**Multilevel Regime Decoupling: The Territorial Dimension of Autocratization and Contemporary Regime Change**

**Online Appendix**

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| **Section A:** Regional Breakdown of Figure 3 |
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| Region/Quadrant | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| W. Europe and N. Am.. | 63% | 38% | 0% | 0% |
| Latin America | 75% | 10% | 15% | 0% |
| MENA | 77% | 14% | 5% | 5% |
| E. Europe and C. Asia | 58% | 16% | 19% | 6% |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 84% | 12% | 0% | 4% |
| East and South Asia | 83% | 13% | 4% | 0% |
| Caribbean & Pacific | 78% | 22% | 0% | 0% |

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Region/Quadrant | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| W. Europe and N. Am.. | 96% | 0% | 0% | 4% |
| Latin America | 50% | 35% | 15% | 0% |
| MENA | 68% | 18% | 9% | 5% |
| E. Europe and C. Asia | 48% | 23% | 19% | 10% |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 59% | 29% | 4% | 8% |
| East and South Asia | 50% | 29% | 8% | 13% |
| Caribbean & Pacific | 78% | 22% | 0% | 0% |

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Region/Quadrant | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| W. Europe and N. Am.. | 8% | 75% | 8% | 8% |
| Latin America | 15% | 20% | 40% | 25% |
| MENA | 45% | 18% | 18% | 18% |
| E. Europe and C. Asia | 23% | 29% | 29% | 19% |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 43% | 20% | 29% | 8% |
| East and South Asia | 33% | 17% | 38% | 13% |
| Caribbean & Pacific | 56% | 33% | 11% | 0% |

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| Note: Built using V-Dem Data. I report percentages estimated by row and rounded up to the closest integer, so the total share in some instances adds up to 100 +/- 1.  |

**Section B:** Quantitative Analysis for Democratic Regimes Only.

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| Regional Breakdown of Figure 3 for Democracies Only |
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| Region/Quadrant | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| W. Europe and N. Am.. | 63% | 38% | 0% | 0% |
| Latin America | 80% | 7% | 13% | 0% |
| MENA | 75% | 25% | 0% | 0% |
| E. Europe and C. Asia | 71% | 18% | 6% | 6% |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 82% | 18% | 0% | 0% |
| East and South Asia | 73% | 18% | 9% | 0% |
| Caribbean & Pacific | 83% | 17% | 0% | 0% |

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|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Region/Quadrant | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| W. Europe and N. Am.. | 96% | 0% | 0% | 4% |
| Latin America | 59% | 29% | 12% | 0% |
| MENA | 60% | 20% | 20% | 0% |
| E. Europe and C. Asia | 67% | 19% | 14% | 0% |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 56% | 33% | 6% | 6% |
| East and South Asia | 55% | 18% | 18% | 9% |
| Caribbean & Pacific | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% |

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Region/Quadrant | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 |
| W. Europe and N. Am.. | 8% | 75% | 8% | 8% |
| Latin America | 19% | 31% | 31% | 19% |
| MENA | 40% | 20% | 20% | 20% |
| E. Europe and C. Asia | 23% | 41% | 23% | 14% |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 48% | 19% | 29% | 5% |
| East and South Asia | 25% | 25% | 42% | 8% |
| Caribbean & Pacific | 50% | 50% | 0% | 0% |

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| Note: Built using V-Dem Data. I report percentages estimated by row and rounder up to the closest integer, so the total share in some instances adds up to 100 +/- 1. |

**Section C:** Examining the Differences used to identify cases and quadrants in Figure 3.

In the table below, I first present the means of both the x (National Free & Fair Elections Δ) and the y (Sub-national Free & Fair Elections Δ) variables for each of the periods displayed in Figure 3. I then present regression results testing for differences a) between quadrants (QII-QIV) and a reference category (QI), and b) F-tests showcasing that these group differences are distinct from each other, and distinct from zero. Finally, I present the results of a pairwise means comparison to underscore that the relevant **horizontal** and **vertical** differences across quadrants are significantly distinct from zero.

| Analysis of Differences Per Quadrant and Period  |
| --- |
| **1990-2000 (Period 1)** |
| **Axis (Level)** | **Quadrant** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev** | **Regression β** | **Regression****F-Tests** | **ANOVA** | **Tukey Pairwise Means Comparison** |
| National Free & Fair Δ(x-axis) | Q1 | 0.096 | 0.117 | (ref.cat.) | Ho: βQn==0 | F | Q1 vs Q2 | Q1 vs Q3 | Q1 vs Q4 |
| Q2 | -0.041 | 0.061 | -0.14\*\*\* | F: 34.55\*\*\* | 24.13 | -0.137\*\*\* | -0.22\*\*\* | 0.046 |
| Q3 | -0.125 | 0.101 | -0.22\*\*\* | Ho: βQn==βQn | P-Val | Q2 vs Q3 | Q2 vs Q4 | Q4 vs Q3 |
| Q4 | 0.142 | 0.073 | 0.046 | F: 17.58\*\*\* | 0.000 | -0.084 | 0.183\*\* | 0.267\*\* |
|  | **Quadrant** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev** | **Regression β** | **Regression****F-Tests** | **ANOVA** | **Tukey Pairwise Means Comparison** |
| Sub-national Free & Fair Δ(y-axis) | Q1 | 0.044 | 0.089 | (ref.cat.) | Ho: βQn==0 | F | Q1 vs Q2 | Q1 vs Q3 | Q1 vs Q4 |
| Q2 | 0.03 | 0.063 | -0.013 | F: 15.74\*\*\* | 10.46 | -0.013 | -0.131\*\*\* | -0.11\*\* |
| Q3 | -0.087 | 0.068 | -0.131\*\*\* | Ho: βQn==βQn | P-Val | Q2 vs Q3 | Q2 vs Q4 | Q4 vs Q3 |
| Q4 | -0.066 | 0.065 | -0.11\*\*\* | F: 15.51\*\*\* | 0.000 | -0.118\*\* | -0.096\* | 0.022 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **2000-2010 (Period 2)** |
| **Axis (Level)** | **Quadrant** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev** | **Regression β** | **Regression****F-Tests** | **ANOVA** | **Tukey Pairwise Means Comparison** |
| National Free & Fair Δ(x-axis) | Q1 | 0.08 | 0.086 | (ref.cat.) | Ho: βQn==0 | F | Q1 vs Q2 | Q1 vs Q3 | Q1 vs Q4 |
| Q2 | -0.062 | 0.052 | -0.14\*\*\* | F: 62.57\*\*\* | 50.17 | -0.142\*\*\* | -0.198\*\*\* | -0.009 |
| Q3 | -0.118 | 0.09 | -0.29\*\*\* | Ho: βQn==βQn | P-Val | Q2 vs Q3 | Q2 vs Q4 | Q4 vs Q3 |
| Q4 | 0.071 | 0.037 | -0.009 | F: 48.02\*\*\* | 0.000 | -0.056\* | 0.133\*\*\* | 0.189\*\*\* |
|  | **Quadrant** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev** | **Regression β** | **Regression** **F-Tests** | **ANOVA** | **Tukey Pairwise Means Comparison** |
| Sub-national Free & Fair Δ(y-axis) | Q1 | 0.033 | 0.06 | (ref.cat.) | Ho: βQn==0 | F | Q1 vs Q2 | Q1 vs Q3 | Q1 vs Q4 |
| Q2 | 0.01 | 0.022 | -0.023\*\* | F: 14.41\*\*\* | 15.30 | -0.023 | -0.085\*\*\* | -0.073\*\*\* |
| Q3 | -0.052 | 0.066 | -0.085\*\*\* | Ho: βQn==βQn | P-Val | Q2 vs Q3 | Q2 vs Q4 | Q4 vs Q3 |
| Q4 | -0.04 | 0.04 | -0.073\*\*\* | F: 13.30\*\*\* | 0.000 | -0.062\*\* | -0.049\* | 0.013 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **2010-2022 (Period 3)** |
| **Axis (Level)** | **Quadrant** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev** | **Regression β** | **Regression** **F-Tests** | **ANOVA** | **Tukey Pairwise Means Comparison** |
| National Free & Fair Δ(x-axis) | Q1 | 0.112 | 0.11 | (ref.cat.) | Ho: βQn==0 | F | Q1 vs Q2 | Q1 vs Q3 | Q1 vs Q4 |
| Q2 | -0.082 | 0.128 | -0.194\*\*\* | F: 51.70\*\*\* | 44.37 | -0.194\*\*\* | -0.244\*\*\* | -0.04 |
| Q3 | -0.132 | 0.109 | -0.244\*\*\* | Ho: βQn==βQn | P-Val | Q2 vs Q3 | Q2 vs Q4 | Q4 vs Q3 |
| Q4 | 0.072 | 0.064 | -0.040\* | F: 46.68\*\*\* | 0.000 | -0.05 | 0.154\*\*\* | 0.204\*\*\* |
|  | **Quadrant** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev** | **Regression β** | **Regression** **F-Tests** | **ANOVA** | **Tukey Pairwise Means Comparison** |
| Sub-national Free & Fair Δ(y-axis) | Q1 | 0.067 | 0.064 | (ref.cat.) | Ho: βQn==0 | F | Q1 vs Q2 | Q1 vs Q3 | Q1 vs Q4 |
| Q2 | 0.015 | 0.033 | -0.052\*\*\* | F: 37.30\*\*\* | 43.33 | -0.052\*\* | -0.145\*\*\* | -0.141\*\*\* |
| Q3 | -0.078 | 0.078 | -0.145\*\*\* | Ho: βQn==βQn | P-Val | Q2 vs Q3 | Q2 vs Q4 | Q4 vs Q3 |
| Q4 | -0.074 | 0.088 | -0.141\*\*\* | F: 34.45\*\*\* | 0.000 | -0.094\*\*\* | -0.089\*\*\* | 0.004 |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

**Section D:** Examining the Differences (Democracies Only)

I replicate the analysis of differences for democratic countries only. I first present the means of both the x (National Free & Fair Elections Δ) and the y (Sub-national Free & Fair Elections Δ) variables for each of the periods displayed in Figure 3. I then present I then present regression results testing for differences a) between quadrants (QII-QIV) and a reference category (QI), and b) F-tests showcasing that these group differences are distinct from each other, and distinct from zero. Finally, I present the results of a pairwise means comparison to underscore that the relevant **horizontal** and **vertical** differences across quadrants are significantly distinct from zero.

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| --- |
| Analysis of Differences Per Quadrant and Period (Democracies Only) |
| **1990-2000 (Period 1)** |
| **Axis (Level)** | **Quadrant** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev** | **Regression****β** | **Regression****F-Tests** | **ANOVA** | **Tukey Pairwise Means Comparison** |
| National Free & Fair Δ(x-axis) | Q1 | 0.08 | 0.109 | (ref.cat.) | Ho: βQn==0 | F | Q1 vs Q2 | Q1 vs Q3 | Q1 vs Q4 |
| Q2 | -0.019 | 0.045 | -0.099\*\*\* | F: 17.02\*\*\* | 10.81 | -0.099\*\* | -0.157\*\* | n/a |
| Q3 | -0.078 | 0.101 | -0.157\*\* | Ho: βQn==βQn | P-Val | Q2 vs Q3 | Q2 vs Q4 | Q4 vs Q3 |
| Q4 | n/a | n/a | n/a | F: 1.63 | 0.000 | -0.059 | n/a | n/a |
|  | **Quadrant** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev** | **Regression****β** | **Regression****F-Tests** | **ANOVA** | **Tukey Pairwise Means Comparison** |
| Sub-national Free & Fair Δ(y-axis) | Q1 | 0.049 | 0.101 | (ref.cat.) | Ho: βQn==0 | F | Q1 vs Q2 | Q1 vs Q3 | Q1 vs Q4 |
| Q2 | 0.015 | 0.037 | -0.034\*\* | F: 38.72\*\*\* | 2.46 | -0.034 | -0.106 | -0.103 |
| Q3 | -0.057 | 0.065 | -0.106\*\* | Ho: βQn==βQn | P-Val | Q2 vs Q3 | Q2 vs Q4 | Q4 vs Q3 |
| Q4 | -0.054 | 0 | -0.103\*\*\* | F: 29.93\*\*\* | 0.069 | -0.072 | -0.069 | 0.003 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **2000-2010 (Period 2)** |
| **Axis (Level)** | **Quadrant** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev** | **Regression****β** | **Regression F-Tests** | **ANOVA** | **Tukey Pairwise Means Comparison** |
| National Free & Fair Δ(x-axis) | Q1 | 0.07 | 0.074 | (ref.cat.) | Ho: βQn==0 | F | Q1 vs Q2 | Q1 vs Q3 | Q1 vs Q4 |
| Q2 | -0.064 | 0.054 | -0.134\*\*\* | F: 40.63\*\*\* | 30.06 | -0.134\*\*\* | -0.175\*\*\* | -0.018 |
| Q3 | -0.105 | 0.064 | -0.175\*\*\* | Ho: βQn==βQn | P-Val | Q2 vs Q3 | Q2 vs Q4 | Q4 vs Q3 |
| Q4 | 0.052 | 0.019 | -0.018 | F: 41.65\*\*\* | 0.000 | -0.041 | 0.116\*\* | 0.157\*\* |
|  | **Quadrant** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev** | **Regression****β** | **Regression F-Tests** | **ANOVA** | **Tukey Pairwise Means Comparison** |
| Sub-national Free & Fair Δ(y-axis) | Q1 | 0.023 | 0.046 | (ref.cat.) | Ho: βQn==0 | F | Q1 vs Q2 | Q1 vs Q3 | Q1 vs Q4 |
| Q2 | 0.013 | 0.02 | -0.01 | F: 6.26\*\*\* | 5.99 | -0.01 | -0.06\*\* | -0.05 |
| Q3 | -0.037 | 0.058 | -0.06\*\* | Ho: βQn==βQn | P-Val | Q2 vs Q3 | Q2 vs Q4 | Q4 vs Q3 |
| Q4 | -0.027 | 0.028 | -0.05\*\* | F: 6.61\*\* | 0.002 | -0.049\*\* | -0.04 | 0.01 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **2010-2022 (Period 3)** |
| **Axis (Level)** | **Quadrant** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev** | **Regression****β** | **Regression****F-Tests** | **ANOVA** | **Tukey Pairwise Means Comparison** |
| National Free & Fair Δ(x-axis) | Q1 | 0.117 | 0.097 | (ref.cat.) | Ho: βQn==0 | F | Q1 vs Q2 | Q1 vs Q3 | Q1 vs Q4 |
| Q2 | -0.083 | 0.138 | -0.2\*\*\* | F: 38.86\*\*\* | 26.2 | -0.2\*\*\* | -0.249\*\*\* | -0.055 |
| Q3 | -0.132 | 0.101 | -0.249\*\*\* | Ho: βQn==βQn | P-Val | Q2 vs Q3 | Q2 vs Q4 | Q4 vs Q3 |
| Q4 | 0.062 | 0.04 | -0.055\*\* | F: 41.09\*\*\* | 0.000 | -0.049 | 0.145\*\* | 0.194\*\*\* |
|  | **Quadrant** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev** | **Regression****β** | **Regression** **F-Tests** | **ANOVA** | **Tukey Pairwise Means Comparison** |
| Sub-national Free & Fair Δ(y-axis) | Q1 | 0.077 | 0.076 | (ref.cat.) | Ho: βQn==0 | F | Q1 vs Q2 | Q1 vs Q3 | Q1 vs Q4 |
| Q2 | 0.014 | 0.033 | -0.064\*\*\* | F: 19.16\*\*\* | 26.32 | -0.064\*\* | -0.155\*\*\* | -0.137\*\*\* |
| Q3 | -0.078 | 0.082 | -0.155\*\*\* | Ho: βQn==βQn | P-Val | Q2 vs Q3 | Q2 vs Q4 | Q4 vs Q3 |
| Q4 | -0.059 | 0.063 | -0.137\*\*\* | F: 18.90\*\*\* | 0.000 | -0.091\*\*\* | -0.073\*\* | 0.018 |
| \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

**Section E:** Replicating the Analysis with a Restricted Sample

Here I carry out the descriptive analysis presented in Figure 3 of Section 4 restricting the sample: I first exclude values too close to zero (falling within ½ standard deviations) (navy blue square). Second, I exclude outlying cases (with values higher than twice the standard deviation) (cases outside the purple square). These ‘exclusion zones’ are built by averaging the standard deviation of the two variables.

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| Identifying Multilevel Regime Decoupling with Restricted Samples |
| Note: Built using V-Dem data. These ‘exclusion zones’ are built by averaging the standard deviation of the two variables |

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| Analysis with restricted sample.  |
| **Panel A.** Excluding Values Too Close to Zero (<1/2 Std. Dev.) |
|  | **1990-2000** | **2000-2010** | **2010-2022** |  |  | **Cases *outside* of blue square only** |
| **Q. I** | 77.3%(92) | 62.3%(92) | 37.4%(46) |  |  | **1990-2000** | **2000-2010** | **2010-2022** |
| **Q. II** | 10.9%(13) | 19.2%(27) | 19.5%(24) |  | **Decoupled Δ Cases**(Q II + Q IV) | 15.1%(18) | 26.3%(37) | 33.3%(41) |
| **Q. III** | 7.6 %(9) | 8.5%(12) | 29.3%(36) |  | **Coupled Δ Cases**(QI + Q III) | 84.9%(101) | 73.7%(104) | 66.7% 82) |
| **Q. IV** | 4.2%(5) | 7.1%(10) | 13.8%(17) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Excludes values *inside* the navy-blue squares of Figure X. That is, here I am *excluding* cases whose X & Y values are *less* than half the average standard deviation of the two variables. The number of units is reported in parenthesis.  |
| Because of rounding up, the sum of shares can sometime be marginally larger than 100%. |

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| **Panel B.** Exclude Outliers (>2\*Std. Dev.) |
|  | **1990-2000** | **2000-2010** | **2010-2022** |  |  | **Cases *inside* purple square only** |
| **Q. I** | 63.21%(67) | 55.6%(65) | 25.6%(31) |  |  | **1990-2000** | **2000-2010** | **2010-2022** |
| **Q. II** | 25.5%(27) | 29.1%(34) | 31.4%(38) |  | **Decoupled Δ Cases**(Q II + Q IV) | 28.3%(30) | 35.9%(42) | 44.6%(54) |
| **Q. III** | 8.5%(9) | 8.6%(10) | 29.8%(36) |  | **Coupled Δ Cases**(QI + Q III) | 71.7%(76) | 64.1%(75) | 55.4%(67) |
| **Q. IV** | 2.8%(3) | 6.8%(8) | 13.2%(16) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Only cases *within* the purple squares of Figure X are counted. That is, here I am *excluding* cases whose X & Y values are two times *larger* than the average standard deviation of the two variables. The number of units is reported in parenthesis.  |
| Because of rounding up, the sum of shares can sometime be marginally larger than 100%. |

**Section F:** Replicating the Quantitative Analysis with Alternative Measures of Subnational Democracy

Here I present, on the first table, a short description of the SEDS, the ISED, Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization, and the V-Dem EDI. Next, I replicate the analysis presented in Section 4 using these indices.

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| Brief Description of Alternative Indicators |
| Indicator Name & Author | Dimensions and Indicators | Countries Covered | Years  |
| Subnational Electoral Democracy Score (SEDS) Fidalgo (2021) | Executive Control, Executive Turnover, Legislative Control of the executive. | Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Mexico, South Africa, Spain, United States | 1980-2016 |
| Index of Subnational Electoral Democracy (ISED) Sandoval (2023) | Contestation & Inclusiveness (Operationalized as electoral competition & turnout as a share of the total population) | Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, United States, Canada, India | 1980-2022 |
| Index of DemocratizationVanhanen (2000) | Contestation & Inclusiveness(Operationalized as electoral competition & turnout as a share of the total population) | 176 countries | 1810-2021 |
| V-Dem (Polyarchy) Electoral Democracy IndexCoppedge et al. (2023) | The v2x\_polyarchy item is configured by 5 differently weighted subcomponents | 202 countries | 1789-2022 |

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| Identifying MRD with Alternative Measures of Subnational and National Democracy. |
| 1. Using ISED and Vanhanen
 |
|  |  | **1990-2000** | **2000-2010** | **2010-2020** |
| Q. I | 37.5%(3) | 58.33%(7) | 58.33%(7) |
| Q. II | 25%(2) | 8.33%(1) | 16.67%(2) |
| Q. III | 25%(2) | 8.33%(1) | 16.67%(2) |
| Q. IV | 12.5%(1) | 25%(3) | 8.33%(1) |
|  | **1990-2000** | **2000-2010** | **2010-2020** |
| **Decoupled Δ Cases**(Q II + Q IV) | 37.5% | 33.3% | 25.0% |
| **Coupled Δ Cases**(QI + Q III) | 62.5% | 66.7% | 75.0% |
|  |
| 1. Using SEDS and V-Dem Polyarchy
 |
|  |  | **1990-2000** | **2000-2010** | **2010-2020** |
| Q. I | 36.4%(4) | 8.33%(1) | 10%(1) |
| Q. II | 9.1%(1) | 16.7%(2) | 60%(6) |
| Q. III | 9.1%(1) | 41.7%(5) | 30%(3) |
| Q. IV | 45.5%(5) | 33.33%(4) | 0%(0) |
|  | **1990-2000** | **2000-2010** | **2010-2020** |
| **Decoupled Δ Cases**(Q II + Q IV) | 54.5% | 50.0% | 60.0% |
| **Coupled Δ Cases**(QI + Q III) | 45.5% | 50.0% | 40.0% |

**Section G:** Exploratory Regression Analyses

Here I first present the variables used to conduct the exploratory regression analysis. I include sources and descriptive statistics. Afterwards, I present the tables with the results of several bivariate and multivariate (or saturated) two-way fixed effects models. The factors and coefficients listed in Panel C of Figure 4 are taken from Model 10 (EMB Type), Model A (Fragile State Index and EMB Capacity), Model B (Regional Autonomy), and Model C (Regional Fiscal Autonomy). Pulling data from different sources results in non-coinciding observations across merged datasets. This issue escalates with the inclusion of additional variables, which is why it is important to note that the number of observations drops considerably in (the multivariate) models A and B

| Description of Structural, Institutional, and Territorial ‘Usual Suspects’ | 1990-2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Variables Name | Description | Source | No. Countries Covered | Years Covered | Mean | Std. Dev |
| GDP per capita USD-PPP (log) | Natural logarithm of the gross domestic product (GDP) expressed in per capita terms in current international dollars converted by purchasing power parity (PPP). | World Bank | 176 | 1990-2022 | 8.92 | 1.26 |
| Total Population (log) | Natural logarithm of the total population regardless of citizenship status. | World Bank | 172 | 1990-2022 | 15.97 | 1.68 |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | Varying between 0 (homogeneous) and 1(heterogeneous), shows the probability that two individuals selected at random will be part of an ethno-linguistic group. | Fearon 2003;Teorell et al. 2024 (QoG) | 160 | 1990-2022 | 0.47 | 0.26 |
| Terrain Ruggedness Index | Measures how jagged or flat the terrain of a country is. It is an average expressed in meters of elevation. | Nunn and Puga (2012) | 234 | n/a | 135.68 | 123.21 |
| Federalism Binary(Fed.= 1) | Binary indicator that is assigned zero (0) if the country is Unitary, and one (1) if the country is Federal. | Forum of Federations;Blume and Voigt 2011 | 181 | n/a | 0.13 | 0.33 |
| Fragile State Index | The index combines 12 dimensions and over 100 indicators to capture state capacity. The index has been transformed so that low(high) values mean low(high) state capacity. | Fund for Peace;Vaccaro 2023 | 178 | 2005-2022 | 60.51 | 24.41 |
| State Fragility Index | Based on two sub-dimensions (effectiveness and legitimacy), the index aggregates 14 indicators to capture coercive aspects of state capacity. The index has been transformed so that low(high) values mean low(high) state capacity. | Center for Systemic Peace; Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017; Vaccaro 2023 | 169 | 1995-2018 | 15.77 | 6.54 |
| Regional Authority Index | A country-year additive index, which varies between zero (0) and thirty (30), where higher values indicate the extent to which regional governments within countries have authority in two core dimensions: self-rule and shared (co-determined) rule.  | Hooghe et al. 2016 | 96 | 1950-2018 | 10.25 | 9.90 |
| EMB Capacity | Based on website content analysis, this score varies between 0 and 3, and captures the ability of electoral management bodies (EMB) to achieve their goals.  | Garnett 2019 | 99 | n/a | 2.27 | 0.69 |
| EMB Type (Government/Mixed=1) | This binary indicator distinguishes whether EMBs are ‘Independent’ (0) or whether they are run by the ‘Government/Mixed’ (1). | International IDEA | 215 | n/a | 0.27 | 0.44 |
| Presidential System (Pres.= 1) | This binary indicator distinguishes between Parliamentary (0) and Presidential systems (1). | Bjørnskov, C., &Rode, M. (2020)Teorell et al. 2024 (QoG) | 192 | 1950-2023 | 0.64 | 0.48 |
| Prop. Rep. Binary (Prep. Rep=1) | This binary indicator distinguishes between electoral systems with Proportional representation (1) and those without (1). | Bjørnskov, C., & Rode, M. (2020)Teorell et al. 2024 (QoG) | 192 | 1950-2023 | 0.49 | 0.50 |
|  |
| Description of the Regional Authority Index Subcomponents  | 1990-2018 |
| **Component Name** | **Description** | **Source** | **No. Countries Covered** | **Years Covered** | **Mean** | **Std. Dev** |
| Self-Rule | Additive subcomponent of the RAI index. It is the sum of 1,2,3,4 and 5 (See below. ) | Hooghe et al. 2016 | 96 | 1950-2018 | 8.41 | 7.41 |
| Shared Rule | Additive subcomponent of the RAI index. It is the sum of indicators 6 through 10 (See below. ) | 1.84 | 3.31 |
| Reg. Gov. Autonomy (1) | Captures the extent to which the regional government is autonomous (high values) or subject to control/veto from the center (low values). | 2.12 | 1.55 |
| Reg. Policy Autonomy (2) | An ordinal level variable (0-4) capturing the range of policy domains regional governments are responsible for.  | 1.53 | 1.55 |
| Reg. Fiscal Autonomy (3) | Measure the extent to which regional governments can set taxes and modify their rate. (Val 0-4) | 1.03 | 1.52 |
| Reg. Borrowing Autonomy (4) | Rates the degree to which regional govs. can borrow independently from central restrictions. (Val 0-3) | 0.97 | 1.18 |
| Reg. Indep. Rep. (5) | Proxies for independent, local representation (Addition of A and B, see below) (Val 0-4) | 2.77 | 2.33 |
| Co-Determine Nat. Legislation (6) | Captures the extent to which regional representatives can co-determine or condition national level legislation. (Val 0-2) | 0.38 | 0.66 |
| Co-Determine Nat. Policy (7) | Evaluates the extent to which regional governments can co-determine or condition national policies. (Val 0-2) | 0.26 | 0.56 |
| Co-Determine Nat. Taxes (8) | Measures the extent to which regional representatives can co-determine or condition national level taxation. (Val 0-2) | 0.24 | 0.58 |
| Co-Determine Nat. Borrowing (9) | Measures the extent to which regional representatives can constrain national and subnational borrowing. (Val 0-2) | 0.12 | 0.43 |
| Co-Determine Nat. Const. Δ (10) | Captures de degree to which the regional government can condition or co-determine constitutional change (Val. 0-4) | 0.84 | 1.58 |
| Regional Assembly (A) | Proxy capturing if there are regional assemblies (0 if not), and whether they are indirectly (1) or directly elected (2).  | 1.54 | 1.26 |
| Regional Executive (B) | Proxy capturing if the regional executive is appointed (0 if not), whether they are indirectly elected (1) or directly elected (2). | 1.23 | 1.16 |

| Regression Analysis of the Structural and Institutional ‘Usual Suspects’  |
| --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | A | B |
| GDP per capita USD-PPP (log) | 0.00647(0.00988) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.0223(0.0200) | -0.0134(0.0212) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total Population (log) |  | -0.00701(0.0247) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00454(0.00837) | 0.000441(0.00849) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ethnic Fractionalization |  |  | 0.0206(0.0278) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.0289(0.0449) | -0.00604(0.0332) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Terrain Ruggedness Index |  |  |  | 1.87e-05(3.45e-05) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 7.45e-05(6.98e-05) | 0.000111(7.64e-05) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Federalism Binary(Fed.= 1) |  |  |  |  | 0.0131(0.00875) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.0259(0.0223) | -0.0335(0.0221) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fragile State Index |  |  |  |  |  | -0.000886(0.000602) |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00140\*\*\*(0.000380) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| State Fragility Index |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.000315(0.00148) |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00239(0.00274) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Regional Authority Index |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.000407(0.00101) |  |  |  |  | 0.00155(0.00219) | 0.00305\*(0.00166) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EMB Capacity (Garnett 2019) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00447(0.00699) |  |  |  | -0.0552\*\*\*(0.0168) | -0.0229(0.0167) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EMB Type (IDEA) (Government/Mixed=1) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.0234\*\*\*(0.00854) |  |  | -0.0223(0.0183) | -0.0161(0.0180) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Presidential System (Pres.= 1) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.00106(0.0315) |  | 0.0438(0.0345) | 0.0293(0.0295) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Prop. Rep. Binary(Prep. Rep=1) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.0206(0.0130) | 0.00604(0.00896) | -0.0393(0.0243) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 4,512 | 4,531 | 2,753 | 4,668 | 4,715 | 2,354 | 3,344 | 2,338 | 2,792 | 4,706 | 4,626 | 4,545 | 293 | 832 |
| R-squared | 0.034 | 0.033 | 0.039 | 0.032 | 0.032 | 0.025 | 0.010 | 0.036 | 0.033 | 0.032 | 0.031 | 0.035 | 0.139 | 0.112 |
| Number of Clusters | 162 | 164 | 142 | 163 | 165 | 161 | 156 | 87 | 94 | 164 | 163 | 162 | 50 | 51 |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Region | Region | Region | Yes | Yes | Yes | Region | Region | Region | Region | Region | Region |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |

| Regression Analysis: Regional Autonomy Subcomponents and Indicators |
| --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | C |
| Self-Rule | 0.000771(0.00144) |  | 0.00114(0.00177) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Shared Rule |  | -0.00174(0.00206) | -0.00293(0.00317) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reg. Gov. Autonomy |  |  |  | 0.00177(0.00640) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.00351(0.0102) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reg. Policy Autonomy |  |  |  |  | 0.00407(0.00510) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00568(0.00686) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reg. Fiscal Autonomy |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00674(0.00453) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0130\*(0.00779) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reg. Borrowing Autonomy |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.00448(0.00562) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.0113(0.00698) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reg. Indep. Rep. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00209(0.00496) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.0769(0.0590) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Co-Determine Nat. Legislation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.00741(0.00743) |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.0116(0.00967) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Co-Determine Nat. Policy |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00473(0.0140) |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0108(0.0114) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Co-Determine Nat. Taxes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.00532(0.00882) |  |  |  |  | -0.00987(0.00922) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Co-Determine Nat. Borrowing |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.00185(0.00990) |  |  |  | -0.00665(0.00912) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Co-Determine Nat. Const. Δ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.00221(0.00305) |  |  | 0.000198(0.00378) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Regional Assembly |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00304(0.00804) |  | 0.0808(0.0614) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Regional Executive |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00413(0.00911) | 0.0771(0.0600) |
| Observations | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 | 2,338 |
| R-squared | 0.037 | 0.036 | 0.038 | 0.036 | 0.038 | 0.038 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.037 | 0.052 |
| Number of Clusters | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 |