81; 0.05]
First term legislator		−0.05 [−0.38; 0.30]
Intercept	5.33* [4.98; 5.69]	4.47* [3.46; 5.48]
N	1001	789

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale. “Businesses support, population oppose” is the reference category.

Table N2: Robustness check: Experiment 2 with individual treatment conditions

	Experiment 1	Experiment 1
Increased profit, lower wages	−0.12 [−0.57; 0.34]	−0.21 [−0.66; 0.22]
Higher wages, reduced profit	2.28* [1.82; 2.71]	2.28* [1.79; 2.76]
Reduced profit, higher wages	2.25* [1.81; 2.70]	2.32* [1.85; 2.81]
Age		−0.03* [−0.04; −0.01]
Male legislator		0.44* [0.11; 0.77]
Left-right ideology		0.27* [0.14; 0.41]
Trustee vs. delegate		0.48* [0.29; 0.67]
Government party		0.06 [−0.30; 0.42]
Single member districts		0.52* [0.04; 0.98]
Upper chamber		−0.19 [−0.58; 0.24]
First term legislator		−0.11 [−0.48; 0.26]
Intercept	3.89* [3.54; 4.23]	3.91* [2.84; 4.83]
N	894	789

* Null hypothesis value outside the 95% confidence interval. Entries are unstandardized coefficients from a linear mixed-effect regression model. Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses. Countries function as groups. Support for PTAs is captured on an 11-point scale. “Lower wages, increased profit” is the reference category.