Appendix 1: Final Coding Scheme

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| Codes | Description |
| Process codes | Codes at specific stages of the process: input, throughput, and output phases. |
| Input phase | Potential capture before a mini-public takes place. In our case, capture before the Ostbelgien model as a whole and capture before every iteration of the Citizens' Assembly. |
| Agenda setting | Capture potentially occurring when determining the topic of the mini-public. Examining when, who, and how the agenda is set. |
| Awareness among designers | The designers were aware about the risk of elites capturing the agenda-setting while drafting the Ostbelgien model; |
| Council members feel supported by administration | The Council members are happy about how the administration supports them and involves them in the process; |
| Feeling of discomfort among members of the parliamentary administration | The administration feels uncomfortable about the subtle power they hold, which is much more than intended by design. |
| Feelings of discomfort among Council members | Council members often feel like they do not really know what to do without guidance from the organization, and especially from the Permanent Secretariat. |
| Informal power of the Permanent Secretariat | In practice, the Permanent Secretariat guides the Council, which goes beyond their procedural tasks. |
| Set by Citizens' Council | The Citizens' Council holds the formal power to set the agenda for every iteration of the Citizens' Assembly. |
| Output phase | Capture occurring after the mini-public has taken place and recommendations have been formulated. This form of capture potentially takes place after every iteration of the Citizens' Assembly. |
| Implementation | Implementation is not a neutral process, and administrators hold significant discretion in how and when they implement certain recommendations. |
| Fatigue among Council members | Council members somewhat monitor the recommendations after an Assembly took place, but they find the task often overwhelming and are sometimes little motivated to do so thoroughly. |
| Leeway for administration. | Administrators often feel forced to make political choices when they attempt to implement recommendations. They claim that it is impossible to neatly implement recommendations as intended by the Assembly’s participants. |
| Transmission | Recommendations need to be transferred to empowered policy-makers. There is a risk of cherry-picking at this stage. Mini-publics' recommendations also need to be interpreted, performed, and negotiated before they become policy. Media visibility is a crucial factor during transmission. |
| Fatigue among Assembly members | Assembly members are little motivated to supervise the transmission of their recommendations. |
| Low media visibility | The media is little interested in reporting about the PBD, especially about its proceedings and outcomes. |
| Monitoring Assembly members are privileged | Most Assembly members that remain interested in transmitting recommendations to policy makers are members of privileged groups in society (mostly older and highly educated men). |
| Participants think politicians know best | Participants from the Assembly and the Council often think that politicians know better because they allegedly possess more technical knowledge about the topics deliberated upon. |
| Throughput phase | Capture over the course of a mini-public, which means capture occurring during the citizens' assembly by facilitators, experts, or external actors. |
| Experts | Experts can selectively represent data and misrepresent evidence. What experts are invited and when? Who has the authority to decide who is invited and staged as an expert. |
| Difficult to control experts | It is hard to make experts confine themselves to technical information only, without letting them present their own political views. |
| Difficulty to recruit experts | It is not easy to find experts for the PDB especially because they want to rely mostly on German-speaking experts. |
| Formally selected by the Council | The council is formally empowered to select the experts for the Citizens' Assembly. |
| Outsourcing by Council | The Council itself actively looks to outsource tasks to the Secretary. The reason being that they trust the Secretary, keep the final say, and do not want to do most of the work for a small stipend in their free time. |
| pre-filtered list by Secretary | The Secretary pre-filters a list of experts to the Council, providing them with considerable informal power over the process. |
| External actors | External actors can potentially capture mini-publics through participants. Participants can be vulnerable because there are few ways to hold them accountable. |
| Inefficient | Capturing participants is perceived as inefficient because power is much more balanced between participants in the PBD than between politicians. |
| Right to exclude | The Council has the right to exclude participating citizens. An instrument that has never been used. |
| Facilitators | Potential capture occurring by facilitators. Practitioners might be driven by other factors than adherence to deliberative values, such as profit and political gain. Provided that they structure the process, they can manipulate it in subtle ways. |
| A single facilitator | Employing a single facilitator holds capture risks. |
| Effective monitoring | Previously, a facilitator has been replaced after negative feedback, showing that actors such as the Permanent Secretary, the Council, and the Assembly can monitor legitimacy issues. |
| Major threat | Assembly members report that the facilitator could potentially manipulate the entire process. This can be done in subtle ways that are hard to identify. |
| Safeguard | Independent scientific evaluation and participant evaluation mitigate the risk of capture. |
| Trust | Even though assembly members believe that facilitators could capture the process, they believe that this did not occur in the PBD and fully trust the organization. |
| Transversal codes | General patterns throughout the process, across the input, throughput and output phase |
| Checks and balances | The various bodies of the PBD are often keeping each other in check to avoid legitimacy issues such as potential capture. |
| Importance | While most interviewees didn't give much previous thought to elite capture. They virtually all thought that it could be an important threat to the functioning of mini-publics. |
| Learning | The PBD is a new institution which needs to develop and stabilize its functioning. The Ostbelgien model is constantly adapting itself after reflexive learning. |
| Leeway | Most interviewees, especially participants to the Assembly, reported that there is considerable leeway for capture in deliberative processes. They specifically point at the possibility for subtle manipulation. |
| Little awareness | There is little awareness about the potential risks of capture among interviewees. In general, they have never thought about the issue. With the exception of the designers regarding the agenda setting issue. |
| No intentional capture | None of the interviewees point at the occurrence of intentional malign capture during the process. Instead, they highlight the potential threat of capture. |

Appendix 2: Interview Guide

**Approach**

I adopted a semi-structured approach and the interview guide reflected the relevant dimensions of the conceptual framework, i.e., potential elite capture in the input, throughput, and output phase of mini-publics. This way of interviewing is ideally suited to explore participants' views about broader themes that are pre-determined by the researchers. The themes structure the conversation and function as a checklist to verify whether all themes of interest are covered (Rossman & Rallis, 2017). At the same time, this approach is flexible enough to explore and probe for responses openly. Although socially desirable answers cannot be ruled out entirely, I tried to minimize the risk by reminding respondents of their right to refuse to answer in the informed consent form and during the interview, and by assuring confidentiality and anonymity in the treatment of data. Certain questions were prioritized over others during the interviews, depending on who was interviewed (designer, administrator, Council member, or Assembly member), and on how long the interview lasted.

**Introductory questions**

Ask *how* they got *involved*

Ask about their *motivations*

What do you think about the possibility of elite manipulation in a mini-public context? Do you think it’s or could be a serious problem?

**Input**

* 1. What do you think were the initial objectives of this process?
	2. What problem was the process addressing?
	3. How and who determined what question would be deliberated upon?
	4. In your view, how well did the members of the process receive and understand the question?
	5. Did you think someone could manipulate the agenda?
	6. How would you manipulate the agenda if you would be willing to do so?
	7. When designing/organizing the process did you think about the possibility of elite capture by wealthy and powerful interests?

**Throughput**

**Facilitation**

1. How were the facilitators selected?
2. What were the main tasks of facilitators?
3. How were the facilitators trained?
4. What did you think about the facilitation in general?
5. Did you think facilitators could manipulate the process if they were willing to do so?
6. If you were a facilitator, and willing to manipulate the process, how would you do that?

**Experts**

1. How were the experts selected?
2. What were the main tasks of the experts?
3. What did you think about the experts in general?
4. Did you think experts could manipulate the process if they were willing to do so?
5. If you were an expert, and willing to manipulate the process, how would you do that?

**External actors**

1. Do you think external actors would be interested in manipulating the Ostbelgien model?
2. How would/could they do so?
3. Do you think they could target participants?
4. How would you target participants if you would be an external actor willing to manipulate the process.

**Output**

 **Transmission**

1. How are recommendations transferred from the Assembly to parliament?
2. Who transfers the recommendations?
3. What do you think about this process?
4. Do you think someone could manipulate this process?
5. How would you manipulate this process if you would be willing to do so?

**Implementation**

1. How are recommendations implemented as policy?
2. Who implements recommendations?
3. Do you think that the media pays sufficient attention to the implementation of these recommendations?
4. What do you think about this process?
5. Do you think someone could manipulate this process?
6. How would you manipulate this process if you would be willing to do so?

**Concluding questions**

1. Now that we talked a lot about potential elite manipulation, do you think it occurred in the PBD?
2. Did your view about the potential threat of elite manipulation change after this interview?
3. How can we improve the resilience of the PBD and other mini-publics to safeguard them against elite capture?
4. Is there still something you would like to share or ask about how this interview went?

Appendix 3: Interviewees

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| Table 1: List of interviewees |
| **Respondent** | **PBD Role** |
| 1 | Parliamentary administrator |
| 2 | Designer |
| 3 | Designer |
| 4 | Council member |
| 5 | Council member |
| 6 | Council member |
| 7 | Council member |
| 8 | Assembly member |
| 9 | Assembly member |
| 10 | Assembly member |
| 11 | Assembly member |
| 12 | Assembly member |
| 13 | Assembly member |
| 14 | Assembly member |
| 15 | Assembly member |
| 16 | Assembly member |
| 17 | Assembly member |

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| Table 2: Pooled socio-demographics |
| **Socio-demographics** | **n** |
| *Gender* |  |
| Male  | 8  |
| Female  | 9  |
| *Age*  |
| Younger than 35 | 4 |
| 35 and older | 13  |
| *Education*  |
| Tertiary education | 13  |
| Secondary education  | 4  |