

ONLINE APPENDIX

Term Limits in Parliament and Electoral Disconnection: The Case of the Five Star Movement

A. Supporting Information

Table A1: Term Limits in the U.S. State Legislatures


State	Year Enacted	Limit	Lifetime Ban	Year of Impact	Legal Source
Arizona	1992	8 consecutive years		2000	Constitution (Art. 4, Part 2, Sec. 21)
Arkansas	1992	6 years (Lower, until 2014)	(2014-2020)	1998 (Lower)	1874 Constitution (Amendment 73)
		8 years (Upper, until 2014)		2000 (Upper)	
		16 years (2014-2020)			
California	1990	12 consecutive years (Combined)	✓	1996 (Lower)	Constitution (Art. 4, Sec. 2)
		6 years (Lower, until 2012)		1998 (Upper)	
Colorado	1990	8 consecutive years		1998	Constitution (Art. 5, Sec. 3)
		8 consecutive years		2000	
Florida	1992	8 consecutive years		2007	Constitution (Art. 6, Sec. 4)
Louisiana	1995	12 consecutive years		1996 (Retroactive)	Constitution (Art. 3, Sec. 4)
Maine	1993	8 consecutive years			Maine Revised Statutes (Tit. 21-A, Sec. 553)
Michigan	1992	6 years (Lower, until 2022)	✓	1998 (Lower)	1963 Constitution (Art. 4, Sec. 54)
		8 years (Upper, until 2022)		2002 (Upper)	
Missouri	1992	12 years (Combined)	✓	2000 (Lower, 8 members)	Constitution (Art. 3, Sec. 8)
		8 years		1998 (Upper, 1 member)	
Montana	1992	8 consecutive years		2002	Constitution (Art. 4, Sec. 8)
Nebraska*	2000	8 consecutive years		2000	Constitution (Art. 3, Sec. 8)
		8 consecutive years		2006	
Nevada	1996	12 years	✓	1998	Constitution (Art. 4, Sec. 3-4)
North Dakota	2022	8 years	✓	2010 (All)	Constitutional Measure No. 1 (2022)
Ohio	1992	8 consecutive years	✓	2022	Constitution (Art. 2, Sec. 2)
		12 years (Combined)		2000	
Oklahoma	1990	8 consecutive years	✓	2004	Constitution (Sec. 5-17A)
		12 years (Combined)		2000	
South Dakota	1992	8 consecutive years	✓	2000	Constitution (Art. 3, Sec. 6)

*Unicameral, nominally non-partisan legislature.

Figure A1: Single and Multi-member Districts in the 2018 Election (Lower Chamber)

Single-member Districts

Multi-member Districts



Note: Plotted by the authors using the [official shapefiles](#) provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). Last accessed: 15 June 2024.

A1: Additional Information on Italian Rules of Procedure

The goal of this section is to provide additional information on the formal rules that regulate plenary speeches, written parliamentary questions, and legislative proposals in the Italian Parliament. In particular, we reference the Italian Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the lower chamber (*Camera dei Deputati*) and the upper chamber (*Senato della Repubblica*). The Rules of Procedure were last amended between 2022 and 2023. The latest version of the rules of both houses (*Regolamento Camera dei Deputati, rCD* and *Regolamento Senato, rS*) are available online (Last accessed: 23 June 2024). We will first discuss the internal rules related to speeches. We will then focus on bills and written questions.

We introduced speeches as one of our dependent variables in our analysis. In doing so, we reported [Proksch and Slapin's \(2015\)](#) classification of restrictions on speeches imposed by parties and procedural constraints. According to the authors, Italy is a median case in the “party leadership control over floor access” (p. 83), with parliamentarians being generally free to speak in plenary meetings. A review of the Italian Rules of Procedure substantiates this affirmation. With respect to speeches, legislators have the right to speak in either chamber (rCD, Art. 36 and Art. 50; rS, Art. 63) within the time window allocated daily to each parliamentary group (rCD, Art. 24 and Art. 26; rS, Art. 84). Each MP can speak only once, with some exceptions (rCD, Art. 43; rS, Art. 86, Art. 87, and Art. 92). Formally, everyone has the same right to speak. However, given the limited time allocated to each group, coordination is critical. In speeches preceding the general discussion, such as those on policy outlines (“*linee generali*”) or certain types of motions (“*questioni pregiudiziali*,” “*sospensive*”) (rCD, Art. 83.1; rS Art. 93 and Art. 94), the control exercised by parliamentary groups is weak, while it remains stronger when it comes to final voting statements (rS, Art. 109; rCD, Art. 80.1). Those who present amendments usually intervene (rCD, Art. 85.2 and Art. 88; rS, Art. 95 and art. 100). Italy can, therefore, be considered a “party list favored,

individual access” type, halfway between the two extremes “individual access, no party list” and “party list, no individual access” (Proksch and Slapin 2015). Since parliamentary party groups must coordinate with respect to speaking, representatives holding a parliamentary group position may have more opportunities to do so. Similarly, a parliamentarian with a committee office might speak more frequently.

The other dependent variables we selected are legislative proposals (private members’ bills) and written parliamentary questions. Unlike speeches, there are no procedural constraints on these activities. Parliamentarians can freely submit as many bills or questions as they wish. In fact, the Italian Constitution or the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate state that each MP is free to present bills (Italian Constitution, Art. 71) and written questions (rCD, Art. 128; rS, Art. 145).

Table A2: Logistic Regression of Re-election in Italy (t+1)

	(1)	(2)
Intercept	1.31** (0.58)	1.33** (0.58)
Parliamentary Speeches	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
Parliamentary Questions	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
Legislative Proposals	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Rebel Votes	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.08** (0.04)
Candidate Vulnerability	-0.97** (0.49)	-1.09* (0.66)
SMD Election (Ref. PR Election)	0.78*** (0.29)	0.65 (0.54)
Vulnerability×SMD		0.27 (0.95)
Legislative Office (Ref. No Office)	0.12 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)
Party Switch (Ref. No Party Switch)	-1.56*** (0.17)	-1.56*** (0.17)
Chamber (Ref. Lower House)	0.22 (0.17)	0.22 (0.17)
Tenure	0.05 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)
Age	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Gender (Ref. Male)	0.24 (0.15)	0.23 (0.15)
Party Dummies	✓	✓
Electoral Period Dummies	✓	✓
Region Dummies	✓	✓
Observations	1277	1277
AIC	1359.72	1361.64
Log-likelihood	-642.86	-642.82

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10; The sample considered in these models is the entire population of MPs who were re-elected in either parliamentary chamber between 2013 and 2022 ($N = 1277$). Similar results emerged when restricting the sample to that of our main models ($N = 601$).

B. Robustness Checks and Additional Tests

Table B1: Negative Binomial Models

	Leg. Proposals	Parl. Speeches	Parl. Questions
Intercept	1.93*** (0.36)	3.55*** (0.34)	4.15*** (0.44)
Five Star Movement (Ref. Other Parties)	-0.20 (0.17)	0.95*** (0.16)	1.15*** (0.20)
18 th Electoral Period (Ref. 17 th Electoral Period)	0.18* (0.09)	0.02 (0.10)	0.02 (0.11)
Five Star Movement × 18 th	-0.14 (0.14)	-1.67*** (0.15)	-1.62*** (0.16)
Candidate Vulnerability	-0.06 (0.39)	0.26 (0.43)	0.96** (0.47)
SMD Election (Ref. PR Election)	0.01 (0.34)	-0.60 (0.39)	-0.84* (0.44)
Vulnerability × SMD	0.11 (0.59)	0.68 (0.66)	0.20 (0.73)
Legislative Office (Ref. No Office)	0.15* (0.08)	0.24*** (0.09)	0.31*** (0.10)
Gov. Membership (Ref. No Membership)	-0.40*** (0.11)	-0.64*** (0.12)	-0.79*** (0.14)
Party Switch (Ref. No Party Switch)	0.10 (0.10)	0.19* (0.10)	0.14 (0.12)
Chamber (Ref. Lower House)	0.11 (0.11)	-0.20 (0.11)	0.37*** (0.13)
Tenure	0.04 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.06 (0.06)
Age	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Gender (Ref. Male)	0.45*** (0.13)	0.00 (0.12)	0.05 (0.16)
Legislator RE	✓	✓	✓
Region RE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	634	634	634
AIC	3712.37	6107.46	4841.10
Log-likelihood	-1839.19	-3036.73	-2403.55

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.

Table B2: Fractional Logit Model

	Rebel Votes	
	Coefficient	Bootstrap p-value
Intercept	0.01	0.10
Five Star Movement (Ref. Other Parties)	-0.01	0.00
18 th Electoral Period (Ref. 17 th Electoral Period)	-0.01	0.00
Five Star Movement×18 th	0.01	0.00
Candidate Vulnerability	0.02	0.01
SMD Election (Ref. PR Election)	0.00	0.58
Vulnerability×SMD	-0.01	0.31
Legislative Office (Ref. No Office)	0.00	0.08
Gov. Membership (Ref. No Membership)	0.00	0.01
Party Switch (Ref. No Party Switch)	0.00	0.13
Chamber (Ref. Lower House)	0.00	0.09
Tenure	0.00	0.00
Age	0.00	0.32
Gender (Ref. Male)	0.00	0.71
Observations	601	

Note: Bootstrap p-values based on 10000 resamples.

Table B3: Linear Mixed-effect Models of Electoral Disconnection by Chamber

	Lower Chamber					Upper Chamber				
	Leg.	Parl.	Speeches	Questions	Rebel Votes	Leg. Proposals	Parl. Speeches	Questions	Parl. Questions	Rebel Votes
Intercept	6.66*	34.24	(22.92)	42.52***	0.25	14.38**	76.33***	72.48***	72.48***	1.47**
Five Star Movement	(3.59)	(22.92)	(14.91)	(14.91)	(0.48)	(6.23)	(26.05)	(23.25)	(23.25)	(0.64)
(Ref. Other Parties)	-3.00*	51.84***	30.51***	30.51***	-0.52**	-3.43	35.48***	27.08**	27.08**	-0.64**
18 th Electoral Period	(1.64)	(11.63)	(7.40)	(7.40)	(0.25)	(2.80)	(12.55)	(10.66)	(10.66)	(0.30)
(Ref. 17 th Electoral Period)	-0.51	6.27	-10.22**	-10.22**	-1.51***	0.26	-36.14***	-5.36	-5.36	-0.09
	(0.88)	(8.00)	(4.78)	(4.78)	(0.20)	(1.43)	(8.17)	(5.99)	(5.99)	(0.18)
Five Star Movement × 18 th	0.14	-82.06***	-41.71***	-41.71***	0.73**	1.11	-38.50***	-31.72***	-31.72***	-0.06
	(1.25)	(13.53)	(7.79)	(7.79)	(0.32)	(2.12)	(13.86)	(9.44)	(9.44)	(0.29)
Candidate Vulnerability	7.41*	77.09**	74.54***	74.54***	1.78**	-6.20	-62.66**	22.21	22.21	0.82
	(3.88)	(35.80)	(21.75)	(21.75)	(0.82)	(6.00)	(30.80)	(24.59)	(24.59)	(0.72)
SMD Election	0.02	8.33	-7.56	-7.56	0.16	4.24	-58.44*	-56.93**	-56.93**	-1.67**
(Ref. PR Election)	(2.99)	(29.28)	(17.51)	(17.51)	(0.65)	(6.60)	(35.34)	(27.52)	(27.52)	(0.81)
Vulnerability × SMD	-3.02	-67.45	-52.90*	-52.90*	-1.65	1.88	124.84**	50.50	50.50	1.92
	(5.39)	(51.33)	(30.99)	(30.99)	(1.16)	(10.66)	(55.09)	(43.82)	(43.82)	(1.28)
Legislative Office	1.84***	21.83***	9.61**	9.61**	0.15	-0.56	-31.83***	-7.53	-7.53	0.20
(Ref. No Office)	(0.70)	(6.51)	(3.94)	(3.94)	(0.15)	(1.51)	(7.81)	(6.24)	(6.24)	(0.18)
Gov. Membership	-1.93**	-26.56***	-11.60**	-11.60**	-0.15	-5.60***	-9.59	-18.85**	-18.85**	-0.48*
(Ref. No Membership)	(0.96)	(9.18)	(5.53)	(5.53)	(0.25)	(2.00)	(11.39)	(8.50)	(8.50)	(0.26)
Party Switch	1.23	12.40	10.05**	10.05**	0.44**	-1.44	-8.36	-6.27	-6.27	0.03
(Ref. No Party Switch)	(0.89)	(7.94)	(4.87)	(4.87)	(0.18)	(2.10)	(8.28)	(7.68)	(7.68)	(0.21)
Tenure	1.10*	3.40	4.94**	4.94**	0.43***	0.46	5.20*	4.15	4.15	0.20***
	(0.59)	(3.52)	(2.31)	(2.31)	(0.07)	(0.71)	(2.71)	(2.60)	(2.60)	(0.07)
Age	-0.10	-0.27	-0.96***	-0.96***	0.00	-0.11	0.12	-0.97**	-0.97**	-0.02
	(0.08)	(0.47)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.01)	(0.12)	(0.48)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.01)
Gender	2.18*	-20.08***	-7.85	-7.85	0.04	4.90**	9.20	2.72	2.72	-0.12
(Ref. Male)	(1.32)	(7.77)	(5.16)	(5.16)	(0.16)	(2.12)	(8.33)	(7.77)	(7.77)	(0.21)
Legislator RE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region RE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	434	434	434	434	401	200	200	200	200	200
AIC	3074.88	4806.43	4406.53	4406.53	1456.00	1462.19	2055.75	1977.04	1977.04	650.37
Log-likelihood	-1521.44	-2387.21	-2187.27	-2187.27	-712.00	-715.10	-1011.88	-972.52	-972.52	-309.19

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.

Table B4: Panel Models

	Leg. Proposals	Parl. Speeches	Parl. Questions
Intercept	3.63*** (1.38)	25.11*** (7.09)	22.44*** (4.03)
Five Star Movement (Ref. Other Parties)	-1.53*** (0.48)	10.60*** (2.42)	5.40*** (1.61)
18 th Electoral Period (Ref. 17 th Electoral Period)	-0.20 (1.61)	-3.58 (8.39)	-4.10 (4.36)
Five Star Movement × 18 th	1.06 (0.70)	-11.99*** (3.49)	-4.93** (2.33)
Candidate Vulnerability	1.40 (1.23)	0.95 (6.10)	16.12*** (4.08)
SMD Election (Ref. PR Election)	2.03 (1.36)	-11.22 (6.97)	-1.01 (4.59)
Vulnerability × SMD	-2.52 (2.14)	13.16 (10.94)	-11.71 (7.22)
Majority Status (Ref. Opposition)	-0.83** (0.35)	-10.04*** (1.76)	-6.83*** (1.17)
Gov. Membership (Ref. No Membership)	-1.78*** (0.49)	-10.75*** (2.42)	-4.62*** (1.62)
Party Switch (Ref. No Party Switch)	-0.24 (0.47)	4.93** (2.31)	1.62 (1.55)
Chamber (Ref. Lower House)	0.30 (0.29)	-4.95*** (1.41)	1.59* (0.95)
Tenure	0.27** (0.11)	0.82 (0.53)	1.20*** (0.35)
Age	-0.03** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.29*** (0.05)
Gender (Ref. Male)	0.74*** (0.26)	-4.66*** (1.29)	-2.27*** (0.87)
Legislator RE	✓	✓	✓
Region RE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1800	1800	1800
AIC	11029.81	16749.87	15314.62
Log-likelihood	-5497.90	-8357.94	-7640.31

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.

Table B5: Rapporteurs and Rebel Votes

	Rapporteur	Constant (Mean)	Constant (Lnvar)
Five Star Movement, 18 th Electoral Period	0.01* (0.01)	0.24*** (0.04)	-2.26*** (0.30)
Other Parties, 18 th Electoral Period	0.00 (0.01)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.26 (0.20)

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10; **Difference: chi2(1)=0.50, Prob>chi2=0.48.**

References

Proksch, Sven-Oliver and Jonathan B. Slapin. 2015. *The Politics of Parliamentary Debate: Parties, Rebels and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.