**Appendix A.**

**Table A1**. Issue attitudes and MORENA Partisanship

Partisanship (Base=MORENA Partisanship)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
|  | TraditionalMarriage | Same-sex adoption | Abortion | Euthanasia | No debt | Inflation vs. Growth | Taxing Rich | **Private Investment** | **2006**  **Fraud** |
| PAN | -0.10 | -0.00 | -0.25 | -0.00 | -0.12 | 0.07 | -0.20 | **0.53\*\*\*** | **-0.51\*\*\*** |
|  | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.17) | (0.19) | (0.17) | **(0.19)** | **(0.17)** |
| PRI | 0.25 | 0.19 | -0.33\* | -0.02 | -0.24 | 0.05 | 0.05 | **0.39\*\*** | **-0.42\*\*\*** |
|  | (0.18) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.19) | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.17) | **(0.19)** | **(0.16)** |
| Indep | -0.24 | 0.19 | 0.37\* | -0.25 | 0.25 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 0.07 | 0.03 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.19) | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.17) | (0.20) | (0.17) |
| Other | -0.29\*\* | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.03 | 0.06 | -0.08 | -0.05 | 0.15 | -0.15 |
|  | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.11) | (0.13) | (0.10) |
| Ideology | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.06\*\*\* | -0.01 | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 | -0.05\*\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Elementary | -0.29 | -0.24 | -0.27 | -0.24 | 0.05 | -0.24 | -0.05 | 0.50\*\* | -0.14 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.18) | (0.20) | (0.17) | (0.20) | (0.18) |
| Secondary | -0.40\*\* | -0.11 | -0.18 | 0.05 | 0.09 | -0.19 | 0.08 | 0.43\*\* | -0.02 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.17) | (0.18) | (0.16) | (0.19) | (0.17) |
| High School | -0.51\*\*\* | -0.35\* | -0.04 | 0.17 | 0.01 | -0.37\* | -0.03 | 0.45\*\* | 0.06 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.18) | (0.20) | (0.17) | (0.20) | (0.18) |
| College+ | -0.79\*\*\* | 0.04 | 0.35\* | 0.45\*\* | 0.10 | -0.47\*\* | 0.02 | 0.37\* | -0.10 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.18) | (0.20) | (0.18) | (0.20) | (0.19) |
| Age | 0.40\*\*\* | -0.43\*\*\* | 0.09 | -0.03 | 0.10\*\* | -0.09 | 0.23\*\*\* | -0.06 | -0.03 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) |
| Female | -0.29\*\*\* | 0.15 | -0.39\*\*\* | -0.18\* | -0.04 | -0.16 | 0.02 | -0.15 | -0.15\* |
|  | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.08) |
| Amlo’s FT | 0.02 | -0.00 | -0.03\* | -0.00 | 0.03\* | 0.04\*\* | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.03\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) |
| Constant | 2.92\*\*\* | 4.02\*\*\* | 3.14\*\*\* | 3.95\*\*\* | 3.15\*\*\* | 3.47\*\*\* | 3.21\*\*\* | 2.76\*\*\* | 3.35\*\*\* |
|  | (0.29) | (0.32) | (0.32) | (0.32) | (0.29) | (0.31) | (0.27) | (0.32) | (0.26) |
| Observations | 788 | 782 | 786 | 783 | 783 | 782 | 789 | 770 | 662 |
| R-squared | 0.18 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.08 |

Among these nine issue attitudes, only one—in addition to the 2006 electoral fraud— has been consistently politicized by Mexican partisan elites: private investment in the electric power industry. In fact, this topic is the only one showing similar results than the belief in the 2006 electoral fraud: there is a significant partisan gap between MORENA partisans and PAN/PRI partisans.

**Table A2**. Descriptive Statistics

Original Surveys conducted in the 2018 presidential campaign

(First survey)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Obs** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev.** | **Min** | **Max** |
| Belief in the 2006 election fraud | 872 | 0.59 | 0.38 | 0 | 1 |
| Party ID: PAN | 928 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| Party ID: PRI | 928 | 0.17 | 0.37 | 0 | 1 |
| Party ID: PRD | 928 | 0.03 | 0.17 | 0 | 1 |
| Party ID: MORENA | 928 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| Party ID: Independent | 928 | 0.43 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Affective Polarization | 910 | 0.56 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| Conspiracy Thinking Index | 973 | 0.40 | 0.29 | 0 | 1 |
| Political Information Index | 1,001 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Ideology | 859 | 0.55 | 0.32 | 0 | 1 |
| AMLO’s Feeling Thermometer | 938 | 0.54 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 1,001 | 2.67 | 1.12 | 1 | 4 |
| Age | 1,001 | 3.04 | 0.94 | 1 | 4 |
| Female | 1,001 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |

(Second survey)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Obs** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev.** | **Min** | **Max** |
| Belief in the 2006 election fraud | 712 | 6.10 | 4.10 | 0 | 10 |
| Treatment | 782 | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Party ID: PAN | 738 | 0.25 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |
| Party ID: PRI | 738 | 0.18 | 0.38 | 0 | 1 |
| Party ID: PRD | 738 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0 | 1 |
| Party ID: MORENA | 738 | 0.30 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| Party ID: Independent | 738 | 0.25 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 |

**Tabla A3.** 2018 Survey

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Affective polarization  (including Morena’s FT)  MORENA’s FT –  (PAN’s FT + PRI’s FT)/2 | | |  | Affective polarization  (including AMLO’s FT)  AMLO’s FT –  (PAN’s FT + PRI’s FT)/2. | | |
|  | Complete Sample | | Morena partisans |  | Complete Sample | | Morena partisans |
| Party ID (Reference = PAN) | (1) | (2) | (3) |  | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| - PRI | 0.11\*\* | 0.10\*\* |  |  | 0.11\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) |  |  | (0.04) | (0.04) |  |
| - PRD | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.14\*\* |  |  | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.14\*\* |  |
|  | (0.08) | (0.07) |  |  | (0.08) | (0.07) |  |
| - MORENA | 0.38\*\*\* | 0.16\*\*\* |  |  | 0.38\*\*\* | 0.17\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.04) | (0.05) |  |  | (0.04) | (0.04) |  |
| - Independent | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* |  |  | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.11\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) |  |  | (0.04) | (0.04) |  |
| Affective Polarization (MORENA) |  | 0.40\*\*\* | 0.23 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.10) | (0.19) |  |  |  |  |
| Affective Polarization (AMLO |  |  |  |  |  | 0.59\*\*\* | 0.43\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.12) | (0.24) |
| Conspiracy Thinking (0-1) |  | 0.16\*\*\* | 0.02 |  |  | 0.16\*\*\* | 0.02 |
|  |  | (0.04) | (0.08) |  |  | (0.04) | (0.08) |
| AMLO FT (0-1) |  | 0.20\*\*\* | 0.11 |  |  | 0.05 | -0.04 |
|  |  | (0.06) | (0.13) |  |  | (0.07) | (0.17) |
| Trust in Elections (0-1) |  | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.24\*\* |  |  | 0.19\*\*\* | 0.23\*\* |
|  |  | (0.05) | (0.11) |  |  | (0.05) | (0.11) |
| Political Information (0-1) | 0.06\*\* | 0.06\*\* | 0.06 |  | 0.06\*\* | 0.06\*\* | 0.06 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) |  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) |
| Ideology (0-1) | -0.15\*\*\* | -0.02 | 0.11 |  | -0.15\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.13\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.07) |  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.07) |
| Education | -0.02\* | -0.01 | -0.01 |  | -0.02\* | -0.01 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Age | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.06\*\* |  | 0.00 | -0.00 | 0.06\*\*\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Woman | -0.04 | -0.05\* | -0.04 |  | -0.04 | -0.04\* | -0.04 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.05) |  | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.05) |
| Constant | 0.52\*\*\* | -0.08 | 0.10 |  | 0.52\*\*\* | -0.08 | 0.09 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.18) |  | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.18) |
| Observations | 709 | 626 | 145 |  | 709 | 639 | 145 |
| R-squared | 0.19 | 0.35 | 0.14 |  | 0.19 | 0.35 | 0.15 |

**Tabla A4.** Ologit models (instead of OLS)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2018 Survey | | |  | 2021 Mexican Election Study | | |
|  | Complete Sample | | Morena partisans |  | Complete Sample | | Morena partisans |
| Party ID (Reference = PAN) | (1) | (2) | (3) |  | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| - PRI | 0.60\*\*\* | 0.75\*\*\* |  |  | 0.11 | 0.04 |  |
|  | (0.23) | (0.26) |  |  | (0.35) | (0.36) |  |
| - PRD | 1.31\*\*\* | 0.83\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.41) | (0.45) |  |  |  |  |  |
| - MORENA | 2.21\*\*\* | 1.12\*\*\* |  |  | 1.05\*\*\* | 0.41 |  |
|  | (0.25) | (0.30) |  |  | (0.29) | (0.34) |  |
| - Independent | 0.89\*\*\* | 0.65\*\*\* |  |  | 0.59\*\* | 0.30 |  |
|  | (0.20) | (0.23) |  |  | (0.29) | (0.31) |  |
| Affective Polarization (MORENA) |  | 3.02\*\*\* | 3.27\*\* |  |  | 1.75\*\*\* | 2.42\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.66) | (1.52) |  |  | (0.52) | (0.88) |
| Conspiracy Thinking (0-1) |  | 1.02\*\*\* | -0.12 |  |  | 0.68\*\* | 0.83 |
|  |  | (0.30) | (0.66) |  |  | (0.26) | (0.52) |
| AMLO FT (0-1) |  | 0.97\*\*\* | 0.39 |  |  | 0.17 | 0.87 |
|  |  | (0.37) | (1.07) |  |  | (0.32) | (0.63) |
| Trust in Elections (0-1) |  | 1.50\*\*\* | 2.04\*\* |  |  | 0.55\*\* | 0.92\*\* |
|  |  | (0.33) | (0.85) |  |  | (0.23) | (0.37) |
| Political Information (0-1) | 0.28\* | 0.33\*\* | 0.28 |  | 0.26 | 0.32 | 0.41 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.39) |  | (0.24) | (0.25) | (0.44) |
| Ideology (0-1) | -0.88\*\*\* | -0.13 | 0.87 |  | -0.64\*\*\* | -0.67\*\* | -0.82\*\* |
|  | (0.24) | (0.29) | (0.60) |  | (0.25) | (0.26) | (0.42) |
| Education | -0.09 | -0.00 | 0.10 |  | -0.01 | 0.02 | 0.14 |
|  | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.18) |  | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.13) |
| Age | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.55\*\*\* |  | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.05 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.19) |  | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.15) |
| Woman | -0.20 | -0.27\* | -0.17 |  | -0.33\*\* | -0.27\* | -0.85\*\*\* |
|  | (0.14) | (0.16) | (0.37) |  | (0.15) | (0.16) | (0.26) |
| /cut1 | -0.94\*\* | 3.04\*\*\* | 3.77\*\*\* |  | -1.67\*\*\* | -0.42 | 0.62 |
|  | (0.42) | (0.62) | (1.45) |  | (0.50) | (0.56) | (0.92) |
| /cut2 | -0.28 | 3.78\*\*\* | 4.08\*\*\* |  | -0.59 | 0.71 | 1.46 |
|  | (0.42) | (0.62) | (1.45) |  | (0.49) | (0.55) | (0.92) |
| /cut3 | 1.61\*\*\* | 6.05\*\*\* | 6.62\*\*\* |  | 0.54 | 1.93\*\*\* | 2.66\*\*\* |
|  | (0.42) | (0.65) | (1.52) |  | (0.49) | (0.56) | (0.93) |
| Observations | 709 | 626 | 145 |  | 613 | 587 | 240 |
| R-squared | 0.0811 | 0.170 | 0.107 |  | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.07 |

**Table A5.** OLS models. Probability of believing that there was electoral fraud in 2006

(values range from 0 “not true at all” to 1 “very true”)

ONLY MORENA PARTISANS

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2018 Survey |  | 2021 Mexican  Election Study |
| Affective Polarization (0-1) | 0.23 |  | 0.39\*\* |
|  | (0.19) |  | (0.15) |
| Conspiracy Thinking (0-1) | 0.02 |  | 0.13\* |
|  | (0.08) |  | (0.08) |
| AMLO FT (0-1) | 0.11 |  | 0.17 |
|  | (0.13) |  | (0.11) |
| Trust in Elections (0-1) | 0.24\*\* |  | 0.15\*\* |
|  | (0.11) |  | (0.06) |
| Political Information (0-1) | 0.06 |  | 0.05 |
|  | (0.05) |  | (0.08) |
| Ideology (0-1) | 0.11 |  | -0.16\*\* |
|  | (0.07) |  | (0.07) |
| Education | -0.01 |  | 0.02 |
|  | (0.02) |  | (0.02) |
| Age | 0.06\*\* |  | -0.02 |
|  | (0.02) |  | (0.03) |
| Woman | -0.04 |  | -0.14\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) |  | (0.04) |
| Constant | 0.10 |  | 0.34\*\* |
|  | (0.18) |  | (0.16) |
| Observations | 145 |  | 240 |
| R-squared | 0.14 |  | 0.16 |
| Standard error in parenthesis \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | | |

**Table A6.** OLS models. Probability of believing that there was electoral fraud in 2006

(values range from 0 “not true at all” to 1 “very true”)

(Even when excluding trust in elections)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2018 Survey | | |  | 2021 Mexican Election Study | | |
| Party ID (Reference = PAN) | (1) | (2) | (3) |  | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| - PRI | 0.11\*\* | 0.09\*\* | 0.10\*\* |  | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |  | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| - PRD | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.12\* | 0.14\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |  |  |  |  |
| - MORENA | 0.38\*\*\* | 0.16\*\*\* | 0.16\*\*\* |  | 0.20\*\*\* | 0.09 | 0.08 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) |  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| - Independent | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.12\*\*\* |  | 0.12\*\* | 0.08 | 0.07 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |  | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Affective Polarization |  | 0.42\*\*\* | 0.40\*\*\* |  |  | 0.30\*\*\* | 0.29\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.10) | (0.10) |  |  | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Conspiracy Thinking (0-1) |  | 0.19\*\*\* | 0.16\*\*\* |  |  | 0.13\*\*\* | 0.12\*\* |
|  |  | (0.04) | (0.04) |  |  | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| AMLO FT (0-1) |  | 0.20\*\*\* | 0.20\*\*\* |  |  | 0.01 | 0.04 |
|  |  | (0.06) | (0.06) |  |  | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Trust in Elections (0-1) |  |  | 0.21\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.10\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.05) |  |  |  | (0.04) |
| Political Information (0-1) | 0.06\*\* | 0.04 | 0.06\*\* |  | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |  | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Ideology (0-1) | -0.15\*\*\* | -0.03 | -0.02 |  | -0.13\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* | -0.13\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |  | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Education | -0.02\* | -0.02 | -0.01 |  | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Age | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |  | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |  | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Woman | -0.04 | -0.04\* | -0.05\* |  | -0.06\* | -0.04 | -0.05 |
|  | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) |  | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.09 | -0.08 |  | 0.66\*\*\* | 0.47\*\*\* | 0.42\*\*\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) |  | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Observations | 709 | 646 | 626 |  | 613 | 589 | 587 |
| R-squared | 0.19 | 0.32 | 0.35 |  | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.12 |

**Table A7**. Balance between treatment groups

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Logistic Regression**  DV= Treatment Groups | |
|  |  |
| Education: High School | 0.16 |
|  | (0.23) |
| Education: College+ | -0.29 |
|  | (0.21) |
| Female | -0.12 |
|  | (0.15) |
| Age: 26-40 | -0.17 |
|  | (0.20) |
| Age: 41-60 | -0.05 |
|  | (0.21) |
| Age: 61+ | 0.01 |
|  | (0.26) |
| Constant | 0.09 |
|  | (0.26) |
|  |  |
| Observations | 769 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.00980 |
| Standard errors in parentheses,  \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | |

Education (Base Group) = Elementary School ; Age (Base Group): 18-25.

**Tabla A8.** 2018 Survey

Vote in the 2018 presidential election (reference category = MORENA)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (4) | (5) | (7) | (8) | (10) | (11) |
|  | PAN | PRI | PAN | PRI | PAN | PRI | PAN | PRI |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Belief Election Fraud** | **-2.97\*\*\*** | **-3.65\*\*\*** | **-3.17\*\*\*** | **-3.82\*\*\*** | **-2.54\*\*\*** | **-3.38\*\*\*** | **-2.64\*\*\*** | **-2.80\*\*\*** |
|  | **(0.32)** | **(0.37)** | **(0.33)** | **(0.39)** | **(0.42)** | **(0.50)** | **(0.48)** | **(0.55)** |
| Party ID: PRI |  |  |  |  | -1.77\*\*\* | 2.53\*\*\* | -1.75\*\*\* | 2.52\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.44) | (0.51) | (0.47) | (0.56) |
| Party ID: Morena |  |  |  |  | -5.66\*\*\* | -3.10\*\*\* | -5.03\*\*\* | -2.21\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (1.03) | (1.10) | (1.04) | (1.12) |
| Party ID: Independents |  |  |  |  | -1.79\*\*\* | -0.01 | -1.66\*\*\* | 0.44 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.30) | (0.50) | (0.34) | (0.54) |
| Ideology (0-10) |  |  |  |  |  |  | 3.06\*\*\* | 3.34\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.55) | (0.67) |
| Incumbent President FT |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.03 | 0.06 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.30) | (0.36) |
| Evaluation: Economy |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.04 | 0.18\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.06) | (0.07) |
| Education |  |  | -0.16 | -0.13 | -0.14 | 0.08 | -0.08 | 0.16 |
|  |  |  | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.18) |
| Age |  |  | 0.32\*\*\* | 0.50\*\*\* | 0.32\*\* | 0.42\*\* | 0.29\* | 0.56\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.12) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.19) | (0.16) | (0.21) |
| Female |  |  | 0.16 | 0.52\*\* | 0.16 | 0.25 | -0.10 | 0.06 |
|  |  |  | (0.22) | (0.26) | (0.27) | (0.33) | (0.31) | (0.37) |
| Constant | 0.93\*\*\* | 0.78\*\*\* | 0.49 | -0.55 | 1.72\*\* | -1.43 | 0.12 | -5.31\*\*\* |
|  | (0.21) | (0.22) | (0.57) | (0.70) | (0.74) | (0.98) | (0.90) | (1.29) |
| Observations | 598 | 598 | 598 | 598 | 558 | 558 | 516 | 516 |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.142 | 0.142 | 0.164 | 0.164 | 0.428 | 0.428 | 0.491 | 0.491 |

Affective polarization has a less relevant role among MORENA supporters because, among this partisan group, the vast majority of the observations are located in one extreme of the index (they like MORENA and highly dislike the PAN and PRI). In a similar way, variables such as opinion of López Obrador, political information or conspiracy thinking are not statistically significant (conspiracy thinking only reaches some significance but at the 10% level in 2021)—meaning that partisanship tends to trump the effect of such variables in the dependent variable. Distrust in elections is the only variable that reports some effect: at higher levels of distrust of Mexican elections, MORENA partisans are more likely to believe in election fraud: increases 22 percentage points in 2018 and 15 percentage points in 2021.

**Figure A1.** Trust in the IFE/INE - Annual averages as reported in Moreno (2022)

To what extent do your trust the Instituto Federal Electoral/Instituto Nacional Electoral…?

*A great deal, somewhat, not much, not at all.*



Source: Moreno (2022), El Financiero.

**Figure A2.** Among MORENA partisans

(2018 Survey)



(Mexican Election Study 2021)



**Figure A3.** AMLO’s Feeling thermometer effect on the treatment condition



**Appendix B.**

A further issue to consider is that unlike the U.S., Mexico does not have a two-party system and, therefore, the measure of affective polarization used in the main document (i.e., the difference between voters’ opinion of MORENA and their average opinion of the PAN and the PRI) can obscure some differences between the PAN and the PRI. As an alternative, the models presented in table B1 and figure B1 separate i) voters who have a very positive opinion of MORENA and a very negative opinion of the PRI and ii) voters who have a very positive opinion of MORENA and a very negative opinion of the PAN.[[1]](#footnote-1) The results are fairly similar with the inclusion of affective polarization relative to the PAN or relative to the PRI (PAN: a 38-percentage-point difference; PRI: a 34-percentage-point difference). This is likely the case because López Obrador has consistently claimed that the PRI and the PAN represent the same political alternative—in fact, he refers to them as the “PRIAN”—and are part of the same “political mafia” that has kidnapped Mexico and stolen the presidency from him.


**Table B1.** OLS models. Probability of believing that there was electoral fraud in 2006

Dependent Variable measured on a 0 “not true at all” - 1 “very true” scale

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  |  |  |
| Party ID (Reference Category = PAN) |  |  |
| - PRI | 0.04 | 0.13\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| - PRD | 0.15\* | 0.16\*\* |
|  | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| - MORENA | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.20\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| - Independent | 0.12\*\*\* | 0.15\*\*\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Affective Polarization (MORENA vis-à-vis the PAN) | 0.29\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.09) |  |
| Affective Polarization (MORENA vis-à-vis the PRI) |  | 0.30\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.08) |
| Conspiracy Thinking (Index 0-1) | 0.21\*\*\* | 0.19\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Political Information (Index 0-1) | 0.04 | 0.05\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Ideology (0-1) | -0.06 | -0.07 |
|  | (0.05) | (0.04) |
| AMLO Feeling Thermometer (0-1) | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.26\*\*\* |
|  | (0.06) | (0.05) |
| Education | -0.02 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Age | 0.00 | -0.00 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Woman | -0.05\* | -0.05\* |
|  | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Constant | 0.20\*\* | 0.14 |
|  | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Observations | 657 | 663 |
| R-squared | 0.31 | 0.32 |
| Standard Errors in parenthesis \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 | | |

**Figure B1.** Probability of Believing that there was electoral fraud in 2006

(values range from 0 “not true at all” to 1 “very true”)



Affective Polarization: MORENA-PAN (0-1) Affective Polarization: MORENA-PRI (0-1)

1. The correlation between the two variables is 0.72. To avoid multicollinearity, the variables are included in two different models. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)