**Appendix 1: List of Populist Parties in the Latinobarometer Analysis**

**Appendix 2: Control Variables in the Latinobarometer Analysis**

**Appendix 3: Results of Vote Intentions with Demographic Variables Included**

**Appendix 4: Results From Table 2 Highlighting the Choice Between Populist and Non-Populist Opposition Parties**

**Appendix 5: Cross-National Models with Controls for Presidential Approval and Views of Democracy**

**Appendix 6: Results from 2023 Latinobarometer, by Partisan or Not**

**Appendix 7: Results of Cross-National Survey with Country Fixed Effects**

**Appendix 8: Variables in the Bolivia Analysis**

**Appendix 9: Full Results of the Bolivia Analysis in Table 4 with Coefficients for Demographic Variables Listed**

**Appendix 10: Results of the Bolivia Analysis Separated by Survey Wave**

**Appendix 11: Results of the Bolivia Analysis with Survey Wave Fixed Effects**

**Appendix 1: List of Populist Parties in the Latinobarometer Analysis**

While the PREPPS database identifies a larger set of populist parties, this analysis is limited to the parties that were mentioned by Latinobarometer respondents to the vote choice prompt and that are in the PREPPS database. The table below lists all the parties by country and their classification as populist or not populist. All parties in Nicaragua that had expressed vote intentions are classified as populist while no Panamanian parties are, but every other country in this sample has a mix of populist and non-populist parties seeking office.

**Table A1: List of Political Parties in the Vote Intention Model Classified by Populist Status**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Non-Populist Parties** | **Populist Parties** |
| Argentina | Cambiemos | Civic Front for Santiago |
|  | Evolución | Front for the Renewal of Concord |
|  |  | Justicialist Party |
|  |  | Workers' Left Front |
| Bolivia | Christian Democratic Party | Movement for Socialism |
|  | National Unity Front |  |
| Brazil | Brazilian Democratic Movement | Brazilian Socialist Party |
|  | Brazilian Republican Party | Social Liberal Party |
|  | Democrats | Workers' Party |
|  | Progressive Party |  |
|  | Social Democracy Party |  |
| Chile | Broad Front | The Force of the Majority |
|  | Chile Let's Go |  |
|  | Democratic Convergence |  |
| Colombia | Colombian Conservative Party | Alternative Democratic Polo Party |
|  | Colombian Liberal Party | Citizen Option Party |
|  | Green Alliance Party | Coalition List of the Decency |
|  | Independent Movement of Absolute Renovation | Democratic Center Party |
|  | National Unity Social Party / Party of the U |  |
|  | Radical Change Party |  |
| Costa Rica | Citizens Action Party | Broad Front |
|  | National Liberation Party | National Integration |
|  | Social Christian Unity Party | National Restoration |
|  |  | Social-Christian Republican Party |
| Dominican Republic | Dominican Liberation Party | Modern Revolutionary Party |
| Liberal Reformist Party | Social Christian Reformist Party |
| Ecuador | Creating Opportunities Movement | Fuerza Ecuador |
|  | Movimiento Alianza Pais | January 21 Patriotic Society Party |
|  |  | Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement - New Country |
|  |  | Party of the Democratic Left |
|  |  | Social Christian Party |
| El Salvador | Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front | Christian Democratic Party |
|  | Grand Alliance for National Unity |  |
|  | National Coalition Party |  |
|  | Nationalist Republican Alliance |  |
| Guatemala | Commitment, Renewal, and Order Party | Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity |
|  | Encounter for Guatemala | National Unity for Hope |
|  | Everyone Together for Guatemala |  |
|  | National Convergence Front |  |
|  | National Union for Change |  |
|  | Patriot Party |  |
|  | Renewed Democratic Liberty Party |  |
|  | Vision with Values |  |
| Mexico | Movimiento Ciudadano | Coalición PRI-PVEM |
|  | Partido Accion Nacional | Movimiento Regeneracion Nacional |
|  | Partido Nueva Alianza | Partido Encuentro Social |
|  |  | Partido de la Revolucion Democrática |
|  |  | Partido del Trabajo |
| Nicaragua |  | Alliance for the Republic |
|  |  | Conservative Party of Nicaragua |
|  |  | Liberal Constitutionalist Party |
|  |  | Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance |
|  |  | Sandinista National Liberation Front |
| Panama | Democratic Change |  |
|  | Democratic Revolutionary Party |  |
|  | Liberal Republican Nationalist Movement |  |
|  | Panemeñista Party |  |
| Paraguay | Authentic Liberal Radical Party | Let's Do It |
|  | Beloved Fatherland | National Crusade Movement |
|  | National Encounter Party |  |
|  | National Republican Association - Colorado Party |  |
| Peru | Alliance for the Progress of Peru | Broad Front |
|  | Peruvians for Change | Popular Force |
|  | Popular Action |  |
|  | Popular Alliance |  |
| Uruguay | Broad Front | Popular Assembly |
|  | Colorado Party |  |
|  | Independent Party |  |
|  | National Party |  |
| Venezuela | Democratic Unity Roundtable | United Socialist Party of Venezuela/Great Patriotic Pole |

**Appendix 2: Control Variables in the Latinobarometer Analysis**

The following variables are in the analysis of support for populist parties in Tables 1-2.

*Perceived economic situation*: “Do you consider the country’s present economic situation to be better, a little better, the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago?” High values represent positive views of the economy.

*Fear Violent Crime*: “How often are you concerned that you could be a victim of a violent crime? Almost all the time, sometimes, occasionally, never”-high values represent greater fear of crime.

*Perceived Corruption*: Measured as an index of three questions. “Imagine a foreign friend who ask you what are the odds in your country of bribing a policeman in order to avoid an arrest? What would you answer? (answer) And if he would ask, what are the odds to bribe a judge in order to obtain a favorable sentence? (answer) And if he would ask what are the odds to bribe someone in a MINISTRY in order to obtain a contract? (answer).” Answers are “NOT possible, don´t even try, Low, Depends on the case, Fair amount, High.” High values represent a perception that corruption is rampant.

*Received Welfare Benefit*: Respondents were asked “Are you a beneficiary of a subsidy or of any help from the state? Yes or no”

**Appendix 3: Results of Vote Intentions with Demographic Variables Included**

As described in the text, we do not include demographic variables because the models pool parties from the left and right in the same categories and so we do not have strong expectations about demographic variables and worry that including them could add additional noise while reducing the sample size as missing respondents are excluded. However, to ensure that the results are not being driven by missing variable bias, in Table A1 we include controls for the respondent’s age cohort, gender, education level,[[1]](#footnote-1) level of religiosity,[[2]](#footnote-2) ethnicity,[[3]](#footnote-3) and household wealth.[[4]](#footnote-4) The results in Table A1 are consistent with those in Table 1 in the text: if the incumbent is not a populist, those who most distrust the current institutions and are most dissatisfied with democracy are more likely to support a populist opposition party than a non-populist party while if the incumbent is a populist, those who still distrust institutions are more likely to support a populist opposition party while those who are dissatisfied with democracy under populist rule are more likely to support a non-populist opposition party.

**Table A1: Models of Support for Populist Incumbents with Demographic Controls**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent (Model 9)** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent (Model 10)** | | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent (Model 11)** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent (Model 12)** | |
|  | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** |
| Trust in Institutions | -0.621\* | -0.404\* | -1.028\* | -0.779\* |  |  |  |  |
| (0.066) | (0.059) | (0.179) | (0.127) |  |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  |  | -0.641\* | -0.439\* | -0.888\* | -1.099\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.051) | (0.046) | (0.138) | (0.110) |
| View of the Economy | -0.661\* | -0.530\* | -0.705\* | -0.714\* | -0.588\* | -0.478\* | -0.550\* | -0.467\* |
| (0.043) | (0.040) | (0.103) | (0.078) | (0.044) | (0.040) | (0.107) | (0.082) |
| Corruption | 0.028 | -0.137\* | 0.376\* | 0.389\* | 0.012 | -0.156\* | 0.330\* | 0.308\* |
| (0.039) | (0.036) | (0.100) | (0.076) | (0.038) | (0.035) | (0.098) | (0.078) |
| Fear Violent Crime | 0.075 | 0.077\* | 0.226\* | 0.084 | 0.069 | 0.086\* | 0.223\* | 0.055 |
| (0.040) | (0.037) | (0.114) | (0.083) | (0.040) | (0.037) | (0.114) | (0.087) |
| Received Welfare Benefit | 0.110 | -0.067 | -0.588 | -0.417 | 0.085 | -0.113 | -0.625\* | -0.250 |
| (0.120) | (0.114) | (0.302) | (0.214) | (0.120) | (0.113) | (0.303) | (0.219) |
| Wealth Quintile | 0.053 | -0.001 | 0.188\* | 0.166\* | 0.060 | 0.007 | 0.225\* | 0.164\* |
| (0.033) | (0.031) | (0.087) | (0.064) | (0.033) | (0.031) | (0.086) | (0.066) |
| Age 26-40 | -0.065 | 0.083 | -0.009 | -0.449\* | -0.051 | 0.106 | -0.029 | -0.503\* |
|  | (0.111) | (0.107) | (0.299) | (0.222) | (0.111) | (0.108) | (0.300) | (0.230) |
| Age 41-60 | -0.292\* | 0.266\* | -0.451 | -0.519\* | -0.244\* | 0.311\* | -0.379 | -0.552\* |
|  | (0.119) | (0.110) | (0.324) | (0.234) | (0.120) | (0.111) | (0.323) | (0.244) |
| Age 61+ | -0.346\* | 0.312\* | -0.186 | -0.399 | -0.350\* | 0.340\* | 0.043 | -0.032 |
|  | (0.151) | (0.134) | (0.420) | (0.317) | (0.151) | (0.134) | (0.422) | (0.323) |
| Male | 0.315\* | 0.164\* | 0.366 | 0.325 | 0.316\* | 0.148 | 0.446\* | 0.394\* |
|  | (0.085) | (0.077) | (0.225) | (0.170) | (0.085) | (0.077) | (0.223) | (0.175) |
| Incomplete primary education | 0.000 | 0.630\* | 0.575 | 1.462\* | -0.034 | 0.617\* | 0.240 | 1.117 |
| (0.212) | (0.225) | (0.597) | (0.611) | (0.215) | (0.226) | (0.564) | (0.630) |
| Complete Primary Education | -0.111 | 0.498\* | 0.498 | 1.432\* | -0.148 | 0.497\* | -0.031 | 1.241\* |
| (0.210) | (0.224) | (0.590) | (0.602) | (0.214) | (0.225) | (0.564) | (0.620) |
| Incomplete Secondary, Technical | -0.115 | 1.115\* | 0.910 | 1.664\* | -0.131 | 1.087\* | 0.234 | 1.258 |
| (0.219) | (0.225) | (0.547) | (0.582) | (0.221) | (0.226) | (0.520) | (0.601) |
| Complete Secondary, Technical | -0.106 | 0.671\* | 0.288 | 1.589\* | -0.147 | 0.662\* | -0.465 | 1.117\* |
| (0.208) | (0.221) | (0.582) | (0.590) | (0.211) | (0.222) | (0.557) | (0.612) |
| Incomplete High School | -0.300 | 0.593\* | 0.500 | 2.163\* | -0.347 | 0.527\* | -0.357 | 1.638\* |
| (0.228) | (0.237) | (0.670) | (0.630) | (0.231) | (0.239) | (0.647) | (0.647) |
| Complete High School | 0.119 | 1.224 | 0.670 | 1.677 | 0.096 | 1.197 | 0.063 | 1.371 |
|  | (0.233) | (0.238) | (0.595) | (0.601) | (0.236) | (0.239) | (0.574) | (0.628) |
| Religious Devotion | -0.077\* | 0.039 | 0.025 | 0.075 | -0.089 | 0.032\* | -0.040 | 0.011 |
|  | (0.035) | (0.033) | (0.101) | (0.079) | (0.035) | (0.033) | (0.101) | (0.082) |
| Indigenous | -0.941\* | -0.625 | 1.174\* | 0.429 | -0.957\* | -0.657\* | 1.498\* | 0.691 |
|  | (0.240) | (0.224) | (0.564) | (0.454) | (0.242) | (0.224) | (0.571) | (0.478) |
| Mestizo | -0.824\* | -0.643\* | 0.780 | 0.747 | -0.799\* | -0.651\* | 0.905 | 0.923\* |
|  | (0.178) | (0.173) | (0.533) | (0.405) | (0.180) | (0.175) | (0.542) | (0.429) |
| Mulatto | -0.633\* | -0.657\* | -1.468 | 0.648 | -0.577\* | -0.570\* | -1.213 | 0.906 |
|  | (0.238) | (0.237) | (1.149) | (0.512) | (0.244) | (0.239) | (1.157) | (0.546) |
| White | -0.622\* | -0.254 | -0.528 | 0.909 | -0.561\* | -0.247 | -0.677 | 0.822 |
|  | (0.183) | (0.177) | (0.653) | (0.429) | (0.185) | (0.178) | (0.659) | (0.453) |
| Other Race | -0.135 | -0.782\* | 1.551\* | 1.751\* | -0.131 | -0.717\* | 1.808\* | 1.924\* |
|  | (0.248) | (0.267) | (0.739) | (0.573) | (0.250) | (0.265) | (0.730) | (0.591) |
| Constant | 2.517 | 1.354 | -1.999 | -2.351 | 2.717 | 1.537 | -1.778 | -1.392 |
|  | (0.346) | (0.341) | (0.933) | (0.813) | (0.340) | (0.335) | (0.891) | (0.809) |
| N | 4222 |  | 1227 |  | 4272 |  | 1252 |  |
| χ2 | 804.30\* |  | 452.47\* |  | 886.56\* |  | 542.97\* |  |
| Multinomial Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | | | | | |

**Appendix 4: Results From Table 2 Presented Highlighting the Choice Between Populist and Non-Populist Opposition Parties**

The multinomial logit models in Table 2 use vote for the governing party as the baseline option. However, this can make it difficult to observe what leads voters to support a populist opposition party instead of a non-populist one. In Table A2 we present the coefficients of that choice. The key results form this table are discussed in the text.

**Table A2: Correlates of Vote Intentions for Populist Opposition Instead of Non-Populist Opposition**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Non-Populist Incumbent (Model 5):** | **Populist Incumbent (Model 6):** | **Non-Populist Incumbent (Model 7):** | **Populist Incumbent (Model 8):** |
|  | **Vote for Populist Opposition instead of Non-Populist Opposition** | **Vote for Populist Opposition instead of Non-Populist Opposition** | **Vote for Populist Opposition instead of Non-Populist Opposition** | **Vote for Populist Opposition instead of Non-Populist Opposition** |
| Trust in Institutions | -0.178\* | -0.692\* |  |  |
| (0.058) | (0.147) |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  | -0.265\* | 0.258\* |
|  |  | (0.042) | (0.120) |
| View of the Economy | -0.147\* | 0.366\* | -0.127\* | 0.245\* |
| (0.034) | (0.079) | (0.035) | (0.081) |
| Perceived Corruption | 0.117\* | -0.063 | 0.115\* | -0.025 |
| (0.032) | (0.079) | (0.031) | (0.078) |
| Fear Violent  Crime | -0.075\* | 0.029 | -0.087\* | 0.039 |
| (0.034) | (0.094) | (0.034) | (0.092) |
| Received Welfare Benefit | 0.276\* | 0.156 | 0.251\* | -0.031 |
| (0.103) | (0.250) | (0.103) | (0.245) |
| Constant | 0.091 | -0.282 | 0.343 | -1.950 |
|  | (0.184) | (0.457) | (0.166) | (0.426) |
| N | 5,258 | 1,879 | 5,335 | 1,912 |
| χ2 | 709.01\* | 776.02\* | 863.58\* | 918.45\* |
| Multinomial Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | |

**Appendix 5: Cross-National Models with Controls for Presidential Approval and Views of Democracy**

In the paper, we model support for populist incumbent and opposition parties as a function of evaluations of democratic performance. As robustness tests, we control for presidential approval as a more short-term determinant of political support and normative views about democracy as a more long-term driver of support. The results are in Table A3 and Table A4 below.

As described in the text, Table A3 shows that those who disapprove of a non-populist president are particularly likely to support a populist opposition party, while presidential disapproval does not have a significant effect distinguishing between populist and non-populist opposition to a populist incumbent. Including presidential approval in the model reduces the importance of perceived government outcomes and in particular reduces the effect of corruption in generating support for populist alternatives to non-populist governments. However, distrust in institutions and dissatisfaction with democracy remain significantly correlated with populist party support inside and outside of the government even when presidential approval is controlled for.

The effects of institutional trust and evaluations of democratic performance also do not change if we control for whether or not the respondent believes that democracy is the best system of government (Table A4). The results in Table A4 also suggest that supporters of populist opposition parties tend to have low levels of belief that democracy is the best system of government (regardless of whether or not the incumbent is a populist) while supporters of non-populist opposition parties tend to believe more in democracy’s ideals than do supporters of populist incumbent parties. Populist supporters are less enamored with democracy than the rest of the public is. But these robustness checks do not change the fundamental associations whereby those who distrust institutions and are dissatisfied with democracy support populist opposition ruling parties whereby populist incumbent support is higher if citizens have positive views of democratic performance under the regime.

**Table A3: Model of Vote Intentions for Incumbent Party, Populist Opposition Party, or Non-Populist Opposition Party by Incumbent Party Type, Controlling for Presidential Approval**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent (Model 9)** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent (Model 10)** | | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent (Model 11)** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent (Model 12)** | |
|  | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** |
| Trust in Institutions | -0.254\* | -0.168\* | -0.617\* | 0.089 |  |  |  |  |
| (0.066) | (0.059) | (0.175) | (0.125) |  |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  |  | -0.327\* | -0.242\* | -0.291\* | -0.640\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.051) | (0.047) | (0.139) | (0.106) |
| Presidential Approval | -2.845\* | -2.456\* | -4.065\* | -3.662\* | -2.787\* | -2.390\* | -3.973\* | -3.183\* |
| (0.096) | (0.087) | (0.329) | (0.185) | (0.097) | (0.087) | (0.324) | (0.181) |
| View of the Economy | -0.356\* | -0.138\* | -0.077 | -0.467\* | -0.317\* | -0.102\* | -0.059 | -0.339\* |
| (0.042) | (0.039) | (0.091) | (0.071) | (0.043) | (0.040) | (0.093) | (0.073) |
| Perceived Corruption | -0.062 | -0.267\* | 0.334\* | 0.402\* | -0.078\* | -0.278\* | 0.260\* | 0.285\* |
| (0.040) | (0.037) | (0.093) | (0.072) | (0.039) | (0.036) | (0.093) | (0.072) |
| Fear Violent  Crime | 0.023 | 0.051 | 0.199 | 0.159\* | 0.019 | 0.059 | 0.232\* | 0.157\* |
| (0.040) | (0.037) | (0.109) | (0.080) | (0.040) | (0.037) | (0.107) | (0.079) |
| Received Welfare Benefit | 0.221 | 0.016 | -0.027 | -0.168 | 0.187 | -0.016 | 0.061 | 0.048 |
| (0.118) | (0.111) | (0.285) | (0.214) | (0.118) | (0.110) | (0.277) | (0.210) |
| Constant | 2.333 | 2.466 | -0.070 | 0.173 | 2.562 | 2.638 | -0.576 | 1.570 |
|  | (0.226) | (0.208) | (0.535) | (0.405) | (0.212) | (0.197) | (0.505) | (0.371) |
| N | 5,138 |  | 1,850 |  | 5,213 |  | 1,878 |  |
| χ2 | 2106.87\* |  | 1446.87\* |  | 2161.27\* |  | 1444.65\* |  |
| Multinomial Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | | | | | |

**Table A4: Model of Vote Intentions for Incumbent Party, Populist Opposition Party, or Non-Populist Opposition Party by Incumbent Party Type, Controlling for Presidential Approval and Belief that Democracy is the Best System of Government**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent (Model 13)** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent (Model 14)** | | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent (Model 15)** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent (Model 16)** | |
|  | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** |
| Trust in Institutions | -0.220\* | -0.161\* | -0.503\* | 0.039 |  |  |  |  |
| (0.067) | (0.060) | (0.180) | (0.128) |  |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  |  | -0.306\* | -0.242\* | -0.271 | -0.664\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.052) | (0.048) | (0.140) | (0.107) |
| Democracy is Best System | -0.171\* | -0.007 | -0.399\* | 0.129 | -0.119\* | 0.036 | -0.381\* | 0.241\* |
| (0.059) | (0.056) | (0.142) | (0.114) | (0.059) | (0.056) | (0.137) | (0.112) |
| Presidential Approval | -2.854\* | -2.467\* | -3.966\* | -3.704\* | -2.802\* | -2.401\* | -3.840\* | -3.270\* |
| (0.098) | (0.088) | (0.331) | (0.189) | (0.098) | (0.088) | (0.326) | (0.186) |
| View of the Economy | -0.347\* | -0.127\* | -0.081 | -0.450\* | -0.314\* | -0.097\* | -0.076 | -0.326\* |
| (0.043) | (0.040) | (0.092) | (0.071) | (0.043) | (0.040) | (0.094) | (0.074) |
| Perceived Corruption | -0.043 | -0.251\* | 0.365\* | 0.364\* | -0.063 | -0.267\* | 0.305\* | 0.247\* |
| (0.040) | (0.037) | (0.096) | (0.073) | (0.039) | (0.036) | (0.095) | (0.073) |
| Fear Violent  Crime | 0.025 | 0.050 | 0.233\* | 0.186\* | 0.017 | 0.053 | 0.240\* | 0.162\* |
| (0.041) | (0.037) | (0.110) | (0.081) | (0.040) | (0.037) | (0.107) | (0.080) |
| Received Welfare Benefit | 0.163 | 0.019 | -0.012 | -0.173 | 0.147 | -0.022 | 0.112 | 0.064 |
| (0.121) | (0.113) | (0.288) | (0.215) | (0.120) | (0.112) | (0.280) | (0.211) |
| Constant | 2.719 | 2.417 | 0.640 | -0.052 | 2.841 | 2.508 | 0.274 | 1.035 |
|  | (0.276) | (0.257) | (0.606) | (0.472) | (0.261) | (0.245) | (0.589) | (0.459) |
| N | 5,050 |  | 1,832 |  | 5,136 |  | 1,858 |  |
| χ2 | 2095.85\* |  | 1456.84\* |  | 2151.65\* |  | 1467.02\* |  |
| Multinomial Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | | | | | |

**Appendix 6: Results from 2023 Latinobarometer, by Partisan or Not**

The cross-national analysis in the paper focuses on the results of the 2018 PREPPS survey and the corresponding 2018 Latinobarometer. As a replication exercise, we analyze here the results of the 2023 PREPPS survey. Just as in the previous wave, the survey relies on experts giving their opinions about the strategies of political parties. However, the measurement of populism is slightly different, as it adds an additional indicator of a Manichean outlook. Specifically, respondents were asked to score parties on 4 dimensions:

Question 1: Many parties and leaders refer to “the people”, but only some describe “the people” specifically as a homogenous group, for which they claim to be the only legitimate representatives. This means that they do not acknowledge the existence of divergent interests and values in society, but rather suggest that “the people” have a unified political will, one common interest that should guide all political action. This group of “the people” is usually glorified and romanticized, describing an ideal-typically commoner/ordinary person, who embodies the national ideal.

Refers to the common people as an authentic and homogeneous unit, with which s/he identifies. (1)

Refers more generally to citizens with their different interests and values. (20)

Question 2: Respectful political leaders refrain from personal attacks and demonization. An example for personal attacks and demonization would be describing their political opponents as an existential threat or as subversive, criminal or foreign agents.

Demonizes and vilifies opponents. (1)

Treats opponents with respect (20)

Question 3. Some parties and leaders propagate a dualist worldview, a moral understanding of politics that translates into a perspective of society divided into two opposing poles. They reject the view of politics as a dynamic process and a reflection of divergent interests and values in society that require compromise and consensus.

Treats politics as a moral struggle between good and evil, denying the possibility of natural and justifiable differences of opinion (1)

Does not treat politics in moral terms, but acknowledges the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion (20)

Question 4: “Elites” are relatively small and cohesive social groups that have a greater say in society than others, for instance due to their political power, wealth or societal standing. The specific groups considered to be “the elite” may vary from country to country and even from party to party within the same country as do the terms used to address them. In some cases “the elite” can also refer to an international elite.

Specifically targets elite groups with derogatory rhetoric, discrediting their standing and legitimacy in society (1)

Does not target elite groups with derogatory rhetoric (20)

We again take the geometric mean to combine the 4 indicators into a single dimension of populism. We then follow the same methodology as in the paper, coding vote intentions by whether they were for the incumbent party or not and whether they were for a populist party or not (again using the breakpoint of 10 on the 20-point scale to differentiate populist and non-populist parties) and model vote intentions as a function of the same controls in Tables 1-2. The results are in Table TBD and the list of parties coded as populist are in Table TBX.

The 2023 data provide a couple of advantages over the 2018 data in addition to having more data to probe the robustness of the findings in Table 2. First, in 2023 there were more incumbent presidents in office that PREPPS experts coded as populist: populist parties were in office in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. Then the 2023 Latinobarometer includes a question on whether the respondent was “close to a particular party.” Unfortunately the survey does not ask a follow up question asking what party the respondent is close to nor does it ask any questions about previous electoral choices and so we cannot replicate the analysis of partisans in Bolivia in Table 5 that allowed us to check for the role of political predispositions. However, we can separate out political independents and ensure that the results are not being driven by incumbent partisans having positive views of democratic performance and opposition partisans having negative views of performance; political independents should lack these predispositions and thus provide a cleaner test of the mechanism.

The pooled results in Table TBD.1 are consistent with the results in Table 2 from 2018. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, respondents who are distrusting of political institutions or who are dissatisfied with democracy are significantly more likely to vote for a populist opposition party than they are to vote for a non-populist opposition party or the incumbent. That is true in countries governed by non-populists and by populists. And then, again, we see that populist incumbent parties benefit when respondents are trusting of institutions or are satisfied with democracy under their rule. That is consistent with Hypothesis 2. Thus the results from the 2018 Latinobarometer are not limited to that time period or set of populist incumbents.

Table TBD.2 and Table TBD.3 then divide the sample into political independents and political partisans respectively. The results on partisans combine those who self-identify with incumbent parties and with opposition ones, but among this pooled sample we see the same divides as in Table TBD.1. The more informative results, in our opinion, are in Table TBD.2 that looks at respondents who do not have these political predispositions. The results support Hypothesis 1 that distrusting individuals support populist opposition parties, although the difference in democratic satisfaction between populist opposition-party supporters and non-populist opposition party supporters in countries governed by populist incumbents is not quite statistically significant at conventional levels. Then we also see that political independents who are satisfied with institutions or democracy under populist rule supporting populist incumbents and rewarding them for that perceived good performance. So even among political independents who are not predisposed to support/reject the incumbent, views of democracy correlate with political support.

**Table TBD.1: Views of Democracy and Vote Intentions by Incumbency and Populism Among the Whole Sample, 2023**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent** | | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent** | |
|  | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** |
| Trust in Institutions | -0.294\* | -0.025 | -0.185\* | -0.125\* |  |  |  |  |
| (0.031) | (0.023) | (0.022) | (0.019) |  |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  |  | -0.748\* | -0.096 | -0.486\* | -0.261\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.074) | (0.055) | (0.052) | (0.043) |
| View of the Economy | -0.870\* | -0.751\* | -0.439\* | -0.330\* | -0.823\* | -0.750\* | -0.414\* | -0.327\* |
| (0.061) | (0.051) | (0.039) | (0.034) | (0.061) | (0.050) | (0.040) | (0.034) |
| Fear Violent  Crime | -0.049 | -0.156\* | -0.039 | 0.128\* | -0.071 | -0.169\* | -0.007 | 0.160\* |
| (0.053) | (0.043) | (0.040) | (0.036) | (0.053) | (0.043) | (0.039) | (0.035) |
| Perceived Corruption | 0.056 | -0.202\* | -0.299\* | -0.366\* | 0.027 | -0.187\* | -0.291\* | -0.374\* |
| (0.061) | (0.050) | (0.046) | (0.040) | (0.060) | (0.049) | (0.046) | (0.040) |
| Received Welfare Benefit | -0.434\* | -0.308\* | -0.620\* | 0.057 | -0.453\* | -0.363\* | -0.658\* | 0.044 |
| (0.131) | (0.104) | (0.100) | (0.079) | (0.129) | (0.103) | (0.099) | (0.078) |
| Constant | 1.954 | 2.060 | 0.902 | 0.564 | 1.970 | 2.147 | 0.823 | 0.443 |
|  | (0.186) | (0.161) | (0.117) | (0.109) | (0.183) | (0.160) | (0.112) | (0.105) |
| N | 2,397 |  | 4,246 |  | 2,448 |  | 4,369 |  |
| χ2 | 665.30\* |  | 777.88\* |  | 691.39\* |  | 833.45\* |  |
| Multinomial Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | | | | | |

**Table TBD.2: Views of Democracy and Vote Intentions by Incumbency and Populism Among those Who Are NOT Close to a Party, 2023**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent** | | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent** | |
|  | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** |
| Trust in Institutions | -0.307\* | -0.138\* | -0.207\* | -0.117\* |  |  |  |  |
| (0.053) | (0.042) | (0.041) | (0.032) |  |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  |  | -0.579\* | -0.226\* | -0.568\* | -0.444\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.122) | (0.098) | (0.093) | (0.075) |
| View of the Economy | -0.829\* | -0.543\* | -0.552\* | -0.338\* | -0.826\* | -0.562\* | -0.528\* | -0.309\* |
| (0.104) | (0.088) | (0.071) | (0.057) | (0.101) | (0.087) | (0.071) | (0.057) |
| Fear Violent  Crime | -0.034 | -0.183 | 0.039 | 0.101 | -0.049 | -0.209\* | 0.071 | 0.123\* |
| (0.087) | (0.074) | (0.068) | (0.058) | (0.085) | (0.073) | (0.068) | (0.057) |
| Perceived Corruption | 0.147 | -0.031 | -0.134 | -0.418\* | 0.101 | -0.046 | -0.149 | -0.395\* |
| (0.102) | (0.089) | (0.080) | (0.069) | (0.099) | (0.087) | (0.080) | (0.068) |
| Received Welfare Benefit | -0.694\* | -0.167 | -0.492\* | 0.000 | -0.694\* | -0.247 | -0.569\* | -0.022 |
| (0.222) | (0.181) | (0.173) | (0.134) | (0.215) | (0.179) | (0.173) | (0.133) |
| Constant | 1.834 | 1.568 | 0.874 | 1.015 | 1.728 | 1.547 | 0.908 | 1.095 |
|  | (0.305) | (0.275) | (0.204) | (0.178) | (0.299) | (0.274) | (0.203) | (0.178) |
| N | 782 |  | 1,440 |  | 799 |  | 1,474 |  |
| χ2 | 185.31\* |  | 269.18\* |  | 172.18\* |  | 310.20\* |  |
| Multinomial Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | | | | | |

**Table TBD.3: Views of Democracy and Vote Intentions by Incumbency and Populism Among those Who Are Close to a Party, 2023**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent** | | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent** | |
|  | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** |
| Trust in Institutions | -0.281\* | 0.014 | -0.174\* | -0.114\* |  |  |  |  |
| (0.039) | (0.029) | (0.027) | (0.023) |  |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  |  | -0.842\* | -0.062 | -0.446\* | -0.148\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.094) | (0.068) | (0.062) | (0.054) |
| View of the Economy | -0.901\* | -0.833\* | -0.385\* | -0.333\* | -0.820\* | -0.825\* | -0.361\* | -0.350\* |
| (0.077) | (0.063) | (0.048) | (0.043) | (0.077) | (0.063) | (0.049) | (0.044) |
| Fear Violent  Crime | -0.060 | -0.151\* | -0.079 | 0.159\* | -0.083 | -0.155\* | -0.050 | 0.197\* |
| (0.068) | (0.054) | (0.049) | (0.046) | (0.068) | (0.053) | (0.048) | (0.045) |
| Perceived Corruption | -0.005 | -0.282\* | -0.383\* | -0.335\* | -0.030 | -0.256\* | -0.364\* | -0.358\* |
| (0.076) | (0.062) | (0.057) | (0.051) | (0.076) | (0.061) | (0.056) | (0.050) |
| Received Welfare Benefit | -0.263 | -0.321\* | -0.665\* | 0.098 | -0.294 | -0.371\* | -0.684\* | 0.094 |
| (0.163) | (0.128) | (0.123) | (0.100) | (0.164) | (0.127) | (0.121) | (0.098) |
| Constant | 2.029 | 2.283 | 0.906 | 0.242 | 2.123 | 2.438 | 0.784 | 0.040 |
|  | (0.236) | (0.202) | (0.145) | (0.141) | (0.234) | (0.201) | (0.135) | (0.134) |
| N | 1,615 |  | 2,806 |  | 1,649 |  | 2,895 |  |
| χ2 | 502.08\* |  | 513.41\* |  | 542.51\* |  | 539.49\* |  |
| Multinomial Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | | | | | |

**Table TBX: Parties Coded as Populist in the 2023 Latinobarometer**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Argentina | Frente para la Victoria (FPV) | El Salvador | Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional |
| Partido Justicialista (PJ) | Concertacion Nacional (CN) |
| Frente de Todos (TODOS) | Nuevas Ideas |
| Bolivia | Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) | Guatemala | Unidad Nacional de Esperanza (UNE) |
| Brazil | Partido Progressista (PP) | Partido Politico Vision con Valores |
| Partido Republicano Progresista (PRP) | Compromiso Renovacion y Orden (CREO) |
| Partido Liberal (PL) | Frente de Convergencia Nacional (FCN) |
| Partido Social Democratico (PSD) | Vamos por una Guatemala Diferente |
| Partido Novo - NOVO | Valor |
| Podemos | Honduras | Partido Liberal (PL) |
| Ciudadania-Partido Popular Socialista | Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) |
| Uniao Brasil (UNIAO) | Mexico | Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico |
| Chile | Partido Comunista (PC) | Partido del Trabajo (PT) |
| Revolucion Democratica (RD) | Movimiento Regeneracion Nacional (MORENA) |
| Partido Republicano de Chile (PLR) | Panama | Partido Realizando Metas |
| Partido Convergencia social | Paraguay | Union Nacional de Ciudadanos Eticos |
| Colombia | Partido Social de Unidad Nacional, | Partido Patria Querida (PPQ) |
| Partido Cambio Radical (PCR) | Partido Colorado (PC) |
| Partido Conservador Colombiano (PCC) | Partido Cruzada Nacional |
| Movimiento MIRA | Peru | Accion Popular (AP) |
| Centro Democratico (CD) | Renovacion Popular (RP) |
| Costa Rica | Restauracion Nacional (RN) | Fuerza Popular (antiguo 'Fuerza 201 |
| Partido Nueva Republica (PNR) | Avanza pais (VP) |
| Progreso Social Democratico | Juntos por el Peru (JPP) |
| Dominican Republic | Partido Fuerza del Pueblo - (PFDP) | PERU LIBRE (PL) |
| Ecuador | Movimiento Pachakutik (PK) | Uruguay | Cabildo Abierto |
| Izquierda Democratica (ID) | Venezuela | Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela |
| Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) | Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV |
| Partido Sociedad Patriotica 21 de Enero | Accion Democratica (AD) |
| Creando Oportunidades (CREO) | Voluntad Popular (VP) |
| Movimiento Centro Democratico Nacio | Avanzada Progresista (AP) |
| Fuerza Compromiso Social |  |  |

**Appendix 7: Results of Cross-National Survey with Country-Fixed Effects**

The results in Table 2 did not contain country-fixed effects to allow differences across countries to correlate with differences in voting behavior, not just differences within countries. The analysis in Table AX add dummy variables for the countries in each models, but the main substantive effects do not change. Readers should note that many of the country-fixed effects are based on very small samples for a subtype of electoral choices and so they have very large standard errors.

**Table AX: Replication of Table 2 (Model of Vote Choice by Type of Incumbent) With Country Fixed Effects**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent (Model 13)** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent (Model 14)** | | **Baseline: Non-Populist Incumbent (Model 15)** | | **Baseline: Populist Incumbent (Model 16)** | |
|  | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** | **Populist Opposition** | **Non-Populist Opposition** |
| Trust in Institutions | -0.618\* | -0.421\* | -0.777\* | -0.634\* |  |  |  |  |
| (0.071) | (0.063) | (0.170) | (0.102) |  |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  |  | -0.594\* | -0.493\* | -0.932\* | -1.000\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.052) | (0.052) | (0.139) | (0.087) |
| View of the Economy | -0.515\* | -0.461\* | -0.694\* | -0.622\* | -0.461\* | -0.413\* | -0.607\* | -0.443\* |
| (0.042) | (0.045) | (0.098) | (0.064) | (0.042) | (0.045) | (0.098) | (0.068) |
| Perceived Corruption | 0.137\* | 0.008 | 0.748\* | 0.458\* | 0.127\* | -0.006 | 0.661\* | 0.359\* |
| (0.041) | (0.039) | (0.100) | (0.057) | (0.040) | (0.039) | (0.097) | (0.060) |
| Fear Violent  Crime | 0.104\* | 0.191\* | 0.297\* | 0.084 | 0.093\* | 0.188\* | 0.317\* | 0.094 |
| (0.041) | (0.039) | (0.105) | (0.066) | (0.041) | (0.039) | (0.103) | (0.068) |
| Received Welfare Benefit | -0.096 | -0.293\* | -0.597\* | -0.750\* | -0.099 | -0.371\* | -0.452 | -0.485\* |
| (0.123) | (0.120) | (0.275) | (0.167) | (0.123) | (0.120) | (0.272) | (0.171) |
| Brazil | 2.324\* | 3.250\* |  |  | 1.884\* | 3.025\* |  |  |
|  | (0.379) | (0.432) |  |  | (0.381) | (0.435) |  |  |
| Chile | -2.994\* | 3.132\* |  |  | -3.286\* | 3.114\* |  |  |
|  | (0.437) | (0.228) |  |  | (0.474) | (0.231) |  |  |
| Colombia | 0.625\* | 3.884\* |  |  | 0.408\* | 3.813\* |  |  |
|  | (0.231) | (0.266) |  |  | (0.231) | (0.269) |  |  |
| Costa Rica | -1.015\* | 3.742\* |  |  | -1.017\* | 3.870\* |  |  |
|  | (0.313) | (0.262) |  |  | (0.315) | (0.266) |  |  |
| Dominican Rep. | -1.251\* | -15.841 |  |  | -1.385\* | -17.727 |  |  |
|  | (0.154) | (458.133) |  |  | (0.154) | (1166.302) |  |  |
| Ecuador | -2.222\* | 0.887\* |  |  | -2.303\* | 0.897\* |  |  |
|  | (0.167) | (0.208) |  |  | (0.165) | (0.211) |  |  |
| El Salvador | -18.307 | 2.003\* |  |  | -20.553 | 1.751\* |  |  |
|  | (712.456) | (0.238) |  |  | (1776.595) | (0.241) |  |  |
| Guatemala | -0.082 | 1.670\* |  |  | -0.281 | 1.586\* |  |  |
|  | (0.301) | (0.374) |  |  | (0.311) | (0.388) |  |  |
| Honduras | -0.744\* | -2.186\* |  |  | -0.813\* | -2.145\* |  |  |
|  | (0.144) | (0.537) |  |  | (0.144) | (0.538) |  |  |
| Panama | -17.502 | 3.645\* |  |  | -19.536 | 3.563\* |  |  |
|  | (816.425) | (0.261) |  |  | (1981.541) | (0.258) |  |  |
| Paraguay | -3.485\* | 1.167\* |  |  | -3.536\* | 1.160\* |  |  |
|  | (0.228) | (0.205) |  |  | (0.223) | (0.207) |  |  |
| Peru | 0.943\* | 1.174\* |  |  | 0.703\* | 1.089\* |  |  |
|  | (0.182) | (0.300) |  |  | (0.182) | (0.300) |  |  |
| Uruguay | -4.350\* | 1.999\* |  |  | -4.476\* | 2.054\* |  |  |
|  | (0.462) | (0.202) |  |  | (0.462) | (0.204) |  |  |
| Mexico |  |  | 18.907 | 1.042\* |  |  | 18.605 | 0.740\* |
|  |  |  | (999.373) | (0.193) |  |  | (971.216) | (0.192) |
| Nicaragua |  |  | 16.902 | -17.019 |  |  | 16.953 | -16.965 |
|  |  |  | (999.373) | (646.715) |  |  | (971.216) | (624.045) |
| Venezuela |  |  | -0.774 | 0.906\* |  |  | -1.344 | 0.491\* |
|  |  |  | (1267.150) | (0.202) |  |  | (1243.174) | (0.204) |
| Constant | 2.123 | -0.539 | -19.287 | -0.203 | 2.420 | -0.208 | -18.574 | 0.767 |
|  | (0.243) | (0.276) | (999.373) | (0.358) | (0.228) | (0.274) | (971.216) | (0.352) |
| N | 5,258 |  | 1,879 |  | 5,335 |  | 1,912 |  |
| χ2 | 4139.82\* |  | 1326.88\* |  | 4298.50\* |  | 1462.65\* |  |
| Multinomial Logit, Standard Errors in Parentheses, \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | | | | | |

**Appendix 8: Variables in the Bolivia Analysis**

The following variables are included in the analysis of vote intentions in Bolivia

*Vote Intention*. Coded from the question “If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? [Read alternatives] Wouldn’t vote, Would vote for the current (incumbent) candidate or party, Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration, Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote?” The first and the last responses are combined into a non-valid vote category to create a three-point categorical variable.

*Voted for Morales Previously.* Coded from two questions: “Did you vote in the last presidential elections of (year of last presidential elections)? [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST]: Voted [Continue] or Did not vote [Skip to VB10]? (for those who voted) Who did you vote for in the last presidential election of 2008? [DO NOT read alternatives] [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST]. From these two questions we generated a dummy variable that took the value of 1 if the respondent voted for Morales in the last election, 0 if they named a different candidate they voted for, and missing if they abstained, cast a blank vote, or did not answer the question. We exclude the last category because we are interested in the opinions of those who actively opposed the incumbent.

*Institutional trust*. Coded from two questions, introduced with an explanation of the scale. “On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number. … To what extent do you trust the National Congress? [and] To what extent do you trust the political parties?” Institutional trust is measured by finding the average of the two scores.

*Satisfaction with democracy*: Coded from the question: “In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in (country)? Very satisfied, Satisfied, Dissatisfied, Very dissatisfied?” Coded so that high values represent greater levels of satisfaction.

*Presidential Approval*. Coded from the question “Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT? [Read alternatives] Very good, Good, Neither good nor bad (fair), Bad, Very bad?” Coded so that high values represent greater approval.

*Evaluation of the national economy*. Coded from the question “Do you think that the country’s current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?” High values represent positive views of the economy.

*Feels insecure in their neighborhood*. Coded from the question “Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?” High values represent feeling unsafe.

*Corruption victim.* Coded from the questions “In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe? Yes, No, and “Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? Yes, No.” Takes the value of 1 if the responded was asked for a bribe and 0 otherwise.

*Rural.* The respondents’ town was coded as “Urban” or “Rural” by LAPOP staff ising the country’s census definition; the dummy variable takes the value of 1 f the respondent lives in a rural area and 0 otherwise.

*Female*. In these waves of the survey, interviewers recoded the respondent’s sex. Coded as 0 for male and 1 for female.

*Education*. Coded from the question “How many years of schooling have you completed?” This is then reduced to the scale of what level of school they completed: None, Primary, Secondary, or More (Ninguna, Primaria, Secondaria, o Superior), with high values representing greater years of education.

*Age*. A series of dummy variables coding the respondent’s age in years. Ages 16-25 are the excluded baseline categories and then dummy variables are included for ages 26-25, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65, and 66+

*Ethnic Identity.* A series of dummy variables coded from the question “Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or of another race?” the baseline category is white and then dummy variables for each of the other categories (mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, and other) are included.

*Wealth:* This variable is an income quintile measure coded from a factor analysis that looks at which of the following household goods the respondent reported owning: phone (landline or cellular), tv, refrigerator, indoor plumbing, indoor bathroom, washing machine, a computer, a motorcycle, and the number of cars they own. The measure, generated by the AmericasBarometer staff, then break respondents into quintiles within each country by doing a factor analysis of these various goods to see which ones cluster together, separating urban and rural respondents who might not have access to these goods at the same level (e.g. if indoor plumbing is not as widely available). High values represent the wealthier quintiles.

**Appendix 9: Full Results of the Bolivia Analysis**

The text presents the results of the key political variables for the Bolivia analysis in Table 3 and Table 4, omitting the control variables to save space. The full results, including all the controls, are presented in Table A5 and Table A6 below.

**Table A5: Evaluations of Democracy Under MAS Rule and Vote Intentions by Previous Vote, 2008-2019**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | All Respondents | Voted for MAS in Last Election | Voted for Opposition Party | All Respondents | Voted for MAS in Last Election | Voted for Opposition Party |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] |
| **Would Vote for the Opposition** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trust Institutions | -0.157\* | -0.174\* | 0.060\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.030) | (0.048) | (0.110) |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  | -0.597\* | -0.453\* | -0.709\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.059) | (0.091) | (0.166) |
| Presidential Approval | -1.710\* | -1.378\* | -1.397\* | -1.646\* | -1.344\* | -1.208\* |
|  | (0.065) | (0.092) | (0.202) | (0.064) | (0.088) | (0.208) |
| Economy Has Improved | -0.576\* | -0.491\* | -0.679\* | -0.543\* | -0.467\* | -0.578\* |
|  | (0.050) | (0.080) | (0.183) | (0.049) | (0.079) | (0.180) |
| Feels Insecure in Neighborhood | -0.104\* | -0.129 | 0.144 | -0.117\* | -0.125 | 0.087 |
|  | (0.044) | (0.075) | (0.169) | (0.045) | (0.072) | (0.170) |
| Corruption Victim | -0.030 | 0.195 | -0.191 | -0.042 | 0.210 | -0.199 |
|  | (0.078) | (0.116) | (0.258) | (0.077) | (0.117) | (0.262) |
| Rural | -0.563\* | -0.365\* | -0.102 | -0.541\* | -0.369\* | -0.012 |
|  | (0.107) | (0.157) | (0.316) | (0.105) | (0.153) | (0.315) |
| Female | -0.076 | -0.222 | 0.152 | -0.118 | -0.292\* | 0.156 |
|  | (0.063) | (0.120) | (0.243) | (0.063) | (0.119) | (0.245) |
| Income Quintile | 0.179\* | 0.055 | 0.004 | 0.173\* | 0.063 | 0.018 |
|  | (0.028) | (0.045) | (0.087) | (0.028) | (0.043) | (0.088) |
| Education | 0.230\* | 0.226\* | 0.234 | 0.220\* | 0.211\* | 0.190 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.094) | (0.193) | (0.060) | (0.094) | (0.178) |
| Mestiza | -0.375\* | -0.085 | -0.087 | -0.393\* | -0.053 | -0.277 |
|  | (0.122) | (0.256) | (0.432) | (0.121) | (0.244) | (0.422) |
| Indígena | -0.855\* | -0.335 | -0.270 | -0.838\* | -0.276 | -0.334 |
|  | (0.168) | (0.297) | (0.570) | (0.166) | (0.281) | (0.560) |
| Negra | 0.331 | -0.016 | -0.039 | -0.106 | -0.368 | -1.082 |
|  | (0.436) | (0.857) | (0.856) | (0.479) | (0.886) | (1.149) |
| Mulata | -0.938\* | -0.837 | 13.841\* | -0.965\* | -0.760 | 12.644\* |
|  | (0.404) | (0.978) | (0.894) | (0.425) | (0.951) | (1.044) |
| Other Race | -0.039 | -0.135 | 14.127\* | -0.219 | -0.294 | 12.976\* |
|  | (0.298) | (0.571) | (0.584) | (0.280) | (0.545) | (0.643) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.223\* | -0.150 | 0.127 | -0.177 | -0.138 | 0.130 |
|  | (0.096) | (0.171) | (0.334) | (0.093) | (0.166) | (0.332) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.300\* | -0.300 | 0.317 | -0.274\* | -0.299 | 0.237 |
|  | (0.100) | (0.184) | (0.337) | (0.096) | (0.177) | (0.343) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.507\* | -0.187 | -0.093 | -0.413\* | -0.137 | -0.198 |
|  | (0.111) | (0.195) | (0.413) | (0.108) | (0.188) | (0.397) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.356\* | -0.241 | 0.490 | -0.301\* | -0.165 | 0.272 |
|  | (0.136) | (0.229) | (0.516) | (0.134) | (0.227) | (0.468) |
| Age 66+ | -0.141 | 0.239 | 2.181\* | -0.056 | 0.149 | 1.642\* |
|  | (0.164) | (0.264) | (0.753) | (0.159) | (0.272) | (0.596) |
| Constant | 4.804 | 2.998 | 4.652 | 5.195 | 3.157 | 5.611 |
|  | (0.278) | (0.461) | (0.972) | (0.280) | (0.464) | (0.851) |
| **Would Abstain or Cast a Null Vote** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trust Institutions | -0.271\* | -0.274\* | -0.057 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.027) | (0.043) | (0.122) |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  | -0.474\* | -0.444\* | -0.499\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.056) | (0.091) | (0.181) |
| Presidential Approval | -1.284\* | -1.032\* | -0.972\* | -1.303\* | -1.051\* | -0.874\* |
|  | (0.058) | (0.084) | (0.206) | (0.057) | (0.082) | (0.211) |
| Economy Has Improved | -0.506\* | -0.561\* | -0.399 | -0.493\* | -0.572\* | -0.355 |
|  | (0.046) | (0.072) | (0.219) | (0.044) | (0.071) | (0.213) |
| Feels Insecure in Neighborhood | 0.062 | 0.120 | 0.361\* | 0.056 | 0.120 | 0.319\* |
|  | (0.040) | (0.064) | (0.161) | (0.039) | (0.063) | (0.161) |
| Corruption Victim | -0.096 | 0.105 | -0.422 | -0.087 | 0.089 | -0.429 |
|  | (0.069) | (0.108) | (0.280) | (0.067) | (0.106) | (0.287) |
| Rural | -0.240\* | -0.065 | -0.236 | -0.264\* | -0.097 | -0.252 |
|  | (0.092) | (0.135) | (0.329) | (0.090) | (0.132) | (0.325) |
| Female | 0.084 | 0.260\* | 0.050 | 0.058 | 0.211 | 0.052 |
|  | (0.061) | (0.115) | (0.260) | (0.060) | (0.110) | (0.257) |
| Income Quintile | 0.093\* | 0.055 | -0.041 | 0.096\* | 0.072 | -0.015 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.045) | (0.087) | (0.025) | (0.044) | (0.085) |
| Education | 0.074 | 0.130 | 0.204 | 0.098\* | 0.152 | 0.233 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.081) | (0.205) | (0.049) | (0.080) | (0.188) |
| Mestiza | -0.308\* | -0.611\* | -0.250 | -0.264\* | -0.481\* | -0.355 |
|  | (0.126) | (0.222) | (0.446) | (0.120) | (0.215) | (0.440) |
| Indígena | -0.749\* | -0.840\* | -0.562 | -0.697\* | -0.737\* | -0.616 |
|  | (0.145) | (0.255) | (0.615) | (0.140) | (0.246) | (0.619) |
| Negra | 0.709 | 0.719 | -14.705\* | 0.386 | 0.397 | -14.909\* |
|  | (0.401) | (0.661) | (0.810) | (0.425) | (0.655) | (0.996) |
| Mulata | -0.495 | -0.043 | 14.057\* | -0.311 | 0.275 | 13.782\* |
|  | (0.431) | (0.814) | (1.094) | (0.433) | (0.716) | (1.040) |
| Other Race | 0.675\* | 0.483 | 14.515\* | 0.488 | 0.317 | 13.512\* |
|  | (0.281) | (0.408) | (0.613) | (0.260) | (0.397) | (0.636) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.243\* | 0.093 | 0.008 | -0.147 | 0.179 | -0.047 |
|  | (0.086) | (0.166) | (0.342) | (0.086) | (0.164) | (0.333) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.530\* | -0.208 | 0.254 | -0.436\* | -0.103 | 0.153 |
|  | (0.101) | (0.185) | (0.355) | (0.098) | (0.180) | (0.365) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.678\* | -0.359 | -0.064 | -0.528\* | -0.202 | -0.191 |
|  | (0.102) | (0.196) | (0.411) | (0.095) | (0.185) | (0.409) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.653\* | -0.208 | 0.180 | -0.514\* | -0.051 | 0.060 |
|  | (0.126) | (0.216) | (0.569) | (0.126) | (0.213) | (0.519) |
| Age 66+ | -0.430\* | 0.098 | 1.684 | -0.261 | 0.296 | 1.161 |
|  | (0.160) | (0.259) | (0.805) | (0.155) | (0.252) | (0.670) |
| Constant | 4.365 | 2.527 | 3.272 | 4.321 | 2.354 | 3.641 |
|  | (0.254) | (0.426) | (1.019) | (0.247) | (0.406) | (0.904) |
| N | 10,470 | 4,233 | 1,588 | 10,841 | 4,429 | 1,602 |
| χ2 | 42.51\* | 18.67\* | 93.31\* | 43.91\* | 18.46\* | 91.4\* |
| Multinomial logit with baseline of “Would vote for the governing party”, standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | | | |

**Table A6: Evaluations of Democracy Under MAS Rule and Vote Intentions by Partisanship, 2008-2019**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Independents | MAS Partisans | Opposition Partisans | Independents | MAS Partisans | Opposition Partisans |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] |
| **Would Vote for the Opposition** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trust Institutions | -0.135\* | -0.168 | -0.067 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.034) | (0.129) | (0.141) |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  | -0.517\* | -0.638\* | -0.526\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.064) | (0.237) | (0.234) |
| Presidential Approval | -1.506\* | -1.694\* | -1.044\* | -1.456\* | -1.544\* | -1.015\* |
|  | (0.069) | (0.236) | (0.246) | (0.067) | (0.221) | (0.226) |
| Economy Has Improved | -0.509\* | -0.492\* | -0.409 | -0.487\* | -0.493\* | -0.293 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.194) | (0.211) | (0.056) | (0.189) | (0.211) |
| Feels Insecure in Neighborhood | -0.103\* | -0.001 | 0.106 | -0.108\* | -0.004 | 0.053 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.180) | (0.169) | (0.050) | (0.187) | (0.160) |
| Corruption Victim | -0.009 | 0.016 | 0.688\* | -0.034 | 0.298 | 0.756\* |
|  | (0.088) | (0.334) | (0.297) | (0.087) | (0.349) | (0.296) |
| Rural | -0.562\* | -0.120 | -0.075 | -0.529\* | -0.292 | -0.141 |
|  | (0.119) | (0.349) | (0.331) | (0.115) | (0.338) | (0.330) |
| Female | -0.135 | -0.126 | 0.046 | -0.172\* | -0.256 | 0.071 |
|  | (0.076) | (0.255) | (0.352) | (0.074) | (0.256) | (0.341) |
| Income Quintile | 0.175\* | 0.194 | -0.008 | 0.175\* | 0.167 | -0.056 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.100) | (0.123) | (0.032) | (0.102) | (0.122) |
| Education | 0.184\* | 0.614\* | 0.429 | 0.159\* | 0.583\* | 0.418 |
|  | (0.070) | (0.206) | (0.239) | (0.068) | (0.199) | (0.221) |
| Mestiza | -0.284\* | -0.180 | -0.653 | -0.326\* | -0.150 | -0.887 |
|  | (0.145) | (0.497) | (0.585) | (0.147) | (0.491) | (0.531) |
| Indígena | -0.621\* | -0.825 | -1.032 | -0.652\* | -0.916 | -1.171 |
|  | (0.187) | (0.547) | (0.676) | (0.188) | (0.560) | (0.625) |
| Negra | -0.089 | 4.415\* | 0.575 | -0.504 | 4.246\* | 0.168 |
|  | (0.476) | (1.442) | (1.159) | (0.527) | (1.360) | (1.149) |
| Mulata | -1.442\* | 1.584 | 0.159 | -1.465\* | 1.171 | -0.144 |
|  | (0.445) | (1.207) | (1.307) | (0.488) | (1.210) | (1.396) |
| Other Race | -0.152 | 0.213 | 0.449 | -0.406 | 0.305 | 0.284 |
|  | (0.333) | (0.947) | (1.057) | (0.313) | (0.965) | (1.071) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.035 | -0.249 | -0.492 | -0.012 | -0.126 | -0.261 |
|  | (0.107) | (0.437) | (0.450) | (0.104) | (0.417) | (0.430) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.154 | -0.181 | -0.734 | -0.128 | -0.243 | -0.674 |
|  | (0.118) | (0.420) | (0.487) | (0.113) | (0.410) | (0.492) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.340\* | -0.624 | -0.870 | -0.276\* | -0.625 | -0.907 |
|  | (0.130) | (0.491) | (0.665) | (0.126) | (0.504) | (0.683) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.353\* | 0.196 | 0.641 | -0.306 | 0.071 | 0.718 |
|  | (0.161) | (0.508) | (0.500) | (0.158) | (0.516) | (0.489) |
| Age 66+ | -0.314 | 0.498 | 0.669 | -0.263 | 0.621 | 0.792 |
|  | (0.194) | (0.501) | (0.736) | (0.187) | (0.499) | (0.680) |
| Constant | 4.426 | 4.707 | -0.287 | 4.833 | 5.021 | 0.513 |
|  | (0.310) | (1.037) | (1.216) | (0.311) | (0.939) | (1.101) |
| **Would Abstain or Cast a Null Vote** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trust Institutions | -0.230\* | -0.210 | -0.215\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.031) | (0.135) | (0.107) |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  | -0.409\* | -0.337 | -0.412 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.061) | (0.244) | (0.216) |
| Presidential Approval | -1.147\* | -0.928\* | -0.535\* | -1.169\* | -0.896\* | -0.583\* |
|  | (0.066) | (0.239) | (0.169) | (0.065) | (0.229) | (0.167) |
| Economy Has Improved | -0.440\* | -0.545\* | -0.431\* | -0.433\* | -0.549\* | -0.357\* |
|  | (0.055) | (0.236) | (0.186) | (0.053) | (0.227) | (0.182) |
| Feels Insecure in Neighborhood | 0.076 | -0.052 | 0.195 | 0.068 | -0.009 | 0.168 |
|  | (0.046) | (0.193) | (0.145) | (0.045) | (0.198) | (0.144) |
| Corruption Victim | -0.066 | 0.309 | 0.031 | -0.063 | 0.557 | -0.110 |
|  | (0.079) | (0.341) | (0.265) | (0.076) | (0.350) | (0.255) |
| Rural | -0.248\* | 0.047 | 0.494 | -0.261\* | -0.254 | 0.523 |
|  | (0.099) | (0.372) | (0.298) | (0.096) | (0.365) | (0.293) |
| Female | 0.005 | -0.189 | 0.476 | -0.012 | -0.343 | 0.375 |
|  | (0.072) | (0.297) | (0.284) | (0.069) | (0.305) | (0.274) |
| Income Quintile | 0.086\* | 0.135 | 0.139 | 0.094\* | 0.136 | 0.129 |
|  | (0.028) | (0.107) | (0.103) | (0.028) | (0.107) | (0.104) |
| Education | 0.054 | 0.167 | -0.119 | 0.055 | 0.195 | -0.096 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.222) | (0.216) | (0.058) | (0.221) | (0.209) |
| Mestiza | -0.275 | 0.102 | 0.268 | -0.264 | 0.211 | 0.305 |
|  | (0.142) | (0.599) | (0.638) | (0.140) | (0.606) | (0.621) |
| Indígena | -0.554\* | -1.114 | -0.216 | -0.560\* | -1.048 | -0.191 |
|  | (0.166) | (0.763) | (0.700) | (0.164) | (0.780) | (0.685) |
| Negra | 0.393 | 3.946\* | 1.427 | 0.108 | 4.018\* | 1.098 |
|  | (0.407) | (1.623) | (1.526) | (0.426) | (1.605) | (1.420) |
| Mulata | -1.108 | 2.430 | 3.209\* | -0.875 | 2.270 | 3.078\* |
|  | (0.460) | (1.294) | (1.095) | (0.491) | (1.297) | (1.035) |
| Other Race | 0.577 | 1.028 | 1.448 | 0.294 | 1.164 | 1.380 |
|  | (0.308) | (1.114) | (0.979) | (0.287) | (1.155) | (0.946) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.049 | -0.454 | -0.034 | 0.023 | -0.429 | 0.074 |
|  | (0.101) | (0.391) | (0.325) | (0.100) | (0.378) | (0.312) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.327\* | -0.787 | -0.660 | -0.245\* | -0.818 | -0.493 |
|  | (0.119) | (0.464) | (0.387) | (0.115) | (0.452) | (0.373) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.508\* | -0.504 | -0.830 | -0.402\* | -0.462 | -0.705 |
|  | (0.121) | (0.517) | (0.475) | (0.113) | (0.529) | (0.460) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.566\* | -0.020 | -0.711 | -0.447\* | -0.078 | -0.922 |
|  | (0.146) | (0.576) | (0.656) | (0.145) | (0.580) | (0.706) |
| Age 66+ | -0.510\* | 0.240 | 0.228 | -0.355\* | 0.383 | 0.215 |
|  | (0.179) | (0.622) | (0.519) | (0.173) | (0.615) | (0.505) |
| Constant | 4.166 | 3.125 | -1.141 | 4.224 | 2.815 | -0.964 |
|  | (0.296) | (1.147) | (1.016) | (0.285) | (1.111) | (0.965) |
| N | 7,570 | 936 | 1,964 | 7,830 | 944 | 2,067 |
| χ2 | 27.59\* | 3.60\* | 3.27\* | 28.9\* | 3.82\* | 3.99\* |
| Multinomial logit with baseline of “Would vote for the governing party”, standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | | | |

**Appendix 10: Results of the Bolivia Analysis Separated by Survey Wave**

The results in Table 3 and Table 4 combine all available waves of the AmericasBarometer to pool enough observations to have leverage on previous electoral groups/partisan groups within the electorate. While there are not enough observations to do subgroup-specific analysis by survey wave, in Table A7 we estimate the basic model of vote intentions for all respondents by survey wave. The results for democratic satisfaction are fairly consistent by wave; in all surveys, those who are dissatisfied with democracy become more likely to either abstain or vote for the opposition than to vote for the populist incumbent. Trust in institutions, in contrast, is correlated with higher support for the opposition in the 2008 wave and then is insignificantly correlated with the choice between the MAS and the opposition in 2010 and 2012 before becoming significantly negative in 2014 and in subsequent waves. While the reason for these changes is unclear, it suggests that the public holds the populist incumbent accountable quickly for the state of democracy while not seeing them as fully responsible for the larger institutional environment until more time has passed and institutional control is more consolidated. Further work should explore this possibility.

**Table A7: Evaluations of Democracy Under MAS Rule and Vote Intentions by Survey Wave, 2008-2019**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016/17 | 2018/19 |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] |
| **Would Vote for the Opposition** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trust Institutions | 0.221\* | -0.050 | -0.088 | -0.333\* | -0.320\* | -0.337\* |
|  | (0.061) | (0.057) | (0.052) | (0.058) | (0.066) | (0.076) |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Presidential Approval | -2.317\* | -1.852\* | -1.392\* | -1.381\* | -1.460\* | -1.772\* |
|  | (0.129) | (0.107) | (0.101) | (0.100) | (0.130) | (0.143) |
| Economy Has Improved | -0.833\* | -0.684\* | -0.351\* | -0.417\* | -0.610\* | -0.522\* |
|  | (0.104) | (0.122) | (0.096) | (0.094) | (0.117) | (0.128) |
| Feels Insecure in Neighborhood | -0.139 | -0.234\* | -0.060 | -0.170\* | -0.024 | -0.153 |
|  | (0.089) | (0.083) | (0.079) | (0.081) | (0.098) | (0.105) |
| Corruption Victim | 0.082 | 0.316\* | -0.185 | 0.151 | 0.033 | -0.420\* |
|  | (0.164) | (0.143) | (0.127) | (0.140) | (0.179) | (0.200) |
| Rural | -0.971\* | -0.926\* | -0.453\* | -0.582\* | -0.373 | -0.436\* |
|  | (0.181) | (0.160) | (0.141) | (0.150) | (0.192) | (0.213) |
| Female | 0.014 | 0.053 | 0.262\* | -0.126 | -0.164 | -0.731\* |
|  | (0.159) | (0.135) | (0.128) | (0.132) | (0.178) | (0.196) |
| Income Quintile | 0.239\* | 0.057 | 0.113\* | 0.183\* | 0.186\* | 0.256\* |
|  | (0.062) | (0.051) | (0.049) | (0.052) | (0.067) | (0.073) |
| Education | -0.262\* | 0.216\* | 0.031 | 0.480\* | 0.312\* | 0.422\* |
|  | (0.125) | (0.110) | (0.102) | (0.100) | (0.137) | (0.162) |
| Mestiza | -0.543 | -0.654\* | -0.260 | -0.961\* | -0.200 | 0.313 |
|  | (0.294) | (0.269) | (0.308) | (0.281) | (0.286) | (0.347) |
| Indígena | -1.695\* | -1.123\* | -0.285 | -1.588\* | -0.756 | 0.222 |
|  | (0.366) | (0.336) | (0.349) | (0.329) | (0.359) | (0.426) |
| Negra | 1.788 | -0.746 | 15.322 | -14.440 | -0.709 | 1.001 |
|  | (1.277) | (0.833) | (1795.873) | (1079.358) | (0.820) | (0.695) |
| Mulata | 11.515 | -1.101 | -0.704 | -15.112 | -0.627 | -0.923 |
|  | (467.382) | (0.985) | (1.601) | (1451.161) | (0.718) | (0.783) |
| Other Race | 0.440 | 1.720 | -0.969 | -0.566 | -0.271 | 0.669 |
|  | (0.846) | (1.118) | (0.836) | (0.851) | (0.570) | (0.563) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.415\* | -0.178 | -0.102 | -0.229 | -0.451 | -0.103 |
|  | (0.208) | (0.178) | (0.175) | (0.184) | (0.244) | (0.267) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.372 | -0.219 | -0.498\* | -0.586\* | -0.300 | -0.540 |
|  | (0.228) | (0.190) | (0.192) | (0.198) | (0.265) | (0.284) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.271 | -0.761\* | -0.670\* | -0.511\* | -0.402 | -0.738\* |
|  | (0.249) | (0.263) | (0.206) | (0.208) | (0.292) | (0.318) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.211 | -0.531\* | -0.683\* | -0.477 | -0.550 | -0.448 |
|  | (0.330) | (0.265) | (0.239) | (0.252) | (0.335) | (0.357) |
| Age 66+ | 0.088 | -0.385 | -0.480 | -0.367 | -0.319 | -0.996\* |
|  | (0.430) | (0.359) | (0.315) | (0.302) | (0.388) | (0.429) |
| Constant | 6.242 | 5.396 | 4.426 | 4.284 | 4.491 | 4.665 |
|  | (0.583) | (0.523) | (0.496) | (0.512) | (0.609) | (0.714) |
| **Would Abstain or Cast a Null Vote** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trust Institutions | -0.180\* | -0.020 | -0.272\* | -0.429\* | -0.295\* | -0.403\* |
|  | (0.057) | (0.058) | (0.056) | (0.056) | (0.060) | (0.063) |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Presidential Approval | -1.847\* | -1.161\* | -1.124\* | -1.000\* | -1.247\* | -1.183\* |
|  | (0.120) | (0.103) | (0.103) | (0.097) | (0.123) | (0.125) |
| Economy Has Improved | -0.483\* | -0.823\* | -0.326\* | -0.326\* | -0.457\* | -0.434\* |
|  | (0.093) | (0.123) | (0.101) | (0.090) | (0.106) | (0.105) |
| Feels Insecure in Neighborhood | 0.135 | -0.076 | 0.128 | -0.054 | 0.009 | 0.073 |
|  | (0.083) | (0.084) | (0.083) | (0.078) | (0.091) | (0.088) |
| Corruption Victim | -0.235 | 0.382\* | -0.238 | -0.008 | -0.124 | -0.368\* |
|  | (0.153) | (0.146) | (0.134) | (0.137) | (0.168) | (0.171) |
| Rural | -0.777\* | -0.615\* | -0.099 | -0.303\* | -0.134 | -0.228 |
|  | (0.167) | (0.158) | (0.148) | (0.140) | (0.174) | (0.173) |
| Female | 0.161 | 0.016 | 0.355\* | 0.039 | 0.088 | -0.160 |
|  | (0.146) | (0.137) | (0.134) | (0.127) | (0.165) | (0.165) |
| Income Quintile | 0.217\* | -0.022 | 0.047 | 0.071 | 0.052 | 0.233\* |
|  | (0.058) | (0.052) | (0.052) | (0.049) | (0.062) | (0.062) |
| Education | -0.033 | -0.053 | 0.042 | 0.323\* | -0.050 | -0.247 |
|  | (0.115) | (0.112) | (0.108) | (0.095) | (0.127) | (0.132) |
| Mestiza | -0.322 | -0.156 | -0.059 | -1.025\* | 0.143 | -0.172 |
|  | (0.283) | (0.301) | (0.330) | (0.276) | (0.283) | (0.267) |
| Indígena | -1.389\* | -0.566 | -0.573 | -1.518\* | -0.092 | 0.011 |
|  | (0.341) | (0.352) | (0.380) | (0.313) | (0.331) | (0.321) |
| Negra | 0.118 | -0.677 | -0.328 | 0.283 | -0.423 | 0.812 |
|  | (1.406) | (0.947) | (2520.861) | (1.051) | (0.739) | (0.536) |
| Mulata | 11.650 | -0.380 | -0.132 | -1.001 | -0.408 | -0.893 |
|  | (467.381) | (1.003) | (1.568) | (1.344) | (0.709) | (0.610) |
| Other Race | 0.488 | 2.160\* | 0.062 | -0.329 | 0.504 | 0.654 |
|  | (0.845) | (1.038) | (0.769) | (0.790) | (0.506) | (0.433) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.365 | -0.570\* | -0.224 | -0.363\* | -0.286 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.189) | (0.186) | (0.181) | (0.174) | (0.224) | (0.229) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.520\* | -0.422\* | -0.701\* | -0.667\* | -0.550\* | -0.679\* |
|  | (0.211) | (0.191) | (0.203) | (0.187) | (0.251) | (0.245) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.602\* | -0.714\* | -0.940\* | -0.862\* | -0.378 | -1.018\* |
|  | (0.239) | (0.254) | (0.221) | (0.203) | (0.269) | (0.269) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.287 | -0.674\* | -0.837\* | -1.069\* | -1.147\* | -0.747\* |
|  | (0.303) | (0.265) | (0.253) | (0.257) | (0.331) | (0.306) |
| Age 66+ | 0.089 | -0.996\* | -0.696\* | -0.816\* | -0.867\* | -0.645\* |
|  | (0.405) | (0.391) | (0.343) | (0.296) | (0.380) | (0.319) |
| Constant | 5.229 | 3.857 | 3.713 | 4.151 | 4.777 | 5.307 |
|  | (0.548) | (0.542) | (0.524) | (0.497) | (0.582) | (0.601) |
| N | 1,842 | 1,983 | 2,033 | 2,067 | 1,257 | 1,288 |
| χ2 | 1193.88\* | 960.41\* | 592.93\* | 819.54\* | 526.99\* | 634.14\* |
| Multinomial logit with baseline of “Would vote for the governing party”, standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | | | |

**Table A7 Continued: Evaluations of Democracy Under MAS Rule and Vote Intentions by Survey Wave, 2008-2019**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016/17 | 2018/19 |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] |
| **Would Vote for the Opposition** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trust Institutions |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy | -0.528\* | -0.633\* | -0.917\* | -0.378\* | -0.553\* | -0.531\* |
|  | (0.119) | (0.117) | (0.113) | (0.109) | (0.126) | (0.130) |
| Presidential Approval | -2.163\* | -1.687\* | -1.202\* | -1.423\* | -1.519\* | -1.783\* |
|  | (0.126) | (0.110) | (0.096) | (0.101) | (0.128) | (0.137) |
| Economy Has Improved | -0.832\* | -0.644\* | -0.227\* | -0.419\* | -0.627\* | -0.503\* |
|  | (0.102) | (0.122) | (0.094) | (0.092) | (0.116) | (0.125) |
| Feels Insecure in Neighborhood | -0.195\* | -0.245\* | -0.088 | -0.175\* | -0.048 | -0.147 |
|  | (0.087) | (0.083) | (0.078) | (0.080) | (0.098) | (0.102) |
| Corruption Victim | -0.024 | 0.244 | -0.220 | 0.195 | 0.067 | -0.300 |
|  | (0.162) | (0.145) | (0.124) | (0.139) | (0.177) | (0.193) |
| Rural | -0.819\* | -0.999\* | -0.493\* | -0.648\* | -0.328 | -0.427\* |
|  | (0.177) | (0.162) | (0.137) | (0.147) | (0.191) | (0.209) |
| Female | -0.024 | 0.089 | 0.257\* | -0.092 | -0.273 | -0.783\* |
|  | (0.156) | (0.136) | (0.124) | (0.130) | (0.176) | (0.192) |
| Income Quintile | 0.196\* | 0.095 | 0.100\* | 0.195\* | 0.193\* | 0.250\* |
|  | (0.061) | (0.051) | (0.048) | (0.051) | (0.066) | (0.071) |
| Education | -0.220 | 0.186 | 0.027 | 0.426\* | 0.302\* | 0.506\* |
|  | (0.122) | (0.110) | (0.099) | (0.098) | (0.136) | (0.155) |
| Mestiza | -0.800\* | -0.632\* | -0.170 | -0.748\* | -0.344 | 0.461 |
|  | (0.287) | (0.267) | (0.314) | (0.269) | (0.283) | (0.341) |
| Indígena | -1.954\* | -1.073\* | -0.310 | -1.335\* | -0.785\* | 0.287 |
|  | (0.358) | (0.333) | (0.349) | (0.316) | (0.352) | (0.415) |
| Negra | -0.626 | -1.003 | 12.894 | -13.733 | -1.349 | 0.858 |
|  | (1.127) | (0.845) | (454.123) | (720.987) | (0.845) | (0.680) |
| Mulata | 12.436 | -1.009 | -0.612 | -15.061 | -0.919 | -0.651 |
|  | (781.402) | (1.004) | (1.595) | (1521.551) | (0.747) | (0.777) |
| Other Race | 0.124 | 1.438 | -0.711 | -0.458 | -0.602 | 0.762 |
|  | (0.837) | (1.070) | (0.826) | (0.845) | (0.559) | (0.544) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.389 | -0.238 | -0.109 | -0.143 | -0.234 | 0.005 |
|  | (0.205) | (0.179) | (0.171) | (0.181) | (0.238) | (0.259) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.439 | -0.301 | -0.406\* | -0.482\* | -0.143 | -0.379 |
|  | (0.225) | (0.191) | (0.188) | (0.194) | (0.260) | (0.273) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.378 | -0.957\* | -0.660\* | -0.411\* | -0.085 | -0.243 |
|  | (0.248) | (0.262) | (0.202) | (0.204) | (0.283) | (0.303) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.493 | -0.504 | -0.548\* | -0.305 | -0.360 | -0.233 |
|  | (0.322) | (0.266) | (0.234) | (0.247) | (0.329) | (0.345) |
| Age 66+ | 0.094 | -0.483 | -0.454 | -0.131 | -0.045 | -0.586 |
|  | (0.410) | (0.362) | (0.302) | (0.291) | (0.387) | (0.407) |
| Constant | 7.615 | 5.927 | 5.134 | 3.961 | 4.716 | 4.078 |
|  | (0.576) | (0.522) | (0.499) | (0.500) | (0.618) | (0.667) |
| **Would Abstain or Cast a Null Vote** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trust Institutions |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy | -0.498\* | -0.510\* | -0.818\* | -0.241\* | -0.322\* | -0.208\* |
|  | (0.110) | (0.120) | (0.117) | (0.106) | (0.117) | (0.103) |
| Presidential Approval | -1.748\* | -1.030\* | -1.079\* | -1.125\* | -1.370\* | -1.312\* |
|  | (0.116) | (0.108) | (0.099) | (0.096) | (0.122) | (0.118) |
| Economy Has Improved | -0.494\* | -0.756\* | -0.275\* | -0.338\* | -0.499\* | -0.448\* |
|  | (0.091) | (0.123) | (0.098) | (0.087) | (0.105) | (0.100) |
| Feels Insecure in Neighborhood | 0.106 | -0.099 | 0.044 | -0.013 | 0.000 | 0.093 |
|  | (0.080) | (0.084) | (0.081) | (0.077) | (0.091) | (0.084) |
| Corruption Victim | -0.178 | 0.298\* | -0.272\* | 0.074 | -0.093 | -0.273 |
|  | (0.149) | (0.147) | (0.130) | (0.135) | (0.167) | (0.163) |
| Rural | -0.737\* | -0.782\* | -0.157 | -0.423 | -0.144 | -0.269 |
|  | (0.162) | (0.160) | (0.142) | (0.137) | (0.174) | (0.167) |
| Female | 0.141 | 0.074 | 0.451\* | 0.091 | 0.024 | -0.266 |
|  | (0.143) | (0.138) | (0.129) | (0.124) | (0.164) | (0.159) |
| Income Quintile | 0.197\* | 0.031 | 0.030 | 0.083 | 0.076 | 0.214\* |
|  | (0.057) | (0.052) | (0.050) | (0.048) | (0.062) | (0.059) |
| Education | -0.017 | -0.111 | 0.061 | 0.289\* | -0.089 | -0.044 |
|  | (0.113) | (0.111) | (0.104) | (0.094) | (0.126) | (0.125) |
| Mestiza | -0.353 | -0.262 | 0.042 | -0.724\* | 0.119 | -0.025 |
|  | (0.277) | (0.289) | (0.332) | (0.265) | (0.283) | (0.256) |
| Indígena | -1.472\* | -0.547 | -0.530 | -1.193\* | -0.042 | 0.019 |
|  | (0.333) | (0.338) | (0.375) | (0.301) | (0.330) | (0.308) |
| Negra | -1.756 | -0.966 | -0.116 | 0.212 | -0.661 | 0.562 |
|  | (1.406) | (0.959) | (662.630) | (0.985) | (0.723) | (0.512) |
| Mulata | 13.435 | -0.377 | -0.264 | -15.355 | -0.458 | -0.437 |
|  | (781.402) | (1.005) | (1.617) | (1588.967) | (0.721) | (0.576) |
| Other Race | 0.199 | 1.810 | 0.248 | -0.096 | 0.281 | 0.532 |
|  | (0.807) | (0.981) | (0.759) | (0.776) | (0.499) | (0.420) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.264 | -0.561\* | -0.150 | -0.219 | -0.045 | 0.127 |
|  | (0.186) | (0.186) | (0.174) | (0.169) | (0.219) | (0.219) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.462\* | -0.446\* | -0.599\* | -0.506\* | -0.341 | -0.509\* |
|  | (0.208) | (0.193) | (0.196) | (0.181) | (0.247) | (0.230) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.498\* | -0.791\* | -0.913\* | -0.742\* | -0.094 | -0.548\* |
|  | (0.233) | (0.251) | (0.215) | (0.199) | (0.262) | (0.253) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.359 | -0.602\* | -0.657\* | -0.776\* | -0.949\* | -0.508 |
|  | (0.295) | (0.265) | (0.244) | (0.247) | (0.325) | (0.288) |
| Age 66+ | 0.295 | -0.930\* | -0.672\* | -0.565\* | -0.534 | -0.367 |
|  | (0.378) | (0.377) | (0.326) | (0.289) | (0.375) | (0.305) |
| Constant | 5.400 | 4.418 | 4.217 | 3.384 | 4.757 | 4.293 |
|  | (0.539) | (0.535) | (0.522) | (0.486) | (0.593) | (0.558) |
| N | 1,914 | 2,030 | 2,203 | 2,116 | 1,265 | 1,313 |
| χ2 | 1198.77\* | 1037.35\* | 695.98\* | 789.75\* | 528.26\* | 598.81\* |
| Multinomial logit with baseline of “Would vote for the governing party”, standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | | | |

**Appendix 11: Results of the Bolivia Analysis with Survey Wave Fixed Effects**

The results of the Bolivia analysis in Table 3 and Table 4 pool the results of 6 survey waves. Here we add fixed effects to capture any time-varying differences in support. The results in Table A8 and Table A9 roughly mirror the results in Tables 3-4; the evaluations of democratic performance that are significantly correlated with vote intentions in the pooled analysis remain so when fixed effects are added.

**Table A8:** **Evaluations of Democracy Under MAS Rule and Vote Intentions with Fixed Effects by Survey Wave and Previous Vote**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | All | Previous MAS Voter | Previous Opposition Voter | All | Previous MAS Voter | Previous Opposition Voter |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] |
| **Would Vote for the Opposition** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trust Institutions | -0.174\* | -0.226\* | 0.071 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.030) | (0.050) | (0.114) |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  | -0.592\* | -0.434\* | -0.736\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.059) | (0.095) | (0.168) |
| Presidential Approval | -1.721\* | -1.346\* | -1.512\* | -1.654\* | -1.330\* | -1.328\* |
|  | (0.066) | (0.097) | (0.211) | (0.065) | (0.093) | (0.216) |
| Economy Has Improved | -0.557\* | -0.442\* | -0.673\* | -0.532\* | -0.423\* | -0.589\* |
|  | (0.051) | (0.084) | (0.183) | (0.051) | (0.083) | (0.176) |
| Feels Insecure in Neighborhood | -0.109\* | -0.126 | 0.092 | -0.115\* | -0.112 | 0.044 |
|  | (0.044) | (0.073) | (0.169) | (0.045) | (0.071) | (0.170) |
| Corruption Victim | -0.099 | 0.047 | -0.210 | -0.098 | 0.079 | -0.193 |
|  | (0.079) | (0.123) | (0.256) | (0.078) | (0.124) | (0.257) |
| Rural | -0.612\* | -0.410\* | -0.173 | -0.594\* | -0.421\* | -0.050 |
|  | (0.100) | (0.140) | (0.324) | (0.099) | (0.136) | (0.324) |
| Female | -0.088 | -0.262\* | 0.188 | -0.126 | -0.320\* | 0.189 |
|  | (0.064) | (0.128) | (0.240) | (0.065) | (0.127) | (0.244) |
| Income Quintile | 0.189\* | 0.064 | -0.016 | 0.187\* | 0.079 | -0.005 |
|  | (0.028) | (0.046) | (0.085) | (0.028) | (0.044) | (0.085) |
| Education | 0.218\* | 0.272\* | 0.181 | 0.218\* | 0.267\* | 0.137 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.096) | (0.199) | (0.059) | (0.096) | (0.184) |
| Mestiza | -0.331\* | -0.095 | 0.018 | -0.359\* | -0.063 | -0.216 |
|  | (0.123) | (0.271) | (0.431) | (0.121) | (0.256) | (0.422) |
| Indígena | -0.775\* | -0.270 | -0.181 | -0.765\* | -0.217 | -0.276 |
|  | (0.163) | (0.303) | (0.563) | (0.160) | (0.283) | (0.549) |
| Negra | 0.244 | -0.137 | -0.394 | -0.136 | -0.365 | -1.380 |
|  | (0.444) | (0.842) | (0.897) | (0.469) | (0.857) | (1.119) |
| Mulata | -1.077\* | -1.056 | 13.355\* | -1.060\* | -0.984 | 12.720\* |
|  | (0.402) | (1.014) | (1.080) | (0.419) | (0.966) | (1.200) |
| Other Race | -0.156 | -0.399 | 13.606\* | -0.295 | -0.530 | 12.972\* |
|  | (0.306) | (0.589) | (0.599) | (0.285) | (0.558) | (0.672) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.214\* | -0.214 | 0.117 | -0.163 | -0.180 | 0.141 |
|  | (0.097) | (0.182) | (0.336) | (0.094) | (0.175) | (0.334) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.279\* | -0.344 | 0.220 | -0.255\* | -0.314 | 0.152 |
|  | (0.103) | (0.198) | (0.344) | (0.098) | (0.188) | (0.345) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.528\* | -0.310 | -0.112 | -0.426\* | -0.223 | -0.218 |
|  | (0.112) | (0.200) | (0.415) | (0.110) | (0.192) | (0.397) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.403\* | -0.375 | 0.366 | -0.330\* | -0.256 | 0.127 |
|  | (0.138) | (0.239) | (0.512) | (0.136) | (0.232) | (0.464) |
| Age 66+ | -0.220 | 0.036 | 2.085\* | -0.099 | -0.008 | 1.522\* |
|  | (0.166) | (0.271) | (0.742) | (0.160) | (0.276) | (0.620) |
| 2010 | 0.341\* | 0.703\* | 0.614 | 0.412\* | 0.716\* | 0.676\* |
|  | (0.153) | (0.277) | (0.342) | (0.149) | (0.267) | (0.332) |
| 2012 | 1.119\* | 2.462\* | 0.277 | 1.116\* | 2.448\* | 0.284 |
|  | (0.180) | (0.262) | (0.370) | (0.176) | (0.254) | (0.380) |
| 2014 | 0.437\* | 1.256\* | 0.800\* | 0.439\* | 1.296\* | 0.888\* |
|  | (0.137) | (0.249) | (0.373) | (0.134) | (0.244) | (0.374) |
| 2016/17 | 0.963\* | 1.769\* | 1.094\* | 0.917\* | 1.744\* | 0.934 |
|  | (0.143) | (0.253) | (0.517) | (0.141) | (0.244) | (0.485) |
| 2018/19 | 0.813\* | 1.737\* | 1.335\* | 0.703\* | 1.699\* | 1.178\* |
|  | (0.143) | (0.238) | (0.576) | (0.140) | (0.236) | (0.563) |
| Constant | 4.250 | 1.590 | 4.579 | 4.554 | 1.538 | 5.653 |
|  | (0.306) | (0.508) | (0.970) | (0.306) | (0.506) | (0.845) |
| **Would Abstain or Cast a Null Vote** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trust Institutions | -0.280\* | -0.318\* | -0.056 |  |  |  |
|  | -0.028 | (0.045) | (0.124) |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  | -0.392\* | -0.324\* | -0.493\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.054) | (0.089) | (0.176) |
| Presidential Approval | -1.305\* | -1.024\* | -1.040\* | -1.338\* | -1.079\* | -0.956\* |
|  | (0.059) | (0.085) | (0.217) | (0.058) | (0.083) | (0.222) |
| Economy Has Improved | -0.451\* | -0.483\* | -0.366 | -0.447\* | -0.507\* | -0.337 |
|  | (0.046) | (0.073) | (0.215) | (0.045) | (0.071) | (0.206) |
| Feels Insecure in Neighborhood | 0.027 | 0.075 | 0.308 | 0.030 | 0.087 | 0.274 |
|  | (0.038) | (0.065) | (0.160) | (0.037) | (0.063) | (0.160) |
| Corruption Victim | -0.166\* | -0.051 | -0.439 | -0.144\* | -0.044 | -0.424 |
|  | (0.072) | (0.117) | (0.277) | (0.070) | (0.114) | (0.282) |
| Rural | -0.310\* | -0.174 | -0.286 | -0.340\* | -0.222 | -0.278 |
|  | (0.082) | (0.124) | (0.333) | (0.081) | (0.121) | (0.331) |
| Female | 0.083 | 0.223 | 0.089 | 0.066 | 0.185 | 0.091 |
|  | (0.063) | (0.119) | (0.260) | (0.062) | (0.113) | (0.259) |
| Income Quintile | 0.111\* | 0.079 | -0.043 | 0.117\* | 0.102 | -0.021 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.045) | (0.086) | (0.024) | (0.044) | (0.083) |
| Education | 0.016 | 0.025 | 0.174 | 0.048 | 0.061 | 0.196 |
|  | (0.051) | (0.085) | (0.212) | (0.051) | (0.084) | (0.194) |
| Mestiza | -0.226 | -0.419 | -0.151 | -0.192 | -0.304 | -0.302 |
|  | (0.126) | (0.233) | (0.447) | (0.122) | (0.221) | (0.446) |
| Indígena | -0.636\* | -0.578\* | -0.518 | -0.602\* | -0.509\* | -0.621 |
|  | (0.142) | (0.264) | (0.617) | (0.138) | (0.252) | (0.622) |
| Negra | 0.418 | 0.449 | -14.629\* | 0.132 | 0.195 | -15.362\* |
|  | (0.408) | (0.651) | (0.882) | (0.418) | (0.627) | (0.999) |
| Mulata | -0.797 | -0.373 | 13.527\* | -0.588 | -0.071 | 13.789\* |
|  | (0.442) | (0.809) | (1.276) | (0.436) | (0.704) | (1.190) |
| Other Race | 0.386 | 0.158 | 13.892\* | 0.216 | 0.003 | 13.368\* |
|  | (0.284) | (0.410) | (0.651) | (0.264) | (0.398) | (0.682) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.247\* | 0.026 | -0.020 | -0.149 | 0.144 | -0.064 |
|  | (0.088) | (0.174) | (0.344) | (0.087) | (0.173) | (0.334) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.525\* | -0.274 | 0.167 | -0.432\* | -0.122 | 0.065 |
|  | (0.104) | (0.184) | (0.365) | (0.100) | (0.180) | (0.368) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.726\* | -0.483\* | -0.091 | -0.568\* | -0.274 | -0.232 |
|  | (0.105) | (0.205) | (0.417) | (0.098) | (0.194) | (0.410) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.726\* | -0.400 | 0.094 | -0.580\* | -0.208 | -0.045 |
|  | (0.126) | (0.220) | (0.574) | (0.126) | (0.220) | (0.525) |
| Age 66+ | -0.577\* | -0.143 | 1.483 | -0.382\* | 0.118 | 0.918 |
|  | (0.161) | (0.270) | (0.780) | (0.156) | (0.264) | (0.682) |
| 2010 | -0.252 | -0.383 | 0.143 | -0.239 | -0.435\* | 0.204 |
|  | (0.144) | (0.210) | (0.382) | (0.137) | (0.212) | (0.375) |
| 2012 | 0.621\* | 1.037\* | 0.031 | 0.625\* | 0.952\* | 0.050 |
|  | (0.151) | (0.223) | (0.380) | (0.148) | (0.217) | (0.386) |
| 2014 | 0.023 | -0.182 | 0.072 | 0.040 | -0.224 | 0.141 |
|  | (0.135) | (0.249) | (0.412) | (0.134) | (0.252) | (0.417) |
| 2016/17 | 0.852\* | 1.200\* | 0.661 | 0.834\* | 1.091\* | 0.597 |
|  | (0.138) | (0.208) | (0.561) | (0.136) | (0.202) | (0.531) |
| 2018/19 | 1.057\* | 1.393\* | 1.304\* | 1.007\* | 1.286\* | 1.291\* |
|  | (0.133) | (0.207) | (0.613) | (0.130) | (0.197) | (0.606) |
| Constant | 4.102 | 2.174 | 3.291 | 3.914 | 1.783 | 3.734 |
|  | (0.257) | (0.450) | (1.017) | (0.250) | (0.438) | (0.905) |
| N | 10470 | 4233 | 1,588 | 10,841 | 4,429 | 1,602 |
| χ2 | 34.79\* | 17.06\* | 61.95\* | 35.90\* | 17.84\* | 67.40\* |
| Multinomial logit with baseline of “Would vote for the governing party”, standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | | | |

**Table A9:** **Evaluations of Democracy Under MAS Rule and Vote Intentions with Fixed Effects by Survey Wave and Partisanship**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Independents | Opposition Partisan | MAS Partisan | Independents | Opposition Partisan | MAS Partisan |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] |
| **Would Vote for the Opposition** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trust Institutions | -0.150\* | -0.158 | -0.118 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.033) | (0.133) | (0.157) |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  | -0.515\* | -0.621\* | -0.853\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.064) | (0.254) | (0.248) |
| Presidential Approval | -1.513\* | -1.662\* | -0.949\* | -1.459\* | -1.530\* | -0.891\* |
|  | (0.070) | (0.250) | (0.271) | (0.068) | (0.231) | (0.246) |
| Economy Has Improved | -0.502\* | -0.550\* | -0.428 | -0.485\* | -0.539\* | -0.289 |
|  | (0.060) | (0.214) | (0.222) | (0.059) | (0.211) | (0.224) |
| Feels Insecure in Neighborhood | -0.101\* | -0.046 | 0.191 | -0.099\* | -0.032 | 0.143 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.184) | (0.167) | (0.049) | (0.187) | (0.160) |
| Corruption Victim | -0.088 | 0.261 | 0.638\* | -0.099 | 0.500 | 0.741\* |
|  | (0.088) | (0.345) | (0.305) | (0.087) | (0.360) | (0.308) |
| Rural | -0.601\* | -0.014 | 0.029 | -0.573\* | -0.167 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.112) | (0.336) | (0.342) | (0.109) | (0.319) | (0.341) |
| Female | -0.141 | -0.082 | 0.093 | -0.176\* | -0.220 | 0.162 |
|  | (0.077) | (0.253) | (0.342) | (0.077) | (0.255) | (0.333) |
| Income Quintile | 0.190\* | 0.228\* | -0.021 | 0.193\* | 0.194\* | -0.073 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.098) | (0.123) | (0.032) | (0.099) | (0.121) |
| Education | 0.180\* | 0.620\* | 0.574\* | 0.165\* | 0.594\* | 0.575\* |
|  | (0.070) | (0.203) | (0.249) | (0.068) | (0.199) | (0.230) |
| Mestiza | -0.233 | -0.222 | -0.840 | -0.290\* | -0.210 | -1.144\* |
|  | (0.146) | (0.515) | (0.619) | (0.148) | (0.508) | (0.561) |
| Indígena | -0.563\* | -0.955 | -1.082 | -0.599\* | -1.011 | -1.283\* |
|  | (0.184) | (0.540) | (0.677) | (0.184) | (0.542) | (0.635) |
| Negra | -0.112 | 4.181 | 0.918 | -0.495 | 4.120\* | 0.394 |
|  | (0.481) | (1.370) | (1.285) | (0.522) | (1.319) | (1.362) |
| Mulata | -1.577\* | 2.068 | 0.389 | -1.556\* | 1.492 | 0.090 |
|  | (0.439) | (1.497) | (1.284) | (0.479) | (1.419) | (1.462) |
| Other Race | -0.238 | 0.321 | 0.586 | -0.466 | 0.386 | 0.549 |
|  | (0.339) | (1.020) | (0.956) | (0.317) | (1.035) | (0.926) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.029 | -0.230 | -0.535 | -0.004 | -0.174 | -0.314 |
|  | (0.108) | (0.434) | (0.452) | (0.105) | (0.429) | (0.430) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.137 | -0.131 | -0.892 | -0.112 | -0.243 | -0.784 |
|  | (0.121) | (0.417) | (0.507) | (0.115) | (0.414) | (0.505) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.371\* | -0.729 | -0.946 | -0.297\* | -0.755 | -0.924 |
|  | (0.132) | (0.492) | (0.654) | (0.127) | (0.510) | (0.670) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.423\* | 0.062 | 0.611 | -0.354\* | -0.027 | 0.799 |
|  | (0.164) | (0.524) | (0.504) | (0.161) | (0.528) | (0.502) |
| Age 66+ | -0.410\* | 0.440 | 0.622 | -0.321 | 0.581 | 0.834 |
|  | (0.196) | (0.552) | (0.731) | (0.189) | (0.541) | (0.677) |
| 2010 | 0.527\* | -1.021\* | 0.830 | 0.581\* | -0.784 | 1.335\* |
|  | (0.180) | (0.458) | (0.532) | (0.177) | (0.441) | (0.553) |
| 2012 | 1.339\* | -1.413\* | 1.893\* | 1.292\* | -1.243\* | 2.532\* |
|  | (0.197) | (0.578) | (0.578) | (0.192) | (0.549) | (0.556) |
| 2014 | 0.515\* | -0.550 | 0.628 | 0.501\* | -0.452 | 0.947 |
|  | (0.161) | (0.502) | (0.616) | (0.156) | (0.460) | (0.633) |
| 2016/17 | 1.135\* | -1.685\* | 0.404 | 1.048\* | -1.354\* | 0.983 |
|  | (0.162) | (0.626) | (0.775) | (0.158) | (0.636) | (0.749) |
| 2018/19 | 0.838\* | -0.196 | 0.084 | 0.726\* | -0.216 | 0.252 |
|  | (0.168) | (0.583) | (0.774) | (0.165) | (0.591) | (0.787) |
| Constant | 3.671 | 5.293 | -1.368 | 4.030 | 5.535 | -0.767 |
|  | (0.340) | (1.102) | (1.201) | (0.335) | (1.045) | (1.158) |
| **Would Abstain or Cast a Null Vote** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Trust Institutions | -0.238\* | -0.163 | -0.303\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.032) | (0.141) | (0.107) |  |  |  |
| Satisfaction with Democracy |  |  |  | -0.339\* | -0.217 | -0.389 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.060) | (0.278) | (0.226) |
| Presidential Approval | -1.162\* | -0.944\* | -0.528\* | -1.195\* | -0.938\* | -0.622\* |
|  | (0.067) | (0.244) | (0.179) | (0.066) | (0.232) | (0.179) |
| Economy Has Improved | -0.397\* | -0.632\* | -0.308 | -0.397\* | -0.609\* | -0.252 |
|  | (0.054) | (0.258) | (0.187) | (0.053) | (0.251) | (0.187) |
| Feels Insecure in Neighborhood | 0.043 | -0.135 | 0.192 | 0.046 | -0.072 | 0.156 |
|  | (0.044) | (0.201) | (0.154) | (0.043) | (0.202) | (0.153) |
| Corruption Victim | -0.134 | 0.384 | -0.122 | -0.118 | 0.610 | -0.202 |
|  | (0.081) | (0.367) | (0.267) | (0.078) | (0.372) | (0.255) |
| Rural | -0.294\* | -0.015 | 0.386 | -0.315\* | -0.288 | 0.417 |
|  | (0.091) | (0.364) | (0.288) | (0.089) | (0.355) | (0.280) |
| Female | 0.010 | -0.182 | 0.485 | 0.002 | -0.314 | 0.371 |
|  | (0.074) | (0.294) | (0.293) | (0.071) | (0.301) | (0.279) |
| Income Quintile | 0.107\* | 0.144 | 0.151 | 0.117\* | 0.139 | 0.149 |
|  | (0.028) | (0.105) | (0.101) | (0.028) | (0.104) | (0.102) |
| Education | 0.001 | 0.081 | -0.182 | 0.012 | 0.116 | -0.167 |
|  | (0.061) | (0.224) | (0.227) | (0.060) | (0.225) | (0.219) |
| Mestiza | -0.185 | 0.060 | 0.257 | -0.189 | 0.150 | 0.372 |
|  | (0.145) | (0.596) | (0.665) | (0.142) | (0.605) | (0.642) |
| Indígena | -0.465\* | -1.225 | 0.035 | -0.486\* | -1.180 | 0.111 |
|  | (0.168) | (0.739) | (0.723) | (0.166) | (0.749) | (0.705) |
| Negra | 0.152 | 3.674 | 1.024 | -0.115 | 3.788\* | 0.807 |
|  | (0.410) | (1.704) | (1.604) | (0.421) | (1.671) | (1.478) |
| Mulata | -1.361\* | 2.575 | 2.987\* | -1.107\* | 2.199 | 2.905\* |
|  | (0.464) | (1.444) | (1.316) | (0.485) | (1.398) | (1.242) |
| Other Race | 0.372 | 0.957 | 0.973 | 0.097 | 0.938 | 1.087 |
|  | (0.309) | (1.194) | (1.006) | (0.288) | (1.253) | (0.938) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.058 | -0.384 | -0.068 | 0.015 | -0.420 | 0.061 |
|  | (0.102) | (0.393) | (0.336) | (0.101) | (0.388) | (0.323) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.338\* | -0.754 | -0.652 | -0.255\* | -0.856 | -0.457 |
|  | (0.121) | (0.469) | (0.401) | (0.117) | (0.464) | (0.373) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.558\* | -0.490 | -0.882 | -0.446\* | -0.451 | -0.683 |
|  | (0.123) | (0.516) | (0.495) | (0.115) | (0.532) | (0.468) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.641\* | -0.151 | -0.761 | -0.518\* | -0.193 | -0.896 |
|  | (0.146) | (0.606) | (0.673) | (0.146) | (0.613) | (0.724) |
| Age 66+ | -0.645\* | 0.154 | 0.077 | -0.468\* | 0.256 | 0.167 |
|  | (0.178) | (0.668) | (0.539) | (0.174) | (0.668) | (0.509) |
| 2010 | -0.345\* | 0.325 | 0.631 | -0.327\* | 0.362 | 0.617 |
|  | (0.157) | (0.572) | (0.518) | (0.150) | (0.562) | (0.520) |
| 2012 | 0.436\* | 0.454 | 1.817\* | 0.434\* | 0.372 | 1.688\* |
|  | (0.175) | (0.632) | (0.480) | (0.168) | (0.607) | (0.469) |
| 2014 | -0.153 | 0.739 | 0.651 | -0.139 | 0.653 | 0.608 |
|  | (0.147) | (0.640) | (0.572) | (0.145) | (0.612) | (0.557) |
| 2016/17 | 0.600\* | 0.255 | 2.038\* | 0.562\* | 0.468 | 1.991\* |
|  | (0.148) | (0.702) | (0.496) | (0.146) | (0.725) | (0.468) |
| 2018/19 | 0.787\* | 1.520\* | 1.872\* | 0.741\* | 1.490\* | 1.801\* |
|  | (0.147) | (0.677) | (0.509) | (0.144) | (0.694) | (0.491) |
| Constant | 4.008 | 2.867 | -2.080 | 3.940 | 2.536 | -2.101 |
|  | (0.303) | (1.212) | (1.166) | (0.290) | (1.177) | (1.094) |
| N | 7,570 | 936 | 1,964 | 7,830 | 944 | 2,067 |
| χ2 | 23.40\* | 2.98\* | 3.43\* | 24.38\* | 3.14\* | 4.36\* |
| Multinomial logit with baseline of “Would vote for the governing party”, standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.05 (two-tailed) | | | | | | |

1. Measured with the question: “What level of education do you have? What was the last year you completed?” I include dummy variables for each level. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Measured with two questions. “What is your religion?” (if answered), “how would you describe yourself? Very devout, Devout, Not very devout, Not devout at all.” We combined those who did not mention a religion with the “not devout at all” to be the least religious category and coded the variable on a 4-point scale from least to most religious. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Measured with the question “What ethnicity or race you identify best with?” The model includes a series of dummy variables with “Black” as the reference category and “Asian” combined with “other races” because there were few Asian respondents. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Measured by taking a factor analysis of household items. Respondents were asked whether the household owned a house where the parents had a bedroom separate from their kids, they owned their own house, a computer, washing machine, a landline telephone, a cell phone, a car, hot water, sewage, a meal a day, drinking water, and a smartphone. We then took a factor analysis of these variables by country to distinguish wealth and divided households by quintile. This method adapts Cordoba (2009). See Córdova, Abby. "Methodological note: Measuring relative wealth using household asset indicators." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 6.9 (2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)