

Online Appendix for 'Are Ideological and Partisan Affinities Determining Voters' Support of Arms Deliveries? Insights from a Large-Scale Survey Experiment in France and Germany'

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A.1 Supplementary information regarding our theoretical framework

A.1.1 Surveys on public opinion on arms trade preferences

Based on a systematic internet and literature research, we are not aware of any general, specific, or even regular surveys on the topic of arms trade before the Ukraine war, i.e., before 2022. Representative surveys on “Germans’ views on foreign policy” have been conducted annually on behalf of the Körber Foundation.⁴ However, arms exports have not been a topic here. The Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the German Armed Forces also conducts an annual survey on “Security and Defense Policy Opinions in the Federal Republic of Germany”. Here, however, respondents have only been only asked whether they “support arms deliveries to friendly states as a means of German foreign policy”.⁵ The French Ministry of Defense also regularly conducts surveys on French citizens’ attitudes to foreign and security policy issues (‘Les chiffres clés de la Défense’) – arms exports did not appear here either⁶ There have been sporadic survey questions in selected provider countries on arms exports to Saudi Arabia on the occasion of the murder of journalist Khashoggi and the war in Yemen.⁷

⁴ See https://www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/koerber-stiftung/redaktion/handlungsfeld_internationale-verstaendigung/pdf/2019/Umfrage_Einmischen_oder_zuru_ckhalten.pdf

⁵ See <https://www.zmsbw.de/html/einsatzunterstuetzung/downloads/190222fb118bevoelkerungsumfragezmsbw2018ausfuehrlicherbericht.pdf?PHPSESSID=92bb8>.

⁶ See <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/portail/mediatheque/publications/sondage-les-chiffres-cles-de-la-defense-juillet-2018>.

⁷ For the US see <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-arms-sales-embargo-us-yemen-civil-war-famine-trump-congress-a8651931.html> and <https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/americans-consider-us-arms-sales-hazard-us-security><https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/03/12/congress-may-have-act-punish-saudi-arabia/>, for France see https://handicap-international.fr/sn_uploads/pdf/CP-Yemen-Sondage-ventes-armes.pdf, for Germany see a survey for the NGO Greenpeace at https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/publications/umfrage_waffenexporte_mai_2019.pdf, and for the UK see <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/05/most-britons-believe-selling-arms-to-saudis-is-unacceptable>.

A.1.2 Arms transfers and party manifestos

The manifesto project contains no explicit coding of weapons transfers or exports per se, but rather of attitudes to the military and peace.⁸ Here, positive stances to the military are summarized into coding instruction per104 (‘increase military expenditure’, ‘modernize armed forces and improve military strength’), and negative stances to the military are exemplified in per105 (‘decreasing military expenditures’, ‘disarmament’ etc) and per106 contains manifestos’ statements to peace (e.g. ‘peace as a general goal’, ‘disarmament’ etc.). The list does not specifically include ‘arms trade’, ‘arms transfer’, or ‘arms exports’. Thus, we conclude that this should be no frequent item in party and electoral manifestos in electoral competition in party systems of the world — otherwise, it would be mentioned. We base a systematic empirical assessment of this conjecture on Manifestos from German and French parties in the period 2013 to 2021. For Germany it is especially the Green party, the Left, and the SPD allocating lengthy passages to strengthening export controls and even to propose a complete or far-reaching ban of weapons transfers.⁹ On the contrary, parties like the CDU/CSU, the FDP, and the AfD usually completely ignore the topic or only selectively and shortly highlight some specific points.¹⁰ In the case of French party manifestos, the lack of agenda prominence of this issue is even more obvious: only the French Green party allocates relevant space to arms transfer reduction, the Left Front 2012 and the Democratic Movement 2017 provide for

⁸ See https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/down/data/2022a/codebooks/codebook_MPDataset_MPDS2022a.pdf.

⁹ E.g., Electoral Program of the Green Party in 2021: “Exports of weapons and armaments to dictators, regimes that despise human rights and to war zones are to be prohibited” (p. 250); The Left, 2021: “We want an immediate stop to all arms exports. We reject investments in militarization and rearmament.” (p. 133); or the SPD 2017 demanding “a fundamental ban on the export of small arms to third countries outside the EU, NATO and comparable countries” (p. 82, own translations).

¹⁰ See the CDU/CSU 2021: “We want to press ahead with the key projects that are central to European defense policy. Arms exports are a key element in shaping security policy. That is why we are committed to uniform European directives” (p.14, own translations).

singular sentences¹¹ All other parties remain silent on this issue, even the Communist Party.

A.2 Supplementary information regarding our research design

A.2.1 Comparison of polling at national level and by survey respondents

Table A.1: Comparison of party preferences for parliamentary vote among German survey respondents and by nationally representative polling

	CDU/CSU	SPD	Greens	Left	FDP	AfD	Other
Own survey	27.85	15.87	20.16	9.86	7.06	10.87	8.34
FG Wahlen 27.11.20	37	16	21	7	5	9	5
Infratest dimap 26.11.20	35	15	21	7	7	11	4
Forsa 28.11.20	37	15	21	8	6	7	6

Note: Comparison of party vote intentions from our survey (first row) and polling at three points in time by three different opinion polls (subsequent rows). Party acronyms: Christlich Demokratisch Union and Christlich Soziale Union (CU/CSU); Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD); Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Greens); Die Linke (Left); Freiheitlich Demokratische Partei (FDP); Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) Source: <https://www.wahlrecht.de/>.

¹¹ See Europe Ecology – The Greens 2012 and 2017 party manifestos. Another exception is the Left Front in 2012, which spends one sentence on this issue: “We will work for denuclearization, for multilateral and controlled disarmament of all types of weaponry in the spirit of the Culture of Peace promoted by Unesco and the UN Charter” (p.30). The Democratic Movement in 2017 even states “Support our defense industry, so that it is not only the linchpin of our defense policy, but also of our industrial policy” (p.20, own translations).

Table A.2: Comparison of party preferences for parliamentary vote among French survey respondents and preferences for presidential candidate by nationally representative polling

	RN	En Marche	Greens	Rep.	LFI	PS	Debout	PCF	other
Own survey	22.73	14.40	15.95	11.61	8.47	10.84	4.52	2.58	8.90
Harris 24.01.21	Le Pen	Macron	Jadot	Bertrand	Mélenchon	Hidalgo	Dupont-Aignan		
	26	24	7	16	11	6	7	–	3
	Le Pen	Macron	Jadot	Péresse	Mélenchon	Hidalgo	Dupont-Aignan		
	26	24	8	14	11	7	7	–	3
	Le Pen	Macron	Jadot	Bertrand	Mélenchon	Montebourg	Dupont-Aignan		
	26	23	10	16	10	5	7	–	3

Note: Comparison of party vote intentions in our survey (first row) and polling for first-round presidential elections by presidential candidates (subsequent rows) of parties in three scenarios of candidate compositions by harris interactive (2021). Party acronyms: Rassemblement National (RN); La République En Marche (En Marche) Europe Ecologie - Les Verts (Greens) Les Républicains (Rep) La France insoumise de Jean-Luc Mélenchon (LFI) Parti socialiste (PS) Debout la France (Debout) Parti communiste français (PCF) other.

Source: harris interactive (2021). For this and additional polling in overview see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_2022_French_presidential_election.

A.2.2 Attributes and levels of the conjoint experiment

The attributes and levels of the conjoint experiment (see Table 2) differed in nuanced ways for economic implications for the home country, the normative context in the recipient country, as well as additional contextual characteristics.

Concerning the economic dimension, we differentiate three sub-aspects: the gross welfare added (range: observed exports in 2019), employment consequences (negligible to 5,000, a medium-sized firm, as upper bound), and exports to an important trade partner (binary yes/no).

Concerning the normative context, global regulatory commitments highlight regime type, human rights situation, and conflict status of the target country as central dimensions for non-proliferation rules and guidelines. We translate this into democratic vs. non-democratic, (no) (strong) violation of human rights, and common types of conflict situations.

We also present security aspects of arms trade, i.e., negative/positive security externalities that link to alliance status (this, we capture by a security partnership between seller/target (binary yes/no)).¹²

Also, we present the product to be traded (from defensive equipment to large-scale weapons) as a potential moderating factor and to prevent respondents from inferring weapon type and its harm potential from the monetary value of the deal. We finally communicate international competition as a moderator (“unknown” vs. allies vs. rivals trading). We explicitly stay silent on the country that is to be traded with, to avoid unre-

¹² Note that the normative context of the recipient country, i.e., autocracy/democracy, human rights situation and peace/conflict in the country are also relevant from the perspective of geo-strategic considerations by way of negative security externalities for the sending country. But while governments are likely considering the normative context by way of security externalities (García-Alonso and Levine 2007; Levine et al. 1994), citizens are more likely to directly tap into normative considerations related to moral considerations or even pacifist convictions (can it be justified morally to export to such a context?, see Rudolph et al. (2024)).

alistic profiles and to avoid idiosyncratic country perceptions that could affect preference formation.

Online Appendix Figure A.1 gives an exemplary indication of how the experiment was administered to respondents.

Wir zeigen Ihnen nun das zweite Vergleichspaar von zwei Waffenlieferungen.

	Waffenlieferung 1	Waffenlieferung 2
Menschenrechtslage im Land?	Menschenrechte geachtet	Andersdenkende verfolgt/eingesperrt /gefoltert
Militärische Konflikte im Land?	Bürgerkrieg mit Rebellen	Konflikt mit Terroristen
Liefern andere Länder bereits Waffen?	Frankreich	Frankreich
Regierung im Land demokratisch gewählt?	Nicht demokratisch gewählt	Demokratisch gewählt
Handelt das Land Waren mit Deutschland?	Viel Handel von Waren	Viel Handel von Waren
Wirtschaftsvorteil für Deutschland in Millionen Euro insgesamt?	100 Mio.	1 Mio.
Wie viele Arbeitsplätze in Deutschland gehen ohne Lieferung verloren?	5000	5000
Was soll geliefert werden?	Kleinwaffen (z.B. Gewehre, Pistolen)	Militärische Aufklärungssysteme (z.B. Satellitentechnologie)
Ist das Land wichtig für die Sicherheit Deutschlands?	Wichtiger Sicherheitspartner	Kein wichtiger Sicherheitspartner

Wenn Sie sich zwischen einer der beiden Waffenlieferungen entscheiden müssten, welcher würden Sie persönlich den Vorzug geben und diese genehmigen?

Waffenlieferung 1 Waffenlieferung 2

Nun betrachten Sie beide Waffenlieferungen einzeln.

Auf einer Skala von 1 bis 7, auf der 1 bedeutet, dass die Waffenlieferung auf jeden Fall abgelehnt werden sollte und 7 bedeutet, dass die Waffenlieferung auf jeden Fall genehmigt werden sollte: Wie würden Sie die beiden Waffenlieferungen einschätzen?

Waffenlieferung 1

→ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Auf jeden Fall ablehnen 1 Auf jeden Fall genehmigen 7

Waffenlieferung 2

→ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Auf jeden Fall ablehnen 1 Auf jeden Fall genehmigen 7

Weiter »

Figure A.1: Survey screen with an exemplary display of the conjoint experiment (German version).

A.2.3 Survey items on political ideology

Left-right ideology was questioned with a standard survey item with an 11-point Likert-scale. Wording was (translated): “In politics, people often talk about ”left” and ”right”. On a scale from 1 (left) to 11 (right): How would you rank your own political views?”; German original: “In der Politik sprechen die Menschen oft über ”links” und ”rechts”. Auf einer Skala von 1 (links) bis 11 (rechts): Wie würden Sie Ihre eigenen politischen Ansichten einordnen?”; French original: “A propos de politique, les gens parlent de ”la gauche” et de ”la droite”. Vous-même, pourriez-vous situer votre position sur cette échelle de 1 à 11, où 1 signifie ”gauche” et 11 signifie ”droite”? Quel nombre décrit le mieux votre position?”

Party vote intention was questioned with a standard survey item on a hypothetical election next Sunday. For Germany, this was (translated): “If there were a federal election next Sunday, which party would you vote for?”; German original: “Wenn am nächsten Sonntag Bundestagswahl wäre, welche Partei würden Sie wählen?”. For French respondents, this was (translated): “If the first round of the parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, who would you vote for? A candidate from...”; French original: “Si le premier tour des élections législatives avait lieu dimanche prochain, pour qui voteriez-vous? Un candidat de...”

A.2.4 Strengths and limitations of the design

The survey-experimental approach we apply remedies a number of known concerns from surveys eliciting population preferences. First and foremost, by way of experimental manipulation, we can trace whether experimenter-induced variation in question-wording (vignette or conjoint conditions) relates to differences in answering behavior in a causal way (Hainmueller et al. 2014; Mutz 2011). However, in interpreting effects, researchers

have to beware of ‘masking’: as the scenarios presented in factorial experiments are stylized miniatures of real-world scenarios, respondents could read unmentioned features into certain attribute expressions – e.g., high arms trade values could at the same time indicate high destruction potential for some respondents, or high geo-strategic alliance value for other respondents. Such concerns matter empirically, as Dafoe et al. (2018) have shown. It is, hence, crucial for the survey-experimental information environment to match empirical estimates with theoretical questions of interest (Bansak et al. 2021). We explicitly approach this challenge in the conjoint experiment, which incorporates with nine dimensions relevant real-world complexity, preventing the masking of the attributes on democracy/human rights compliance and monetary value/job creation by, e.g., conflict situation, alliance status, or weapon harm potential. By fielding first the conjoint, repeated for six rounds, and only then the reduced vignette experiment, we created a mindset that mimics an ‘average scenario’ on all other attributes. We are confident our design succeeded in doing so. Online Appendix Table A.3 shows compelling evidence that this is the case: comparing respondent decisions in the vignette tasks to decisions in the conjoint task that exactly mimic the vignette scenario while randomly varying all other attributes leads to nearly identical choice behavior.

Second, recent research indicates that factorial experiments can reduce social desirability bias, i.e., bias from social norms that citizens do not want to openly violate (in our case, e.g., support for autocracies for monetary gain). This is a valid concern, as obtrusive attributes might trigger such social desirability in particular (Mutz 2011), and could be relevant for our vignette experiment with only two prominent and salient dimensions. Still, Horiuchi et al. (2022: 535) propose that factorial experiments have two desirable properties: first, hiding sensitive items among others, and thereby not making respondents aware of potential social norm violations (‘imperceptibility’); second, enabling

respondents to justify norm-violating responses with alternative attribute combinations and thereby concealing their decision-making calculus on the individual level (‘rationalization’). Both Horiuchi et al. (2022), investigating gender preferences in candidate choice and preferences for sustainable consumption with conjoint experiments, as well as Auspurg et al. (2014), researching the perceived fairness of pay gaps via vignette experiments, show that social desirability bias is likely of low concern, at least compared to standard survey items, even for groups most likely to exhibit these biases. For vignette experiments, this seems to be even more the case if, as in our case, between-subject designs are used (Walzenbach 2019). While these vignette experiments were of considerably higher complexity, increasing imperceptibility, and making rationalization easier compared to our case, the comparability of conjoint and vignette results alleviates potential concerns (see online Appendix Table A.3).

Third, and as a consequence of these desirable properties, Hainmueller et al. (2015) show that survey-experimental results can mimic consequential real-world choices, in their case regarding citizens’ attitudes toward immigration, i.e., a topic prone to social desirability in standard survey questions. This is comforting, given a relevant limitation of survey experiments concerns their ‘ecological validity’, i.e., the question whether respondents hypothetical choices in a low-consequence environment travel to their real world decision making.

A.2.5 Robustness of conjoint and vignette experiment

Table A.3: Comparison of vignette and conjoint results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Vignette decision	Conjoint choice	Conjoint choice	Conjoint rating	Conjoint rating
Democracy, human rights resp.	0.480*** (0.0107)	0.558*** (0.0257)		1.190*** (0.0667)	
1 bn. benefit, 5000 jobs	0.0245* (0.0107)		0.0305 (0.0580)		0.0644 (0.121)
Constant	0.185*** (0.00848)	0.221*** (0.0129)	0.485*** (0.0290)	2.689*** (0.0525)	3.129*** (0.103)
N	6617	2074	590	2074	590
r2	0.23	0.31	0.00	0.11	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Model 1: Regression of vignette choice on vignette conditions (baseline: low economic value; autocratic and human rights violating context). Robust standard errors used. Model 2/3: Regression of conjoint choice on conjoint attribute expressions corresponding to vignette choice scenario. In model 2, the sample is reduced to choice tasks that force a choice between a democratic context with human rights compliance and an autocratic context with severe human rights violation; in model 2 to tasks that force a choice between a 1 bn. deal with 5,000 jobs and a 1 mio. deal with 1,000 jobs. All other attributes are expressed as randomized without restriction. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. Model 4/5: Set-up is identical to model 2/3, but the outcome is conjoint rating.

As can be seen, coefficients on both norms and economic value are highly comparable between models 1-3. For ratings, effects are substantively comparable, though on a different scale (1-7). The statistical insignificance of the estimates from models 3 and 5 is most likely a consequence of the much smaller sample size due to the rare combination of these specific conjoint configurations.

Table A.4: Comparison of vignette and conjoint replies for the full sample and for respondents with nonsensical vignette replies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vignette decision	Vignette decision	Conjoint choice	Conjoint choice
Democracy	0.480*** (0.0107)	0.482*** (0.0107)		
High economic value	0.0245* (0.0107)	0.0250* (0.0107)		
Not democratically elected			-0.105*** (0.00342)	-0.144*** (0.0368)
Freedom of expression suppressed			-0.148*** (0.00418)	-0.0631 (0.0450)
Dissidents persecuted/incarcerated/tortured			-0.192*** (0.00417)	-0.133** (0.0441)
Conflict with terrorists			-0.0244*** (0.00542)	-0.00117 (0.0551)
Civil war with rebels			-0.0923*** (0.00542)	-0.0553 (0.0572)
Country at war, under attack			-0.0133* (0.00543)	-0.0267 (0.0585)
Country at war, attacks			-0.164*** (0.00539)	-0.124* (0.0574)
Not an important partner			-0.0598*** (0.00342)	-0.0742* (0.0374)
Little trade of goods			-0.0353*** (0.00342)	-0.0277 (0.0372)
10 m			0.0254*** (0.00483)	0.00519 (0.0530)
100 m			0.0422*** (0.00485)	0.0117 (0.0528)
1000 m (1 bn)			0.0714*** (0.00483)	0.0306 (0.0527)
1000			0.00859* (0.00418)	-0.0699 (0.0451)
5000			0.0141*** (0.00420)	-0.0898* (0.0457)
Small arms (e.g. rifles, pistols)			-0.0436*** (0.00484)	-0.0464 (0.0519)
Large weapons (e.g. tanks, aircraft, ships)			-0.0746*** (0.00483)	-0.0607 (0.0541)
Military reconnaissance and surveillance systems			-0.0172*** (0.00485)	-0.00933 (0.0520)
France/Germany			0.0568*** (0.00484)	0.202*** (0.0509)
China and Russia			-0.0231*** (0.00484)	0.0503 (0.0518)
NATO partners (USA, UK, France/Germany)			0.0873*** (0.00482)	0.114* (0.0528)
Constant	0.185*** (0.00848)	0.187*** (0.00853)	0.734*** (0.00777)	0.701*** (0.0819)
N	6617	6557	79404	720
r ²	0.23	0.24	0.07	0.08

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, **** $p < 0.001$

Note: Model 1: Regression of vignette choice on vignette experimental conditions for full sample; model 2: for subsample excluding 60 respondents with nonsensical replies in open question (no estimation for subsample of these 60 possible, as they exhibit no variation; all 60 replied with "reject"). Model 3: Regression of conjoint choice on conjoint attribute levels for the full sample; model 4: for the subsample of respondents with nonsensical replies in open question. Model 1/2: robust standard errors; model 3/4: standard errors clustered by respondents.

As can be seen from models 1 and 2, coefficients for vignette choice are affected only marginally when excluding these respondents, which is a consequence of their low number. As can be seen from models 3 and 4, even though these respondents gave nonsensical answers in the open question following the vignette task, they replied sensibly in the conjoint experiment – coefficients for this sample largely follow main sample results, with some differences (e.g., much stronger response to allies trading as well).

A.3 Supplementary empirical analyses

A.3.1 Additional results for the vignette experiment




Figure A.2: Vignette by right vs. center vs. left. Coefficients from linear regression of vignette dimensions (binary indicator whether recipient country is human-rights upholding democracy (1) vs. human-rights violating autocracy (0); binary indicator whether the arms trade is of high monetary value securing many jobs (1) or of low monetary value securing few jobs) and their interaction on binary indicator of respondent agreement that such an export should take place. 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors shown.




Figure A.3: Vignette by 11-point scale, cubic modeling




Figure A.4: Mechanism battery overall and by political ideology. Coefficients based on linear regression of agreement with statement in panel header (on a 7-point scale; panels 4 and 5 reverse coded) on two vignette dimensions (recipient country autocracy/democracy; arms trade of low/high value). See Figure 2 for marginal means.

A.3.2 Additional results for the conjoint experiment




Figure A.5: Marginal means for conjoint task by respondents with left vs. center vs. right-leaning and difference in marginal means (see Figure 3 for left vs. right only).

A.3.3 Additional results for the party vignette experiment

Table A.5: Distribution of respondents stated party identification (y) and party displayed in vignette experiment (x) for German respondents

	Union	SPD	Greens	Left	FDP	AfD	Total
Union	415	80	93	72	99	66	825
SPD	46	224	44	50	49	57	470
Greens	62	58	305	61	58	53	597
Left	28	29	30	142	43	20	292
FDP	18	17	16	25	111	22	209
AfD	36	30	31	24	30	171	322
Other	36	44	39	34	49	45	247
Total	641	482	558	408	439	434	2,962

Note: Union – CDU/CSU; SPD – SPD; Greens – Bündnis 90/Die Grünen; Left – Die Linke; FDP – FDP; AfD – AfD

Table A.6: Distribution of respondents stated party identification (y) and party displayed in vignette experiment (x) for French respondents

	RN	Marche	Greens	Rep	Insoumise	PS	Debout	PCF	Total
RN	325	44	52	48	42	49	45	39	644
Marche	31	219	26	23	26	27	33	23	408
Greens	30	32	217	33	39	22	34	45	452
Rep	27	24	22	169	24	17	22	24	329
Insoumise	17	15	17	14	128	15	21	13	240
PS	21	30	30	17	22	134	26	27	307
Debout	10	8	11	6	11	5	70	7	128
PCF	3	7	6	6	5	6	4	36	73
Other	26	36	32	34	30	32	36	26	252
Total	490	415	413	350	327	307	291	240	2,833

Note: RN – Rassemblement national; Marche – La République en marche; Greens – Europe Ecologie - Les Verts; Rep – Les Républicains; Insoumise – La France insoumise de Jean-Luc Mélenchon; PS – Parti socialiste; Debout – Debout la France; PCF – Parti communiste français

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