# Appendices:

(Appendices for “Sweden’s Peculiar Adoption of Proportional Representation: the Overlooked Effects of Time and History”)

## CHA Glossary:

CHA draws on many different literatures in economics, political science and sociology that oftentimes use different vernaculars to describe near-identical temporal concepts. This lack of a standardized vocabulary impedes communication within CHA as well as its conversations with other more variance-based approaches. We therefore offer a brief glossary and references of the key CHA terms used in this article.

**Comparative Historical Analysis**. CHA is an umbrella term for a range of literatures exploring macro-historical questions in sociology, political science, evolutionary psychology, and economics (Adams, Clemens, and Orloff 2005; For a survey of these literatures, see Møller 2016; Skocpol 1984). It anchors its analysis in two elements of time. It emphasizes the historical nature of its objects of analysis. It recognizes that these objects are subject to qualitative changes over time and that consequently the questions, concepts, and theories need to be continuously updated. Furthermore, CHA employs a more complex historical notion of causality and recognizes the causal effects of four temporal causal mechanisms: sequencing, timing, tempo, and duration (Aminzade 1992; Grzymala-Busse 2011; Pierson 2004; Sewell 1996). The interplay between these two notions of time constitutes the shared foundation of the otherwise very heterodox literatures constituting CHA (For a survey of CHA methodology, see Abrams 1982; Abbott 2001, 1988; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Mahoney and Thelen 2015).

**Duration:** Duration together with tempo is the most immediately measurable element of time because it is linked to clocks. (Aminzade 1992, 460–62; Grzymala-Busse 2011, 1277–85) It measures the time elapsed between a starting and end date and permits a *long and short* differentiation. Adam Przeworski, for example, points out that understanding crises requires attention to duration. “Crises are situations that cannot last, in which something must be decided.” He points out that some crises endure, as the new cannot replace the status quo even though it has become untenable. Other crisis, in turn are shorter and become turning points or so-called critical junctures. (2019, 10–12) The theorist Elizabeth Cohen investigates how political and legal procedures rely on duration to determine election or census intervals, citizenship eligibility, or sentencing guidelines. She shows how the measurable and hence seemingly impartial nature of duration legitimizes those procedures while also becoming a source of bias. (2018, 1–21) (See also “historical causation” for the connection between duration and causation)

**Historical Change**: CHA starts from the premise that we live in a constantly changing world that requires updating research questions, concepts, and theories. It consequently treats actors, events, or even concepts as moving objects that qualitatively change over time. It views those transformations as categorical changes in kind rather than continuous changes in degree. It follows historians in using dates to demonstrate that the past does *not* repeat itself (i.e. is not frozen), that it is not just prior to the present, but that it also is qualitatively *different* from it (Schiffman 2011, 2). Exploring these qualitative differences—varying referred as discontinuities, transformation, ruptures, or mutations—describing and explaining them is a key objective of CHA.

**Historical Causation**: The left threat thesis—and more generally explanations assuming temporal homogeneity—combines long/short and short/short time structure that is closely linked to linear notions of causality. It has the characteristic of a tornado which is the result of very short-term meteorological occurrences that produces a quick, and short, albeit still enormously destructive, outcome. The left threat thesis involves a singular, discreet and short legislative moment resulting from temporally proximate, equally brief and discreet causal factors (i.e. right fragmentation, left’s vote share, and disproportionality of existing electoral system). Short/short explanations in effect operate under assumptions of temporal homogeneity that make it possible to employ a linear notion of causality. Linear causality stipulates that causal effects are simultaneous, immediate, additive and symmetrical and thus largely unaffected by the temporal order (Abbott 1988; P. Hall 2003, 382–83; Jervis 1998, 39–68; Lieberson 1985, 63–82; Pierson 2003, 181–82).

Pierson juxtaposes short/short with long/long explanations in which outcomes and causes extend over longer time periods and interact in more complex ways. Long/long explanations have the characteristics of climate change which involves the slow moving, cumulative effects of decades of carbon emission that gradually are transforming atmospheric temperatures and weather patterns (Pierson 2003, 179–81). Long/long explanations require “temporal broadening” of outcomes to capture not just singular discreet outcomes but also near misses, reversals, lagged effect, or increasing returns associated with path dependencies. They treat outcomes as a process of several causally linked events and thereby underscore that causal effects that are not immediate, additive, simultaneous, and symmetrical. Historical notions of causality thus become attentive to the temporal order of causal factors, the generative processes, and historical context.

Long/long explanations also encourage reading history forward, becoming more aware of alternative possible outcomes, and paying closer attention to the generative mechanisms producing a particular outcome (Cowan and Rizzo 1996; Ermakoff 2019; Mahoney 2000; Møller 2021). It demonstrated that the key left threat factors—electorally growing left, fragmentation of the right, disproportionality of status electoral systems, and social protest—did not have the immediate causal effects but that those causal factors were instead mediated through the temporal order through which they unfolded as well as their own qualitative transformations. This mediation requires a long/long time scale to shift the attention from the broad structural and institutional factors producing the left threat to the generative process explaining their delayed effects resulting from their interaction with sequencing, timing, historical change, and duration.

**Near misses**: Such effects constitute a theoretically important but conceptually somewhat muddled category for exploring, slower moving, drawn out outcomes. Near misses share an affinity with counter-factual explanations that leverage potential outcomes to assess the robustness of causal inferences. (Kiser and Levi 1996) They can be thought of as observable rather than strictly hypothetical potential outcomes. The conceptual confusion comes from the fact that there are four different near misses—near miss events, near miss cases, negative cases, and counterfactual cases. Each of these near misses relies on a distinct type of comparison and makes a distinct contribution to theorizing.

Political defeats constitute actual *near miss events* that provide observable outcomes. Such outcomes tend to be ignored because, unlike political victories, they seem less directly relevant for understanding historical change. This neglect of political defeats, however, overlooks the fact that they frequently are part of the pre-history of subsequent political victories and as such provide important inductive clues for better explaining actual outcomes. Near miss events could involve, for example, a bill that never made it out of committee, a bill tabled but then withdrawn, a bill defeated in the legislature, or a bill signed into law but defeated in the courts, by a presidential veto, by a referendum, or some international agency. *Near-miss cases* de-historicize near miss events by stripping them of dates, converting them from events into cases—thus treating them as being historically independent of each other. Near miss cases are methodologically interesting because they increase the number of observations within a single case by treating earlier outcomes within a case as the equivalent of other cross-sectional outcomes. Near miss cases have an empirically more anemic cousin, *negative cases* that starts assuming a more counter-factual quality. Jim Mahoney and Gary Goertz define negative cases as involving an observable near-miss but the near miss is an artifact of the theoretical possibility of its probable occurrence. A negative case is assumed to have a probability of occurring (e.g., hence being near miss) because of the partial presence of the theorized causal factors that explain the outcomes in the positive cases (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). It thus differs from the near-miss case by being particularly counterfactual—it did not occur—but being empirically possible by having some theorized factors present. Finally, *counter-factual cases*, at least in their purest, most parlor-like fashion, imagine alternative historical paths of events that could have happened even though the possibility was very slim. Examples includes musing of what would have happened if Hitler successfully invaded England or would have defeated Stalin. (Ferguson 2000; For a more differentiated treatment, see Tetlock 1999)

**Sequencing**: In ordinary language, we talk about the sequence of day and night or the seasons and thus refer to fixed and recurring patterns *within* a single case. Or we talk about a sequence of events to reference a strictly chronological order. By contrast, CHA uses sequence to differentiate the temporal order of causal factors. Such so-called sequence analysis requires comparing two or more events *across* multiple cases to explore whether the order of those events varied. Sequencing involves a *before/after or simultaneity differentiation* to figure whether event x1 happened before x2 or happened concurrently compared to what the theory specified. Sequencing compares sets of qualitatively equivalent events across multiple cases, figures out whether they unfolded in the same temporal order, and then explores whether the variation in their sequencing affects the outcome (Falleti and Mahoney 2015). Robert Dahl argues that democratizations in which limited elite contestation—permitted by rule of law, a free press, and freedom of association—preceded universal male suffrage were more stable than democratizations with the reverse sequence. He contends that the contest-inclusion sequence made it easier to develop norms of compromise because elite contestation involved smaller and more homogeneous groups of actors (1971).

**Tempo:** Tempo measures the rate at which a particular phenomenon changes and thus allows *slow/fast* or *acceleration* differentiations. It plays a role in many political phenomena. (Grzymala-Busse 2011) Stefano Bartolini compares the tempo with which the franchise was expanded across various countries. (2000) Ron Hassner looks the role that tempo and duration play in territorial disputes. He explains the varying tempi with which countries entrench themselves in newly acquired territories in terms of the geographic constraints they faced and the symbolic significance of the territory itself. He then points out that the tempo of this entrenchment process affects the duration of the ensuing conflict with the country from which the territory was taken. (2007, 127–38)

**Temporal Heterogeneity:**Statistics stipulates unity homogeneity, that the units of analysis used to gather evidence are sufficiently uniform so that we can infer from aggregate causal effects, that have been observed across all cases, the workings of uniform causal mechanisms that are present in each case. Unit homogeneity has on closer inspection geographic and temporal dimension. The term is most frequently associated with geographic homogeneity that assumes that geographic differences across cases are sufficiently small to make it possible for drawing inferences from case-based findings for the larger population. Temporal heterogeneity extends this logic. It challenges the notion that causal effects are unaffected by the temporal order with they unfold. It points out that sequencing, timing, tempo and duration all involve variations in either the temporal order or the temporal dynamic in which causal factors unfold. Temporal heterogeneity thus directly challenges linear notions of causality and favors historical notion of causality. Temporal heterogeneity also recognizes that social phenomena are moving objects that qualitatively change through time and thus are subject to historical transformations.

**Timing**:Timing compares the dates of singular, qualitatively equivalent events across multiple cases and makes an ordinal distinction between cases in which those events occur *early/late* relative to each other. Timing thus benchmarks the analysis to the first occurrence of a particular phenomenon and then differentiates later occurrences of similar events in terms of how proximate or distal in time they took place relative to the first case. It is distinct from sequencing because it compares identical events across time rather than sets of distinct events. Sociologists, for example, found that sentencing taking place early in the day and later in the afternoon is more lenient than sentencing taking place around mid-day. Similarly, students perform better when exams are timed early and late in the day rather than mid-day. Sociologists explain these effects because the timing of the sentencing or exam-taking interacts with the biological clocks of judges or students to produce these varied outcomes (Pink 2018). Alexander Gerschenkron discovered that the timing of industrialization profoundly affected its tempo as late industrializers learn from early one and used this knowledge to develop their economies more quickly (1962).

## Appendix 1: Literature Review

Comparative historical analysis generally studies macro-historical phenomena whose explanations involved complex temporal dynamics.[[1]](#footnote-2) It therefore pivots back and forth between theoretical worlds that either are temporally homogeneous or heterogeneous and often eschews standard testing of hypothesis in favor of analytical narratives, abductive reasoning, and a folk Bayesianism. It also rests confidence in causal inferences not just in terms of evidentiary an ontological robustness, but also in terms of its consistency with the available foreknowledge on the subject matter. It therefore is important that we situate more fully the left threat thesis’ provenance, demonstrate its centrality in the broader literature, and document the ontological diversity in its analysis.

Table A.1. provides a genealogy of the PR literature that lumps individual works into four research cycles that are demarcated by methodological shifts. Individual works are classified as *historical* if they were mostly descriptive and atheoretical, *comparative-historical* if they combined descriptive with theoretical elements and operated under assumptions of temporal heterogeneity, *and variance-based* if they engaged in standard hypothesis testing, typically using statistical tools, and operated under assumptions of temporal homogeneity.

This genealogy underscores three broad methodological patterns. First, the initial two cycles were dominated by conventional and mostly descriptive political histories, just like the ones we used for the Swedish case. Second, very few contributions during the third and fourth cycles employed only a variance-based research design but instead combined it with CHA. Strikingly, scholars in the fourth cycle relied their CHA analysis to sort out theoretical impasses encountered in the third cycle. Third, the literature converged around an updated version of Rokkan and Boix’s original left threat thesis. Table A.1. indicates this convergence by italicizing authors who elaborated on the original left threat thesis.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **Historical Analysis** | | **CHA** | | **Variance Based Analysis** | **Scholarly Works** |
| **First Cycle** | 1880s-1900s | **** | | -- | | -- | Journalist accounts, parliamentary proceedings | |
| 1910s-40s | **** | | -- | | -- | **(**Braunias 1932) | |
| **Second Cycle** | 1950s | **** | | -- | | -- | (Campbell 1965; Ziegler 1956) | |
| 1960s | **** | | -- | | -- | (Butler 1963; Eckelberry 1964; Rokkan 1968; Sternberger 1969; Törnudd 1968) | |
| 1970s | **** | | -- | | -- | (Finer 1975) | |
| 1980s | ** ** | | -- -- | | -- -- | (Carstairs 1980)  (Schanbacher 1982) | |
| **Third Cycle** | 1990s | -- -- | | **** -- | | -- **** | (J. M. Colomer 1998) **(Boix 1999)** | |
| 2000s | ------ -- -- ---- | | ****  **** -- **** -- -- -- | | -- -- **** -- -- ** ** | (Grofman and Lijphart 2002)  (J. Colomer 2004)  (Blais, Dobrzynska, and Indridason 2005 et al.) (Alesina and Glaeser 2004)  (Penadés 2008)  (J. Colomer 2007) (Calvo 2009) | |
|  | ------ | | **** ** --** | | **  ** | (Andrews and Jackman 2005)  (J. Colomer 2005) (Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007) | |
| **Fourth Cycle** | 2010-14 | **-- -- -- --** | | ** ** ** ** | | -- -- -- -- | (Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2010)\*\*  (Lundell 2010)  (Renwick 2010)  (Pilon 2013) | |
|  | **-- -- -- -- -- --** | | **** **** **** -- -- -- | | *-- --* ******  ** | *(Ahmed 2013)  (Barzachka 2014)\*\*  (Boix 2010)  (Kreuzer 2010)  (Leeman and Mares 2014)\*\**  (Schröder and Manow 2014)\*\* | |
| 2015-19 | **--** -- | | **** -- | | -- -- | (Santucci 2017)\*\*  (Iversen and Soskice 2019) | |
|  | **-- -- --** | | **** **** **** | | **  ** | *(Cox, Fiva, and Smith 2019)\*\**  (Walter and Emmenegger 2019)\*\* *(Emmenegger and Walter 2019)\*\** | |
| Next | 2020s |  | Unexplored | |  | |  | |

**Table A.1: Genealogy of PR Literature**

The knowledge accumulation of the PR literature results because scholars leverage the complementarities historical, eventful, and variance-based analysis. Table A.1. documents this dialogue and the five research cycles it produced. Authors in italics indicate works that Rokkan/Boix left threat thesis. \*\* mark single country studies.

*First and Second Research Cycles (1880s to 1980s):*  the first research cycle (1880s-1940s) involved contemporaneous accounts of PR adoption as well as normative debates about whether to choose first-past-the-post systems, that prioritize geographic, or PR system that favor group-based notions of representation. They often had a journalistic quality. The second cycle (1950s-80s) comprised traditional political histories that predate the left threat thesis and that were atheoretical and very descriptive. Rokkan’s 1968 formulation of the left-threat thesis is the one exception (1968). He used the patterns described in other works to formulate the first tentative explanation. The first two cycles constitute the pre-history of the left threat thesis.

*Third Research Cycle (1990s and 2000s)*: Boix elaborated Rokkan’s thesis and subjected it to the first empirical test (1999). His article, in turn, was replicated and challenged by seven alternative hypotheses (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Andrews and Jackman 2005; Blais, Dobrzynska, and Indridason 2005; Calvo 2009; J. Colomer 2005, 2007; Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007). Four other contributions studied different aspects about the origins of PR without directly explaining its adoption (J. Colomer 2004; J. M. Colomer 1998; Grofman and Lijphart 2002; Penadés 2008). Boix and six of the seven articles challenging him used variance-based analysis. Some combined it with case-based analysis. This cycle was marked by the smallest knowledge cumulation as seven articles advanced seven different theories and failed to replicate any of the earlier results. These studies produced merely results and were temporally and geographically far too homogeneous to turn those results into genuine answers. It was marked by the gladiatorial testing of barely test-worthy hypotheses. These hypotheses were little more than conjectures that were theoretically poorly grounded. They were imported from other historical contexts without paying close attention to the differences in contexts. Scholars were more interested in falsifying the findings of their competitors than to consult the case studies from the first two cycles or engage in their own eventful analysis. This cycle produced more results than answers. The falsifications of the left threat thesis and its proposed alternatives were subsequently largely and rightly ignored in subsequent research.

*Fourth Research Cycle (2010-20s):* The fourth cycle corrected the ad hoc testing of the third cycle. Three factors contributed to these advances. First, CHA works became more prominent during the fourth cycle. Amel Ahmed (2013), Dennis Pillon (2013), Nina Barzachka (2014), and Jack Santucci (2017) employed CHA that was partly motivated by the shortcomings of the third research cycle. Second, variance-based studies shifted from analyzing cross-sectional, national level election outcomes to analyzing single country district-level election results (Cox, Fiva, and Smith 2019; Emmenegger and Walter 2019; Leeman and Mares 2014; Schröder and Manow 2014, 2014; Walter and Emmenegger 2019). This shift dramatically increased the number of observations because the number of electoral districts in each country were far more numerous than the countries adopting PR. Focusing on a single case also allowed scholars to pay closer attention to the quality of the data as well as theoretical confounders (Pepinsky 2019). Third, more scholars incorporated CHA analysis. Boix and Cusack et al., who during the third cycle, did just conventional hypothesis testing now engaged in CHA (2010; 2010).

*Fifth Research Cycle (2020s to present):* This fifth research cycle is just starting and will face the challenge of how to generalize the robust but country specific explanations of the fourth cycle. This challenge requires better theorizing. Most fourth-generation studies remain vague to what extent their contributions are direct challenges or extensions of the left threat thesis and thus hand down numerous theoretical loose ends. It hopefully will also pay, as our study does, pay closer attention to sequencing, timing, historical change, and duration as well as the role of public opinion.

Overall, this retracing these research cycles validates our decision to build our analysis around the left threat thesis. It clearly is the default theory in the literatures and lacks any equally prominent and equally vetted alternative explanation.

## Appendix 2: Supplementary Process Tracing Evidence

Our analysis uses evidence from political historians to confirm most key implications of the left threat thesis. Here we add longer citations that underscores the broad scale support for the link between left threat, minority protection and PR adoption in Sweden.

Robert Eckelberry wrote:

“It is significant that PR reemerged in the Swedish political debates in 1891. Electoral reform was sporadically demanded as early as the late 1860s but did not become a burning issue until the 1890s. The 1890s climaxed in a period of domestic unrest in Sweden. Urbanization and industrialization produced a large ‘politically conscious’ working class which challenged the constitutional arrangement of the ‘old order.’ The focal point of this discontent was the electoral system. The working class objected to being excluded from the franchise and demanded the right to vote in order that their voice might be heard in the Swedish Parliament. […] And as the cries for a democratization of the suffrage became louder, the Conservatives, as defenders of the old order, began to search for an electoral device that would mitigate the effects of the suffrage extension. Bishop Gottfrid Billing was one of the most perceptive and independent members of the First Chamber. He urged the adoption of a wider suffrage combined with ‘guarantees’ that would ‘forestall or mitigate the dangers of an extension’. In plain language these dangers reduced themselves to a single one—the sudden displacement of the traditional elite by a parliamentary working class majority—and the ‘guarantees’ that Billing had in mind included a scale of multiple votes (up to 5) according to income, military service a pre-condition for voting, higher voting age, cancellation of per-diems for lower house members, and proportional representation” (1964, 31–32).

Robert Eckleberry citing from 1902 Royal Commission to study PR.

“The purpose of an extension of the suffrage is not merely to extend the formal right to vote. The purpose must be to unconditionally secure different social classes, and more importantly, different ideologies, aa real influence on the representation composition. But this goal is only imperfectly achieved through the universal suffrage, if one maintains a method of voting which allows the majority alone to make itself heard. The real right to a voice in decisions in the nation’s affairs means the right of the voter, in so far as is possible, to become represented. A real universal suffrage demands, therefore, that this right as possible be extended to minorities. This purpose can be won through proportional voting. In principle must this method of voting be considered as an inseparable part of the universal program” (1964, 48). In effect asks for descriptive representation as logical extension of democratization.

Andrew Carstairs:

“From about 1900, the Conservatives reconciled themselves to an extension of the franchise through the reduction of property qualifications for electoral, and concentrated instead on ensuring that, in spite of the growth of the Liberal and Social Democratic votes, Conservatives representation should be safeguarded in both chambers of parliament. After Bostrom, a Conservative, became chancellor in 1900, he introduced a Bill providing for the extension of the franchise to men aged 25, with a safeguard in favor of mature and responsible (that is, Conservative) voters by confining the vote to taxpayers who were liable to conscription and giving an extra vote to married and older man. This proposal was rejected by both chambers. It was at this point that PR, which had earlier been proposed by Bishop Gottfrid Billing in 1892, was put forward as an alternative ‘safeguards’ of property qualifications” (1980, 102).

Dankwart Rustow:

Conservatives “began to feel that universal suffrage, at least for the lower house, would prove inevitable. The entry of the working class into the plutocratically defined electorate must have contributed to this impression. So surely did the mounting organized extra-parliamentary pressure. Foreign events drove home a similar lesson: Norway widened its franchise in 1894 and 1897, Great Britain in 1893, and Finland in 1906 … It was in this frame of mind that leading Conservatives were beginning to look for what they called ‘guarantees’—not to prevent the adoption of universal suffrage but to alleviate it. As early as 1892 Bishop Gottfrid Billing expressed this attitude: ‘Rather stronger guarantees and further expansion of this suffrage than weaker guarantees and a lesser extension” (1971, 22).

Leif Lewin wrote:

“Even the Conservatives had to accept universal manhood suffrage. But question was whether the country—confronted by a militant Left …—should continue to elect is MPs by a majority method in which the winner took all and the loser got nothing. This method would soon put the Left in a totally dominant position in Swedish politics. … there was good reason to ensure some minority protection by switching to a proportional representation system of elections” (1988, 71) .

## Appendix 3: Annotated Chronology

Table 3 offers a very abridged chronology of the key constitutional reform bills and laws that marked Sweden’s transition from a constitutional monarchy established in 1866 to a full democracy by 1918. We therefore provide here a more detailed constitutional chronology that served as the empirical basis for our analysis.

#### 1866 Constitution

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| --- | --- |
| **Constitutional Choice** | **Proposed Changes** |
| Lower House PR | Indirect elections but gradually shifted to direct elections in single member FPTP systems. Urban districts by turn of the century came to use blocked voting systems. (Explained further in the text) |
| Upper House PR | Indirectly elected one member for every 30’000 inhabitants. For nine years. Upper house was elected through electors in the County Council who in turn were elected by local councils and municipal governments (Eckelberry 1964, 23; Verney 1957, 91–92). |
| Lower House Franchise | Male franchise needed to own property of at least 1,000 riksdaler, lease property of 6’000 riskdaler or have an annual income of 800 riskdaler (Eckelberry 1964, 24, 1964, 24). |
| Upper House Franchise | Adults over 21 years old. Need to pay local taxes. Multiple votes for rural Council elections unlimited (later limited to 5000). For towns limited to 100 votes. To be elected needed property value of at least 80,000 riksdaler and annual income of 4’000 riskdaler. |
| Parliamentarization | Separation of powers between King and parliament, giving the King the right to appoint and dismiss the PM, cabinet members as well as dissolve parliament. These norms change gradually and informally rather than through a constitutional amendment. The King used his powers only sparingly from 1866-1905 in part because always had Conservative parliamentary majorities (Verney 1957, 112–19). The upper house was modeled after US Senate (Verney 1957, 67). |

#### 1896 Annerstedt Reform Bill

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| --- | --- |
| **Constitutional Choice** | **Proposed Changes** |
| Lower House PR | PR would substitute for plurality and blocked vote systems in large cities. This was intended to cut into the advantages that Liberals and Socialists enjoyed in urban districts. (Eckelberry 1964, 37). |
| Upper House PR | No change proposed |
| Lower House Franchise | The income barrier should be lowered from 800 to 600 SEK and the rent barrier from 6000 to 3000 SEK, while the property barrier should remain unchanged.  Voters who had not paid their taxes to the state and commune in full for two years prior to the election would be disqualified (Eckelberry 1964, 36). |
| Upper House Franchise | No changes proposed |
| Bicameralism | No changes proposed |
| Parliamentarization | No change proposed |
| Outcome | Bill was rejected by 102 to 26 in upper house and 131 to 82 in the lower house (Eckelberry 1964, 36). |

#### 1902 Otter Reform Bills

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Constitutional Choice** | **Proposed Changes** |
| Lower House PR | Restricting to reduce urban districts and merged them with rural districts. Government bill contained no PR provisions. Was added through private motion (Eckelberry 1964, 43–44). |
| Upper House PR | No change |
| Lower House Franchise | Widening franchise for taxpayers, 25 year or older, and income of 450 riksdaler, extra vote for married men over 40 (Eckelberry 1964, 42; Verney 1957, 138) |
| Upper House Franchise | No changes proposed |
| Bicameralism | No changes proposed |
| Parliamentarization | No changes proposed |
| Outcome | Defeated, led to resignation of PM Otter (Eckelberry 1964, 44). |

#### 1903 Boström Reform Bill

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| --- | --- |
| **Constitutional Choice** | **Proposed Changes** |
| Lower House PR | Plans to divide Sweden into 33 constituencies with no more than 14 seats. Districts should be mixed, so that they incorporated cities and rural areas. This contributed to suspicion among Liberals because under the proposal the seats in urban districts would have been reduced. And rural districts were afraid that this would weaken rural districts by combining them with cities (Eckelberry 1964, 49). |
| Upper House PR | No change (No part of the bill even though demanded by Liberals) (Verney 1957, 140). |
| Lower House Franchise | 1903 Boström Bill: franchise expansion for lower house for men 25 of age, having done military service, were not welfare recipients or in arrears with taxes, and an extra vote was to be given to married and older men. After it was rejected, property qualifications were replaced with PR for both houses of parliament (Eckelberry 1964, 49–50; 2019b, 141; Verney 1957, 142; Carstairs 1980, 102 He reports that bill involved double PR.). |
| Upper House Franchise | Grade voting based on income, extra vote |
| Bicameralism | Liberals demanded limiting its powers did not become part of the bill (Verney 1957, 142–42). |
| Parliamentarization | No changes proposed |
| Outcome | Was defeated. |
| Other | PM Berström appoints Royal PR Commission in October 1902. Report findings by summer 1903. Commission recommends PR (Eckelberry 1964, 46). |

#### 1904/05 Berger Reform Bill

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Constitutional Choice** | **Proposed Changes** |
| Lower House PR | PR |
| Upper House PR | No changes proposed |
| Lower House Franchise | Universal male suffrage, military service required, free of bankruptcy, and local taxpayer. Estimate that would have tripled the electorate (Eckelberry 1964, 55). |
| Upper House Franchise | Ignore Royal PR Commissions’ recommendations on changing indirect elections. (No details mentioned) (Eckelberry 1964, 56) |
| Bicameralism | No changes proposed |
| Parliamentarization | No changes proposed |
| Outcome | The Upper Chamber accepted it (93 to 50), but Lower Chamber rejected it. Was defeated in complicated parliamentary procedure (Eckelberry 1964, 59–60). |
| Other | The Government more or less re-introduced the 1904 in 1905. It was again rejected (Eckelberry 1964, 70–74). |

#### 1906 Staaff Bill

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| --- | --- |
| **Constitutional Choice** | **Proposed Changes** |
| Lower House PR | Each constituency would return one member. Also proposed a run-off. This was meant to both improve the chances of smaller parties. Also, Liberals as more centrist parties were hoping to be in a better position in the run-off ballots. Increased number of rural districts relative to urban districts (Eckelberry 1964, 78; Verney 1957, 145). |
| Upper House PR | Staaff also insisted on PR for both City and Council elections as well as for the indirect election of member to the First Chamber. |
| Lower House Franchise | Male suffrage to men over 24 years, not bankrupt, nor receiving poor relief. So franchise almost same as in 1903 and 1904 (Eckelberry 1964, 79). |
| Upper House Franchise | No changes proposed |
| Bicameralism | Not addressed because needed support of upper house (Eckelberry 1964, 89–91). |
| Parliamentarization | No changes proposed |

#### 1907 Lindman Law

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Constitutional Choice** | **Proposed Changes** |
| Lower House PR | 56 constituencies were to be formed, in which (except for the six largest town constituencies) town and country were mixed (Verney 1957, 169). |
| Upper House PR | PR extended to Provincial and Council Elections as well as to the Electoral college selecting the upper house Members (Carstairs 1980, 102; Verney 1957, 169). |
| Lower House Franchise | Universal male but over 20% were disqualified because of unpaid taxes or receiving poor relief. An income of 12000 SEK was necessary in the towns and 15000 in the country (Eckelberry 1964, 101; Verney 1957, 169). |
| Upper House Franchise | Plural vote would be lowered from 100 to 40 in towns and 5000 in the country. (Verney 1957, 169) Double PR. PR for lower house would be applied to county councils and big city councils the served as electors for the Upper Chamber (Eckelberry 1964, 101; Lewin 1988, 73–74). |
| Bicameralism | Term length of upper house shortened from nine to six years (Verney 1957). |
| Parliamentarization | No changes proposed |
| Other | Increase the electorate from 200’000 in 1866 and 500’000 in 1905 to over a million in 1907. Increased to 3,200,000 after 1918 with introduction of female franchise (Verney 1957, 249). |

#### 1918 (Spring):

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Constitutional Choice | Proposed Changes |
| Lower House PR | No changes proposed |
| Upper House PR | No changes proposed |
| Lower House Franchise | Universal male and female suffrage |
| Upper House Franchise | Universal male and female suffrage with tax payment requirement. To be eligible to served had to own property valued 50,00 crowns or annual income of 3,000 crowns. Still indirectly elected (Verney 1957, 206). |
| Bicameralism | No changes proposed |
| Parliamentarization | No changes proposed |
| Outcome | Failed because Conservatives and upper house found the reforms to radical. |

#### 1918 (December):

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Constitutional Choice | Proposed Changes |
| Lower House PR | Number of constituencies reduced from 56 to 28 increasing the district magnitude from 4.1. to 8.1. Also permission of apparentments to facilitate vote pooling and further increase proportionality (Carstairs 1980, 104; Sarlvik 2002, 243; Verney 1957, 213). |
| Upper House PR | No changes proposed |
| Lower House Franchise | Female franchise. Condition of tax payment and military service abolished. (changed from Spring version). Bankruptcy and poverty restriction abolished only in 1944 (Caramani 2000 Appendix; Sarlvik 2002, 241). |
| Upper House Franchise | Same as lower house but applied to City and Council elections. Upper house still directly elected. Retained financial qualifications for being able to serve in the upper house. Either 50,000 crown in property or 3,000 crown in annual income (Verney 1957, 12,49,206). |
| Bicameralism | Remained unchanged. Appointment of government required a majority of votes of both houses combined. Term for upper house expanded from six to eight years with one eights of seats elected each hear. Term for lower house expanded from three to four years (Sarlvik 2002, 242; Verney 1957, 213). |
| Parliamentarization | Established informally after 1907 election completing Sweden’s silent parliamentarization. Establishing parliamentary sovereignty over appointing the government, dissolving parliament and calling early elections accomplished without a formal constitutional amendment (Verney 1957, 202–3). Parliamentarization: term for upper house expanded from six to eight years with one eights of seats elected each hear. Term for lower house expanded from three to four years (Sarlvik 2002, 242). |

## Appendix 4: Uncertainty and Institutional Design

Throughout our analysis, we linked sequencing, timing, historical change, and duration to uncertainty, thus following CHA’s practice of recasting the narratives offered by political historians in broader, more theoretical terms. We chose uncertainty because the literature on institutional design places it at the center of its analysis. It links uncertainty to the complexities that actors face in assessing ex ante the political consequences of large-scale constitutional reforms. Economic institutionalists have long recognized that broader constitutional arrangements or property rights reduce uncertainty in economic decision-making by extending actors’ time horizons and facilitating so-called credible mutual commitments. (Greif 2006; Greif and Laitin 2004; North and Thomas 1976; On the distinction between economic and other forms of institutionalism, see P. A. Hall and Taylor 1996) The work of economic institutionalist also has been influential in comparative politics and has been applied to explain the choice of electoral systems (Andrews and Jackman 2005; Shvetsova 2003) as well as democratizations more broadly. (Alexander 2002a, 2002b; Przeworski 1991) It differentiates between different types of uncertainty. Adam Przeworski argues that transitions to democracy end when actors shift from an environment of *systemic uncertainty*—“where actors do not know what can happen”—to a situation of *institutionalized uncertainty*—"where they know what is possible and likely to happen” (1991, 11; See also Blyth 2006, 495–98). Systemic uncertainty is akin to the uncertainty created by Sweden’s complex sequencing, early timing, historical change, and duration. It can also be linked—in an even more dramatic scenario—to the threat of civil war in cases where constitutional negotiations break down and parties start resorting to violence. Institutionalized uncertainty, in turn, describes the situation after the 1907 and 1918 reform laws. These laws constructed a more level playing field by removing the constitutional advantages of Conservatives. This revised playing field reduced the costs of losing by assuring all actors that they could repose their demands and turn today’s defeat into tomorrow’s potential victory. It is the institutions’ ability to make losses temporary that institutionalizes uncertainty (1991, 11–14). Parenthetically, Przeworski’s distinction between systemic and institutionalized uncertainty is identical to economists’ distinction between uncertainty—a world with unknowable probabilities—and risk—a world with knowable probabilities. (Blyth 2006, 495–98; Knight 1921)

Przeworski treats systematic uncertainty as his starting point—a kind of state of nature—and institutionalized uncertainty as his end point—a world in which institutions civilize political conflict by turning it into competition. Consequently, he leaves unaddressed the transitional process through which actors move from systemic to institutionalized uncertainty. Dankwart Rustow’s influential article “Transitions to Democracy” fills this gap (1970). He shifts his analysis from Przeworski’s world of equilibria analysis to a more historical and eventful world in which it is possible to observe generative processes that move actors from systemic to institutionalized uncertainty. He points to learning as the mechanism that lowers uncertainty and allows actors to move into a world of institutionalized, more risk-based uncertainty. This learning mechanism involves imagining and then agreeing on institutional compromises that are second-best for all actors. If no party gets everything, the agreed upon constitutional compromise institutionalizes uncertainty and permits, given certain background conditions, transitions to democracy (D. Rustow 1970, 355–57). Interestingly enough, Rustow derived this influential theoretical insight from studying the 1907 Lindman Law. He wrote that the law “was about equally distasteful to Conservatives (who would have rather continued the old plutocratic voting system) and to the Liberals and Socialists (who wanted majority rule undiluted by PR” (1970, 357).

## Appendix 5: Timing, Informational Deficit and Uncertainty

Assessing the informational challenges associated with being an early PR adopter is difficult because understanding what actors did or did not understand about the various electoral system requires very fine-grained evidence. We were able to identify three sources of evidence, the deliberation of the 1902/03 and 1907 Royal Commissions on Proportional Election Methods, the actual provenance of the PR system, and the 1907 parliamentary debates. These three sources offer contradictory evidence and permit only tentative conclusions.

The 1902/03 Royal Commission involved eight members representing different parties and one mathematician and it articulated a cogent argument in favor of PR (Sverige, Riksdagen 1904, 6). It linked PR to the expansion of the franchise and the goal of representing groups interests more effectively. “The intentions must unconditionally be to ensure different social classes … to have real influence on the composition of representation. […] A real universal suffrage therefore requires that this right to the extent that it can be extended to the minorities as well. This purpose is achieved through the proportional choice” (Sverige, Riksdagen 1904, 68–69 (Authors’ translation)). The report also contained insightful discussions about PR’s organizational implications, the different electoral formula, and the limitations to engineer proportional outcomes in single-member districts through re-districting (Sverige, Riksdagen 1904, 68, 79). Overall, the report provided a clear normative argument in favor of adopting PR, but it never addressed the partisan effect of providing minority protection to conservatives or how it might affect the legislative prospects of socialists. The report’s inability to draw on the experience of other PR cases thus did not prevent it from understanding the general principles of PR. It was less clear whether the Commission left the more political implications unaddressed because it was supposed to be non-partisan or because the early timing of the PR adoption deprived it of case studies to fully understand them.

What remains puzzling is the contrast between the Commission’s clear understanding about PR’s general features, and the very peculiar idiosyncratic elements that ended up in the final law and the poorly informed parliamentary debates leading up to its adoption.

Sweden adopted a unique PR system whose features had a distinctly domestic provenance untouched by the few available foreign examples. Robert Dahl used an intriguing analogy to think about the origins of institutions. He contended that the origins of democracies should be less thought of along the lines of the steam engine, invented in one place and then replicated elsewhere, and more along the lines of language that was invented independently of each other in multiple different localities (1998, 4–6). Sweden’s PR adoption follows more closely the language analogy. We already described the peculiar blocked voting system used before 1907 in urban districts. This complicated system became the template for Sweden’s PR system which also allowed parties to pool votes by creating electoral alliances, permitted voters to rank-order candidates, write in candidates’ names, and combine them from different lists (Braunias 1932, 485–90; Janson 2018, 75–78; Proportional Representation Society 1908). This home-grown nature of Sweden’s PR system is apparent when compared to the other two PR systems in existence at the time. Sweden’s PR had no resemblance to Finland’s even more peculiar PR system (Carstairs 1980, 114–15; Wendt von 1906) and the more standard Belgian closed list system. Furthermore, the transnational network of PR groups that would contribute to the convergence of more standard PR systems had not yet emerged. The British Proportional Representation Society became the clearing house for those transnational efforts to diffuse information about PR through publishing newsletters and organizing pan-European conferences. But it was not founded until 1907, the same year Sweden adopted PR (Bol, Pilet, and Riera 2015; Carstairs 1980; Lijphart 1987).

The domestic provenance of Sweden’s PR system also was evident in parliamentary debates. We did a full text search for the 1907 legislative proceedings of the two chambers to see how often electoral system of other countries were mentioned. As Table A.2. shows, neighboring Finland was mentioned most frequently. It is difficult to see what inferences Swedish legislators could have drawn from Finland’s electoral system given that it was so different and that it was used for the first time in March 1907. The discussions about Finland’s electoral system were very general and showed no command of its actual functioning. PR supporters, for example, used Finland to illustrate that elections were peaceful, while opponents of PR dismissed this point by arguing Finland could not be compared to Sweden. The parliamentary debates remained at this level of generality and thus underscored the absence of any cross-national learning effects. (Sweden, Riksdagen, Andra kammaren (1867-1948) 1907a, 69-70 (Petterson), 104 (Kronlund) Parenthesis indicate name of deputy) Other comments were factually incorrect such as using the UK as an example for the progress of PR. (Sverige, Riksdagen, Första kammaren (1867-1948) 1907, 11 (Count Grefve)) It is not surprising that parties were slow to form their preferences and settle on an electoral system.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Country | Upper House (First Chamber) | Lower House (Second Chamber) |
| Australia | 0 | 0 |
| Belgium | 1 | 5 |
| Denmark | 0 | 0 |
| England | 1 | 1 |
| Finland | 3 | 14 |
| France | 1 | 3 |
| Germany | 1 | 1 |
| Netherlands | 0 | 0 |
| USA | 0 | 0 |
| Switzerland | 1 | 0 |

**Table A.2: Learning Effects**

We counted discussions to foreign electoral systems during the 1907 legislative session that passed the Lindman Law. We tabulated multiple mentions of an electoral system during a deputy’s single interpellation is one mentioning. Source: (Sweden, Riksdagen, Andra kammaren (1867-1948) 1907a, 1907b, 1907c).

Overall, we were unable to definitely determine whether the Royal Commission Reports or parliamentary debates reflected more accurately the foreknowledge that the Riksdag brought to its electoral system deliberation. We are inclined to give more weight to the parliamentary debates because they involved more actors and also touched more directly on the political implications that the Royal Reports left unaddressed. This tentative conclusion ultimately is not overly problematic because the Riksdag’s informational deficit played a secondary role when compared to the uncertainty resulting from sequencing and historical change.

## Appendix 6: Historical Transformation of Minority Protections

We had to rely on circumstantial evidence to assess public attitudes towards the various minority protections. We used references to public attitude in the political histories and, where unavailable, used the preferences of parties as a proxy indicator.

|  |
| --- |
| Property or Tax Requirement Lower House   * Low public acceptance since 1880s. * Sources: see section on social movements. |
| Property or Tax Requirements Upper House   * Not quite as low as for lower house because more people could vote. But the vote diluted by plural voting. * Source: see text for sources |
| Multiple Votes for Upper House   * Not quite as low as for lower house because more people could vote. But the vote diluted by plural voting. |
| Indirect Election for Upper House   * Indirection to the upper house always were a secondary issue to its very restrictive franchise. Liberal and Conservatives welcome the indirect election as well as the partial annual renewal as a counterweight to more rapidly and intermittently changes in the composition of the lower house. Socialists disliked the indirect elections until the 1918 franchise reform dramatically increased their seat share in it. * Sources: (Verney 1957). |
| Symmetrical Bicameralism. Moderate acceptance, particularly if upper house would be democratized. Was kept of the reform bills because did not want to alienate the upper house who could veto any curtailments of its powers.   * Conservatives strongly support the status quo bicameralism * Socialists opposed bicameralism seeing that it gave Conservatives a de facto veto point, especially with the restrictive vote and indirect election for the upper house. They strongly preferred a unicameral legislature or giving the upper house no more than a suspensive veto. * Liberals opposed bicameralism given for the same reasons as Socialists. But they were supportive of reformed British style asymmetrical bi-cameralism and where the upper house would be directly elected by universal franchise. * Sources: (Eckelberry 1964, 88–92, 102, 104, 111). |
| Limited Parliamentarization. Low acceptance, heightened salience after 1914 when King reasserted his prerogatives.   * Conservatives only moderately supported it. Deputies wanted to maintain autonomy from too much royal inference. * Liberals strongly opposed because had won parliamentary majorities and wanted to appoint their own PR and cabinet members. * Socialists also strongly opposed to point where some of its factions even supported abolishing the monarchy. * Sources: (Carstairs 1980, 101; Eckelberry 1964, 102; Ericsson and Nyzell 2017, 337–40; Lewin 1988, 102–4). |
| PR for Both Houses. Strongly supported, but temporarily contested between 1902-1904.   * PR had strong public support as the proportional translation of votes into seats was seen as the logical extension of the franchise expansion. Both Royal PR Commission strongly endorsed PR. * However, Liberals and Socialists began to oppose from 1902 onwards for largely strategic reasons in order to gain more democratic concessions from Conservatives but also realizing that it might translated their votes more efficiently into seats. There also were periodic anti PR demonstrations. * Sources: (Eckelberry 1964, 58–65, 97–98; Lewin 1988, 85–86). |

**Table A.3. Coding of Public Acceptance of Minority Protections**

## Appendix 7: Sources for Comparative Chronology:

* Parliamentary Sovereignty: (Penadés 2008, 211). Penadés lists 1848 as year for Denmark’s full parliamentarization. Jørgen Møller argued it was only 1901 that the Danish King fully relinquished the right to appoint the government irrespective of parliamentary majorities. (Personal communication)
* Founding of Socialist Parties and their Electoral Viability: (For electoral viability Ahmed 2013, 197; For founding dates Bartolini 2000, 246).
* Suffrage: (Flora 1983; Penadés 2008, 211).
* First PR Adoption and Near Misses: The coding is very incomplete for many countries leading us to have most likely numerous near misses not covered in Carstairs and other rather macro-scale political histories. (For Belgium Barzachka 2014, 214; Ahmed 2013, 166–83) (For Denmark Carstairs 1980, 79–80; Elklit 2002, 69–71) (For France Ahmed 2013, 157–58) (For Germany Ziegler 1956, 97, 100) (For Italy Boix 2010, 3) (For Netherlands Carstairs 1980) (For Norway Carstairs 1980) (For Switzerland Klöti 1901; Lutz 2004; Walter and Emmenegger 2019) (For UK Ahmed 2013, 123; Andrews and Jackman 2005, 74–75; For Belgium Barzachka 2014, 214; For Italy Boix 2010, 3; For Denmark Carstairs 1980, 79–80; Elklit 2002, 69–71; For Switzerland Klöti 1901; Lutz 2004; Walter and Emmenegger 2019; For Germany Ziegler 1956, 97, 100).
* PR Adoption: (Penadés 2008, 211).
* Reversals and Updates: (For France see also Cole Alistair and Campbell Peter 1989; Penadés 2008, 211).

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1. Appendix 1 is drawn from Kreuzer (2023, 67–71). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)