**Supplementary Appendix for “Forging support: when there is no alternative to ‘there is no alternative’”**

1. **Descriptive information**

*Table A 1 Summary statistics*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Mean | SD | Min. | Max. | N |
| Year | 2006.6 | 7.583 | 1995 | 2017 | 46045 |
| Income group | 0.9 | 0.805 | 0 | 2 | 46045 |
| Gender | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 | 45971 |
| Age | 49.8 | 16.484 | 15 | 98 | 44998 |
| Pref. Spending cuts | 37.8 | 57.822 | -100 | 100 | 44339 |
| Pref. spend total | 22.9 | 24.476 | -100 | 100 | 41067 |
| Pref. spend env. | 29.8 | 43.258 | -100 | 100 | 44463 |
| Pref. spend health | 51.1 | 40.746 | -100 | 100 | 45302 |
| Pref. spend law | 32.6 | 42.265 | -100 | 100 | 44766 |
| Pref. spend edu. | 46.8 | 40.468 | -100 | 100 | 45071 |
| Pref. spend def. | -9.5 | 52.402 | -100 | 100 | 43992 |
| Pref. spend pension | 38 | 41.712 | -100 | 100 | 44945 |
| Pref. spend unemp. | 2.2 | 48.61 | -100 | 100 | 44523 |
| Pref. spend cult. | -6.3 | 49.834 | -100 | 100 | 44391 |
| Pref. tax (total) | -19.6 | 29.246 | -100 | 100 | 41931 |
| Pref. tax (Low) | -48.9 | 41.297 | -100 | 100 | 43799 |
| Pref. tax (M) | -29.9 | 37.416 | -100 | 100 | 44029 |
| Pref. tax (H) | 19.2 | 54.784 | -100 | 100 | 43131 |
| Economic orthodoxy average (t-1, interpolated, standardized) | 0 | 1.049 | -0.971 | 5.341 | 46045 |
| Economic orthodoxy consensus (t-1, interpolated, standardized) | 0 | 1.01 | -4.817 | 1.046 | 46045 |
| GDP growth | 2.2 | 2.343 | -13.591 | 10.844 | 45013 |
| Unemployment rate | 6.8 | 3.064 | 2.74 | 19.64 | 46045 |
| GDP (logged) | 10.4 | 0.57 | 8.209 | 11.363 | 45414 |

*Table A 2 Country-year average party attention to fiscal strategy, consensus and grouped preferences by income group*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country | Year | Economic orthodoxy average | Economic orthodoxy consensus | Keynesian demand management average | Keynesian demand management consensus | Low | Middle | High |
| AU | 1997 | 1.47 | -1.397 | -0.625 | 0.682 | 57.25 | 54.07 | 44.64 |
| AU | 2007 | 0.889 | 0.229 | -0.625 | 0.682 | 38.66 | 30.26 | 22.77 |
| AU | 2016 | -0.167 | 0.175 | -0.615 | 0.558 | 45.88 | 36.95 | 41.16 |
| BE | 2017 | -0.403 | 0.477 | -0.399 | 0.468 | 58.29 | 60.48 | 50.41 |
| BG | 1997 | 0.113 | 0.921 | -0.531 | 0.646 | 38.59 | 38.42 | 45.38 |
| CA | 1996 | 0.257 | -0.208 | 1.305 | -0.431 | 55.94 | 65.38 | 66.03 |
| CA | 2006 | 0.444 | -0.47 | -0.307 | 0.415 | 51.4 | 51.89 | 50 |
| CH | 1998 | 0.324 | -1.315 | -0.181 | -0.027 | 54.88 | 53.9 | 55.25 |
| CH | 2007 | 0.184 | -1.466 | -0.514 | 0.524 | 36.07 | 36.39 | 39.74 |
| CH | 2017 | -0.683 | 0.402 | -0.538 | 0.245 | 42.86 | 35.59 | 39.05 |
| CZ | 1996 | -0.16 | 0.504 | 1.398 | 0.28 | 37.01 | 39.86 | 36.92 |
| CZ | 2006 | -0.388 | 0.087 | -0.339 | 0.388 | 50 | 43.36 | 52.3 |
| CZ | 2016 | -0.609 | 0.456 | 0.43 | 0.147 | 38.89 | 41.54 | 50 |
| DE | 1996 | -0.564 | 0.902 | -0.52 | 0.568 | 71.23 | 72.53 | 72.18 |
| DE | 2006 | 0.763 | -0.47 | -0.244 | -0.594 | 63.55 | 64.76 | 62.66 |
| DE | 2016 | -0.446 | 0.613 | 0.898 | -0.122 | 35.26 | 34.9 | 42.91 |
| DK | 2008 | -0.401 | -0.702 | -0.625 | 0.682 | 21.14 | 23.72 | 41.04 |
| DK | 2016 | -0.559 | -0.202 | 0.643 | -1.493 | 29.02 | 28.76 | 39.22 |
| ES | 2007 | -0.563 | 0.763 | -0.599 | 0.549 | 36.81 | 35.59 | 39.74 |
| ES | 2016 | -0.44 | 0.175 | 0.014 | -0.293 | 33.93 | 35.03 | 30.87 |
| FI | 2006 | -0.202 | -0.823 | -0.498 | 0.533 | 12.31 | 28.96 | 33.19 |
| FI | 2016 | 0.164 | -0.604 | 1.078 | -2.063 | 25 | 33.01 | 43.4 |
| FR | 1997 | 0.126 | -0.742 | 3.734 | -2.403 | 85.63 | 82.16 | 77.38 |
| FR | 2006 | -0.815 | 1.001 | -0.404 | 0.631 | 79.3 | 70.07 | 73.68 |
| FR | 2016 | -0.552 | 0.834 | -0.317 | -0.173 | 81.16 | 78.67 | 77.73 |
| GB | 1996 | -0.277 | 0.516 | 0.267 | -0.331 | 41.39 | 25.11 | 31.03 |
| GB | 2006 | -0.614 | 0.898 | -0.612 | 0.525 | 29.21 | 25.37 | 29.39 |
| HR | 2006 | -0.522 | 0.743 | -0.625 | 0.682 | 78.26 | 74.26 | 72.4 |
| HR | 2017 | 0.465 | -0.006 | 2.248 | -0.34 | 84.31 | 85 | 87.22 |
| HU | 1996 | 1.385 | -3.002 | 3.856 | -2.326 | 71.43 | 67.21 | 70.69 |
| HU | 2006 | -0.312 | 0.479 | -0.621 | 0.672 | 64.2 | 63.82 | 71.34 |
| HU | 2016 | -0.247 | 0.566 | -0.492 | 0.458 | 67.14 | 66.89 | 55.1 |
| IE | 1996 | 0.529 | -0.142 | -0.625 | 0.682 | 57.03 | 56.6 | 54.85 |
| IE | 2005 | -0.051 | 0.252 | -0.608 | 0.647 | 30.06 | 28.24 | 16.36 |
| IL | 2007 | -0.903 | 0.727 | -0.608 | 0.581 | 57.85 | 58.72 | 55.81 |
| IS | 2017 | 0.334 | -0.822 | 0.34 | -1.208 | 37.42 | 33.33 | 40.44 |
| JP | 1996 | 0.136 | -1.127 | -0.625 | 0.682 | 59.77 | 75 | 63.67 |
| JP | 2006 | 1.848 | -0.231 | 0.099 | -4.031 | 67.51 | 68.01 | 68.83 |
| JP | 2016 | 0.381 | 0.234 | 2.338 | -1.651 | 57.14 | 63.33 | 67.97 |
| KR | 2006 | -0.892 | 1.036 | -0.576 | 0.672 | 40.02 | 37.84 | 42.38 |
| KR | 2016 | -0.971 | 1.046 | 1.276 | 0.525 | 32.81 | 39.04 | 38.24 |
| LT | 2016 | -0.49 | 0.282 | -0.14 | -0.003 | 70.88 | 72.04 | 68.1 |
| LV | 2007 | -0.725 | 0.074 | 0.589 | -2.009 | 78.68 | 77.69 | 73.85 |
| LV | 2016 | -0.468 | 0.233 | 2.652 | -3.432 | 83.46 | 80.98 | 68.31 |
| NL | 2006 | -0.422 | 0.658 | -0.548 | 0.532 | 47.75 | 42.94 | 52.78 |
| NO | 1996 | -0.427 | 0.298 | -0.508 | 0.482 | 46.89 | 54.56 | 50.75 |
| NO | 2006 | -0.934 | 0.914 | -0.094 | -0.151 | 43.92 | 48.05 | 46.63 |
| NO | 2016 | -0.81 | 0.978 | -0.248 | 0.487 | 37.88 | 38.72 | 40.48 |
| NZ | 1997 | -0.1 | -0.254 | -0.625 | 0.682 | 60.38 | 58.05 | 48.61 |
| NZ | 2006 | 0.032 | -1.71 | -0.604 | 0.614 | 47.66 | 44.94 | 45.26 |
| NZ | 2016 | 0.244 | 0.509 | -0.575 | 0.64 | 36.68 | 35.25 | 31.56 |
| PL | 2008 | 0.008 | 0.305 | -0.625 | 0.682 | 78.61 | 72.35 | 75.28 |
| PT | 2006 | 0.283 | 0.421 | -0.511 | 0.471 | 67.87 | 65.38 | 63.79 |
| SE | 1996 | 5.341 | -2.563 | -0.493 | 0.153 | 42.34 | 39.93 | 51.89 |
| SE | 2006 | -0.262 | -0.127 | -0.508 | 0.374 | 34.4 | 36.28 | 46.01 |
| SE | 2016 | -0.854 | 0.688 | -0.153 | -0.009 | 32.88 | 21.92 | 26.89 |
| SI | 1995 | -0.508 | 0.601 | -0.625 | 0.682 | 68.89 | 71.9 | 70.87 |
| SI | 2006 | -0.819 | 0.649 | -0.6 | 0.639 | 66.83 | 57.43 | 66.22 |
| SI | 2015 | 0.399 | -0.815 | 0.301 | -2.24 | 58.99 | 52.1 | 51.69 |
| SK | 2016 | 4.553 | -4.817 | -0.509 | 0.619 | 72.4 | 73.27 | 73.05 |
| US | 1996 | -0.217 | 0.935 | -0.625 | 0.682 | 59 | 67.24 | 66.89 |
| US | 2006 | -0.934 | 1.038 | -0.625 | 0.682 | 37.68 | 46.77 | 53.41 |
| US | 2016 | -0.415 | 0.526 | -0.415 | 0.446 | 47.27 | 56.34 | 54.22 |

*Table A 3 Number of respondents per income group per country-year*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country | Year | Low income | Middle income | High income |
| AU | 1997 | 642 | 605 | 559 |
| AU | 2007 | 654 | 719 | 447 |
| AU | 2016 | 261 | 235 | 237 |
| BE | 2017 | 384 | 389 | 251 |
| BG | 1997 | 150 | 203 | 173 |
| CA | 1996 | 289 | 186 | 156 |
| CA | 2006 | 220 | 221 | 167 |
| CH | 1998 | 320 | 311 | 229 |
| CH | 2007 | 127 | 173 | 152 |
| CH | 2017 | 87 | 122 | 109 |
| CZ | 1996 | 200 | 218 | 227 |
| CZ | 2006 | 210 | 217 | 174 |
| CZ | 2016 | 185 | 135 | 138 |
| DE | 1996 | 614 | 591 | 628 |
| DE | 2006 | 282 | 298 | 325 |
| DE | 2016 | 327 | 368 | 296 |
| DK | 2008 | 484 | 409 | 288 |
| DK | 2016 | 313 | 346 | 220 |
| ES | 2007 | 390 | 498 | 272 |
| ES | 2016 | 329 | 317 | 187 |
| FI | 2006 | 217 | 210 | 234 |
| FI | 2016 | 229 | 216 | 259 |
| FR | 1997 | 256 | 364 | 231 |
| FR | 2006 | 265 | 296 | 269 |
| FR | 2016 | 201 | 217 | 326 |
| GB | 1996 | 313 | 245 | 200 |
| GB | 2006 | 241 | 208 | 174 |
| HR | 2006 | 96 | 105 | 98 |
| HR | 2017 | 189 | 200 | 176 |
| HU | 1996 | 163 | 221 | 176 |
| HU | 2006 | 177 | 201 | 165 |
| HU | 2016 | 109 | 153 | 149 |
| IE | 1996 | 187 | 54 | 104 |
| IE | 2005 | 173 | 89 | 56 |
| IL | 2007 | 233 | 266 | 158 |
| IS | 2017 | 162 | 183 | 186 |
| JP | 1996 | 190 | 116 | 129 |
| JP | 2006 | 209 | 146 | 165 |
| JP | 2016 | 286 | 206 | 242 |
| KR | 2006 | 488 | 377 | 453 |
| KR | 2016 | 97 | 74 | 85 |
| LT | 2016 | 95 | 94 | 106 |
| LV | 2007 | 68 | 65 | 66 |
| LV | 2016 | 134 | 94 | 146 |
| NL | 2006 | 271 | 266 | 261 |
| NO | 1996 | 266 | 269 | 206 |
| NO | 2006 | 307 | 314 | 334 |
| NO | 2016 | 306 | 301 | 257 |
| NZ | 1997 | 344 | 280 | 151 |
| NZ | 2006 | 343 | 359 | 199 |
| NZ | 2016 | 359 | 452 | 185 |
| PL | 2008 | 211 | 240 | 277 |
| PT | 2006 | 297 | 172 | 116 |
| SE | 1996 | 257 | 276 | 217 |
| SE | 2006 | 292 | 291 | 287 |
| SE | 2016 | 294 | 327 | 265 |
| SI | 1995 | 137 | 137 | 127 |
| SI | 2006 | 111 | 105 | 111 |
| SI | 2015 | 89 | 123 | 118 |
| SK | 2016 | 185 | 160 | 143 |
| US | 1996 | 348 | 330 | 300 |
| US | 2006 | 497 | 375 | 265 |
| US | 2016 | 239 | 276 | 225 |

1. **Results by individual spending and taxation items**

This section looks more closely at the individual policy areas for which there is survey-level data. The spending policy areas that are available in the ISSP are: environment, health care, law enforcement, education, defence, old age pension, unemployment benefits and culture. Even though the variables in the main analyses specifically focusses on spending cuts, I have argued that this is an indicator for support for fiscal austerity and preferences to rebalance the budget. Besides cutting expenses, voters could also prefer to increase government income by raising taxes. Here I look at the three available tax items that ask respondents to qualify whether taxation on low, middle or high incomes is considered too high or too low. All spending and taxation items are recoded so that higher values indicate preferences for more spending or more taxation. To balance the government budget, I therefore expect spending coefficients to be negative and taxation coefficients to be positive under austerity consensus.

Table B1 shows the average preferences by income group and the difference between low- and high-income voters. I will just highlight the most striking results. In general, low- and middle-income voters want to see significantly less spending when economic orthodoxy average is high and this effect is even stronger when there is consensus. This pattern seems to hold across all individual spending areas, while both low- and middle-income voters adapt in law and defence regardless of consensus. Moreover, the middle only adapts in the policy domains environment and education when there is consensus. The results for high-income voters are more mixed. These groups hardly adapt to average party attention to economic orthodoxy (only by demanding less spending in culture), while under consensual austerity they adapt in five out of eight policy domains. Interestingly, high-income voters adapt the strongest in environment, in which they demand more spending than low income voters. Finally, peculiarly the middle and the rich demand more spending on unemployment when the weighted economic orthodoxy average is higher (though under consensus they demand less). Average support for unemployment spending is already quite low and even negative for high-income voters, as shown in Table B1. These results, like the negative main effect on support for spending cuts for high-income voters in the main text, are surprising and go against the theoretical expectations.

Looking at preferences for taxation, there are first of all no statistically significant effects observable for low-income voters. Middle- and high-income voters want to see less taxation on middle incomes and high incomes under austerity consensus, although the coefficient size of high-income voters is in both cases more than double the size of that of middle-income voters. These results are rather contrary to the theoretical expectations. First of all because the results suggest that under cross-party consensus on austerity middle and high-income voters do not want to ‘rebalance the budget’ – as support for higher taxation would indicate -, but instead they are more likely to demand a smaller government and possibly trickle-down policies by demanding less taxation on the rich. Interpreting austerity not just as a temporary solution to rebalance government budget, but as a broader paradigm to shrink the size of the government (Blyth, 2013), these results makes sense. Moreover, this is in line with the earlier mentioned notion that austerity has consisted primarily of spending-based consolidation as compared to tax-based. If this translates to where the emphasis is in austerity by political parties, the results are perhaps less surprising. Second, the results show that preferences, especially on support for higher taxes for the rich, polarize even further than they already did. This goes against the findings on spending for which the results indicate that there is more consensus among income groups when there is consensus among parties.

*Table B 1 Average fiscal preferences by income group*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Policy domain | Low | Middle | High | High – Low |
| Environment | 27.1 | 30.7 | 33.9 | - 6.8 |
| Health care | 55.1 | 52.9 | 46.7 | 8.4 |
| Law | 31.7 | 31.9 | 28.8 | 2.9 |
| Education | 46.3 | 47.6 | 47.9 | – 1.6 |
| Defence | -5.09 | -8.86 | -13.0 | 7.91 |
| Pension | 47.8 | 39.4 | 31.3 | 16.5 |
| Unemployment | 14.9 | 4.36 | -3.10 | 18 |
| Culture | -3.89 | -4.44 | -0.35 | 3.5 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Tax (L) | -57.6 | -51.7 | -43.6 | 14 |
| Tax (M) | -29.5 | -31.6 | -32.4 | 2.9 |
| Tax (H) | 24.4 | 22.8 | 9.54 | – 14.86 |

*Table B 2 Orthodoxy & Low income spending preferences*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | Env | Health | Law | Edu | Def | Pension | Unemp | Cult | Total |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | -2.226 | -5.737\*\*\* | -6.580\*\*\* | -3.872\*\* | -8.429\*\*\* | -6.309\*\*\* | 2.770 | -4.237\*\* | -4.210\*\*\* |
|  | (1.992) | (1.896) | (1.926) | (1.820) | (2.246) | (1.760) | (2.041) | (2.047) | (1.222) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | 2.026\*\* | 1.588\* | -1.871\* | -0.379 | -2.291\* | -1.334 | 5.340\*\*\* | -1.475 | 0.419 |
|  | (0.997) | (0.919) | (1.006) | (0.933) | (1.169) | (0.925) | (1.151) | (1.113) | (0.596) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | -4.842\*\*\* | -2.401\*\*\* | 2.213\*\*\* | -3.659\*\*\* | 5.973\*\*\* | -1.548\*\* | -5.538\*\*\* | -4.773\*\*\* | -1.822\*\*\* |
|  | (0.627) | (0.593) | (0.619) | (0.599) | (0.757) | (0.601) | (0.719) | (0.720) | (0.372) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | -15.497\*\*\* | -0.125 | -23.497\* | -60.441\*\*\* | -104.743\*\*\* | 9.272 | 49.315\*\*\* | -41.565\*\*\* | -24.655\*\*\* |
|  | (13.449) | (12.261) | (14.219) | (12.901) | (14.881) | (12.690) | (15.094) | (14.135) | (7.865) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -0.914 | 0.920\*\*\* | -1.378\*\*\* | 0.264 | -2.061\*\*\* | 0.039 | 1.934\*\*\* | -1.048\*\*\* | -0.287 |
|  | (0.374) | (0.325) | (0.363) | (0.339) | (0.436) | (0.345) | (0.389) | (0.400) | (0.217) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | 2.188\*\*\* | 2.353\*\*\* | -1.052\* | 3.499\*\*\* | -0.916 | 0.352 | 0.204 | 0.360 | 0.718\* |
|  | (0.651) | (0.600) | (0.637) | (0.617) | (0.757) | (0.571) | (0.711) | (0.658) | (0.399) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.327 | 0.033 | 0.354\*\*\* | -0.152\*\*\* | 0.336\*\*\* | 0.364\*\*\* | 0.071\*\*\* | -0.050\*\* | 0.076\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.020) | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.027) | (0.022) | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.013) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 1.624\* | 4.006\*\*\* | 1.676\*\* | 2.626\*\*\* | 0.195 | 3.034\*\*\* | 3.219\*\*\* | 4.509\*\*\* | 2.590\*\*\* |
|  | (0.802) | (0.696) | (0.766) | (0.727) | (0.915) | (0.729) | (0.840) | (0.887) | (0.452) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | -3.536\*\*\* | -3.388\*\*\* | -0.159 | -3.562\*\*\* | -0.664 | -2.507\*\*\* | -2.642\*\*\* | -3.268\*\*\* | -2.433\*\*\* |
|  | (0.830) | (0.784) | (0.818) | (0.766) | (0.950) | (0.742) | (0.865) | (0.869) | (0.509) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 209.524 | 48.912 | 286.596\* | 674.990\*\*\* | 1,105.301\*\*\* | -78.268 | -552.132\*\*\* | 420.884\*\*\* | 277.890\*\*\* |
|  | (143.466) | (130.884) | (152.140) | (137.851) | (158.849) | (135.568) | (161.385) | (151.211) | (83.919) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| Income group | L | L | L | L | L | L | L | L | L |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 13,152 | 13,585 | 13,368 | 13,447 | 13,039 | 13,499 | 13,241 | 13,099 | 11,889 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.046 | 0.096 | 0.122 | 0.087 | 0.168 | 0.111 | 0.120 | 0.116 | 0.145 |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | | | | | | |

*Table B 3 Orthodoxy & Middle income spending preferences*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | Env | Health | Law | Edu | Def | Pension | Unemp | Cult | spend\_total |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | -1.207 | -6.137\*\*\* | -7.152\*\*\* | -2.017 | -9.897\*\*\* | -8.012\*\*\* | 4.281\* | -4.374\*\* | -4.613\*\*\* |
|  | (2.037) | (1.990) | (2.050) | (1.859) | (2.380) | (1.884) | (2.195) | (2.230) | (1.215) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | 3.520\*\*\* | 1.905\*\* | -2.222\*\* | 1.356 | -4.008\*\*\* | -1.824\*\* | 4.946\*\*\* | 0.012 | 0.242 |
|  | (0.950) | (0.875) | (0.942) | (0.857) | (1.109) | (0.879) | (1.036) | (1.039) | (0.526) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | -6.296\*\*\* | -2.442\*\*\* | 2.425\*\*\* | -2.790\*\*\* | 5.717\*\*\* | -1.051\*\* | -6.652\*\*\* | -7.241\*\*\* | -2.279\*\*\* |
|  | (0.610) | (0.533) | (0.564) | (0.555) | (0.701) | (0.516) | (0.642) | (0.678) | (0.302) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | -9.437\*\*\* | -15.961 | -28.137\*\* | -83.552\*\*\* | -88.355\*\*\* | -19.944 | 70.966\*\*\* | -47.593\*\*\* | -26.513\*\*\* |
|  | (13.184) | (12.427) | (13.083) | (12.965) | (16.104) | (13.358) | (14.580) | (14.370) | (7.293) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -0.938 | 0.028 | -1.392\*\*\* | -0.457 | -1.452\*\*\* | -0.594\* | 1.522\*\*\* | -0.504 | -0.462\*\* |
|  | (0.355) | (0.320) | (0.348) | (0.320) | (0.419) | (0.331) | (0.371) | (0.390) | (0.197) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | 2.071\*\*\* | 2.979\*\*\* | -0.830 | 4.205\*\*\* | 0.799 | 0.826 | 2.176\*\*\* | 2.173\*\*\* | 1.895\*\*\* |
|  | (0.665) | (0.650) | (0.669) | (0.627) | (0.805) | (0.616) | (0.730) | (0.742) | (0.393) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.228\*\*\* | 0.020 | 0.175\*\*\* | -0.124\*\*\* | 0.237\*\*\* | 0.262\*\*\* | 0.164\*\*\* | 0.137\*\*\* | 0.079\*\*\* |
|  | (0.025) | (0.023) | (0.024) | (0.023) | (0.030) | (0.024) | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.014) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 1.317 | 5.928\*\*\* | 1.034 | 2.573\*\*\* | -0.096 | 3.962\*\*\* | 3.348\*\*\* | 3.397\*\*\* | 2.621\*\*\* |
|  | (0.758) | (0.675) | (0.727) | (0.691) | (0.885) | (0.699) | (0.820) | (0.846) | (0.412) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | -4.392\*\*\* | -3.831\*\*\* | 0.130 | -2.573\*\*\* | -1.028 | -3.253\*\*\* | -3.207\*\*\* | -4.952\*\*\* | -3.043\*\*\* |
|  | (0.859) | (0.846) | (0.865) | (0.799) | (1.011) | (0.805) | (0.947) | (0.955) | (0.515) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 144.440 | 218.908\* | 337.716\*\* | 921.476\*\*\* | 916.997\*\*\* | 236.575\* | -804.448\*\*\* | 465.903\*\*\* | 291.012\*\*\* |
|  | (140.614) | (132.790) | (139.868) | (138.535) | (171.677) | (142.632) | (155.786) | (153.345) | (77.814) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| Income group | M | M | M | M | M | M | M | M |  |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 13,248 | 13,441 | 13,297 | 13,401 | 13,091 | 13,326 | 13,258 | 13,230 | 12,315 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.056 | 0.118 | 0.105 | 0.093 | 0.159 | 0.110 | 0.166 | 0.144 | 0.176 |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | | | | | | |

*Table B 4 Orthodoxy & High income spending preferences*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | Env | Health | Law | Edu | Def | Pension | Unemp | Cult | spend\_total |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | -1.894 | -1.716 | -0.423 | -2.138 | -3.939 | -1.955 | 5.115\*\* | -4.601\*\* | -1.655 |
|  | (2.109) | (2.175) | (2.005) | (1.996) | (2.467) | (2.067) | (2.191) | (2.133) | (1.207) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | 3.032\*\*\* | 2.426\*\* | -0.276 | -0.035 | -3.006\*\* | -3.895\*\*\* | 6.411\*\*\* | 0.588 | 0.742 |
|  | (1.104) | (1.041) | (1.055) | (1.069) | (1.279) | (1.034) | (1.246) | (1.163) | (0.612) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | -7.087\*\*\* | -3.952\*\*\* | 2.598\*\*\* | -3.004\*\*\* | 5.435\*\*\* | -1.866\*\*\* | -7.120\*\*\* | -6.694\*\*\* | -2.483\*\*\* |
|  | (0.679) | (0.617) | (0.620) | (0.588) | (0.778) | (0.596) | (0.703) | (0.685) | (0.350) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 18.076\*\*\* | -19.122 | -18.916 | -69.211\*\*\* | -99.903\*\*\* | -17.000 | 21.010 | -21.310 | -26.423\*\*\* |
|  | (12.543) | (12.837) | (12.326) | (12.880) | (15.808) | (13.569) | (13.826) | (13.377) | (7.228) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -0.802 | -1.220\*\*\* | -2.290\*\*\* | -0.987\*\*\* | -2.285\*\*\* | -1.726\*\*\* | 0.138 | -0.344 | -1.226\*\*\* |
|  | (0.389) | (0.378) | (0.370) | (0.356) | (0.450) | (0.373) | (0.394) | (0.411) | (0.205) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | 2.220\*\*\* | 2.353\*\*\* | -1.795\*\*\* | 4.642\*\*\* | 0.029 | 0.121 | 2.980\*\*\* | 2.363\*\*\* | 1.694\*\*\* |
|  | (0.685) | (0.680) | (0.657) | (0.658) | (0.828) | (0.655) | (0.754) | (0.691) | (0.389) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.217\*\*\* | -0.033 | 0.184\*\*\* | -0.153\*\*\* | 0.311\*\*\* | 0.240\*\*\* | 0.165\*\*\* | 0.220\*\*\* | 0.089\*\*\* |
|  | (0.032) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.038) | (0.030) | (0.034) | (0.035) | (0.017) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 2.859\*\*\* | 7.757\*\*\* | 1.245 | 1.554\*\* | 0.018 | 6.771\*\*\* | 6.109\*\*\* | 6.789\*\*\* | 3.970\*\*\* |
|  | (0.831) | (0.789) | (0.776) | (0.772) | (0.941) | (0.770) | (0.853) | (0.889) | (0.441) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | -4.167\*\*\* | -2.075\*\* | 2.499\*\*\* | -3.119\*\*\* | 0.793 | 0.027 | -2.352\*\* | -4.921\*\*\* | -1.753\*\*\* |
|  | (0.884) | (0.920) | (0.845) | (0.852) | (1.041) | (0.867) | (0.919) | (0.894) | (0.501) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -135.883 | 258.782\* | 242.021\* | 774.588\*\*\* | 1,034.034\*\*\* | 204.465 | -271.530\* | 192.765 | 293.782\*\*\* |
|  | (133.051) | (136.945) | (131.541) | (137.388) | (168.538) | (144.691) | (147.350) | (142.273) | (76.952) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| Income group | H | H | H | H | H | H | H | H |  |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 11,148 | 11,227 | 11,156 | 11,217 | 10,940 | 11,140 | 11,102 | 11,155 | 10,417 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.072 | 0.142 | 0.094 | 0.072 | 0.163 | 0.126 | 0.141 | 0.138 | 0.192 |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | | | | | | |

*Table B 5 Orthodoxy & Low income taxation preferences*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | Tax lower incomes | Tax middle incomes | Tax high incomes | Tax total |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | 1.132 | 1.763 | -0.401 | 0.809 |
|  | (1.863) | (1.664) | (2.456) | (1.294) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | -0.207 | 3.258\*\*\* | 4.801\*\*\* | 2.629\*\*\* |
|  | (1.066) | (0.924) | (1.332) | (0.735) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | 1.793\*\*\* | -1.525\*\*\* | -5.273\*\*\* | -1.586\*\*\* |
|  | (0.557) | (0.571) | (0.779) | (0.419) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | -7.681\*\*\* | -33.345\*\*\* | -28.431\* | -22.269\*\*\* |
|  | (13.268) | (12.358) | (16.454) | (8.614) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -1.821\*\*\* | -0.863\*\*\* | 0.446 | -0.665\*\*\* |
|  | (0.345) | (0.322) | (0.459) | (0.253) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | 0.351\*\*\* | 0.312 | 2.581\*\*\* | 1.045\*\* |
|  | (0.603) | (0.565) | (0.809) | (0.432) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.166 | 0.075\*\*\* | 0.256\*\*\* | 0.056\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) | (0.019) | (0.028) | (0.016) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | -1.579\*\* | -2.723\*\*\* | 0.807 | -1.317\*\* |
|  | (0.737) | (0.679) | (0.988) | (0.547) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | 0.654 | -0.487 | -3.875\*\*\* | -1.236\*\* |
|  | (0.787) | (0.697) | (1.041) | (0.554) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 52.651 | 333.506\*\* | 288.576 | 215.824\*\* |
|  | (141.859) | (132.211) | (176.028) | (92.109) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | |
| Income group | L | L | L | L |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 13,163 | 12,965 | 12,679 | 12,328 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.041 | 0.068 | 0.088 | 0.077 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | |

*Table B 6 Orthodoxy & Middle income taxation preferences*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | Tax lower incomes | Tax middle incomes | Tax high incomes | Tax total |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | -2.220 | 0.488 | 2.533 | 0.065 |
|  | (1.983) | (1.739) | (2.632) | (1.353) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | 1.036 | 5.938\*\*\* | 8.370\*\*\* | 5.120\*\*\* |
|  | (0.989) | (0.852) | (1.245) | (0.676) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | 1.694\*\*\* | -2.516\*\*\* | -5.049\*\*\* | -2.034\*\*\* |
|  | (0.547) | (0.496) | (0.744) | (0.393) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | -35.526\*\*\* | -41.674\*\*\* | -37.315\*\* | -42.093\*\*\* |
|  | (13.753) | (11.999) | (17.320) | (9.366) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -1.508\*\* | -0.455 | 1.496\*\*\* | -0.208 |
|  | (0.345) | (0.305) | (0.429) | (0.238) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | 1.476\*\*\* | 0.874 | 1.665\* | 1.410\*\*\* |
|  | (0.647) | (0.589) | (0.866) | (0.463) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.095 | 0.135\*\*\* | 0.263\*\*\* | 0.102\*\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.022) | (0.031) | (0.017) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | -1.223 | -1.988\*\*\* | 1.160 | -0.605 |
|  | (0.729) | (0.647) | (0.935) | (0.519) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | -0.563 | -2.102\*\*\* | -4.615\*\*\* | -2.466\*\*\* |
|  | (0.848) | (0.735) | (1.111) | (0.579) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 345.020\*\* | 402.116\*\*\* | 371.288\*\* | 415.251\*\*\* |
|  | (147.084) | (127.897) | (185.054) | (99.897) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | |
| Income group | M | M | M | M |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 12,967 | 13,128 | 12,812 | 12,461 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.056 | 0.081 | 0.089 | 0.069 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | |

*Table B 7 Orthodoxy & High income taxation preferences*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | Tax lower incomes | Tax middle incomes | Tax high incomes | Tax total |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | 1.678 | 3.078\* | 3.246 | 2.829\* |
|  | (2.166) | (1.847) | (2.903) | (1.543) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | 2.553\*\* | 6.261\*\*\* | 6.350\*\*\* | 5.126\*\*\* |
|  | (1.107) | (0.973) | (1.422) | (0.792) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | 0.940 | -4.044\*\*\* | -9.751\*\*\* | -4.452\*\*\* |
|  | (0.581) | (0.553) | (0.851) | (0.446) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | -38.674\*\*\* | -21.716\* | -20.733 | -26.834\*\*\* |
|  | (13.408) | (12.198) | (16.709) | (9.256) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -1.332\* | -0.296 | 1.026\*\* | -0.211 |
|  | (0.376) | (0.339) | (0.489) | (0.278) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | 1.032\*\*\* | 1.001 | 2.953\*\*\* | 1.741\*\*\* |
|  | (0.715) | (0.614) | (0.934) | (0.522) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.153 | 0.054\*\* | 0.185\*\*\* | 0.029 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.027) | (0.040) | (0.022) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | -1.696\* | -1.722\*\* | 3.336\*\*\* | 0.004 |
|  | (0.785) | (0.703) | (1.051) | (0.578) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | -0.219 | -1.481\* | -4.764\*\*\* | -2.122\*\*\* |
|  | (0.914) | (0.786) | (1.228) | (0.669) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 387.590\*\*\* | 191.239 | 180.779 | 251.326\*\* |
|  | (143.060) | (130.158) | (178.269) | (98.745) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | |
| Income group | H | H | H | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 10,889 | 11,096 | 10,953 | 10,666 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.078 | 0.070 | 0.120 | 0.095 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | |

1. **Results using Keynesian Demand Management**

Table C1 and Figure C3 show the results using expansionary fiscal policies as the independent variable. For fiscally expansionary policies I use the indicator ‘Keynesian Demand Management’ from the Manifesto Project Database, which includes favourable mentions of demand side oriented economic policies (assistance to consumers rather than businesses) through: increasing public demand; increasing social expenditures; stabilisation in the face of depression; government stimulus plans in the face of economic crises. The expectation is that results are in the opposite direction of economic orthodoxy, meaning that voters demand less spending cuts and more spending. Moreover, I expect that because the rich are most distant to the Keynesian consensus, they adapt the most. Indeed, model (1) shows that average party attention to Keynesian politics strongly decreases support for spending cuts. This effect is even stronger when Keynesianism is consensual across political parties. The strong main effect suggests that when there is a Keynesian alternative for voters, even if this is not the consensus, voters adapt their preferences. To be sure, economic orthodoxy did not show this main effect. The position of one’s own party also is negative and significant.


Looking more closely at heterogeneity across income groups, we see in models (2) – (4) that while for this measure all individual groups adapt to the consensus, the results are the strongest for high-income voters, followed by the middle and finally the lower-income groups. Indeed, those furthest away from the consensus adapt most strongly to the consensus. As was the case for economic orthodoxy, high-income voters respond the strongest to the preferred party variable. This again may either suggest that the rich are better at identifying the party that most strongly represents their interests or that they adapt to the preferences of their preferred party.

Looking at the polarized spending areas in Table C2 and Figure C4, we see that voters only adapt when the Keynesian position is consensual. Moreover, income groups adapt roughly to the same extent. This means that while income groups do want to see more spending, we do not observe the same heterogeneous effects as for economic orthodoxy whereby income groups significantly move closer to one another.

*Table C 1 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for cuts to government spending, Keynesian demand management*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | Preference for spending cuts | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Keynesian demand management (average, t-1) | -7.790\*\*\* | -8.925\*\*\* | -6.626\*\*\* | -6.285\*\*\* |
|  | (0.967) | (1.790) | (1.790) | (1.798) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Keynesian demand management (consensus, t-1) | -5.287\*\*\* | -6.150\*\*\* | -3.118\*\* | -4.954\*\*\* |
|  | (0.690) | (1.215) | (1.317) | (1.300) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Keynesian demand management (party, t-1) | -3.179\*\*\* | -2.651\*\*\* | -3.626\*\*\* | -4.433\*\*\* |
|  | (0.566) | (0.961) | (0.998) | (1.259) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 19.117\*\*\* | 3.671 | 26.597\* | 33.245\*\* |
|  | (8.301) | (14.887) | (15.613) | (15.451) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | 0.392 | 0.389 | 0.732 | 0.295 |
|  | (0.277) | (0.521) | (0.488) | (0.552) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | -0.824\*\*\* | -1.304\*\* | -0.703 | -0.927 |
|  | (0.338) | (0.630) | (0.628) | (0.639) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.197\*\*\* | 0.200\*\*\* | 0.150\*\*\* | 0.280\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.028) | (0.032) | (0.040) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | -1.494\*\*\* | -0.697 | 0.437 | -5.127\*\*\* |
|  | (0.534) | (0.997) | (0.973) | (1.049) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Keynesian demand management average \* consensus | -2.634\*\*\* | -2.526\*\*\* | -2.551\*\*\* | -3.203\*\*\* |
|  | (0.468) | (0.854) | (0.867) | (0.890) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -181.981\*\* | -9.615 | -267.725 | -334.722\*\* |
|  | (87.927) | (158.039) | (165.613) | (163.435) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 43,832 | 13,076 | 13,161 | 11,116 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.153 | 0.160 | 0.162 | 0.145 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | |


*Figure C 1 Effect of one unit increase in Keynesian demand management on support for cuts to government spending for different consensuses*



*Table C 2 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for spending in pensions, health and unemployment, Keynesian demand management*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | Preference for spending in pensions, health, and unemployment | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Keynesian demand management (average, t-1) | -0.278 | -0.186 | -0.731 | -0.430 |
|  | (0.593) | (1.077) | (1.031) | (1.101) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Keynesian demand management (consensus, t-1) | 0.370 | 0.661 | -0.131 | 0.282 |
|  | (0.474) | (0.812) | (0.895) | (0.918) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Keynesian demand management (party, t-1) | 4.095\*\*\* | 3.563\*\*\* | 3.711\*\*\* | 4.481\*\*\* |
|  | (0.415) | (0.707) | (0.733) | (0.842) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 15.216\*\*\* | 22.135\*\* | 14.155 | 0.648 |
|  | (5.276) | (9.525) | (9.036) | (9.559) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -0.181 | 0.713\*\*\* | -0.090 | -1.046\*\*\* |
|  | (0.149) | (0.273) | (0.253) | (0.293) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | -0.235\*\*\* | -1.049\*\*\* | -0.152 | 0.578 |
|  | (0.202) | (0.373) | (0.353) | (0.374) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.203\*\*\* | 0.146\*\*\* | 0.142\*\*\* | 0.114\*\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.023) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 5.530\*\*\* | 3.505\*\*\* | 4.375\*\*\* | 6.917\*\*\* |
|  | (0.308) | (0.568) | (0.536) | (0.594) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Keynesian demand management average \* consensus | 1.340\*\*\* | 1.379\*\*\* | 1.091\*\* | 1.374\*\* |
|  | (0.286) | (0.521) | (0.495) | (0.536) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -146.886\*\*\* | -216.438\*\* | -132.518 | 8.026 |
|  | (56.018) | (101.019) | (95.936) | (101.600) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 43,399 | 13,016 | 13,087 | 10,953 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.146 | 0.129 | 0.150 | 0.161 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | |

*Figure C 2 Effect of one unit increase in Keynesian demand management on support for government spending for different consensuses*



1. **Results by left - right**

The sharp divide in public opinion towards support for ‘Grexit’ is not driven by material self-interest or mainstream versus anti-system parties, but left versus right is the key factor in the split (Bansak et al., 2020). Left-voters see the economy through a Keynesian framework that promotes active and countercyclical fiscal policy. Right-wing voters are more likely to support a framework that proposes limited state intervention and they might therefore be more likely to support austerity (Hübscher et al., 2021, pp. A8 - A9).

Following Schakel and Burgoon (2022), under left-wing parties I group social-democratic, socialist and green parties and under right-wing parties, I group liberal, conservative and nationalist parties. The average voter positions are shown in in Table D 1 and indeed show sharp differences between left and right voters. Right-wing voters on average are 16.5 more supportive of cuts to government spending, while being 10 points lower in support for spending in the polarized policy areas. Table D2 and Table D3 clearly show that particularly left-wing voters that are further away from the consensus are susceptible to party austerity. The effects are all significantly strongly under cross-party consensus, as the interaction coefficient of Table D2 shows.

Table D 1 Average fiscal preferences by left - right

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Left | Right |
| Support for cuts to government spending | 27.9 | 44.4 |
| Support for higher spending (pensions, health care, unemployment) | 36.1 | 26.1 |

Table D 2 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for cuts to government spending, left - right

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | |
|  |  | |
|  | Preference for spending cuts | |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | 3.297\*\* | 12.621\*\*\* |
|  | (1.555) | (3.083) |
|  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | -3.682\*\*\* | 5.968\*\*\* |
|  | (0.994) | (1.310) |
|  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | 3.863\*\*\* | 4.475\*\*\* |
|  | (0.787) | (1.067) |
|  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 24.897\*\*\* | -62.948\*\*\* |
|  | (11.404) | (19.903) |
|  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -0.785 | -1.117\*\* |
|  | (0.446) | (0.477) |
|  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | -1.426\*\*\* | -5.540\*\*\* |
|  | (0.624) | (1.035) |
|  |  |  |
| Age | 0.239 | 0.123\*\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.026) |
|  |  |  |
| Female | -3.494\*\*\* | 3.580\*\*\* |
|  | (0.755) | (0.842) |
|  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | 2.944 | 7.105\*\*\* |
|  | (0.682) | (1.337) |
|  |  |  |
| Constant | -227.756\* | 719.348\*\*\* |
|  | (121.690) | (213.139) |
|  |  |  |
|  | | |
| Income group | Right | Left |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 19,332 | 19,012 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.139 | 0.207 |
|  | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | |

Figure D 1 Effect of one unit increase in economic orthodoxy on support for cuts to government spending for different consensuses, left - right





Table D 3 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for spending in pensions, health and unemployment, left - right

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | |
|  |  | |
|  | Preference for spending in pensions, health and unemployment | |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | -5.053\*\*\* | -12.562\*\*\* |
|  | (1.128) | (1.849) |
|  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | 3.301\*\*\* | -1.126 |
|  | (0.626) | (0.769) |
|  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | -1.513\*\*\* | -0.392 |
|  | (0.471) | (0.547) |
|  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 9.245\*\*\* | 51.615\*\*\* |
|  | (7.335) | (11.932) |
|  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | 0.560 | 1.382\*\*\* |
|  | (0.256) | (0.252) |
|  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | 0.962\*\*\* | 4.261\*\*\* |
|  | (0.428) | (0.571) |
|  |  |  |
| Age | 0.211 | 0.225\*\*\* |
|  | (0.014) | (0.014) |
|  |  |  |
| Female | 6.175\*\*\* | 3.797\*\*\* |
|  | (0.465) | (0.451) |
|  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | -3.108 | -6.294\*\*\* |
|  | (0.502) | (0.764) |
|  |  |  |
| Constant | -95.203 | -554.632\*\*\* |
|  | (78.198) | (128.086) |
|  |  |  |
|  | | |
| Income group | Right | Left |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 19,065 | 18,894 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.201 | 0.130 |
|  | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | |

Figure D 2 Effect of one unit increase in economic orthodoxy on support for cuts to government spending for different consensuses, left - right



1. **Results by education and information groups**

This section studies the results when survey respondents are not grouped by their income, but based on other individual categories that have previously been argued to structure preference formation. Specifically, I look at respondents by three education groups and three politically informed groups. Education levels are recoded and harmonized across the different countries and years that the ISSP spans, resulting in seven ISCED levels which I combined into three groups of roughly equal size: ‘Low educated’ (ISCED 0, 1 and 2), ‘Middle educated’ (ISCED 0, 1 and 2), ‘High educated’ (ISCED 4, 5 and 6)[[1]](#footnote-1). Based on a five-point scale, I also created a ‘low’, ‘middle’ and ‘high’ category in terms of politically interested. Here those with a score of 1 and 2 are combined as ‘low’, a score of 3 as ‘middle’ and 4 and 5 as ‘high’. Being informed is based on the self-reported survey question ‘Most people better informed than I am’ varying from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’

First, Table E1 shows how preferences are distributed across these groups. Highly educated are much less supportive of spending cuts to government spending, while low and middle are closer to each other. This pattern is not reflected in support for spending in the large social policy domains that income groups are polarized on. Here low educated want to see most spending, followed by middle and finally highly educated voters. For being informed, the average scores show that both support for cuts as well as support for spending goes up increases with information. In short, these categories do not present the same more or less coherent preference distribution as for income.

Table E 1 Average fiscal preferences by education and information group

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Education | | |  | Information | | |
|  | Low | Middle | High |  | Low | Middle | High |
| Support for cuts to government spending | 40.1 | 42.9 | 30.4 |  | 35.2 | 36.3 | 38 |
| Support for higher spending (pensions, health care, unemployment) | 38.5 | 29.6 | 24.5 |  | 26.5 | 30.4 | 34.4 |

If we first look at the results of support for spending cuts across these groups in Table E2, we can see that the effect of average economic orthodoxy does not change any education or information group. Looking at situations in which economic orthodoxy is consensual in the interaction term, all groups adapt. Adaptation seems to increase with education and information, and more clearly for information than for education. Looking at support for spending in health care, old-age pensions and unemployment in Table E3 we find comparable patterns. Highly educated want to see much less spending when the weighted average of austerity attention increases and want to see even less when this is consensual. Low- and middle-education groups want to see less spending only when this is consensual. The middle informed group wants to see less spending at austerity average, while all groups adapt to roughly the same extent (the highly informed a bit more) when austerity is consensual.

Table E 2 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for cuts to government spending, by education and information groups

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | |
|  | Preference for spending cuts | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | | | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | -0.266 | 2.223 | -3.116 | -1.414 | 2.249 | 0.325 |
|  | (2.333) | (2.012) | (2.089) | (2.137) | (2.042) | (2.232) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | -0.107 | 0.105 | -1.455 | 0.808 | -0.453 | 0.552 |
|  | (1.144) | (1.319) | (1.170) | (1.200) | (1.147) | (1.216) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | 5.160\*\*\* | 5.595\*\*\* | 10.973\*\*\* | 9.553\*\*\* | 4.081\*\*\* | 8.276\*\*\* |
|  | (0.688) | (0.686) | (0.745) | (0.669) | (0.684) | (0.786) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 45.748\*\*\* | 18.320 | -7.157 | 69.276\*\*\* | 46.723\*\*\* | -8.927 |
|  | (16.332) | (15.775) | (14.466) | (16.340) | (14.945) | (14.674) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | 0.610 | 0.678 | 0.889\* | 0.160 | 1.226\*\* | 0.379 |
|  | (0.503) | (0.693) | (0.457) | (0.476) | (0.505) | (0.470) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | -3.528\*\*\* | -0.900 | -3.346\*\*\* | -1.955\*\* | -3.641\*\*\* | -2.826\*\*\* |
|  | (0.816) | (0.749) | (0.728) | (0.790) | (0.700) | (0.685) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.118\*\*\* | 0.235\*\*\* | 0.172\*\*\* | 0.225\*\*\* | 0.169\*\*\* | 0.168\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.033) | (0.029) | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.027) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 0.683 | -1.557 | -3.133\*\*\* | -3.244\*\*\* | -0.400 | -1.238 |
|  | (0.888) | (1.071) | (0.867) | (0.953) | (0.962) | (0.921) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | 1.902\*\* | 2.697\*\*\* | 2.753\*\*\* | 2.016\*\* | 2.887\*\*\* | 3.643\*\*\* |
|  | (0.998) | (0.946) | (0.896) | (0.926) | (0.904) | (1.004) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -449.393\*\*\* | -178.077 | 104.498 | -709.151\*\*\* | -469.410\*\*\* | 134.266 |
|  | (173.408) | (167.985) | (154.905) | (173.882) | (159.817) | (156.698) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | |
| Group | Low Edu | Mid Edu | High Edu | Low Informed | Mid Informed | High Informed |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 15,270 | 10,419 | 17,705 | 14,535 | 12,093 | 15,709 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.171 | 0.170 | 0.143 | 0.165 | 0.162 | 0.164 |
|  | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | | | |

Table E 3 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for spending in pensions, health and unemployment, by education and information groups

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | |
|  | Preference for spending in pensions, health and unemployment | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | | | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | -2.395 | 0.096 | -6.603\*\*\* | -2.757 | -3.523\*\* | -0.211 |
|  | (1.549) | (1.428) | (1.544) | (1.721) | (1.439) | (1.390) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | 1.980\*\*\* | 2.656\*\*\* | 0.612 | -0.321 | 3.086\*\*\* | 1.442\*\* |
|  | (0.711) | (0.859) | (0.671) | (0.792) | (0.719) | (0.734) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | -3.120\*\*\* | -3.524\*\*\* | -5.049\*\*\* | -4.177\*\*\* | -2.080\*\*\* | -5.165\*\*\* |
|  | (0.422) | (0.467) | (0.427) | (0.384) | (0.443) | (0.504) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | -1.075\*\*\* | 28.595\*\*\* | -1.506 | -14.374 | -6.347 | 38.039\*\*\* |
|  | (10.395) | (10.355) | (8.913) | (10.815) | (9.562) | (8.827) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | 0.957\* | 0.063 | -0.276 | 0.171 | 0.081 | 0.195 |
|  | (0.270) | (0.365) | (0.256) | (0.252) | (0.275) | (0.251) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | 0.945\*\*\* | 0.807\* | 3.233\*\*\* | 1.620\*\*\* | 1.873\*\*\* | 1.675\*\*\* |
|  | (0.532) | (0.490) | (0.518) | (0.568) | (0.456) | (0.432) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.118\*\*\* | 0.140\*\*\* | 0.189\*\*\* | 0.223\*\*\* | 0.190\*\*\* | 0.199\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.020) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.015) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 4.094\*\*\* | 6.227\*\*\* | 6.481\*\*\* | 5.429\*\*\* | 3.521\*\*\* | 4.439\*\*\* |
|  | (0.516) | (0.639) | (0.475) | (0.532) | (0.558) | (0.526) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | -2.489\*\*\* | -1.568\*\* | -4.890\*\*\* | -2.743\*\*\* | -3.010\*\*\* | -3.198\*\*\* |
|  | (0.652) | (0.623) | (0.657) | (0.718) | (0.609) | (0.607) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 26.492 | -294.924\*\*\* | 13.428 | 152.112 | 79.258 | -390.685\*\*\* |
|  | (110.320) | (110.580) | (95.481) | (115.125) | (102.179) | (94.303) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | |
| Group | Low Edu | Mid Edu | High Edu | Low Informed | Mid Informed | High Informed |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 15,155 | 10,278 | 17,522 | 14,384 | 12,062 | 15,581 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.146 | 0.143 | 0.150 | 0.165 | 0.139 | 0.165 |
|  | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | | | |

1. **Robustness tests**

The empirical analyses rely on linear interpolation of political party positions between elections. This assumes that party positions gradually shift between elections. Moreover, this assumes that voters are aware of these gradual shifts and adapt accordingly. As these are strong assumptions, I restrict the analyses to survey waves that were conducted within two years after a parliamentary election in a given country. This drops 15 country-years and roughly 10,000 survey respondents. Table F1 and Table F2 show the results and find roughly the same results, although the effect sizes are somewhat smaller than those in the main results.

As a second robustness check, I created a composite score for austerity including other related items from the Manifesto Project Database. The austerity composite consists of six different variables. In addition to economic orthodoxy, these include: 1) free market economy; 2) incentives: positive; 3) protectionism: negative; 4) welfare state limitation; and 5) education limitation[[2]](#footnote-2). Table F3 shows the correlations between the individual items that construct the composite measure. The items show rather low correlation. Table F4 and Table F5 replicate the main analyses with this independent variable. The results do not completely hold to this robustness test. Particularly the direct effects of the weighted economic orthodoxy variable show results in the unexpected direction: voters want to see less spending cuts and more spending. When austerity is consensual, these results are somewhat more muted, but they do not seem to reverse the direction of the coefficient sign.

A third set of robustness checks considers change in party positions as opposed to the level of party positions. The results are demonstrated in Table F6 and Table F7. Change is measured by taking the interpolated score at time *t* and subtract the score of the last election. While in terms of support for government spending cuts the average effects are mostly negative, the consensus interaction term shows that this negative effect is muted under consensus. The results for spending in the polarized spending areas are more in line with the main results. Low and middle-income voters adapt to changes in the weighted average, while high-income voters do not change. Consensus does not significantly alter this change.

A fourth set of supplementary analyses shown in Table F8 and Table F9 considers different lags and leads. Tables study the results when party positions are taken at time *t-2* and at time *t*. While the interaction terms show results that are roughly similar to those in the main analyses, the effects of the average economic orthodoxy position are strong and in the unexpected direction. This is very surprising because the party attention to economic orthodoxy is interpolated and correlates at 0.9 with the variables used in these analyses. As the results do not seem to make a lot of sense, this strengthens the expectation that looking at party positions at *t-1* is the most meaningful time to study the impact of party positions on voter preferences.

In the fifth set of technical robustness tests, shown in Table F10 and Table F11, I exclude country and year dummies. The results for support for government spending do not hold to this specification. Those for support for spending in unemployment, health care and old-age pensions do.

Finally, excluding one’s own party as a control variable in Table F12 and Table F13 does not change the results.

Table F 1 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for cuts to government spending, subset survey within two years of election

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | Preference for spending cuts | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | -2.352\* | 1.310 | 0.170 | -10.973\*\*\* |
|  | (1.297) | (2.386) | (2.456) | (2.487) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | -0.282 | 0.029 | -3.454\*\* | 0.762 |
|  | (0.825) | (1.517) | (1.420) | (1.649) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | 6.932\*\*\* | 6.015\*\*\* | 7.129\*\*\* | 9.668\*\*\* |
|  | (0.444) | (0.839) | (0.869) | (0.872) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 18.685\*\*\* | -2.215 | 35.775 | 22.070 |
|  | (11.313) | (20.226) | (21.949) | (20.502) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | 0.736 | 0.566 | -1.739\* | 2.801\*\* |
|  | (0.595) | (1.237) | (1.037) | (1.109) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | -0.333\*\*\* | -1.048 | -0.301 | 0.518 |
|  | (0.514) | (0.922) | (0.973) | (1.024) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.186\*\*\* | 0.184\*\*\* | 0.134\*\*\* | 0.258\*\*\* |
|  | (0.019) | (0.032) | (0.036) | (0.045) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | -1.545\*\*\* | -1.110 | 0.950 | -5.014\*\*\* |
|  | (0.607) | (1.148) | (1.099) | (1.182) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | 1.522\*\*\* | 3.069\*\*\* | 2.747\*\* | -1.412 |
|  | (0.575) | (1.045) | (1.069) | (1.092) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -171.214 | 59.062 | -343.392 | -217.992 |
|  | (121.024) | (216.905) | (235.076) | (218.721) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 45 | 45 | 45 | 45 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 33,397 | 9,958 | 10,105 | 8,637 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.164 | 0.159 | 0.179 | 0.166 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | |

Table F 2 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for spending in pensions, health and unemployment, subset survey within two years of election

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | | |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | Preference for spending in pensions, health and unemployment | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | -2.332\*\* | -2.851\* | -2.075 | 0.383 |
|  | (0.906) | (1.606) | (1.745) | (1.837) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | 2.956\*\*\* | 3.385\*\*\* | 3.065\*\*\* | 2.330\*\* |
|  | (0.510) | (0.908) | (0.884) | (1.016) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | -3.689\*\*\* | -3.548\*\*\* | -3.464\*\*\* | -3.937\*\*\* |
|  | (0.282) | (0.556) | (0.448) | (0.573) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 4.773\*\*\* | 13.752 | 5.133 | -14.159 |
|  | (7.444) | (12.775) | (13.364) | (13.893) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -0.057 | 2.071\*\*\* | -0.442 | -1.865\*\*\* |
|  | (0.358) | (0.717) | (0.611) | (0.689) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | -0.064\*\*\* | -1.007 | -0.139 | 0.308 |
|  | (0.363) | (0.614) | (0.724) | (0.753) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.204 | 0.144\*\*\* | 0.155\*\*\* | 0.121\*\*\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.027) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 5.553\*\*\* | 3.101\*\*\* | 4.030\*\*\* | 7.777\*\*\* |
|  | (0.354) | (0.656) | (0.617) | (0.678) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | -3.351 | -3.021\*\*\* | -3.587\*\*\* | -1.823\*\* |
|  | (0.391) | (0.664) | (0.749) | (0.769) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -42.544 | -137.225 | -42.405 | 164.545 |
|  | (79.437) | (136.493) | (142.881) | (148.105) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 33,085 | 9,922 | 10,038 | 8,510 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.136 | 0.111 | 0.140 | 0.156 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | |

Table F 3 Correlation of party positions related to the austere composite measure

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Preferences | Free Market Economy | Incentives: Positive | Protectionism: Negative | Economic Orthodoxy | Welfare State Limitation | Education Limitation |
| Incentives: Positive | 0.11 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Protectionism: Negative | 0.19 | 0.04 |  |  |  |  |
| Economic Orthodoxy | 0.24 | 0.14 | 0.13 |  |  |  |
| Welfare State Limitation | 0.27 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.12 |  |  |
| Education Limitation | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.32 |  |

Table F 4 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for cuts to government spending, austerity composite

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | Preference for spending cuts | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Austerity composite (average, t-1) | -3.163\*\*\* | -2.711\*\* | -3.074\*\*\* | -4.513\*\*\* |
|  | (0.638) | (1.190) | (1.183) | (1.253) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Austerity composite (consensus, t-1) | 2.129\*\*\* | 2.343\* | 2.140\* | 2.728\*\* |
|  | (0.665) | (1.260) | (1.169) | (1.231) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Austerity composite (party, t-1) | 10.333\*\*\* | 8.139\*\*\* | 11.045\*\*\* | 13.132\*\*\* |
|  | (0.324) | (0.618) | (0.592) | (0.613) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 45.251\*\*\* | 22.110 | 62.808\*\*\* | 53.644\*\*\* |
|  | (8.095) | (15.280) | (15.126) | (14.947) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | 1.444\*\*\* | 1.499\*\*\* | 1.531\*\*\* | 1.727\*\*\* |
|  | (0.276) | (0.527) | (0.486) | (0.540) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | -2.140\*\*\* | -2.749\*\*\* | -1.623\*\*\* | -2.903\*\*\* |
|  | (0.331) | (0.625) | (0.622) | (0.633) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.178\*\*\* | 0.177\*\*\* | 0.126\*\*\* | 0.251\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.028) | (0.031) | (0.040) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | -0.730\* | -0.531 | 1.168 | -3.668\*\*\* |
|  | (0.528) | (0.992) | (0.961) | (1.036) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Austerity composite average \* consensus | 0.789\* | 0.946 | 0.183 | 1.223 |
|  | (0.431) | (0.807) | (0.795) | (0.805) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -461.875\*\*\* | -204.932 | -653.718\*\*\* | -555.965\*\*\* |
|  | (86.937) | (164.209) | (162.393) | (160.305) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 43,832 | 13,076 | 13,161 | 11,116 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.172 | 0.168 | 0.183 | 0.180 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | |

Table F 5 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for spending in pensions, health and unemployment, austerity composite

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | Preference for spending in pensions, health and unemployment | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Austerity composite (average, t-1) | 0.923\*\* | -0.644 | 1.300\* | 1.775\*\* |
|  | (0.409) | (0.759) | (0.709) | (0.833) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Austerity composite (consensus, t-1) | -1.067\*\* | -2.024\*\* | -0.461 | -0.910 |
|  | (0.421) | (0.793) | (0.708) | (0.785) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Austerity composite (party, t-1) | -5.821\*\*\* | -4.840\*\*\* | -5.116\*\*\* | -6.017\*\*\* |
|  | (0.189) | (0.380) | (0.324) | (0.348) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 4.064\*\*\* | 5.926 | 10.397 | -9.060 |
|  | (5.336) | (9.996) | (9.129) | (9.829) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -0.443\*\* | 0.334 | -0.205 | -1.395\*\*\* |
|  | (0.148) | (0.278) | (0.253) | (0.289) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | 0.440\*\*\* | -0.406 | 0.492 | 1.132\*\*\* |
|  | (0.205) | (0.384) | (0.372) | (0.387) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.215 | 0.162\*\*\* | 0.154\*\*\* | 0.130\*\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.023) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 5.133\*\*\* | 3.385\*\*\* | 4.082\*\*\* | 6.297\*\*\* |
|  | (0.305) | (0.565) | (0.532) | (0.586) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Austerity composite average \* consensus | -0.770\*\*\* | -0.675 | -0.932\* | 0.070 |
|  | (0.272) | (0.497) | (0.476) | (0.522) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -26.649 | -39.556 | -93.490 | 114.639 |
|  | (57.336) | (107.287) | (97.986) | (105.663) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 43,399 | 13,016 | 13,087 | 10,953 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.164 | 0.141 | 0.165 | 0.182 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | |

Table F 6 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for cuts to government spending, change in party position

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | Preference for spending cuts | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (mean, change) | -4.394\*\*\* | -3.891\*\* | -2.109 | -4.223\*\* |
|  | (0.997) | (1.838) | (1.917) | (1.858) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, change) | -0.340 | -0.161 | -0.166 | -0.088 |
|  | (0.466) | (0.857) | (0.832) | (0.873) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, change) | -0.970\*\*\* | -0.433\*\* | -1.128\*\*\* | -1.174\*\*\* |
|  | (0.112) | (0.195) | (0.211) | (0.242) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 44.032\*\*\* | 27.109\* | 48.080\*\*\* | 39.309\*\* |
|  | (8.690) | (16.406) | (16.177) | (15.656) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | 1.208\*\*\* | 1.286\*\* | 1.239\*\*\* | 1.154\*\* |
|  | (0.265) | (0.507) | (0.470) | (0.520) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | -1.428\*\*\* | -1.858\*\*\* | -1.164\*\* | -1.800\*\*\* |
|  | (0.315) | (0.598) | (0.588) | (0.597) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.199 | 0.200\*\*\* | 0.150\*\*\* | 0.283\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.028) | (0.032) | (0.040) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | -1.424\*\*\* | -0.659 | 0.530 | -5.139\*\*\* |
|  | (0.534) | (0.998) | (0.974) | (1.051) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average change \* consensus change | 0.115\*\*\* | 0.109\*\*\* | 0.069\* | 0.121\*\*\* |
|  | (0.021) | (0.038) | (0.040) | (0.042) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -438.050\*\*\* | -255.299 | -489.064\*\*\* | -398.443\*\* |
|  | (90.786) | (171.854) | (169.308) | (163.184) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 43,832 | 13,076 | 13,161 | 11,116 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.152 | 0.157 | 0.161 | 0.145 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | |

Table F 7 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for spending in pensions, health and unemployment, change in party position

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | Preference for spending in pensions, health and unemployment | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (change) | -3.200\*\*\* | -3.521\*\*\* | -4.157\*\*\* | -1.420 |
|  | (0.671) | (1.206) | (1.256) | (1.323) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (change) | -1.542\*\*\* | -0.966\* | -2.242\*\*\* | -0.999\* |
|  | (0.283) | (0.518) | (0.471) | (0.533) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, change) | 0.658\*\*\* | 0.520\*\*\* | 0.503\*\*\* | 0.769\*\*\* |
|  | (0.080) | (0.157) | (0.137) | (0.158) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 33.655\*\*\* | 43.801\*\*\* | 35.032\*\*\* | 14.824 |
|  | (5.506) | (10.062) | (9.517) | (10.126) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -0.173 | 0.671\*\* | 0.051 | -1.071\*\*\* |
|  | (0.143) | (0.268) | (0.247) | (0.279) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | 0.313\*\*\* | -0.493 | 0.276 | 1.102\*\*\* |
|  | (0.189) | (0.359) | (0.337) | (0.354) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.204 | 0.148\*\*\* | 0.142\*\*\* | 0.113\*\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.023) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 5.527\*\*\* | 3.496\*\*\* | 4.338\*\*\* | 6.937\*\*\* |
|  | (0.308) | (0.569) | (0.537) | (0.594) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average change \* consensus change | 0.010 | 0.052\*\* | 0.00001 | -0.015 |
|  | (0.014) | (0.026) | (0.027) | (0.030) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -302.238\*\*\* | -421.160\*\*\* | -295.457\*\*\* | -116.548 |
|  | (56.739) | (103.866) | (98.291) | (103.767) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 43,399 | 13,016 | 13,087 | 10,953 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.145 | 0.128 | 0.150 | 0.161 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | |

Table F 8 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for cuts to government spending, different lags and leads

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | |
|  | Preference for spending cuts | | | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t) | -8.411\*\*\* | -10.713\*\*\* | -12.846\*\*\* | -3.197 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (1.972) | (3.523) | (3.644) | (3.847) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t) | -0.704 | -0.910 | -2.080\*\*\* | 0.365 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.450) | (0.814) | (0.783) | (0.904) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t) | 1.883\*\*\* | 1.566\*\*\* | 2.030\*\*\* | 2.970\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.123) | (0.221) | (0.243) | (0.264) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-2) |  |  |  |  | -16.591\*\*\* | -17.793\*\*\* | -19.853\*\*\* | -10.698\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (1.759) | (3.179) | (3.302) | (3.345) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-2) |  |  |  |  | -2.031\*\*\* | -1.675\*\*\* | -2.717\*\*\* | -1.693\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.299) | (0.540) | (0.525) | (0.599) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-2) |  |  |  |  | 2.613\*\*\* | 1.967\*\*\* | 2.845\*\*\* | 3.314\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.130) | (0.245) | (0.240) | (0.248) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | 0.989 | 0.938\*\* | 0.806\* | 1.404\*\*\* | 1.153\*\*\* | 0.832 | 1.015\*\* | 2.136\*\*\* |
|  | (0.249) | (0.477) | (0.445) | (0.495) | (0.273) | (0.525) | (0.485) | (0.535) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 47.368\*\*\* | 31.241\* | 81.198\*\*\* | 34.244\* | 33.171\*\*\* | 2.445 | 52.442\*\*\* | 36.246\*\* |
|  | (9.563) | (16.897) | (18.617) | (17.875) | (8.287) | (15.477) | (15.786) | (15.378) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | -1.726\*\*\* | -2.180\*\*\* | -1.860\*\*\* | -1.513\*\* | -3.790\*\*\* | -4.453\*\*\* | -4.027\*\*\* | -2.994\*\*\* |
|  | (0.323) | (0.597) | (0.618) | (0.624) | (0.416) | (0.742) | (0.797) | (0.818) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.192 | 0.189\*\*\* | 0.147\*\*\* | 0.272\*\*\* | 0.185\*\*\* | 0.189\*\*\* | 0.135\*\*\* | 0.261\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.028) | (0.031) | (0.039) | (0.016) | (0.028) | (0.032) | (0.040) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | -1.331\*\*\* | -0.817 | 0.712 | -4.865\*\*\* | -1.145\*\* | -0.535 | 0.513 | -4.692\*\*\* |
|  | (0.526) | (0.985) | (0.959) | (1.033) | (0.533) | (0.998) | (0.971) | (1.046) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus (t) | 0.288\*\*\* | 0.396\*\*\* | 0.485\*\*\* | 0.010 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.083) | (0.148) | (0.155) | (0.163) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus (t-2) |  |  |  |  | 0.632\*\*\* | 0.715\*\*\* | 0.773\*\*\* | 0.322\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.078) | (0.140) | (0.148) | (0.150) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -461.366\*\*\* | -274.548 | -788.542\*\*\* | -356.590\*\* | -277.376\*\*\* | 51.797 | -465.571\*\*\* | -329.159\*\* |
|  | (96.956) | (172.596) | (188.586) | (180.128) | (88.066) | (165.409) | (167.724) | (162.051) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 44,767 | 13,348 | 13,428 | 11,353 | 43,255 | 12,960 | 12,998 | 10,968 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.155 | 0.160 | 0.166 | 0.154 | 0.160 | 0.163 | 0.171 | 0.159 |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | | | | | |

Table F 9 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for spending in pensions, health and unemployment, different lags and leads

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | |
|  | Preference for spending in pensions, health and unemployment | | | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t) | 10.568\*\*\* | 8.985\*\*\* | 13.288\*\*\* | 8.176\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (1.239) | (2.172) | (2.371) | (2.418) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t) | 1.516\*\*\* | 1.295\*\*\* | 2.057\*\*\* | 1.024\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.259) | (0.474) | (0.436) | (0.497) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t) | -0.966\*\*\* | -0.767\*\*\* | -0.972\*\*\* | -1.146\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.078) | (0.148) | (0.128) | (0.164) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-2) |  |  |  |  | 10.775\*\*\* | 8.792\*\*\* | 11.977\*\*\* | 6.945\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (1.154) | (2.015) | (2.149) | (2.294) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-2) |  |  |  |  | 1.872\*\*\* | 1.750\*\*\* | 2.049\*\*\* | 1.394\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.186) | (0.343) | (0.312) | (0.363) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-2) |  |  |  |  | -1.434\*\*\* | -1.221\*\*\* | -1.233\*\*\* | -1.486\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.078) | (0.157) | (0.126) | (0.143) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | -15.282\*\*\* | -7.339 | -20.280\* | -21.734\*\* | 11.542\*\* | 17.105\* | 13.827 | -4.005 |
|  | (5.849) | (10.293) | (10.623) | (10.939) | (5.236) | (9.724) | (9.225) | (9.560) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -0.249 | 0.563\*\* | -0.072 | -1.055\*\*\* | -0.370\*\* | 0.553\*\* | -0.319 | -1.368\*\*\* |
|  | (0.137) | (0.257) | (0.237) | (0.274) | (0.150) | (0.279) | (0.262) | (0.298) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | 0.783\*\*\* | -0.026 | 0.978\*\*\* | 1.408\*\*\* | 1.638\*\*\* | 0.654 | 1.795\*\*\* | 1.829\*\*\* |
|  | (0.201) | (0.367) | (0.374) | (0.392) | (0.269) | (0.485) | (0.506) | (0.547) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.210 | 0.156\*\*\* | 0.148\*\*\* | 0.128\*\*\* | 0.211\*\*\* | 0.155\*\*\* | 0.150\*\*\* | 0.121\*\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.023) | (0.009) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.024) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 5.519\*\*\* | 3.552\*\*\* | 4.366\*\*\* | 6.916\*\*\* | 5.478\*\*\* | 3.423\*\*\* | 4.422\*\*\* | 6.728\*\*\* |
|  | (0.304) | (0.561) | (0.530) | (0.587) | (0.309) | (0.570) | (0.537) | (0.595) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus (t) | -0.420 | -0.377\*\*\* | -0.527\*\*\* | -0.323\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.053) | (0.094) | (0.104) | (0.105) |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus (t-2) |  |  |  |  | -0.406\*\*\* | -0.335\*\*\* | -0.458\*\*\* | -0.246\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.053) | (0.091) | (0.099) | (0.106) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 136.510\*\* | 65.619 | 177.452\* | 218.315\*\* | -158.011\*\*\* | -208.345\*\* | -184.955\* | 22.279 |
|  | (59.556) | (105.583) | (107.717) | (110.992) | (55.783) | (103.166) | (98.210) | (102.100) |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 44,325 | 13,283 | 13,348 | 11,185 | 42,828 | 12,897 | 12,925 | 10,808 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.147 | 0.128 | 0.152 | 0.164 | 0.151 | 0.133 | 0.152 | 0.165 |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | | | | | |

Table F 10 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for cuts to government spending, excluding country and year dummies

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | |
|  | Preference for spending cuts | | | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | -5.672\*\*\* | -2.282 | -5.047\*\*\* | -11.904\*\*\* | -5.728\*\*\* | -3.301\*\*\* | -6.949\*\*\* | -7.842\*\*\* |
|  | (0.959) | (1.752) | (1.787) | (1.892) | (0.613) | (1.106) | (1.139) | (1.200) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | -0.448 | 0.706 | -2.471\*\* | -0.998 | 4.445\*\*\* | 4.914\*\*\* | 3.115\*\*\* | 3.516\*\*\* |
|  | (0.607) | (1.121) | (1.046) | (1.215) | (0.462) | (0.848) | (0.803) | (0.904) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | 7.099\*\*\* | 6.012\*\*\* | 7.405\*\*\* | 9.852\*\*\* | 6.506\*\*\* | 6.129\*\*\* | 7.162\*\*\* | 8.307\*\*\* |
|  | (0.407) | (0.754) | (0.785) | (0.796) | (0.411) | (0.781) | (0.798) | (0.764) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | -67.268\*\*\* | -83.266\*\*\* | -63.014\*\*\* | -53.045\*\*\* | -16.945\*\*\* | -16.824\*\*\* | -17.633\*\*\* | -15.609\*\*\* |
|  | (3.181) | (6.154) | (5.737) | (6.108) | (0.621) | (1.162) | (1.093) | (1.259) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | 0.528\*\*\* | 0.566 | 0.361 | 1.165\*\*\* | -0.013 | -0.064 | -0.140 | 0.110 |
|  | (0.189) | (0.360) | (0.331) | (0.414) | (0.116) | (0.217) | (0.213) | (0.248) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | -0.573\* | -1.748\*\*\* | -0.304 | -0.064 | 1.383\*\*\* | 1.926\*\*\* | 1.775\*\*\* | 0.906\*\* |
|  | (0.295) | (0.545) | (0.566) | (0.576) | (0.194) | (0.334) | (0.325) | (0.424) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.175\*\*\* | 0.173\*\*\* | 0.128\*\*\* | 0.261\*\*\* | 0.197\*\*\* | 0.165\*\*\* | 0.158\*\*\* | 0.355\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.028) | (0.032) | (0.040) | (0.017) | (0.029) | (0.033) | (0.041) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | -1.339\*\* | -0.743 | 0.369 | -4.680\*\*\* | -1.316\*\* | -0.540 | 0.652 | -4.461\*\*\* |
|  | (0.534) | (0.999) | (0.971) | (1.049) | (0.561) | (1.051) | (1.025) | (1.094) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | 0.918\*\* | 2.138\*\*\* | 1.582\*\* | -1.139 | -1.744\*\*\* | -1.157\*\*\* | -1.120\*\*\* | -1.912\*\*\* |
|  | (0.412) | (0.754) | (0.772) | (0.810) | (0.161) | (0.297) | (0.329) | (0.335) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 743.565\*\*\* | 922.797\*\*\* | 696.305\*\*\* | 579.246\*\*\* | 209.536\*\*\* | 207.124\*\*\* | 218.110\*\*\* | 190.896\*\*\* |
|  | (34.802) | (67.565) | (62.789) | (66.774) | (6.989) | (13.270) | (12.244) | (14.212) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C | C | C | C | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Observations | 43,832 | 13,076 | 13,161 | 11,116 | 43,832 | 13,076 | 13,161 | 11,116 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.152 | 0.157 | 0.161 | 0.150 | 0.065 | 0.067 | 0.066 | 0.069 |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | | | | | |

Table F 11 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for spending in pensions, health and unemployment, excluding country and year dummies

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | |
|  | Preference for spending in pensions, health and unemployment | | | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | -1.045\* | -1.653 | -1.295 | 0.678 | 1.251\*\*\* | 0.682 | 0.763 | 0.335 |
|  | (0.607) | (1.145) | (1.085) | (1.221) | (0.365) | (0.675) | (0.602) | (0.749) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | 0.963\*\*\* | 1.130\* | 1.377\*\* | 0.869 | 2.218\*\*\* | 2.802\*\*\* | 3.163\*\*\* | 1.454\*\*\* |
|  | (0.354) | (0.648) | (0.571) | (0.710) | (0.271) | (0.497) | (0.429) | (0.553) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (party, t-1) | -3.750\*\*\* | -3.036\*\*\* | -3.377\*\*\* | -4.295\*\*\* | -3.789\*\*\* | -3.154\*\*\* | -3.318\*\*\* | -4.379\*\*\* |
|  | (0.252) | (0.506) | (0.403) | (0.489) | (0.258) | (0.512) | (0.416) | (0.495) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 8.384\*\*\* | 11.828\*\*\* | 7.555\*\* | 5.273 | -9.766\*\*\* | -6.722\*\*\* | -9.503\*\*\* | -12.620\*\*\* |
|  | (1.833) | (3.360) | (3.287) | (3.575) | (0.341) | (0.630) | (0.599) | (0.664) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -0.158\* | 0.330\*\* | 0.140 | -0.744\*\*\* | 0.918\*\*\* | 1.344\*\*\* | 1.083\*\*\* | 0.558\*\*\* |
|  | (0.091) | (0.166) | (0.159) | (0.200) | (0.058) | (0.104) | (0.106) | (0.124) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | 1.211\*\*\* | 0.726\*\* | 1.246\*\*\* | 1.408\*\*\* | 0.128 | 0.083 | 0.050 | 0.602\*\*\* |
|  | (0.183) | (0.339) | (0.338) | (0.376) | (0.092) | (0.158) | (0.166) | (0.184) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.210\*\*\* | 0.153\*\*\* | 0.150\*\*\* | 0.117\*\*\* | 0.205\*\*\* | 0.158\*\*\* | 0.150\*\*\* | 0.121\*\*\* |
|  | (0.009) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.023) | (0.010) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.024) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 5.448\*\*\* | 3.481\*\*\* | 4.369\*\*\* | 6.717\*\*\* | 5.641\*\*\* | 3.555\*\*\* | 4.415\*\*\* | 6.945\*\*\* |
|  | (0.307) | (0.569) | (0.534) | (0.591) | (0.317) | (0.582) | (0.552) | (0.609) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | -2.282\*\*\* | -2.128\*\*\* | -2.525\*\*\* | -1.290\*\* | -1.063\*\*\* | -1.238\*\*\* | -1.556\*\*\* | -1.264\*\*\* |
|  | (0.262) | (0.482) | (0.478) | (0.518) | (0.102) | (0.182) | (0.179) | (0.213) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -80.560\*\*\* | -108.879\*\*\* | -70.211\* | -47.945 | 109.477\*\*\* | 85.726\*\*\* | 109.756\*\*\* | 134.904\*\*\* |
|  | (20.018) | (36.719) | (35.867) | (39.101) | (3.802) | (7.097) | (6.697) | (7.383) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C | C | C | C | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Observations | 43,399 | 13,016 | 13,087 | 10,953 | 43,399 | 13,016 | 13,087 | 10,953 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.148 | 0.129 | 0.153 | 0.163 | 0.096 | 0.087 | 0.099 | 0.114 |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | | | | | |

Table F 12 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for cuts to government spending, dropping one's own party as control

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | Preference for spending cuts | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | 2.898\*\*\* | 4.071\*\*\* | 4.331\*\*\* | -0.652 |
|  | (0.622) | (1.239) | (1.240) | (1.348) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | 1.641\*\*\* | 2.949\*\*\* | -0.170 | 0.733 |
|  | (0.429) | (0.801) | (0.770) | (0.910) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | 47.835\*\*\* | 43.330\*\*\* | 59.715\*\*\* | 48.303\*\*\* |
|  | (2.884) | (5.380) | (5.547) | (5.884) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | 1.372\*\*\* | 0.965\*\*\* | 1.188\*\*\* | 2.083\*\*\* |
|  | (0.135) | (0.320) | (0.319) | (0.357) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | -1.361\*\*\* | -1.445\*\*\* | -1.919\*\*\* | -0.472 |
|  | (0.213) | (0.405) | (0.411) | (0.446) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.174\*\*\* | 0.165\*\*\* | 0.127\*\*\* | 0.245\*\*\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.019) | (0.023) | (0.028) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | -0.478 | -0.308 | 0.695 | -3.120\*\*\* |
|  | (0.368) | (0.696) | (0.709) | (0.764) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | 1.034\*\*\* | 1.379\*\* | 1.766\*\*\* | -0.487 |
|  | (0.279) | (0.575) | (0.578) | (0.627) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -486.888\*\*\* | -428.320\*\*\* | -611.524\*\*\* | -505.974\*\*\* |
|  | (31.095) | (58.378) | (60.052) | (63.929) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 86,820 | 25,587 | 23,844 | 19,819 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.173 | 0.175 | 0.177 | 0.167 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | |

Table F 13 Linear regression models of voters’ preferences for spending in pensions, health and unemployment, dropping one's own party as control

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|  |  | | | |
|  | Preference for spending in pensions, health and unemployment | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | | | | |
| Economic orthodoxy (average, t-1) | -3.537\*\*\* | -3.666\*\*\* | -3.293\*\*\* | -2.571\*\*\* |
|  | (0.403) | (0.783) | (0.817) | (0.853) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy (consensus, t-1) | 0.633\*\* | 1.034\*\* | 1.237\*\*\* | 0.570 |
|  | (0.273) | (0.502) | (0.470) | (0.562) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| GDP (logged) (t) | -24.921\*\*\* | -17.850\*\*\* | -24.298\*\*\* | -31.762\*\*\* |
|  | (1.891) | (3.473) | (3.576) | (3.754) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Unemployment rate (t) | -0.462\*\*\* | 0.082 | -0.478\*\*\* | -0.887\*\*\* |
|  | (0.082) | (0.178) | (0.174) | (0.199) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth (t) | 0.921\*\*\* | 0.738\*\*\* | 1.224\*\*\* | 0.773\*\*\* |
|  | (0.133) | (0.255) | (0.255) | (0.272) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.174\*\*\* | 0.139\*\*\* | 0.125\*\*\* | 0.099\*\*\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.011) | (0.013) | (0.017) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 5.414\*\*\* | 3.638\*\*\* | 4.454\*\*\* | 6.690\*\*\* |
|  | (0.222) | (0.415) | (0.406) | (0.445) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Economic orthodoxy average \* consensus | -1.510\*\*\* | -1.649\*\*\* | -1.717\*\*\* | -0.642\* |
|  | (0.176) | (0.347) | (0.358) | (0.382) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 281.675\*\*\* | 208.437\*\*\* | 277.679\*\*\* | 356.319\*\*\* |
|  | (20.389) | (37.561) | (38.582) | (40.656) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | |
| Income group | All | L | M | H |
| Country-years | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 |
| Fixed effects | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y | C&Y |
| Observations | 85,634 | 25,448 | 23,596 | 19,450 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.157 | 0.141 | 0.176 | 0.187 |
|  | | | | |
| *Note:* | \*p\*\*p\*\*\*p<0.01 | | | |

## Literature

Bansak, K., Bechtel, M. M., Hainmueller, J., & Margalit, Y. (2020). Left-Right ideology and the debate over international bailouts: The case of Grexit. *The Journal of Politics*, *82*(2), 509-528.

Blyth, M. (2013). *Austerity: The history of a dangerous idea*. Oxford University Press.

Hübscher, E., Sattler, T., & Wagner, M. (2021). Voter responses to fiscal austerity. *British Journal of Political Science*, *51*(4), 1751-1760.

Schakel, W., & Burgoon, B. (2022). The party road to representation: Unequal responsiveness in party platforms. *European Journal of Political Research*, *61*(2), 304-325.

1. The ISCED groups are the following: ISCED 0: Early childhood education (‘less than primary’ for educational attainment); ISCED 1: Primary education; ISCED 2: Lower secondary education; ISCED 3: Upper secondary education; ISCED 4: Post-secondary non-tertiary education; ISCED 5: First stage of tertiary education; ISCED 6: Second stage of tertiary education. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The complete description of the austerity composite are (1) Free Market Economy**:** Including favourable mentions of the free market and free market capitalism as an economic model. May include favourable references to: Laissez-faire economy; Superiority of individual enterprise over state and control systems; Private property rights; Personal enterprise and initiative; Need for unhampered individual enterprises. (2) Incentives: Positive: Including favourable mentions of supply side oriented economic policies (assistance to businesses rather than consumers). May include: Financial and other incentives such as subsidies, tax breaks etc.; Wage and tax policies to induce enterprise; Encouragement to start enterprises. (3) Protectionism: Negative: May include mentions of support for the concept of free trade and open markets. Call for abolishing all means of market protection (in the manifesto or any other country). (4) Welfare State Limitation: Including mentions of limiting state expenditures on social services or social security. Favourable mentions of the social subsidiary principle (i.e. private care before state care); (5) Education Limitation: Including mentions of limiting state expenditure on education. May include: The introduction or expansion of study fees at all educational levels; Increasing the number of private schools. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)