## Appendix for Visibility of Autocratization and Election Outcomes

## Contents

A1. [Universe of Cases](https://sumailsyr-my.sharepoint.com/personal/ehern_syr_edu/Documents/Research/Visibility%20of%20Autocratization/EPSR/Appendix_EPSR.docx#A1. Universe of Cases: Reasonably Competitive African Elections)  page A1

A2. [Case Selection and Sensitivity Analysis](https://sumailsyr-my.sharepoint.com/personal/ehern_syr_edu/Documents/Research/Visibility%20of%20Autocratization/EPSR/Revision/Appendix_EPSR_revised.docx?web=1#A2. Case Selection and Sensitivity Analysis: Elections under Autocratization)  page A4

A3. [Measurement Validation of Visibility of Autocratization](https://sumailsyr-my.sharepoint.com/personal/ehern_syr_edu/Documents/Research/Visibility%20of%20Autocratization/EPSR/Appendix_EPSR.docx#A2. Measurement Validation of Visibility of Autocratization) page A5

A4. [Sampling Procedure for Original Survey](https://sumailsyr-my.sharepoint.com/personal/ehern_syr_edu/Documents/Research/Visibility%20of%20Autocratization/EPSR/Appendix_EPSR.docx#A3. Sampling Procedure for Original Survey)  page A8

A5. [Coding Details for Afrobarometer Survey](https://sumailsyr-my.sharepoint.com/personal/ehern_syr_edu/Documents/Research/Visibility%20of%20Autocratization/EPSR/Appendix_EPSR.docx#A4. Coding Details for Afrobarometer Survey) page A9

A6. [Validating the “Perceive Autocratization” Measure](https://sumailsyr-my.sharepoint.com/personal/ehern_syr_edu/Documents/Research/Visibility%20of%20Autocratization/EPSR/Appendix_EPSR.docx#A5. Validating ) page A10

A7. [Full Results Tables](#_A6._Full_Results) and Robustness Checks page A12

A8. [Endogeneity Probe: QCA](https://sumailsyr-my.sharepoint.com/personal/ehern_syr_edu/Documents/Research/Visibility%20of%20Autocratization/EPSR/Appendix_EPSR.docx#A7. Endogeneity Probe: QCA) page A22

A9. [Works Cited (in Appendix Only)](https://sumailsyr-my.sharepoint.com/personal/ehern_syr_edu/Documents/Research/Visibility%20of%20Autocratization/EPSR/Appendix_EPSR.docx#A8. Works Cited (in Appendix Only)) page A26

## A1. Universe of Cases: Reasonably Competitive African Elections

**Table A1: Reasonably Competitive Elections and Incumbents**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Election Year** | **Election Type** | **Incumbent Candidate** | **Incumbent Party** | **Incum. Won?** | **Ref.** |
| Benin | 1996 | Direct | Soglo | Benin Rebirth Party/UTRD | No | [NY Times](https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/06/world/world-news-briefs-benin-presidential-vote-heads-for-a-runoff.html), African Elections Database ([AED](https://africanelections.tripod.com/)) |
| Benin | 2001 | Direct | Kerekou | FARD-Alfia | Yes | AED |
| Benin | 2006 | Direct | . | FARD-Alfia | No | [ABC](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2006-03-23/boni-wins-benin-presidential-election-official/825650), AED |
| Benin | 2011 | Direct | Boni | Ind. | Yes | AED |
| Botswana | 1994 | Indirect | Masire | BDP | Yes | Inter-parliamentary Union ([IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2041_94.htm)), AED |
| Botswana | 1999 | Indirect | Mogae | BDP | Yes | [IPU](http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2041_99.htm) |
| Botswana | 2004 | Indirect | Mogae | BDP | Yes | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2041_04.htm) |
| Botswana | 2009 | Indirect | Khama | BDP | Yes | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2041_09.htm) |
| Botswana | 2014 | Indirect | Khama | BDP | Yes | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/BW/BW-LC01/election/BW-LC01-E20141024/) |
| Botswana | 2019 | Indirect | Masisi | BDP | Yes | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/BW/BW-LC01/election/BW-LC01-E20191023/) |
| Cape Verde | 2001 | Direct | Monteiro | MpD | No | AED |
| Cape Verde | 2006 | Direct | Pires | PAIVC | Yes | AED |
| Cape Verde | 2011 | Direct | . | PAIVC | No | AED |
| Cape Verde | 2016 | Direct | Fonseca | MpD | Yes | [Yahoo News](https://web.archive.org/web/20161004171420/https%3A/au.news.yahoo.com/world/a/32792870/president-fonseca-wins-second-term-in-cape-verde-vote/#page1) |
| Cape Verde | 2021 | Direct | . | MpD | No | [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/opposition-candidate-neves-wins-cape-verde-election-2021-10-18/) |
| Ghana | 1996 | Direct | Rawlings | NDC | Yes | AED |
| Ghana | 2000 | Direct | . | NDC | No | AED |
| Ghana | 2004 | Direct | Kufuor | NPP | Yes | AED |
| Ghana | 2008 | Direct | . | NPP | No | AED |
| Ghana | 2012 | Direct | .[[1]](#footnote-1) | NDC | Yes | [Telegraph](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/ghana/9733745/Ghana-John-Mahama-declared-election-winner.html) |
| Ghana | 2016 | Direct | Mahama | NDC | No | [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38270956) |
| Ghana | 2020 | Direct | Akufo-Addo | NPP | Yes | [Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-09/ghana-s-president-akufo-addo-wins-re-election-with-52-of-vote) |
| Guinea | 2015 | Direct | Conde | RPG | Yes | [Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/17/guinea-president-alpha-conde-election) |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1999 | Direct | . | PAIGC | No | AED |
| Guinea-Bissau | 2019 | Direct | Vaz | Independent | No | [AfricaNews](https://www.africanews.com/2020/02/05/g-bissau-ex-pm-embalo-wins-poll-round-2/) |
| Kenya | 1997 | Direct | Moi | KANU | Yes | AED |
| Kenya | 2002 | Direct | . | KANU | No | AED |
| Kenya | 2022 | Direct | . | Jubilee | No[[2]](#footnote-2) | [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62554210) |
| Lesotho | 1998 | Indirect | . | LCD | Yes | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2181_98.htm) |
| Lesotho | 2002 | Indirect | Mosisili | LCD | Yes | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2181_02.htm) |
| Lesotho | 2007 | Indirect | Mosisili | LCD | Yes | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2181_07.htm) |
| Lesotho | 2012 | Indirect | Mosisili | LCD/DC | No | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2181_12.htm) |
| Lesotho | 2015 | Indirect | Thabane | ABC | No | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2181_15.htm) |
| Lesotho | 2017 | Indirect | Mosisili | DC | No | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/LS/LS-LC01/election/LS-LC01-E20170603/) |
| Lesotho | 2022 | Indirect | Majoro | ABC | No | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/LS/LS-LC01/election/LS-LC01-E20221007/) |
| Liberia | 2011 | Direct | Sirleaf | UP | Yes | AED |
| Liberia | 2017 | Direct | . | UP | No | [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42507405) |
| Madagascar | 1996 | Direct | Zafy | UNDD | No | AED |
| Madagascar | 2001 | Direct | Ratsiraka | AREMA | No | AED |
| Madagascar | 2006 | Direct | Ravalomanana | TIM | Yes | AED |
| Madagascar | 2018 | Direct | Rajaonarimampianina | HVM | No | [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46694430) |
| Malawi | 1999 | Direct | Muluzi | UDF | Yes | AED |
| Malawi | 2004 | Direct | . | UDF | Yes | AED |
| Malawi | 2009 | Direct | B. Mutharika | DPP | Yes | AED |
| Malawi | 2014 | Direct | Banda [B. Mutharika] | PP [DPP][[3]](#footnote-3) | Yes | [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27646181) |
| Malawi | 2020 | Direct | P. Mutharika | DPP | No | [Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/27/opposition-wins-rerun-of-malawis-presidential-election-in-historic-first) |
| Mali | 2002 | Direct | . | ADEMA | No | AED |
| Mali | 2007 | Direct | Toure | ADP | Yes | AED |
| Mali | 2018 | Direct | Keita | RPM | Yes | [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/article/world/mali-president-keita-wins-landslide-election-faces-uphill-struggle-idUSKBN1L10ZF/) |
| Mauritius | 1991 | Indirect | A. Jugnauth | MSM | Yes | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2209_91.htm) |
| Mauritius | 1995 | Indirect | A. Jugnauth | MSM | No | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2209_95.htm) |
| Mauritius | 2000 | Indirect |  Ramgoolam | Labour | No | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2209_00.htm) |
| Mauritius | 2005 | Indirect | Berenger | MSM | No | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2209_05.htm) |
| Mauritius | 2010 | Indirect | Ramgoolam | Labour | Yes | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2209_10.htm) |
| Mauritius | 2014 | Indirect | Ramgoolam | Labour | No | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/MU/MU-LC01/election/MU-LC01-E20141210/) |
| Mauritius | 2019 | Indirect | P. Jugnauth | MSM | Yes | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/MU/MU-LC01/election/MU-LC01-E20191107/) |
| Mozambique | 1999 | Direct | Chissano | FRELIMO | Yes | AED |
| Mozambique | 2004 | Direct | . | FRELIMO | Yes | AED |
| Mozambique | 2009 | Direct | Guebuza | FRELIMO | Yes | AED |
| Mozambique | 2014 | Direct | . | FRELIMO | Yes | [IPU](http://archive.ipu.org/parline/reports/2223_E.htm) |
| Niger | 2004 | Pre | Tandja | MNSD | Yes | AED |
| Niger | 2020 | Direct | . | PNDS | Yes | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/NE/NE-LC01/election/NE-LC01-E20201227/) |
| Nigeria | 2011 | Direct | Jonathan | PDP | Yes | AED |
| Nigeria | 2015 | Direct | Jonathan | PDP | No | [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32139858) |
| Nigeria | 2019[[4]](#footnote-4) | Direct | Buhari | APC | Yes | [CNN](https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/26/africa/buhari-wins-nigeria-election-intl/index.html) |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 1996 | Direct | Trovoada | ADI | Yes | AED |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 2006 | Direct | Menezes | MDFM-PL | Yes | AED |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 2010 | Indirect[[5]](#footnote-5) | Branco | MLSTP-PSD | No | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/election-summary/HTML/2275_10.htm) |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 2014 | Indirect | Trovoada | ADI | Yes[[6]](#footnote-6) | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/ST/ST-LC01/election/ST-LC01-E20141012/) |
| SaoTome and Principe | 2018 | Indirect | Trovoada | ADI | Yes[[7]](#footnote-7) | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/ST/ST-LC01/election/ST-LC01-E20181007/) |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 2022 | Indirect | Jesus | MLSTP-PSD | No | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/ST/ST-LC01/election/ST-LC01-E20220925/) |
| Senegal | 2007 | Direct | Wade | PDS | Yes | AED |
| Senegal | 2012 | Direct | Wade | PDS | No | AED |
| Senegal | 2019 | Direct | Sall | APR | Yes | [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47400711) |
| Seychelles | 1998 | Direct | Rene | FPPS | Yes | AED |
| Seychelles | 2001 | Direct | Rene | FPPS | Yes | AED |
| Seychelles | 2006 | Direct | . | FPPS | Yes | AED |
| Seychelles | 2011 | Direct | Michel | PL | Yes | AED |
| Seychelles | 2015 | Direct | Michel | PL | Yes | [Nation](https://www.nation.sc/archive/247992/presidential-election-2015-) |
| Seychelles | 2020 | Direct | Faure | US | No | [Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/25/seychelles-election-marks-first-opposition-victory-in-44-years) |
| Sierra Leone | 2002 | Direct | Kabbah | SLPP | Yes | AED |
| Sierra Leone | 2007 | Direct | . | SLPP | No | AED |
| Sierra Leone | 2012 | Direct | Koroma | APC | Yes | AED |
| Sierra Leone | 2018 | Direct | . | APC | No | [Al Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/4/5/sierra-leone-opposition-leader-wins-presidential-election-runoff) |
| South Africa | 2014 | Indirect | Zuma | ANC | Yes | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/ZA/ZA-LC01/election/ZA-LC01-E20140507/) |
| South Africa | 2019 | Indirect | Ramaphosa | ANC | Yes | [IPU](https://data.ipu.org/parliament/ZA/ZA-LC01/election/ZA-LC01-E20190508/) |
| Tanzania | 2010 | Direct | Kikwete | CCM | Yes | AED |
| Tanzania | 2015 | Direct | . | CCM | Yes | [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34669468) |
| The Gambia | 2016 | Direct | Jammeh | APRC | No | [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38183906) |
| The Gambia | 2021 | Direct | Barrow | Coalition | Yes | [Al Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/6/the-gambias-barrow-wins-second-term-opposition-reject-results) |
| Togo | 2015 | Direct | Gnassingbe | UNIR | Yes | [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32512615) |
| Zambia | 2001 | Direct | . | MMD | Yes | AED |
| Zambia | 2006 | Direct | Mwanawasa | MMD | Yes | AED |
| Zambia | 2008 | Direct | . | MMD | Yes | AED |
| Zambia | 2011 | Direct | Banda | MMD | No | AED |
| Zambia | 2015 | Direct | . | PF | Yes | [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30970952) |
| Zambia | 2016 | Direct | Lungu | PF | Yes | [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37086365) |
| Zambia | 2021 | Direct | Lungu | PF | No | [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58226695) |

## A2. Case Selection and Sensitivity Analysis: Elections under Autocratization

Upon identifying the universe of relevant elections (A1), I subsequently used the Episodes of Regime Transition (ERT) dataset to identify autocratization episodes using the following criteria: start inclusion of -0.01, cumulative inclusion of -0.05, annual turn of 0.02, cumulative turn of 0.02 and tolerance of 5. I matched these episodes to the list of elections, considering an election as occurring under autocratization if it (a) took place during an autocratization episode after the decline of 0.05 or more, or (b) took place in the aftermath of an autocratization episode. “Aftermath” indicates that the autocratization episode took place (or continued) *after* the previous election (ie, it was carried out by the relevant incumbent), and that the democracy score had not since recovered. Due to the context-dependent nature of the “aftermath” (dependent on the date of the previous election), the episodes generated by the ERT are used as a reference point rather than to directly code whether an election took place during this window. I subsequently used the Freedom House reports to validate that the autocratization picked up the EDI was in fact carried out by the incumbent during the relevant time frame.

The data presented in the main text are from v11 of V-Dem, released in 2021, with updates from subsequent versions of data for the elections that took place in 2022-3. V-Dem updates its scores annually, and occasionally these updates revise historical data. At the time of writing, the current dataset is v14. The coding for some of the relevant cases changed between v11 and v14 enough to alter their inclusion as cases of autocratization. To evaluate the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of these borderline cases, I re-generated the list of elections under autocratization two ways: first, using the v14 scores with the same 0.05 decline on the EDI, and second, using the v14 scores with a looser 0.04 threshold. Five elections are subject to changes across these various measurements, but their inclusion or exclusion does not change the main results (Table A2).

Benin’s 2011 election was omitted from the original analysis, as it barely missed the cutoff (EDI decline of 0.049), but re-scoring put it over the cutoff (decline of 0.06). Ghana (2020) and Liberia (2017) were originally included with declines of 0.05, but would be omitted with v14 rescoring as it decreased their declines to 0.047 and 0.045, respectively. Nigeria’s 2011 election was originally included, as declines had occurred subsequently to the 2007 election, but upon rescoring, Nigeria’s score was stagnant between the 2007 and 2011 election.

Loosening the threshold to 0.04 results in the re-inclusion of Ghana (2020) and Liberia (2017), along with The Gambia (2021), which had a decline of 0.041.

Given that the changes in scoring affects the inclusion of countries on the threshold, I re-ran the primary analyses to determine whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of these cases. Table A2 displays the mean scores for visibility, polarization, and GDP growth for each of three samples: the using data from v11 with a 0.05 threshold (the data from the main text), the updated data from v14 with a 0.05 threshold, and the updated data from v14 with a 0.04 threshold. The main results are unchanged across the samples.

**Table A2. Case Selection Sensitivity Analysis**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **IncumbStatus** | **Mean Vis.****(v11, 0.05)** | **Mean Vis.****(v14, 0.05)** | **Mean Vis.****(v14, 0.04)** | **Mean Polar.****(v11, 0.05)** | **Mean****Polar.****(v14, 0.05)** | **Mean Polar.****(v14, 0.04)** | **Mean ΔGDP****(v11, 0.05)** | **Mean ΔGDP****(v14, 0.05)** | **Mean ΔGDP****(v14, 0.04)** |
| Re-elected | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Voted Out | 5.2 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 0.19 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| t-testp-value | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.15 | 0.49 | 0.37 | 0.33 |
| N | 17 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 15 | 17 |

An additional case selection concern is the use of the EDI rather than the LDI to identify episodes. Given that most of the cases included here are electoral democracies or electoral autocracies rather than liberal democracies, the EDI is a more appropriate measure for most of the cases. Because the LDI includes additional elements that do not change across most of these cases, the index itself is less variable. Practically, using the LDI with a 0.05 generates a sample of only 10 elections, while loosening the threshold to 0.04 expands the sample to 14. The stricter LDI sample omits clear cases of autocratization, such as Malawi in 2020. Given the cases under investigation, EDI is the more appropriate measure.

## A3. Measurement Validation of Visibility of Autocratization

I use three forms of validation (content, convergent, discriminant) to evaluate whether this measurement appropriately reflects the concept. First, content validation aims to ensure that the components of the measure reflect the underlying concept (Adcock and Collier 2001). As applied here, it is important to ensure that the inductive categorization of the varied autocratic acts as “visible” or “subtle” based on the conceptual definition accurately reflects the meaning of the concept. One way to check this is through the conceptual relationship between visible acts and their greater legibility to the relevant population. To check whether the acts I categorized as visible were also more legible, I rely on an original survey of 300 Zambians carried out in March of 2022 (full sampling and site selection details in the subsequent section).

This survey took place seven months after an election in which Zambians had decisively voted out an autocratizing incumbent. From 1994 to 2012, after its return to multiparty democracy, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project’s estimate of Zambia’s Electoral Democracy Index hovered between 0.49 and 0.53 (on a scale of 0-1). After the elections of populist Michal Sata and his successor Edgar Lungu of the Patriotic Front (PF), the quality of Zambia’s democracy declined to a nadir of 0.33 between 2012 and 2020. Importantly, the government had undertaken both visible and subtle forms of autocratization, and anecdotally the nature of autocratization in the years leading up to the election had become increasingly visible. For example, while the government had long harassed private media outlets for giving voice to political opponents, after 2016 their strategy shifted to revoking media licenses and shutting down outlets (Lynch and Gadjanovaa 2022). Similarly, opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema had endured harassment such as defamation lawsuits and refusal to grant meeting permits for years, but after 2016 these actions escalated to include periodic arrests and unjust imprisonment (Kaaba *et al.* 2021). Additionally, private citizens more regularly became targets, arrested for criticizing the government on social media. Violence carried out by party cadres—young men employed by the party—became more pronounced. These actions took place alongside government strategies of “lawfare”—more subtle ways of entrenching the ruling party (Hinfelaar *et al.* 2023). One important attempt at such was through “Bill 10,” legislation intended to further entrench the power of the presidency that parliament ultimately failed to pass. In the two years prior to the election, there were a number of visible forms of autocratization that should be more legible to citizens (jailing the opposition leader and private citizens, shutting down media outlets, violence carried out by cadres), alongside more subtle ones that should be less legible (judicial stacking, Bill 10, de-registration of civil society groups, withholding meeting permits from opposition parties).

To assess Zambians’ awareness of the different elements of autocratization in their country, I asked the open-ended question: “During President Lungu’s rule, he made some changes and tried to make some changes to the way Zambian democracy works. Are you familiar with any of these?” I intentionally phrased this question neutrally to enable PF supporters to respond with actions they might perceive as strengthening the way Zambian democracy works. Of 302 respondents, 147 offered actions that Lungu or the PF had taken. 73% of their responses were actions I categorized as “high visibility”: the modal response was to identify violence by the PF cadres (69), followed by the arrests of opposition leaders (21). The remaining 27% of responses included actions I categorized as subtle: Bill 10, de-registration of civil society groups, restrictions on political gatherings, and non-violent harassment of opposition party members. Overall, 13% of the sample offered knowledge of “subtle” autocratizing actions, while an additional 37% offered knowledge of “visible” autocratizing actions. Over half the sample could not think of anything. The responses to this question validate that citizens are more likely to be aware of the type of autocratization I categorized as “visible” than “subtle,” but also that awareness of any specific action is limited.

Next, I use convergent and discriminant validation to ensure that my measure appropriately captures the concept. Convergent validation is based on the logic that a measure of a concept should correlate closely with other measures intended to capture that concept. Discriminant validation is the inverse: that it should diverge from measures intended to capture something else (Adcock and Collier 2001). I perform these checks using the conceptual distinction between visibility and severity of autocratization. If my measure captures visibility of autocratization, but is distinct from the severity of autocratization, then I would expect the following: the combined measures of “subtle” and “visible” autocratization for a country should converge with the size of decline in V-Dem’s EDI, as this “total” count of autocratizing actions should correlate with the severity of decline in a country’s democracy score (convergent validation). However, visibility by itself should be less closely correlated with the size of the decline in the democracy index, as it measures a distinct component of autocratization that does not necessarily correlate with overall severity of autocratization (discriminant validation).

**Figure A1. Scores for Elections Occurring Under Autocratization**

Figure A1 displays the 17 elections that took place under autocratization with their visibility scores, total autocratization scores (count of both subtle and visible forms of autocratization) and the size of the decline on V-Dem’s EDI measured the year prior to the election (with the sign reversed, so that larger numbers indicate larger declines). As the figure displays, there is great variation in the proportion of visible to subtle forms of autocratization country by country. In some cases, such as Zambia 2015/6 and Malawi 1999, it makes up a very small portion of total autocratization. Total autocratization is correlated with the change in V-Dem’s EDI measure at 68%, indicating that these measures are capturing a similar phenomenon. There are three elections (Lesotho 2017, Zambia 2015, Malawi 2004) where my count of autocratizing incidences diverges from the size of the decline in EDI. In the cases of Lesotho and Malawi, the divergence is due to the timing of the measures: additional autocratizing actions took place during the election year, in the months prior to the election, which were not reflected in the EDI from the previous year. Omitting these countries or using the EDI from the election year rather than the year prior increases the correlation of the measures to 83% or 78%, respectively. Visibility is much more weakly correlated with the change in EDI (49%), validating that it is distinct from both total autocratization and change in EDI, though it is conceptually a component of each.

## A4. Sampling Procedure for Original Survey

The original survey was carried out in Zambia in March 2022, 7 months after the August 2021 elections. Enumerators from Ubuntu Research drew samples of 50 respondents from six locations in three Zambian provinces. The two sites in each province include an urban location and a nearby rural location. These districts were selected for political diversity: Southern Province as a UPND stronghold, Eastern Province as a PF stronghold, and Lusaka Province as a politically mixed area. Sites on the map below (Figure A1) are in gray; red indicates areas that voted largely for UPND; green indicates areas that voted largely for PF. The white area is Zimbabwe. As indicated in the main analysis, while this survey is not nationally representative, it does reflect the distribution of UPND vs PF support at the time of the election.

To recruit survey respondents, enumerators went door to door at residences. Enumerators began at a central starting point and began a random walk in varying directions. In sparsely populated rural areas, enumerators sampled every residence they happened upon. In densely populated urban areas, they used a 3-household skipping pattern. Enumerators were instructed to alternate the gender of the person they interviewed. Overall response rate was 88.5%.



**Figure A2: Survey Enumeration Sites and Election Results**

## A5. Coding Details for Afrobarometer Survey

**Table A3: Afrobarometer Variable Coding**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Variable Name** | **Source** | **Coding Details** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev.** | **Obs** |
| DV | Incumbent Vote | Afrobarometer Round 8 Q99 | 1 if respondent reported prospective vote for incumbent party0 if respondent reported prospective vote for opposition partyDropped if neither 0/1 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 3646 |
| Explanatory Variables | Perceive Autocracy | Afrobarometer Round 8 Q10a, Q14, Q56 | These three questions ask about restrictions on free speech, the fairness of the most recent election, and restrictions on free media, respectively. Each range from 0-3, where 3 indicates heightened perception of restriction.In Ghana, where the only visible form of autocratization was attacks on the free press, this variable includes only Q56.In Niger and Zambia, where recorded visible forms of autocratization included attacks on the free press as well as free speech, the variable is the averaged response to Q56 and Q10a.In Malawi, recorded visible forms of autocratization included attacks on the free press, free speech, and election integrity, so this variable is the averaged response to all three variables.See below for additional justification of this measurement. | 1.03 | 0.83 | 5570 |
| Economic Assessment | Afrobarometer Round 8 Q6a | Ordinal measure of how well respondents think the economy is doing compared to 6 months previously ranging from 1-5. Nonresponse dropped. | 2.47 | 1.21 | 5900 |
| Partisan | Afrobarometer Q91B | 0 if respondents reported not feeling close to any party (“not applicable”)1 if respondents reported feeling close to an opposition party2 if respondents reported feeling close to a ruling party | 0.748 | 0.83 | 5691 |
| Partisan Animosity | Afrobarometer Q86E | Ordinal measure of “how much would you like having neighbors who supported a different political party” ranging from 1-5. Nonresponse dropped. Not asked in Niger. | 3.84 | 1.26 | 4752 |
| Media Exposure | Afrobarometer Q55A-E | Additive index of responses to the question “How often do you get news from the following sources?” Asked re: radio, television, print newspapers, internet, and social media. Responses to each question are ordinal, ranging from never to every day. Additive index ranges from 0 to 20.  | 6.87 | 5.47 | 5851 |
| Discuss Politics | Afrobarometer Q9 | Ordinal response to the following: “When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters:” Answers range from never to frequently. | 0.91 | 0.72 | 5986 |
| Extent of Democracy | AfrobarometerQ36 | Ordinal response to the following: “In your opinion, how much of a democracy is [country] today?” Responses are: (1) Not a democracy, (2) a democracy, with major problems, (3) a democracy, but with minor problems, (4) A full democracy.  | 2.71 | 0.90 | 5840 |
| Control Variables | Rural | Afrobarometer urbrur | Binary variable, 1 if rural 0 if urban | 0.64 | 0.48 | 5999 |
| Age | Afrobarometer Age\_v1 | Reported age, dropped if missing | 2.68 | 1.48 |  5996 |
| Female | Afrobarometer Q101 | Binary variable, 1 if female 0 if male (only binary response option provided) | 0.5 | 0.5 | 5999 |
| Edu | Afrobarometer EDUC\_COND | Ordinal variable, 0 (no formal education) to 3 (post-secondary) | 1.32 | 0.95 | 5990 |
| Poverty | Afrobarometer LivedPoverty | Index measuring how frequently respondents have gone without food, water, medicine, cooking oil, and cash income over the past year | 1.23 | 0.89 | 5971 |
| Ethnicity | Afrobarometer Q81 | Categorical measure of self-reported ethnicity. Recoded so base category is “other.” Dropped if missing. | . | . | 5983 |

## A6. Validating “Perceive Autocratization” Measure

One critique of using this operationalization of perception of autocratization is that, rather than measuring citizen’s perspectives of an objective phenomenon, it rather captures some other feature of personality or disposition, such as generalized distrust of the government. If this underlying feature is also associated with support for opposition parties, then there are serious problems interpreting the meaning of any correlation between this variable and prospective opposition vote. One way to validate that this measure captures perception of actual phenomena is by evaluating how well its components co-vary with national-level indicators of performance in areas of free speech, free media, and election integrity.

If this operationalization of perception of autocratization validly measures citizen’s recognition of national political phenomena, we would expect that citizens would be more likely to report the visible components of autocratization in countries where there have been documented events of such than in countries where there have not. Table A3 displays the national averages of the variables that form the autocratization perception measure. Each variable ranges from 0-3, where 0 indicates no perception of restriction on that variable. Shaded cells are those that were included in the “perception of autocratization” score for the country.

**Table A4: Within-Sample Averages**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Ghana | Zambia | Niger | Malawi |
| Media Restriction | 0.81 | 1.37 | 1.21 | 0.89 |
| Free Speech Restriction | 0.43 | 1.03 | 1.06 | 1.04 |
| Election Unfairness | 0.47 | 1.07 | 0.87 | 1.63 |

Ghana was the country in the sample with the least pronounced visible autocratization, and the only measurable type of visible autocratization was violations of the free media—specifically, journalists being arrested and attacked by government agents and an instance of a journalist being murdered after a politician encouraged violence against him. As Table A3 demonstrates, the average perception of media restriction was nearly double the average perception of restrictions on free speech and election unfairness. While majorities of Ghanaians report no restrictions on free speech (71%) and election unfairness (67%), a majority report at least some restrictions on media freedom (56%). Ghanaians’ perception of autocratization is the lowest compared to the other three countries on all measures, which also reflects its comparatively small decline in democracy: Ghana’s decline on V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index leading up the election was 5 points, compared to 8 points in Malawi, 11 in Niger, and 19 in Zambia.

In Zambia, visible attacks on the media and free speech were common, and attacks on the media were more frequent than in Ghana, including the closure of a popular television station, radio broadcasters attacked for airing opposition politician, and murder of journalists. The comparative intensity of these attacks on the media are reflected in the increased perception of media restriction in Zambia. Additionally, Zambia experienced infringements on free speech by civil society activists who were jailed for organizing meetings, and citizens who were arrested for posts on social media. Unfairness of the past election was not one of the issues listed under Zambia’s visible forms of autocratization because the previous election took place in 2016, outside the 24-month time frame of the visibility score. Zambia’s elevated score in this area likely reflects the unusually high rates of violence surrounding the 2016 election, which contributed to very low electoral turnout. As a robustness check, I generated an alternative measure of “perceive autocracy” that includes election unfairness for Zambia. The results are robust to this specification (see Table A5, column IV below).

In Niger, the degree of autocratization was smaller and all visible autocratization was related to arrests of journalists and citizens for criticizing the government. Nigeriens’ perceptions of media restriction fell between those of Zambians and Ghanaians, and perception of free speech restriction is similar to Zambia which coheres with the visible violations in the country at the time. Perceptions of the unfairness of the previous election in Niger were much lower. In 2016, the incumbent president won re-election in the second round due to an opposition boycott, though international observers deemed the election fair. Turnout was relatively high even with the opposition boycott.

In Malawi, all three forms of visible autocratization were evident in the 24 months prior to the 2020 election. This election took place by court order after a judge deemed the 2019 election to have been fraudulent—a context clearly reflected by strong perception of election unfairness in Malawi. Visible forms of media restriction were similar to what was taking place in Zambia, including media outlet being shut down and the assault of journalists who published work critical of the government. It is curious that Malawians did not report perceiving this restriction at the same rate as Zambians or Nigeriens (though they still did so more than Ghanaians). Violations of free speech included the arrest of protestors and civil society organizers. The underlying data support the idea that Malawians perceived the 2019 election to be fraudulent, and the media at the time was vocal in dubbing it the “tip-ex” election, for the brand name of white correction fluid that had been used to doctor ballots in some locations, contributing to a sense of election manipulation on behalf of the incumbent. President Mutharika’s subsequent attempts to nullify the Supreme Court’s order to re-do the election—including attempts to oust the head justice—intensified perceptions of election manipulation. Nevertheless, it is unclear that the initial election irregularities favored any particular candidate. An alternative specification for Malawi therefore includes only media and speech restriction. The results are robust to this specification (Table A5, column V).

In general, the pattern of responses across these countries is what one would expect if these variables reflected national circumstances, though there may also be some variation in baseline perception of each related issue, as exemplified by the unexpectedly muted perception of media restriction in Malawi.

## A7. Full Results Tables and Robustness Checks

Tables of full regression outputs. Columns I-II correspond to Table Two in the main text, column III reflects the alternative specification vote intention, including “don’t know” responses with opposition voters, and columns IV and V reflect the alternative specification of “perceive autocratization” detailed in section A6 above for Zambia and Malawi, respectively. Codes from ethnicity are unaltered from Afrobarometer Round 8, except that the “other” ethnicity category was re-coded to be the omitted base category.

**Table A5: Full Regression Results**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (I) | (II) | (III) | (IV) | (V) |
|  | Main voteincumb | Interaction voteincumb | Alt-Spec (Vote intent)voteincumb | Alt-Spec(Zambia)voteincumb | Alt-Spec (Malawi)voteincumb |
| perceiveautoc | -.038\*\*\* | -.048\*\*\* | -.024\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (.007) | (.008) | (.006) |  |  |
| altperceiveautoc |  |  |  | -.042\*\*\*(.007) | -.032\*\*\*(.006) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| econassess | .024\*\*\* | .028\*\*\* | .025\*\*\* | .023\*\*\* | .025\*\*\* |
|  | (.004) | (.005) | (.004) | (.004) | (.004) |
| 0bn.partisan |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.partisan | -.435\*\*\* | -.495\*\*\* | -.135\*\*\* | -.437\*\*\* | -.437\*\*\* |
|  | (.014) | (.043) | (.012) | (.014) | (.014) |
| 2.partisan | .365\*\*\* | .274\*\*\* | .601\*\*\* | .363\*\*\* | .366\*\*\* |
|  | (.013) | (.045) | (.012) | (.013) | (.013) |
| rural | .027\*\* | .019 | .027\*\* | .026\*\* | .028\*\* |
|  | (.013) | (.014) | (.011) | (.013) | (.013) |
| age | 0 | -.001 | -.005 | 0 | .001 |
|  | (.004) | (.004) | (.003) | (.004) | (.004) |
| female | -.006 | -.002 | -.013 | -.003 | -.005 |
|  | (.01) | (.012) | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) |
| edu | -.019\*\*\* | -.02\*\* | -.015\*\* | -.02\*\*\* | -.02\*\*\* |
|  | (.007) | (.008) | (.006) | (.007) | (.007) |
| poverty | -.023\*\*\* | -.023\*\*\* | -.014\*\* | -.022\*\*\* | -.023\*\*\* |
|  | (.007) | (.008) | (.007) | (.007) | (.007) |
| 0bn.ethnicity |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.ethnicity | -.437 | -.447 | -.154 | -.431 | -.441 |
|  | (.294) | (.299) | (.336) | (.293) | (.295) |
| 260.ethnicity | .151\*\*\* | .158\*\*\* | .075\*\*\* | .153\*\*\* | .152\*\*\* |
|  | (.03) | (.031) | (.027) | (.03) | (.03) |
| 261.ethnicity | -.053 | -.053 | -.059\* | -.049 | -.053 |
|  | (.037) | (.038) | (.032) | (.037) | (.037) |
| 262.ethnicity | .043 | .039 | -.075\*\* | .045 | .047 |
|  | (.047) | (.048) | (.037) | (.047) | (.047) |
| 263.ethnicity | .073\* | .071\* | .073\* | .074\* | .076\* |
|  | (.042) | (.043) | (.04) | (.042) | (.042) |
| 264.ethnicity | .084 | .081 | .129 | .085 | .087 |
|  | (.078) | (.079) | (.081) | (.078) | (.078) |
| 265.ethnicity | .196 | .204 | .181 | .202 | .194 |
|  | (.171) | (.174) | (.169) | (.17) | (.171) |
| 266.ethnicity | -.092 | -.083 | -.039 | -.088 | -.094 |
|  | (.092) | (.094) | (.093) | (.092) | (.092) |
| 267.ethnicity | .023 | .033 | -.014 | .025 | .026 |
|  | (.209) | (.212) | (.195) | (.208) | (.209) |
| 268.ethnicity | -.033 | -.039 | -.017 | -.032 | -.032 |
|  | (.086) | (.087) | (.087) | (.085) | (.086) |
| 269.ethnicity | -.067 | -.071 | -.084 | -.064 | -.065 |
|  | (.08) | (.082) | (.074) | (.08) | (.081) |
| 270.ethnicity | -.259\*\* | -.275\*\* | -.11 | -.258\*\* | -.258\*\* |
|  | (.107) | (.109) | (.096) | (.107) | (.107) |
| 271.ethnicity | .007 | .007 | .075 | .009 | .006 |
|  | (.071) | (.072) | (.074) | (.071) | (.071) |
| 272.ethnicity | .184\*\* | .178\*\* | .163\* | .186\*\* | .188\*\* |
|  | (.086) | (.088) | (.085) | (.086) | (.086) |
| 273.ethnicity | -.047 | -.045 | -.025 | -.044 | -.046 |
|  | (.096) | (.098) | (.093) | (.096) | (.097) |
| 274.ethnicity | -.059 | -.072 | .024 | -.058 | -.056 |
|  | (.149) | (.152) | (.129) | (.148) | (.149) |
| 275.ethnicity | .015 | -.005 | -.007 | .016 | .016 |
|  | (.08) | (.084) | (.067) | (.08) | (.08) |
| 276.ethnicity | -.113 | -.101 | -.049 | -.11 | -.113 |
|  | (.083) | (.084) | (.085) | (.082) | (.083) |
| 277.ethnicity | -.171\* | -.183\* | -.1 | -.166 | -.174\* |
|  | (.101) | (.109) | (.09) | (.101) | (.102) |
| 278.ethnicity | .098\* | .098\* | .142\*\*\* | .099\* | .1\* |
|  | (.053) | (.054) | (.052) | (.053) | (.053) |
| 279.ethnicity | .046 | .056 | -.06 | .049 | .047 |
|  | (.074) | (.076) | (.067) | (.074) | (.074) |
| 460.ethnicity | -.01 | -.005 | .004 | -.007 | -.022 |
|  | (.042) | (.042) | (.043) | (.041) | (.042) |
| 461.ethnicity | -.134 | -.13 | -.061 | -.13 | -.15 |
|  | (.123) | (.125) | (.121) | (.122) | (.123) |
| 462.ethnicity | .084 | .09 | .102 | .087 | .074 |
|  | (.086) | (.088) | (.093) | (.085) | (.086) |
| 463.ethnicity | -.036 | -.032 | -.015 | -.033 | -.047 |
|  | (.032) | (.033) | (.031) | (.032) | (.032) |
| 464.ethnicity | .133\*\*\* | .145\*\*\* | .151\*\*\* | .135\*\*\* | .125\*\*\* |
|  | (.04) | (.041) | (.039) | (.04) | (.04) |
| 465.ethnicity | -.002 | .006 | -.011 | 0 | -.013 |
|  | (.042) | (.043) | (.041) | (.042) | (.042) |
| 466.ethnicity | .198\*\*\* | .205\*\*\* | .196\*\*\* | .2\*\*\* | .205\*\*\* |
|  | (.036) | (.037) | (.035) | (.036) | (.036) |
| 467.ethnicity | .244\*\*\* | .246\*\*\* | .214\*\*\* | .246\*\*\* | .241\*\*\* |
|  | (.052) | (.053) | (.051) | (.052) | (.052) |
| 468.ethnicity | .192\*\*\* | .185\*\*\* | .282\*\*\* | .193\*\*\* | .172\*\*\* |
|  | (.056) | (.057) | (.057) | (.055) | (.055) |
| 469.ethnicity | -.436 | -.492 | -.173 | -.43 | -.444 |
|  | (.294) | (.3) | (.336) | (.293) | (.295) |
| 470.ethnicity | .277 | .277 | .101 | .283\* | .251 |
|  | (.171) | (.174) | (.152) | (.171) | (.172) |
| 471.ethnicity | -.007 | -.001 | .076 | -.003 | -.017 |
|  | (.086) | (.087) | (.093) | (.085) | (.086) |
| 820.ethnicity | .167\*\*\* | .167\*\*\* | .066\*\* | .17\*\*\* | .168\*\*\* |
|  | (.036) | (.037) | (.032) | (.037) | (.037) |
| 821.ethnicity | .001 | -.01 | .018 | .034 | .001 |
|  | (.08) | (.082) | (.073) | (.083) | (.081) |
| 822.ethnicity | -.004 | -.001 | .002 | .004 | -.006 |
|  | (.041) | (.042) | (.039) | (.041) | (.041) |
| 823.ethnicity | .028 | .034 | -.045 | .033 | .027 |
|  | (.059) | (.061) | (.049) | (.059) | (.059) |
| 824.ethnicity | .131\* | .144\*\* | -.029 | .129\* | .131\* |
|  | (.068) | (.07) | (.047) | (.068) | (.068) |
| 825.ethnicity | .267\*\*\* | .265\*\*\* | .133\*\*\* | .266\*\*\* | .268\*\*\* |
|  | (.06) | (.061) | (.051) | (.062) | (.06) |
| 826.ethnicity | .123\* | .135\* | .025 | .132\* | .122\* |
|  | (.073) | (.074) | (.061) | (.074) | (.073) |
| 827.ethnicity | .078 | .086 | -.108 | .076 | .078 |
|  | (.134) | (.136) | (.09) | (.133) | (.134) |
| 828.ethnicity | .02 | .027 | .021 | .007 | .019 |
|  | (.068) | (.071) | (.067) | (.072) | (.068) |
| 829.ethnicity | .157\*\* | .161\*\* | .079 | .135\* | .157\*\* |
|  | (.075) | (.076) | (.062) | (.076) | (.075) |
| 830.ethnicity | .029 | .035 | .059 | .053 | .027 |
|  | (.071) | (.072) | (.068) | (.072) | (.071) |
| 831.ethnicity | .213\* | .201 | .147 | .215\* | .211\* |
|  | (.123) | (.125) | (.1) | (.122) | (.123) |
| 832.ethnicity | .022 | .033 | -.039 | .024 | .021 |
|  | (.171) | (.174) | (.169) | (.17) | (.172) |
| 833.ethnicity | -.089 | -.087 | -.047 | .079 | -.088 |
|  | (.101) | (.103) | (.083) | (.113) | (.101) |
| 834.ethnicity | .046 | .064 | -.159\* | .045 | .045 |
|  | (.114) | (.116) | (.087) | (.114) | (.114) |
| 835.ethnicity | .136\*\* | .142\*\* | .062 | .173\*\* | .137\*\* |
|  | (.068) | (.07) | (.059) | (.069) | (.069) |
| 836.ethnicity | -.149 | -.261 | -.092 | -.136 | -.148 |
|  | (.171) | (.213) | (.152) | (.17) | (.172) |
| 837.ethnicity | -.018 | 0 | -.032 | -.015 | -.021 |
|  | (.102) | (.103) | (.093) | (.101) | (.102) |
| 838.ethnicity | .002 | -.018 | .069 | -.02 | .005 |
|  | (.107) | (.109) | (.1) | (.114) | (.107) |
| 839.ethnicity | -.153 | -.155 | -.082 | -.085 | -.156 |
|  | (.134) | (.136) | (.121) | (.148) | (.134) |
| 840.ethnicity | .082 | .093 | -.006 | .091 | .078 |
|  | (.134) | (.137) | (.129) | (.134) | (.135) |
| 841.ethnicity | .008 | .003 | .103 | .013 | .009 |
|  | (.123) | (.125) | (.121) | (.122) | (.123) |
| 842.ethnicity | .165\*\* | .179\*\* | .084 | .203\*\* | .164\*\* |
|  | (.083) | (.085) | (.073) | (.085) | (.083) |
| 843.ethnicity | .309\*\*\* | .317\*\*\* | .135 | .307\*\*\* | .308\*\*\* |
|  | (.107) | (.109) | (.085) | (.107) | (.107) |
| 844.ethnicity | .062 | .056 | -.055 | .06 | .068 |
|  | (.171) | (.174) | (.139) | (.171) | (.172) |
| 846.ethnicity | .546\* | .541\* | .044 | .529\* | .543\* |
|  | (.294) | (.299) | (.152) | (.292) | (.294) |
| 847.ethnicity | -.32\*\* | -.319\*\* | -.215 | -.321\*\* | -.322\*\* |
|  | (.134) | (.136) | (.152) | (.133) | (.134) |
| 849.ethnicity | .357\* | .367\* | .301 | .356\* | .355\* |
|  | (.209) | (.213) | (.195) | (.208) | (.209) |
| 851.ethnicity | .144 | .148 | .347\* | .147 | .142 |
|  | (.172) | (.175) | (.195) | (.171) | (.172) |
| 852.ethnicity | -.164 | -.165 | -.117 | -.157 | -.173 |
|  | (.209) | (.213) | (.152) | (.208) | (.209) |
| 1100.ethnicity | .044 |  | -.028 | .046 | .043 |
|  | (.032) |  | (.03) | (.032) | (.032) |
| 1101.ethnicity | -.082\*\* |  | -.067\*\* | -.078\*\* | -.085\*\* |
|  | (.036) |  | (.034) | (.036) | (.036) |
| 1102.ethnicity | .028 |  | -.096\*\* | .031 | .027 |
|  | (.052) |  | (.045) | (.052) | (.052) |
| 1103.ethnicity | .051 |  | -.032 | .053 | .049 |
|  | (.045) |  | (.04) | (.045) | (.045) |
| 1104.ethnicity | .076 |  | .077 | .077 | .078 |
|  | (.051) |  | (.05) | (.051) | (.051) |
| 1106.ethnicity | .002 |  | -.066 | .007 | .001 |
|  | (.209) |  | (.195) | (.208) | (.209) |
| 1107.ethnicity | .165 |  | .265\*\* | .167 | .166 |
|  | (.114) |  | (.129) | (.114) | (.114) |
| 9990.ethnicity | .106 | .12 | -.035 | .11 | .085 |
|  | (.171) | (.174) | (.139) | (.171) | (.149) |
| animosity |  | -.013\* |  |  |  |
|  |  | (.008) |  |  |  |
| 0bn.partisan#c.~y |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.partisan#c.an~y |  | .011 |  |  |  |
|  |  | (.011) |  |  |  |
| 2.partisan#c.an~y |  | .012 | -.105 |  |  |
|  |  | (.011) | (.336) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \_cons | .484\*\*\* | .556\*\*\* | .178\*\*\* | .489\*\*\* | .475\*\*\* |
|  | (.038) | (.049) | (.034) | (.038) | (.038) |
| lns1\_1\_1:\_cons | -26.962\*\* | -26.702\*\* | -26.045\*\* | -27.189\*\*\* | -27.052\*\* |
|  | (12.19) | (13.096) | (12.118) | (9.682) | (12.984) |
| lnsig\_e:\_cons | -1.23\*\*\* | -1.213\*\*\* | -1.095\*\*\* | -1.235\*\*\* | -1.228\*\*\* |
|  | (.012) | (.014) | (.01) | (.012) | (.012) |
| Observations | 3355 | 2691 | 5179 | 3325 | 3362 |
| Wald Chi2 | 6467.06 | 4915.64 | 4938.38 | 6497.85 | 6437.07 |

Different levels of autocratization and measurement of its perception country by country may result in comparison of different phenomena. While the modeling strategy includes random effects for country, it is prudent to ensure that the results hold for each country case. Additionally, in any cross-national analysis, there the potential that the results are driven by an influential country case, perhaps with more pronounced autocratization. To address this concern, I ran the results country-by-country, with the results in table A5. The results hold for Ghana, Malawi, and Zambia, but not Niger. This null result may be an issue of power. As the analysis in the main text illustrates, relationship of perceived autocratization to vote choice runs predominantly through nonpartisans. Among the 541 proclaimed nonpartisans in the Nigerien sample, only 155 stated their voting intention, compared to 396 in Ghana, 269 in Malawi, and 215 in Zambia. In this small sample size, the only variables that were significantly associated with vote choice were ethnicity and partisanship, with the Zarma/Songhay being much less likely to intend to vote for the incumbent than other groups. Interestingly, Niger is also the only country where economic assessments were uncorrelated from vote intention. As Niger does not have higher rates of partisanship than the other countries, these null results are puzzling. Importantly, however, this country-by-country analysis illustrates that the main results are not being driven by one country case with more pronounced autocratization.

**Table A6: Country-by-Country Results**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   |  Ghana | Malawi | Niger |  Zambia |
|   |  voteincumb |  voteincumb |  voteincumb |  voteincumb |
|  perceiveautoc | -.023\*\* | -.087\*\*\* | .007 | -.069\*\*\* |
|   | (.01) | (.015) | (.013) | (.018) |
|  econassess | .03\*\*\* | .017\*\* | .014 | .041\*\*\* |
|   | (.007) | (.009) | (.009) | (.012) |
|  0bn.partisan |  |  |  |  |
|   |  |  |  |  |
|  1.partisan | -.502\*\*\* | -.382\*\*\* | -.324\*\*\* | -.444\*\*\* |
|   | (.023) | (.026) | (.027) | (.035) |
|  2.partisan | .308\*\*\* | .296\*\*\* | .583\*\*\* | .344\*\*\* |
|   | (.021) | (.027) | (.028) | (.035) |
|  rural | -.015 | .124\*\*\* | .041 | -.001 |
|   | (.018) | (.031) | (.029) | (.031) |
|  age | .002 | -.005 | .007 | .001 |
|   | (.006) | (.007) | (.008) | (.01) |
|  female | -.019 | .036\* | -.016 | -.006 |
|   | (.018) | (.02) | (.021) | (.028) |
|  edu | -.014 | -.021 | -.005 | -.052\*\* |
|   | (.011) | (.017) | (.014) | (.02) |
|  poverty | -.013 | -.019 | -.016 | -.047\*\* |
|   | (.014) | (.013) | (.012) | (.02) |
|  0bn.ethnicity |  |  |  |  |
|   |  |  |  |  |
|  260.ethnicity | .161\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|   | (.034) |  |  |  |
|  261.ethnicity | -.045 |  |  |  |
|   | (.04) |  |  |  |
|  262.ethnicity | .057 |  |  |  |
|   | (.05) |  |  |  |
|  263.ethnicity | .086\* |  |  |  |
|   | (.044) |  |  |  |
|  264.ethnicity | .101 |  |  |  |
|   | (.081) |  |  |  |
|  265.ethnicity | .199 |  |  |  |
|   | (.176) |  |  |  |
|  266.ethnicity | -.079 |  |  |  |
|   | (.095) |  |  |  |
|  267.ethnicity | .055 |  |  |  |
|   | (.214) |  |  |  |
|  268.ethnicity | -.006 |  |  |  |
|   | (.089) |  |  |  |
|  269.ethnicity | -.052 |  |  |  |
|   | (.083) |  |  |  |
|  270.ethnicity | -.264\*\* |  |  |  |
|   | (.111) |  |  |  |
|  271.ethnicity | -.001 |  |  |  |
|   | (.074) |  |  |  |
|  272.ethnicity | .19\*\* |  |  |  |
|   | (.089) |  |  |  |
|  273.ethnicity | -.026 |  |  |  |
|   | (.099) |  |  |  |
|  274.ethnicity | -.039 |  |  |  |
|   | (.153) |  |  |  |
|  275.ethnicity | .024 |  |  |  |
|   | (.083) |  |  |  |
|  276.ethnicity | -.09 |  |  |  |
|   | (.086) |  |  |  |
|  277.ethnicity | -.176\* |  |  |  |
|   | (.105) |  |  |  |
|  278.ethnicity | .12\*\* |  |  |  |
|   | (.056) |  |  |  |
|  279.ethnicity | .082 |  |  |  |
|   | (.077) |  |  |  |
|  9990.ethnicity | .106 |  |  |  |
|   | (.176) |  |  |  |
|  460.ethnicity |  | -.115 |  |  |
|   |  | (.085) |  |  |
|  461.ethnicity |  | -.222 |  |  |
|   |  | (.143) |  |  |
|  462.ethnicity |  | -.033 |  |  |
|   |  | (.113) |  |  |
|  463.ethnicity |  | -.125 |  |  |
|   |  | (.081) |  |  |
|  464.ethnicity |  | .066 |  |  |
|   |  | (.084) |  |  |
|  465.ethnicity |  | -.077 |  |  |
|   |  | (.084) |  |  |
|  466.ethnicity |  | .154\* |  |  |
|   |  | (.082) |  |  |
|  467.ethnicity |  | .188\*\* |  |  |
|   |  | (.09) |  |  |
|  468.ethnicity |  | .123 |  |  |
|   |  | (.092) |  |  |
|  469.ethnicity |  | -.368 |  |  |
|   |  | (.304) |  |  |
|  470.ethnicity |  | .156 |  |  |
|   |  | (.187) |  |  |
|  471.ethnicity |  | -.051 |  |  |
|   |  | (.113) |  |  |
|  1100.ethnicity |  |  |  |  |
|   |  |  |  |  |
|  1101.ethnicity |  |  | -.124\*\*\* |  |
|   |  |  | (.027) |  |
|  1102.ethnicity |  |  | -.018 |  |
|   |  |  | (.042) |  |
|  1103.ethnicity |  |  | -.016 |  |
|   |  |  | (.034) |  |
|  1104.ethnicity |  |  | .016 |  |
|   |  |  | (.041) |  |
|  1106.ethnicity |  |  | -.065 |  |
|   |  |  | (.184) |  |
|  1107.ethnicity |  |  | .093 |  |
|   |  |  | (.1) |  |
|  1.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.694 |
|   |  |  |  | (.445) |
|  820.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.082 |
|   |  |  |  | (.314) |
|  821.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.257 |
|   |  |  |  | (.324) |
|  822.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.228 |
|   |  |  |  | (.316) |
|  823.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.195 |
|   |  |  |  | (.319) |
|  824.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.11 |
|   |  |  |  | (.319) |
|  825.ethnicity |  |  |  | .007 |
|   |  |  |  | (.318) |
|  826.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.099 |
|   |  |  |  | (.32) |
|  827.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.171 |
|   |  |  |  | (.342) |
|  828.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.205 |
|   |  |  |  | (.321) |
|  829.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.084 |
|   |  |  |  | (.321) |
|  830.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.196 |
|   |  |  |  | (.321) |
|  831.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.073 |
|   |  |  |  | (.34) |
|  832.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.199 |
|   |  |  |  | (.362) |
|  833.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.337 |
|   |  |  |  | (.33) |
|  834.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.17 |
|   |  |  |  | (.334) |
|  835.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.115 |
|   |  |  |  | (.319) |
|  836.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.431 |
|   |  |  |  | (.362) |
|  837.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.218 |
|   |  |  |  | (.33) |
|  838.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.253 |
|   |  |  |  | (.332) |
|  839.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.389 |
|   |  |  |  | (.344) |
|  840.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.095 |
|   |  |  |  | (.344) |
|  841.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.259 |
|   |  |  |  | (.337) |
|  842.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.064 |
|   |  |  |  | (.324) |
|  843.ethnicity |  |  |  | .071 |
|   |  |  |  | (.332) |
|  844.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.196 |
|   |  |  |  | (.362) |
|  846.ethnicity |  |  |  | .302 |
|   |  |  |  | (.443) |
|  847.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.542 |
|   |  |  |  | (.343) |
|  849.ethnicity |  |  |  | .141 |
|   |  |  |  | (.383) |
|  851.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.053 |
|   |  |  |  | (.363) |
|  852.ethnicity |  |  |  | -.354 |
|   |  |  |  | (.385) |
|  \_cons | .497\*\*\* | .53\*\*\* | .337\*\*\* | .843\*\*\* |
|   | (.052) | (.099) | (.058) | (.318) |
|  Observations | 1259 | 885 | 655 | 556 |
|  R-squared | .634 | .657 | .736 | .639 |
| Standard errors are in parentheses |
| \*\*\* p<.01, \*\* p<.05, \* p<.1  |

## A8. Correlates of Perceived Autocratization and Heterogeneous Relationship to Vote Choice

Column I presents perceived autocratization as the dependent variable and displays its correlates. Columns II-V have incumbent vote intention as the dependent variable and display the interaction between perceived autocratization and some of its correlates in predicting vote choice. All models are mixed effects regression with random effects for country. Figure 3 in the main text corresponds to the regression in column V.

**Table A7: Correlates of Perceived Autocratization and Interaction Models**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | I |  II |  III |  IV |  V |
|   | perceiveauto |  voteincumb |  voteincumb |  voteincumb |  voteincumb |
|  perceiveautoc |  | -.021\* | -.045\*\*\* | -.026\*\* | -.125\*\*\* |
|   |  | (.011) | (.011) | (.011) | (.012) |
| Perceive Autoc## |  | -.013\* |  |  |  |
|  Edu |  | (.007) |  |  |  |
|  Perceive Autoc## |  |  | .007 |  |  |
|  Discuss pol |  |  | (.008) |  |  |
| Perceive Autoc## |  |  |  | -.002 |  |
|  Media exp |  |  |  | (.001) |  |
| Perceived Autoc## |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Partisan |  |  |  |  |  |
|  1.opposition |  |  |  |  | .126\*\*\* |
|   |  |  |  |  | (.015) |
|  2.ruling  |  |  |  |  | .125\*\*\* |
|   |  |  |  |  | (.016) |
|  discusspol | .005 | -.003 | -.01 | -.003 | -.004 |
|   | (.016) | (.007) | (.011) | (.007) | (.007) |
|  mediaexp | .008\*\*\* | -.002\* | -.002\* | -.001 | -.002 |
|   | (.002) | (.001) | (.001) | (.002) | (.001) |
|  econassess |  | .025\*\*\* | .025\*\*\* | .025\*\*\* | .026\*\*\* |
|   |  | (.004) | (.004) | (.004) | (.004) |
|  edu | .047\*\*\* | .001 | -.012 | -.012 | -.013\* |
|   | (.016) | (.01) | (.008) | (.008) | (.008) |
|  0bn.partisan |  |  |  |  |  |
|   |  |  |  |  |  |
|  1.partisan | .088\*\*\* | -.433\*\*\* | -.434\*\*\* | -.434\*\*\* | -.581\*\*\* |
|   | (.029) | (.014) | (.014) | (.014) | (.023) |
|  2.partisan | -.157\*\*\* | .367\*\*\* | .367\*\*\* | .366\*\*\* | .242\*\*\* |
|   | (.027) | (.014) | (.014) | (.014) | (.02) |
|  rural | -.708\*\* | .021 | .021 | .021 | .024\* |
|   | (.013) | (.013) | (.013) | (.013) | (.013) |
|  age | .001 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -.001 |
|   | (.007) | (.004) | (.004) | (.004) | (.004) |
|  female | .038\* | -.009 | -.009 | -.009 | -.008 |
|   | (.022) | (.011) | (.011) | (.011) | (.011) |
|  poverty | .064\*\*\* | -.022\*\*\* | -.022\*\*\* | -.022\*\*\* | -.022\*\*\* |
|   | (.015) | (.007) | (.007) | (.007) | (.007) |
| Ethnicity | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
|   |  |  |  |  |  |
|  \_cons | 1.131\*\*\* | .49\*\*\* | .515\*\*\* | .494\*\*\* | .597\*\*\* |
|   | (0.087) | (.041) | (.041) | (.041) | (.041) |
|  Observations | 5018 | 3287 | 3287 | 3287 | 3287 |
| Wald Chi2 | 928.45 | 6358.17 | 6349.77 | 6354.27 | 6596.90 |
| *Standard errors are in parentheses**\*\*\* p<.01, \*\* p<.05, \* p<.1*  |

## A9. Endogeneity Probe: QCA

This section presents the narrative mini-cases of the nine elections from 2016 onwards that occurred in Africa under conditions of autocratization. Each mini-case presents details of democratic decline as well as the metrics of precarity. This case detail informs Table 3 in the main text.

**Botswana**

Democratic decline in Botswana has been slow and creeping. The onset of its decline as measured by V-Dem was in 2012, and it has been characterized primarily by the slow and subtle concentration of power in the executive by appointing family members in key positions and expanding the size of the parliament, attempts to increase executive influence over the judiciary, and suppression of the media (FH Reports 2017-2019). Its democracy score declined from 0.73 to 0.68 over that duration. Most of this decline has been attributed to the actions of president Ian Khama, who stepped down when he hit his 10-year term limit (Brown 2020).

Botswana has a parliamentary system in which the president is the leader of the majority party of the national assembly. In 2018, President Masisi succeeded former president Ian Khama. The following year, Khama had a high-profile split from the ruling BDP, defecting to an opposition party that was part of an opposition umbrella movement seeking to dislodge the BDP from its position of power (Brown 2020). Nevertheless, the BDP enjoyed strong pre-election polling in the survey carried out by the Afrobarometer in July/August of that year (the election was in October). While Botswana has strong judicial oversight (despite attempts to erode it), there have been allegations that its EMB is not impartial (Mogalakwe 2015). Indeed, the estimate of its autonomy dropped prior to the 2019 elections, suggesting heightened ability for subtle manipulation. Additionally, Botswana has never had an alternation of power, and the ruling party had a comfortable majority with 65% of the legislative seats going into the 2019 elections. A persistent critique of Botswanan democracy is that the BDP-dominated legislature does not place any effective constraints on presidential power (Mogalakwe and Nyamnjoh 2017). While economic growth had slowed over recent years, it was still strong at 4.5%. Botswana’s democratic decline had been slow and plodding under Khama. Despite his defection from the party and the high levels of judicial autonomy, the government under Masisi was not in a state of precarity.

**Ghana**

Democratic decline in Ghana began in 2012 and has been slow, declining from 0.77 to 0.72 over 7 years, persisting across a transfer of power from the NDC (2012-2016) to the NPP (2016-pres). Democratic decline has been the result of some instances of political violence (Asamoah 2020), restriction on the media, and attempts to interfere in campaigning in 2020 (FH Reports 2017-2020). This incremental decline has occurred across two presidencies from two parties.

Ghana has a presidential system that has two dominant parties and has experienced several electoral turnovers since its return to democracy. Ghana’s EMB autonomy declined precipitously prior to the 2020 elections, from a high of 3.76 in 2012 to 2.98 in 2020, but still ranks comparatively highly in its autonomy. Ghana also has strong judicial constraints on the executive. On the eve of the election, the NPP had a comfortable majority of 60% in the legislature. While numerous pre-election polls predicted the NPP would win, they projected he would have a narrow majority, or may even need to go to a second round. However, Ghana’s two-party system tends to generate close elections, so this close polling does not indicate a large drop in support. There is not evidence of high profile party defections prior to this election. Overall, this suggests that Afuko-Addo was in a semi-precarious position, with high levels of EMB and judicial autonomy and a history of electoral turnover. Protective characteristics included a comfortable legislative majority, high GDP growth, no high profile defections, and reasonably stable support in the polls.

**Lesotho**

Lesotho’s democratic decline occurred from 2014 to 2017, over which time its EDI dropped from 0.63 to 0.51. This was a comparatively rapid and dramatic decline, marked by political violence (including assassinations) directed at politicians, members of the media, and academics, alongside media shutdowns and other actions to consolidate power (FH reports 2017-2018). Much of this decline was related to the involvement of the military (LDF) in Lesotho politics (Leshoele 2021).

Lesotho has a parliamentary system with two major parties and a number of smaller parties. Most of the country’s recent democratic erosion occurred under the tenure of PM Mosisili (DC), who was elected in 2015 after a political crisis and possible coup attempt against ABC’s Thabane in 2014 (Banerjee and Rich 2017). During his controversial tenure, there was a high profile defection (Monyane Moleleki) and Thabane, the leader of the opposition party, fled in self-imposed exile (Wan 2017). Mosisili’s party did not have a majority, and he was ousted in a vote of no confidence led by a new alliance of opposition parties in the parliament. Lesotho had a history of alternation of power. EMB autonomy is very high, with judicial autonomy similar to the other countries under study, and Mosisili’s precarity was intensified by poor economic performance. The last polling was done by AB in 2015, so it is unclear where the electorate stood at the time the snap election was called. All told, Mosisili was in a very precarious position with a shaky coalition and poor performance.

**Liberia**

Liberian democracy declined from 2011 to 2014, after which it stagnated through the 2017 election. The country’s decline was marked by silencing critics of the government, both in civil society and the media, alongside more subtle electoral manipulations (FH Reports 2018-2017)

Liberia has a presidential system. Institutional precarity was low, with the EMB and judicial systems exhibiting limited autonomy. Indeed, lack of horizontal accountability, particularly of the judiciary and the EMB, is one of the weaknesses of Liberian democracy (Signé and Korha 2016). Because Liberia has so many parties, Sirleaf’s UP had only 18% of legislative seats. However, Sirleaf’s UP had been in power since the end of the civil war in 2003. 3 of 4 polls prior to the election showed that the Unity party leading in the polls with a plurality, but the two-round system for presidential elections meant that this lead was not necessarily meaningful. There was a number of defections from the UP in the lead-up to the elections, signaling a succession crisis (Sirleaf was constitutionally barred from running for a third term), but that wouldn’t have influenced UP’s previous behavior (New Dawn Liberia 2016). Liberia also enjoyed extremely high GDP growth the year prior to the election. Overall, the ruling party was not experiencing precarity up until the challenges around succession became clear.

**Malawi**

Malawi’s democracy declined slowly from 0.56 in 2013 to 0.48 in 2019, with most of the decline occurring immediately preceding the 2019 election, including political violence and attacks on the media, and culminated in allegations of election fraud in 2019 (FH Reports). That led to the Constitutional Court throwing out the election results and ordering a new election in 2020 (Chikapa-Jamali 2023).

Malawi has a presidential system wherein the winner only needed a plurality, until the Constitutional Court decision changed the requirement to a majority (Dionne and Dulani 2020). While there have been different parties in power since the return to multipartyism, it has in fact been one party with changing labels—there is no history of rotation of power. Malawi has limited EMB and judicial autonomy, indicating little institutional precarity. While Mutharika’s DPP had only a legislative plurality of 22%, this was typical given how many parties hold seats and did not directly threaten the president’s tenure. The Malawian economy had been growing well prior to the election. There was a high-profile split of Saulos Chalima, who was previously Mutharika’s VP. There was no pre-election polling, so Mutharika’s prospects were uncertain. That split—and the general fractiousness of parties in Malawi—was the only element of precariousness in Malawi prior to the stolen 2019 election.

**Niger**

Niger’s democracy declined from 0.64 in 2014 to 0.53 in 2021. It’s decline was marked by harassment of opposition party members during the 2016 elections and concerns of serious irregularities, and the restriction of civil liberties under the guise of controlling the security situation (Elischer and Mueller 2019). The incumbent president was term limited and respected the term limit, though his successor was elected in the second round of the 2020/21 elections (FH 2017-2022).

Niger has a presidential system with limited EMB and judicial autonomy. While the ruling party only had a legislative plurality of 44%, the remainder was divided between so many opposition parties that there was no real opposition heavyweight. Niger does not have a history of electoral turnover. While there had been one rotation of power in 2011, it occurred in the wake of a coup. Prior to the 2021 election, the economy had been growing and there were no high-profile defections. There was no pre-election polling, so public opinion was uncertain. Overall, there were no signs of precarity.

**South Africa**

South African democracy experienced a slow, steady decline from 0.77 in 2009 to 0.71 in 2019. Most of the decline was related to restrictions on media and opposition campaigning, and were mostly subtle. South Africa’s political challenges were predominantly related to the corruption and state capture under President Zuma, who was succeeded by Cyril Ramaphosa in 2018. However, South Africa under the ANC has continued its plodding decline.

South Africa has a parliamentary system with high EMB and judicial autonomy. It is a dominant party system, having been ruled by the ANC since the end of apartheid in 1994. The ANC went into the 2019 election with a sizeable legislative majority. While the economy was growing, growth was sluggish. There were two defections from the ANC, but several to it, and these defections were pretty low level. Opinion polls in the years and months prior to the election all showed the ANC retaining a comfortable majority despite an erosion of its magnitude. Overall, the ruling ANC faced a low level of precarity.

**Zambia**

From the 2016 to 2020 elections in Zambia, a lot changed. In 2016, Zambian EMB and judiciary had reasonably high autonomy, but the PF only had a legislative plurality. The economy was shrinking, there were several high-profile defections from the ruling party after the succession crisis, and a 2015 poll by the Afrobarmeter showed only 25% of respondents supported the PF. By all measures, Lungu was in a very precarious position.

By 2021, both the EMB and judicial autonomy had been eroded and PF had a slim legislative majority of 51%. However, the economy was performing even worse, and while public opinion polls showed 34% supporting PF, they had fallen behind UPND. This time, there were no apparent defections. Precarity was still middling, but had dropped. The main text elaborates this case.

## A9. Works Cited (in Appendix Only)

Adcock, Robert, and David Collier. 2001. “Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research.” *American Political Science Review* 95 (3): 529–46. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055401003100.

Asamoah, Kwame. 2020. “Addressing the Problem of Political Vigilantism in Ghana through the Conceptual Lens of Wicked Problems.” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 55 (3): 457–71. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909619887608.

Banerjee, Vasabjit, and Timothy S Rich. 2017. “Lesotho’s 2015 Legislative Election: Providing or Undermining Stability?” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 52 (5): 586–97. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909615599012.

Brown, Chris. 2020. “Botswana Votes 2019: Two-Party Competition and the Khama Factor.” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 46 (4): 703–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2020.1778901.

Chikapa-Jamali, Tiyesere Mercy. 2023. “Fresh Presidential Election in Malawi, June 2020: Implications on Malawi’s Democracy.” In *Military, Politics and Democratization in Southern Africa: The Quest for Political Transition*, edited by Tendai Chari and Patrick Dzimiri, 135–46. Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35229-4\_7.

Elischer, Sebastian, and Lisa Mueller. 2019. “Niger Falls Back off Track.” *African Affairs* 118 (471): 392–406. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady066.

Hinfelaar, Marja, Lise Rakner, Sishuwa Sishuwa, and Nicolas van de Walle. 2023. “Legal Autocratisation Ahead of the 2021 Zambian Elections.” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 0 (0): 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2022.2235658.

Kaaba, O’Brien, Muna Ndulo, and Pamela Towela Samba. 2021. “The Role of the Courts in the Electoral Processin Zambia.” 2. Zambia Electoral Analysis Project Briefing Paper. Lusaka, Zambia: SAIPAR.

Leshoele, Moorosi. 2021. “The Political History of Military-Induced Conflict and Instability in Lesotho and Its Economic and Developmental Implications.” *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity* 16 (2): 79–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/18186874.2021.1962726.

Lynch, Gabrielle, and Elena Gadjanovaa. 2022. “Overcoming Incumbency Advantage: The Importance of Social Media on- and Offline in Zambia’s 2021 Elections.” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 16 (4): 536–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2023.2232241.

Mogalakwe, Monageng. 2015. “An Assessment of Botswana’s Electoral Management Body to Deliver Fair Elections.” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 33 (1): 105–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2015.1021210.

Mogalakwe, Monageng, and Francis Nyamnjoh. 2017. “Botswana at 50: Democratic Deficit, Elite Corruption and Poverty in the Midst of Plenty.” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 35 (1): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2017.1286636.

Signé, Landry, and Koiffi Korha. 2016. “Horizontal Accountability and the Challenges for Democratic Consolidation in Africa: Evidence from Liberia.” *Democratization* 23 (7): 1254–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1081896.

Wan, James. June 2, 2017. “Lesotho’s Night Before the Elections,” *African Arguments*. Accessed 1/11/2024 at https://africanarguments.org/2017/06/lesothos-night-before-the-elections-photo-of-the-weekexplainer/

1. Incumbent President Mills died several months before the election. His Vice President, John Mahama, subsequently ran in the 2012 election. Due to the proximity to the election, I coded this case as having an incumbent party, not individual. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/7/25/ghana-swears-in-mahama-as-new-president> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. William Ruto (UDA) won the election. While he had been the deputy president to the incumbent, they had fallen out, their respective parties joining separate coalitions. The incumbent, Uhuru Kenyatta, endorsed Raila Odinga (Azmio). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Joyce Banda was Malawi’s Vice President, and became president upon the death of Bingu wa Mutharika. However, she had been expelled from the ruling DPP party because of her refusal to endorse Mutharika’s younger brother, Peter, for the 2014 presidential elections. While she was technically the incumbent, she was unelected, and her eligibility to take over the presidency after her expulsion from the ruling party was called into question. Because the DPP won both the 2009 and 2014 elections, I code this as an incumbent win. <https://www.voanews.com/a/malawi-vp-dismisses-resignation-demands---125832943/158532.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Borderline case—some credible reports of election manipulation. Omission does not alter outcome of analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Sao Tome and Principe has a semi-presidential system. From 1991-2006, the president had considerable powers. Due to regular conflicts between the president and PM caused by cohabitation, a constitutional reform in 2006 dramatically reduced the power of the presidency and transferred most executive powers to the PM. I therefore code the president as the relevant incumbent up to 2006, and the PM afterwards: <https://africanarguments.org/2016/07/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sao-tome-and-principes-presidential-elections/> [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. PM Trovoada won the premiership in 2010 without a majority, and was subsequently removed in a vote of no confidence in 2012, with the president appointing opposition PCD’s Costa as PM. I have coded Trovoada as the incumbent because he remains the leader of the largest party that won the most recent election. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. PM Trovoada’s ADI party won the most seats but was unable to form a coalition government, so while the incumbent party won the most votes, Trovoada lost the premiership. While Trovoada’s ADI won this election, I treat the PM Jesus’s MLSTP-PSD as the incumbent for the 2022 election. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)