

Appendix A

Table A1. DV: Union Influence

	(1) Simple model	(2) Weighted	(3) Controls	(4) Simple model	(5) Weighted	(6) Controls
Control				-0.194 (0.181)	-0.136 (0.181)	-0.096 (0.203)
Strike	-0.242 (0.179)	-0.308* (0.179)	-0.308 (0.202)	-0.435** (0.178)	-0.445** (0.176)	-0.403** (0.203)
Pro-strike	0.194 (0.181)	0.136 (0.181)	0.096 (0.203)			
Anti-strike	-0.386** (0.180)	-0.421** (0.182)	-0.521** (0.204)	-0.579*** (0.179)	-0.557*** (0.178)	-0.617*** (0.205)
Double frame	-0.121 (0.183)	-0.157 (0.184)	-0.257 (0.209)	-0.315* (0.182)	-0.294 (0.181)	-0.353* (0.210)
Woman			0.045 (0.133)			0.045 (0.133)
Age			-0.021*** (0.005)			-0.021*** (0.005)
Income			-0.054 (0.053)			-0.054 (0.053)
Education			-0.311*** (0.094)			-0.311*** (0.094)
Morena voter			0.263** (0.130)			0.263** (0.130)
Observations	976	975	754	976	975	754

Notes: Results from ordered logistic regression models. Models 1-3 show the estimated effects of moving from the Control to the four treatment conditions. Models 4-6 demonstrate the estimated effects of movement from the pro-strike to the other treatment conditions. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2. DV: Support for Strike

	(1) Simple model	(2) Weighted	(3) Controls	(4) Simple model	(5) Weighted	(6) Controls
Control				-0.473*** (0.182)	-0.428** (0.181)	-0.391* (0.202)
Strike	-0.113 (0.181)	-0.129 (0.181)	-0.178 (0.204)	-0.586*** (0.185)	-0.557*** (0.183)	-0.569*** (0.209)
Pro-strike	0.473*** (0.182)	0.428** (0.181)	0.391* (0.202)			
Anti-strike	0.030 (0.179)	-0.038 (0.180)	0.003 (0.201)	-0.444** (0.183)	-0.467** (0.182)	-0.388* (0.206)
Double frame	0.057 (0.181)	0.052 (0.181)	0.047 (0.210)	-0.416** (0.185)	-0.377** (0.183)	-0.344 (0.214)
Woman			-0.042 (0.134)			-0.042 (0.134)
Age			-0.010** (0.005)			-0.010** (0.005)
Income			-0.012 (0.053)			-0.012 (0.053)
Education			-0.279*** (0.096)			-0.279*** (0.096)
Morena voter			0.117 (0.132)			0.117 (0.132)
Observations	961	962	747	961	962	747

Notes: Results from ordered logistic regression models. Models 1-3 show the estimated effects of moving from the Control to the four treatment conditions. Models 4-6 demonstrate the estimated effects of movement from the pro-strike to the other treatment conditions. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3. Main Results (Tamaulipas excluded)

	(1) DV: Union Influence	(2) DV: Union Influence	(3) DV: Support Strike	(4) DV: Support Strike
Control		-0.10 (0.18)		-0.51*** (0.19)
Strike	-0.26 (0.18)	-0.35* (0.18)	-0.12 (0.18)	-0.63*** (0.19)
Pro-strike	0.10 (0.18)		0.51*** (0.19)	
Anti-strike	-0.40** (0.18)	-0.50*** (0.18)	-0.01 (0.18)	-0.52*** (0.19)
Double-frame	-0.18 (0.19)	-0.27 (0.19)	-0.00 (0.18)	-0.51*** (0.19)
Observations	947	947	931	931

Notes: Results from ordered logistic regression models. Models 1 and 3 show the estimated effects of moving from the Control to the four treatment conditions. Models 2 and 4 demonstrate the estimated effects of movement from the pro-strike to the other treatment conditions. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A4. Means by Treatment Condition

		Control	Strike	Pro- strike	Anti- strike	Double framing
Union Influence	Value	3.25	3.08	3.41	2.96	3.17
	Difference with Control condition		-0.17	0.16	-0.29	-0.08
Striking Teacher Support	Value	4.36	4.18	4.91	4.40	4.43
	Difference with Control condition		-0.18	0.55	0.04	0.07

Table A5. Balance (Census vs. Sample)

	Census	Sample
N	100,528,155	1011
Female	0.51	0.50
Age levels (%)		
18 to 29	28.3	30.3
30 to 49	39.9	40.4
Over 50	31.9	29.4
Education levels (%)		
Basica	54.2	50.6
Media	22.6	32.7
Superior	23.2	16.7

Notes: Census data comes from National Institute of Statistics and Geography (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* - INEGI) 2020 general population census.

Table A6. Balance (Control and Treatment groups)

	Control	Strike	Pro-strike	Anti-strike	Double frame	p	SMD
N	210	200	206	201	194		
Woman (%)	104 (49.5%)	110 (55.0%)	104 (50.5%)	103 (51.2%)	83 (42.8%)	0.185	0.105
Age levels (%)						0.678	0.103
18 to 29	66 (31.4%)	66 (33.0%)	50 (24.3%)	64 (31.8%)	60 (30.9%)		
30 to 49	87 (41.4%)	75 (37.5%)	93 (45.1%)	76 (37.8%)	77 (39.7%)		
Over 50	57 (27.1%)	59 (29.5%)	63 (30.6%)	61 (30.3%)	57 (29.4%)		
Income (mean (SD))	4.33 (1.41)	4.40 (1.37%)	4.16 (1.42)	4.21 (1.29)	4.31 (1.23)	0.522	0.089
Education levels (%)						0.29	0.145
Basica	99 (47.6%)	94 (47.7%)	112 (56.3%)	100 (51.0%)	97 (50.5%)		
Media	78 (37.5%)	63 (32.0%)	51 (25.6%)	68 (34.7%)	64 (33.3%)		
Superior	31 (14.9%)	40 (20.3%)	36 (18.1%)	28 (14.3%)	31 (16.1%)		
Morena voter (%)	114 (54.3%)	111 (55.5%)	117 (56.8%)	110 (54.7%)	96 (49.5%)	0.652	0.064

Notes: SMD refers to Standardized Mean Difference.

Appendix B: Constructing the Treatment

Our experimental design examines how messaging, based on key talking points, influences attitudes. Instead of presenting respondents with full newspaper articles or clips from television or radio, we opted to show them only key messages related to the strike debate. While an alternative approach could have involved using complete media excerpts, we decided against it because relying on direct media messages could weaken our research design. Although this would have replicated a real media environment, it could have also introduced biases into the vignettes.

First, real-world media often contains a lot of additional, sometimes irrelevant information that could confuse respondents. Teacher strikes are complex issues involving unions with extensive demands, and media reports may reference individual union leaders that many respondents may not know, making it hard for bystanders to understand the conflict. Second, longer treatments like newspaper articles make it difficult to pinpoint which specific parts of the article are influencing our outcomes. The messages in news articles about striker grievances and political opportunism vary in wording and content, making it likely that we cannot easily identify which parts actually affect public opinion.

To simplify our approach, we created straightforward informational treatments based on key issues from news reports and union documents. Our goal was to present clear and concise messages that respondents with different educational backgrounds could easily understand. We drew on our knowledge of the Mexican context and specific media reports to develop treatments that resonate with respondents and immerse them in the narrative. We aimed to establish equivalence by highlighting one or two key points for each side.

To construct our treatments, we reviewed numerous newspaper articles about the Tamaulipas strike, primarily from national and local sources, and verified this information using union documents. Google searches for the Tamaulipas strike yielded over 100 articles from local news sources and 40 articles from national newspapers (this will be presented in the main text). We selected three articles that exemplify the key pro- and anti-strike messages used in our treatment, though these were not the only sources we used in the construction of our treatments.

Animal Politico (2023, September 12) “[Tras una semana en paro, maestros de Tamaulipas arman plantón afuera del Palacio de Gobierno para exigir pagos.](#)”

Escamilla, Josue (2023, December 15). “[Niegan en el SNTE buscar ‘hueso’ politico en la Secretaria de Educacion de Tamaulipas.](#)” Hoy Tamaulipas.

Saldaña, Erik Eduardo (2023, September 15) “[‘Me quieren enlodar’”, asegura Arnulfo Rodríguez del SNTE Tamaulipas.](#) Milenio.

SNTE 30. [Pliego Estatal de Demandas 2023.](#)

The full list of demands by SNTE Section 30 was outlined in a lengthy and complex 12-page document. The main grievances of the union are summarized in a newspaper article published by Animal Político, in which teachers demanded the dismissal of Lucía Aimé Castillo Pastor, the Secretary of Education of Tamaulipas, and the payment of salaries owed to teachers

in training.¹ There was a close correspondence between our treatment, SNTE's list of demands (*pliego de petición*), and the Animal Político article.

The articles by Josué Escamilla and Erik Saldaña summarize the anti-strike arguments presented by state government officials to the media in an effort to discredit the strikers, referencing Arnulfo Rodríguez's potential political interests in seeking electoral positions through the strike. These articles were used to create our anti-strike treatment. Escamilla's article suggests that the union defended itself against allegations that it used the protest to pressure the Secretariat of Education of Tamaulipas to appoint union leaders to positions in the administration. Furthermore, Saldaña's article reports that Arnulfo Rodríguez, the leader of the teachers' union in Tamaulipas, accused the government of mudslinging and of claiming he was seeking a position in public office, while he reiterated that he was "free from cultivating support for a political party." We summarized these accusations as suggesting that the strike was used to "promote personal political interests."

¹ "Teachers from different municipalities and members of section 30 of the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE) are demanding the dismissal of Lucía Aimé Castillo Pastor, head of the Tamaulipas Education Secretariat, as a condition for negotiating their return to classes. In addition to 'unsticking' agreements so that salaries owed are covered for teachers in training, teacher promotions, and vacancies."