**Online Appendix: Division on the Christian Right**

Contents

[**Appendix A: Survey Item Wording for Variables** 2](#_Toc168687256)

[A.1 Dependent Variable 2](#_Toc168687257)

[A.2 Independent Variables 2](#_Toc168687258)

[A.3 Other variables 3](#_Toc168687259)

[**Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics of Variables** 6](#_Toc168687260)

[B.1 Univariate Statistics 6](#_Toc168687261)

[B.2 Correlation Matrix 7](#_Toc168687262)

[**Appendix C: Additional analyses** 8](#_Toc168687263)

[C.1.: Linear regression models on the frequency of pastor discussion of elections 8](#_Toc168687264)

[C.2: Logistic models with partisanship voting as control (robustness analysis for Table 4) 11](#_Toc168687265)

[C.3: Logistic models with Trump vote voting as control (robustness analysis for Table 4) 12](#_Toc168687266)

[C.4: Linear probability models with four-category dependent variable 13](#_Toc168687267)

[C.5: Using Davis’ measure of Christian nationalism 14](#_Toc168687268)

[C.6: Logistic models with interaction terms (Figure 1) 16](#_Toc168687269)

[C.7: White grievance and friendships across the divide 17](#_Toc168687270)

[C.8: A conjoint on twinning churches 18](#_Toc168687271)

# **Appendix A: Survey Item Wording for Variables**

## **A.1 Dependent Variable**

***Force* =** dichotomous variable whereby 1=agree strongly or agree somewhat and 0=disagree strongly or disagree somewhat

*People have different views on how our political system works. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with this statement.* [Agree strongly/Agree somewhat/Disagree somewhat/Disagree strongly]:

The traditional American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it.

## **A.2 Independent Variables**

***Biblical literalism =*** PCA factorof two items; higher values express strong biblical literalism. The first component has an Eigenvalue of 1.62 that explains 81% of the variance. Alpha scale reliability coefficient = 0.76

* *I’d like to ask your views about how life on earth unfolded. Which of the following statements comes closest to your views?*
  1. Human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life, but God had no part in this process.
  2. Human beings have developed over millions of years from less advanced forms of life, but God guided this process.
  3. God created human beings pretty much in their present form at one time within the last 10,000 years or so.
* *Which of these statements comes closest to describing your views about Holy Scripture?*

1. Scripture is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word.
2. Scripture is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.

***Christian nationalism*** = 0-18 scale that aggregates scores on six items; higher values express stronger nationalism. Alpha scale reliability coefficient = 0.85.

*Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:*[Agree strongly=0/Agree somewhat/Disagree somewhat/Disagree strongly=3]\*

1. The federal government should declare the United States a Christian nation (R).
2. The federal government should enforce strict separation of church and state.
3. The federal government should advocate Christian values (R).
4. The federal government should not allow the display of religious symbols in public spaces .
5. The success of the United States is part of God’s plan (R).
6. The federal government should not allow prayer in schools.

\*Items are presented in randomized order to respondents. Scales on items 1, 3 and 5 are reversed (R) so that higher values indicate agreement.

***White grievance*** *=* 0-9 scale that aggregates scores on three items; higher values express higher grievance. The first component has an Eigenvalue of 1.71 that explains 57% of the variance. Alpha scale reliability coefficient = 0.62.

Here are some views people have expressed about American society. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree [Disagree strongly=0/Disagree somewhat/Agree somewhat/Agree strongly=3]

* Racial discrimination is the main reason why many African Americans/Black Americans can’t get ahead these days.
* We should protect our borders to prevent illegal immigration.
* Immigrants contribute a great deal to American society and culture.\*

\*Item is reversed so that higher values indicate disagreement.

***Election distrust***: 1-4 scale with higher values express stronger distrust.

*Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement.* [Agree strongly/Agree somewhat/Disagree somewhat/Disagree strongly\*]:

It is hard to trust the results of elections nowadays.

\*Re-scaled so that higher values indicate greater distrust.

## **A.3 Other variables**

***Socio-demographics***

**Gender:** a value of 0 if a man and 1 if a woman

**Age:** four categories (<40; 40-54; 55-70; +70) simplified to younger = 1 (<40 or 40-54) and 0 (55-70 or 70+)

**Education:** four categories simplified to lower education = 1 (high school or GED/some college; or BA or equivalent) and 0 (MA or equivalent; PhD or equivalent).

**Rural:** four categories simplified to rural = 1 (rural farm/open country; or rural town) and 0 (suburban; or urban).

***Partisanship***

*Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?*

* 1. Democrat
  2. Republican
  3. Independent
  4. Other: ……..

(If 1 or 2 or previous question] *Would you call yourself a strong [ANSWER FROM PREVIOUS QUESTION] or not a very strong [ANSWER FROM PREVIOUS QUESTION]?*

1. Strong […]
2. Not very strong […]

[If 3 or 4 on previous question] *Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?*

1. Closer to the Democratic Party
2. Closer to the Republican Party
3. Closer to neither party

***Moral threat***

*To what extent do you feel your moral values are threatened in America today?*

1. Very
2. Moderately
3. Slightly
4. Not at all

*And how about your church congregation? How many people in your church feel their moral values are threatened in America today?*

1. Very many of them
2. Many (a majority)
3. Some (a minority)
4. None

*If 1, 2, or 3, which of the following institutions or agents, if any, are routinely mentioned as a threat to moral values? Please tick all that apply.*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Yes | No |
| Social media |  |  |
| Universities |  |  |
| Atheists |  |  |
| Proud Boys |  |  |
| Muslims |  |  |
| Black Lives Matter |  |  |
| QAnon |  |  |
| Other: …………………………. |  |  |

***Social heterophily =*** extent to which a respondent’s five closest friends possess one or more socio-demographic characteristics that are different from the respondent’s profile.

*Thinking about your five closest friends beyond your close family, how many of them are:*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | 0-5 |
| of a different race/ethnicity |  |
| gay, lesbian, transgender |  |
| of a different religion or faith |  |
| not religious |  |
| born & raised outside the South |  |
| recent immigrant to the United States (past ten years) |  |
| living in a big city |  |
| a manual worker—e.g. factory, truck driver, construction |  |
| a professor at 4-year college or university  (not divinity school, Christian studies, religious studies) |  |

We operationalize in two ways:

* *Social heterophily on race/ethnicity or immigrant status* (0-10)= number of friends who have a different ethnicity/race + number of friends who are a recent immigrant, whereby 0 means ‘no friend is of a different race/ethnicity or is a recent immigrant’ and 10 means ‘all five friends are of a different race/ethnicity and all are recent immigrants.’
* *General social heterophily* (0-35)*=* number of friends with a characteristic that is different from the respondent, repeated for each of the characteristics, and summed, with a scale that ranges from 0 (no friend has any of the nine characteristics) to 35. The theoretical maximum is 35 because two sets of characteristics can be expected to be mutually exclusive (not religious || different religion; manual worker || professor).

# **Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics of Variables**

## **B.1 Univariate Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable Name** | **Min.** | **Max.** | **Mean** | **Std. Deviation** | **N** |
| Force | 0 | 1 | 0.301 | 0.460 | 143 |
| Biblical literalism | -1.08 | 1.88 | 0.638 | 1.265 | 143 |
| Christian nationalism | 2 | 18 | 11.363 | 3.759 | 143 |
| White grievance | 0 | 9 | 5.154 | 2.022 | 143 |
| Election distrust | 1 | 4 | 2.874 | 1.054 | 143 |
| Gender (female) | 1 | 2 | 1.113 | 0.318 | 141 |
| Age (<55 years) | 0 | 1 | 0.406 | 0.493 | 143 |
| Education (lower) | 0 | 1 | 0.324 | 0.470 | 142 |
| Rural | 0 | 1 | 0.545 | 0.480 | 143 |

## **B.2 Correlation Matrix**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | Force | Biblical literalism | Christian nationalism | White grievance | Election distrust | Gender (female) | Age (younger) | Education (lower) | | Rural |
| Force | 1.000 |
| Biblical literalism | 0.316\*\* | 1.000 |
| Christian nationalism | 0.423\*\* | 0.484\*\* | 1.000 |
| White grievance | 0.394\*\* | 0.404\*\* | 0.462\*\* | 1.000 |
| Election distrust | 0.378\*\* | 0.354\*\* | 0.357\*\* | 0.565\*\* | 1.000 |
| Gender | -0.037 | -0.263\*\* | -0.185\* | -0.171\* | -0.060 | 1.000 |
| Age | 0.042 | 0.050 | -0.088 | 0.016 | -0.116 | -0.016 | 1.000 |
| Education | 0.086 | 0.211\*\* | 0.199\* | 0.188\* | 0.232\*\* | 0.043 | 0.097 | 1.000 |
| Rural | 0.167\* | 0.025 | 0.193\* | 0.170\* | 0.084 | -0.073 | -0.005 | 0.145 | 1.000 | |
| N=141 -- \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | | | | | | | | | |

# **Appendix C: Additional analyses**

## **C.1.: Linear regression models on the frequency of pastor discussion of elections**

These models indirectly test whether our sample is biased towards more militant Republicans compared to moderate ones. The survey probes the extent to which the respondent pastor considers a range of topics to be divisive and how frequently they discuss topics with their congregants. The models reveal that there is no statistically significant difference between the frequency with which Democratic and Republican pastors discussed the 2020 election or discussed voting and election fraud with their congregations. If our sample were biased towards more militant pastors willing to share their views, it is plausible that we would observe more Republican than Democratic pastors speaking to congregants about recent electoral issues.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DV=Frequency of talk about 2020 election | **Majority of congregants have same party ID as pastor** | **Party ID of pastor** |
| **(1)** | **(2)** |
| Political talk generally acceptable | 0.900\*\*\*  (0.192) | 0.757\*\*\*  (0.138) |
| Pastor generally comfortable talking about politics | -0.008  (0.084) | -0.078  (0.063) |
| Election fraud controversial in congregation | 0.686\*\*\*  (0.210) | 0.283\*\*\*  (0.143) |
| Pastor estimation of congregation’s unity over time | -0.336  (0.342) | -0.374  (0.279) |
| Pastor estimation of congregation’s unity over time2 | 0.051  (0.067) | 0.056  (0.056) |
| Perception that values are threatened | 0.048  (0.140) | 0.005  (0.087) |
| Majority same PID | 0.265  (0.203) | -0.187  (0.263) |
| Independent (ref: Democrat) |  |  |
| Republican |  | 0.037  (0.160) |
| Constant | 1.991\*\*\*  (0.650) | 2.821\*\*\*  (0.554) |
|  |  |  |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.155 | 0.092 |
| F Statistic | 4.729\*\*\*  (df = 7; 135) | 4.590\*\*\*  (df = 8; 274) |
| Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DV=Frequency of talk about voting or election fraud | **Majority of congregants have same party ID as pastor** | **Party ID of pastor** |
| **(1)** | **(2)** |
| Political talk generally acceptable | 0.814\*\*\*  (0.194) | 0.635\*\*\*  (0.130) |
| Pastor generally comfortable talking about politics | 0.003  (0.084) | 0.009  (0.059) |
| Election fraud controversial in congregation | 0.497\*\*  (0.211) | 0.314\*\*\*  (0.134) |
| Pastor estimation of congregation’s unity over time | -0.609\*  (0.345) | -0.666\*\*  (0.262) |
| Pastor estimation of congregation’s unity over time2 | 0.121\*  (0.068) | 0.124\*\*  (0.053) |
| Perception that values are threatened | 0.221  (0.141) | 0.278\*\*\*  (0.082) |
| Majority same PID | 0.028  (0.205) | 0.062  (0.241) |
| Independent (ref: Democrat) |  |  |
| Republican |  | -0.016  (0.151) |
| Constant | 1.600\*\*  (0.655) | 1.529\*\*\*  (0.523) |
|  |  |  |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.148 | 0.141 |
| F Statistic | 4.508888  (df = 7; 134) | 6.809\*\*\*  (df = 8; 275 |
| Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | |

## **C.2: Logistic models with partisanship voting as control (robustness analysis for Table 4)**

These models reproduce the analyses in Table 4 with a control for partisanship to rule out the potential confounding influence of strength of partisanship (Republican and Republican-leaning). The table reveals that a) all independent variables of interest retain statistical power, and b) partisanship is nonsignificant.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| DV=Use of force to save the traditional American way of life | **Religious dogmatism** | **Christian nationalism** | **White grievance** | **Election distrust** | **Full model** |
| **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** |
| Biblical literalism | 1.857\*\*\* |  |  |  | 1.227 |
|  | (0.355) |  |  |  | (0.281) |
| Christian nationalism |  | 1.356\*\*\* |  |  | 1.231\*\* |
|  |  | (0.101) |  |  | (0.102) |
| White grievance |  |  | 1.821\*\*\* |  | 1.399\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.289) |  | (0.234) |
| Distrust in elections |  |  |  | 2.894\*\*\* | 2.050\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.814) | (0.669) |
| Gender (ref=man) | 1.848 | 1.493 | 1.119 | 0.956 | 1.327 |
|  | (1.356) | (1.072) | (0.843) | (0.682) | (1.079) |
| Age (ref=55 or older) | 1.241 | 1.561 | 1.214 | 1.564 | 1.652 |
|  | (0.505) | (0.677) | (0.507) | (0.660) | (0.788) |
| Education (ref=MA or higher) | 0.867 | 0.849 | 0.949 | 0.836 | 0.625 |
| (0.378) | (0.385) | (0.414) | (0.365) | (0.308) |
| Rural (ref=urban/suburban) | 2.229\* | 1.634 | 1.926 | 2.192\* | 1.999 |
|  | (0.937) | (0.704) | (0.821) | (0.942) | (0.963) |
| Partisanship | 1.527 | 1.253 | 1.037 | 1.325 | 0.823 |
|  | (0.442) | (0.376) | (0.337) | (0.392) | (0.293) |
| Constant | 0.012\*\*\* | 0.002\*\*\* | 0.007\*\*\* | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.001\*\*\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.003) | (0.012) | (0.005) | (0.001) |
| McFadden R2 | 0.129 | 0.183 | 0.169 | 0.170 | 0.289 |
| AIC | 1.161 | 1.094 | 1.112 | 1.110 | 1.007 |
| BIC | -513.495 | -522.886 | -520.324 | -520.631 | -526.235 |

Note: Coefficients are odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses; observations = 141. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **C.3: Logistic models with Trump vote voting as control (robustness analysis for Table 4)**

These models reproduce the analyses in Table 4 with a control for whether a respondent voted for Trump in the 2020 election. The table reveals that a) all independent variables of interest retain statistical power, and b) the Trump factor is nonsignificant in the full model and attains marginal significance (at .10 level) in two of the four simpler models.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| DV=Use of force to save the traditional American way of life | **Religious dogmatism** | **Christian nationalism** | **White grievance** | **Election distrust** | **Full model** |
| **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** |
| Biblical literalism | 1.698\*\*\* |  |  |  | 1.331 |
|  | (0.341) |  |  |  | (0.318) |
| Christian nationalism |  | 1.332\*\*\* |  |  | 1.213\*\* |
|  |  | (0.099) |  |  | (0.100) |
| White grievance |  |  | 1.780\*\*\* |  | 1.549\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.316) |  | (0.288) |
| Distrust in elections |  |  |  | 2.802\*\*\* | 2.603\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.890) | (0.958) |
| Gender (ref=man) | 1.762 | 1.600 | 1.138 | 0.907 | 1.181 |
|  | (1.305) | (1.181) | (0.858) | (0.641) | (0.970) |
| Age (ref=55 or older) | 1.201 | 1.506 | 1.213 | 1.506 | 1.729 |
|  | (0.490) | (0.659) | (0.504) | (0.632) | (0.837) |
| Education (ref=MA or higher) | 0.846 | 0.822 | 0.936 | 0.839 | 0.570 |
| (0.368) | (0.372) | (0.411) | (0.366) | (0.292) |
| Rural (ref=urban/suburban) | 2.031\* | 1.500 | 1.914 | 2.158\* | 2.410\* |
|  | (0.860) | (0.654) | (0.817) | (0.927) | (1.233) |
| Voted for Trump | 3.137\* | 3.012\* | 1.233 | 1.471 | 0.237 |
|  | (1.945) | (1.835) | (0.892) | (1.050) | (0.221) |
| Constant | 0.039\*\*\* | 0.002\*\*\* | 0.008\*\*\* | 0.008\*\*\* | 0.000\*\*\* |
|  | (0.042) | (0.003) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.000) |
| McFadden R2 | 0.138 | 0.202 | 0.169 | 0.167 | 0.302 |
| AIC | 1.149 | 1.072 | 1.112 | 1.114 | 0.993 |
| BIC | -515.079 | -526.038 | -520.397 | -519.994 | -528.337 |

## **C.4: Linear probability models with four-category dependent variable**

These models reproduce the analyses in Table 4 with a four-category dependent variable. The table reveals that the results are robust across this alternative operationalization of the dependent variable.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| DV=Use of force to save the traditional American way of life (4-category) | **Religious dogmatism** | **Christian nationalism** | **White grievance** | **Election distrust** | **Full model** |
| **(1)** | **(2)** | **(3)** | **(4)** | **(5)** |
| Biblical literalism | 0.305\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.034 |
|  | (0.061) |  |  |  | (0.061) |
| Christian nationalism |  | 0.426\*\*\* |  |  | 0.246\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.019) |  |  | (0.021) |
| White grievance |  |  | 0.451\*\*\* |  | 0.182\* |
|  |  |  | (0.035) |  | (0.041) |
| Distrust in elections |  |  |  | 0.471\*\*\* | 0.287\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.066) | (0.075) |
| Gender (ref=man) | -0.003 | -0.008 | -0.011 | -0.054 | 0.019 |
|  | (0.236) | (0.220) | (0.216) | (0.211) | (0.208) |
| Age (ref=55 or older) | -0.078 | -0.024 | -0.069 | -0.004 | -0.003 |
|  | (0.147) | (0.141) | (0.138) | (0.138) | (0.132) |
| Education (ref=MA or higher) | 0.007 | -0.007 | -0.004 | -0.038 | -0.081 |
|  | (0.160) | (0.152) | (0.149) | (0.149) | (0.143) |
| Rural (ref=urban/suburban) | 0.145\* | 0.073 | 0.077 | 0.116 | 0.064 |
|  | (0.146) | (0.141) | (0.138) | (0.135) | (0.131) |
| Constant | 1.767\*\*\* | 0.809\*\* | 0.972\*\*\* | 0.926\*\*\* | 0.131 |
|  | (0.303) | (0.371) | (0.336) | (0.331) | (0.369) |
| R2 | 0.122 | 0.201 | 0.226 | 0.243 | 0.341 |
| Adj. R2 | 0.089 | 0.172 | 0.197 | 0.215 | 0.301 |
| AIC | 359.998 | 346.653 | 342.246 | 338.990 | 325.469 |
| BIC | 377.690 | 364.346 | 359.939 | -356.683 | 352.008 |

Note: Coefficients are Beta (standardized) coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; observations = 141. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **C.5: Using Davis’ measure of Christian nationalism**

Our study uses the standard measure of Christian nationalism, the Perry-Whitehead six-item measure of Christian nationalism. This combines comprehensiveness and practicality in tapping how a Christian-nationalist view may impact diverse public spheres in American society –church-state relations, schools, national symbols, national policy. It also meets exacting psychometric standards (alpha=0.85 in the entire sample that includes non-Republican pastors, and alpha=0.74 in the sample of Republican pastors).

Recently Nicholas Davis (2023) has advocated for a stricter political conceptualization, which is defined as “a preference for a religious conservative political regime.” To capture this directly, he proposes to limit the index to two of the six items:

* + - * The federal government should declare the United States a Christian nation.
* The federal government should advocate Christian values.

Statistically, the two measures are highly correlated among respondents in our sample (r=0.88) and substituting one for the other in our full models reveals no significant differences (see below).

Our decision to use the Perry-Whitehead measure is motivated by theory. The broadness of the measure is better geared at capturing the “worldview” (Djupe et al. 2023) or “cultural framework” (Whitehead and Perry 2020) that Christian nationalists seek to embed in the civic life of American society. It is this general societal-political agenda with specific public policy implications that we are interested in. Davis’ measure has the virtue of simplicity, but its particular focus on the federal government as an agent of Christian values elides the essential role of other public bodies including state or local government, school boards, or hospitals that set or mediate public policy. The Whitehead and Perry scale may not be the ultimate panacea in capturing the desire to impose a particular cultural framework across civic life (consider e.g. the absence of an item on medical care), but it is better equipped than other scales we are aware of.

Reference:

Davis, Nicholas T. 2023. “The Psychometric Properties of the Christian Nationalism Scale.” *Politics and Religion* 16: 1-26. doi: https://doi:10.1017/S1755048322000256.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **DV=Use of force to save the traditional American way of life** | MODEL WITH WHITEHEAD-PERRY MEASURE | MODEL WITH DAVIS MEASURE |
| Biblical literalism | 1.225 | 1.295 |
|  | (0.279) | (0.285) |
| Christian nationalism | 1.224\*\* | 1.477\*\* |
|  | (0.100) | (0.225) |
| White grievance | 1.368\* | 1.389\*\* |
|  | (0.220) | (0.224) |
| Distrust in elections | 2.032\*\* | 2.102\*\* |
|  | (0.662) | (0.687) |
| Gender (ref=man) | 1.386 | 1.453 |
|  | (1.120) | (1.202) |
| Age (ref=55 or older) | 1.683 | 1.774 |
|  | (0.798) | (0.848) |
| Education (ref=MA or higher) | 0.633 | 0.548 |
|  | (0.310) | (0.272) |
| Rural (ref=urban/suburban) | 2.001 | 2.017 |
|  | (0.962) | (0.981) |
| Constant | 0.000\*\*\* | 0.000\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| McFadden R2 | 0.288 | 0.290 |
| AIC | 0.995 | 0.992 |
| BIC | -530.886 | -531.337 |

## **C.6: Logistic models with interaction terms (Figure 1)**

This table shows the models for Figure 1, which plot the interaction between election distrust and Christian nationalism or White grievance respectively. The figures display the effects of strongly distrusting or strongly trusting elections on willingness to legitimize force at various levels of Christian nationalism (white grievance).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DV=Use of force to save the traditional American way of life | **Christian nationalism** | **White grievance** |
| **(1)** | **(2)** |
|  |  |  |
| Election distrust | 0.528 | 1.363 |
|  | (0.492) | (1.268) |
| Christian nationalism | 0.813 |  |
|  | (0.220) |  |
| Election distrust x Christian nationalism | 1.153\* |  |
|  | (0.096) |  |
| White grievance |  | 1.102 |
|  |  | (0.631) |
| Election distrust x White grievance |  | 1.113 |
|  |  | (0.195) |
| Gender (ref=man) | 0.954 | 1.026 |
|  | (0.723) | (0.761) |
| Age (ref=55 or older) | 1.859 | 1.454 |
|  | (0.876) | (0.636) |
| Education (ref=MA or higher) | 0.711 | 0.738 |
|  | (0.350) | (0.342) |
| Rural (ref=urban/suburban) | 2.053 | 2.513\* |
|  | (0.972) | (1.195) |
| Constant | 0.101 | 0.007\* |
|  | (0.313) | (0.021) |
| McFadden R2 | 0.272 | 0.224 |
| AIC | 1.000 | 1.059 |
| BIC | -533.116 | -524.819 |

Note: Coefficients are odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses; observations = 141. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## **C.7: White grievance and friendships across the divide**

In this section we provide evidence for our null finding that White grievance does not appear associated with avoiding non-white friends. We operationalize social heterophily in two ways. The first focuses on presence/absence of two ethnic markers among a pastor’s five closest friends: *a)* different ethnicity/race or *b)* being a recent immigrant. These are combined in a scale from 0 (no heterophily) to 10 (every friend is of a different ethnicity/race and is a recent immigrant). The second encompasses, in addition, the following socio-demographic sources of diversity: *c)* gay, lesbian, transgender; *d)* of a different religion; *e)* not religious; *f)* born and raised outside the South; *g)* living in a big city; *h)* manual worker; *i)* a professor (not counting a divinity school or religious studies), and here the scale runs from 0 (no heterophily) to 35 (every friend has seven characteristics that are different from the respondent).

Figures C.7a and C.7b below partition the sample of conservative pastors at the median value of White grievance (median=6). The left panel shows that respondents with high White grievance are as likely to report friends of a different ethnicity or immigrant status than those with low grievance (see table below). The right panel, which compares the distribution on the broader measure of social heterophily, finds that pastors with low grievance report that, on average, their closest friends meet 8.0 heterophily characteristics (maximum=35) and pastors with high grievance an average of 8.2 characteristics. None of these differences are statistically significant.

**Figure C.7: White Grievance and Social Heterogeneity**



Note: Left panel = number of friends who have a different ethnicity/race + number who are a recent immigrant. Right panel = for each of nine characteristics, number of friends who are different, and summed.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| White grievance | Minimum | 25th percentile | Mean | 75th percentile | Maximum |
| Friends of different ethnicity/race or immigrant status | | | | | |
| Low | 0 | 0 | 1.69 | 2 | 10 |
| High | 0 | 1 | 1.68 | 2 | 8 |
| Friends of different socio-demographic background | | | | | |
| Low | 0 | 5 | 8.03 | 10 | 28 |
| High | 0 | 4 | 8.15 | 11 | 30 |

## **C.8: A conjoint on twinning churches**

This section provides conjoint evidence for our null finding that ethnicity, in particular, personal anti-Black racism does not appear to influence what kind of churches a conservative pastor chooses to twin with. A twinning arrangement presumes an investment in repeated in-person meetings over a five-year period, so it provides a benchmark for evaluating the extent to which conservative pastors seek or avoid racial segregation in church matters.

Table C.8 reports on a conjoint in which conservative pastors are presented with a pair of churches that vary on denomination, rural or urban location, state location, partisan composition, and ethnic composition, and they are asked to choose which of these they choose to twin with. Each pastor is presented with four pairs consecutively.

**Table C.8: Estimated average marginal component effects (AMCEs) for force and non-force Republican pastors**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Force pastors** | | **Non-force pastors** | |
| **Denomination** |  |  |  |  |
| Baptist [ref] | 0.000 | . | 0.000 | . |
| Methodist | –0.054 | 0.068 | –0.076 | 0.056 |
| Presbyterian | 0.106 | 0.078 | –0.024 | 0.056 |
| Catholic | 0.073 | 0.076 | –0.100\* | 0.055 |
| **Location** |  |  |  |  |
| Urban | –0.037 | 0.062 | 0.002 | 0.038 |
| Rural [ref] | 0.000 | . | 0.000 | . |
| **State** |  |  |  |  |
| Georgia [ref] | 0.000 | . | 0.000 | . |
| New York | 0.039 | 0.072 | –0.034 | 0.035 |
| **Partisan composition** |  |  |  |  |
| Democratic | –0.173\*\* | 0.074 | –0.097\* | 0.051 |
| Purple church | –0.197\*\* | 0.075 | –0.031 | 0.055 |
| Republican [ref] | 0.000 | . | 0.000 | . |
| **Ethnic composition** |  |  |  |  |
| Predominantly white [ref] | 0.000 | . | 0.000 | . |
| Ethnically diverse | 0.100 | 0.066 | 0.030 | 0.042 |
| Predominantly Black | 0.048 | 0.061 | 0.007 | 0.046 |

Note: Non–force pastors: Number of respondents: 93 | number of observations: 726. Force pastors: Number of respondents: 42 | number of observations: 318. The observations are clustered by respondent; constraints for gender, age, rural, and education. Conjoint command in Stata (Michael J. Frith 2021; Leeper, Hobolt, Tilley 2020).

These results suggest that ethnic composition does not discriminate among the churches that conservative pastors choose, and where it approaches significance, ethnic diversity tends to be a positive trait, particularly among force pastors. The chief discriminating factor is partisanship: conservative pastors prefer churches with a partisan composition that echoes their own, and they appear particularly wary of politically diverse (purple) churches. Partisanship is most discriminatory among force pastors.

The null finding on ethnic composition and significant finding on partisanship hold up under a variety of conditions. Excluding the seven conservative pastors who identify as non-White does not shift results. Including a constraint for the pastor’s strength of partisanship does not shift results. Below we show the AMCE plot when we extend the analysis to include Democratic pastors alongside conservative force and non-force pastors, and once again, we detect the same pattern: partisanship affects church choice, while ethnic composition is a weakly positive (but statistically non-significant) factor on church choice.

**Figure C.5: Twinning churches for Democrats, non-force Republicans, force Republicans**



Note: Coefficients are average marginal component effects (AMCE). Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals; constraints for gender, rural, age, education; observations are clustered by respondent