Appendices

Contents

Appendix A Distribution of Racial Segregation Across All Cities

Table 1 displays the distribution of the white racial boundary variable alongside a dissimilarity index for the distribution of the Black and White populations within a city at large. After the column identifying each city, the next five summarize the distribution of the white racial boundary measure. These statistics demonstrate that there are no major outliers within all the cities and that the distribution of our boundary measure is relatively consistent across all cities. The next column displays the Black-White dissimilarity index for each city. Higher values represent greater levels of Black-White segregation. The final column then shows the percent of the city-wide population that is Black. Taken together these statistics demonstrate slight differences between city contexts based on the level of Black-White segregation. For instance, Atlanta and Chicago have the lowest average white racial boundary values by census block and the highest levels of Black-White segregation. These two cities alongside Milwaukee, also have the highest proportion of Black residents city-wide. This context may help explain some of the null results for these cities, as they may have overall fewer areas of stark racial differences due to more concentrated racial segregation and racialized policing practices may therefore occur more prominently in homogeneous Black communities as compared to other boundary zones.

city	Mean, sd white_blv	Min white_blv	25th white_blv	75th white_blv	Max white_blv	DI B-W	Mean, sd % Black
ATL	0.21 (0.22)	0.00	0.05	0.29	1.00	0.82	0.58 (0.42)
AUS	0.30 (0.21)	0.00	0.15	0.40	1.00	0.66	0.07 (0.13)
BOS	0.27 (0.22)	0.00	0.10	0.38	1.00	0.78	0.23 (0.29)
CHI	0.23 (0.22)	0.00	0.04	0.35	1.00	0.87	0.37 (0.44)
LOU	0.26 (0.21)	0.00	0.11	0.36	1.00	0.66	0.23 (0.32)
MIL	0.25 (0.19)	0.00	0.11	0.32	1.00	0.77	0.37 (0.38)
SEA	0.27 (0.17)	0.00	0.15	0.34	1.00	0.67	0.07 (0.13)

Table 1: **Racial Boundary and Segregation Measures by City.** White_blv represents white boundary measure. DI is the Black-White dissimilarity index for the city. Higher values represent greater dissimilarity or more Black-White segregation.

City	Race of Mayor	City Council % White	Income Ratio	Homeownership Ratio
ATL	Black	23%	1.76	1.69
AUS	White	56%	1.27	1.34
BOS	White	69%	2.42	1.80
CHI	White (11-19)	24%	1.56	1.26
LOU	White	77%	1.18	1.63
MIL	White	50%	1.44	1.62
SEA	White	82%	1.72	1.57

Table 2: **Indicators of Whites' Political and Economic Power by City**



Figure 1: **Boundary Measure by Racial Subgroup.** Graph displays the mean value of the racial boundary when the boundary is measured as white/non-white, black/non-black, latino/non-latino, and asian/non-asian.

Appendix B Summary Statistics for Model Variables

	Atlanta	Austin	Boston	Chicago	Louisville	Milwaukee	Seattle
Mean Logged(Arrests)	0.04	-0.08	0.39	0.31	0.01	1.26	0.27
SD Logged(Arrests)	1.05	0.85	1.31	1.22	1.01	1.59	1.46
Mean White Boundary	0.21	0.30	0.27	0.23	0.26	0.25	0.27
SD White Boundary	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.19	0.17
Mean SES Boundary	0.24	0.50	0.31	0.45	0.38	0.44	0.64
SD SES Boundary	0.16	0.24	0.14	0.17	0.23	0.21	0.25
Mean Log(Population)	3.84	3.83	4.41	3.88	3.81	4.21	3.90
SD Log(Population)	1.24	1.24	1.12	0.98	1.12	0.94	0.92
Mean % White	0.34	0.60	0.50	0.31	0.69	0.43	0.70
SD % White	0.39	0.30	0.36	0.34	0.33	0.35	0.25
Mean Age 15-35 Male	18.03	17.02	27.92	12.30	10.93	15.94	12.47
SD Age 15-35 Male	54.86	48.38	50.97	33.96	20.58	28.77	27.52
Mean Diversity	0.20	0.37	0.40	0.27	0.24	0.33	0.37
SD Diversity	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.20	0.20	0.20
Mean Logged(MHHI)	10.66	11.08	10.91	10.71	10.66	10.54	11.20
SD Logged(MHHI)	0.74	0.52	0.61	0.52	0.56	0.46	0.47
Mean % Homeowner	0.49	0.64	0.41	0.53	0.62	0.48	0.58
SD % Homeowner	0.26	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.23	0.23
Mean % Poverty	0.26	0.14	0.19	0.22	0.20	0.26	0.11
SD % Poverty	0.19	0.14	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.11
Mean % Unemployed	0.16	0.07	0.11	0.16	0.12	0.13	0.07
SD % Unemployed	0.11	0.05	0.09	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.05
Mean % College	0.43	0.47	0.43	0.28	0.27	0.24	0.59
SD % College	0.28	0.23	0.26	0.23	0.22	0.19	0.19
Mean Log(Property Crime)	2.07	1.22		3.54	0.84	2.90	2.43
SD Log(Property Crime)	1.22	1.30		1.09	0.94	1.56	1.15
Mean Log(Violent Crime)	0.53	0.58		3.23	0.18	2.15	0.71
SD Log(Violent Crime)	0.73	0.96		1.26	0.43	1.54	0.93
Mean Log(Crime)	2.15	1.34	3.01	4.16	0.88	3.21	2.51
SD Log(Crime)	1.24	1.40	1.12	1.11	0.98	1.70	1.19

Table 3: **Summary Statistics for Key Model Variables.** Rows display mean and standard deviation for each variable by city

B.1 Adjusting for Crime

In this section, we elaborate on the choice to adjust for crime when modeling stops and arrests. Some readers may be skeptical of our endeavor to disentangle police activity (arrests) from crime because they are co-determined. One may argue that the relationship between boundaries and crime should be considered as a separate effect from arrests, or that in the absence of this relationship no control for crime is needed. Crime is arguably the theoretically most important confounder in our analysis, given its strong relationship with levels of policing and arrests.

Moreover, prior research demonstrates boundary areas are associated with higher levels of crime. We outline a number of causal models, and discuss their implications for our coefficient estimates, and the appropriateness of our approach.

On one hand, we might believe that crime could be a confounder in our models in that it is jointly associated with both boundary areas and policing. The association between crime and policing is obvious and well established, but there is less research on how crime may motivate the development of boundary areas. In fact, there is no research on how crime affects the development of boundary areas to our knowledge, but we can think of some theoretical reasons as to how this might work. For instance, if there is more crime, that could lead to white flight from specific areas or city blocks, which would lead to the downstream development of racial boundary areas. In this model, crime begets boundary zones, and also heightened arrests; crime jointly explains variation in boundaries and arrests, and adjusting for crime is theoretically appropriate, and allows us to assess the extent to which boundary areas are associated with policing/arrests net of the joint variation in policing/arrests and boundaries explained by crime. The statistical implication of adjusting for crime in our model is that the relationship between boundaries and arrests would be attenuated.

However, it could also be that crime follows boundaries, which then leads to higher arrests. This is the model developed in the existing literature. In this case, adjusting for crime is equivalent to adjusting for a mediator/moderator. Like adjustment for a confounder, adjustment for a mediator/moderator can attenuate the relationship between boundaries and arrests, but not because a third variable explains both boundaries and arrests, but because that third variable is a mechanism that explains part of why boundaries affect downstream arrests.

Another consideration, however, is post-treatment bias that would be generated by conditioning on a collider. It could be the case that, through some roundabout way, that both levels of arrests cause crime and boundaries cause crime. If post-treatment bias is generated by conditioning on a collider, the relationship between boundaries and arrests will be inflated as opposed to attenuated. It is this third case about which we are most concerned. If the inclusion of crime attenuates the relationship between boundaries and arrests but the relationship persists net of crime, then we can be sure we are drawing appropriate conclusions from our models. If crime is a collider and the estimates are artificially inflated from its inclusion, then the conclusions we draw are more tenuous.

First, we demonstrate that it is important to adjust for crime because there is an association between crime and boundary zones in our data. This analysis is displayed below in Figure 2. Here, we can see that in every city included in the analysis there is a positive association between racial boundary zones and crime. This comports with existing literature. In Figure 3 we display the relationship between boundary zones and arrests including a control for crime (black) and excluding a control for crime (grey). Here we can see that including a control for crime attenuates the relationship between boundaries and arrests in all cities, suggesting that crime is not a collider, but instead either a confounder or a mediator/moderator.

We cannot distinguish between these two possibilities. However, doing so is not necessary to our analysis. Ultimately, we are interested in how racial boundaries affect arrests both net of crime and through other mechanisms outside the influence of crime. We do not contest the finding in the literature that boundaries may be spaces that feature heightened crime, which also yields heightened policing. Our effort is to make space for a theoretical perspective that boundaries may generate a variety of mechanisms that could also affect downstream arrests net of the relationship between boundaries and crime, such as institutional incentives to police areas where politically dominant and non-dominant ethno-racial groups are in proximity

but separated from each other. The relationship between crime and arrests itself prompts the moderation analysis, where we assess whether there are more arrests in boundary zones than in non-boundary zones, given variation in crime.



Figure 2: **The relationship between boundaries and crime.**



Figure 3: **The relationship between boundaries and crime.**

B.2 Correlation Between Arrests And Crime

Table 4: **Correlation Between Logged Misdemeanor Arrests and Logged Crime Across Cities**

City	Crime Type	Pearson's Rho
Atlanta	All Crime	0.55
Atlanta	Violent Crime	0.55
Atlanta	Property Crime	0.54
Austin	All Crime	0.65
Austin	Violent Crime	0.73
Austin	Property Crime	0.63
Boston	All Crime	0.57
Chicago	All Crime	0.61
Chicago	Violent Crime	0.66
Chicago	Property Crime	0.54
Milwaukee	All Crime	0.59
Milwaukee	Violent Crime	0.67
Milwaukee	Property Crime	0.56
Seattle	All Crime	0.31
Seattle	Violent Crime	0.34
Seattle	Property Crime	0.30

Appendix C The Impact of Racial Boundaries on Police Activity

C.1 Arrests for felony and misdemeanor infractions



Figure 4: **Influence of Racial Boundary on Logged Arrests (Standardized).** Graph displays the relationship between racial boundaries and misdemeanor and felony arrests when measuring boundaries as white/non-white, black/non-black, latino/non-latino, and asian/non-asian.

Table 5: Influence of Racial Boundary on Logged Misdemeanor Arrests (Standardized)

	Dependent Variable: Misdemeanor Arrests					
	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Boundary (White)	$0.17^{\dagger}$	0.14^{***}	0.27^{**}	0.04	0.09	0.25^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Boundary (SES)	0.25^{*}	0.07^{**}	-0.03	0.04	0.24^{**}	-0.01
	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)
Log(Population)	-0.05^{**}	-0.04^{***}	0.20^{***}	0.04^{***}	0.31^{***}	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
% White	-0.07	-0.18^{***}	-0.87^{***}	-0.19^{***}	-1.63^{***}	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00	0.00^{***}	-0.00	0.00	0.00^{*}	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	0.01	-0.19^{***}	-0.24^{*}	-0.30^{***}	-0.42^{***}	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Log(MHHI)	$0.17^{\dagger}$	0.07^{*}	0.01	-0.01	-0.09	-0.01
	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.06)
% Poverty	0.20	0.22^{*}	0.75^{***}	0.33^{***}	0.47^{*}	-0.02
	(0.22)	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.16)
% Homeowner	-0.38^{***}	-0.07	-0.10	-0.59^{***}	-0.92^{***}	-0.29^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.09)
% Unemployed	0.34	-0.01	0.62^{*}	$0.14^{\dagger}$	-0.12	$0.51^{\dagger}$
	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.09)	(0.25)	(0.31)
% College	0.30^{*}	-0.07	-0.20	-0.24^{***}	-0.43^{**}	0.08
	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.08)
Log(Property Crime)	0.24^{***}	0.09^{***}		0.00	0.08^{***}	0.10^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.48^{***}	0.34^{***}		0.42^{***}	0.19^{***}	0.17^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log(Crime)			0.41^{***}			
			(0.02)			
Physical Boundary	0.07^{*}	0.07^{**}	0.09^{*}	0.32^{***}	0.40^{***}	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Commercial Density	-0.00	0.00	0.01^{*}	$0.00^{\dagger}$	0.01^{*}	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.40	0.55	0.45	0.49	0.66	0.14
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 6: Influence of Racial Boundary on Logged Felonies Arrests (Standardized)

	Dependent Variable: Felony Arrests					
	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Boundary (White)	0.05	0.11^{***}	0.28^{***}	-0.16^{***}	-0.06	0.51^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Boundary (SES)	0.30^{***}	0.04^{*}	-0.08	0.03	0.08	-0.04
	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Log(Population)	-0.03^{*}	-0.00	0.16^{***}	-0.01	0.29^{***}	0.16^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
% White	-0.06	-0.22^{***}	-0.63^{***}	-0.15^{***}	-1.67^{***}	-0.44^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.12)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00	0.00^{***}	-0.00	0.00^{***}	0.00^{*}	0.00^{*}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.05	-0.25^{***}	-0.21^{*}	-0.43^{***}	-0.62^{***}	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.12)
Log(MHHI)	0.07	0.13^{***}	0.03	-0.01	$-0.14^{\dagger}$	-0.02
	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.09)
% Poverty	0.25	0.19^{**}	0.61^{**}	0.54^{***}	0.23	0.15
	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.24)
% Homeowner	$-0.17^{\dagger}$	-0.10^{**}	-0.18	-0.42^{***}	-0.55^{***}	-0.53^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.12)
% Unemployed	0.56^{*}	0.15	0.64^{**}	0.32^{**}	0.10	$0.74^{\dagger}$
	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.45)
% College	$0.24^{\dagger}$	-0.18^{***}	-0.06	-0.27^{***}	$-0.25^{\dagger}$	-0.21
	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Log(Property Crime)	0.22^{***}	0.07^{***}		0.01	0.01	0.12^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.51^{***}	0.34^{***}		0.32^{***}	0.21^{***}	0.44^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log(Crime)			0.32^{***}			
			(0.02)			
Physical Boundary	0.04	0.05^{**}	0.09^{*}	0.19^{***}	0.26^{***}	0.12^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Commercial Density	0.00	-0.00	0.00^{*}	0.00	0.00^{**}	0.01^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.49	0.59	0.39	0.45	0.67	0.31
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

C.2 Arrests for infractions against persons, property and society



Figure 5: **Louisville: Influence of Racial Boundary on Logged Arrests by Type (Standardized).** Annotations denote the robustness value and bounding variable value necessary to attenuate the substantive influence of *racial boundaries* to 0.

Table 7: Lousiville: Influence of Racial Boundary on Logged Arrests by Type (Standardized)

	Against Persons	Against Property	Against Society
Boundary (White)	$0.06^{\dagger}$	0.21^{***}	0.22^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Boundary (SES)	0.02	0.04	0.07
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Log(Population)	0.04^{***}	0.09^{***}	0.06^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% White	-0.12^{***}	-0.13^{***}	-0.14^{**}
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00^{***}	0.00^{***}	0.00^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	0.03	-0.02	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Log(MHHI)	-0.06^{*}	-0.10^{*}	$-0.10^{\dagger}$
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
% Poverty	0.17^{*}	$0.20^{\dagger}$	$0.23^{\dagger}$
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.13)
% Homeowner	-0.07	$-0.11^{\dagger}$	-0.12
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)
% Unemployed	0.06	0.08	-0.17
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.17)
% College	-0.11^{*}	-0.33^{***}	-0.49^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Log(Property Crime)	0.04^{***}	0.12^{***}	0.13^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.19^{***}	0.25^{***}	0.28^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Physical Boundary	0.10^{***}	0.16^{***}	0.16^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Commercial Density	0.00^{***}	0.00^{*}	0.00^{*}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.24	0.32	0.27
Num. obs.	7212	7212	7212
N Clusters	540	540	540

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Appendix D The moderating effect of crime on police activity in boundary zones

Table 8: Influence of Logged Crime on Logged Felony Arrests (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.

	Dependent Variable: Felony Arrests					
	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Boundary (White)	0.08	-0.07^{***}	-0.15	0.32^{***}	-0.01	-0.30^{**}
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Log(Crime)	0.40^{***}	0.23^{***}	0.30^{***}	0.35^{***}	0.16^{***}	0.29^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Boundary (SES)	0.30^{**}	0.05^{*}	-0.06	0.04	0.07	-0.07
	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Log(Population)	0.00	0.01	0.15^{***}	-0.00	0.30^{***}	0.13^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
% White	$-0.15^{\dagger}$	-0.40^{***}	-0.62^{***}	-0.25^{***}	-1.81^{***}	-0.57^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.13)
Age 15-35 Male	$0.00^{\dagger}$	0.00^{***}	-0.00	0.00^{***}	0.00^{*}	0.01^{*}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.24^{***}	-0.35^{***}	$-0.17^{\dagger}$	-0.46^{***}	-0.68^{***}	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.13)
Log(MHHI)	0.13	0.20^{***}	0.03	-0.03	-0.16^{*}	-0.03
	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.10)
% Poverty	0.47^{*}	0.27^{**}	0.59^{**}	0.58^{***}	0.27	0.27
	(0.24)	(0.09)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.26)
% Homeowner	-0.25^{*}	-0.14^{**}	-0.19	-0.41^{***}	-0.57^{***}	-0.61^{***}
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.14)
% Unemployed	0.67^{**}	0.15	0.66^{**}	0.39^{**}	0.15	$0.86^{\dagger}$
	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.12)	(0.24)	(0.48)
% College	0.08	-0.37^{***}	-0.06	-0.47^{***}	-0.38^{**}	-0.40^{**}
	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.15)
BoundaryXCrime	-0.04	0.08^{***}	0.09^{**}	-0.09^{***}	0.01	0.17^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Physical Boundary	0.06^{*}	0.06^{**}	0.09^{**}	0.20^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.13^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Commercial Density	0.00	-0.00	0.00^{*}	0.00	0.00^{**}	0.01^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.40	0.53	0.39	0.44	0.67	0.28
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 9: Influence of Logged Crime on Logged Misdemeanor Arrests (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.

	Dependent Variable: Misdemeanor Arrests					
	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Boundary (White)	-0.01	-0.08^{***}	-0.11	0.17^{***}	0.02	-0.31^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Log(Crime)	0.39^{***}	0.24^{***}	0.38^{***}	0.43^{***}	0.22^{***}	0.14^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Boundary (SES)	0.25^{*}	0.08^{**}	-0.03	$0.05^{\dagger}$	0.24^{**}	-0.02
	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)
Log(Population)	-0.02	-0.03^{**}	0.19^{***}	0.04^{***}	0.31^{***}	-0.04^{*}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
% White	-0.13	-0.36^{***}	-0.86^{***}	-0.29^{***}	-1.74^{***}	-0.01
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00	0.00^{***}	-0.00	0.00	0.00^{*}	$0.00^{\dagger}$
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.19^{*}	-0.30^{***}	-0.22^{*}	-0.31^{***}	-0.44^{***}	-0.02
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Log(MHHI)	0.23^{*}	0.13^{**}	0.01	-0.02	-0.11	-0.01
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.07)
% Poverty	$0.42^{\dagger}$	0.30^{**}	0.73^{***}	0.38^{***}	0.49^{*}	0.03
	(0.25)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.17)
% Homeowner	-0.45^{***}	$-0.11^{\dagger}$	-0.11	-0.60^{***}	-0.95^{***}	-0.33^{***}
	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.09)
% Unemployed	$0.43^{\dagger}$	-0.02	0.64^{*}	0.20^{*}	-0.11	0.53
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.09)	(0.26)	(0.32)
% College	0.12	-0.26^{***}	-0.20	-0.53^{***}	-0.55^{***}	0.01
	(0.16)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.09)
BoundaryXCrime	0.03	0.09^{***}	0.09^{*}	-0.03^{**}	0.00	0.14^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Physical Boundary	0.10^{*}	0.08^{***}	0.09^{*}	0.34^{***}	0.41^{***}	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Commercial Density	-0.00	0.00	0.01^{*}	$0.00^{\dagger}$	0.01^{*}	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.33	0.49	0.45	0.47	0.66	0.13
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 10: Lousiville: Influence of Logged Crime on Logged Arrests by Type (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.

	Against Persons	Against Property	Against Society
Boundary (White)	0.01	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log(Crime)	0.08***	0.17***	0.17***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Boundary (SES)	0.01	0.04	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Log(Population)	0.04***	0.08***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% White	−0.14***	−0.15***	−0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	0.02	−0.01	−0.04
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Log(MHHI)	−0.07*	−0.10*	−0.11*
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
% Poverty	0.18*	0.22†	0.25†
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.13)
% Homeowner	−0.07†	−0.12†	−0.13
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)
% Unemployed	0.07	0.10	−0.14
	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.18)
% College	−0.11*	−0.33***	−0.49***
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)
BoundaryXCrime	0.02	0.05*	0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Physical Boundary	0.10***	0.16***	0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Commercial Density	0.00***	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.22	0.31	0.26
Num. obs.	7212	7212	7212
N Clusters	540	540	540

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$



Figure 6: **Louisville: Influence of Logged Crime on Logged Arrests By Type (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.**

Appendix E The moderating effect of racial composition of neighborhood on the relationship between racial boundaries and police activity

Table 11: Influence of Percent White on Logged Misdemeanor Arrests (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	Dependent Variable: Misdemeanor Arrests					
	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Boundary (White)	0.09	0.11**	0.02	−0.01	−0.21***	0.23***
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.07)
% White	−0.03	−0.15***	−0.92***	−0.21***	−1.76***	0.16†
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Boundary (SES)	0.26*	0.07**	−0.03	0.04	0.25**	−0.01
	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)
Log(Population)	−0.05***	−0.05***	0.20***	0.04***	0.32***	−0.04†
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00	0.00***	−0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	0.01	−0.18***	−0.20*	−0.29***	−0.37***	−0.04
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Log(MHHI)	0.17†	0.07*	−0.00	−0.01	−0.08	−0.01
	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.06)
% Poverty	0.21	0.23*	0.72***	0.33***	0.46*	0.01
	(0.22)	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.16)
% Homeowner	−0.38***	−0.07	−0.10	−0.59***	−0.94***	−0.28**
	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.09)
% Unemployed	0.34	−0.01	0.57*	0.13	−0.18	0.51†
	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.09)	(0.25)	(0.31)
% College	0.30†	−0.09†	−0.15	−0.23***	−0.37*	0.04
	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.08)
Log(Property Crime)	0.25***	0.09***		0.00	0.08***	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.48***	0.34***		0.42***	0.19***	0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log(Crime)			0.40***			
			(0.02)			
Boundary X % White	−0.06	−0.08	0.25*	0.07†	0.49***	−0.25**
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Physical Boundary	0.07*	0.07**	0.09*	0.32***	0.41***	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Commercial Density	−0.00	0.00	0.01*	0.00†	0.01*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.40	0.55	0.45	0.49	0.66	0.14
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; †$p < 0.1$

Table 12: Influence of Percent White on Logged Felony Arrests (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	Dependent Variable: Felony Arrests					
	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Boundary (White)	0.01	0.09**	0.06	−0.08***	−0.28***	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.10)
% White	−0.04	−0.20***	−0.65***	−0.21***	−1.83***	−0.53***
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.15)
Boundary (SES)	0.30***	0.04*	−0.07	0.03	0.08	−0.03
	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Log(Population)	−0.03*	−0.01	0.15***	−0.00	0.30***	0.15***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00	0.00***	−0.00	0.00***	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	−0.04	−0.24***	−0.16†	−0.45***	−0.59***	−0.09
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.13)
Log(MHHI)	0.07	0.13***	0.03	−0.01	−0.13†	−0.02
	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.09)
% Poverty	0.25	0.19**	0.59**	0.55***	0.23	0.17
	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.24)
% Homeowner	−0.18†	−0.10**	−0.17	−0.42***	−0.56***	−0.52***
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.12)
% Unemployed	0.56*	0.15	0.61**	0.34**	0.05	0.70
	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.44)
% College	0.24†	−0.19***	−0.03	−0.25***	−0.16	−0.22
	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Log(Property Crime)	0.22***	0.07***		0.01	0.01	0.12***
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.51***	0.34***		0.32***	0.20***	0.44***
	(0.03)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log(Crime)			0.32***			
			(0.02)			
Boundary X % White	−0.03	−0.06	0.13	0.11**	0.57***	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Physical Boundary	0.04	0.05**	0.09*	0.18***	0.27***	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Commercial Density	0.00	−0.00	0.00*	0.00	0.00**	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.49	0.59	0.39	0.45	0.68	0.31
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$



Figure 7: **Influence of Percent Poverty on Logged Arrests by Type (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.**

Table 13: Influence of Percent Poverty on Logged Misdemeanor Arrests (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	Dependent Variable: Misdemeanor Arrests					
	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Boundary (White)	0.07	0.01	0.03	0.09***	0.19**	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.04)
% White	−0.05	−0.19***	−0.87***	−0.19***	−1.62***	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Boundary (SES)	0.26*	0.08**	−0.03	0.04	0.34***	−0.01
	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)
Log(Population)	−0.05***	−0.05***	0.20***	0.04***	0.27***	−0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00	0.00***	−0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	0.01	−0.19***	−0.21*	−0.29***	−0.41***	−0.08
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Log(MHHI)	0.18†	0.07*	0.01	−0.01	−0.08	−0.01
	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.07)
% Poverty	0.23	0.15	0.57*	0.40***	0.56**	−0.14
	(0.23)	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.16)
% Homeowner	−0.39***	−0.07	−0.11	−0.59***	−1.01***	−0.28**
	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.09)
% Unemployed	0.34	−0.02	0.64*	0.11	−0.31	0.50†
	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.26)	(0.09)	(0.24)	(0.30)
% College	0.31*	−0.07	−0.18	−0.24***	−0.47**	0.06
	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.08)
Log(Property Crime)	0.25***	0.09***		0.01	0.09***	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.48***	0.34***		0.42***	0.20***	0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log(Crime)			0.40***			
			(0.02)			
Boundary X % Poverty	−0.06	0.30**	0.67*	−0.40***	−0.51*	0.37
	(0.21)	(0.11)	(0.26)	(0.10)	(0.22)	(0.32)
Physical Boundary	0.07*	0.07***	0.09*	0.32***		
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)		
Commercial Density	−0.00	0.00	0.01*	0.00†		
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)		
R^2	0.40	0.55	0.45	0.49	0.65	0.14
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Table 14: Influence of Percent Poverty on Logged Felony Arrests (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	Dependent Variable: Felony Arrests					
	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Boundary (White)	0.01	0.03	−0.00	0.07***	0.11*	0.09†
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)
% White	−0.05	−0.22***	−0.63***	−0.17***	−1.66***	−0.47***
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.12)
Boundary (SES)	0.30***	0.05*	−0.07	0.03	0.08	−0.04
	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Log(Population)	−0.03*	−0.01	0.15***	−0.01	0.29***	0.15***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00	0.00***	−0.00	0.00***	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	−0.03	−0.24***	−0.16†	−0.45***	−0.63***	−0.05
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.12)
Log(MHHI)	0.07	0.13***	0.03	−0.02	−0.14†	−0.03
	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.09)
% Poverty	0.27	0.16*	0.42*	0.65***	0.34*	0.02
	(0.21)	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.27)
% Homeowner	−0.18†	−0.10**	−0.18	−0.42***	−0.56***	−0.51***
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.12)
% Unemployed	0.56*	0.15	0.66**	0.31**	0.08	0.71
	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.44)
% College	0.25†	−0.18***	−0.04	−0.26***	−0.26*	−0.23†
	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Log(Property Crime)	0.22***	0.07***		0.01	0.01	0.12***
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.51***	0.34***		0.32***	0.21***	0.44***
	(0.03)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log(Crime)			0.32***			
			(0.02)			
Boundary X % Poverty	−0.07	0.12	0.71**	−0.61***	−0.47*	0.38
	(0.19)	(0.11)	(0.24)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.32)
Physical Boundary	0.04	0.05**	0.09**	0.18***	0.26***	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Commercial Density	0.00	−0.00	0.00*	0.00	0.00**	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.49	0.59	0.39	0.45	0.67	0.31
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$



Figure 8: **Louisville: Influence of Percent White on Logged Arrests by Type (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.**

Table 15: Louisville: Influence of Percent White on Logged Arrests by Type (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.

	Against Persons	Against Property	Against Society
Boundary (White)	0.02	0.09^{*}	$0.11^{\dagger}$
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
% White	-0.12^{***}	-0.12^{**}	-0.13^{*}
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Boundary (SES)	0.02	0.04	0.07
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Log(Population)	0.04^{***}	0.09^{***}	0.06^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00^{***}	0.00^{***}	0.00^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	0.03	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Log(MHHI)	-0.06^{*}	-0.10^{*}	-0.10^{*}
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
% Homeowner	-0.06	$-0.11^{\dagger}$	-0.12
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)
% Poverty	0.17^{*}	$0.20^{\dagger}$	$0.23^{\dagger}$
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.13)
% Unemployed	0.06	0.09	-0.17
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.17)
% College	-0.10^{*}	-0.33^{***}	-0.49^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Boundary * % White	0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Log(Property Crime)	0.04^{***}	0.12^{***}	0.13^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.19^{***}	0.25^{***}	0.28^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
R^2	0.24	0.32	0.27
Num. obs.	7212	7212	7212
N Clusters	540	540	540

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Appendix F Police stops in boundary zones in Austin, Chicago and Milwaukee

F.1 The direct relationship between racial boundaries and police stops

Table 16: Influence of Racial Boundary on Police Stops

	Dependent Variable: Logged Police Stops		
	AUS	CHI	MIL
Boundary (White)	0.46^{***}	0.13^{**}	$0.28^{\dagger}$
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.15)
Boundary (SES)	$0.08^{\dagger}$	0.04	0.35^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.11)
Log(Population)	-0.09^{***}	0.13^{***}	$0.06^{\dagger}$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
% White	-0.25^{***}	-0.21^{***}	-0.86^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.12)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00^{*}	$0.00^{\dagger}$	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.25^{***}	-0.24^{***}	-0.31^{*}
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.12)
Log(MHHI)	0.08	-0.03	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.13)
% Homeowner	-0.30^{***}	-0.18^{***}	-0.23
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.20)
% Poverty	0.58^{**}	0.46^{***}	0.20
	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.28)
% Unemployed	-0.05	0.22^{*}	-0.23
	(0.33)	(0.11)	(0.38)
% College	0.12	-0.18^{**}	-0.61^{**}
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.20)
Log(Property Crime)	0.34^{***}	0.08^{***}	0.13^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.44^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.14^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Physical Boundary	0.41^{***}	0.36^{***}	1.06^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Commercial Density	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.60	0.15	0.30
Num. obs.	7867	35382	5862
N Clusters	572	2228	575

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$



Figure 9: **Influence of Racial Boundary on Police Stops (Standardized).** Annotations denote the robustness value and bounding variable value necessary to attenuate the substantive influence of racial boundaries to 0.

F.2 The impact of crime on police stops in boundary zones

Table 17: Influence of Logged Crime on Logged Stops (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.

	Dependent Variable: Logged Police Stops		
	AUS	CHI	MIL
Boundary (White)	$0.05^{\dagger}$	0.04	0.07
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.11)
Log(Crime)	0.53^{***}	0.35^{***}	0.22^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Boundary (SES)	0.10^{*}	0.04	0.36^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.11)
Log(Population)	-0.08^{***}	0.14^{***}	$0.06^{\dagger}$
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
% White	-0.43^{***}	-0.25^{***}	-0.91^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.12)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00^{***}	$0.00^{\dagger}$	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.38^{***}	-0.24^{***}	-0.30^{*}
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.12)
Log(MHHI)	$0.15^{\dagger}$	-0.04	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.13)
% Homeowner	-0.34^{**}	-0.18^{***}	-0.25
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.20)
% Poverty	0.68^{***}	0.48^{***}	0.20
	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.28)
% Unemployed	-0.03	0.23^{*}	-0.26
	(0.36)	(0.11)	(0.38)
% College	-0.11	-0.35^{***}	-0.67^{**}
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.21)
Boundary X Crime	0.09^{***}	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Physical Boundary	0.44^{***}	0.38^{***}	1.08^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Commercial Density	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.57	0.15	0.30
Num. obs.	7867	35382	5862
N Clusters	572	2228	575

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

F.3 The moderating effect of racial composition of neighborhood on the relationship between racial boundaries and police stops

Table 18: Influence of Percent White on Logged Stops (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	Dependent Variable: Logged Police Stops		
	AUS	CHI	MIL
Boundary (White)	0.12^{*}	0.05	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.10)
% White	-0.29^{***}	-0.19^{***}	-0.93^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.12)
Boundary (SES)	0.09^{*}	0.04	0.36^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.11)
Log(Population)	-0.10^{***}	0.13^{***}	$0.06^{\dagger}$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00^{**}	$0.00^{\dagger}$	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.26^{***}	-0.23^{***}	-0.25^{*}
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.12)
Log(MHHI)	0.07	-0.03	0.06
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.13)
% Homeowner	-0.30^{**}	-0.18^{***}	-0.24
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.20)
% Poverty	0.58^{**}	0.46^{***}	0.18
	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.27)
% Unemployed	-0.02	$0.20^{\dagger}$	-0.30
	(0.33)	(0.11)	(0.38)
% College	0.14	-0.19^{**}	-0.57^{**}
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.20)
Boundary X % White	0.12	-0.00	0.33^{*}
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.16)
Log(Property Crime)	0.34^{***}	0.08^{***}	0.14^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.44^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.13^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Physical Boundary	0.42^{***}	0.36^{***}	1.07^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Commercial Density	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.60	0.15	0.30
Num. obs.	7867	35382	5862
N Clusters	572	2228	575

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$



Figure 10: **Influence of Percent White on Police Stops, Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.**

F.4 Police stops by race of civilian, conditional on neighborhood composition and boundary zone status

Table 19: Influence of Percent White on Police Stops by Race of Civilian, Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	Dependent Variable: Logged Police Stops					
	Non-white	White	Non-white	White	Non-white	White
Boundary (White)	$0.10^{\dagger}$	0.19^{***}	-0.00	0.20^{***}	-0.10	0.21^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.07)
% White	-0.39^{***}	0.16^{**}	-0.41^{***}	0.44^{***}	-1.28^{***}	0.65^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Boundary (SES)	0.09^{*}	0.11^{***}	0.03	$0.04^{\dagger}$	0.29^{**}	0.35^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Log(Population)	-0.09^{***}	-0.08^{***}	0.12^{***}	0.00	0.03	$0.05^{\dagger}$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00^{**}	0.00^{***}	$0.00^{\dagger}$	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.26^{***}	-0.03	-0.28^{***}	0.28^{***}	-0.26^{*}	0.38^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Log(MHHI)	0.15^{*}	0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.15
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.09)
% Homeowner	-0.22^{**}	-0.25^{***}	-0.21^{***}	-0.12^{***}	-0.08	-0.36^{*}
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.16)
% Poverty	0.69^{***}	0.06	0.50^{***}	$0.09^{\dagger}$	0.10	0.20
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.26)	(0.21)
% Unemployed	-0.08	0.19	0.22^{*}	-0.32^{***}	-0.11	-0.84^{***}
	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.36)	(0.25)
% College	$-0.15^{\dagger}$	0.33^{***}	-0.12^{*}	-0.17^{***}	-0.48^{**}	-0.74^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.19)	(0.16)
Boundary * % White	0.11	-0.06	0.11^{*}	-0.28^{***}	0.40^{**}	-0.23^{*}
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.15)	(0.11)
Log(Property Crime)	0.25^{***}	0.23^{***}	0.08^{***}	0.04^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.11^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.44^{***}	0.26^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.11^{***}	0.15^{***}	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Physical Boundary	0.32^{***}	0.32^{***}	0.32^{***}	0.26^{***}	1.00^{***}	0.67^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Commercial Density	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.59	0.47	0.17	0.10	0.34	0.17
Num. obs.	7867	7867	35382	35382	5862	5862
N Clusters	572	572	2228	2228	575	575

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$



Figure 11: **Influence of Percent Poverty on Police Stops by Race of Civilian, Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.**

Table 20: Influence of Percent Poverty on Police Stops by Race of Civilian, Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	Dependent Variable: Logged Police Stops					
	Non-white	White	Non-white	White	Non-white	White
Boundary (White)	0.15^{***}	0.14^{***}	0.05^{*}	$0.03^{\dagger}$	0.22^{*}	0.21^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.07)
% White	-0.34^{***}	0.14^{**}	-0.37^{***}	0.34^{***}	-1.15^{***}	0.61^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Boundary (SES)	0.09^{*}	0.11^{***}	0.04	$0.04^{\dagger}$	0.29^{**}	0.35^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.08)
Log(Population)	-0.09^{***}	-0.08^{***}	0.12^{***}	0.01	0.03	$0.05^{\dagger}$
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00^{*}	0.00^{***}	$0.00^{\dagger}$	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.26^{***}	-0.03	-0.30^{***}	0.31^{***}	-0.29^{*}	0.41^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Log(MHHI)	0.15^{*}	0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.15
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.09)
% Homeowner	-0.22^{**}	-0.25^{***}	-0.21^{***}	-0.12^{***}	-0.08	-0.38^{*}
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.15)
% Poverty	0.69^{***}	0.03	0.51^{***}	0.03	0.22	0.29
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.25)	(0.21)
% Unemployed	-0.08	0.19	0.23^{*}	-0.33^{***}	-0.11	-0.90^{***}
	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.37)	(0.24)
% College	-0.18^{*}	0.34^{***}	-0.13^{*}	-0.15^{***}	-0.56^{**}	-0.73^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.19)	(0.16)
Boundary * % Poverty	0.02	0.12	-0.02	0.28^{**}	-0.54	$-0.46^{\dagger}$
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.35)	(0.26)
Log(Property Crime)	0.25^{***}	0.23^{***}	0.08^{***}	0.04^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.11^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.44^{***}	0.26^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.11^{***}	0.15^{***}	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
R^2	0.59	0.47	0.17	0.10	0.34	0.17
Num. obs.	7867	7867	35382	35382	5862	5862
N Clusters	572	572	2228	2228	575	575

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

Appendix G Pedestrian police stops in boundary zones in Austin and Chicago

G.1 The direct relationship between racial boundaries and pedestrian stops

Table 21: Influence of Racial Boundary on Pedestrian Stops

	Dependent Variable: Logged Pedestrian Stops	
	AUS	CHI
Boundary (White)	0.20^{***}	0.12^{**}
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Boundary (SES)	0.13^{***}	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.04)
Log(Population)	-0.05^{***}	0.11^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
% White	$-0.06^{\dagger}$	$-0.05^{\dagger}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00^{***}	$0.00^{\dagger}$
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.11^{**}	-0.21^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Log(MHHI)	0.14^{***}	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Homeowner	-0.14^{**}	-0.29^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)
% Poverty	$0.14^{\dagger}$	0.45^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.08)
% Unemployed	0.11	0.16
	(0.16)	(0.10)
% College	-0.09^{*}	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Log(Property Crime)	0.16^{***}	0.04^{**}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.23^{***}	0.28^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Physical Boundary	0.25^{***}	0.31^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Commercial Density	$-0.00^{\dagger}$	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.53	0.16
Num. obs.	7867	35382
N Clusters	572	2228

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$



Figure 12: **Influence of Racial Boundary on Police Stops (Standardized).** Annotations denote the robustness value and bounding variable value necessary to attenuate the substantive influence of racial boundaries to 0.

G.2 The impact of crime on pedestrian stops in boundary zones

Table 22: Influence of Logged Crime on Logged Pedestrian Stops (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.

	Dependent Variable: Logged Pedestrian Stops	
	AUS	CHI
Boundary (White)	-0.02	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.06)
Log(Crime)	0.25^{***}	0.32^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Boundary (SES)	0.14^{***}	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.04)
Log(Population)	-0.05^{***}	0.11^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
% White	-0.15^{***}	-0.10^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00^{***}	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.18^{***}	-0.21^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Log(MHHI)	0.18^{***}	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Homeowner	-0.17^{***}	-0.29^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)
% Poverty	0.20^{*}	0.48^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.09)
% Unemployed	0.11	$0.18^{\dagger}$
	(0.18)	(0.10)
% College	-0.22^{***}	-0.21^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Boundary X Crime	0.06^{***}	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Physical Boundary	0.27^{***}	0.33^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Commercial Density	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.49	0.15
Num. obs.	7867	35382
N Clusters	572	2228

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$



Figure 13: **Influence of Logged Crime on Pedestrian Stops, Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.**

G.3 The moderating effect of racial composition of neighborhood on the relationship between racial boundaries and pedestrian stops

Table 23: Influence of Percent White on Logged Pedestrian Stops (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	Dependent Variable: Logged Pedestrian Stops	
	AUS	CHI
Boundary (White)	0.12^{***}	0.07^{*}
	(0.04)	(0.03)
% White	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Boundary (SES)	0.13^{***}	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.04)
Log(Population)	-0.06^{***}	0.11^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00^{***}	$0.00^{\dagger}$
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.11^{*}	-0.20^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Log(MHHI)	0.14^{***}	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Homeowner	-0.14^{**}	-0.29^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)
% Poverty	$0.16^{\dagger}$	0.45^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.08)
% Unemployed	0.12	0.14
	(0.16)	(0.10)
% College	-0.12^{**}	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Boundary X % White	$-0.08^{\dagger}$	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Log(Property Crime)	0.16^{***}	0.04^{**}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.23^{***}	0.28^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Physical Boundary	0.26^{***}	0.31^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Commercial Density	$-0.00^{\dagger}$	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.53	0.16
Num. obs.	7867	35382
N Clusters	572	2228

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$



Figure 14: **Influence of Percent White on Pedestrian Stops, Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.**

G.4 Pedestrian stops by race of civilian, conditional on neighborhood composition and boundary zone status

Table 24: Influence of Percent White on Pedestrian Stops by Race of Civilian, Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	Dependent Variable: Logged Pedestrian Stops			
	Non-white	White	Non-white	White
Boundary (White)	0.11^{**}	0.08^{**}	0.01	0.17^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
% White	-0.08^{*}	0.13^{***}	-0.21^{***}	0.37^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Boundary (SES)	0.09^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.04	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Log(Population)	-0.04^{***}	-0.05^{***}	0.10^{***}	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00^{***}	0.00^{***}	$0.00^{\dagger}$	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.13^{***}	0.03	-0.25^{***}	0.21^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Log(MHHI)	0.15^{***}	0.06^{**}	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
% Homeowner	-0.10^{*}	-0.09^{*}	-0.31^{***}	-0.10^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
% Poverty	0.22^{**}	-0.07	0.48^{***}	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.05)
% Unemployed	0.01	0.12	$0.17^{\dagger}$	-0.26^{***}
	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.05)
% College	-0.22^{***}	0.02	0.02	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Boundary * % White	$-0.09^{\dagger}$	$-0.07^{\dagger}$	0.04	-0.23^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Log(Property Crime)	0.10^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.03^{*}	0.03^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.21^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.10^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Physical Boundary	0.17^{***}	0.16^{***}	0.25^{***}	0.22^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Commercial Density	-0.00^{*}	-0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.48	0.36	0.18	0.10
Num. obs.	7867	7867	35382	35382
N Clusters	572	572	2228	2228

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$



Figure 15: **Influence of Percent White on Pedestrian Stops by Race of Civilian, Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.**

G.5 Correlation Between Arrests And Crime

Table 25: **Correlation Between Logged Misdemeanor Arrests and Logged Crime Across Cities**

City	Crime Type	Pearson's Rho
Atlanta	All Crime	0.55
Atlanta	Violent Crime	0.55
Atlanta	Property Crime	0.54
Austin	All Crime	0.65
Austin	Violent Crime	0.73
Austin	Property Crime	0.63
Boston	All Crime	0.57
Chicago	All Crime	0.61
Chicago	Violent Crime	0.66
Chicago	Property Crime	0.54
Milwaukee	All Crime	0.59
Milwaukee	Violent Crime	0.67
Milwaukee	Property Crime	0.56
Seattle	All Crime	0.31
Seattle	Violent Crime	0.34
Seattle	Property Crime	0.30

Appendix H City Boundary Maps



Figure 16: Atlanta White Racial Boundaries



Figure 17: Austin White Racial Boundaries



Figure 18: Boston White Racial Boundaries



Figure 19: Chicago White Racial Boundaries



Figure 20: Louisville White Racial Boundaries



Figure 21: Seattle White Racial Boundaries

Figure 22: White Racial Boundaries Maps by City

Appendix I Negative Binomial and Count Outcome Models

Table 27: Neg. Binomial Model: White/Non-White Racial Geographic Boundaries Are Associated With Felony Arrests

	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL
Racial Boundary	0.258	0.596***	0.624***	−0.298***	−0.008
	(0.231)	(0.172)	(0.164)	(0.078)	(0.176)
Log(Population)	−0.045	−0.038	0.228***	−0.090**	0.083
	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.070)
% White	−0.738**	−0.961***	−1.013***	−0.727***	−1.715***
	(0.245)	(0.158)	(0.160)	(0.066)	(0.132)
Age 15-35 Male	0.000	−0.001	−0.002**	0.005**	0.004*
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Diversity	0.437*	0.133	−0.151	−0.504***	−0.643***
	(0.192)	(0.189)	(0.180)	(0.103)	(0.100)
Log(MHHI)	0.265	0.263	−0.050	−0.015	0.038
	(0.293)	(0.202)	(0.135)	(0.082)	(0.109)
% Poverty	1.159+	0.559	0.628+	0.823***	0.337
	(0.601)	(0.347)	(0.367)	(0.228)	(0.228)
% Homeowner	−0.496+	−0.381*	−0.649**	−0.900***	−1.133***
	(0.262)	(0.179)	(0.247)	(0.112)	(0.274)
% Unemployed	1.714***	0.347	0.811+	0.220	0.048
	(0.497)	(0.590)	(0.422)	(0.236)	(0.255)
% College	0.461	−0.429*	0.294	−0.342**	−0.204
	(0.443)	(0.189)	(0.241)	(0.132)	(0.311)
Log(Property Crime)	0.676***	0.418***		0.046	−0.013
	(0.052)	(0.039)		(0.052)	(0.030)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.785***	0.671***		0.604***	0.273***
	(0.081)	(0.041)		(0.043)	(0.038)
Log(Crime)			0.515***		
			(0.036)		
Physical Boundary	0.250**	0.113+	0.215*	0.352***	0.417***
	(0.081)	(0.063)	(0.088)	(0.053)	(0.069)
Commercial Density	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.000)	(0.003)
Num.Obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862
R2	0.243	0.261	0.087	0.138	0.110
Std.Errors	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE

Table 28: Binary Outome Model: White/Non-White Racial Geographic Boundaries Are Associated With Misdemeanor Arrests

	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Racial Boundary	0.10^{*}	0.10^{***}	0.10^{**}	0.04^{**}	0.03	0.12^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
SES Boundary	0.06	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.02	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Log(Population)	-0.02^{*}	-0.02^{***}	0.07^{***}	0.02^{***}	0.03^{***}	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% White	-0.05	-0.15^{***}		-0.20^{***}	-0.11^{***}	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Age 15-35 Male	-0.00	-0.00^{*}	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	0.07	-0.06^{*}	0.15^{***}	-0.01	0.05^{**}	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log(MHHI)	0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
% Poverty	0.00	0.09	0.10	0.01	0.01	-0.00
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
% Homeowner	-0.13^{*}	-0.02	-0.18^{**}	-0.17^{***}	-0.05^{*}	-0.11^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Unemployed	0.19^{*}	-0.07	0.09	-0.00	0.00	0.13
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.10)
% College	0.10	-0.02	-0.10^{*}	-0.08^{***}	0.03	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Log(Property Crime)	0.12^{***}	0.07^{***}		-0.02^{***}	0.02^{***}	0.03^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.16^{***}	0.16^{***}		0.11^{***}	-0.01	0.06^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Log(Crime)			0.10^{***}			
			(0.01)			
Physical Boundary	0.05^{**}	0.04^{*}	0.02	0.09^{***}	0.02^{**}	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Commercial Density	-0.00	0.00	0.00^{***}	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.29	0.40	0.25	0.23	0.11	0.15
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 29: Binary Outome Model: White/Non-White Racial Geographic Boundaries Are Associated With Felony Arrests

	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
SES Boundary	0.09	−0.00	−0.01	0.00	0.05*	−0.02
	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Racial Boundary	0.05	0.07**	0.11**	0.01	0.05	0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Log(Population)	−0.01*	0.01	0.07***	0.01*	0.04***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% White	−0.07	−0.16***	−0.30***	−0.27***	−0.29***	−0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Age 15-35 Male	−0.00	−0.00***	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	0.04	−0.06*	−0.03	−0.12***	0.14***	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Log(MHHI)	−0.06	0.02	0.06*	0.01	−0.03	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
% Poverty	−0.04	0.10	0.16	0.10**	−0.01	0.00
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.09)
% Homeowner	0.01	−0.06*	−0.19***	−0.21***	−0.12**	−0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
% Unemployed	0.23*	0.04	0.25*	0.09**	0.00	0.16
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.14)
% College	0.01	−0.10**	−0.01	−0.09***	0.02	−0.06
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Log(Property Crime)	0.13***	0.07***		−0.01	0.04***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.16***	0.18***		0.12***	−0.00	0.12***
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log(Crime)			0.12***			
			(0.01)			
Physical Boundary	0.02	0.04**	0.02	0.11***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Commercial Density	0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00	0.00	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.32	0.41	0.28	0.30	0.24	0.27
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 30: Neg. Binomial Model: Crime Moderation Analysis for White/Non-White Boundaries and Misdemeanor Arrests

	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Boundary (White)	0.393	0.660^{***}	0.212	-0.008	0.014	0.056
	(0.441)	(0.145)	(0.274)	(0.095)	(0.106)	(0.698)
SES Boundary	1.782^{***}	-0.168	0.039	0.192^{***}	0.341^{**}	0.475
	(0.453)	(0.184)	(0.205)	(0.057)	(0.114)	(0.550)
Log(Crime)	1.250^{***}	1.163^{***}	0.502^{***}	0.621^{***}	0.215^{***}	0.626^{***}
	(0.082)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.119)
Log(Population)	-0.044	-0.231^{***}	0.215^{***}	-0.074^{***}	0.091^{+}	-0.061
	(0.055)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.021)	(0.053)	(0.137)
% White	-0.820^{*}	-1.318^{***}	-1.031^{***}	-0.606^{***}	-1.544^{***}	0.712
	(0.337)	(0.165)	(0.152)	(0.051)	(0.117)	(0.559)
Age 15-35 Male	0.002	0.000	-0.001^{*}	0.008^{***}	0.006^{**}	0.022^{**}
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.008)
Diversity	0.298	0.231	-0.103	-0.249^{***}	-0.477^{***}	0.562
	(0.379)	(0.243)	(0.150)	(0.060)	(0.109)	(0.877)
Log(MHHI)	0.556^{+}	-0.013	-0.004	-0.014	-0.043	-0.294
	(0.297)	(0.209)	(0.115)	(0.051)	(0.114)	(0.515)
% Poverty	1.653^{*}	0.421	0.737^{*}	0.372^{**}	0.445^{+}	-0.489
	(0.703)	(0.420)	(0.325)	(0.122)	(0.233)	(1.957)
% Homeowner	-1.072^{**}	-0.332^{+}	-0.592^{**}	-0.996^{***}	-1.264^{***}	-3.283^{***}
	(0.374)	(0.198)	(0.226)	(0.073)	(0.225)	(0.814)
% Unemployed	1.305^{*}	-0.341	0.741^{+}	0.322^{*}	-0.183	6.144^{**}
	(0.584)	(0.802)	(0.384)	(0.136)	(0.283)	(2.378)
% College	0.167	-0.297	0.081	-0.507^{***}	-0.776^{**}	-0.039
	(0.506)	(0.211)	(0.233)	(0.097)	(0.254)	(0.903)
Physical Boundary	0.556^{***}	0.115	0.165^{*}	0.460^{***}	0.508^{***}	-0.146
	(0.155)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.043)	(0.062)	(0.243)
Commercial Density	-0.002	0.000	0.023^{+}	0.000	0.006^{+}	0.012
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.009)
BoundaryXCrime	-0.027	-0.102^{**}	0.012	0.014	0.017	0.127
	(0.133)	(0.037)	(0.075)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.187)
Num.Obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
R2	0.179	0.251	0.081	0.117	0.087	0.040
Std.Errors	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE

Table 31: Neg. Binomial Model: Crime Moderation Analysis for White/Non-White Boundaries and Felony Arrests

	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
SES Boundary	1.401^{**}	-0.236^{+}	-0.180	0.143^{+}	0.011	-0.059
	(0.428)	(0.134)	(0.220)	(0.084)	(0.097)	(0.264)
Boundary (White)	0.328	0.474^{***}	0.133	-0.140	-0.069	0.535^{+}
	(0.319)	(0.140)	(0.312)	(0.117)	(0.113)	(0.320)
Log(Crime)	1.049^{***}	0.959^{***}	0.503^{***}	0.647^{***}	0.198^{***}	0.503^{***}
	(0.067)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.057)
Log(Population)	0.033	-0.030	0.218^{***}	-0.079^{*}	0.069	0.277^{***}
	(0.045)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.076)	(0.079)
% White	-1.017^{***}	-1.299^{***}	-0.954^{***}	-0.951^{***}	-1.876^{***}	-0.048
	(0.248)	(0.153)	(0.155)	(0.069)	(0.133)	(0.263)
Age 15-35 Male	0.000	0.000	-0.002^{*}	0.005^{**}	0.005^{*}	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Diversity	0.067	0.093	-0.049	-0.563^{***}	-0.714^{***}	0.575
	(0.218)	(0.194)	(0.180)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.421)
Log(MHHI)	0.352	0.356	-0.047	-0.058	0.020	-0.306
	(0.310)	(0.217)	(0.132)	(0.082)	(0.113)	(0.245)
% Poverty	1.795^{**}	0.681^{+}	0.608	0.831^{***}	0.377	-0.408
	(0.666)	(0.351)	(0.370)	(0.221)	(0.237)	(0.777)
% Homeowner	-0.601^{*}	-0.349^{+}	-0.642^{**}	-0.932^{***}	-1.199^{***}	-1.012^{**}
	(0.279)	(0.187)	(0.244)	(0.114)	(0.289)	(0.362)
% Unemployed	1.834^{***}	0.431	0.790^{+}	0.365	0.142	3.773^{**}
	(0.507)	(0.619)	(0.419)	(0.242)	(0.268)	(1.346)
% College	0.188	-0.626^{**}	0.283	-0.713^{***}	-0.380	-0.299
	(0.460)	(0.192)	(0.242)	(0.124)	(0.335)	(0.452)
Physical Boundary	0.312^{***}	0.064	0.210^{*}	0.361^{***}	0.433^{***}	0.165
	(0.093)	(0.063)	(0.088)	(0.052)	(0.072)	(0.119)
Commercial Density	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.001	0.007^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.001)
BoundaryXCrime	-0.031	-0.047	0.043	0.011	0.026	-0.057
	(0.101)	(0.039)	(0.084)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.086)
Num.Obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
R2	0.228	0.255	0.086	0.135	0.107	0.029
Std.Errors	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE

Table 32: Binary Outcome: Crime Moderation Analysis for White/Non-White Boundaries and Misdemeanor Arrests

	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
SES Boundary	0.06	0.01	0.01	−0.00	0.02	−0.00
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Boundary (White)	0.00	0.01	0.01	−0.10***	−0.01	−0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log(Crime)	0.17***	0.15***	0.10***	0.09***	0.02***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Log(Population)	−0.01	−0.01*	0.07***	0.03***	0.03***	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% White	−0.07	−0.22***	−0.26***	−0.22***	−0.10***	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Age 15-35 Male	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	0.01	−0.11***	0.03	−0.02	0.06***	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log(MHHI)	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.01	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
% Poverty	0.07	0.13	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
% Homeowner	−0.15**	−0.04	−0.14*	−0.18***	−0.06*	−0.13***
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Unemployed	0.22*	−0.06	0.09	0.02	−0.00	0.14
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.10)
% College	0.05	−0.10**	−0.03	−0.18***	0.04	−0.01
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Physical Boundary	0.06**	0.04**	0.03	0.10***	0.02**	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Commercial Density	−0.00	0.00	0.00***	0.00***	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
BoundaryXCrime	0.02	0.02***	0.01	0.03***	0.00	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.26	0.37	0.26	0.23	0.11	0.13
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 33: Binary Outcome Model: Crime Moderation Analysis for White/Non-White Boundaries and Felony Arrests

	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
SES Boundary	0.09	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.05^{*}	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Boundary (White)	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.05^{*}	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Log(Crime)	0.19^{***}	0.16^{***}	0.12^{***}	0.11^{***}	0.03^{***}	0.09^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Log(Population)	-0.01	0.01^{*}	0.07^{***}	0.02^{***}	0.04^{***}	0.06^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% White	-0.09^{*}	-0.24^{***}	-0.31^{***}	-0.30^{***}	-0.28^{***}	-0.26^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Age 15-35 Male	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.02	-0.11^{***}	-0.02	-0.13^{***}	0.15^{***}	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Log(MHHI)	-0.04	0.06^{**}	0.06^{*}	0.01	-0.03	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
% Poverty	0.03	0.14^{*}	0.16	0.11^{***}	-0.01	0.04
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.09)
% Homeowner	-0.01	-0.07^{*}	-0.19^{***}	-0.21^{***}	-0.12^{**}	-0.20^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
% Unemployed	0.26^{*}	0.05	0.26^{*}	0.12^{***}	-0.01	0.20
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.15)
% College	-0.04	-0.19^{***}	-0.01	-0.18^{***}	0.03	-0.12^{*}
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Physical Boundary	0.02	0.04^{**}	0.03	0.12^{***}	0.05^{***}	0.05^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Commercial Density	0.00^{***}	0.00	0.00^{***}	0.00^{***}	0.00	0.00^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
BoundaryXCrime	-0.00	0.02^{**}	0.01	0.02^{**}	0.01	0.02^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.30	0.38	0.28	0.29	0.23	0.25
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 34: Neg. Binomial Model: Influence of Logged Crime on Logged Stops (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.

	AUS	CHI	MIL
Boundary (White)	0.772^{***}	-0.160	0.122
	(0.182)	(0.137)	(0.192)
Log(Crime)	1.144^{***}	0.526^{***}	0.175^{***}
	(0.039)	(0.018)	(0.032)
Boundary (SES)	-0.096	0.319^{***}	0.853^{**}
	(0.164)	(0.083)	(0.301)
Log(Population)	-0.229^{***}	-0.096^{***}	0.071
	(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.068)
% White	-0.766^{***}	-0.725^{***}	-0.820^{***}
	(0.192)	(0.084)	(0.215)
Age 15-35 Male	-0.001	0.009^{***}	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Diversity	-0.422^{*}	-0.275^{***}	0.583^{**}
	(0.215)	(0.080)	(0.200)
Log(MHHI)	-0.141	-0.097	-0.099
	(0.198)	(0.070)	(0.225)
% Homeowner	-1.064^{***}	-0.936^{***}	0.231
	(0.258)	(0.109)	(0.406)
% Poverty	0.347	0.787^{***}	-0.111
	(0.525)	(0.178)	(0.476)
% Unemployed	-0.973	0.371^{+}	-0.254
	(0.955)	(0.212)	(0.597)
% College	0.476	-0.552^{***}	-0.918^{*}
	(0.348)	(0.131)	(0.407)
Physical Boundary	0.730^{***}	0.562^{***}	1.036^{***}
	(0.099)	(0.060)	(0.088)
Commercial Density	-0.001	0.000	0.007
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.007)
Boundary X Crime	-0.143^{*}	0.052	0.027
	(0.058)	(0.034)	(0.049)
Num.Obs.	7867	35382	5862
R2	0.147	0.033	0.026
Std.Errors	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE

Table 35: Binary Outome Model: Influence of Logged Crime on Logged Stops (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status.

	AUS	CHI	MIL
Boundary (White)	0.09^{***}	-0.04	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log(Crime)	0.20^{***}	0.06^{***}	0.06^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Boundary (SES)	-0.02	-0.02	0.12^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Log(Population)	-0.02^{***}	0.06^{***}	0.03^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
% White	-0.17^{***}	-0.04^{***}	-0.27^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Age 15-35 Male	-0.00^{***}	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	-0.08^{*}	-0.00	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Log(MHHI)	-0.05	-0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.04)
% Homeowner	-0.13^{***}	0.10^{***}	-0.22^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.06)
% Poverty	0.21^{**}	0.01	-0.00
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.07)
% Unemployed	-0.07	0.03	-0.02
	(0.16)	(0.03)	(0.09)
% College	0.13^{**}	-0.07^{***}	0.00
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Physical Boundary	0.13^{***}	0.09^{***}	0.14^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Commercial Density	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Boundary X Crime	-0.01^{*}	0.01^{**}	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.40	0.05	0.23
Num. obs.	7867	35382	5862
N Clusters	572	2228	575

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 36: Neg. Binomial Model: Influence of Percent White on Logged Misdemeanor Arrests (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Boundary (White)	0.490^{+}	0.024	-0.071	-0.239^{***}	-0.278^{**}	1.200^{*}
	(0.261)	(0.162)	(0.117)	(0.064)	(0.095)	(0.535)
% White	-0.884^{*}	-2.667^{***}	-1.537^{***}	-1.252^{***}	-2.020^{***}	1.146
	(0.395)	(0.285)	(0.229)	(0.115)	(0.127)	(0.837)
Log(Population)	0.279^{***}	0.028	0.298^{***}	-0.062	0.130^{*}	-0.312^{*}
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.152)
Age 15-35 Male	0.010^{**}	0.007^{***}	-0.001	0.014^{***}	0.008^{**}	0.029^{**}
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)
Diversity	0.143	0.524^{+}	-0.026	-0.300^{*}	-0.421^{**}	0.816
	(0.361)	(0.289)	(0.195)	(0.145)	(0.129)	(0.859)
Log(MHHI)	0.298	0.006	0.165	-0.018	0.014	-0.228
	(0.344)	(0.379)	(0.175)	(0.078)	(0.125)	(0.493)
% Poverty	2.088^{*}	0.786	1.202^{**}	0.806^{***}	0.471^{+}	-0.784
	(0.831)	(0.626)	(0.456)	(0.198)	(0.262)	(2.079)
% Homeowner	-1.919^{***}	-2.277^{***}	-1.360^{***}	-1.824^{***}	-1.528^{***}	-4.357^{***}
	(0.481)	(0.422)	(0.337)	(0.109)	(0.264)	(0.787)
% Unemployed	0.142	-1.600	0.798	0.885^{***}	-0.215	4.924
	(0.811)	(1.156)	(0.556)	(0.249)	(0.329)	(3.285)
% College	-0.244	0.307	0.191	0.509^{**}	-0.500^{+}	-0.589
	(0.652)	(0.360)	(0.341)	(0.170)	(0.273)	(1.000)
Physical Boundary	1.051^{***}	0.904^{***}	0.233^{**}	0.743^{***}	0.620^{***}	0.153
	(0.159)	(0.102)	(0.083)	(0.065)	(0.081)	(0.249)
Commercial Density	0.006	0.010^{+}	0.030^{*}	0.003^{+}	0.008	0.033
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.031)
Boundary X % White	0.761^{+}	1.353^{***}	0.832^{***}	0.445^{**}	0.767^{***}	-0.798
	(0.458)	(0.310)	(0.240)	(0.156)	(0.219)	(0.949)
Num.Obs.	3963	7867	4453	36824	5862	7438
R2	0.102	0.121	0.052	0.062	0.075	0.026
Std.Errors	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE

Table 37: Neg. Binomial Model: Influence of Percent White on Logged Felony Arrests (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Boundary (White)	0.463^{*}	0.059	-0.049	-0.498^{***}	-0.374^{***}	0.211
	(0.228)	(0.143)	(0.115)	(0.079)	(0.087)	(0.261)
% White	-0.988^{**}	-2.373^{***}	-1.472^{***}	-1.702^{***}	-2.362^{***}	-0.721^{+}
	(0.322)	(0.306)	(0.217)	(0.140)	(0.118)	(0.399)
Log(Population)	0.361^{***}	0.177^{**}	0.306^{***}	-0.034	0.106	0.227^{**}
	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.074)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Age 15-35 Male	0.005	0.006^{***}	-0.001	0.010^{***}	0.007^{**}	0.010^{**}
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Diversity	0.144	0.184	-0.009	-0.549^{**}	-0.679^{***}	0.334
	(0.315)	(0.252)	(0.207)	(0.174)	(0.121)	(0.439)
Log(MHHI)	0.308	0.319	0.083	-0.086	0.090	-0.120
	(0.326)	(0.345)	(0.190)	(0.107)	(0.122)	(0.278)
% Poverty	2.037^{**}	0.881^{+}	1.040^{*}	1.300^{***}	0.419	0.046
	(0.744)	(0.529)	(0.488)	(0.284)	(0.260)	(0.963)
% Homeowner	-1.644^{***}	-1.939^{***}	-1.338^{***}	-1.711^{***}	-1.502^{***}	-1.815^{***}
	(0.340)	(0.364)	(0.326)	(0.146)	(0.332)	(0.373)
% Unemployed	1.348^{*}	-0.224	0.852	0.796^{**}	0.078	3.391^{*}
	(0.616)	(1.029)	(0.553)	(0.290)	(0.305)	(1.504)
% College	-0.193	-0.181	0.406	0.302	-0.072	-0.277
	(0.514)	(0.325)	(0.332)	(0.196)	(0.338)	(0.477)
Physical Boundary	0.836^{***}	0.676^{***}	0.243^{**}	0.626^{***}	0.543^{***}	0.202
	(0.136)	(0.079)	(0.089)	(0.070)	(0.088)	(0.125)
Commercial Density	0.004	0.003^{*}	0.025	0.002	0.003	0.006^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.019)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Boundary X % White	0.308	0.995^{**}	0.946^{***}	0.745^{***}	0.896^{**}	0.427
	(0.403)	(0.317)	(0.252)	(0.187)	(0.280)	(0.410)
Num.Obs.	3963	7867	4453	36824	5862	7438
R2	0.140	0.137	0.055	0.086	0.095	0.020
Std.Errors	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE

Table 38: Binary Outome Model: Influence of Percent White on Logged Midemeanor Arrests (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Boundary (White)	0.06	0.02	-0.03	-0.03^{***}	0.00	0.08^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
SES Boundary	0.06	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
% White	-0.04	-0.16^{***}	-0.30^{***}	-0.23^{***}	-0.11^{***}	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log(Population)	-0.02^{*}	-0.02^{***}	0.07^{***}	0.02^{***}	0.03^{***}	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age 15-35 Male	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	0.08^{*}	-0.07^{*}	0.04	0.01	0.06^{***}	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Log(MHHI)	0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
% Poverty	0.01	0.09	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
% Homeowner	-0.13^{*}	-0.02	-0.14^{*}	-0.17^{***}	-0.06^{*}	-0.11^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Unemployed	0.19^{*}	-0.07	0.07	-0.02	-0.00	0.13
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.10)
% College	0.11	-0.01	-0.01	-0.07^{***}	0.03	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Log(Property Crime)	0.12^{***}	0.07^{***}		-0.02^{***}	0.02^{***}	0.03^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.16^{***}	0.16^{***}		0.11^{***}	-0.01	0.06^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Log(Crime)			0.10^{***}			
			(0.01)			
Physical Boundary	0.05^{**}	0.04^{**}	0.03	0.09^{***}	0.02^{**}	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Commercial Density	-0.00	0.00	0.00^{***}	0.00^{***}	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Boundary X % White	-0.02	0.05	0.14^{**}	0.11^{***}	-0.00	-0.08^{*}
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
R^2	0.29	0.40	0.26	0.24	0.11	0.14
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 39: Binary Outome Model: Influence of Percent White on Logged Felony Arrests (Standardized), Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	ATL	AUS	BOS	CHI	MIL	SEA
Boundary (White)	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.05^{***}	-0.04^{**}	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
SES Boundary	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05^{*}	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
% White	-0.06	-0.19^{***}	-0.34^{***}	-0.31^{***}	-0.31^{***}	-0.32^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Log(Population)	-0.02^{*}	0.01	0.07^{***}	0.01^{***}	0.04^{***}	0.07^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age 15-35 Male	-0.00	-0.00^{***}	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00^{*}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	0.05	-0.06^{*}	-0.01	-0.10^{***}	0.16^{***}	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Log(MHHI)	-0.06	0.02	0.06^{*}	0.01	-0.03	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
% Poverty	-0.03	0.09	0.15	0.09^{**}	-0.01	0.01
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.08)
% Homeowner	0.01	-0.06^{*}	-0.19^{***}	-0.21^{***}	-0.12^{**}	-0.18^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
% Unemployed	0.23^{*}	0.05	0.24^{*}	0.08^{*}	-0.01	0.14
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.13)
% College	0.02	-0.08^{*}	0.01	-0.08^{***}	0.03	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Log(Property Crime)	0.13^{***}	0.07^{***}		-0.01	0.04^{***}	0.03^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.16^{***}	0.18^{***}		0.12^{***}	-0.00	0.13^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log(Crime)			0.12^{***}			
			(0.01)			
Physical Boundary	0.02	0.04^{**}	0.02	0.11^{***}	0.05^{***}	0.05^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Commercial Density	0.00^{***}	0.00	0.00^{***}	0.00^{***}	0.00	0.00^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Boundary X % White	0.01	0.09^{**}	0.14^{**}	0.13^{***}	0.11^{**}	0.16^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
R^2	0.32	0.41	0.28	0.30	0.24	0.27
Num. obs.	3963	7867	4098	35382	5862	7438
N Clusters	292	572	540	2228	575	483

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 40: Negative Binomial Model: Influence of Percent White on Police Stops by Race of Civilian, Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	AUS: White	AUS: Nonwhite	CHI: White	CHI: Nonwhite	MIL: White	MIL: Nonwhite
Boundary (White)	0.765^{*}	-0.020	0.719^{***}	-0.188^{**}	0.622^{***}	-0.142
	(0.327)	(0.160)	(0.086)	(0.059)	(0.186)	(0.178)
% White	0.455^{+}	-1.373^{***}	1.901^{***}	-1.248^{***}	1.630^{***}	-1.585^{***}
	(0.245)	(0.215)	(0.153)	(0.092)	(0.258)	(0.250)
Boundary (SES)	0.016	-0.140	0.187^{+}	0.309^{***}	1.001^{***}	0.858^{**}
	(0.203)	(0.165)	(0.103)	(0.086)	(0.300)	(0.311)
Log(Population)	-0.167^{***}	-0.281^{***}	-0.186^{***}	-0.109^{***}	0.057	0.061
	(0.050)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.078)	(0.070)
Age 15-35 Male	-0.002^{+}	-0.002^{***}	0.008^{***}	0.010^{***}	0.004	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Diversity	-0.372	-0.001	1.013^{***}	-0.250^{**}	1.297^{***}	0.823^{***}
	(0.261)	(0.218)	(0.107)	(0.077)	(0.222)	(0.216)
Log(MHHI)	-0.248	-0.075	0.064	-0.033	0.292	-0.217
	(0.233)	(0.186)	(0.097)	(0.070)	(0.266)	(0.226)
% Homeowner	-1.182^{***}	-0.944^{***}	-0.942^{***}	-0.967^{***}	-0.310	0.393
	(0.311)	(0.257)	(0.162)	(0.109)	(0.470)	(0.409)
% Poverty	-0.153	0.781	0.534^{+}	0.836^{***}	0.096	-0.348
	(0.655)	(0.530)	(0.304)	(0.173)	(0.519)	(0.482)
% Unemployed	-0.567	-0.751	-1.659^{***}	0.314	-1.806^{**}	-0.194
	(1.216)	(0.909)	(0.347)	(0.214)	(0.654)	(0.610)
% College	1.279^{**}	0.026	-1.129^{***}	0.017	-1.596^{***}	-0.568
	(0.403)	(0.303)	(0.178)	(0.129)	(0.461)	(0.421)
Physical Boundary	0.743^{***}	0.643^{***}	0.741^{***}	0.453^{***}	0.983^{***}	1.041^{***}
	(0.129)	(0.086)	(0.073)	(0.056)	(0.095)	(0.092)
Commercial Density	0.000	-0.001	0.001^{**}	0.000	0.007	0.008
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.009)
Log(Property Crime)	0.739^{***}	0.805^{***}	0.040	0.003	0.160^{*}	0.042
	(0.080)	(0.059)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.063)	(0.062)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.488^{***}	0.491^{***}	0.475^{***}	0.553^{***}	0.100	0.179^{**}
	(0.103)	(0.061)	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.068)	(0.063)
Boundary * % White	-0.459	0.879^{***}	-1.068^{***}	0.525^{***}	-0.660^{*}	0.791^{*}
	(0.438)	(0.266)	(0.169)	(0.126)	(0.329)	(0.323)
Num.Obs.	7867	7867	35382	35382	5862	5862
R2	0.147	0.173	0.045	0.040	0.041	0.035
Std.Errors	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE	by: BG_CODE

Table 41: Binary Outcome Model: Influence of Percent White on Police Stops by Race of Civilian, Conditional on Racial Boundary Status

	AUS: White	AUS: Nonwhite	MIL: White	MIL: Nonwhite	CHI: White	CHI: Nonwhite
Boundary (White)	0.07^{**}	0.01	0.10^{***}	-0.07^{**}	0.11^{***}	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% White	-0.00	-0.26^{***}	0.22^{***}	-0.42^{***}	0.28^{***}	-0.11^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Boundary (SES)	0.03	-0.02	0.17^{***}	0.15^{***}	$0.03^{\cdot}$	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log(Population)	-0.03^{***}	-0.03^{***}	0.02	$0.01^{\cdot}$	0.02^{***}	0.06^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Age 15-35 Male	0.00	-0.00^{***}	0.00	0.00^{*}	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Diversity	$-0.07^{\cdot}$	-0.08^{*}	0.13^{**}	0.01	0.16^{***}	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Log(MHHI)	$-0.05^{\cdot}$	-0.01	0.07	0.02	0.03^{*}	-0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)
% Homeowner	-0.11^{**}	-0.11^{**}	-0.29^{***}	-0.23^{***}	-0.08^{***}	0.07^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)
% Poverty	0.09	0.26^{***}	0.12	-0.01	0.10^{***}	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Unemployed	0.07	-0.03	-0.47^{***}	-0.07	-0.18^{***}	0.02
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% College	0.26^{***}	0.01	-0.21^{**}	0.01	-0.18^{***}	$-0.04^{\cdot}$
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Boundary * % White	0.01	0.14^{***}	-0.13^{*}	0.15^{***}	-0.18^{***}	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Log(Property Crime)	0.14^{***}	0.15^{***}	0.06^{***}	0.05^{***}	0.02^{***}	0.05^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Log(Violent Crime)	0.09^{***}	0.10^{***}	0.02^{*}	0.02	0.05^{***}	0.02^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
R^2	0.34	0.42	0.09	0.26	0.07	0.06
Num. obs.	7867	7867	5862	5862	35382	35382
N Clusters	572	572	575	575	2228	2228

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$