SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

What Makes a Good Lobbyist for the Government? Explaining Intergovernmental Lobbying Success

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Rahel Freiburghaus (University of Bern)

Appendix

A1. Further Information on the New and Original Data Collection

Acronyms of the 26 Swiss Cantons

AG = Aargau; AI = Appenzell Innerrhoden; AR = Appenzell Ausserrhoden; BE = Bern; BL = Basel-Country; BS = Basel-City; FR = Fribourg; GE = Geneva; GL = Glarus; GR = Graubünden; JU = Jura; LU = Lucerne; NE = Neuchâtel; NW = Nidwalden; OW = Obwalden; SG = St. Gallen; SH = Schaffhausen; SO = Solothurn; SZ = Schwyz; TG = Thurgovia; TI = Ticino; UR = Uri; VD = Vaud; VS = Valais; ZG = Zug; ZH = Zurich.

Selection Criteria

As argued in section 3, siting decisions are the only federal policy-making processes that enable to measure lobbying success as 'preference attainment' (e.g., Mahoney, 2007; Dür, 2008; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Bernhagen et al., 2014; De Bruycker and Beyers, 2019). The empirical analyses presented in this article are therefore based on a new and original data set that comprehensively documents the influence of all 26 Swiss regional (i.e. cantonal) governments in the full sample of all federal policy decisions regarding the location of a specific facility since 2000. To define the scope of the full sample, three selection criteria were applied:

1. *The final and ultimately binding siting decision must be made at the federal level:* Given that the article specifically examines intergovernmental lobbying of regional

governments vis-à-vis the federal level, only final and ultimately binding siting decisions taken at the federal level are included. There are no further sampling criteria on the responsible federal authority that takes the final and ultimately binding decision. Sites that are determined by the Federal Parliament (i.e. the bicameral parliament consisting of the National Council and the Council of States), sites that are designated by the Federal Council, as well as sites whose allocation authority is vested with the Federal Administration are all equally included.

2. *The siting decisions must be contested:* In order to denote real 'winning' and 'losing' regional governments, the siting decision needs to be contested. If there is nothing at stake anymore, regional governments are likely to refrain from engaging in active lobbying, due to the severe resource constraints regional governments face (see section 2). This requires excluding siting decisions whose outcome is already, in one way or another, *de facto* predetermined. First, siting decisions that disproportionately favor a specific group of cantons due to particular geographic and/or topographical conditions (while depriving others of realistic lobbying success prospects) are excluded from the full sample. Examples of such siting decisions include the siting of the National Snow Sports Center (BASPO, 2023), large-scale wind or solar power plants (BFE, 2023), or geological deep repositories for radioactive waste (ENSI, 2023). These siting decisions require a set of specific *de facto* criteria such as e.g., snow reliability, wind or radiation intensity, or a dense, stable, and clay-bearing rock layer not every canton possesses within its territory. Second, site allocations based solely on compensatory logic are similarly unsuitable. Such non-contested 'deals', which are characteristic of Swiss-style consociationalism, are also excluded. For example, this includes periodic rail and highway infrastructure investment decisions that exclusively privilege these cantons that were defeated in previous allocation rounds (ASTRA, 2023).

3. *The siting decision must be independent of other federal policy decisions:* The full sample excludes siting decisions that are, in one way or another, interlinked with other federal policy decisions. To avoid that siting decisions ar just path-dependent, or based on compensatory logic (see above), recurring items of business such as the annual Federal Council dispatch in which the federal government just seeks an extension for the funding for already existing state-owned facilities are omitted from the full sample (Curia Vista, 2023).

Background Information: Short Case Description of the Siting Decisions Covered by the Full Sample

The new and original data set comprehensively documents the influence of all 26 Swiss regional (i.e. cantonal) governments in the full sample of all federal policy decisions regarding the location of a specific facility since 2000 (i.e. siting decisions) that meet the three selection criteria discussed above. The following list presents additional background information and a short case description of the siting decisions covered the full sample:

- *Seat of the Federal Criminal Court and the Federal Administrative Court (2001–2002):* In February 2001, the Federal Council introduced a judicial reform. As part of this reform, two new federal courts were proposed: the Federal Criminal Court and the Federal Administrative Court. While the Federal Criminal Court would serve as the primary court for criminal offenses falling under federal jurisdiction (particularly related to organized crime and economic crimes), the Federal Administrative Court would replace existing appeal commissions and complaint services of federal departments (Flick Witzig et al., 2024). The process of selecting the locations for these new federal courts faced significant delays and disputes among the cantons. The evaluation of suitable locations took more time than initially planned as the decentralized placement of the new courts became a guiding principle, encouraging all interested cantons to position themselves accordingly (Curia Vista, 2001–2002). Even remote cantons submitted their candidacy. The final decision on the allocation of court locations was subject to parliamentary approval, with the Federal Parliament ultimately deciding in June 2002 that Bellinzona (the canton of Ticino) would be the location for the Federal Criminal Court, and St. Gallen (the canton of St. Gallen) would host the Federal Administrative Court (BBl 2001 605). Aarau (the canton of Aargau) and Fribourg (the canton of Fribourg) were defeated and, hence, not selected as court seats (BBl 2001 6050).

- *Location of the military air bases – deployment concept of the Swiss Army (2013) and Sachplan Militär (2017):* In 2013, the Federal Council initiated a major reorganization project called the *Weiterentwicklung der Armee* white paper to address evolving security threats and changing security needs (VBS, 2013). To reduce these costs significantly and allocate funds for necessary armament investments, the core inventory of army properties was planned to be reduced by approximately one-third (around CHF

8.7 billion). As part of the restructuring, the Swiss Air Force was also affected. The 2013 deployment concept (*Stationierungskonzept 2013*), unveiled in November 2013, proposed the reduction of three air bases (BBl 2014 6995). The selection of future air force locations considered military, operational, and regional criteria. This allowed cantons like Valais and Nidwalden to resist the proposed closure of the military airfield in Sion (canton of Valais) and the complete abandonment of the then 'sleeping base' in Buochs (canton of Nidwalden). After the publication of the 2013 deployment concept, cantons had the opportunity to express their views by the end of January 2014. The plan underwent revisions, culminating in the *Sachplan Militär* (2017; see VBS, 2017). In this process, the canton of Nidwalden suffered a definitive defeat, as the military airfield in Buochs has been exclusively used for civilian purposes since then. However, the canton of Valais lobbied successfully by saving the Sion airfield (EFK, 2022, 43), which continues to serve as an alternative base for fighter jets, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters of the army. Additionally, it remains a training center for polymechanics. The originally planned closure of the military operations in Sion (canton of Valais) by 2020 did not materialize, and the army continues to carry out renovation, renewal, and maintenance work, providing employment opportunities in the canton of Valais.

- *Swiss Innovation Park – network locations and further sites (2012–2021):* The 2012 revised Federal Act on the Promotion of Research and Innovation (RIPA) established a legal framework for the Swiss Innovation Park, aiming to strengthen Switzerland as a global research and innovation hub. The park was inspired by successful models such as the Silicon Valley in California and Kendall Square in Massachusetts. The RIPA allowed the Federal Council to support the establishment of the Swiss Innovation Park, as long as it served national interests, competitiveness, resource efficiency, and sustainable development, and was distributed across multiple regional sites connected to universities. Several cantons submitted applications to host the innovation park, and the evaluation committee selected two 'hub sites' near ETH Zurich (canton of Zurich) and EPFL Lausanne (joint candidacy of the French-speaking cantons of Fribourg, Vaud, Valais, Neuchâtel, and Geneva; BBl 2015 2964). Additional 'network sites' were designated in the cantons of Aargau, Basel-City, and Jura. However, some cantons—i.e. Basel-Country and Graubünden—and joint applications—i.e. from the cantons of Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Obwalden, Nidwalden, and Zug in Central Switzerland as well

as from the cantons of Thurgau and from the two Appenzell, in Eastern Switzerland—were not chosen. In 2015, the Federal Council confirmed this initial configuration but added a network site in Biel/Bienne, representing the canton of Bern. The RIPA also outlined an accreditation process for future network sites (BBl 2015 2968). In 2021, the Federal Council approved the inclusion of SIP Ost as the sixth site holder in the Swiss Innovation Park network. SIP Ost represents the 'winning' cantons of St. Gallen, Appenzell Innerrhoden, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, and Thurgau (The Federal Council, 2021).

- *Locations of federal asylum centers (2014–):* The increase in asylum applications from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Sri Lanka posed challenges to the Swiss asylum system. To address this, the Federal Council implemented legislative amendments to the Federal Asylum Act (AsylA) to expedite procedures, combat abuses, and reduce incentives for unfounded claims (BBl 2010 4455, 7996). The concept of federal asylum centers was introduced to process the majority of cases within a shorter timeframe. A National Asylum Conference led to a joint declaration, requiring the federal government and cantons to agree on a restructuring plan, including the search for decentralized center locations (The Federal Council, 2013). Negotiations took longer than expected, with not all sites decided by the implementation of the asylum reform in 2019. The canton of Vaud achieved success through lobbying efforts, securing a location after the federal government promised solely refugees from the UNHCR 'Resettlement program' (EFK, 2022, 33). Other regions still lacked definitive federal asylum centers, so that at the time of data collection, no further definite 'winning' and 'losing' cantonal governments could be designated (SEM, 2022).

Choice of the Type of Sets and Calibration

The coding (or 'calibration') of the data in the new and original follows the four-step calibration guidelines by Oana et al. (2021, 28–47): concept definition ('What defines and constitutes the set?'), measurement ('What qualitative and/or quantitative data do I use to observe the set in the cases analyzed?'), calibration anchors ('How do I attribute cases to the set?'), and diagnostics ('How skewed is the set?').

A note of the choice of sets is in order, as in QCA, there are basically three basic types of sets (i.e. crisp, fuzzy, and multi-value sets). However, the present outcome has only

two empirical manifestations—that is either lobbying success ($SUCC = 1$), if the federal siting decision reflects the preference of a given regional government, or no lobbying success ($SUCC = 0$), if the federal siting decision does not reflect the preference of a given regional government. The outcome is therefore naturally dichotomous. The same applies to the five distinct success conditions as well. For example, a particular regional government may either be pressurized by a third actor such as e.g., by MPs in the cantonal parliament or local governments to act vis-à-vis the federal level ($PRESS = 1$), or there are no such occurrences of third actors exerting pressure on the regional government ($PRESS = 0$).

In the context of naturally dichotomous empirical manifestations, the literature on set-theoretic methods emphasizes that researchers, in this scenario, lack the option to choose sets. Rather, they '[...] must work with crisp sets if the concept of interest is generically binary' (Rohlfing, 2020, 76). This is why the empirical analyses are based on crisp sets, necessitating the application of csQCA.

Coding Process

As detailed in section 'Data and Methods' of the main article, the empirical analyses draw on a multi-year data collection effort. To compile data from the 'legislative footprint' of all 26 Swiss constituent units (named cantons) in the full sample—covering all federal policy decisions regarding the siting of specific facilities (i.e. federal siting decisions)—an iterative coding process took place. The key principles that guided this iterative coding process are as follows:

- *Consistency and coherence through a single-researcher approach:* To ensure consistency and coherence, a single researcher conducted the entire coding process. This approach ensured uniformity in coding both the outcomes (i.e. the match between a given regional government's preference to either host or not host a specific site and the federal authorities' siting decision) and the conditions. As only one researcher was involved, inter-coder reliability measures cannot be provided.

- *Triangulation of multiple document types:* The iterative coding process was grounded in a comprehensive analysis of diverse documents, including official records, archival materials, and press statements. This effort also incorporated confidential materials obtained via data access requests submitted under the Swiss Federal Act on Freedom of Information in the Administration (FoIA). These confidential materials were crucial

in acknowledging that certain regional governments might intentionally avoid publicizing their preferences, choosing instead to communicate them confidentially (e.g., in bilateral meetings).

- *Validation loops:* In line with established scholarship on interest groups, lobbying, and intergovernmental mobilization, which recognizes that much lobbying occurs in 'mostly informal meetings' (Tatham, 2016, 122) that leave minimal formal documentation, expert interviews were employed as the gold standard for validation. These interviews served to cross-check the coding's validity and to impute missing data arising from the informal nature of intergovernmental lobbying. An anonymized list of expert interviews conducted is provided below.

Anonymized List of Experts Interviewed

Year	**Role of the Expert**	**Canton**	**Format**
2020	Former Chancellor (*Staatsschreiber*)	BE	Semi-structured
2020	Member of the Cantonal Government (*Regierungsrat*)	SG	Semi-structured
2020	Head of the Office of External Affairs (*Präsidium/Staatskanzlei Wallis*)	VS	Semi-structured
2020	Head of the Office of External Affairs (*Dienst für Aussenbeziehungen*)	BE	Semi-structured
2020	Head of the Office of External Affairs (*Antenna amministrativa*)	TI	Informal exchange
2021	Member of the Cantonal Government (*Regierungsrat*)	GR	Informal exchange
2021	Member of the Cantonal Government (*Regierungsrat*)	ZH	Semi-structured
2021	Member of the Cantonal Government (*Regierungsrat*)	ZH	Informal exchange
2021	Member of the Cantonal Government (*Regierungsrat*)	BS	Semi-structured
2021	Head of the Office of External Affairs (*Koordinationsstelle für Aussenbeziehungen*)	SG	Joint workshop
2023	Former Member of the Cantonal Government (*Regierungsrat*)	AG	Informal exchange
2023	Former Member of the Cantonal Government (*Regierungsrat*)	BS	Semi-structured
2023	Head of the Office of External Affairs (*Secteur Relations extérieures*)	FR	Semi-structured
2023	Former Head of the Office of External Affairs (*Service des affaires européennes, régionales et fédérales*)	GE	Informal exchange

A2. csQCA: Validity and Robustness checks

Consistency: For the necessity analysis (section 4.1), consistency—sometimes also denoted 'inclusion score'—was calculated according to the following formula [0; 1]:

$$Cons_{\text{nec}} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} Y_i} \tag{1}$$

As for the sufficiency analysis (section 4.2), consistency was calculated as follows [0; 1]:

$$Cons_{\text{suf}} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} X_i} \tag{2}$$

Coverage: For the necessity analysis (section 4.1), coverage was calculated according to the following formula [0; 1]:

$$Cov_{\text{nec}} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} X_i} \tag{3}$$

As for the sufficiency analysis (section 4.2), consistency was calculated as follows [0; 1]:

$$Cov_{\text{suf}} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} min(X_i, Y_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} Y_i} \tag{4}$$

Relevance of Necessity (RoN): As the coverage parameter only expresses the difference in size between a success condition X and the outcome Y, formulae 3 and 4 may also cover almost constant conditions. In order to account for trivialness, Schneider and Wagemann (2012) proposed the parameter of Relevance of Necessity (RoN), calculated as follows:

$$RoN = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I}(1 - X_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{I}(1 - min(X_i, Y_i))} \tag{5}$$

Following the suggestions by Oana et al. (2021, 73), in applied QCA, it '[...] is best to calculate both parameters'. As RoN is the more conservative measure, its values tend to be lower than those for the coverage parameter.

A3. Additional Empirical Analyses

INUS and SUIN Conditions

One of the major strengths of QCA is its capacity to account for causal complexity (section 3). This also includes the assumption of 'conjunctural causation': '[. . .] a given factor might only perform its causal role together with another condition' (Oana et al., 2021, 8). Such combination are usually called a 'conjunction' or intersection of different sets, and they are to be calculated according to the ESA protocol as well.

INUS conditions: An INUS condition is an 'insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result' (Mackie, 1974, 62). The additional analyses yielded no INUS conditions, neither for the outcome $SUCC = 1$ nor for the outcome $SUCC = 0$.

SUIN conditions: A SUIN condition is a 'sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome' (Mahoney et al., 2009, 126).

For the outcome $SUCC = 1$, the SUIN disjunction $SOLU + PRESS$ surpassed the conventional thresholds of ≥ 0.9 in terms of consistency and of ≥ 0.6 in terms of coverage and RoN, respectively. However, in applied QCA, disjunctions of SUIN conditions (that is, conditions combined with a logical OR) '[. . .] should only be considered necessary when they are non-trivial and can be meaningfully interpreted as functional equivalents of a higher-order necessity condition' (Oana et al., 2021, 85). The SUIN disjunction $SOLU + PRESS$ can not be considered as a theoretically viable functional equivalent of the outcome $SUCC = 1$. This is why the said SUIN disjuntion is not interpreted substantively.

In terms of the outcome $SUCC = 0$, the additional analyses yielded no SUIN conditions that surpassed the above mentioned conventional thresholds regarding consistency and coverage.

Table 5.1: Five Causal Pathways to Intergovernmental Lobbying Non-Success ($SUCC = 0$)

	Causal pathway	Consistency	PRI	covS	covU	Cases explained
1	**∼PRESS*∼TEMP*∼MULT**	1.000	1.000	0.500	0.062	NW.2a, TI.3a; GR.3a; LU.3a, UR.3a, SZ.3a, OW.3a, NW.3a
2	**∼PRESS*∼MULT*∼INFO**	1.000	1.000	0.625	0.188	NW.2a, TI.3a; LU.3a, UR.3a, SZ.3a, OW.3a, NW.3a; FR.1; AR.3a, AI.3a
3	**∼TEMP*∼COAL*MULT**	1.000	1.000	0.062	0.062	AG.1
4	**∼COAL*MULT*∼INFO**	1.000	1.000	0.062	0.062	VS.2a
5	**∼TEMP*COAL*∼MULT*∼INFO**	1.000	1.000	0.375	0.062	LU.3a, UR.3a, SZ.3a, OW.3a, NW.3a; ZG.3a
	M1	1.000	1.000	0.875		

Notes: ∼ = non-occurrence of the success condition; ∗ = logical AND; + logical OR; PRI = proportional reduction in inconsistency; covS = raw coverage»; covU = unique coverage (see appendix for further details). Reported is the parsimonious solution (please refer to the appendix where the other solutions that have been calculated according to the ESA protocol are documented). There is no 'model ambiguity', but only one causal model that can account for the configurational data (M1; see Baumgartner and Thiem, 2015): $\sim PRESS*\sim TEMP*\sim MULT + \sim PRESS*\sim MULT*\sim INFO + \sim TEMP*\sim COAL*MULT + \sim COAL*MULT*\sim INFO + \sim TEMP*COAL*\sim MULT*\sim INFO \Longrightarrow \sim SUCC$. The numbers behind the abbreviations of the cantons indicate the specific site decision: 1 = seat of the Federal Criminal Court and the Federal Administrative Court (created by the 2000 Swiss judicial reform); 2a = 2013 deployment concept of the Swiss Army; 2b = 2017 *Sachplan Militär*; 3a = network locations of the Swiss Innovation Park; 3b = further sites of the Swiss Innovation Park; 4 = location of federal asylum centers. Please refer to the appendix for further information on the cases examined.

Source: Freiburghaus (2024a, 569) with own adjustments.