ONLINE APPENDIX: CAREER CIVIL SERVANTS' SOCIALLY-EMBEDDED RESPONSES TO DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

APPENDIX A1: Citizens' Support for the Legal Overhaul

A1.1 *Religiosity, gender, and partisanship as predictors of support in the Legal Overhaul*

To demonstrate the association between citizens' levels of religiosity and partisanship, and between these variables, gender, and support for the Legal Overhaul, we draw on data from a large, three-wave survey conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (Viterbi Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research). This survey was carried out during February and March 2023, around the same period as our survey of civil servants. The sample is representative, including 2,315 Israeli citizens, of whom 1,835 are Jewish. Our analysis is restricted to Jews because categories of religiosity levels vary by religion. Participants were asked about their support for five specific components of the Legal Overhaul. We converted respondents' responses to each of the five items into binary measures of support/non-support and summed the number of proposed changes each respondent supports (0 = does not support any proposed changes, 5 = supports all proposed changes). Figure A1 shows the distribution of this indicator across religiosity groups, indicating that support for the Legal Overhaul is associated with religiosity categories. Using this data and the constructed dependent variable, Table A1.1 presents OLS regression models of the association between religiosity levels, gender, partisanship (voting for the opposition vs. the coalition in December 2022), and support for the Legal Overhaul, controlling for education and income. In model 1, which does not include partisanship, the coefficients of religiosity groups and gender are statistically significant. Once we add partisanship in model 2, the coefficients of religiosity remain significant yet are about two times smaller (because religiosity is an antecedent of partisanship). Employing Poisson regressions instead of OLS does not alter any of the findings.

Figure A1.1: Legal Overhaul Support across Religious Groups



Table A1.1: Citizens' Support for the Legal Overhaul (OLS regressions)

	DV=Num. of Judicial Overhaul Components Supported	
	Model 1	Model 2
Traditional non-religious	0.547***	0.187**
	(0.093)	(0.089)
Traditional religious	1.017***	0.435***
	(0.135)	(0.132)
Religious	1.525***	0.847***
	(0.129)	(0.124)
Ultra-orthodox	2.697***	1.710***
	(0.127)	(0.126)
Female	-0.534***	-0.517***
	(0.075)	(0.069)
Voted for the opposition		-1.616***
		(0.079)
Education	-0.042**	0.022
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Income	0.032	0.068**
	(0.031)	(0.030)
Constant	2.067***	2.766***
	(0.172)	(0.165)
N	1,677	1,515
R^2	0.267	0.435
Adjusted R^2	0.264	0.432

Notes: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

A1.2 *Partisanship and optimism/pessimism about Israel's democracy*

One of the items we used to estimate civil servants' perceptions of the Legal Overhaul as a threat to democracy replicates, word by word, a measure used by the Israel Democracy Institute in a citizen survey, conducted in February 2023, in proximity to our survey (N=782, of whom 608 are Jewish). As reported in the manuscript, this item reads "How do you feel about the state of Israel's democracy in the foreseeable future?", with responses ranging from "very pessimistic" (=1) to "very optimistic" (=4), which we reverse-coded so that higher values signify greater pessimism.

Table A1.2 shows that opposition supporters expressed higher pessimism on this scale, which we attribute to their concerns regarding the Legal overhaul announced in the prior month. As evident from Model 1, among the full sample, compared with coalition supporters, those who voted for the opposition supporters are on average 1.55 points, or 1.39 standard deviations more pessimistic about the future of Israel's democracy (adjusted R^2=0.39). Among Jewish respondents (Model 2) the difference between opposition and coalition supporters amounts to 1.63 points or 1.44 standard deviations (adjusted R^2=0.44). Additionally, as apparent from Model 3, women are more pessimistic, and the association with Jewish religiosity levels is significant, such that the more religious (who tend to vote for the coalition's religious parties) are more optimistic.

Table A1.2 Pessimism about the Future of Democracy

	Pessimism about democracy		
	Model 1 (full sample)	Model 2 (Jewish sample)	Model 3 (Jewish sample)
Non-voter	1.286***	1.091***	0.877***
	(0.096)	(0.127)	(0.124)
Voted for the opposition	1.546***	1.626***	1.273***
	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.087)
Voted for a party under the threshold	1.359***	1.253***	1.046***
	(0.114)	(0.133)	(0.129)
Female			0.254***
			(0.067)
Traditional non-religious			-0.159*
			(0.093)
Traditional religious			-0.392***
			(0.129)
Religious			-0.762***
			(0.122)
Ultra-Orthodox			-0.774***
			(0.117)
Constant	1.921***	1.890***	2.189***
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.085)
Observations	746	577	577
R^2	0.393	0.441	0.511
Adjusted R^2	0.391	0.438	0.504

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.

APPENDIX A2: Survey Structure and Distribution Channels

The structure of the survey was as follows. After introducing the general aim of the study, obtaining participants' informed consent, and confirming respondents' status as civil servants, we asked them a series of questions about their perceptions and expectations of their current and future professional influence, and the current and future meritocracy of the human resource management practices of their ministry. Next, we asked them how optimistic/pessimistic they are about the future of democracy in Israel, followed by a battery of five items regarding their family members' and close friends' views of the Legal Overhaul, which we use to measure perceived democratic backsliding. We then asked respondents about their intentions to exit the civil service, and their past inclination and future intentions to exercise their voice and exert effort at work (our key outcome variables).[1] At the end of the survey, we included a shortened 4-item public service motivation (PSM) scale (which is not used in the analysis), and additional questions about respondents' demographic and professional characteristics. The median completion time of the survey was approximately 10 minutes. The questionnaire included circa 60 closed survey items in total. Additionally, we allowed respondents the opportunity to provide open-ended verbal explanations and comments to clarify their choices along with the closed questions throughout the survey and at the end. These comments are analyzed as part of our qualitative analysis (see section 6 of the article). For the exact wording of the survey items see Table A3.

As detailed in the manuscript, we distributed the survey via multiple channels. Figure A2 presents how the respondents, focusing on those occupying middle and senior-level positions, received the anonymous link to our survey.

[1] We included an additional section, after our outcome variables, where we presented respondents with a hypothetical scenario, to measure their response to a future event wherein they would be required to implement a policy that they perceive as detrimental to the public interest (drawing on Schuster et al. 2022). This part of the survey was also included in the pre-registration plan, yet we decided not to include it in the paper since it transcends our main focus on respondents' overall willingness to contribute as opposed to their response to specific policies that we, as researchers, specify as detrimental to the public.

Figure A2: Respondents' Reporting of the Source from Whom they Received the Survey



APPENDIX A3: Operationalization of Variables

Table A3: List of Variables

Variable Name	Scale as in the paper (after normalization and item reversal)	Survey Items	Original Scale (before normalization and item reversal)	Cronbach alpha
PAST_INFLUENCE	0-1 (0 – low influence; 1 – high influence)	Item 1 (Q4_1): The professional ranks in the unit in which I work had an influence over the policy advanced within our remit. Item 2 (Q4_1): The professional ranks in the unit in which I work enjoyed autonomy in advancing policy within our remit. Item 3 (Q4_1): The professional ranks in the unit in which I work enjoyed a broad latitude of discretion in implementing policy within our remit.	1-7 (1 – strongly disagree; 7 – strongly agree)	0.85
PAST_POLITICIZATION	0-1 (0 – low politization; 1 – high politization)	Item 1 (Q10_1): In the department for which I work, promotion through the ranks is based on competence and experience. (reversed) Item 2 (Q10_2): In the department for which I work, effort and hard work are rewarded with promotion. (reversed) Item 3 (Q10_3): In the department for which I work, people are promoted based on their proven capacity to perform the required work. (reversed)	1-7 (1 – strongly disagree; 7 – strongly agree)	0.93

PAST_EFFORT	0-1 (0 – low effort; 1 – high effort)	Thinking back over the past five years (or a shorter period of time you've been working in an office), how would you describe your exertion of effort in performing your role?	1-5 (1– very low investment of effort; 5 – very high investment of effort)	
PAST_VOICE	0-1 (0 – low voice; 1 – high voice)	Item 1 (Q22_1): I made suggestions that affected my unit's work. Item 2 (Q22_2): I expressed my opinions regarding the work of my unit to my colleagues, even if my opinions were different or if other colleagues in the unit did not agree with my opinions. Item 3 (Q22_3): I suggested ideas for new projects or improvements to the work procedures used in my unit's work.	1-6 (1– never; 6 – very frequently)	0.81
PROJECT_VOICE	0-1 (0 – low voice; 1 – high voice)	And compared with your answers to the previous questions, to what extent do you expect that you will express your views about the workings of the unit in which you work in the upcoming five years?	1-5 (1 – much less; 5 – much more)	
PROJECT_ POLITICIZATION	0-1 (0 – low politicization; 1 – high politicization)	And looking ahead to the next five years, to what extent do you anticipate that there will be a change for the better or for worse in the extent to which promotions in the department will de facto be made based on relevant experience, competence, and hard work? (reversed)	1-5 (1 – significant change for the worse; 5 – significant change for the better)	

PERCIEVED DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING	0-1 (0 – low backsliding; 1 – high backsliding)	Item 1 (Q15): How do you feel about the state of Israel's democracy in the foreseeable future? (reversed) Item 2 (Q16_1): My family and close friends believe that Israel's democracy is in a real danger. Item 3 (Q16_2): My family and close friends support the legal reform (reversed) Item 4 (Q16_3): My family and close friends believe that the legal reform will increase the public's trust in the legal system (reversed) Item 5 (Q16_4): My family and close friends believe that the legal reform will strengthen democracy (reversed) Item 6 (Q16_5): My family and close friends take part in the demonstrations against the legal reform.	1-4 (1 – very pessimistic, 4 – very optimistic) 1-7 (1 – strongly disagree; 7 – strongly agree)	0.87
PROJECT_EFFORT	0-1 (0 – low effort; 1 – high effort)	And compared to your answers to the previous question, how much effort do you expect to exert in performing your role in the coming five years?	1-5 (1 – much less than today; 5 – much more than today)	
PROJECT_INFLUENCE	0-1 (0 – low influence; 1 – high influence)	Looking ahead to the next five years, to what extent do you anticipate that there will be an increase or waning in the degree of influence that the professional ranks in	1-5 (1 – substantial waning; 5 – substantial increase)	

		your unit exert over the ministry's policies within the unit's remit?	
INTENT_EXIT	0-1 (0 – low intent; 1 – high intent)	If you were offered today a position outside the civil service at a salary level similar to what you currently earn, what is the likelihood that you would choose to leave the civil service?	1-5 (1 – very low; 5 – very high)
ranking	1 – “junior”; 2 – “middle”; 3 – “senior”; 4 – “very senior”	How do you perceive your rank?	
position_type	1 – “trust based”; 2 – “competitive tender”; 3 – “replacement”; 4 – “other”	What is the category of your position?	
tenure	1 - “1-“ 2 – “1-5” 3 – “6-10” 4 – “11-20” 5 – “20+”	How long have you been working in the civil service?	
ministry	1 2 3 4 5 6	To which of the following offices does the unit for which you work belong to?	

	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 30	
`age`	1 – “20-30”; 2 – “31-40”; 3 – “41-50”; 4 – “51-60”; 5 – “60+”	How old are you?
`gender`	1 – “male” / “other”; 2 – “female”	What is your gender?

religiosity	0 – “secular”; 1 – “traditional-nonreligious”; 2 – “traditional-religious”; 3 – “religious”; 4- “ultra-orthodox”; 999 – “other”	How do you define yourself in terms of religiosity?
nationality	0 – “jewish”; 1 – “non jewish”	Are you:
education	1 – “high-school”; 2 – “bachelor”; 3- “master”; 4 – “phd”; 999 – “other”	What is your highest level of education completed?
jurist	0 – “no legal background” 1 – “legal background”	Coding based on the question: what is the subject of your most recent academic degree (public policy, law, medicine, economics, social work, accounting, etc.)? _ _____
ministry_by_party	0 - "Other" 1 2 3 4 5 6	The party affiliation of the ministers in the respondent's unit

Marker variable	To what extent do you agree that the questions in this questionnaire are formulated in an understandable and clear manner?	1-7 (1 – strongly disagree, 7 – strongly agree)

APPENDIX A4: Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC)

Table A4: ICC Results

	ICC1	ICC2
Perceived democratic backsliding	-0.007	-0.091
Exit intention	0.006	0.076
Voice intention	-0.012	-0.191
Work effort intention	0.032	0.299

Note: Intraclass correlation coefficient tests, across ministries, calculated via R multilevel package.

APPENDIX A5: Religiosity and Gender as Antecedents of Civil Servants' Perceived Democratic Backsliding

Table A5: Civil Servants' Perceived Democratic Backsliding

	Perceived democratic backsliding								
Predictors	*Estimates*	*std. Beta*	*p*	*Estimates*	*std. Beta*	*p*	*Estimates*	*std. Beta*	*p*
(Intercept)	0.85 (0.02)	0.52 (0.05)	**<0.001**	0.80 (0.03)	0.38 (0.07)	**<0.001**	0.97 (0.29)	0.87 (0.85)	**0.001**
religiosity [traditional-nonreligious]	-0.22 (0.05)	-0.65 (0.14)	**<0.001**	-0.21 (0.05)	-0.62 (0.14)	**<0.001**	-0.21 (0.05)	-0.62 (0.15)	**<0.001**
religiosity [traditional-religious]	-0.33 (0.06)	-0.97 (0.18)	**<0.001**	-0.31 (0.06)	-0.92 (0.18)	**<0.001**	-0.30 (0.06)	-0.89 (0.18)	**<0.001**
religiosity [religious]	-0.50 (0.04)	-1.48 (0.11)	**<0.001**	-0.50 (0.04)	-1.48 (0.11)	**<0.001**	-0.51 (0.04)	-1.49 (0.11)	**<0.001**
religiosity [ultra-orthodox]	-0.69 (0.07)	-2.03 (0.21)	**<0.001**	-0.68 (0.07)	-2.01 (0.21)	**<0.001**	-0.70 (0.08)	-2.07 (0.23)	**<0.001**
religiosity [other]	-0.32 (0.10)	-0.93 (0.29)	**0.001**	-0.31 (0.10)	-0.92 (0.28)	**0.001**	-0.36 (0.11)	-1.05 (0.31)	**0.001**
gender [female]				0.08 (0.03)	0.23 (0.08)	**0.006**	0.09 (0.03)	0.26 (0.09)	**0.003**
education [bachelor]							-0.26 (0.28)	-0.76 (0.83)	0.365
education [master]							-0.28 (0.28)	-0.84 (0.84)	0.317
education [phd]							-0.30 (0.29)	-0.88 (0.85)	0.302
education [other]							-0.33 (0.30)	-0.96 (0.90)	0.286
tenure1-5							-0.08 (0.12)	-0.22 (0.36)	0.536
tenure6-10							-0.07 (0.12)	-0.19 (0.36)	0.591
tenure11-20							-0.08 (0.12)	-0.23 (0.36)	0.516
tenure [20+]							-0.10 (0.13)	-0.30 (0.37)	0.427
position type [competitive tender]							0.12 (0.08)	0.36 (0.24)	0.125

position type [replacement]			0.22 (0.12)	0.64 (0.35)	0.070
position type [other]			0.18 (0.10)	0.53 (0.30)	0.076
ranking [senior]			-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.10)	0.882
ranking [very senior]			0.15 (0.06)	0.44 (0.18)	**0.018**
age31-40			0.09 (0.09)	0.27 (0.25)	0.295
age41-50			0.05 (0.09)	0.13 (0.26)	0.606
age51-60			0.05 (0.10)	0.15 (0.28)	0.603
age [61+]			-0.03 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.35)	0.820
legal background			-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.534
Observations	322	322	322		
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.452 / 0.443	0.465 / 0.455	0.491 / 0.450		

A6: Measurement Model

CFA- A 7-Factor Measurement Model

Factor	Item	Estimate std.
Past influence	Item_1	0.682 (<.001)
	Item_2	0.812 (<.001)
	Item_3	0.906 (<.001)
Past politicization	Item_1	0.889 (<.001)
	Item_2	0.885 (<.001)
	Item_3	0.977 (<.001)
Past work effort	Item_1	1.000 (<.001)
Past voice	Item_1	0.86 (<.001)
	Item_2	0.56 (<.001)
	Item_3	0.878 (<.001)
Perceived democratic backsliding	Item_1	0.846 ((<.001)
	Item_2	0.906 (<.001)
	Item_3	0.958 (<.001)
	Item_4	0.966 (<.001)
	Item_5	0.96 (<.001)
	Item_6	0.834 (<.001)
Expected politicization	Item_1	1.000 (<.001)
Expected influence	Item_1	1.000 (<.001)
N	344	
$\chi 2$	241.923 [df=117, p<.001]	
CFI	0.976	
TLI	0.968	
RMSEA	0.056 CI[0.046,0.066]	
SRMR	0.04	

Notes: Analyses conducted via `R lavaan` package. Item numbers match table A3.

APPENDIX A7: Complete Versions of Tables 3, 4 And 5 of the Main Manuscript

This section reports the main models presented in the manuscript (Tables 3-5). Tables A7.1 and A7.2 present the full regression results, which are summarized in Tables 3 and 4 of the manuscript. Table A7.3 presents the results of a multiple mediation Structural Equation Model (SEM), summarized in Table 5 of the main article. The SEM model was estimated using the `R lavaan` package (Rosseel, 2012). For each of the three outcome variables (exit, voice, and work intentions), we specified mediation models with two indirect paths (via politicization and influence) and set the two mediators' error terms to covary. As explained in the manuscript, all models control for respondents' perceptions about the past (past politicization, past influence, past voice, and past effort). Standard errors are estimated through bootstrapping with 1,000 iterations. In our programming, we used set.seed (2023). We report standardized Beta coefficients and two-tailed p-values. For transparency, we also provide the full R lavaan code and outputs.

Table A7.1: regression models for the link between perceived democratic backsliding and concerns of increased politicization and reduced professional influence

	Expected politicization		Expected influence	
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Democratic backsliding	0.52 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.53 (0.05)	<0.001
Past politicization	0.08 (0.05)	0.085	-0.01 (0.05)	0.789
Past influence	-0.06 (0.05)	0.229	0.15 (0.05)	0.001
Intercept	0.00 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.00 (0.04)	<0.001
Observations	351		351	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.277 / 0.270		0.315 / 0.309	

Table A7.2: regression models for the link between perceived democratic backsliding and higher exit, and lower voice and work effort intentions

	Exit intention				Voice intention				Work effort intention			
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Democratic backsliding	0.32 (0.05)	<0.001	0.21 (0.06)	0.001	-0.25 (0.05)	<0.001	0.03 (0.06)	0.586	-0.25 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.05 (0.06)	0.432
Expected politicization			0.27 (0.07)	<0.001			-0.29 (0.07)	<0.001			-0.34 (0.07)	<0.001
Expected influence			0.06 (0.07)	0.438			0.27 (0.07)	<0.001			0.04 (0.07)	0.596
Past politicization	0.09 (0.06)	0.100	0.07 (0.05)	0.227	-0.03 (0.06)	0.565	-0.01 (0.05)	0.917	-0.08 (0.06)	0.175	-0.04 (0.05)	0.406
Past influence	0.02 (0.06)	0.747	0.03 (0.06)	0.638	0.04 (0.06)	0.436	-0.02 (0.05)	0.741	0.04 (0.06)	0.433	0.02 (0.05)	0.743
Past voice					0.06 (0.05)	0.237	0.06 (0.05)	0.196				
Past work effort									-0.07 (0.05)	0.214	-0.07 (0.05)	0.143
Intercept	-0.00 (0.05)	0.048	-0.00 (0.05)	0.896	0.00 (0.05)	<0.001	0.00 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.00 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.00 (0.05)	<0.001
Observations	338		338		340		340		347		347	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.101 / 0.093		0.144 / 0.131		0.067 / 0.056		0.232 / 0.218		0.072 / 0.061		0.166 / 0.152	

Table A7.3: Summary of SEM results

Parameter	β	LL	UP	p-value
Standardized direct correlations				
Democratic backsliding → exit intention	.22	.10	.34	<.001
Politicization → exit intention	.28	.14	.40	<.001
Influence → exit intention	.07	-.06	.21	.304
Democratic backsliding → voice intention	.05	-.06	.21	.304
Politicization → voice intention	-.31	-.44	-.18	<.001
Influence → voice intention	.26	.12	.40	<.001
Democratic backsliding → work intention	-.06	-.17	.06	.338
Politicization → work intention	-.33	-.45	-.20	<.001
Influence → work intention	.03	-.11	.18	.637
Democratic backsliding → politicization	.53	.45	.60	<.001
Democratic backsliding → influence	-.51	-.58	-.43	<.001
Standardized indirect correlations				
Backsliding → politicization → exit	.15	.07	.22	<.001
Backsliding → influence → exit	-.04	-.11	.03	.305
Backsliding → politicization → voice	-.16	-.24	-.10	<.001
Backsliding → influence → voice	-.13	-.21	-.06	.001
Backsliding → politicization → work	-.17	-.25	-.10	<.001
Backsliding → influence → work	-.02	-.09	.05	.639
Standardized total correlations				
Democratic backsliding → exit intention	.33	.24	.42	<.001
Democratic backsliding → voice intention	-.24	-.34	-.13	<.001
Democratic backsliding → work intention	-.25	-33	-.16	<.001

Notes: LL = Lower limit, UP – upper limit. 95% confidence intervals calculated via bootstrapping.

Model fit: N=394, $\chi^2(156) = 323.492$, p<.001, CFI=.972, TLI=.962, RMSEA=.052 CI[.044,.060], SRMR=.038

R lavaan code

```
## SEM models



```{r}
SEM_All <-'
##latent variables##
Past_influence=~ Q4_1 + Q4_2 + Q4_3
Past_politicization=~ Q10_1 + Q10_2 + Q10_3
Demo_backsliding=~ Q16_1 + Q16_2 + Q16_3 + Q16_4 + Q16_5 + Q15
Past_voice=~Q22_1+Q22_2+Q22_3
Past_effort=~PAST_EFFORT

##Direct effects##
INTENT_EXIT ~ cp_ex*Demo_backsliding
PROJECT_VOICE ~ cp_vc*Demo_backsliding + Past_voice
PROJECT_EFFORT ~ cp_eff*Demo_backsliding + Past_effort

##Mediators##
PROJECT_POLITICIZATION ~ a1*Demo_backsliding + Past_politicization
PROJECT_INFLUENCE ~ a2*Demo_backsliding + Past_influence

INTENT_EXIT ~ b1_ex*PROJECT_POLITICIZATION + Past_politicization
INTENT_EXIT ~ b2_ex*PROJECT_INFLUENCE + Past_influence

PROJECT_VOICE ~ b1_vc*PROJECT_POLITICIZATION + Past_politicization
PROJECT_VOICE ~ b2_vc*PROJECT_INFLUENCE + Past_influence

PROJECT_EFFORT ~ b1_eff*PROJECT_POLITICIZATION + Past_politicization
PROJECT_EFFORT ~ b2_eff*PROJECT_INFLUENCE + Past_influence

## Indirect effects ##
tot_ind_exit := abs(a1*b1_ex) + abs(a2*b2_ex)
tot_ind_voice := abs(a1*b1_vc) + abs(a2*b2_vc)
tot_ind_effort := abs(a1*b1_eff) + abs(a2*b2_eff)

dir_backs_polit := a1
dir_backs_inf := a2

dir_backs_exit := cp_ex
dir_polit_exit := b1_ex
dir_infl_exit := b2_ex

dir_backs_voice := cp_vc
dir_polit_voice := b1_vc
dir_infl_voice := b2_vc

dir_backs_effort := cp_eff
dir_proj_polit_effort := b1_eff
dir_proj_infl_effort := b2_eff

##indirect effects##
ind_back_polit_exit := a1*b1_ex
ind_back_infl_exit := a2*b2_ex

ind_back_polit_voice := a1*b1_vc
ind_back_infl_voice := a2*b2_vc

ind_back_polit_effort := a1*b1_eff
ind_back_infl_effort := a2*b2_eff

##total effects##
tot_back_exit := cp_ex + (a1*b1_ex) + (a2*b2_ex)
tot_back_voice := cp_vc + (a1*b1_vc) + (a2*b2_vc)
tot_back_effort := cp_eff + (a1*b1_eff) + (a2*b2_eff)


##Correlations between mediators##
PROJECT_POLITICIZATION~~PROJECT_INFLUENCE

##Other correlations##
PROJECT_POLITICIZATION~~Past_influence
PROJECT_INFLUENCE~~Past_politicization
Past_politicization~~Past_influence
```
```

```
Past_effort~~PROJECT_POLITICIZATION
Past_effort~~PROJECT_INFLUENCE

##Contrasts
c1v2_exit := (a1*b1_ex) - (a2*b2_ex)
c1v2_voice := (a1*b1_vc) - (a2*b2_vc)
c1v2_effort := (a1*b1_eff) - (a2*b2_eff)'


fit_all <- sem(SEM_All, # model formula
               se = "bootstrap",
               missing="ML",
               data = data_for_analysis_senior)#

summary(fit_all, fit.measures=TRUE, standardized=TRUE)
```

```
lavaan 0.6-19 ended normally after 199 iterations

  Estimator                                         ML
  Optimization method                           NLMINB
  Number of model parameters                        96

  Number of observations                           394
  Number of missing patterns                        34

Model Test User Model:

  Test statistic                               323.492
  Degrees of freedom                               156
  P-value (Chi-square)                           0.000

Model Test Baseline Model:

  Test statistic                              6168.493
  Degrees of freedom                               210
  P-value                                        0.000

User Model versus Baseline Model:

  Comparative Fit Index (CFI)                    0.972
  Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)                       0.962

  Robust Comparative Fit Index (CFI)             0.971
  Robust Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)                0.961

Loglikelihood and Information Criteria:

  Loglikelihood user model (H0)              -7673.623
  Loglikelihood unrestricted model (H1)             NA

  Akaike (AIC)                               15539.245
  Bayesian (BIC)                             15920.975
  Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (SABIC)      15616.368

Root Mean Square Error of Approximation:

  RMSEA                                          0.052
  90 Percent confidence interval - lower         0.044
  90 Percent confidence interval - upper         0.060
  P-value H_0: RMSEA <= 0.050                    0.317
  P-value H_0: RMSEA >= 0.080                    0.000

  Robust RMSEA                                   0.053
  90 Percent confidence interval - lower         0.045
  90 Percent confidence interval - upper         0.061
  P-value H_0: Robust RMSEA <= 0.050             0.254
  P-value H_0: Robust RMSEA >= 0.080             0.000

Standardized Root Mean Square Residual:

  SRMR                                           0.038

Parameter Estimates:

  Standard errors                            Bootstrap
  Number of requested bootstrap draws             1000
  Number of successful bootstrap draws            1000
```

Latent Variables:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(>|z|)	Std.lv	Std.all
Past_influence =~						
Q4_1	1.000				0.981	0.698
Q4_2	1.257	0.108	11.630	0.000	1.233	0.828
Q4_3	1.301	0.107	12.216	0.000	1.276	0.893
Past_politicization =~						
Q10_1	1.000				1.560	0.883
Q10_2	0.977	0.036	27.298	0.000	1.525	0.890
Q10_3	1.044	0.033	31.807	0.000	1.629	0.970
Demo_backsliding =~						
Q16_1	1.000				2.030	0.909
Q16_2	1.019	0.035	28.997	0.000	2.069	0.956
Q16_3	1.033	0.030	34.145	0.000	2.096	0.962
Q16_4	1.046	0.035	30.275	0.000	2.123	0.951
Q16_5	0.897	0.031	29.043	0.000	1.821	0.813
Q15	-0.448	0.015	-28.989	0.000	-0.910	-0.847
Past_voice =~						
Q22_1	1.000				0.688	0.848
Q22_2	0.727	0.109	6.697	0.000	0.500	0.553
Q22_3	1.190	0.110	10.784	0.000	0.819	0.882
Past_effort =~						
PAST_EFFORT	1.000				0.146	1.000

Regressions:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(>|z|)	Std.lv	Std.all
INTENT_EXIT ~						
Dm_bcks (cp_x)	0.035	0.009	3.699	0.000	0.070	0.223
PROJECT_VOICE ~						
Dm_bcks (cp_v)	0.006	0.007	0.885	0.376	0.012	0.053
Past_vc	0.008	0.018	0.479	0.632	0.006	0.026
PROJECT_EFFORT ~						
Dm_bcks (cp_f)	-0.006	0.006	-0.959	0.338	-0.012	-0.057
Pst_ffr	-0.077	0.070	-1.100	0.271	-0.011	-0.051
PROJECT_POLITICIZATION ~						
Dm_bcks (a1)	0.064	0.006	11.069	0.000	0.131	0.529
Pst_plt	-0.018	0.007	-2.463	0.014	-0.028	-0.112
PROJECT_INFLUENCE ~						
Dm_bcks (a2)	-0.061	0.006	-10.630	0.000	-0.125	-0.509
Pst_nfl	0.045	0.013	3.613	0.000	0.044	0.182
INTENT_EXIT ~						
PROJECT (b1_x)	0.352	0.088	3.996	0.000	0.352	0.276
Pst_plt	-0.015	0.011	-1.328	0.184	-0.024	-0.075
PROJECT (b2_x)	0.092	0.088	1.037	0.300	0.092	0.071
Pst_nfl	0.010	0.018	0.560	0.576	0.010	0.032
PROJECT_VOICE ~						
PROJECT (b1_v)	-0.274	0.060	-4.578	0.000	-0.274	-0.305
Pst_plt	0.001	0.008	0.183	0.855	0.002	0.010
PROJECT (b2_v)	0.240	0.066	3.617	0.000	0.240	0.265
Pst_nfl	0.005	0.013	0.436	0.663	0.005	0.024
PROJECT_EFFORT ~						
PROJECT (b1_f)	-0.293	0.060	-4.911	0.000	-0.293	-0.329
Pst_plt	0.007	0.008	0.955	0.339	0.011	0.051
PROJECT (b2_f)	0.030	0.064	0.472	0.637	0.030	0.034
Pst_nfl	0.009	0.014	0.615	0.539	0.008	0.038

Covariances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(>|z|)	Std.lv	Std.all
.PROJECT_POLITICIZATION ~~						
.PROJECT_INFLUE	-0.022	0.003	-8.560	0.000	-0.022	-0.517
Past_influence ~~						
.PROJECT_POLITI	-0.015	0.011	-1.406	0.160	-0.016	-0.075
Past_politicization ~~						
.PROJECT_INFLUE	0.001	0.015	0.036	0.972	0.000	0.002
Past_influence ~~						
Past_politcztn	0.554	0.110	5.051	0.000	0.362	0.362
Past_effort ~~						
.PROJECT_POLITI	0.001	0.002	0.465	0.642	0.005	0.023
.PROJECT_INFLUE	-0.001	0.001	-0.455	0.649	-0.005	-0.022
Past_influence ~~						
Demo_backsldng	-0.250	0.118	-2.116	0.034	-0.125	-0.125
Past_voice	-0.004	0.042	-0.107	0.915	-0.007	-0.007
Past_effort	0.006	0.008	0.773	0.440	0.045	0.045
Past_politicization ~~						
Demo_backsldng	0.348	0.165	2.113	0.035	0.110	0.110
Past_voice	0.124	0.063	1.980	0.048	0.116	0.116
Past_effort	0.038	0.012	3.157	0.002	0.169	0.169
Demo_backsliding ~~						
Past_voice	0.145	0.084	1.725	0.085	0.104	0.104
Past_effort	0.011	0.017	0.680	0.496	0.038	0.038
Past_voice ~~						
Past_effort	0.041	0.011	3.846	0.000	0.411	0.411
.INTENT_EXIT ~~						
.PROJECT_VOICE	-0.012	0.003	-3.758	0.000	-0.012	-0.213
.PROJECT_EFFORT	-0.015	0.003	-4.754	0.000	-0.015	-0.257
.PROJECT_VOICE ~~						
.PROJECT_EFFORT	0.013	0.003	5.060	0.000	0.013	0.344

Intercepts:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(>|z|)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Q4_1	5.557	0.074	75.059	0.000	5.557	3.955
.Q4_2	4.934	0.075	65.744	0.000	4.934	3.314
.Q4_3	5.205	0.073	71.320	0.000	5.205	3.643
.Q10_1	4.293	0.090	47.602	0.000	4.293	2.429
.Q10_2	3.792	0.089	42.798	0.000	3.792	2.213
.Q10_3	4.043	0.086	46.958	0.000	4.043	2.406
.Q16_1	4.840	0.118	41.008	0.000	4.840	2.167
.Q16_2	5.231	0.113	46.114	0.000	5.231	2.417
.Q16_3	5.262	0.115	45.565	0.000	5.262	2.414
.Q16_4	5.208	0.118	44.153	0.000	5.208	2.334
.Q16_5	4.354	0.116	37.604	0.000	4.354	1.945
.Q15	2.082	0.059	35.485	0.000	2.082	1.938
.Q22_1	4.982	0.042	119.158	0.000	4.982	6.141
.Q22_2	4.885	0.049	99.089	0.000	4.885	5.395
.Q22_3	4.851	0.047	102.622	0.000	4.851	5.227
.PAST_EFFORT	0.912	0.007	129.332	0.000	0.912	6.250
.INTENT_EXIT	0.179	0.073	2.453	0.014	0.179	0.568
.PROJECT_VOICE	0.568	0.052	10.974	0.000	0.568	2.559
.PROJECT_EFFORT	0.666	0.051	12.990	0.000	0.666	3.020
.PROJECT_POLITI	0.615	0.012	49.512	0.000	0.615	2.486
.PROJECT_INFLUE	0.342	0.013	26.453	0.000	0.342	1.398

Variances:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(>|z|)	Std.lv	Std.all
.Q4_1	1.013	0.134	7.572	0.000	1.013	0.513
.Q4_2	0.697	0.106	6.597	0.000	0.697	0.314
.Q4_3	0.413	0.076	5.462	0.000	0.413	0.202
.Q10_1	0.688	0.092	7.502	0.000	0.688	0.220
.Q10_2	0.612	0.085	7.221	0.000	0.612	0.208
.Q10_3	0.169	0.049	3.439	0.001	0.169	0.060
.Q16_1	0.868	0.136	6.361	0.000	0.868	0.174
.Q16_2	0.403	0.137	2.945	0.003	0.403	0.086
.Q16_3	0.358	0.067	5.387	0.000	0.358	0.075
.Q16_4	0.472	0.164	2.879	0.004	0.472	0.095
.Q16_5	1.699	0.179	9.476	0.000	1.699	0.339
.Q15	0.326	0.035	9.209	0.000	0.326	0.283
.Q22_1	0.185	0.041	4.534	0.000	0.185	0.281
.Q22_2	0.569	0.070	8.110	0.000	0.569	0.695
.Q22_3	0.191	0.048	3.935	0.000	0.191	0.221
.PAST_EFFORT	0.000				0.000	0.000
.INTENT_EXIT	0.084	0.005	17.652	0.000	0.084	0.848
.PROJECT_VOICE	0.037	0.003	11.354	0.000	0.037	0.753
.PROJECT_EFFORT	0.041	0.003	12.862	0.000	0.041	0.837
.PROJECT_POLITI	0.044	0.003	15.133	0.000	0.044	0.721
.PROJECT_INFLUE	0.041	0.003	13.982	0.000	0.041	0.685
Past_influence	0.962	0.158	6.076	0.000	1.000	1.000
Past_politcztn	2.435	0.184	13.240	0.000	1.000	1.000
Demo_backsldng	4.120	0.277	14.848	0.000	1.000	1.000
Past_voice	0.473	0.071	6.655	0.000	1.000	1.000
Past_effort	0.021	0.003	7.966	0.000	1.000	1.000

Defined Parameters:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(>|z|)	Std.lv	Std.all
tot_ind_exit	0.028	0.009	3.246	0.001	0.057	0.182
tot_ind_voice	0.032	0.005	6.656	0.000	0.066	0.296
tot_ind_effort	0.021	0.005	4.582	0.000	0.042	0.191
dir_backs_polt	0.064	0.006	11.064	0.000	0.131	0.529
dir_backs_inf	-0.061	0.006	-10.625	0.000	-0.125	-0.509
dir_backs_exit	0.035	0.009	3.697	0.000	0.070	0.223
dir_polit_exit	0.352	0.088	3.994	0.000	0.352	0.276
dir_infl_exit	0.092	0.089	1.036	0.300	0.092	0.071
dir_backs_voic	0.006	0.007	0.885	0.376	0.012	0.053
dir_polit_voic	-0.274	0.060	-4.576	0.000	-0.274	-0.305
dir_infl_voice	0.240	0.066	3.615	0.000	0.240	0.265
dir_backs_ffrt	-0.006	0.006	-0.958	0.338	-0.012	-0.057
dr_prj_plt_ffr	-0.293	0.060	-4.908	0.000	-0.293	-0.329
dr_prj_nfl_ffr	0.030	0.065	0.472	0.637	0.030	0.034
ind_bck_plt_xt	0.023	0.006	3.802	0.000	0.046	0.146
ind_bck_nfl_xt	-0.006	0.006	-1.024	0.306	-0.011	-0.036
ind_bck_plt_vc	-0.018	0.004	-4.298	0.000	-0.036	-0.161
ind_bck_nfl_vc	-0.015	0.004	-3.342	0.001	-0.030	-0.135
ind_bck_plt_ff	-0.019	0.004	-4.593	0.000	-0.038	-0.174
ind_bck_nfl_ff	-0.002	0.004	-0.469	0.639	-0.004	-0.017
tot_back_exit	0.052	0.007	6.901	0.000	0.105	0.333
tot_back_voice	-0.027	0.006	-4.548	0.000	-0.054	-0.243
tot_back_effrt	-0.027	0.005	-5.146	0.000	-0.055	-0.248
c1v2_exit	0.028	0.010	2.888	0.004	0.057	0.182
c1v2_voice	-0.003	0.007	-0.419	0.675	-0.006	-0.027
c1v2_effort	-0.017	0.007	-2.558	0.011	-0.035	-0.157

References

Rosseel Y (2012). “lavaan: An R Package for Structural Equation Modeling.” *Journal of Statistical Software*, 48(2), 1–36.

APPENDIX A8: Robustness check models

In this section, we replicate the main regression models (Tables 3 and 4 from the manuscript) using alternative model specifications and applying survey weights. For each alternative specification, we first estimate the equivalent of Table 3, followed by the equivalent of Table 4. We find no significant changes to the main findings when using these alternative model specifications and weights.

In ***subsection A8.1***, we replicate the main regression models while including individual-level covariates (religiosity, education level, tenure, position type, seniority, age, and legal background). In ***subsection A8.2***, we extended our sample and included junior-level civil servants who were removed from our main models. In ***subsection A8.3***, we replicate our main models, using the `survey` package and the svyglm function (Lumley 2024), to account for potential imbalances in our sample compared with the relevant civil service population. Proportions for gender, age, ranking, tenure, and education were first calculated using population data, based on detailed data from the Civil Service Commission, and the sample data. Next, all possible combinations of these variables were generated, and population proportions for each combination were calculated by multiplying the proportions of each variable. Weights were computed by dividing the population proportions for each combination by the corresponding sample proportions. These weights were then assigned to each observation in the analysis. In ***subsection A8.4***, we replicate our main regression models without controlling for past perceptions to address potential bias, to address the concern that past perceptions may be influenced by respondents' views on democratic backsliding, and therefore including them could yield biased estimates.

Subsection A8.1: Adding individual-level controls

Table A8.1.1 Replication of Table 3 with individual-level controls

	Expected politicization		Expected influence	
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Intercept	-0.44 (0.94)	0.292	2.08 (0.94)	<0.001
Democratic backsliding	0.55 (0.07)	<0.001	-0.55 (0.07)	<0.001
Past politicization	0.10 (0.05)	0.056	-0.04 (0.05)	0.452
Past influence	-0.10 (0.05)	0.060	0.19 (0.05)	<0.001
Religiosity traditional-nonreligious	0.05 (0.17)	0.773	0.08 (0.17)	0.640
Religiosity traditional-religious	-0.27 (0.21)	0.201	0.09 (0.21)	0.667
Religiosity religious	0.12 (0.16)	0.456	-0.15 (0.16)	0.362
religiosity ultra-orthodox	-0.49 (0.28)	0.084	0.18 (0.28)	0.534
Religiosity other	-0.50 (0.36)	0.160	-0.17 (0.36)	0.638
Education bachelor	0.35 (0.92)	0.704	-1.79 (0.92)	0.053
Education master	0.53 (0.92)	0.566	-1.92 (0.92)	0.038
Education PhD	0.72 (0.94)	0.443	-2.20 (0.94)	0.020
Education other	0.83 (0.99)	0.402	-2.02 (0.99)	0.043
Gender female	-0.16 (0.10)	0.095	0.02 (0.10)	0.803
tenure1-5	0.40 (0.40)	0.320	-0.43 (0.40)	0.278
tenure6-10	0.60 (0.40)	0.133	-0.48 (0.40)	0.232
tenure11-20	0.66 (0.40)	0.099	-0.50 (0.40)	0.211

tenure20+	0.70 (0.41)	0.092	-0.47 (0.41)	0.257
position_type competitive tender	-0.38 (0.28)	0.166	0.37 (0.28)	0.178
position_type replacement	-0.43 (0.40)	0.285	0.13 (0.40)	0.750
position_type other	-0.48 (0.34)	0.160	0.33 (0.34)	0.338
Ranking senior	-0.01 (0.11)	0.947	-0.09 (0.11)	0.397
Ranking very senior	0.02 (0.21)	0.941	-0.15 (0.21)	0.494
age31-40	-0.22 (0.28)	0.425	-0.03 (0.28)	0.913
age41-50	-0.16 (0.29)	0.572	0.01 (0.29)	0.984
age51-60	-0.14 (0.31)	0.657	0.02 (0.31)	0.960
age61+	-0.35 (0.39)	0.373	0.33 (0.39)	0.398
Legal	0.23 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.23 (0.05)	<0.001
Observations	317		317	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.392 / 0.335		0.394 / 0.337	

Table A8.1.2 Replication of Table 4 with individual-level controls

	Exit intention				Voice intention				Work effort intention			
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Intercept	1.27 (1.11)	0.144	1.37 (1.09)	0.245	1.53 (1.09)	<0.001	0.93 (1.02)	0.001	0.78 (1.11)	0.004	0.55 (1.07)	0.003
Democratic backsliding	0.33 (0.08)	<0.001	0.18 (0.09)	0.043	-0.28 (0.08)	<0.001	0.00 (0.08)	0.978	-0.19 (0.08)	0.017	0.01 (0.09)	0.931
Past politicization	0.11 (0.06)	0.085	0.08 (0.06)	0.206	-0.07 (0.06)	0.281	-0.03 (0.06)	0.660	-0.06 (0.06)	0.365	-0.02 (0.06)	0.750
Past influence	0.04 (0.06)	0.471	0.07 (0.06)	0.268	0.04 (0.06)	0.493	-0.03 (0.06)	0.609	0.05 (0.06)	0.415	0.01 (0.06)	0.871
Religiosity traditional-nonreligious	0.08 (0.20)	0.686	0.07 (0.19)	0.729	-0.06 (0.20)	0.751	-0.07 (0.18)	0.705	-0.17 (0.20)	0.384	-0.17 (0.19)	0.383
Religiosity traditional-religious	0.30 (0.25)	0.225	0.38 (0.24)	0.123	-0.04 (0.24)	0.884	-0.13 (0.23)	0.562	0.17 (0.25)	0.495	0.07 (0.24)	0.764
Religiosity religious	0.07 (0.19)	0.725	0.04 (0.19)	0.850	-0.15 (0.19)	0.416	-0.09 (0.17)	0.619	0.10 (0.19)	0.588	0.13 (0.18)	0.466
Religiosity ultra-orthodox	-0.31 (0.33)	0.348	-0.18 (0.33)	0.584	0.46 (0.33)	0.165	0.27 (0.31)	0.371	0.62 (0.33)	0.065	0.44 (0.32)	0.173
Religiosity other	-0.04 (0.42)	0.932	0.10 (0.41)	0.801	-0.42 (0.42)	0.317	-0.52 (0.39)	0.181	-0.19 (0.42)	0.649	-0.35 (0.41)	0.385
Education bachelor	-1.19 (1.09)	0.275	-1.26 (1.07)	0.239	-0.67 (1.07)	0.533	-0.16 (1.00)	0.873	-0.98 (1.08)	0.368	-0.79 (1.05)	0.451
Education master	-0.94 (1.09)	0.387	-1.07 (1.07)	0.320	-0.90 (1.07)	0.403	-0.30 (1.00)	0.762	-1.53 (1.09)	0.160	-1.28 (1.05)	0.225
Education PhD	-1.25 (1.10)	0.259	-1.42 (1.09)	0.192	-0.74 (1.09)	0.495	-0.03 (1.02)	0.975	-1.09 (1.10)	0.323	-0.76 (1.07)	0.476
Education other	-1.27 (1.17)	0.279	-1.48 (1.15)	0.200	0.02 (1.15)	0.987	0.72 (1.08)	0.504	-1.43 (1.17)	0.222	-1.07 (1.13)	0.343
Gender female	-0.15 (0.11)	0.195	-0.10 (0.11)	0.353	0.13 (0.11)	0.266	0.08 (0.11)	0.465	0.19 (0.11)	0.091	0.14 (0.11)	0.208
tenure1-5	-0.22 (0.47)	0.647	-0.33 (0.46)	0.481	-0.23 (0.46)	0.617	-0.02 (0.43)	0.970	0.47 (0.47)	0.316	0.63 (0.45)	0.165
tenure6-10	-0.26 (0.47)	0.577	-0.42 (0.46)	0.360	-0.43 (0.46)	0.355	-0.15 (0.43)	0.724	0.30 (0.47)	0.527	0.51 (0.45)	0.259
tenure11-20	-0.06 (0.47)	0.900	-0.23 (0.46)	0.609	-0.61 (0.46)	0.185	-0.31 (0.43)	0.472	0.28 (0.47)	0.547	0.52 (0.45)	0.250
tenure20+	-0.31 (0.49)	0.528	-0.49 (0.48)	0.301	-0.43 (0.48)	0.368	-0.12 (0.45)	0.787	0.25 (0.49)	0.608	0.50 (0.47)	0.289
position_type competitive tender	-0.48 (0.33)	0.138	-0.38 (0.32)	0.233	-0.19 (0.32)	0.563	-0.38 (0.30)	0.203	0.08 (0.33)	0.804	-0.06 (0.31)	0.850
position_type replacement	-0.80 (0.47)	0.091	-0.68 (0.46)	0.144	-0.35 (0.46)	0.456	-0.50 (0.43)	0.245	-0.07 (0.47)	0.879	-0.22 (0.45)	0.630
position_type other	-0.28 (0.40)	0.495	-0.14 (0.40)	0.715	-0.28 (0.40)	0.477	-0.50 (0.37)	0.180	0.13 (0.40)	0.745	-0.04 (0.39)	0.921
Ranking senior	0.01 (0.13)	0.907	0.02 (0.12)	0.883	0.01 (0.13)	0.934	0.03 (0.12)	0.814	0.19 (0.13)	0.132	0.20 (0.12)	0.110
Ranking very senior	0.01 (0.25)	0.973	0.01 (0.25)	0.983	0.26 (0.25)	0.292	0.30 (0.23)	0.193	0.15 (0.25)	0.550	0.17 (0.24)	0.494

age31-40	0.33 (0.33)	0.313	0.39 (0.32)	0.223	-0.11 (0.33)	0.745	-0.16 (0.30)	0.601	0.07 (0.33)	0.832	-0.00 (0.32)	0.999
age41-50	0.47 (0.34)	0.169	0.52 (0.33)	0.123	-0.11 (0.34)	0.734	-0.16 (0.31)	0.600	0.02 (0.34)	0.944	-0.03 (0.33)	0.930
age51-60	0.62 (0.37)	0.094	0.66 (0.36)	0.069	-0.20 (0.37)	0.582	-0.25 (0.34)	0.456	-0.03 (0.37)	0.935	-0.08 (0.36)	0.832
age61+	0.58 (0.47)	0.219	0.67 (0.46)	0.146	-0.30 (0.45)	0.507	-0.48 (0.42)	0.259	0.29 (0.47)	0.540	0.16 (0.45)	0.718
Jurist	-0.01 (0.06)	0.876	-0.07 (0.06)	0.225	-0.18 (0.06)	0.002	-0.06 (0.06)	0.255	-0.11 (0.06)	0.071	-0.02 (0.06)	0.778
Expected politicization			0.28 (0.08)	<0.001			-0.29 (0.07)	<0.001			-0.33 (0.07)	<0.001
Expected influence			0.01 (0.08)	0.891			0.23 (0.07)	0.001			0.05 (0.07)	0.546
Observations	314		314		315		315		314		314	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.159 / 0.080		0.204 / 0.123		0.183 / 0.106		0.301 / 0.230		0.160 / 0.081		0.234 / 0.156	

Subsection A8.2: Including junior-level civil servants

Table A8.2.1: Replication of Table 3 including junior-level civil servants

	Expected politicization		Expected influence	
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Democratic backsliding	0.51 (0.04)	<0.001	-0.50 (0.04)	<0.001
Past politicization	0.03 (0.05)	0.457	0.00 (0.05)	0.992
Past influence	-0.08 (0.05)	0.094	0.15 (0.05)	0.001
Intercept	-0.00 (0.04)	<0.001	-0.00 (0.04)	<0.001
Observations	408		407	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.273 / 0.267		0.288 / 0.282	

Table A8.2.2: Replication of Table 4 including junior-level civil servants

	Exit intention				Voice intention				Work effort intention			
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Democratic backsliding	0.30 (0.05)	<0.001	0.18 (0.06)	0.002	-0.26 (0.05)	<0.001	0.00 (0.06)	1.000	-0.27 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.07 (0.06)	0.233
Expected politicization			0.28 (0.06)	<0.001			-0.26 (0.06)	<0.001			-0.32 (0.06)	<0.001
Expected influence			0.05 (0.06)	0.447			0.26 (0.06)	<0.001			0.07 (0.06)	0.259
Past politicization	0.09 (0.05)	0.069	0.08 (0.05)	0.111	-0.05 (0.05)	0.357	-0.04 (0.05)	0.425	-0.06 (0.05)	0.261	-0.04 (0.05)	0.368
Past influence	0.01 (0.05)	0.910	0.02 (0.05)	0.684	0.05 (0.05)	0.361	-0.01 (0.05)	0.776	0.05 (0.05)	0.293	0.02 (0.05)	0.710
Past voice					-0.01 (0.05)	0.763	-0.01 (0.05)	0.877				
Past work effort									-0.06 (0.05)	0.193	-0.08 (0.05)	0.100
Intercept	0.00 (0.05)	0.026	0.00 (0.05)	0.984	-0.00 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.00 (0.04)	<0.001	0.00 (0.05)	<0.001	0.00 (0.05)	<0.001
Observations	394		394		396		396		403		403	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.090 / 0.083		0.138 / 0.127		0.075 / 0.065		0.221 / 0.209		0.086 / 0.076		0.180 / 0.168	

Subsection A8.3: Employing survey weights

Table A8.3.1: Replication of Table 3 including weights

	Expected politicization		Expected influence	
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Democratic backsliding	0.37 (0.06)	<0.001	-0.36 (0.05)	<0.001
Past politicization	0.18 (0.09)	0.053	-0.01 (0.08)	0.888
Past influence	0.03 (0.12)	0.807	0.17 (0.10)	0.089
Intercept	0.27 (0.12)	0.022	0.47 (0.11)	<0.001
Observations	319		319	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.220 / 0.213		0.276 / 0.269	

Table A8.3.2: Replication of Table 4 including weights

	Exit intention				Voice intention				Work effort intention			
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Democratic backsliding	0.42 (0.08)	<0.001	0.31 (0.09)	0.001	-0.14 (0.04)	0.001	0.02 (0.05)	0.750	-0.13 (0.05)	0.007	-0.03 (0.05)	0.595
Expected politicization			0.25 (0.12)	0.033			-0.33 (0.08)	<0.001			-0.25 (0.08)	0.002
Expected influence			-0.04 (0.13)	0.754			0.11 (0.11)	0.311			0.02 (0.08)	0.809
Past politicization	0.29 (0.10)	0.005	0.25 (0.10)	0.015	-0.09 (0.06)	0.162	-0.03 (0.05)	0.615	-0.15 (0.06)	0.016	-0.10 (0.06)	0.077
Past influence	0.10 (0.12)	0.403	0.10 (0.12)	0.409	0.11 (0.09)	0.225	0.10 (0.07)	0.171	-0.01 (0.09)	0.931	-0.00 (0.08)	0.964
Past voice					0.02 (0.10)	0.880	0.02 (0.09)	0.822				
Past work effort									-0.10 (0.09)	0.236	-0.13 (0.08)	0.114
Intercept	-0.02 (0.14)	0.888	-0.07 (0.14)	0.600	0.53 (0.10)	<0.001	0.56 (0.12)	<0.001	0.73 (0.12)	<0.001	0.80 (0.13)	<0.001
Observations	319		316		319		316		318		315	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.181 / 0.173		0.217 / 0.205		0.076 / 0.064		0.258 / 0.244		0.068 / 0.056		0.154 / 0.137	

Subsection A8.4: Omitting past perceptions from our models

Table A8.4.1: Replication of Table 3 while omitting past perceptions

	Expected politicization		Expected influence	
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Democratic backsliding	0.52 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.54 (0.04)	<0.001
Intercept	0.00 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.00 (0.04)	<0.001
Observations	354		354	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.267 / 0.265		0.294 / 0.292	

Table A8.4.2: Replication of Table 4 while omitting past perceptions

	Exit intention				Voice intention				Work effort intention			
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Democratic backsliding	0.31 (0.05)	<0.001	0.19 (0.06)	0.002	-0.25 (0.05)	<0.001	0.04 (0.06)	0.454	-0.25 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.04 (0.06)	0.540
Expected politicization			0.28 (0.07)	<0.001			-0.30 (0.07)	<0.001			-0.35 (0.07)	<0.001
Expected influence			0.06 (0.07)	0.432			0.26 (0.07)	<0.001			0.06 (0.07)	0.423
Intercept	0.00 (0.05)	<0.001	0.00 (0.05)	0.349	0.00 (0.05)	<0.001	0.00 (0.05)	<0.001	0.00 (0.05)	<0.001	0.00 (0.05)	<0.001
Observations	341		341		344		344		351		351	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.094 / 0.091		0.143 / 0.135		0.062 / 0.059		0.235 / 0.228		0.061 / 0.058		0.168 / 0.161	

References

Lumley T (2024). survey: analysis of complex survey samples. R package version 4.4.

Appendix A9: Assessment of Common Method Variance

As discussed in the manuscript, we carefully designed our survey so as to mitigate the risk of Common Method Variance (CMV). That is, spurious correlations between the independent and dependent variables due to systematic common measurement error. To this end, we deliberately used different scales and labels for our explanatory and outcome variables (Jakobsen and Jensen, 2015). Specifically, *perceived democratic backsliding*, our main independent variable, is measured with five 7-point item scales ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" (and one 4-item scale ranging from "very pessimistic" to "very optimistic"). Our first dependent variable, *exit intention* is a 5-point scale ranging from "very low [likelihood]" to "very high [likelihood]", and the two other dependent variables, *voice and work effort intentions*, are measured on 5-point scales ranging from "much less" to "much more". The two mediators, *projected politicization* and *projected influence* are measured on 5-point scales, ranging from "significant change to the worse" to "significant change to the better", and from "substantial waning" to "substantial increase", respectively.

To examine the extent to which we succeeded in mitigating CMV, we included at the very end of the survey a designated Marker variable (Simmering et al. 2015[2]), which is logically uncorrelated with either our independent variable *(perceived democratic backsliding*) or any of the outcome variables *(intended exit, voice and work effort*). This question read: "To what extent do you agree that the questions in this questionnaire are formulated in an understandable and clear manner?", measured, in a similar vein to *perceived democratic backsliding*, with a 7-point scale item, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". Table A9 presents the bi-variate correlations between the Marker and all the perceptual variables in our study, employing composite indices or single items as applicable. We find that the Marker is positively and significantly correlated with *perceived democratic backsliding,* the independent variable, possibly reflecting common method variance, as they are measured on an identical 7-point scale. We also find a significant, negative, correlation between the Marker and one of the mediators (*projected influence*). Conversely, confirming the success of our usage of different labels and scales, the Marker is not significantly correlated with any of the three outcome variables. Overall, this analysis supports our assumption that the significant associations that we find between *perceived democratic backsliding* and the three outcome variables are not attributable to common measurement errors.

[2] Simmering, M. J., Fuller, C. M., Richardson, H. A., Ocal, Y., & Atinc, G. M. (2015). Marker variable choice, reporting, and interpretation in the detection of common method variance: A review and demonstration. *Organizational Research Methods*, *18*(3), 473-511.

Table A9: Bi-variate Correlations Between the Marker and Other Perceptual Measures

type	variable	scale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
marker	1. CLARITY OF QUESTIONS	1-7 strongly agree to strongly disagree										
Controls	2. PAST INFLUENCE	1-7 strongly agree to strongly disagree	0.05									
	3. PAST POLITICIZATION	1-7 strongly agree to strongly disagree	0.03	-0.33***								
	4. PAST EFFORT	1-5 very low investment of effort to very high investment of effort	-0.01	0.05	-0.17***							
	5. PAST VOICE	1-6 never to very frequently	0.07	0.01	-0.12*	0.36***						
mediators	6. PROJECT POLITICIZATION	1-5 significant change to the worse to significant change to the better	0.1	-0.14**	0.04	0.02	0.03					
	7. PROJECT INFLUENCE	1-5 substantial waning to substantial increase	-0.21***	0.21***	0	-0.04	-0.1	-0.66***				
IDV	8. PERC, DEMO BACKSLIDING	1-7 strongly agree to strongly disagree	0.17**	-0.09	-0.11*	0.06	0.17**	0.52***	-0.54***			
DVs	9. PROJECT EFFORT	1-5 much less than today to much more than today	-0.03	0.11*	-0.07	-0.05	0.06	-0.39***	0.29***	-0.25***		
	10. PROJECT VOICE	1-5 much less to much more	0	0.1	-0.04	0.02	0.04	-0.45***	0.44***	-0.25***	0.46***	
	11. INTENT_EXIT	1-5 very low to very high	-0.01	-0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.34***	-0.22***	0.30***	-0.36***	-0.32***

APPENDIX A10: Testing the heterogeneous effect of perceived democratic backsliding

As an additional post-hoc exploratory analysis, we examine the heterogenous effect of perceived democratic backsliding on the variables. To this end, we fit models with a series of interaction terms. We examine the interaction between perceived democratic backsliding and respondents' seniority (table A10.1), tenure (table A10.2), education level (table A10.3), legal education background (table A10.4), age (table A10.5) and gender (table A10.6). We also explore the heterogenous effect of perceived democratic backsliding across ministers' party affiliations assuming that bureaucrats may react differently given the minister's party identity (table A10.7).

Overall, we did not find sufficiently statistically robust evidence indicating heterogeneous effects across these categories, as evidenced by the insignificant interaction terms across all models. Two-way ANOVA with interaction yields consistent results.

Table A10.1: Interaction with seniority level

	Exit intention		Voice intention		Work effort intention	
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Intercept	-0.05 (0.07)	0.126	0.02 (0.07)	<0.001	-0.07 (0.07)	<0.001
Democratic backsliding (DB)	0.32 (0.07)	<0.001	-0.24 (0.07)	0.001	-0.18 (0.07)	0.013
Past politicization	0.10 (0.06)	0.104	-0.04 (0.06)	0.555	-0.05 (0.06)	0.420
Past influence	0.02 (0.06)	0.758	0.05 (0.06)	0.420	0.03 (0.06)	0.582
Senior	0.13 (0.12)	0.579	-0.07 (0.12)	0.866	0.16 (0.12)	0.069
Very senior	0.15 (0.23)	0.597	0.10 (0.24)	0.618	0.22 (0.24)	0.211
DB × Senior	-0.00 (0.11)	0.980	-0.02 (0.12)	0.896	-0.15 (0.11)	0.182
DB × Very senior	-0.07 (0.26)	0.779	-0.09 (0.26)	0.726	-0.24 (0.26)	0.348
Past voice			0.02 (0.06)	0.693		
Past work effort					-0.10 (0.06)	0.084
Observations	319		319		318	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.104 / 0.084		0.072 / 0.048		0.090 / 0.066	

Note: Seniority reference category – middle-level.

Table A10.2: Interaction with tenure

	Exit intention		Voice intention		Work effort intention	
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Intercept	-8.17 (6.39)	0.208	4.36 (6.54)	0.456	5.11 (6.54)	0.324
Democratic backsliding (DB)	9.38 (7.02)	0.182	-4.68 (7.19)	0.516	-6.35 (7.17)	0.377
Past politicization	0.08 (0.06)	0.153	-0.03 (0.06)	0.594	-0.07 (0.06)	0.263
Past influence	0.03 (0.06)	0.606	0.04 (0.06)	0.483	0.03 (0.06)	0.637
tenure1-5	8.03 (6.39)	0.198	-4.12 (6.54)	0.536	-4.92 (6.54)	0.414
tenure6-10	8.06 (6.39)	0.198	-4.38 (6.54)	0.527	-5.14 (6.54)	0.408
tenure11-20	8.34 (6.39)	0.200	-4.54 (6.54)	0.526	-5.16 (6.54)	0.404
tenure20+	8.25 (6.39)	0.197	-4.38 (6.54)	0.526	-5.19 (6.54)	0.409
DB × Tenure 1-5	-9.15 (7.02)	0.193	4.42 (7.19)	0.540	6.08 (7.17)	0.397
DB × Tenure 6-10	-9.12 (7.02)	0.195	4.44 (7.19)	0.538	6.09 (7.17)	0.396
DB × Tenure 11-20	-8.93 (7.02)	0.204	4.36 (7.19)	0.545	6.14 (7.17)	0.393
DB × Tenure 20+	-9.05 (7.02)	0.198	4.44 (7.19)	0.538	6.04 (7.17)	0.400
Past voice			0.04 (0.06)	0.496		
Past work effort					-0.09 (0.06)	0.099
Observations	320		320		319	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.129 / 0.098		0.098 / 0.062		0.093 / 0.058	

Note: Tenure reference category – less than 1 year.

Table A10.3: Interaction with education level

	Exit intention		Voice intention		Work effort intention	
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Intercept	-0.22 (0.18)	0.837	0.05 (0.18)	<0.001	0.30 (0.18)	<0.001
Democratic backsliding (DB)	0.37 (0.17)	0.028	0.00 (0.17)	0.980	-0.14 (0.17)	0.424
Past politicization	0.12 (0.06)	0.049	-0.03 (0.06)	0.667	-0.07 (0.06)	0.272
Past influence	0.04 (0.06)	0.524	0.06 (0.06)	0.337	0.04 (0.06)	0.455
Education: Master	0.27 (0.19)	0.446	-0.09 (0.19)	0.233	-0.37 (0.19)	0.798
Education: PhD	0.03 (0.26)	0.165	0.12 (0.27)	0.262	0.09 (0.26)	0.902
Education: Other	0.00 (0.43)	0.326	0.81 (0.44)	0.946	-0.45 (0.44)	0.527
DB × Master	-0.01 (0.18)	0.944	-0.29 (0.18)	0.112	-0.14 (0.18)	0.443
DB × PhD	-0.37 (0.25)	0.135	-0.26 (0.25)	0.309	0.01 (0.25)	0.965
DB × Other	-0.42 (0.40)	0.291	0.38 (0.41)	0.349	0.05 (0.41)	0.909
Past voice			0.00 (0.06)	0.960		
Past work effort					-0.06 (0.06)	0.254
Observations	317		317		316	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.125 / 0.100		0.096 / 0.067		0.100 / 0.070	

Note: Education reference category – Bachelor. We removed one observation of a participant with high-school education.

Table A10.4: Interaction with legal education background (Jurist)

	Exit intention		Voice intention		Work effort intention	
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Intercept	0.00 (0.05)	0.042	-0.00 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.00 (0.05)	<0.001
Democratic backsliding (DB)	0.32 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.26 (0.05)	<0.001	-0.25 (0.05)	<0.001
Past politicization	0.09 (0.06)	0.108	-0.05 (0.06)	0.366	-0.09 (0.06)	0.131
Past influence	0.02 (0.06)	0.745	0.06 (0.06)	0.308	0.05 (0.06)	0.351
Jurist	-0.02 (0.05)	0.586	-0.19 (0.05)	0.432	-0.09 (0.05)	0.617
DB × Jurist	0.02 (0.05)	0.692	-0.05 (0.05)	0.296	-0.07 (0.05)	0.132
Past voice			0.07 (0.05)	0.169		
Past work effort					-0.06 (0.05)	0.274
Observations	338		340		347	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.102 / 0.088		0.102 / 0.086		0.085 / 0.069	

Table A10.5: Interaction with age group

	Exit intention		Voice intention		Work effort intention	
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Intercept	-0.34 (0.29)	0.974	0.42 (0.29)	<0.001	0.35 (0.29)	<0.001
Democratic backsliding (DB)	0.41 (0.28)	0.149	-0.36 (0.29)	0.216	-0.02 (0.29)	0.931
Past politicization	0.08 (0.06)	0.160	-0.04 (0.06)	0.499	-0.06 (0.06)	0.299
Past influence	0.04 (0.06)	0.509	0.05 (0.06)	0.439	0.05 (0.06)	0.402
Age 31-40	0.22 (0.30)	0.391	-0.41 (0.31)	0.255	-0.34 (0.30)	0.468
Age 41-50	0.41 (0.30)	0.289	-0.46 (0.31)	0.373	-0.37 (0.30)	0.873
Age 51-60	0.49 (0.32)	0.653	-0.42 (0.32)	0.313	-0.43 (0.32)	0.960
Age 61+	0.24 (0.44)	0.086	-0.43 (0.43)	0.059	0.04 (0.44)	0.729
DB × Age 31-40	-0.14 (0.30)	0.636	0.14 (0.30)	0.648	-0.39 (0.30)	0.191
DB × Age 41-50	-0.10 (0.29)	0.723	0.03 (0.30)	0.918	-0.14 (0.30)	0.632
DB × Age 51-60	0.11 (0.31)	0.729	0.11 (0.32)	0.734	-0.20 (0.32)	0.524
DB × Age 61+	-0.54 (0.39)	0.166	0.52 (0.39)	0.178	0.16 (0.40)	0.696
Past voice			0.03 (0.06)	0.594		
Past work effort					-0.09 (0.06)	0.120
Observations	316		316		315	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.130 / 0.099		0.090 / 0.054		0.103 / 0.068	

Note: Age reference category – 20-30.

Table A10.6: Interaction with gender

	Exit intention		Voice intention		Work effort intention	
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Intercept	0.09 (0.08)	0.020	-0.05 (0.08)	<0.001	-0.09 (0.08)	<0.001
Democratic backsliding (DB)	0.28 (0.08)	<0.001	-0.29 (0.08)	<0.001	-0.34 (0.08)	<0.001
Past politicization	0.10 (0.06)	0.088	-0.04 (0.06)	0.500	-0.09 (0.06)	0.111
Past influence	0.01 (0.06)	0.926	0.04 (0.06)	0.469	0.03 (0.06)	0.540
Female	-0.16 (0.11)	0.164	0.08 (0.11)	0.859	0.15 (0.11)	0.446
DB × Female	0.08 (0.11)	0.438	0.06 (0.11)	0.572	0.17 (0.11)	0.112
Past voice			0.06 (0.05)	0.282		
Past work effort					-0.07 (0.05)	0.166
Observations	338		340		347	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.109 / 0.095		0.070 / 0.053		0.084 / 0.068	

Table A10.7: Interaction with the Minister's party

	Exit intention		Voice intention		Work effort intention	
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Intercept	0.10 (0.08)	0.113	0.06 (0.08)	<0.001	0.01 (0.08)	<0.001
Democratic backsliding (DB)	0.36 (0.08)	<0.001	-0.27 (0.08)	0.001	-0.33 (0.08)	<0.001
Past politicization	0.09 (0.06)	0.155	-0.05 (0.06)	0.396	-0.10 (0.06)	0.089
Past influence	0.04 (0.06)	0.529	0.04 (0.06)	0.521	0.05 (0.06)	0.396
Minister party: Other	-0.28 (0.21)	0.387	-0.03 (0.22)	0.647	0.02 (0.21)	0.039
Minister party: Otzma Yehudit	-0.27 (0.35)	0.024	0.32 (0.36)	0.105	0.22 (0.36)	0.433
Minister party: Religious Zionist Party	-0.32 (0.21)	0.684	-0.20 (0.21)	0.769	-0.65 (0.21)	0.365
Minister party: Shas	-0.21 (0.13)	0.384	-0.09 (0.14)	0.389	0.23 (0.13)	0.792
Minister party: United Torah Judaism	0.06 (0.25)	0.368	-0.48 (0.26)	0.861	-0.39 (0.25)	0.505
DB × Minister party: Other	0.04 (0.19)	0.824	0.09 (0.19)	0.653	0.45 (0.19)	0.017
DB × Minister party: Otzma Yehudit	0.64 (0.33)	0.051	-0.41 (0.34)	0.224	-0.16 (0.33)	0.632
DB × Minister party: Religious Zionist Party	-0.08 (0.19)	0.665	-0.04 (0.20)	0.839	-0.15 (0.19)	0.437
DB × Minister party: Shas	-0.24 (0.13)	0.080	0.09 (0.14)	0.536	0.16 (0.13)	0.248
DB × Minister party: United Torah Judaism	-0.23 (0.27)	0.398	-0.20 (0.28)	0.488	-0.01 (0.27)	0.980
Past voice			0.03 (0.06)	0.553		
Past work effort					-0.05 (0.06)	0.366
Observations	309		309		308	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.141 / 0.104		0.096 / 0.053		0.148 / 0.107	

Note: Minister party reference category – "Likud".

APPENDIX A11: Qualitative Data Analysis

1. **Complementary data sources**

As mentioned in the main article, the qualitative data analysis includes three sources of data as follows, which complement one another in terms of their weaknesses and strengths:

Free-text survey comments: An important advantage of using free text survey comments is that the limited response space allows respondents to vent or express themselves in a short narrative form. Compared to the time commitment and exposure entailed in interviews, this method is less demanding and thereby less affected by selection bias. Hence, it enables capturing greater diversity of views (Jackson and Trochim 2002). In the context of this research, allowing respondents to add free text comments allowed us to capture the diverse perceptions of both supporters and opponents of the Legal Overhaul. Still, such free text comments lack context, and, unlike interviews or focus groups, the format of the survey does not allow follow-up questions to unpack respondents' perspectives. This impinges on the quality of the data gathered (Small and Calarco 2022), inter alia because respondents likely differ in their ability or willingness to express their answers (Jackson and Trochim 2002).

To solicit respondents' comments, we included in the survey eight instances in which they were invited to add free-text comments, following seven specific questions and at the end. Comments were included in the analysis only if they contained at least four words. Attesting to the personal relevance of the survey for the participants, 183 respondents commented on at least one survey question, with 146 respondents adding general comments at the end of the survey. In contrast, 211 respondents did not provide any comments. To explore differences in commenting patterns, we compared respondents who provided comments with those who did not across various demographic variables. Statistical tests were conducted to assess whether these differences were significant. Chi-square tests for demographic factors—including gender, age, tenure, ministry, education, nationality, and religiosity—did not reveal significant associations with commenting patterns (Table A11.1). Additionally, we compared the distribution of perceived democratic backsliding values between respondents with and without comments. A t-test indicated no significant difference between the two groups (T-statistic = 1.9310, p-value = 0.0543).

Overall, the topic that generated the most comments was participants' perceptions of expected influence (N=65), followed by participants' comments on the questions regarding their exit intention (N=60), expected politicization (N=56), their family and close friends'

perceptions of the Legal Overhaul (N=47), future work effort intention (N=41), and expected voice intention (N=25).

Table A11.1 : Chi-square test results for differences in demographic variables between respondents who provided open comments and those who did not

Variable	Statistic	p-value
Age	7.068231	0.132326
Gender	0.915136	0.338755
Tenure	7.054000	0.133062
Ministry	24.187159	0.565264
Education	4.453562	0.348089
Nationality	0.269793	0.603470
Religiosity	4.057179	0.541213

Interviews: We carried in-depth interviews to gain insight into respondents' perspectives and decision-making processes (Fontana and Frey 2005), and to compensate for the lack of depth and context in the open-ended survey comments. Thus, the interviews were designed to disentangle respondents' motivations, expectations, and fears. However, since interviews require a high commitment and willingness to share one's experiences and views, they are more open to selection bias. It is likely that those who agreed to be interviewed were individuals who perceived the Legal Overhaul and its consequences as a more pressing matter or, alternatively, those who were otherwise less apprehensive about expressing their opinions on this contentious topic.

To create an interviewee sample, we invited respondents at the end of the survey, to leave us their email for further research. Subsequently, we contacted all those who did so (N=63), of whom 20 agreed to be interviewed. The interviewee sample includes 10 men and 10 women, working in 16 ministries or sub-units, with tenures ranging from 1 to 30 years. Of the 20, two were junior, and the rest were middle-level, senior-level, or very senior-level civil servants. The interviews were conducted via Zoom between March and April 2023, with each interview lasting about an hour. Out of the 20 interviews, 18 were recorded and fully transcribed. Two interviewees requested not to be recorded, and we therefore took verbatim

notes. The interviews began with questions regarding interviewees' current professional situation: what motivates them to work, their perceived ability to exercise their voice and influence policy, and their perception of the professional calibre of individuals, the quality of promotions, and decision making within their respective units. Then, they were asked about their perceptions of the Legal Overhaul and whether and how they believe it will affect themselves and their work. See the full interview schedule in section 3 below.

A focus group: The logic of holding a focus group, over and above the interviews, is that it allows for social interactions and conversations between participants. This can provide more insight into the individuals' decision-making processes and perceptions, as well as generate new themes. Additionally, when individuals participate in a focus group with others who are similar to them, they may be more likely to share their stories and perspectives on sensitive topics. The group setting, by providing a safe space for sharing ideas, can ease the sense of discomfort; seeing others willing to share their experiences can encourage more reluctant participants to share as well.

In order to create a safe space, alongside a diversity of views, our focus group was restricted to graduates of a prestigious civil service leadership program who hold key positions across government departments. Graduates of this program either know one another personally or feel connected by their mutual membership in the program. We reached out to all graduates of the program (approximately 200), inviting them to participate in an event that combined a presentation of our survey results with a follow-up focus group session. Five willing participants, including three women and two men from different cohorts of the program, participated in the focus group conducted on Zoom in May 2023, and lasted approximately 1.5 hours. These participants were mid-level managers from five different units, with tenures ranging between 1 and 10 years. As members of the same program, they showed a sense of ease and confidence in sharing their experiences. We briefly presented the survey results and asked about the extent to which the results resonated with their own experiences. Thereafter, participants freely shared their feelings and experiences, engaging in discussions among themselves, with limited follow-up questions from the researchers. See the full focus group protocol on Section 3.

2. **Data Coding and Analysis**

Table A11.2: Codes Used to Analyze the Qualitative Data and Their Frequency

Exit intention	Expressions addressing the willingness of respondents to exit or the willingness of others to exit, justifications for exiting or choosing not to exit, fears related to what might happen if one does not exit, and drawing the threshold beyond which respondents believe they will leave (appeared in 17 interviews and in the focus group).
Past voice and voice intention	The extent to which the respondents can exercise their voice in the present and their estimation of the degree to which they will be able to exercise their voice in the future (appeared in 16 interviews and in the focus group).
Past politicization and future politicization	The distinction between meritocratic and political appointments and their implications for the work environment, difficulties in hiring individuals to the civil service at present, along with projected difficulties, and the problems arising from politicized appointments (appeared in 16 interviews and in the focus group).
Past influence and expected influence	The extent to which respondents have an influence today, the effect they believe the Legal Overhaul will have on their power to influence policy and policymakers, and their ability to make a difference in the future (appeared in 18 interviews and in the focus group).
Respect for the civil servants' position and work	The extent to which politicians respect and appreciate the work and opinions of civil servants today, and the projected level of respect in the future (appeared in 11 interviews and in the focus group).
Legal overhaul	The perceived effect that the Legal Overhaul will have on respondents' work, work environment, and the government in general. (appeared in 20 interviews and in the focus group).
Social identity	The effect of the Legal Overhaul on respondents as citizens, their general feelings given the current situation, and any

	references to their families and friends (appeared in 20 interviews and in the focus groups).
Principled and unprincipled policy	Respondents' perspectives on what they deem appropriate and inappropriate policy, instances in which politicians asked them to promote unprincipled policy, and their fear of future policies that may conflict with legality or ethicality (appeared in 18 interviews and in the focus group).

3. **Interview and Focus Groups Schedules**

Interview schedule

1. Tell me about your career path in the civil service. How were you recruited, and where have you worked?
2. What do you like about your work?
3. To what extent do you have decision-making discretion in your role?
4. Do you feel that appointments made in your ministry are based on merit?
5. How much freedom do you have to freely express your professional opinion? Do your supervisors listen to your opinion? Do they value your experience and knowledge?
6. To what extent can you, in your role, affect the policies being made?
7. Describe your relations with the political ranks.
8. Have you experienced situations in which politicians proposed policies that you believed were unprincipled? How did you handle such situations?
9. Do you anticipate that the judicial reform will have an effect on you, your decision-making discretion, your influence, or your ability to voice your opinions?
10. What concerns you the most about the proposed changes?
11. What concerns you the most as a citizen?
12. Are you planning to continue working in the civil service in the future? What would be your "red line", which would lead you to leave?

Focus group schedule

1. Why did you choose to participate in the focus group?
2. To what extent do the results of the survey represent your feelings or the feelings of your colleagues?
3. Would you encourage your friends to join the civil service today? why or why not?

4. To what extent do you feel changes in your work environment compared to previous governments? what type of changes have you noticed?
5. How does the present government treat professional appointments made by previous governments? Does it differ from previous governments?
6. What type of appointments does the present government makes (based on merit or other considerations)? Does it differ from previous governments?
7. Do you feel that civil servants have more or less influence on policymaking today than before? why do you think this is the case?
8. Do you feel that you can freely express your professional opinions? Do politicians seem willing to listen to such opinions?
9. Is there a change in the position and prestige of the professional ranks in your ministry or in general?
10. Do you believe that you will stay in the civil service in the next five years?
11. How do you envision the civil service in five years from today?
12. Do you think that the proposed Judicial Reform, if passed, will affect your work?

References

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Jackson, Kristin M., & William M. K. Trochim. 2002. "Concept Mapping as an Alternative Approach for the Analysis of Open-Ended Survey Responses." *Organizational Research Methods* 5(4): 307–36. doi:10.1177/109442802237114.

Small, Mario Luis, & Jessica McCrory Calarco. 2022. *Qualitative Literacy: A Guide to Evaluating Ethnographic and Interview Research*. University of California Press.

APPENDIX A12: Deviations from Pre-Analysis plan report

In this section we report noteworthy differences between our pre-analysis plan (available at https://osf.io/x9v8n) and the study, explain their justification and disclose relevant information.

Research questions and hypotheses

We preregistered 2 research questions and 9 hypotheses in total. The original research questions are as follows:

> RQ1 To what extent and how does perceived **decline in bureaucratic influence, and/or meritocratic institutions, and/or democratic institutions,** affect civil servants' inclination to *exit the civil service, exercise professional voice and work*?
>
> RQ2 To what extent and how does **perceived decline in bureaucratic influence, and/or meritocratic institutions, and/or democratic institutions** affect civil **servants' choice between *exit, voice, and sabotage* when required to implement a policy that they perceive as detrimental to the public interest?**

4 hypotheses relate to the first research question (H1b, H2b, H3a, H3b), 3 hypotheses relate to the second research question (H4a, H4b, H4c), and 2 did not clearly relate to any of the two questions (H1a, H2a).

To make the manuscript theoretically coherent, to manage its word length, and to allow space for our qualitative data analyses, we decided to focus it on the first research question. That is, on civil servants' perceptions of democratic backsliding, in relation to the real-world judicial overhaul, and their overarching responses in terms of planned exit, voice and work, and the mediation of these associations by expectations of politicization and reduced influence. Therefore, the analysis in the manuscript focuses on four of the nine original hypotheses which were pre-registered in the pre-analysis plan: H1b, H2b, H3a and H3b.

Compatibly, the main manuscript does not discuss our analyses of hypotheses H4a, H4b and H4c, which refer to the second research question, regarding participants' responses to a specific instance of detrimental policy as described in a hypothetical scenario. We also excluded from the main manuscript the analysis of H1a and H2a, which focus on the associations between participants' perceptions of their past influence and the past politicization in their ministry and their self-reporting of their past work effort and voice behavior. For transparency, we will

deposit in the OSF project repository upon publication all additional empirical results of analyses testing all pre-registered hypotheses in accordance with the original pre-analysis plan.

Additionally, in the manuscript we changed the order in which the original hypotheses (H1b, H2b, H3a and H3b) are presented and listed, and we also slightly simplified and restructured them, to enhance their readability (with no meaningful difference to their content). We also note that the variables related to perceptions of "meritocratic human resource management", were reversed in the article and referred to as perceptions of politicization. For clarification, Table A12.1 summarizes the pre-registered hypotheses pertaining to the first research question and describes how they are matched to the hypotheses presented in the article.

Table A12.1: Match between pre-analysis plan and article research hypotheses

Research hypothesis (PAP)	Hypothesized link between variables:	Research hypothesis (Article)
H1b	Expected influence → Work effort intention	H3
	Expected influence → Voice intention	H3
	Expected influence → Exit intention	H3
H2b	Expected politicization → Work effort intention	H2
	Expected politicization → Voice intention	H2
	Expected politicization → Exit intention	H2
H3a	Perceived democratic backsliding → Work effort intention	H1
	Perceived democratic backsliding → Voice intention	H1
	Perceived democratic backsliding → Exit intention	H1
H3b	Perceived democratic backsliding → Expected politicization → Work effort intention	H2
	Perceived democratic backsliding → Expected influence → Work effort intention	H3

Sample

In our pre-registration we planned to include in the main models a sample that consists of both senior and junior civil servants. We noted that "in additional analyses, we will also restrict our sample to senior civil servants (based on participants' self-reported ranking) to examine possible heterogenous effects".

Deviating from this, in the main models which we present in the manuscript we used a filtered sample in which we excluded participants who self-categorized themselves as junior civil servants (n=71, representing 15% of our sample). We believe this filtering is justified given the study's theoretical focus and the distribution of the survey to graduates of three MA public policy programs (alongside additional channels), as noted in the paper. Additionally, models including junior civil servants show no visible change to the results (section A8.2).

Variable operationalization

In our pre-analysis plan, we included two alternative measures for exit intentions (one of our outcome variables). The *first* was based on an item which asks participants to report their willingness to continue to work in the government. Participants were asked to choose from five options the sentence that best reflects their feelings: "I would like to leave government as soon as possible" (1), "I would like to leave government during the coming year" (2), "I would like to stay in government, a least for the next two years" (3), "I would like to stay in government, at least for the next five years" (4), "I would like to stay in government for the rest of my career" (5). The *second* was based on the item: "If you were offered today a position outside the civil service at a salary level similar to what you currently earn, what is the likelihood that would you choose to leave the civil service?" (responses ranging from 1 "very low" to 5 "very high").

In the manuscript, we report results based on the second measure, due to the fact that the first indicator had a low response rate (247 participants from our filtered sample completed this item, compared to 381 who answered the second item). We believe this difference can be attributed to a technical programming issue in the survey graphical user interface, which confused some of the respondents. To ensure the robustness of the results, section A13 below reports additional analyses with the first measure, with similar results to those in the manuscript.

Statistical analysis plan

In our pre-analysis plan, we noted: “In our main models for testing our research hypotheses, we will employ multilevel generalized linear regression models accounting for participants’ clustering within the government ministry level. In our models, we will control for potential confounding variables, including individual-level professional characteristics (tenure, type of position and ranking); and demographics (gender, age, religiosity, nationality, and education)” (p. 13).

In practice, multilevel analysis of the data suggests that multilevel modeling, accounting for participants’ clustering within ministries and their subunits, is redundant in our case, given the low values of ICC for all outcome variables (see section A4). Thus, for the sake of parsimony, we decided to present in the main paper statistical results from nonhierarchical linear regression models.

In addition, we find that controlling for additional individual-level variables does not substantially contribute to the models’ fit. At the same time, adding controls reduces our sample size. Because we did not force respondents to complete all survey items, there are missing values across controls. Hence, we decided to present in the main manuscript statistical models without controlling for individual level professional characteristics and demographics. Section A8.1 reports the results of statistical models with individual-level controls with no meaningful change to the results.

APPENDIX A13: Alternative measure for exit intentions

In this section, we report the study results in relation to the first measure for exit intentions (which we removed from the paper due to low response rate) and compare them with results in relation to the second measure which was analyzed in the manuscript. We report the distribution of the first measure and examine its correlation with our second measure. Thereafter, we conduct regression analyses to test our mediation hypotheses using the first indicator and compare it to the second indicator. Notice that the two measures have opposite directions – in the first measure higher values represent lower intention to exit, whereas in the second measure (used in the manuscript) higher values represent higher intention to exit.

Overall, we find, as expected, that the two measures are negatively correlated with each other (r=-0.539). The two measures are similarly correlated with other variables. Finally, we find similar mediation results for the two measures. For both measures, we find a significant effect of perceived democratic backsliding on exit intentions that is partially mediated through expectations of politicization.

Table A13.1: Frequency table of exit intention (first measure)

From the sentences below, choose the one that best reflects your feelings about continuing to work in the civil service

1. I would like to leave government as soon as possible	10 (4.0%)
2. I would like to leave government during the coming year	46 (19%)
3. I would like to stay in government, a least for the next two years	82 (33%)
4. I would like to stay in government, at least for the next five years	68 (28%)
5. I would like to stay in government for the rest of my career	41 (17%)
NA	147

Figure A13.1: Distribution of Exit intention (first measure)



Figure A13.2: Correlation between our two measures of Exit intention



Table A13.2: bivariate correlation between the two measures for exit intention and main research variables

	INTENT_EXIT_1	INTENT_EXIT_2
INTENT_EXIT_1		
INTENT_EXIT_2	-0.539	
BACKSLIDING_2	-0.218	0.304
PROJECT_VOICE	0.246	-0.226
PROJECT_EFFORT	0.367	-0.341
PROJECT_POLITICIZATION	-0.309	0.275
PROJECT_INFLUENCE	0.252	-0.188
PAST_POLITICIZATION	-0.096	0.079
PAST_INFLUENCE	0.118	-0.034

Note: Listwise-deletion pearson correlation coefficients are presented, and Cronbach alpha values in parentheses for outcome variables. Correlation coefficients greater than 0.15 are statistically significant.

Table A13.3: Regression results – first exit intention measure

	exit intention (first measure)				exit intention (first measure)			
	Beta	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*	*Beta*	*p*
Intercept	-0.00 (0.06)	<0.001	0.00 (0.06)	<0.001	-0.84 (0.67)	0.030	-0.82 (0.66)	0.018
Democratic backsliding	-0.22 (0.07)	0.001	-0.08 (0.08)	0.305	-0.24 (0.07)	0.001	-0.07 (0.09)	0.405
Past politicization	-0.10 (0.07)	0.146	-0.06 (0.07)	0.394	-0.12 (0.08)	0.107	-0.08 (0.08)	0.271
Past influence	0.04 (0.07)	0.527	0.01 (0.07)	0.840	0.09 (0.07)	0.251	0.03 (0.07)	0.659
Expected politicization			-0.22 (0.09)	0.013			-0.24 (0.09)	0.008
Expected influence			0.06 (0.09)	0.522			0.06 (0.09)	0.485
Education: High-school					0.99 (1.06)	0.353	0.67 (1.05)	0.524
Education: Master					-0.27 (0.24)	0.248	-0.22 (0.23)	0.332
Education: PhD					-0.11 (0.33)	0.736	-0.01 (0.33)	0.981

Education: Other			0.34 (0.60)	0.575	0.29 (0.58)	0.619
Gender: Female			0.09 (0.14)	0.515	0.03 (0.14)	0.851
Tenure: 1-5			-0.06 (0.46)	0.905	0.05 (0.45)	0.915
Tenure: 6-10			-0.03 (0.46)	0.940	0.09 (0.45)	0.839
Tenure: 11-20			-0.15 (0.46)	0.743	0.02 (0.45)	0.957
Tenure: 20+			0.82 (0.49)	0.093	1.03 (0.48)	0.033
Position type: competitive tender			0.52 (0.36)	0.150	0.35 (0.36)	0.327
Position type: replacement			0.21 (0.48)	0.655	0.02 (0.47)	0.962
Position type: other			0.57 (0.47)	0.226	0.25 (0.47)	0.593
Ranking: senior			-0.27 (0.15)	0.071	-0.27 (0.14)	0.064
Ranking: very senior			-0.09 (0.39)	0.809	-0.23 (0.38)	0.555
Age: 31-40			0.54 (0.42)	0.198	0.55 (0.41)	0.179
Age: 41-50			0.59 (0.43)	0.169	0.62 (0.42)	0.143
Age: 51-60			0.67 (0.47)	0.154	0.62 (0.46)	0.179
Age: 61+			0.47 (0.56)	0.398	0.44 (0.54)	0.418
Jurist			0.02 (0.07)	0.746	0.09 (0.07)	0.228
Observations	229	229	212		212	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.062 / 0.050	0.105 / 0.085	0.221 / 0.130		0.266 / 0.171	

APPENDIX A14: Follow-up survey validation of exit intentions

We sought to examine the validity of our measurement of civil servants' exit intentions in the original survey (Feb-Mar 2023) through a follow-up survey. This involved returning to participants who left us their contact details and asking them whether they still work in the civil service, have left or actively searched for a position outside the civil service in the past year. Below, we describe the sample and methodology of this follow-up survey, conducted in May 2024, and report the results.

As explained in the manuscript, at the end of the original survey we invited respondents to leave us their email addresses for follow-up research. Of the 63 participants who left us their emails, 52 met our inclusion criteria of being middle-level, senior-level or very senior level civil servants (of whom one could not be contacted in 2024 because their email was invalid). Analyzing the demographic characteristics of this sample of 51 civil servants, as well as the distribution of the main variables, we found that they are comparable to the overall sample of 394 respondents who participated in the original survey.

Between 17-31 May 2024, we contacted the pool of 51 civil servants with email invitations that included a web link to a follow-up online questionnaire and an identifying number. We asked participants to enter this number at the outset of the questionnaire so that we could link their follow-up responses to the original responses.

A systematic comparison between those who filled out the follow-up survey (n=43) and the remaining original participants (n=351) is summarized below in Table A14.1. The comparison indicates that the differences are statistically insignificant with regard to demographic characteristics, as well exit intention and perceptions of democratic backsliding.

In the follow-up online questionnaire, we asked respondents whether they currently work in the state civil service. If they answered yes, we further asked whether they had actively tried to search for employment outside the state civil service over the past year. Based on these two questions, we created a dummy variable for *reported exit behavior*. Respondents who either reported leaving the state civil service (n=7) or actively searching for a position outside it (n=9) were coded 1, and 0 otherwise. We allowed all respondents to add comments, and in additional open-ended questions, asked those who either left or sought work outside the civil service to explain in their own words the reasons behind their behavior.

Validating our measure of exit intention, reported exit behavior in the follow-up survey in May 2024 is highly correlated with respondents' exit intent as reported in Feb-Mar 2023 (Spearman's correlation coefficient rho=.449, p=0.003). The distribution of exit intention (a five-point scale) between those who reported exit behavior and those who did not is summarized in Table A14.2 using crosstabs. To further test the robustness of this correlation, we conducted a multiple regression analysis, controlling for relevant covariates. We fitted a linear probability model with reported exit behavior as a binary outcome variable and exit intention as the main predictor. The regression results are presented in Table A14.3.

Table A14.1: Balancing test for the follow-up survey sample

		Follow-up survey sample (n = 43)	Remaining (*n* = 351)	*p-value*
Gender				>0.9
	Male	19 (44%)	158 (45%)	
	Female	24 (56%)	193 (55%)	
Age				0.3
	20-30	2 (4.7%)	13 (4.1%)	
	31-40	19 (44%)	113 (36%)	
	41-50	14 (33%)	123 (39%)	
	51-60	5 (12%)	57 (18%)	
	61+	3 (7.0%)	9 (2.9%)	
	Unknown	0	36	
Tenure (in years)				0.6
	1-	1 (2.3%)	4 (1.3%)	
	1-5	12 (28%)	75 (23%)	
	6-10	14 (33%)	92 (29%)	
	11-20	8 (19%)	89 (28%)	
	20+	8 (19%)	60 (19%)	
	Unknown	0	31	
Seniority level				0.7
	Junior	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	
	Middle	27 (63%)	186 (58%)	
	Senior	15 (35%)	112 (35%)	
	Very senior	1 (2.3%)	21 (6.6%)	
	Unknown	0	32	
Education				0.9
	High-school	0 (0%)	1 (0.3%)	
	Bachelor	5 (12%)	34 (11%)	

		Follow-up survey sample (n = 43)	Remaining (*n* = 351)	*p-value*
	Master	36 (84%)	250 (79%)	
	Phd	2 (4.7%)	26 (8.2%)	
	Other	0 (0%)	6 (1.9%)	
	Unknown	0	34	
Jewish religiosity sector				0.3
	Secular	27 (63%)	180 (57%)	
	Traditional-nonreligious	2 (4.7%)	35 (11%)	
	Traditional-religious	5 (12%)	16 (5.1%)	
	Religious	8 (19%)	63 (20%)	
	Haredi	0 (0%)	15 (4.7%)	
	Other	1 (2.3%)	7 (2.2%)	
	Unknown	0	35	
Exit intention	Mean (SD)	0.39 (0.33)	0.43 (0.31)	0.4
	NA	2	11	
Democratic backsliding	Mean (SD)	0.77 (0.25)	0.65 (0.35)	0.13
	NA	3	35	

Note: Tables generated via `R gtsummary::tbl_summary`. P-values represent Chi-square tests for categorical variables, and Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test for continuous variables.

Table A14.2: Correlation between exit intention and reported exit behavior

Exit intention: If you were offered today a position outside the civil service at a salary level similar to what you currently earn, what is the likelihood that you would choose to leave the civil service?

	Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high	NA	Total
Exit behaviour	1 (9.1%)	4 (40%)	4 (40%)	3 (50%)	4 (100%)	2	16
No exit behaviour	10 (91%)	6 (60%)	6 (60%)	3 (50%)	0 (0%)		27
Total	11 (100%)	10 (100%)	10 (100%)	6 (100%)	4 (100%)		

Table A14.3: Regression analysis for exit behavior

	Exit behavior			
	(1)		(2)	
Predictors	*Estimates*	*p*	*Estimates*	*p*
(Intercept)	0.11 (0.11)	0.297	-0.50 (0.83)	0.553
Exit intention	0.71 (0.21)	0.002	1.15 (0.30)	0.001
Education: Master			-0.45 (0.30)	0.142
Education: PhD			-0.47 (0.45)	0.306
Gender: female			0.24 (0.20)	0.239
Tenure: 1-5			0.14 (0.55)	0.809
Tenure: 6-10			0.24 (0.56)	0.667

Tenure: 11-20		-0.11 (0.57)	0.842
Tenure: 20+		-0.45 (0.59)	0.457
Position type: competitive tender		0.00 (0.63)	1.000
Position type: replacement		-0.09 (0.71)	0.897
Position type: other		-0.06 (0.80)	0.938
Ranking: senior		-0.08 (0.23)	0.719
Ranking: very senior		0.15 (0.58)	0.798
Age: 31-40		0.64 (0.49)	0.200
Age: 41-50		0.93 (0.53)	0.093
Age: 51-60		0.40 (0.54)	0.460
Age: 61+		0.70 (0.62)	0.270
Jurist		0.08 (0.22)	0.715
Observations	41	41	
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.218 / 0.198	0.556 / 0.192	