Supplementary information

The Effects of Parental Leave on Attitudes towards the State

A Question formulations, variable distribution, and correlations

Table A1: Question wording

Dimension/ question	Question and item wording	Response options
Dependent variables		
Small Income Differences	Vad anser du om förslaget att satsa på ett samhälle med fler privata alternativ inom skola, vård och omsorg?	Mycket bra förslag
		Ganska bra förslag
Gender Equality in the Family	Vad anser du om förslaget att satsa på ett samhälle där inkomstskillnaderna är små?	Varken bra eller dåligt
		Ganska dåligt förslag
Shift to More Care in the Family	Vad anser du om förslaget att satsa på ett samhälle där vården av barn och äldre i högre grad sker inom familjen?	Mycket dåligt förslag
Private Alternatives	Vad anser du om förslaget att satsa på ett samhälle där männen tar lika stort ansvar som kvinnor för barn och hushåll?	Vet ej
Parental tasks:		
Drop off children	Hur många dagar under en vanlig vecka, måndag till söndag, lämnar du barn på dagis, fritids eller skola?	[*Numeric response*]
	Hur många dagar under en vanlig vecka, måndag till söndag, lämnar din parter barn på dagis, fritids eller skola?	
Pick up children	Hur många dagar under en vanlig vecka, måndag till söndag, hämtar du barn på dagis, fritids eller skola?	
	Hur många dagar under en vanlig vecka, måndag till söndag, hämtar din partner barn på dagis, fritids eller skola?	
Put children to bed	Hur många dagar, under en vanlig vecka (måndag-söndag), lägger du barn för natten?	
	Hur många dagar, under en vanlig vecka (måndag-söndag), lägger din partner barn för natten?	

In Figure A1, we visualize the distribution of the response alternatives of our dependent variables.

Figure A1: Distribution of dependent variables

Note: Response options: (1) "Very bad idea," (2) "Rather bad idea," (3) "Neither good nor bad idea," (4) "Rather good idea," to (5) "Very good idea."

In Tables A2 and A3, we report the correlations between our independent and dependent variables for mothers and fathers, respectively. The first two columns show the correlations between our main independent variables – parental leave in 2000 and 2010 – and our dependent variables.

Table A2: Correlation matrix: Mothers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) Total parental leave (2000)	1.00													
(2) Total parental leave (2010)	0.46	1.00												
(3) Times/week picking up/dropping off child (2000)	0.50	0.10	1.00											
(4) Times/week picking up/dropping off child (2010)	−0.37	0.24	−0.28	1.00										
(5) Days/week putting children to bed (2000)	0.07	0.10	0.16	0.09	1.00									
(6) Days/week putting children to bed (2010)	−0.34	0.06	−0.21	0.38	0.06	1.00								
(7) Small Income Differences (2000)	−0.03	−0.02	−0.03	0.00	0.01	0.07	1.00							
(8) Small Income Differences (2010)	0.05	0.05	−0.03	0.01	−0.01	0.06	0.46	1.00						
(9) Gender Equality in the Family (2000)	−0.11	−0.06	−0.11	0.05	−0.07	0.11	0.24	0.18	1.00					
(10) Gender Equality in the Family (2010)	−0.03	−0.05	−0.01	−0.06	−0.04	−0.05	0.21	0.18	0.33	1.00				
(11) Shift to More Care in the Family (2000)	0.17	0.08	0.03	0.00	0.05	−0.01	0.09	0.08	−0.06	−0.06	1.00			
(12) Shift to More Care in the Family (2010)	0.06	0.12	−0.04	0.05	0.04	0.01	−0.03	0.04	−0.05	−0.05	0.27	1.00		
(13) Private Alternatives (2000)	0.03	0.09	−0.04	0.06	−0.09	0.03	−0.23	−0.25	−0.04	−0.09	0.22	0.10	1.00	
(14) Private Alternatives (2010)	0.03	0.02	−0.05	−0.02	−0.01	0.00	−0.13	−0.19	−0.04	−0.03	0.08	0.18	0.41	1.00

Table A3: Correlation matrix: Fathers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) Total parental leave (2000)	1.00													
(2) Total parental leave (2010)	0.59	1.00												
(3) Times/week picking up/dropping off child (2000)	0.17	−0.09	1.00											
(4) Times/week picking up/dropping off child (2010)	−0.13	0.19	−0.23	1.00										
(5) Days/week putting children to bed (2000)	−0.03	−0.04	0.11	−0.07	1.00									
(6) Days/week putting children to bed (2010)	−0.25	0.08	−0.24	0.23	0.01	1.00								
(7) Small Income Differences (2000)	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.02	−0.01	1.00							
(8) Small Income Differences (2010)	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.01	−0.01	0.49	1.00						
(9) Gender Equality in the Family (2000)	−0.01	0.07	−0.03	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.20	0.08	1.00					
(10) Gender Equality in the Family (2010)	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.09	0.01	0.19	0.17	0.31	1.00				
(11) Shift to More Care in the Family (2000)	0.03	−0.02	0.05	−0.07	−0.04	−0.06	0.03	0.03	−0.02	0.06	1.00			
(12) Shift to More Care in the Family (2010)	0.05	−0.08	0.08	−0.03	−0.09	−0.12	0.00	0.08	−0.05	0.01	0.41	1.00		
(13) Private Alternatives (2000)	−0.07	−0.03	−0.11	0.05	−0.01	0.06	−0.20	−0.17	−0.09	−0.01	0.19	0.10	1.00	
(14) Private Alternatives (2010)	−0.08	−0.12	0.02	0.00	−0.01	0.04	−0.19	−0.20	−0.07	−0.01	0.09	0.14	0.43	1.00

Table A4: Descriptive Statistics

	Mothers		**Fathers**	
	LNU 2000	LNU 2010	LNU 2000	LNU 2010
Dependent variables	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Small Income Differences	3.50	3.43	3.13	3.10
	(1.19)	(1.13)	(1.21)	(1.19)
Gender Equality in the Family	4.38	4.26	4.32	4.19
	(0.90)	(0.97)	(0.87)	(0.95)
Shift to More Care in the Family	2.77	2.50	2.78	2.57
	(1.20)	(1.05)	(1.21)	(1.09)
Private Alternatives	3.24	3.11	3.09	2.96
	(1.23)	(1.14)	(1.32)	(1.16)
Independent variables	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Total parental leave	51.36	57.10	5.95	12.97
	(62.55)	(74.45)	(18.18)	(22.46)
Times/week picking up/dropping off child	3.00	2.97	1.76	2.27
	(3.69)	(3.47)	(2.70)	(2.85)
Days/week putting children to bed	4.97	3.94	3.72	3.36
	(2.06)	(2.48)	(2.12)	(2.40)
Income (in 1,000 SEKs)	1.37	2.27	1.70	2.93
	(0.87)	(1.22)	(1.13)	(1.67)
Age	31.43	41.43	32.74	42.73
	(6.68)	(6.68)	(7.42)	(7.41)
Years of education	13.57	14.46	13.39	13.97
	(2.75)	(3.01)	(3.00)	(3.08)
Age of youngest child	0.31	8.64	-0.61	7.97
	(6.05)	(5.89)	(6.12)	(5.74)
Is working (0=no, 1=yes)	0.72	0.87	0.84	0.94
	(0.45)	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.24)
Have a partner (0=no, 1=yes)	0.77	0.84	0.73	0.91
	(0.42)	(0.36)	(0.44)	(0.29)
Number of children in HH	1.26	2.01	1.14	2.02
	(1.17)	(0.85)	(1.24)	(0.85)
Partner is working (0=no, 1=yes)	0.92	0.96	0.75	0.84
	(0.28)	(0.19)	(0.43)	(0.37)
Observations	583	583	592	592

Note: The table report means a standard deviations in parenthesis. The minimum and maximum values are the following: The four *dependent variables* all have 1–5; *Total parental leave*: Mothers (2000): 0–418, (2010): 0–1037, Fathers (2000): 0–314, (2010): 0–314; *Times/week picking up/dropping off child*: 0–10; Days/week putting children to bed: 0–7; Income (in 1,000 SEKs): Mothers (2000): 0–55, (2010): 0–95, Fathers (2000): 0–62, (2010): 0–130; Years of education: Mothers (2000): 4–23, (2010): 4–26, Fathers (2000): 0–27, (2010): 7–25; Age: Mothers (2000): 19–57, (2010): 29–67, Fathers (2000): 19–64, (2010): 29–74; Number of children: Mothers (2000): 0–6, (2010): 0–9, Fathers (2000): 0–5, (2010): 0–7; Age of youngest child: Mothers (2000): -11–19, (2010): -1–18, Fathers (2000): -11–17, (2010): -1–18.

B General notes on modeling

B.1 Parental tasks

The parental task items were not developed as a single cohesive dimension. Thus, we tested to see if they held together as a single factor. Convergence was not reached when we estimated a three-item parental task latent factor (in a single-factor measurement model, not reported here). Since no other items are available, we cannot improve this measurement model with the data at hand. It is primarily the *Putting Children to Bed* item that has a low loading on the single-dimension model. This finding also makes theoretical sense because both parents often work outside the home in Sweden and often alternate picking up and dropping off at school, whereas putting children to bed might be done more by one parent than the other.

Analyzing the data on parental tasks as a two-wave cross-lagged SEM would have been preferred to account for the potential relationship between attitudes in 2000 and leave in 2010 (as we did with the parental leave models). However, the 10-year time span between the surveys creates an insurmountable problem when analyzing differences in picking up from, dropping off at daycare, and putting children to bed (the parental tasks). For example, only a quarter to a third of the parents had kids young enough to be put to bed in 2000 and 2010 ($N_{female} = 179, N_{male} = 142$). The resultant small sample sizes create SEMs that do not converge, have rank deficiency issues, and potentially suffer from sample bias since we do not know how parents of children with wide age ranges differ from the general parent population.

B.2 Using multiple-group SEM

We tested whether the residual variance of the dependent variables differed between women and men and found that no test was significant at the 0.05 level. This ensures that the resulting differences between mothers and fathers are not due to varying variances between the groups. Below are the test results:

Small Income Differences: $2000 : \chi^2(1) = 0.174, p = 0.676, 2010 : \chi^2(1) = 0.528, p = 0.467$; Gender Equality in the Family: $2000 : \chi^2(1) = 0.281, p = 0.596, 2010 : \chi^2(1) = 0.441, p = 0.506$; Shift to More Care in the Family: $2000 : \chi^2(1) = 0.457, p = 0.499, 2010 : \chi^2(1) = 0.402, p = 0.526$; Private Alternatives: $2000 : \chi^2(1) = 2.518, p = 0.113, 2010 : \chi^2(1) = 0.000, p = 0.992$).

B.3 Model fitness

All models have good fitness statistics when using a few control variables (as we do in the main analyses). No models are significantly different from the saturated models, meaning the proposed models fit the observed data comparably well to a model that perfectly reproduces all variances, covariances, and means (a saturated model). However, this test of model fitness is sensitive to sample size and the complexity of the model (Kline 2016, 271). Consequently, when we include many control variables, the models often show significant differences from the saturated models. This indicates poorer fit due to the increased complexity, as illustrated in Tables C1 and C2. The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) coefficients, also an absolute measure of how our models fit the data, are good (all are below $< .06$). The comparative fit indices (CFI), which compares the fit relative to a null model (where no associations at all are assumed), are also good according to standard rules of thumb ($> .95$). Finally, the root mean square residuals (SRMR), how large the model parameters are from the observed parameters on average, are far below the 0.1 standard threshold. It should also be noted that group-specific fit indices are similar across the gender groups – the SRMRs range between 0.010 and 0.026. Also, modification indices can be used to find spots where there are great improvements in fit, but this is less useful in these parsimonious models with no true measurement component.

Finally, analyses of how well the models fit locally show where the greatest deviations from observed correlations are, showing that only the reverse causality pathway (γ_1) gets a poor fit – all the other residuals are nonexistent. The direction of the residuals shows that our models do a good job generally but underestimate the absolute relationships between attitudes in 2000 and parental leave in 2010. However, the reverse causality residuals of the models with more controls, e.g., Table C2 in the SI, are not the problem, and this does not change our main estimates of interest.

C Few vs. many controls and cumulative vs. non-cum. IV

In Table C1 (mothers) and Table C2 (fathers), we report structural equation models varying two aspects of our main models with *Shift to More Care in the Family* as the DV: the number of controls and whether a non-cumulative or cumulative measure of parental leave is used.

First, in columns 1 and 5, we show a base model with income in 2000 as the only control. To compare to the models in the main text, in columns 2 and 6, we show the models with income as a control in both 2000 and 2010. In columns 3 and 7, we show models where we, in addition to income, we use age, years of education, age of the youngest child (capturing the distance to the most recent experience with parental leave), whether the respondent is working or not, has a partner or not, number of children in the household (which might include non-biological children). Finally, in columns 4 and 8, we show models where we also control whether the partner works, limiting the sample to respondents with partners.

Regardless of control-variable specification, our main estimate, the effect of parental leave on attitudes, is still close to zero for mothers. For fathers, the estimates are fairly consistent, too, although it is slightly higher in the models where the partner's employment is taken into account. This difference could be driven by the fact that those without partners are not included in this model, i.e., that the link between attitudes and parental leave is stronger among respondents with partners than those without partners.

Second, we use a non-cumulative parental leave variable in the first four columns (1 through 4). This means that in 2000, the measure captures the parental leave between 1992 and 2000, while in 2010, it captures the amount of parental leave between 2000 and 2010. In the second set of four columns (5 through 8), we report models where the parental leave variable in 2010 is the total since 1992.

Results show that the direction of results is consistent. But in the case of fathers, the results are non-significant ($p < .1$). This could be due to a diminishing effect of parental leave experiences over time since the cumulative measure also includes parental leave between 1992 and 2000 in the second wave. In short, it may be the most recent experiences that matter (which we also test in SI Section J).

Finally, the goodness-of-fit indices also show that with more complex models, the fit worsens, which is to be expected. The chi-square likelihood ratio tests of model vs. saturated are increasingly significantly different as variables are added. Similarly, the RMSEAs move beyond the traditional threshold of a good fit (0.06) when moving from one control variable to seven.

Table C1: Few vs. many controls and cumulative vs. non-cumulative IV: Shift to More Care in the Family – Mothers

DV	IV	Non-cumulative parental leave in 2010				Cumulative parental leave in 2010 (original)			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Parental leave (2000) ←	Income	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02
	Age			−0.01	0.00			−0.01	0.00
	Years of education			0.00	−0.01			0.00	−0.01
	Age of youngest child			0.01	0.01			0.01	0.01
	Is working			0.00	−0.03			0.00	−0.03
	Have a partner			0.02				0.02	
	No. of children in HH			0.34**	0.31**			0.34**	0.31**
	Partner is working				0.03				0.03
Attitude (2000) ←	Parental leave (2000)	0.34**	0.31**	0.27*	0.35**	0.34**	0.31**	0.27*	0.35**
	Income	−0.09	−0.08	−0.05	−0.07	−0.09	−0.08	−0.05	−0.07
	Age			−0.01	0.00			−0.01	0.00
	Years of education			−0.02	−0.02			−0.02	−0.02
	Age of youngest child			0.01	0.02			0.01	0.02
	Is working			−0.10	−0.13			−0.10	−0.13
	Have a partner			0.05				0.05	
	No. of children in HH			0.02	−0.08			0.02	−0.08
	Partner is working				0.21				0.21
Parental leave (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02
	Income		−0.04+	−0.03+	−0.03		−0.04+	−0.03+	−0.03
	Age			0.00	−0.01			0.00	−0.01
	Years of education			0.00	0.00			0.00	0.00
	Age of youngest child			−0.05**	−0.05**			−0.05**	−0.05**
	Is working			0.12*	0.04			0.12*	0.04
	Have a partner			−0.02				−0.02	
	No. of children in HH			0.31**	0.24**			0.31**	0.24**
	Partner is working				0.14				0.14
Attitude (2010) ←	Parental leave (2010)	0.06	0.04	0.03	−0.10	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.00
	Income		−0.10**	−0.08*	−0.11*		−0.10**	−0.08*	−0.11*
	Age			−0.01	0.00			−0.01	0.00
	Years of education			−0.02	0.00			−0.02	0.00
	Age of youngest child			0.01	0.00			0.00	0.00
	Is working			0.01	0.10			0.01	0.10
	Have a partner			0.17				0.17	
	No. of children in HH			−0.01	0.01			−0.04	0.00
	Partner is working				0.49+				0.47+
Autoregressive paths									
Parental leave (2010) ←	Parental leave (2000)	−0.50**	−0.52**	−0.33**	−0.30**	0.50**	0.48**	0.67**	0.70**
Attitude (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	0.26**	0.24**	0.25**	0.23**	0.25**	0.24**	0.24**	0.23**
Observations		1 096	1 093	1 091	734	1 096	1 093	1 091	734
χ^2 LR test of model vs. saturated		3.053	15.290	236.153	214.997	9.003	21.275	237.334	218.777
p model vs. saturated		0.802	0.122	0.000	0.000	0.173	0.019	0.000	0.000
RMSEA		0.000	0.031	0.075	0.086	0.030	0.045	0.075	0.087

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Table C2: Few vs. many controls and cumulative vs. non-cumulative IV: Shift to More Care in the Family – Fathers

DV	IV	Non-cumulative parental leave in 2010				Cumulative parental leave in 2010 (original)			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Parental leave (2000) ←	Income	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
	Age			0.00+	0.00+			0.00+	0.00+
	Years of education			−0.01*	−0.01*			−0.01*	−0.01*
	Age of youngest child			0.00*	−0.01*			0.00*	−0.01*
	Is working			−0.06**	−0.11**			−0.06**	−0.11**
	Have a partner			0.02				0.02	
	No. of children in HH			0.06**	0.06**			0.06**	0.06**
	Partner is working				0.00				0.00
Attitude (2000) ←	Parental leave (2000)	0.17	0.17	−0.08	−0.13	0.17	0.17	−0.08	−0.13
	Income	0.06	0.06	−0.01	0.03	0.06	0.06	−0.01	0.03
	Age			0.01	0.00			0.01	0.00
	Years of education			0.03	0.01			0.03	0.01
	Age of youngest child			−0.01	0.00			−0.01	0.00
	Is working			0.20	0.27			0.20	0.27
	Have a partner			0.07				0.07	
	No. of children in HH			0.12+	0.10			0.12+	0.10
	Partner is working				−0.22				−0.22
Parental leave (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	0.00	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	0.00
	Income		0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
	Age			0.00	0.00*			0.00	0.00*
	Years of education			0.01*	0.01**			0.01*	0.01**
	Age of youngest child			−0.02**	−0.01**			−0.02**	−0.01**
	Is working			0.00	0.03			0.00	0.03
	Have a partner			−0.06*				−0.06*	
	No. of children in HH			0.03**	0.02*			0.03**	0.02*
	Partner is working				0.04				0.04
Attitude (2010) ←	Parental leave (2010)	−0.57**	−0.57**	−0.46*	−0.80*	−0.28+	−0.28+	−0.29+	−0.36+
	Income		0.01	0.03	0.05		0.01	0.03	0.05
	Age			0.01+	0.01			0.01+	0.01
	Years of education			−0.03*	−0.03+			−0.03*	−0.04*
	Age of youngest child			0.00	−0.01			0.00	0.00
	Is working			−0.45*	−0.70**			−0.48**	−0.76**
	Have a partner			0.18				0.20	
	No. of children in HH			0.04	0.03			0.05	0.05
	Partner is working				0.02				−0.06
Autoregressive paths									
Parental leave (2010) ←	Parental leave (2000)	−0.08	−0.08	−0.02	0.02	0.92**	0.92**	0.98**	1.02**
Attitude (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	0.36**	0.36**	0.35**	0.35**	0.36**	0.36**	0.35**	0.35**
Observations		1 096	1 093	1 091	734	1 096	1 093	1 091	734
χ^2 LR test of model vs. saturated		3.053	15.290	236.153	214.997	9.003	21.275	237.334	218.777
p model vs. saturated		0.802	0.122	0.000	0.000	0.173	0.019	0.000	0.000
RMSEA		0.000	0.031	0.075	0.086	0.030	0.045	0.075	0.087

D Comparisons between DVs using a full set of control variables

In Tables D1, D2, D3, and D4, we report results for all four DVs using a full set of control variables. In the first two tables (D1 and D2), we report results when using the non-cumulative parental leave measure, and the second set of two (D3 and D4), we report results using the cumulative measure. The results are similar under these specifications.

Table D1: Relationship between parental leave and attitudes towards the state – Mothers (non-cumulative measure in w2)

DV	IV	Small Income Differences b	SE	Gender Equality in the Family b	SE	Shift to More Care in the Family b	SE	Private Alternatives b	SE
Parental leave (2000) ←	Income	0.02	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)	0.03	(0.02)	0.03	(0.02)
	Age	−0.01	(0.00)	−0.01	(0.00)	−0.01	(0.00)	−0.01	(0.00)
	Years of education (2000)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Age of youngest child	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
	Is working	0.02	(0.04)	0.02	(0.04)	0.00	(0.04)	0.00	(0.04)
	Have a partner	0.01	(0.05)	0.02	(0.05)	0.02	(0.05)	0.02	(0.05)
	No. of children in HH	0.34**	(0.02)	0.33**	(0.02)	0.34**	(0.02)	0.34**	(0.02)
Attitude (2000) ←	Parental leave (2000)	−0.23+	(0.12)	−0.21*	(0.09)	0.27*	(0.12)	0.10	(0.12)
	Income	−0.19**	(0.06)	−0.02	(0.05)	−0.05	(0.06)	0.15*	(0.07)
	Age	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)
	Years of education	−0.03+	(0.02)	0.04**	(0.02)	−0.02	(0.02)	−0.01	(0.02)
	Age of youngest child	0.02	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	−0.03+	(0.02)
	Is working	0.03	(0.12)	0.07	(0.09)	−0.10	(0.12)	0.18	(0.12)
	Have a partner	−0.21	(0.13)	−0.16	(0.10)	0.05	(0.13)	0.14	(0.14)
	No. of children in HH	0.09	(0.08)	0.05	(0.06)	0.02	(0.08)	0.02	(0.08)
Parental leave (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	−0.03*	(0.02)	−0.04+	(0.02)	0.00	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)
	Income	−0.03+	(0.02)	−0.03	(0.02)	−0.03+	(0.02)	−0.03*	(0.02)
	Age	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
	Years of education	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Age of youngest child	−0.05**	(0.01)	−0.05**	(0.01)	−0.05**	(0.01)	−0.05**	(0.01)
	Is working	0.12+	(0.06)	0.13*	(0.06)	0.12*	(0.06)	0.13*	(0.06)
	Have a partner	−0.03	(0.05)	−0.02	(0.05)	−0.02	(0.05)	−0.01	(0.05)
	No. of children in HH	0.32**	(0.03)	0.31**	(0.02)	0.31**	(0.03)	0.32**	(0.03)
Attitude (2010) ←	Total parental leave (2010)	0.02	(0.09)	−0.14	(0.09)	0.03	(0.09)	−0.19*	(0.10)
	Income	−0.12**	(0.04)	0.00	(0.04)	−0.08*	(0.04)	−0.01	(0.04)
	Age	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)
	Years of education	−0.01	(0.02)	0.00	(0.01)	−0.02	(0.02)	0.00	(0.02)
	Age of youngest child	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)
	Is working	0.02	(0.14)	−0.01	(0.13)	0.01	(0.14)	−0.07	(0.15)
	Have a partner	−0.08	(0.12)	0.07	(0.11)	0.17	(0.12)	0.10	(0.13)
	No. of children in HH	0.07	(0.06)	0.09	(0.05)	−0.01	(0.06)	−0.01	(0.06)
Autoregressive paths									
Parental leave (2010) ←	Parental leave (2000)	−0.34**	(0.04)	−0.33**	(0.04)	−0.33**	(0.04)	−0.33**	(0.04)
Attitude (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	0.41**	(0.04)	0.37**	(0.04)	0.25**	(0.04)	0.39**	(0.04)
Total number of observations		1 107		1 118		1 091		1 099	
Model degrees of freedom		58		58		58		58	
χ^2 LR test of model vs. saturated		230.199		207.223		236.153		230.457	
p model vs. saturated		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
RMSEA		0.073		0.068		0.075		0.074	

Note: $+p < 0.1$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$. Unstandardized coefficients.

Table D2: Relationship between parental leave and attitudes towards the state – Fathers (non-cumulative measure in w2)

DV	IV	Small Income Differences		Gender Equality in the Family		Shift to More Care in the Family		Private Alternatives	
		b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Parental leave (2000) ←	Income	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Age	0.00+	(0.00)	0.00+	(0.00)	0.00+	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)
	Years of education	−0.01+	(0.00)	−0.01*	(0.00)	−0.01*	(0.00)	−0.01*	(0.00)
	Age of youngest child	0.00*	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)	−0.01*	(0.00)
	Is working	−0.06**	(0.02)	−0.06**	(0.02)	−0.06**	(0.02)	−0.06**	(0.02)
	Have a partner	0.02	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)
	No. of children in HH	0.06**	(0.01)	0.06**	(0.01)	0.06**	(0.01)	0.06**	(0.01)
Attitude (2000) ←	Parental leave (2000)	0.21	(0.29)	0.20	(0.21)	−0.08	(0.30)	−0.34	(0.32)
	Income	−0.26**	(0.05)	0.01	(0.03)	−0.01	(0.05)	0.22**	(0.05)
	Age	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Years of education	−0.01	(0.02)	0.03*	(0.01)	0.03	(0.02)	0.01	(0.02)
	Age of youngest child	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.03+	(0.02)
	Is working	−0.03	(0.15)	−0.18+	(0.11)	0.20	(0.15)	0.19	(0.16)
	Have a partner	0.14	(0.13)	−0.01	(0.09)	0.07	(0.14)	0.00	(0.15)
	No. of children in HH	0.03	(0.06)	−0.08+	(0.04)	0.12+	(0.06)	0.03	(0.07)
Parental leave (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Income	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Age	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
	Years of education	0.01*	(0.00)	0.01*	(0.00)	0.01*	(0.00)	0.01*	(0.00)
	Age of youngest child	−0.02**	(0.00)	−0.02**	(0.00)	−0.02**	(0.00)	−0.02**	(0.00)
	Is working	−0.01	(0.04)	−0.01	(0.04)	0.00	(0.04)	−0.01	(0.04)
	Have a partner	−0.06*	(0.03)	−0.06*	(0.03)	−0.06*	(0.03)	−0.06+	(0.03)
	No. of children in HH	0.03**	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)
Attitude (2010) ←	Total parental leave (2010)	−0.26	(0.21)	0.00	(0.18)	−0.46*	(0.20)	−0.55**	(0.21)
	Income	−0.14**	(0.03)	0.01	(0.02)	0.03	(0.03)	0.08**	(0.03)
	Age	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01+	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Years of education	0.03*	(0.02)	0.03*	(0.01)	−0.03*	(0.01)	0.00	(0.02)
	Age of youngest child	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)
	Is working	0.01	(0.18)	−0.16	(0.16)	−0.45*	(0.18)	0.14	(0.18)
	Have a partner	−0.26+	(0.15)	−0.18	(0.13)	0.18	(0.15)	0.35*	(0.15)
	No. of children in HH	−0.01	(0.05)	−0.01	(0.05)	0.04	(0.05)	−0.02	(0.05)
Autoregressive paths									
Parental leave (2010) ←	Parental leave (2000)	−0.02	(0.05)	−0.02	(0.05)	−0.02	(0.05)	−0.02	(0.05)
Attitude (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	0.45**	(0.04)	0.32**	(0.04)	0.35**	(0.03)	0.37**	(0.03)
Observations		1 102		1 113		1 085		1 093	
Model degrees of freedom		6		6		6		6	
χ^2 LR test of model vs. saturated		230.214		206.357		237.334		231.939	
p model vs. saturated		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
RMSEA		0.073		0.068		0.075		0.074	

Note: $+p < 0.1$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$. Unstandardized coefficients.

Table D3: Comparisons between DVs using a full set of control variables – Mothers (cumulative parental leave IV)

DV	IV		Small Income Differences		Gender Equality in the Family		Shift to More Care in the Family		Private Alternatives	
			b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Parental leave (2000) ←	Income	ζ_1	0.02	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)	0.03	(0.02)	0.03	(0.02)
	Age	ζ_1	−0.01	(0.00)	−0.01	(0.00)	−0.01	(0.00)	−0.01	(0.00)
	Years of education	ζ_1	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Age of youngest child	ζ_1	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
	Is working	ζ_1	0.02	(0.04)	0.02	(0.04)	0.00	(0.04)	0.00	(0.04)
	Have a partner	ζ_1	0.01	(0.05)	0.02	(0.05)	0.02	(0.05)	0.02	(0.05)
	No. of children in HH	ζ_1	0.34**	(0.02)	0.33**	(0.02)	0.34**	(0.02)	0.34**	(0.02)
Attitude (2000) ←	Parental leave (2000)	β_1	−0.23+	(0.12)	−0.21*	(0.09)	0.27*	(0.12)	0.10	(0.12)
	Income	ζ_2	−0.19**	(0.06)	−0.02	(0.05)	−0.05	(0.06)	0.15*	(0.07)
	Age	ζ_2	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)
	Years of education	ζ_2	−0.03+	(0.02)	0.04**	(0.02)	−0.02	(0.02)	−0.01	(0.02)
	Age of youngest child	ζ_2	0.02	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	−0.03+	(0.02)
	Is working	ζ_2	0.03	(0.12)	0.07	(0.09)	−0.10	(0.12)	0.18	(0.12)
	Have a partner	ζ_2	−0.21	(0.13)	−0.16	(0.10)	0.05	(0.13)	0.14	(0.14)
	No. of children in HH	ζ_2	0.09	(0.08)	0.05	(0.06)	0.02	(0.08)	0.02	(0.08)
Parental leave (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	γ_1	−0.03*	(0.02)	−0.04+	(0.02)	0.00	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)
	Income	ζ_3	−0.03+	(0.02)	−0.03	(0.02)	−0.03+	(0.02)	−0.03*	(0.02)
	Age	ζ_3	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
	Years of education	ζ_3	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Age of youngest child	ζ_3	−0.05**	(0.01)	−0.05**	(0.01)	−0.05**	(0.01)	−0.05**	(0.01)
	Is working	ζ_3	0.12+	(0.06)	0.13*	(0.06)	0.12*	(0.06)	0.13*	(0.06)
	Have a partner	ζ_3	−0.03	(0.05)	−0.02	(0.05)	−0.02	(0.05)	−0.01	(0.05)
	No. of children in HH	ζ_3	0.32**	(0.03)	0.31**	(0.02)	0.31**	(0.03)	0.32**	(0.03)
Attitude (2010) ←	Parental leave (2010)	δ	0.02	(0.08)	−0.14+	(0.08)	0.07	(0.08)	−0.06	(0.09)
	Income	ζ_4	−0.12**	(0.04)	0.00	(0.04)	−0.08*	(0.04)	−0.01	(0.04)
	Age	ζ_4	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)
	Years of education	ζ_4	−0.01	(0.02)	0.00	(0.01)	−0.02	(0.02)	0.00	(0.02)
	Age of youngest child	ζ_4	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
	Is working	ζ_4	0.02	(0.14)	−0.02	(0.13)	0.01	(0.14)	−0.09	(0.15)
	Have a partner	ζ_4	−0.08	(0.12)	0.06	(0.11)	0.17	(0.12)	0.10	(0.13)
	No. of children in HH	ζ_4	0.06	(0.07)	0.12*	(0.06)	−0.04	(0.07)	−0.03	(0.07)
Autoregressive paths										
Parental leave (2010) ←	Parental leave (2000)	β_2	0.66**	(0.04)	0.67**	(0.04)	0.67**	(0.04)	0.67**	(0.04)
Attitude (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	γ_2	0.41**	(0.04)	0.36**	(0.04)	0.24**	(0.04)	0.39**	(0.04)
Total number of observations			1 102		1 113		1 085		1 093	
χ^2 LR test of model vs. saturated			230.214		206.357		237.334		231.939	
p model vs. saturated			0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
RMSEA			0.073		0.068		0.075		0.074	

Note: $+p < 0.1$, $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$. Unstandardized coefficients.

Table D4: Comparisons between DVs using a full set of control variables – Fathers (cumulative parental leave IV)

DV	IV		Small Income Differences b	SE	Gender Equality in the Family b	SE	Shift to More Care in the Family b	SE	Private Alternatives b	SE
Parental leave (2000) ←	Income	ζ_1	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Age	ζ_1	0.00+	(0.00)	0.00+	(0.00)	0.00+	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)
	Years of education	ζ_1	−0.01+	(0.00)	−0.01*	(0.00)	−0.01*	(0.00)	−0.01*	(0.00)
	Age of youngest child	ζ_1	0.00*	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)	0.00*	(0.00)	−0.01*	(0.00)
	Is working	ζ_1	−0.06**	(0.02)	−0.06**	(0.02)	−0.06**	(0.02)	−0.06**	(0.02)
	Have a partner	ζ_1	0.02	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)
	No. of children in HH	ζ_1	0.06**	(0.01)	0.06**	(0.01)	0.06**	(0.01)	0.06**	(0.01)
Attitude (2000) ←	Parental leave (2000)	β_1	0.21	(0.29)	0.20	(0.21)	−0.08	(0.30)	−0.34	(0.32)
	Income	ζ_2	−0.26**	(0.05)	0.01	(0.03)	−0.01	(0.05)	0.22**	(0.05)
	Age	ζ_2	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Years of education	ζ_2	−0.01	(0.02)	0.03*	(0.01)	0.03	(0.02)	0.01	(0.02)
	Age of youngest child	ζ_2	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.03+	(0.02)
	Is working	ζ_2	−0.03	(0.15)	−0.18+	(0.11)	0.20	(0.15)	0.19	(0.16)
	Have a partner	ζ_2	0.14	(0.13)	−0.01	(0.09)	0.07	(0.14)	0.00	(0.15)
	No. of children in HH	ζ_2	0.03	(0.06)	−0.08+	(0.04)	0.12+	(0.06)	0.03	(0.07)
Parental leave (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	γ_1	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Income	ζ_3	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Age	ζ_3	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
	Years of education	ζ_3	0.01*	(0.00)	0.01*	(0.00)	0.01*	(0.00)	0.01*	(0.00)
	Age of youngest child	ζ_3	−0.02**	(0.00)	−0.02**	(0.00)	−0.02**	(0.00)	−0.02**	(0.00)
	Is working	ζ_3	−0.01	(0.04)	−0.01	(0.04)	0.00	(0.04)	−0.01	(0.04)
	Have a partner	ζ_3	−0.06*	(0.03)	−0.06*	(0.03)	−0.06*	(0.03)	−0.06+	(0.03)
	No. of children in HH	ζ_3	0.03**	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)	0.03**	(0.01)
Attitude (2010) ←	Parental leave (2010)	δ	−0.20	(0.16)	0.03	(0.14)	−0.29+	(0.15)	−0.47**	(0.16)
	Income	ζ_4	−0.14**	(0.03)	0.01	(0.02)	0.03	(0.03)	0.08**	(0.03)
	Age	ζ_4	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01+	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
	Years of education	ζ_4	0.03*	(0.02)	0.03*	(0.01)	−0.03*	(0.01)	0.00	(0.02)
	Age of youngest child	ζ_4	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)
	Is working	ζ_4	−0.01	(0.18)	−0.16	(0.16)	−0.48**	(0.18)	0.10	(0.19)
	Have a partner	ζ_4	−0.25+	(0.15)	−0.18	(0.13)	0.20	(0.15)	0.37*	(0.15)
	No. of children in HH	ζ_4	0.00	(0.05)	−0.01	(0.05)	0.05	(0.05)	0.00	(0.05)
Autoregressive paths										
Parental leave (2010) ←	Parental leave (2000)	β_2	0.98**	(0.05)	0.98**	(0.05)	0.98**	(0.05)	0.98**	(0.05)
Attitude (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	γ_2	0.45**	(0.04)	0.32**	(0.04)	0.35**	(0.03)	0.37**	(0.03)
Observations			1 102		1 113		1 085		1 093	
χ^2 LR test of model vs. saturated			230.214		206.357		237.334		231.939	
p model vs. saturated			0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
RMSEA			0.073		0.068		0.075		0.074	

Note: $+p < 0.1$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$. Unstandardized coefficients.

E Non-linearity

Experiences of parental responsibility above a certain threshold might create non-linear effects on attitudes. For example, going from zero to six months of parental leave might yield a larger effect than going from six months to one year of parental leave. In Figures E1, E2, E3 and E4 we display OLS models that are run for each dependent variable and year, which allow parental leave to have a curvilinear form. The predicted values of the DVs are estimated to a maximum of 200 weeks of parental leave for women and 100 for men since the range 0–200 weeks covers more than 95 percent of the cases in both survey years. The curvilinear coefficient is significant in the case of *Gender Equality in the Family* in 2000 and *Shift to More Care in the Family* in 2010 for women. For men, the coefficient is significant in 2000 and 2010 for *Shift to More Care in the Family*. However, the curvilinear coefficients are generally small, which is also clear from a visual inspection. In short, these figures illustrate that using a linear interpretation of the variable is reasonable.

Figure E1: Small Income Differences

Figure E2: Gender Equality in the Family

Figure E3: Shift to More Care in the Family

Figure E4: Private Alternatives

2000

| Mothers	Fathers

2010

Mothers	Fathers

F Sensitivity analyses of dichotomous parental leave cutoff

Figure F1 shows sensitivity analyses using different cut-off points for dichotomous parental leave variables. Each point estimate represents the unstandardized coefficient in an SEM where the outcome is an attitude in 2010 that is regressed on a dichotomous parental leave variable (the parental leave taken between 2000 and 2010). The coefficients are derived from the same type of model used in the main text (corresponding to δ in Equation (4)). For example, fathers' left-most *Shift to More Care in the Family* coefficient shows the difference between fathers who had taken more and fathers who had taken less than eight weeks, which, at the time, corresponds to time that was dedicated to the father (and mother). These months, often named "daddy months," could not be taken by the mother (or father). Those not taking the two months available left parts of parental leave funding with the state. The coefficients show that those taking more leave are slightly more positive towards *Shift to More Care in the Family* in the welfare sector when compared to those who took between zero and seven weeks during the same period. As we shift to the right, the cutoff puts more and more respondents in the reference category, and the coefficients close in on zero.

These figures illustrate that the cutoff point affects the interpretation of the relationship when using a dichotomous independent variable. This cutoff point is also closely related to the overall distribution of parental leave within each group. For mothers, the distribution of parental leave is more even than for fathers, who tend to skew towards zero. This means we hit the fourth quartile of the parental leave distribution between the estimates for a 16 and 24 weeks cutoff (17 weeks). Cutoffs beyond 52 mean fewer than 5 percent are in the high leave category. The corresponding point for mothers is at 96 weeks. Because of the skewed distribution, the shaded areas represent values above the 95th percentile, and no estimates are provided for 80 weeks or more (two percent of fathers have 80 weeks or more).

In substantive terms, *Private Alternatives* (Figure F1 is negatively related to more parental leave, but only for fathers. *Shift to More Care in the Family* is also consistently negatively related to parental leave for fathers, as was found in the main text. However, we lose statistical power using dichotomous variables and cannot reject a null finding in some specifications. The analyses of *Small Income Differences* also confirm what was found in the main analysis – that there is no relationship. *Gender Equality in the Family* is positively related to parental leave for fathers, where there is enough data to provide a solid basis for interpretations. At the same time, it is the reverse for mothers. In summary, using the dichotomous leave variable confirms the findings in the text but with models that are not as robust.

Figure F1: Sensitivity analyses

Note: The shaded areas represent values above the 95th percentile of the parental leave distribution.

G   Sensitivity analyses of sample selection

Figure G1 shows sensitivity analyses with the respondents who had their last child after 2000, i.e., everyone who had at least one child between 2000 and 2010. The coefficients are derived from the same type of model used in the main text (corresponding to δ in Equation (4)). Comparing these coefficients to the main table in the manuscript (Table 2) shows similar results. *Small Income Differences*: $\delta_{MotherMain} = -0.03$, $\delta_{Mother2000} = -0.02$, $\delta_{FatherMain} = -0.16$, $\delta_{Father2000} = -0.17$; *Gender Equality in the Family*: $\delta_{MotherMain} = -0.10+$, $\delta_{Mother2000} = -0.11$, $\delta_{FatherMain} = 0.12$, $\delta_{Father2000} = 0.14$; *Shift to More Care in the Family*: $\delta_{MotherMain} = 0.04$, $\delta_{Mother2000} = 0.01$, $\delta_{FatherMain} = -0.57^{**}$, $\delta_{Father2000} = -0.41^{*}$; *Private Alternatives*: $\delta_{MotherMain} = -0.09$, $\delta_{Mother2000} = -0.18$, $\delta_{FatherMain} = -0.50^{**}$, $\delta_{Father2000} = -0.63^{**}$.

Table G1: Without respondents who had their last child 2000 or earlier

DV	IV		Small Income Differences b	SE	Gender Equality in the Family b	SE	Shift to More Care in the Family b	SE	Private Alternatives b	SE
Mothers										
Parental leave (2000) ←	Income (2000)	ζ_1	0.03	(0.03)	0.03	(0.03)	0.03	(0.03)	0.03	(0.03)
Attitude (2000) ←	Parental leave (2000)	β_1	−0.05	(0.16)	−0.24*	(0.11)	0.42**	(0.15)	−0.13	(0.16)
	Income (2000)	ζ_2	−0.22**	(0.08)	−0.04	(0.05)	0.05	(0.07)	0.18*	(0.08)
Parental leave (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	γ_1	−0.01	(0.03)	−0.05	(0.04)	0.00	(0.03)	0.02	(0.03)
	Income (2010)	ζ_3	−0.05	(0.03)	−0.04	(0.03)	−0.04	(0.03)	−0.05	(0.03)
Attitude (2010) ←	Parental leave (2010)	δ	0.02	(0.09)	−0.11	(0.09)	0.01	(0.10)	−0.18	(0.10)
	Income (2010)	ζ_4	−0.11*	(0.05)	−0.02	(0.04)	−0.09*	(0.05)	0.01	(0.05)
Autoregressive paths										
Parental leave (2010) ←	Parental leave (2000)	β_2	−0.17*	(0.08)	−0.16*	(0.08)	−0.16*	(0.08)	−0.16*	(0.08)
Attitude (2010) ←	Attitude (2010)	γ_2	0.37**	(0.05)	0.42**	(0.06)	0.21**	(0.05)	0.29**	(0.05)
Fathers										
Parental leave (2000) ←	Income (2000)	ζ_1	0.02**	(0.00)	0.02**	(0.00)	0.02**	(0.00)	0.02**	(0.00)
Attitude (2000) ←	Parental leave (2000)	β_1	1.33	(0.88)	−0.14	(0.59)	1.96*	(0.90)	−0.40	(0.97)
	Income (2000)	ζ_2	−0.26**	(0.07)	0.04	(0.04)	0.03	(0.07)	0.35**	(0.07)
Parental leave (2010) ←	Attitude (2000)	γ_1	0.01	(0.01)	0.02	(0.02)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)
	Income (2010)	ζ_3	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
Attitude (2010) ←	Parental leave (2010)	δ	−0.17	(0.22)	0.14	(0.19)	−0.41*	(0.20)	−0.63**	(0.20)
	Income (2010)	ζ_4	−0.10*	(0.04)	0.05	(0.03)	−0.02	(0.03)	0.04	(0.04)
Autoregressive paths										
Parental leave (2010) ←	Parental leave (2000)	β_2	0.05	(0.19)	0.05	(0.19)	0.09	(0.20)	0.07	(0.19)
Attitude (2010) ←	Attitude (2010)	γ_2	0.44**	(0.05)	0.24**	(0.06)	0.40**	(0.04)	0.40**	(0.04)
Observations			624		630		613		616	
Model degrees of freedom			10		10		10		10	
χ^2 LR test of model vs. saturated			26.077		16.991		15.856		22.429	
p model vs. saturated			0.004		0.075		0.104		0.013	
RMSEA			0.072		0.047		0.044		0.064	
CFI			0.922		0.924		0.956		0.934	
SRMR			0.041		0.031		0.033		0.037	

Note: $+p < 0.1$ * ¡0.05∗∗ < 0.01. Unstandardized coefficients. The two rows where we report our central relationship is shaded light gray. Parental leave is measured in 100s of weeks. The LR test is a test of the difference between the model vs. the saturated model. CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; CI = confidence interval; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. CFI > .95, RMSEA < .06, SRMR < .08 are considered good fit.

H   Alternative estimator: Change score regression models

An alternative way to model the impact of parental leave on attitudes is using a change scores, where the dependent variable is the attitude change score regressed on the control variable change scores and baseline estimates of parental leave and attitudes in 2000. Change scores are defined as follow-up measure (2010) minus the baseline measure (2000). The advantage of this estimator is that we focus solely on within-person changes, but a disadvantage is that we cannot account for the reciprocal relationship between leave and attitudes (Lüdtke and Robitzsch 2023). We report the estimates in Table H1 using the same sample as in Table 2 . The table shows that we find similar estimates with this type of model, with the exception that the *Private Alternatives* coefficient is slightly less significant here and falls below the standard 5 percent level ($p = 0.06$)). We note that the results do not change when excluding the parents who had their last child 2000 or earlier.

The regression model used to analyze the change in attitudes from 2000 to 2010 is specified as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Delta Y_i = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{gender}_i + \beta_2 \Delta\text{pleave2000-2010}_i + \beta_3(\text{gender}_i \times \text{pleave2000-2010}_i) \\
& + \beta_4 Y_{i,2000} + \beta_5 \text{pleave1996-2000}_i + \beta_6 \Delta\text{income}_i + \beta_7 \Delta\text{yearsedu}_i \qquad (5) \\
& + \beta_8 \Delta\text{ageyoungest}_i + \beta_9 \Delta\text{working}_i + \beta_{10}\Delta\text{partnered}_i + \beta_{11}\Delta\text{child}_i + \epsilon_i
\end{aligned}
$$

where ΔY_i represents the change in the dependent variable (attitude) for individual i from 2000 to 2010. The term β_0 is the intercept. The variable gender_i represents gender (father = 1, mother = 0). The variable pleave2000-2010_i measures the total parental leave taken by individual i between 2000 and 2010 (in practice a change score). The interaction term $\text{gender}_i \times \text{pleave2000-2010}_i$ captures how the effect of parental leave varies by gender roles.

The model also includes the baseline attitude $Y_{i,2000}$, with β_4 representing its coefficient, to control for the initial level of attitude in 2000. This is crucial as the initial attitude is a potential confounder of the selection into treatment; for example, this attitude might predict parental leave uptake. The term pleave1996-2000_i denotes the total parental leave taken before 1996−2000, which means the experience before 2000 is taken into account. Additionally, the model accounts for several control variables, all represented as changes between 2000 and 2010: income (Δincome_i), years of education ($\Delta\text{yearsedu}_i$), age of the youngest child ($\Delta\text{ageyoungest}_i$), working status ($\Delta\text{working}_i$), partnered status ($\Delta\text{partnered}_i$), and the number of children in the household (Δchild_i). Finally, ϵ_i represents the error term for individual i. Note that we do not use difference in age as age changes the same for all respondents. It would be pos-

sible to control for all baseline characteristics (e.g., age in 2000, income in 2000, etc.) but there is a high risk of multicollinearity. However, the addition of these baseline characteristics does not change the results (not reported).

In Figure H1, we show the predicted change in attitude at different levels of parental leave based on the regressions in Table H1.

Table H1: Attitude change scores as a function of parental leave taken between 2000 and 2010

	Small Income Differences		Gender Equality in the Family		Shift to More Care in the Family		Private Alternatives	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Gender (Father = 1)	−0.03	(0.09)	−0.13	(0.08)	0.20*	(0.09)	−0.15	(0.09)
Parental leave 2000–2010	0.02	(0.08)	−0.12	(0.07)	0.07	(0.08)	−0.13	(0.09)
Gender × Parental leave 2000–2010	−0.17	(0.20)	0.19	(0.18)	−0.62**	(0.20)	−0.40+	(0.21)
Baseline attitude (2000)	−0.55**	(0.03)	−0.66**	(0.03)	−0.70**	(0.03)	−0.61**	(0.02)
Parental leave (1996–2000)	0.06	(0.08)	0.01	(0.07)	0.03	(0.08)	−0.06	(0.08)
Income (in 1,000 SEKs)	−0.11**	(0.02)	0.03	(0.02)	−0.03	(0.02)	0.02	(0.03)
Years of education	0.02	(0.02)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.02)	−0.01	(0.02)
Age of youngest child	−0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
Working	0.19**	(0.07)	0.03	(0.06)	−0.05	(0.07)	0.03	(0.07)
Have a partner	−0.02	(0.06)	−0.02	(0.06)	0.08	(0.06)	0.08	(0.06)
Number of children in household	−0.01	(0.03)	0.02	(0.03)	−0.02	(0.03)	0.00	(0.03)
Constant	1.96**	(0.15)	2.77**	(0.17)	1.74**	(0.14)	1.97**	(0.14)
Observations	1 107		1 118		1 091		1 099	
R-squared	0.313		0.290		0.418		0.368	

Note: $+p < 0.1$ $* < 0.05$ $** < 0.01$. Unstandardized coefficients. Parental leave is measured in 100s of weeks.

Figure H1: Change score estimates

Note: Predicted values are estimated based on Table H1. 95% confidence intervals.

I Change score regressions using matched non-parents

In our main analyses we treat the parents with little or no parental leave as the control. However, one concern is that the estimates are biased and the parallel trends assumption is violated. This could be due to non-parents' attitudes moving in the same general direction, which would mean that parental leave is not likely a contributing factor to attitudes.

Creating a matched non-parent sample – those who have not been treated with any parental role experiences during the analyzed period – is not clear-cut. The reason is that such a comparison requires producing a matched sub sample of those who were still not parents in 2010. The usefulness of this sub sample as a control group is lessened as selection into parenthood between 2000 and 2010 makes the non-parent group increasingly non-comparable to the parent group. Relatively few "representative" women and men in the older cohorts are left who still want to or cannot become parents after ten years, and it is unclear to what extent these two groups are comparable to the parental group. During this period in Sweden (2000–2010), estimates using a random sample omnibus survey (the SOM surveys) show that about 70–75% of cohorts beyond age 35 have children, and this remains stable after this point, such that the overwhelming majority of the rest will not become parents. For a similar discussion on parenthood and matching in the Swedish context, see Naurin, Stolle, and Markstedt (2023).

Matching is still feasible and we note below that the findings are similar to our other estimators. In this section, we use coarsened exact matching to produce a subsample of respondents who are not parents in 2000 or 2010 and do not have children living in their household. We created a matched sample using gender, age, income, and having a partner, important predictors of selection into parenthood; the resulting matched sample consists of 492 respondents. We then used the same change scores as used in Section H, except that we use treatment group variable where 0 is the matched control, and values 1–4 represent different experiences of parental leave: 0–7, 8–30, 31–50, and more than 50 weeks. The first range (0–7) corresponds to the two first quartiles, 8–30 and 31–50 is an about even split of the third quartile, and more than 50 is the fourth quartile.

In Figure I1, we show the predicted change in attitudes at different levels of parental leave relative to the matched control group by gender, based on the regressions in Table I1. The following equation represents the post-estimation of a change in the dependent variable due to a change in the treatment group j (the parental leave ranges above), holding other factors constant, estimated at different levels of the gender vari-

able:

$$\frac{\partial(\Delta Y_i)}{\partial(\text{treat\_groups}_{ij})}\bigg|\text{gender}_i \qquad (6)$$

Focusing on the effects of parental leave on the two variables that are significant and negative in our main specification for fathers (Shift to More Care in the Family and Private Alternatives), we see that the change scores of the 0–7 weeks of leave group are very similar to the matched group. However, as we increase the length of leave, the differences become incrementally more negative, particularly for the *Shift to More Care in the Family* variable. In the other variables, we tend to find non-significant change score differences (*Gender Equality in the Family*) or the parental sample changing slightly more than the non-parental sample across the board (*Small Income Differences*). Hence, we largely reproduce the findings from our main models and suggest the findings are unique to fathers and are not just a general trend.

Table I1: Attitude change relative to a matched non-parent sample

	Small Income Differences		Gender Equality in the Family		Shift to More Care in the Family		Private Alternatives	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Parental leave (ref: matched non-parents)								
0–7 weeks	−0.22*	(0.10)	0.01	(0.09)	0.18+	(0.10)	0.18	(0.11)
8–30 weeks	−0.57*	(0.24)	−0.14	(0.22)	0.35	(0.26)	0.28	(0.25)
31–50 weeks	−0.12	(0.18)	0.12	(0.16)	0.28	(0.18)	0.10	(0.18)
50+ weeks	−0.13	(0.11)	−0.16	(0.10)	0.29*	(0.11)	0.17	(0.12)
Gender: Man (ref. woman)	−0.08	(0.10)	−0.06	(0.09)	0.41**	(0.10)	0.10	(0.10)
Parental leave × gender (ref: matched men)								
0–7 weeks × Father	0.00	(0.13)	−0.06	(0.12)	−0.20	(0.13)	−0.21	(0.14)
8–30 weeks × Father	0.38	(0.26)	−0.02	(0.23)	−0.43	(0.28)	−0.17	(0.27)
31–50 weeks × Father	0.08	(0.24)	−0.03	(0.21)	−0.58*	(0.24)	−0.55*	(0.25)
50+ weeks × Father	−0.07	(0.21)	0.24	(0.19)	−0.77**	(0.21)	−0.70**	(0.22)
Baseline attitude (2000)	−0.55**	(0.02)	−0.63**	(0.03)	−0.69**	(0.02)	−0.61**	(0.02)
Income (in 1,000 SEKs)	−0.12**	(0.02)	0.02	(0.02)	−0.03	(0.02)	0.05*	(0.02)
Years of education	0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)
Working	0.11*	(0.05)	0.02	(0.05)	−0.05	(0.05)	0.05	(0.06)
Have a partner	−0.05	(0.05)	0.00	(0.05)	0.04	(0.05)	0.09	(0.05)
Number of children in household	−0.03	(0.03)	0.02	(0.03)	−0.02	(0.03)	−0.02	(0.03)
Constant	2.13**	(0.11)	2.68**	(0.14)	1.42**	(0.10)	1.65**	(0.11)
Observations	1 523		1 540		1 503		1 519	
R-squared	0.324		0.288		0.412		0.366	

Note: $+p < 0.1$, * ¡0.05, $** < 0.01$. Unstandardized coefficients. Parental leave is measured in 100s of weeks.

Figure I1: Change score estimates relative to matched non-parent sample within each gender group

Note: Predicted values are estimated based on Table I1. 95% confidence intervals. The estimates are relative to the matched non-parent sample calculated separately by gender.

J   Interaction with time since last parental leave experience

It is possible that there is a greater effect on attitudes when the parents are closer to the leave. In this section, we explore such a possibility. In Figure J1, we visualize the interaction between distance from last parental leave in 2010 and length of parental leave using the same regression specification as in Section H, with the interaction addition. For each dependent variable, we report the components of the interaction under the panel (separated by women and men) so that readers can fully interpret the main effects in conjunction with the interaction. The b_leave shows the baseline relationship between parental leave and the change scores, and b_dist shows the same for temporal distance, while the *int* parameter is the interaction coefficient to get a sense of the direction. The p-value shows the interaction significance.

In the case of *Shift to More Care in the Family*, the positive interaction coefficient (0.086) combined with the main effects of leave and distance from leave are in the expected direction but not significant ($p = 0.27$). As the visualization shows, for fathers who take a lot of leave, the closer they are to the leave, the stronger the negative effect on the dependent variable. For fathers, a long leave and a long distance from that leave has a null effect on the attitude or possibly a positive effect on it. However, so few fathers fall into this category that these results should be interpreted with caution. We see a similar pattern in the *Private Alternatives* attitude, though the coefficient is significant ($p = 0.05$); we see that fathers become more opposed to private alternatives when they have recently taken a long leave. *Gender Equality in the Family* is in the reverse direction for fathers, suggesting that a recent long leave is associated with a slightly more positive view of gender equality, but more distance from the long leave may be associated with diminished support for gender equality. Perhaps fathers who took a long leave have a different recollection of their experiences after a lot of time has passed. It should, however, be noted that we are dealing with a smaller number of observations running this interaction, which means we should treat the findings with caution.

Figure J1: Interaction between distance from last parental leave in 2010 and length of parental leave

Small Income Differences

| 0 mon leave | 30 mon leave | 60 mon leave | 90 mon leave | 120 mon leave |

Parameters:
Mothers main b_leave = -0.158, b_dist = 0.009, int = 0.036 (p = 0.07)
Fathers main b_leave = -0.316, b_dist = -0.016, int = 0.032 (p = 0.69)

Gender Equality in the Family

| 0 mon leave | 30 mon leave | 60 mon leave | 90 mon leave | 120 mon leave |

Parameters:
Mothers main b_leave = -0.201, b_dist = 0.006, int = 0.017 (p = 0.36)
Fathers main b_leave = 0.676, b_dist = -0.003, int = -0.186 (p = 0.01)

Shift to More Care in the Family

| 0 mon leave | 30 mon leave | 60 mon leave | 90 mon leave | 120 mon leave |

Years since last parental leave

Parameters:
Mothers main b_leave = -0.145, b_dist = -0.004, int = 0.037 (p = 0.07)
Fathers main b_leave = -0.774, b_dist = 0.005, int = 0.086 (p = 0.27)

Private Alternatives

| 0 mon leave | 30 mon leave | 60 mon leave | 90 mon leave | 120 mon leave |

Years since last parental leave

Parameters:
Mothers main b_leave = -0.160, b_dist = -0.014, int = -0.008 (p = 0.70)
Fathers main b_leave = -1.181, b_dist = -0.019, int = 0.162 (p = 0.05)

—— Mother
– – Father

Note: 95% confidence intervals.

K   Interaction with partnership

It is possible that single parents are affected differently than those in a relationship because parental role dynamics are different when there is no counterpart in the household. We have information on whether our respondents have a partner at the time of the survey but not their partnership status at the time of the parental leave. As such, it is likely that many of the respondents in 2000 or in 2010 who reported not having a partner were partnered at the time of the leave. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to remove these people from the analysis. Still, our best guess at whether they were single at the time of the parental leave is simply using relationship status in 2010.

In Figure K1, we visually display the interaction between whether they had a partner in 2010 and length of parental leave using the same regression specification as in Section H, with the interaction addition. None of interactions are significant, but the tendency is that the relationship with parental leave is smaller for the single parents.

Figure K1: Interaction between partnership and length of parental leave

Small Income Differences

Gender Equality in the Family

Shift to More Care in the Family

Private Alternatives

No partner in 2010

Have partner in 2010

Note: 95% confidence intervals.