

Supplementary Information (SI) Part 1: Article Selection and Coding

Article selection

The aim of this systematic review is to investigate two main research questions:

- What is the average effect of partisanship on economic inequality?
- Which intermediate factors affect partisan effects on economic inequality?

To begin, we identify the population of studies that may be analyzed to answer these research questions. When identifying the relevant study population, we closely follow guidelines proposed for systematic reviews and meta-analyses (Higgins and Green 2008). We selected studies on the following criteria:

1. A study must report a **regression coefficient** from a Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) regression analysis along with an inference statistic (e.g., standard error, *t*-value, *p*-value, confidence interval). The minimum length of a time series is ten years. There is a minimum number of ten OECD countries per regression analysis. These criteria increase comparability across articles, which is a key precondition for the quantitative analyses.
2. The **dependent variable** has to measure economic inequality defined as wage inequality (based on income before taxes and transfers) or disposable-income inequality (after taxes and transfers) or changes thereof (differences in pre- and post-tax and transfer inequality).
3. The main **explanatory variable** of interest is the partisan composition of (national) governments (or in a few cases (the lower houses of) national parliaments). We only retain studies/models that present a direct test of partisanship on inequality (thus we exclude interactions of partisanship with another explanatory variable).
4. We only include studies published in **English**.

Search of relevant articles

To identify studies meeting our criteria, we started out by collecting studies through the Web of Knowledge and ProQuest electronic databases. We restricted the search to journal articles.

We further restricted the search to English publications published since January 1st, 1990. We collected our final sample on 17 May 2021.

We used the following search string to identify 2,692 unique (excluding duplicates) studies:

(inequal* OR unequal* OR redistribut* OR distribut* OR ‘income share’ OR ‘top income’) AND (parties OR partisan* OR party OR ideolog* OR political OR politics OR democra* OR government OR cabinet)

De-selection based on title and abstract

In a next step, we checked the titles and abstracts of the potentially relevant articles. We rejected all articles that obviously were unrelated to the focus of our study. Simple exclusions were country studies (e.g.. on wage inequality in US states), different geographic subsamples (Latin America), or studies pertaining only to particular aspects of inequality (e.g. education).

Selection based on full articles

For the remaining articles, we checked whether a study met our criteria based on the full article. Thereby, we obtained a sample of 23 relevant articles.

Extension of the sample

To extend the sample we ran two distinct snowball searches: i) we checked all references cited in the articles we initially retained and ii) inspected all articles citing one of the articles from our initial sample in the Web of Science or ProQuest. We repeated these steps until we could not retrieve any new relevant articles. Thereby, we identified 18 *additional* studies.

Final sample

The final sample contains 43 articles (see below). We then collected the regression results, and other relevant information (see below) from these studies. Thereby, we obtained 393 results on partisan effects on inequality. Table A2 lists all included studies, the number of estimates per study, and further details of the studies.

Reference

Higgins Julian P.T., Green Sally. 2008. *Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions*. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell.

43 STUDIES USED FOR THE SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

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Coding of articles

The relevant information from the studies was coded by the authors. Along with the results and coefficient for the statistical association and the associated standard error (or p-values), we collected information about the direction of the effect, the number of observations, the time series included, the number of variables and policy channels, the name of the data set, the type of inequality, the conceptualization and status of partisan effects, and all variables included in the model. Most information we use was easy to retain in a reliable way (e.g. the coefficients). An exceptional aspect that is susceptible to subjective categorizations is the type of policy channel (if it is included), which was subject of lengthy debates and exchange with many colleagues (see explanations in table A2). To the data from the original articles, we add a journal impact factor from Clarivate’s journal citation report to each article¹. The senior researchers thoroughly double-checked the coding of all variables from the original articles and discussed any cases of disagreement. We are thus confident that this procedure ensures high reliability and validity of the final dataset.

Table A1: Codebook

Variable	Description
Coefficient (the size of the association)	Regression coefficient
Standard error	Standard error associated with a regression coefficient
T-statistic	Computed by dividing the coefficient by its standard error: $t = \frac{\beta}{SE}$
Partisan effect	Dichotomous (yes/no) based on coefficient and standard error.
Direction of effect	To distinguish between expected (based on theory) effects and unexpected ones. The basic rationale is that left parties should decrease inequality, whereas right parties will increase it.
Number of observations	Number of observations included in a regression model
Time series	We collect the start and end of each time series and use this information to calculate its length and the share of the golden age.
Number of variables	The number of variables included in the estimation including e.g. squared terms and interaction terms.
Name of variables	We collected each variable name; aggregation of policy channels (see below) based on these data.
Number and types of policy channels	Number of direct and indirect policy channels included in a regression model and their type (e.g. corporatism; policies;

¹ Collected from Clarivate’s Journal citation report <https://jcr.clarivate.com/jcr/home> [accessed 04.29.2021]

	postindustrialization, globalization; see below for further information on the aggregation of the categories)
Measure of inequality	<p>The variable contains information on the type of inequality that is used as dependent variable in the analyses: we collect the exact string, which we later aggregate to three different types (Gini, Income Ratios and Top income shares).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ginis (Pre-, post-, and pre-vs-post tax and transfer) • Income Ratios compare two income groups with each other (e.g. 90-10, 90-50, 50-10) • Top income shares analyze effects on the wealthiest parts of the population (e.g. Top 1%, Top 10%). This information also enters our coding of top incomes (Top shares and income ratios including top income groups, e.g. 90-10)
Measure of Gini	We distinguish between measures of pre-tax and transfer Ginis, post-tax and transfer Ginis and difference between pre- and post-tax and transfer Ginis.
Conceptualization of partisan effects	In general, partisanship is either measured as share of left/right parties in cabinets/parliament or based on a 5-point-scale (extreme left – moderate left – center – moderate right – extreme right). The variable distinguishes between immediate (typically t-1) and long-term partisan effects. The latter uses cumulative shares of left or right parties/cabinets over a substantive time period (in general since 1945).
Status of partisan effects	The variable holds information on whether a regression model stems from an article that theorizes about partisan effects or used it as mere control variable. The former explicitly flag and discuss partisan effects as one of their core explanatory factors, the latter have no genuine interest in partisan effects on inequality and account for it as a possible confounding factor.

Aggregation of policy channels

As noted above, we collect all variables contained in all 393 regression results that enter our analyses. Based on this information and the literature on partisan effects, we group these variables to assemble meaningful and comparable policy channels that might affect partisan effects (e.g., because they are correlated with partisan patterns and/or might condition or absorb partisan effects).

Table A2: Aggregation of policy channels

Policy channel	Variables contained
Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Government expenditures• Public sector (spending)• Size of public sector• Welfare generosity• Social expenditures/transfers• Decommodification• Taxes (wealth, income)
Corporatism	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Union density/coverage• Wage bargaining• Minimum wages/wage scales• Labor relations
Postindustrialization	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Education (Secondary or tertiary education, vocational training)• Work (Sector sizes, De-industrialization, female labor force)• Economy (Unemployment, GDP growth, debt)• Demography (Population data)
Globalization	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Economy (Trade openness, LDC trade, Foreign investment)• Financialization (Financial openness, Stock market size)

Figure A1: Selection of relevant articles




Table A3: Overview of included articles

Study	N (model)	Results / category	Golden age (%)	Measure of inequality	Pre/post tax	Top vs. Rest	Cumulative measure	Party effects as control	Partisan effect (%)
Alemán (2011)	391	1	58	Gini	pre-tax	Rest	no	no	0
Alemán (2011)	389	1	58	Gini	post-tax	Rest	no	no	0
Alemán (2011)	389	1	58	Gini	pre-vs.-post	Rest	no	no	0
Alexiou and Trachanas (2023)	162	3	0	Gini	post-tax	Rest	no	no	100
Alexiou and Trachanas (2023)	158	6	0	Gini	pre-tax	Rest	no	no	50
Beramendi and Cusack (2009)	41	2	8	Gini	post-tax	Rest	yes	no	100
Beramendi and Cusack (2009)	41	2	8	Gini	pre-tax	Rest	yes	no	0
Bradley et al (2003)	61	2	19	Gini	pre-tax	Rest	yes	no	100
Bradley et al (2003)	59	10	19	Gini	pre-vs.-post	Rest	yes	no	90
Brady (2009)	280	9	23	Ratio	pre-tax	Rest	yes	yes	11
Brady (2009)	280	18	23	Ratio	pre-tax	Top	yes	yes	100
Brady and Leicht (2008)	85	11	35	Gini	post-tax	Rest	yes	no	64
Brady and Leicht (2008)	81	2	35	Gini	pre-tax	Rest	yes	no	100
Brady and Leicht (2008)	81	2	35	Ratio	pre-tax	Top	yes	no	100
Brady and Leicht (2008)	85	22	35	Ratio	post-tax	Top	yes	no	82
Busemeyer and Tober (2015)	144	2	0	Gini	post-tax	Rest	no	yes	0
Busemeyer and Tober (2015)	146	2	0	Ratio	post-tax	Top	no	no	0
Crepaz (2002)	30	7	36	Share	pre-vs.-post	Rest	no	no	0
Dorn and Schinke (2018)	574	16	23	Share	pre-tax	Top	no	no	38
Elkjaer and Iversen (2023)	576	6	0	Share	pre-vs.-post	Top	no	no	33
Huber and Stephens (2014)	106	8	30	Gini	pre-vs.-post	Rest	yes	no	50
Huber and Stephens (2014)	108	2	30	Gini	pre-tax	Rest	yes	no	0
Huber et al (2019)	450	6	38	Share	pre-tax	Top	yes	no	100
Huber et al (2021)	443	6	36	Ratio	pre-tax	Top	yes	yes	0
Huber et al (2021)	511	8	36	Share	pre-tax	Top	yes	yes	0
Huber et al. (2019)	593	1	35	Ratio	pre-tax	Rest	yes	no	100

Huber et al. (2019)	588	1	35	Ratio	pre-tax	Top	yes	no	100
Iversen and Soskice (2006)	47	2	43	Gini	pre-vs.-post	Rest	yes	no	100
Jaumotte & Osorio Buitron (2020)	450	10	0	Share	pre-tax	Top	no	yes	80
Kollmeyer (2012)	572	3	26	Gini	post-tax	Rest	no	yes	0
Kollmeyer (2015)	558	15	25	Gini	post-tax	Rest	yes	yes	100
Kwon (2016)	485	22	25	Gini	pre-tax	Rest	no	yes	5
Kwon (2016)	371	2	26	Share	pre-tax	Top	no	yes	0
Kwon (2018)	386	8	0	Gini	pre-tax	Rest	no	yes	25
Kwon (2019)	192	7	0	Share	pre-tax	Top	no	yes	100
Kwon, Roberts & Zingula (2017)	318	11	0	Ratio	pre-tax	Top	no	yes	0
Kwon, Roberts & Zingula (2017)	235	1	0	Share	pre-tax	Top	no	yes	0
Kwon, Roberts & Zingula (2017)	396	1	0	Gini	pre-tax	Rest	no	yes	0
Lee et al. (2011)	239	3	28	Gini	post-tax	Rest	yes	yes	0
Lupu & Pontusson (2011)	55	2	31	Gini	pre-vs.-post	Rest	no	yes	0
Mahler (2004)	50	1	43	Gini	pre-vs.-post	Rest	yes	no	0
Mahler (2004)	59	1	43	Gini	post-tax	Rest	yes	no	0
Mahler (2004)	194	3	43	Gini	pre-tax	Rest	yes	no	0
Mahler (2010)	71	5	4	Ratio	pre-tax	Top	no	no	0
Mahler (2010)	70	1	4	Ratio	pre-vs.-post	Top	no	no	0
Mahler (2010)	71	1	4	Gini	pre-vs.-post	Rest	no	no	0
Mahler (2010)	71	3	4	Ratio	pre-tax	Rest	no	no	0
Mahler (2010)	71	2	4	Gini	pre-tax	Rest	no	no	0
Mahler and Jesuit (2006)	59	3	5	Gini	pre-vs.-post	Rest	no	no	0
Mahutga, Roberts & Kwon (2017)	404	16	16	Gini	post-tax	Rest	yes	yes	13
Minnich (2003)	41	5	15	Gini	post-tax	Rest	no	no	100
Nam (2020)	117	20	0	Gini	post-tax	Rest	yes	yes	0

Nam (2020)	106	10	0	Gini	pre-tax	Rest	yes	yes	20
Neal (2013)	547	2	34	Share	pre-tax	Top	no	no	100
Oliver (2008)	147	8	0	Ratio	pre-tax	Top	no	yes	0
Oskarsson (2005)	171	1	19	Ratio	pre-tax	Rest	no	no	0
Pontusson et al (2002)	211	1	32	Ratio	pre-tax	Rest	no	no	0
Pontusson et al (2002)	211	2	32	Ratio	pre-tax	Top	no	no	100
Roberts & Kwon (2017)	244	4	0	Ratio	pre-tax	Top	yes	yes	25
Roberts & Kwon (2017)	347	4	0	Gini	pre-tax	Rest	yes	yes	0
Roberts & Kwon (2017)	209	4	0	Share	pre-tax	Top	yes	yes	75
Rueda (2008)	203	2	32	Ratio	pre-tax	Rest	no	no	0
Rueda and Pontusson (2010)	217	1	32	Ratio	pre-tax	Top	no	no	100
Schaltegger and Weger (2014)	464	12	6	Gini	post-tax	Rest	no	yes	33
Scheve and Stasavage (2009)	146	18	23	Share	pre-tax	Top	no	no	6
Sjöberg (2009)	225	6	5	Ratio	pre-tax	Top	no	yes	0
Tober (2022)	401	8	28	Share	pre-tax	Top	no	yes	13
Wallerstein (1999)	41	4	0	Ratio	pre-tax	Top	no	no	0
Wong (2017)	196	1	26	Gini	pre-vs.-post	Rest	no	no	100

Note: *Partisan effect* and % share of Golden age based on mean group outcome. *Cumulative partisan effect*: yes means that the an article tests long-term partisan effects.


**Supplementary Information (SI) Part 2:
Additional Information and (Robustness) Tests**

S-A: Descriptive information

Table S-A1: Descriptive information

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Party effect	393	0.37	0.48	0	1
% of Golden Age	393	0.18	0.14	0	0.58
Measure of inequality	393	1.76	0.82	1	3
Gini measures	188	1.81	0.68	1	3
Top Income vs. Rest	393	0.46	0.50	0	1
Journal Impact	393	1.71	1.19	0.21	6.8
Number of observations	393	271.08	187.07	28	694
Policies	393	0.78	0.97	0	5
Corporatism	393	1.44	1.01	0	4
Postindustrialization	393	2.11	1.17	0	4
Globalization	393	0.95	0.65	0	2
Total number of policy channels	393	5.27	1.87	0	8

Figure S-A1: Different policy channels and partisan effects on inequality



Notes: Number of observations on top of bars. Whiskers indicate 90% confidence intervals. Categories are based on a median split. Dissimilarities are due to uneven distributions.

S-B: Examining publication bias


To study patterns of publication bias, we examine whether the ‘control variable’ effect applies similarly to journals with lower and higher impact scores. To do so, we interact journal impact scores with the variable status (as independent or control variable).

Table S-B1: Explaining partisan effects on inequality: Journal impact and policy channels

	Model 1	Model 2
Partisan effect as control	2.01(1.75)	3.08 (3.33)
JIF	0.33 (0.58)	-1.33* (0.69)
Partisan control # JIF	-1.63** (0.79)	-1.20 (1.25)
Total N of policy channels	-0.35** (0.16)	-1.19** (0.52)
Partisan control # Total N of policy channels		0.29 (0.70)
JIF# Total N of policy channels		0.61** (0.28)
Partisan control # JIF # N of policy channels		-0.39 (0.33)
N of observations	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant	0.09 (1.30)	2.05 (1.59)
Sigma based on article clusters	7.46** (3.61)	6.42** (3.04)
Observations	393	393
AIC	356.06	355.76
BIC	383.88	395.50

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure S-B1: Predicted probability of partisan effect conditional on variable status and impact




Notes: The y-axis shows the predicted probabilities of party status (IV/Ctrl) conditional on journal impact (JIF) with 90% confidence intervals. The x-axis shows the status of partisanship as independent or control variable across the interquartile range of journal impact. Results are based on Table S-B1. All remaining variables are at their observed values.

Model 1 (Table S-B1) and Figure S-B1 indicate that the ‘control variable’ effect rather applies to journals with higher impact factors. On average, 56% of journals with high impact scores (75th percentile) report partisan effects on inequality if it is an independent variable. This value drops to 25% for studies controlling for partisan effects. For journals with lower impact scores (25th percentile), we actually observe a small non-significant reversed effect. This pattern suggests that high-impact journals are less likely to publish non-findings.

To rule out that differences in the results of lower and higher impact journals are due to the inclusion or omission of policy channels that might condition or absorb partisan effects, we also test both of these arguments against each other. Accordingly, we include a three-way-interaction term of party status, journal impact and the number of policy channels in our regression model. Model 3 (Table S-B1) and Figure SB2 indicate that the number of policy channels included in the analysis accounts for differences between low- and high-impact score journals: once we account for the number of policy channels, there is no difference in results from lower and higher impact journals with or without a focus on direct partisan effects.


Figure S-B2: Marginal effect of party status conditional on Journal impact and channels



Notes: Y-axis shows the marginal effect with 90% confidence intervals. The x-axis shows the status of partisanship as independent or control variable and across the interquartile range of journal impact factor scores. Results are based on Table S-B2. All remaining variables are held constant at their observed values.

Finally, we also examine whether test statistics provide evidence for authors anticipating an eventual publication bias of journals via ‘p-hacking’ (e.g., test scores clustering just below confidence thresholds – see Elkjær and Klitgaard 2021 for a similar approach). Yet, plotting test statistics of studies from journals with low and high impact scores along the status of partisanship as “control” or independent variable (“IV”) does not yield indications for ‘p-hacking’ in high-impact journals (see Figure S-B3).

Figure S-B3: Test statistics, status of partisan effects and journal impact (median split)



Notes: Lines indicate significance at $p < 0.05$ (solid) and at $p < 0.1$ (dashed)

Reference

Elkjær, Mads A., and Michael B. Klitgaard (2021). "Economic Inequality and Political Responsiveness: A Systematic Review." *Perspectives on Politics*: 1-20, Online first. doi:10.1017/S1537592721002188

S-C: Additional analyses and robustness checks

Table S-C1: Explaining partisan effects on inequality (separate models for each IV)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
% of Golden age	2.09 (2.83)						
Income ratios		0.37 (0.41)					
Top income shares		2.06** (0.84)					
Gini: Post-tax			0.45 (1.17)				
Gini: Pre vs. post			1.23* (0.73)				
Top vs. Rest				2.23** (1.05)			
Cumulative partisan effect					2.16** (0.91)		
Partisan effect as control						-1.78** (0.88)	
N of policy channels							-0.39*** (0.14)
JIF	-0.13 (0.33)	-0.32 (0.33)	-0.75 (0.73)	-0.29 (0.35)	-0.27 (0.34)	-0.17 (0.32)	-0.24 (0.34)
N of observations	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant	-1.54 (1.02)	-1.54 (0.99)	-0.19 (1.55)	-2.14* (1.18)	-1.88* (0.97)	-0.62 (0.90)	0.79 (1.12)
Sigma based on article clusters	9.90** (5.02)	11.20* (5.83)	5.82 (4.20)	13.87 (8.73)	8.59** (4.26)	8.70** (4.44)	8.95* (4.63)
Observations	393	393	188	393	393	393	393
<i>AIC</i>	361.98	359.54	180.12	343.81	358.67	359.76	357.08
<i>BIC</i>	381.85	383.38	199.54	363.68	378.54	379.63	376.95

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table S-C2: Explaining partisan effects on inequality (OLS vs. Logit Multi-level regression)

	M1 (OLS)	M1 (Logit)	M2 (OLS)	M2 (Logit)	M3 (OLS)	M3 (Logit)
% of Golden age	-0.19 (0.33)	-3.38 (3.05)	-0.24 (0.48)	-4.55 (4.24)	-0.01 (0.34)	-2.26 (2.91)
Income ratios	0.08 (0.05)	0.46 (0.37)				
Top income shares	0.23* (0.13)	2.31** (0.92)				
Gini: Post-tax			0.07 (0.15)	0.71 (1.27)		
Gini: Pre vs. post			0.13 (0.09)	1.00 (0.71)		
Top vs. Rest					0.31** (0.13)	2.34** (1.08)
Cumulative partisan effect	0.32*** (0.11)	3.17*** (1.04)	0.21 (0.15)	2.07 (1.46)	0.31*** (0.11)	3.22*** (1.08)
Partisan effect as control	-0.15 (0.10)	-1.98** (0.98)	-0.31 (0.22)	-3.61* (1.87)	-0.13 (0.12)	-1.97* (1.07)
N of policy channels	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.27* (0.15)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.32 (0.21)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.34** (0.17)
Standard controls	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Constant	0.53*** (0.17)	-0.03 (1.36)	0.55** (0.23)	0.15 (2.07)	0.48*** (0.17)	-0.37 (1.44)
Sigma (log) based on article clusters	-1.18*** (0.12)		-1.30*** (0.20)		-1.16*** (0.11)	
Sigma based on article clusters		7.18** (3.61)		3.14 (2.37)		8.25* (4.61)
Observations	393	393	188	188	393	393
<i>AIC</i>	349.58	354.74	174.85	179.89	326.08	338.26
<i>BIC</i>	393.29	394.47	210.45	212.26	365.81	374.02

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Controls: Journal impact factor, Number of observations.

Table S-C3: Explaining partisan effects on inequality (only articles with at least 5 results)

	M1 (CL>=5)	M1 (CL>=10)	M2 (CL>=5)	M2 (CL>=10)	M3 (CL>=5)	M3 (CL>=10)
% of Golden age	-9.17** (3.61)	-1.16 (3.56)	-7.18 (5.14)	0.27 (8.14)	-7.85** (3.48)	-1.54 (4.06)
Income ratios	0.27 (0.48)	0.19 (0.53)				
Top income shares	2.50*** (0.90)	2.21** (1.05)				
Gini: Post-tax			0.50 (1.31)	-1.52 (1.36)		
Gini: Pre vs. post			0.73 (0.61)	0.88** (0.37)		
Top vs. Rest					2.16* (1.10)	2.09* (1.16)
Cumulative partisan effect	3.85*** (1.15)	4.36*** (1.37)	2.29 (1.45)	5.27*** (1.97)	3.57*** (1.19)	4.45*** (1.44)
Partisan effect as control	-1.86 (1.19)	-0.38 (1.51)	-4.26** (1.91)	-2.37 (4.07)	-2.03 (1.24)	-0.71 (1.64)
Number of policy channels	-0.25 (0.16)	-0.28* (0.15)	-0.26 (0.19)	-0.22 (0.24)	-0.29* (0.17)	-0.28* (0.16)
Standard controls	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Constant	0.71 (1.59)	-0.84 (1.82)	1.57 (2.45)	-1.52 (2.72)	0.46 (1.68)	-1.57 (2.24)
Sigma based on article clusters	5.87** (2.80)	2.67** (1.17)	2.01 (2.12)	2.24 (1.49)	7.42* (4.29)	3.79 (2.36)
Observations	353	278	165	138	353	278
<i>AIC</i>	319.97	252.95	161.93	123.50	308.02	241.16
<i>BIC</i>	358.64	289.23	192.99	152.77	342.82	273.81

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Controls: Journal impact factor, Number of observations.

Table S-C4: Explaining partisan effects on inequality (excluding counterintuitive effects*)

	M1 (all)	M1 (exp)	M2 (all)	M2 (exp)	M3 (all)	M3 (exp)
% of Golden age	-3.38 (3.05)	-2.08 (2.99)	-4.55 (4.24)	-4.42 (4.81)	-2.26 (2.91)	-0.83 (2.84)
Income ratios	0.46 (0.37)	0.72** (0.30)				
Top income shares	2.31** (0.92)	2.31*** (0.88)				
Gini: Post-tax			0.71 (1.27)	1.63 (1.35)		
Gini: Pre vs. post			1.00 (0.71)	1.15 (0.76)		
Top vs. Rest					2.34** (1.08)	2.54** (1.18)
Cumulative partisan effect	3.17*** (1.04)	3.13*** (1.11)	2.07 (1.46)	2.14 (1.79)	3.22*** (1.08)	3.17*** (1.21)
Partisan effect as control	-1.98** (0.98)	-2.99*** (1.15)	-3.61* (1.87)	-7.16*** (2.56)	-1.97* (1.07)	-3.10** (1.23)
N of policy Channels	-0.27* (0.15)	-0.25 (0.15)	-0.32 (0.21)	-0.29 (0.29)	-0.34** (0.17)	-0.31* (0.18)
Standard controls	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Constant	-0.03 (1.36)	-0.74 (1.30)	0.15 (2.07)	-1.68 (2.45)	-0.37 (1.44)	-1.10 (1.39)
Sigma based on article clusters	7.18** (3.61)	10.96* (6.37)	3.14 (2.37)	8.40 (7.24)	8.25* (4.61)	11.94* (7.21)
Observations	393	377	188	177	393	377
<i>AIC</i>	354.74	298.06	179.89	125.80	338.26	278.68
<i>BIC</i>	394.47	337.38	212.26	157.56	374.02	314.07

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Models with all (all) vs. models excluding effects that run against theories of left-right party effects on inequality. *Standard assumption: left share yields negative effect, right share positive effect.

Table S-C5: Explaining partisan effects on inequality (Logistic regression)

	M1 (CL)	M1 (RSE)	M2 (CL)	M2 (RSE)	M3 (CL)	M3 (RSE)
% of Golden age	-2.16 (2.30)	-2.16* (1.17)	-5.82* (3.09)	-5.82*** (2.13)	-2.12 (2.20)	-2.12* (1.14)
Income ratios	0.10 (0.49)	0.10 (0.28)				
Top income shares	0.86 (0.86)	0.86** (0.41)				
Gini: Post-tax			1.26 (0.88)	1.26* (0.68)		
Gini: Pre vs. post			0.88 (0.75)	0.88 (0.66)		
Top vs. Rest					0.91* (0.54)	0.91*** (0.25)
Cumulative partisan effect	2.23*** (0.59)	2.23*** (0.34)	2.00** (0.91)	2.00*** (0.54)	2.17*** (0.56)	2.17*** (0.31)
Partisan effect as control	-1.36 (0.88)	-1.36*** (0.41)	-4.39*** (1.19)	-4.39*** (1.21)	-1.35 (0.85)	-1.35*** (0.40)
Number of policy channels	-0.15 (0.13)	-0.15** (0.07)	-0.25* (0.14)	-0.25* (0.13)	-0.18 (0.12)	-0.18*** (0.07)
JIF	-0.65** (0.28)	-0.65*** (0.14)	-0.49 (0.69)	-0.49 (0.40)	-0.61** (0.24)	-0.61*** (0.12)
N (Model)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
Constant	0.13 (1.07)	0.13 (0.53)	0.27 (1.56)	0.27 (1.05)	0.03 (1.09)	0.03 (0.50)
Observations	393	393	188	188	393	393
<i>AIC</i>	444.41	444.41	194.44	194.44	434.94	434.94
<i>BIC</i>	480.17	480.17	223.57	223.57	466.73	466.73


Notes: Standard errors clustered at the level of articles (CL)/robust standard errors (RSE) in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table S-C6: Explaining partisan effects on inequality: Effect of policy channels

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Corporatism	-0.66*				
	(0.34)				
Policies		-0.04			
		(0.25)			
Postindustrialization			-0.26		
			(0.19)		
Globalization				-0.82***	
				(0.30)	
Total N of channels					-0.39***
					(0.14)
Controls	<i>Included</i>	<i>Included</i>	<i>Included</i>	<i>Included</i>	<i>Included</i>
Constant	-0.28	-1.19	-0.69	-0.50	0.79
	(1.04)	(0.93)	(0.96)	(0.90)	(1.12)
Sigma based on article clusters	9.62*	10.16*	9.81*	9.88**	8.95*
	(5.12)	(5.20)	(5.10)	(4.81)	(4.63)
Observations	393	393	393	393	393
AIC	359.47	362.32	361.28	358.80	357.08
BIC	379.34	382.19	381.15	378.67	376.95

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure SC1: Marginal effect of different policy channels on partisan effects




Notes: Y-axis shows marginal effects along with 90% confidence intervals (based on Table SC6). All remaining variables are held constant at their observed values.

Table S-C7: Explaining partisan effects on inequality: Temporal effect of policy channels

	Model 1 (short)	Model 1 (long)	Model 2 (short)	Model 2 (long)	Model 3 (short)	Model 3 (long)
Income ratios	0.51 (0.40)	0.45 (0.38)				
Top income shares	2.48*** (0.91)	2.36** (0.92)				
Top vs. Rest					2.43** (1.07)	2.34** (1.07)
Gini: Post-tax			0.64 (1.35)	0.52 (1.26)		
Gini: Pre vs. post			0.67 (0.79)	0.93 (0.73)		
Cumulative partisan effect	2.63*** (1.00)	3.51** (1.38)	1.36 (1.48)	0.87 (1.99)	2.52** (1.04)	3.14** (1.28)
Partisan effect as control	-2.74*** (0.89)	-2.13** (0.91)	-5.20*** (1.18)	-4.23** (1.66)	-2.95*** (1.01)	-2.10** (1.00)
Short-term channels	-0.30 (0.34)		-0.06 (0.20)		-0.39 (0.40)	
Long-term channels		-0.21 (0.18)		-0.43 (0.36)		-0.32* (0.18)
Cumul. partisan eff. # Short-term channels	1.17** (0.47)		0.99** (0.47)		1.51*** (0.58)	
Cumul. partisan eff. # Long-term channels		-0.08 (0.25)		0.28 (0.38)		0.02 (0.25)
Standard controls	<i>Included</i>	<i>Included</i>	<i>Included</i>	<i>Included</i>	<i>Included</i>	<i>Included</i>
Constant	-1.11 (1.20)	-0.46 (1.45)	-1.05 (1.78)	0.48 (2.38)	-1.75 (1.34)	-0.68 (1.50)
Sigma based on article clusters	7.52** (3.58)	7.00** (3.55)	3.51 (2.99)	2.98 (2.09)	9.14* (4.90)	8.13* (4.52)
Observations	393	393	188	188	393	393
<i>AIC</i>	356.54	356.69	182.37	181.52	340.09	340.46
<i>BIC</i>	400.25	400.40	217.97	217.12	379.82	380.20

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Short term effects include the number of policies (e.g. welfare spending, taxes), long term measures include the number of variables controlling for corporatism, postindustrialization and globalization (e.g. wage setting, unemployment, trade openness).

Figure S-C2: Marginal effect of policy channels on partisan effects



Notes: Y-axis shows marginal effects along with 90% confidence intervals (based on Table SC7). All remaining variables are held constant at their observed values.

Table S-C8: Explaining partisan effects on inequality: Effect of different data sources

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
% of Golden age	-2.69 (2.89)	-6.20 (5.42)	-1.80 (2.96)
Income ratios	0.37 (0.40)		
Top income shares	1.54 (1.16)		
Gini: Post-tax		0.67 (1.41)	
Gini: Pre vs. post		0.57 (0.64)	
Top vs. Rest			2.22* (1.16)
Cumulative partisan effect	3.28*** (1.07)	1.91 (1.52)	3.27*** (1.10)
Partisan effect as control	-2.25** (0.96)	-4.59* (2.65)	-2.19** (1.02)
Number of policy channels	-0.28* (0.14)	-0.29 (0.23)	-0.32** (0.16)
<i>Data source</i> (reference: LIS)			
OECD	0.80 (1.44)	0.00 (.)	-0.40 (1.53)
SWIID	1.71 (1.29)	-2.22 (2.41)	1.37 (1.35)
WID	2.86 (2.20)	0.00 (.)	2.04 (2.30)
Other	0.11 (1.47)	-2.32 (2.35)	-0.23 (1.58)
JIF	-0.76** (0.37)	0.03 (1.12)	-0.79** (0.39)
N of observations	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant	0.04 (1.44)	-0.12 (2.36)	-0.12 (1.52)
Sigma based on article clusters	5.83* (3.14)	3.28 (2.50)	6.98* (4.01)
Observations	393	187	393
<i>AIC</i>	360.27	182.66	343.32
<i>BIC</i>	415.90	221.43	394.98

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table S-C9: Summary information on different data sources for income inequality:

Data source	Number of results	Web reference (as of 01/2022)
LIS (<i>Luxemburg Income Study</i>)	128	https://www.lisdatacenter.org/
OECD (<i>OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD)</i>)	69	https://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm
SWIID (<i>Standardized World Income Inequality Database</i>)	99	https://fsolt.org/swiid/
WID (<i>World Inequality Database</i>)	67	https://wid.world/data/
Other:	30	
a. TIS (<i>Top Income Shares Data</i>)	18	https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/HF9PKZ
b. EU-SILC (<i>EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions</i>)	4	https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/data/database
c. UTIP (<i>University of Texas Inequality Project</i>)	5	https://utip.gov.utexas.edu/about.html
d. WIID (<i>World Income Inequality Database</i>)	3	https://www.wider.unu.edu/data
Total	393	

Table S-C10: Explaining partisan effects on inequality: Study-pooled effects

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
% of Golden age	-0.02 (0.38)	-0.37 (0.47)	0.09 (0.36)
Income ratios	0.02 (0.06)		
Top income shares	0.17 (0.13)		
Gini: Post-tax		0.20 (0.12)	
Gini: Pre vs. post		0.15* (0.08)	
Top vs. Rest			0.19* (0.11)
Cumulative measure of partisan effect	0.23* (0.13)	0.20 (0.15)	0.27** (0.11)
Partisan effects as control	-0.20* (0.12)	-0.38** (0.18)	-0.24* (0.13)
Number of policy channels	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Models/paper	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
N of observations	0.00 (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant	0.37 (0.23)	0.67*** (0.20)	0.33 (0.22)
Sigma based on article clusters	-1.77*** (0.39)	-1.57*** (0.43)	-1.03*** (0.08)
Observations	52	35	52
<i>AIC</i>	56.29	41.75	60.13
<i>BIC</i>	77.75	58.86	79.65

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. We pool average partisan effects across each measure of inequality per study (e.g. % of partisan effects using top income shares in a study). As some studies include tests for different measures of inequality, there are more results than studies.

Table S-C11: Explaining partisan effects on inequality: Inequality vs. redistribution

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7
	(Dummy: inequality/redistribution)			Inequality			Red.
% of Golden age	-3.53 (3.04)	-4.55 (4.24)	-2.47 (2.89)	-3.27 (3.32)	-7.13 (4.81)	-2.88 (3.49)	0.95 (12.64)
Income ratios	0.50 (0.35)			0.57* (0.33)			0.00 (.)
Top income shares	2.35** (0.93)			2.76*** (0.88)			-46.88*** (7.04)
Post-tax		0.71 (1.27)			0.74 (1.28)		
Pre vs. post		1.00 (0.71)					
Top vs. Rest			2.38** (1.08)			2.44** (1.15)	
Cumul. partisan eff.	3.21*** (1.04)	2.07 (1.46)	3.25*** (1.06)	2.58** (1.10)	2.20 (1.73)	2.75** (1.19)	3.88 (4.01)
Partisan eff.=control	-1.92* (1.00)	-3.61* (1.87)	-1.85* (1.08)	-1.49 (1.10)	-3.19 (2.23)	-1.49 (1.21)	0.00 (.)
Number of policy channels	-0.25* (0.15)	-0.32 (0.21)	-0.32** (0.16)	-0.43*** (0.15)	-0.49* (0.27)	- 0.51*** (0.18)	0.77 (1.45)
JIF	-0.72** (0.36)	-0.40 (0.86)	-0.73** (0.37)	-0.83 (0.53)	-1.13 (1.08)	-0.78 (0.54)	8.50*** (1.57)
N of observations	0.00* (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01* (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Redistribution	0.48 (0.73)	0.00 (.)	0.78 (0.67)				
Constant	-0.20 (1.39)	0.15 (2.07)	-0.61 (1.48)	0.92 (1.51)	1.86 (2.17)	0.48 (1.65)	-21.39*** (6.19)
Sigma based on article clusters	7.20** (3.63)	3.14 (2.37)	8.07* (4.47)	7.22* (3.87)	2.58 (2.58)	9.03 (5.56)	0.00 (0.00)
Observations	393	188	393	350	159	350	40
AIC	356.54	179.89	339.77	310.19	146.41	295.28	39.22
BIC	400.25	212.26	379.50	348.77	174.03	330.00	49.35

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table S-C12: Explaining partisan effects on inequality: Controlling for measures before/after taxes and transfers

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
% of Golden age	-3.25 (3.29)	-7.13 (4.81)	-2.86 (3.43)
Income ratios	0.58* (0.32)		
Top income shares	2.78*** (0.87)		
Top vs. Rest=1			2.44** (1.15)
Cumul. partisan eff.	2.53** (1.16)	2.20 (1.73)	2.72** (1.23)
Partisan eff.=control	-1.50 (1.11)	-3.19 (2.23)	-1.49 (1.21)
Number of policy channels	-0.43*** (0.15)	-0.49* (0.27)	-0.50*** (0.18)
Inequality before taxes	-0.20 (1.01)	-0.74 (1.28)	-0.09 (1.13)
JIF	-0.81 (0.55)	-1.13 (1.08)	-0.77 (0.55)
N of observations	0.00 (0.00)	0.01* (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant	1.06 (1.70)	2.60 (1.85)	0.55 (1.84)
Sigma based on article clusters	7.00* (3.76)	2.58 (2.58)	8.89* (5.31)
Observations	350	159	350
<i>AIC</i>	312.10	146.41	297.26
<i>BIC</i>	354.54	174.03	335.84

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table S-C13: Explaining partisan effects on inequality: Separate models for measures before/after taxes and transfers

	M1 (pre)	M1 (post)	M2 (pre)	M2 (post)
% of Golden age	-2.52 (3.74)	-30.51*** (7.86)	-3.56 (4.79)	-30.51*** (7.86)
Income ratios	0.78 (0.77)	0.31 (0.50)		
Top income shares	2.91*** (1.06)			
Top vs. Rest=1			4.44*** (1.59)	0.31 (0.50)
Cumul. partisan eff.	2.25* (1.15)	9.34*** (2.44)	3.39** (1.66)	9.34*** (2.44)
Partisan eff.=control	-1.45 (1.26)	-11.19*** (2.53)	-2.47 (1.62)	-11.19*** (2.53)
Number of policy channels	-0.40** (0.16)	-1.14** (0.48)	-0.56** (0.23)	-1.14** (0.48)
JIF	-0.29 (0.60)	-4.97*** (1.10)	-0.23 (0.68)	-4.97*** (1.10)
N of observations	0.00 (0.00)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.03*** (0.01)
Constant	-0.16 (1.84)	10.82*** (3.12)	-1.43 (2.12)	10.82*** (3.12)
Sigma based on article clusters	8.09 (5.01)	0.00 (0.00)	16.72 (12.64)	0.00 (0.00)
Observations	232	118	232	118
<i>AIC</i>	212.70	91.71	188.41	91.71
<i>BIC</i>	247.17	113.88	219.44	113.88

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table S-C14: Explaining partisan effects on inequality: Top-income recoded (Top-1-Top10% Income Shares and Ratios vs. Rest)

	Model 1 (all results)	Model 2 (Income shares and ratios)
Top-level inequality vs. Rest	2.05** (0.98)	3.82* (2.09)
% of Golden age	-3.09 (2.82)	-1.25 (3.91)
Cumul. partisan eff.	2.99*** (1.02)	3.39*** (1.13)
Partisan eff.=control	-2.14** (1.02)	-2.29 (1.53)
Number of policy channels	-0.33** (0.16)	-0.34 (0.23)
JIF	-0.52 (0.33)	-0.30 (0.36)
N of observations	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Constant	-0.15 (1.41)	-2.93 (2.09)
Sigma based on article clusters	7.39* (3.97)	8.83 (7.04)
Observations	393	205
<i>AIC</i>	341.18	174.76
<i>BIC</i>	376.94	204.67

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table S-C15a: Explaining partisan effects on inequality: Multi-level meta regression based on *available* standardized coefficients

	Model 1	Model 2
% of Golden age	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Income ratios	0.07*** (0.02)	
Top income shares	0.08*** (0.02)	
Top vs. Rest		0.03*** (0.01)
Cumul. partisan eff.	0.13** (0.06)	0.11** (0.05)
Partisan eff.=control	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)
Number of policy channels	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
JIF	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)
N of observations	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Constant	-0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.04)
Sigma based on article clusters	-2.19*** (0.26)	-2.41*** (0.24)
Observations	174	174
<i>AIC</i>	-246.11	-252.08
<i>BIC</i>	-214.52	-223.65

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

S-C15b: Standardized coefficients: Procedure and problems

Based on available data, author requests, as well as our own efforts to standardize coefficients based on data provided in the articles/supplementary files, we were able to collect data for 20 out of the 43 papers accounting for 174/393 coefficients. However, this sample is far from “representative” of all studies included in the review. This applies particularly to the variables of interest. For the measure of inequality, we were able to standardize roughly two thirds of the coefficients for studies using income shares or income ratios (59/110 and 67/95 results, respectively). However, we only have these data for a quarter of the studies relying on the Gini (48/188 results from 8 studies). Similar deviations apply to the share of studies using a cumulative measure of partisanship (55% vs 50%), the number of channels/control variables (on average 1 less), or the share of results where partisanship is a control variable (45% vs. 56%). Moreover, the reduced sample has a greater share of “positive” results with 55% of coefficients reporting a party effect compared to only 37% in the full sample. Therefore, while results largely reproduce those from our main results, we remain cautious. Due to the small number of studies and coefficients using the Gini – which could be a function of the underrepresentation of older studies and the fact that new studies use Ginis less often – we do not present a separate model for them as a meta-analysis of eight studies seems not justifiable.

Table S-C16: Explaining partisan effects on inequality: Controlling for models with/without country-fixed effects

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
% of Golden age	-3.42 (3.07)	-4.54 (3.86)	-2.29 (2.91)
Income ratios	0.49 (0.35)		
Top income shares	2.36** (0.93)		
Post-tax		0.74 (1.23)	
Pre vs. post		1.05 (0.77)	
Top vs. Rest			2.37** (1.10)
Cumul. partisan eff.	3.14*** (1.04)	1.81 (1.33)	3.17*** (1.06)
Partisan eff.=control	-1.89* (1.02)	-2.91* (1.73)	-1.86* (1.10)
Number of policy channels	-0.27* (0.15)	-0.35 (0.22)	-0.34** (0.17)
Country FE	-0.28 (0.64)	-1.23* (0.72)	-0.36 (0.69)
JIF	-0.65* (0.35)	-0.19 (0.80)	-0.62* (0.35)
N of observations	0.00* (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Constant	0.02 (1.38)	0.27 (2.02)	-0.29 (1.45)
Sigma based on article clusters	7.30** (3.71)	2.68 (2.14)	8.32* (4.72)
Observations	393	188	393
<i>AIC</i>	356.52	178.86	339.93
<i>BIC</i>	400.23	214.46	379.67

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table S-C17: Explaining partisan effects on inequality: Controlling for the relationship of countries (c) divided by the time-series length

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
% of Golden age	-2.05 (3.29)	-3.59 (4.06)	-1.30 (3.17)
Income ratios	0.42 (0.40)		
Top income shares	2.51 ^{***} (0.92)		
Post-tax		0.81 (1.23)	
Pre vs. post		1.50 ^{**} (0.69)	
Top vs. Rest			2.36 ^{**} (1.08)
Cumul. partisan eff.	3.45 ^{***} (1.03)	2.93 ^{**} (1.45)	3.36 ^{***} (1.07)
Partisan eff.=control	-1.97 ^{**} (0.96)	-3.55 ^{**} (1.65)	-1.93 [*] (1.07)
Number of policy channels	-0.27 [*] (0.15)	-0.29 [*] (0.17)	-0.35 ^{**} (0.16)
Countries/Time series	2.24 (1.89)	3.82 [*] (2.01)	1.45 (1.95)
JIF	-0.67 [*] (0.34)	-0.55 (0.76)	-0.63 [*] (0.35)
N of observations	0.01 ^{**} (0.00)	0.01 ^{**} (0.00)	0.01 ^{**} (0.00)
Constant	-2.10 (2.10)	-3.41 (2.48)	-1.71 (2.19)
Sigma based on article clusters	6.17 [*] (3.33)	2.05 (1.83)	7.63 [*] (4.45)
Observations	393	188	393
<i>AIC</i>	355.73	179.22	339.84
<i>BIC</i>	399.44	214.82	379.58

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.