**APPENDIX**

**Table A1: Original experiment wording**

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| **Common introduction to the vignette:** |

Unas lluvias torrenciales han inundado y dañado gravemente el alcantarillado de una ciudad. Esta situación produce grandes inconvenientes para los residentes de la ciudad.

Para realizar las reparaciones y resolver el problema el ayuntamiento tiene que seleccionar una empresa a través de un concurso público. Sin embargo, convocar un concurso retrasará la resolución del problema. La única forma de acelerar la reparación es evitar el concurso público y asignar el contrato directamente a una empresa con experiencia. Sin embargo, esto no sería legal.

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| **Treatments:** |

**Lawful:**

David G. P., alcalde de la ciudad y miembro de/l {respondent’s preferred party}, convoca un concurso público que finalmente gana una empresa con experiencia. Esta decisión respeta el procedimiento, aunque retrasa las reparaciones.

**Unlawful:**   
David G. P., alcalde de la ciudad y miembro de/l {respondent’s preferred party}, no convoca el concurso y asigna el contrato a una empresa con experiencia. Esta decisión acelera las reparaciones, aunque no respeta el procedimiento.

**Corrupt:**

David G. P., alcalde de la ciudad y miembro de/l {respondent’s preferred party}, no convoca el concurso y asigna el contrato a una empresa con experiencia que ha colaborado en la campaña electoral de su partido. Esta decisión acelera las reparaciones, aunque no respeta el procedimiento.

**Manipulation checks**

This manipulation check measure to what extent participants think that the mayor described in the vignette is corrupt. This allows us to assess whether our gradual treatment of malfeasance is effective in manipulating participants’ perception of corruption. We asked respondents about the extent to which they think that the mayor they saw in the experiment is corrupt (being 10 completely corrupt). The results clearly show that our experiment is successful in manipulating the perception of corruption of respondents. As the lawful mayor is considered as the least malfeasant and this perception gradually increase until the corrupt mayor.

**Figure A1: Mean perceived corruption across the different treatment groups (participants that pass manipulation check)**



**Figure A2: Mean perceived corruption across the different treatment groups (all participants) **

**Mediation sensitivity analyses**

**Figure A3: Sensitivity tests of multiple mediation analyses**

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| --- | --- |
| **Trustworthiness mediation** | **Efficiency mediation** |
| **Unlawful vs. Lawful** | **Unlawful vs. Lawful** |
|  |  |
| **Corrupt vs. Unlawful** | **Corrupt vs. Unlawful** |
|  |  |
| **Corrupt vs. Lawful** | **Corrupt vs. Lawful** |
|  |  |

**Results excluding participants that do not pass the manipulation check**

The analyses presented in the paper include all the participants that took part in our experiment and survey. Our experimental protocol included a factual manipulation check. 77% of the participants passed this manipulation check. In this appendix we summarize the results of our analyses including only those who pass this factual manipulation check.

**Figure A4: Mean propensity to vote across different treatment conditions**

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**Figure A5: Traits analyses: Proportion of respondents considering the mayor trustworthy and efficient across different treatments conditions**

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**Figure A6: Mediation analysis of trustworthiness with confounding alternative mechanism (efficiency)**

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**Figure A7: Mediation analysis of efficiency with confounding alternative mechanism (trustworthiness)**

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