**Appendix**

Table A1. List of left parties in Western Europe (1871-2020).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **N** | **Parties in the Left bloc** |
| Austria | 2 | Social Democratic Party of Austria; Communist Party of Austria |
| Belgium | 6 | Belgian Workers’ Party; Belgian Socialist Party\*; Francophone Socialist Party; Flemish Socialist Party; Communist Party; Labour Party of Belgium |
| Cyprus | 3 | Progressive Party of Working People; Movement for Social Democracy; Democratic Socialist Renewal Movement |
| Denmark | 6 | Social Democrats; Communist Party of Denmark; Socialist People's Party; Left Socialists; Common Course; Red-Green Alliance |
| Finland | 3 | Left Alliance; Social Democratic Party of Finland; Democratic Alternative |
| France | 9 | Socialist Party; Independent Socialists; Unified Socialist Party; French Communist Party/Front de Gauche; Unbowed France; Workers' Struggle; Revolutionary Communist League; Extreme gauche; Other gauche |
| Germany | 4 | Social Democratic Workers’ Party/Social Democratic Party of Germany; Communist Party of Germany; Independent Social Democrats; Party of Democratic Socialism-LINKE |
| Greece | 9 | Panhellenic Socialist Movement; Communist Party of Greece; Communist Party of Greece-Interior; Coalition of the Left/Syriza; Democratic Social Movement; Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left; Democratic Left; Movement of Democratic Socialists; Popular Unity |
| Iceland | 7 | Social Democratic Party; Communist Party; People's Alliance; Alliance of Social Democrats; National Awakening-People's Movement; Social Democratic Alliance; People's Party |
| Ireland | 8 | Labour Party; Irish Worker League; National Labour Party; National Progressive Democrats; Workers' Party; Socialist Party; People Before Profit Alliance; Democratic Left |
| Italy | 14 | Italian Communist Party/Democratic Party of the Left/Democrats of the Left/Democratic Party; Italian Socialist Party/Italian Democratic Socialists; Reformist Socialist Party; Independent Socialists; Italian Socialist Democratic Party; Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity; Proletarian Democracy; Proletarian Unity Party; Communist Refoundation Party; Party of the Italian Communists; Left, Ecology and Freedom; Civil Revolution; Free and Equal; Power to the People |
| Luxembourg | 4 | Socialist Workers' Party; Communist Party of Luxembourg; Independent Socialists; The Left |
| Malta | 2 | Labour Party; Malta Workers' Party |
| Netherlands | 6 | Social Democratic Workers/Labour Party; Social Democratic League; Revolutionary Socialist Party; Communist Party of the Netherlands; Pacifist Socialist Party; Socialist Party |
| Norway | 5 | Norwegian Labour Party; Social Democratic Workers' Party; Communist Party of Norway; Socialist People's Party/Socialist Left Party; Red Electoral Alliance/Red Party |
| Portugal | 10 | Socialist Party; Unified Democratic Coalition; People's Socialist Front; Movement of Socialist Left; Communist Party of Portuguese Workers; Workers Party of Socialist Unity; Revolutionary Socialist Party; Popular Democratic Union; Portuguese Democratic Movement; Bloc of the Left; |
| Spain | 6 | Spanish Socialist Workers Party; Communist Party of Spain-United Left; People's Socialist Party-Socialist Unity; Party of Labour of Spain; Workers' Party of Spain-Communist Unity Board; *Podemos* |
| Sweden | 5 | Social Democratic Party; Left Socialists; Communist Party of Sweden/Left Party; Hoglund Communists; Kilbom Communists/Socialist Party; |
| Switzerland | 4 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland; Communist Party; Swiss Party of Labour; Progressive Organizations of Switzerland |
| UK | 1 | Independent Labour Party/Labour Party |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 114 |  |
|  |  |  |

\*It includes Liberal-Socialist Cartels in early years.

Sources: Bartolini and Mair (1990); Bartolini (2000); Emanuele (2021). Notice that parties that never reach 1% of the national vote share in parliamentary elections (Lower House) have been excluded.

Table A2. Comparison between Bartolini’s (1998) original GPI and our revised version.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Government status of the party | Cabinet status in parliament | Party status in cabinet | Bartolini's GPI | Revised GPI |
|
|  | Single-party majority | Leading | 13 | 10 |
|  | Minimum winning coalition | Leading | 12 | 9 |
|  |  | Equal | 9 |  |
|  |  | Junior | 7 | 6 |
| In cabinet | Surplus coalition | Leading | 11 | 8 |
|  |  | Equal | 8 |  |
|  |  | Junior | 4 | 4 |
|  | Single-party minority | Leading | 10 | 7 |
|  | Multi-party minority | Leading | 6 | 5 |
|  |  | Equal | 5 |  |
|  |  | Junior | 3 | 3 |
| Necessary external support | Single- or multi-party minority |  | 2 | 2 |
| Necessary abstention | Single- or multi-party minority |  | 1 | 1 |
| In opposition |  |  | 0 | 0 |

Figure A1. Frequency distribution of legislative terms by Governmental Power Index (Left).



Figure A2. Average Governmental Power Index (Left) by country (1871-2020).

Immagine che contiene grafico

Descrizione generata automaticamente

Figure A3. Evolution over time of Governmental Power Index (Left), by country.

Immagine che contiene calendario

Descrizione generata automaticamente

**Notes on the construction of the dependent variables**

The dependent variables we take from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2019a) are all ‘Type C: Variables coded by Country Experts’ according to V-Dem Codebook. As reported at p. 27 in the Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2019a, v.9), ‘Country Expert is typically a scholar or professional with deep knowledge of a country and of a particular political institution. Furthermore, the expert is usually a citizen or resident of the country. Multiple experts (usually 5 or more) code each variable.’ V-Dem proposes different versions of each variable (all versions correlate at 0.95 or more). We have opted for the ‘original scale’ version, namely an interval measure that linearly translates the measurement model point estimates back to the original ordinal scale of each variable (e.g., 0-4 or 0-5). This version provides a continuous measurement (like the measurement model version) and at the same time allows for a meaningful interpretation of the results as it is anchored to the original ordinal version (it ranges from 0 to 4 or from 0 to 5). The detailed description of each V-Dem variable used as dependent variable follows.

**Power equality by socioeconomic position** (original name ‘Power distributed by socioeconomic position’ - v2pepwrses)

It measures the extent to which wealthy people monopolize political power. The variable ranges between wealthy people enjoying a virtual monopoly on political power and wealthy people having no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. More into detail, as reported by V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019a, 190), ‘All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.’ The interval variable ranges from 0 to 4 and the points of substantive interest are the following:

0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.

1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.

2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.

3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.

4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.

**Power equality by social group** (original name ‘Power distributed by social group’ - v2pepwrsoc)

It measures the extent to which one social (ethnic, racial, linguistic, or religious) group monopolizes political power. Here, at one extreme we find a situation in which one social group comprising a minority of the population monopolizes political power, and at the other a situation in which all social groups have roughly equal political power. More into detail, as reported by V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019a, 190-191), ‘A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race,

region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood — by those residing within that society — to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant. The interval variable ranges from 0 to 4 and the points of substantive interest are the following:

0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population.

This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.

1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population.

This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.

2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population.

This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.

3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another — but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.

4: All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.

For the sake of external validity, we have checked the correlation between our measure of Power equality by social group and another measure that tries to capture the same underlying concept. The external measure for Power equality by social group is the percentage of ethnic minority MPs elected in national lower houses in selected countries (France 2007-2017, source: Diderot Institute; Germany 2009-2017, source: MedienDiest; United Kingdom 1987-2019, source: UK Parliament – House of Commons Library) and the Pearson’s *r* is 0.66 (statistically significant at p<0.01).

**Power equality by gender** (original name ‘Power distributed by gender’ - v2pepwrgen)

It measures the extent to which men monopolize political power. It ranges between men having a near-monopoly on political power and men and women having roughly equal political power. The interval variable ranges from 0 to 4 and the points of substantive interest are the following:

0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.

1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.

2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.

3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.

4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

For the sake of external validity, we have checked the correlation between our measure of Power equality by gender and the percentage of female MPs elected in national lower houses since 1900 (sources: Carmichael, Dilli, and Rijpma 2014; Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); genderproject.org.; Edgel 2014; Paxton, Green, and Hughes 2003). The Pearson’s *r* is 0.75 (statistically significant at p<0.001).

**Educational equality** (2peedueq)

It measures the percentage of children receiving low-quality education and ranges from a situation where at least 75% of children receive such low-quality education that it undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens, to a situation where only less than 5% of children are in the above scenario. More into detail, as reported by V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019a, 192), it addressed the following question: ‘To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?’ According to the V-Dem codebook, ‘basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.’ The interval variable ranges from 0 to 4 and the points of substantive interest are the following:

0: Extreme. Provision of high-quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

1: Unequal. Provision of high-quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

3: Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

For the sake of external validity, we have checked the correlation between our measure of Educational equality and, respectively, the average years of education among citizens older than 15 (sources: Clio Infra; Didenko, Foldvari, van Leeuwen 2012; Földvári 2012; Földvári and van Leeuwen 2014; Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, and Földvári 2011, 2012; Mitchell 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; UNESCO; US Census Bureau) and the average years of education among citizens between 15 and 64 (Morrisson and Murtin 2013) between 1871 and 2020 in, respectively, 18 and 16 countries. The Pearson’s *r* is, respectively, 0.81 and 0.72 (both statistically significant at p<0.001).

**Health equality** (v2pehealth)

It measures the percentage of citizens excluded from quality healthcare. Here, at one extreme at least 75% of citizens receive poor-quality healthcare and this undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights, and at the other less than 5% of citizens are in the above scenario. More into detail, as reported by V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019a, 192-193), it addressed the following question: ‘To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens? As detailed in the V-Dem codebook, ‘poor-quality healthcare can make citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).’ The interval variable ranges from 0 to 4 and the points of substantive interest are the following:

0: Extreme. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent (%) of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

1: Unequal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 25 percent (%) of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, ten to 25 percent (%) of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

3: Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poor-quality healthcare, five to ten percent (%) of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens.

**Welfare universalism** (Original name ‘Means-tested v. universalistic policy’ - v2dlunivl)

It measures the extent to which welfare provisions tend to be universalistic. It is an interval variable ranging from a situation where there are no or extremely limited welfare state policies to an opposite situation where almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. More into detail, as reported by V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019a, 150), it addressed the following question: ‘How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?’ As detailed in the V-Dem codebook, ‘A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested. A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs (e.g., when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary. The purpose of this question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. The interval variable ranges from 0 to 5 and the points of substantive interest are the following:

0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, unemployment, poverty programs).

1: Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested.

2: Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3)

is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.

3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic.

4: Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (e.g., 1/4 or 1/3) are means-tested.

5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-tested.

For the sake of external validity, we have checked the correlation between our measure of Welfare universalism and data taken from the Social Citizenship Indicator Program – SCIP. The latter provides information about welfare provisions coverage rates in 13 analyzed countries since 1930. Specifically, we have created an index that is nothing but the average of the two SCIP indicators available at the population level, pensions coverage and sickness insurance coverage. As SCIP data provide information every five years, we have reported, for each observation, the closest SCIP data available. The Pearson’s *r* is 0.61 (statistically significant at p<0.001). The other four SCIP coverage rate indicators available were calculated only for a specific segment of the population (labor force or employees) rather than the population as a whole, and, therefore, not directly comparable with our measure.

Finally, the last measure of inequality is not taken from V-Dem but collected autonomously from other sources.

**Income inequality**

We measure income inequality through the Gini index after taxes and transfers. The data collection related to this variable was rather cumbersome, given that there is no single source covering the whole analyzed timespan and there are also some inconsistencies between the values attributed to a given observation among different sources. Therefore, we collected data from four different publicly available databases (World Income Inequality Database, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Luxembourg Income Study, World Bank, World Inequality Database, and Clio Infra). The World Income Inequality Database (WIID) provides data available from the 1930s, with the exception of the United Kingdom (first available observation: 1867); The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides data from the 1980s; The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) provides data from 1968; The World Inequality Database (Alvaredo et al. 2022) provides data from 1980 with the exception of France for which data are available from 1970; The World Bank provides data from the 1970s (first available observation: United Kingdom in 1969); The Clio Infra provides data at selected time points from 1820 to 2000. For the purpose of our data collection, we have, therefore, only one source available for the first six decades (1871-1930, namely Clio Infra), two sources available for the 1930-1960 period (Clio Infra and WIID), four sources from the 1960s (Clio Infra, WIID, LIS, and World Bank), five sources from the 1970s (Clio Infra, WIID, LIS, World Inequality Database, and World Bank), six sources from the 1980s (Clio Infra, WIID, LIS, World Inequality Database, World Bank, and OECD), and eventually five sources from the 2000s (WIID, World Bank, LIS, World Inequality Database, and OECD). In order to reduce the number of missing information in the dataset, we have proceeded with a linear interpolation of each data source, a standard procedure with political economy data (e.g., Lyon, Cheung, and Gastwirth 2014). Then, in order to increase the accuracy of the measurement and reduce the weight of inconsistent scores, when more than one source provided data for a given observation, we simply took the average among the different sources. We are conscious, therefore, that the Gini index data for the first decades of the period under analysis must be taken with particular caution as they derive from one source only.

Figure A4. Evolution over time of Power equality by socioeconomic position, by country.




Figure A5. Evolution over time of Power equality by social group, by country.




Figure A6. Evolution over time of Power equality by gender, by country.




Figure A7. Evolution over time of Educational equality, by country.




Figure A8. Evolution over time of Health equality, by country.

Immagine che contiene Sito Web

Descrizione generata automaticamente

Figure A9. Evolution over time of Welfare universalism, by country.

Immagine che contiene Sito Web

Descrizione generata automaticamente

Figure A10. Evolution over time of Income inequality, by country.

Immagine che contiene testo, schermata, Carattere, diagramma

Descrizione generata automaticamente

Table A3. Descriptive statistics.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min. | Max. | N |
| Power equality by socioeconomic pos. | 2.74 | 0.65 | 0.25 | 3.66 | 588 |
| Power equality by social group | 3.04 | 0.59 | 0.97 | 3.80 | 588 |
| Power equality by gender | 1.82 | 0.84 | 0.06 | 3.35 | 588 |
| Educational equality | 3.12 | 0.72 | 0.18 | 3.91 | 541 |
| Health equality | 3.14 | 0.72 | 0.47 | 3.93 | 541 |
| Welfare state universalism | 3.49 | 1.11 | 0.14 | 4.88 | 541 |
| Income inequality | 0.38 | 0.08 | 0.25 | 0.61 | 508 |
| Governmental power index (Left) | 2.95 | 3.63 | 0 | 10 | 588 |
| Economic shocks | 0.13 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 | 588 |
| Periods of war | 0.14 | 0.35 | 0 | 1 | 588 |
| Political corruption index | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.41 | 588 |
| Clientelism index | 0.14 | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.75 | 588 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 5.68 | 5.20 | 0.02 | 27.92 | 588 |
| Suffrage | 1.73 | 0.55 | 0 | 2 | 588 |
| EU constraints | 0.52 | 0.73 | 0 | 2 | 588 |
| Rigorous public administration | 2.00 | 0.93 | -1.28 | 3.61 | 588 |
| Year | 1960.36 | 37.81 | 1874 | 2020 | 588 |

Table A4. Governmental power index (Left) and measures of equality. Baseline models.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Left) | 0.062\*\* | 0.022 | 0.060\* | 0.024 | 0.063\*\* | 0.021 | 0.077\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.081\*\* | 0.024 | 0.095\*\* | 0.031 | -0.005\* | 0.002 |
| Lagged DV | 0.908\*\*\* | 0.015 | 0.865\*\*\* | 0.022 | 0.974\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.940\*\*\* | 0.012 | 0.938\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.927\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.962\*\*\* | 0.014 |
| Country-fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 0.228\*\*\* | 0.053 | 0.401\*\*\* | 0.076 | 0.036+ | 0.021 | 0.165\*\*\* | 0.045 | 0.194\*\*\* | 0.055 | 0.258\*\*\* | 0.058 | 0.013+ | 0.007 |
| Wald χ2 | 7052.9\*\*\* |  | 9847\*\*\* |  | 16818.3\*\*\* |  | 17246.8\*\*\* |  | 6703.5\*\*\* |  | 14804\*\*\* |  | 7199.1\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 596 |  | 596 |  | 596 |  | 543 |  | 543 |  | 543 |  | 514 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Table A5. Replication of Table 2 by excluding the observations reporting a score on the V-Dem dependent variables obtained with less than three expert coders.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Left) | 0.057\*\* | 0.021 | 0.058\*\* | 0.022 | 0.017 | 0.02 | 0.047\* | 0.018 | 0.059\*\* | 0.022 | 0.085\*\* | 0.031 |
| Lagged DV | 0.794\*\*\* | 0.03 | 0.663\*\*\* | 0.031 | 0.729\*\*\* | 0.028 | 0.908\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.867\*\*\* | 0.032 | 0.871\*\*\* | 0.026 |
| Economic shocks | -0.008 | 0.02 | -0.038+ | 0.021 | 0.001 | 0.021 | -0.005 | 0.018 | -0.033 | 0.021 | -0.048 | 0.031 |
| Periods of war | 0.001 | 0.035 | -0.083\*\* | 0.031 | -0.052+ | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.024 | -0.021 | 0.035 | 0.019 | 0.055 |
| Political corruption index | -1.000\*\* | 0.313 | -0.423 | 0.309 | -0.367 | 0.254 | -0.496+ | 0.291 | -0.052 | 0.317 | -0.455 | 0.479 |
| Clientelism index | -0.001 | 0.163 | -0.107 | 0.162 | -0.201 | 0.154 | -0.196 | 0.157 | -0.432\* | 0.179 | -0.269 | 0.267 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.004+ | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.005\*\* | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.002 | -0.001 | 0.003 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.249\*\*\* | 0.063 | 0.153\*\* | 0.049 | -0.03 | 0.049 | -0.011 | 0.045 | 0.07 | 0.067 | 0.142 | 0.095 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.338\*\*\* | 0.069 | 0.211\*\*\* | 0.052 | 0.148\*\* | 0.051 | 0.032 | 0.045 | 0.163\* | 0.067 | 0.207\* | 0.096 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.033 | 0.023 | -0.02 | 0.024 | 0.007 | 0.025 | 0.009 | 0.023 | -0.046+ | 0.026 | 0.000 | 0.036 |
| Euro member | -0.046 | 0.031 | -0.063+ | 0.035 | 0.005 | 0.034 | -0.107\*\*\* | 0.032 | -0.112\*\*\* | 0.033 | -0.059 | 0.05 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.037\* | 0.015 | 0.113\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.012 | 0.016 | 0.024+ | 0.014 | 0.037\* | 0.015 | 0.033 | 0.024 |
| Year | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.001 | 0.000 | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Country-fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 0.573 | 0.798 | 1.720+ | 0.918 | -7.012\*\*\* | 1.207 | -0.748 | 0.794 | -0.395 | 0.947 | 0.541 | 1.341 |
| Wald χ2 | 7362.2\*\*\* |  | 5740.8\*\*\* |  | 17406.2\*\*\* |  | 18452.8\*\*\* |  | 12193.0\*\*\* |  | 16904.5\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 532 |  | 532 |  | 532 |  | 522 |  | 522 |  | 541 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Table A6. List of left parties in Western Europe with the addition of ‘new politics’ parties (1871-2020).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **N** | **Parties in the Left bloc** |
| Austria | 6 | Social Democratic Party of Austria; Communist Party of Austria; **Alternative List Austria; The Greens - The Green Alternative; *JETZT* - Pilz List; United Greens Austria.** |
| Belgium | 8 | Belgian Workers’ Party; Belgian Socialist Party\*; Francophone Socialist Party; Flemish Socialist Party; Communist Party; Labour Party of Belgium; **Agalev - Green; Ecolo** |
| Cyprus | 4 | Progressive Party of Working People; Movement for Social Democracy; Democratic Socialist Renewal Movement; **Ecological and Environmental Movement** |
| Denmark | 8 | Social Democrats; Communist Party of Denmark; Socialist People's Party; Left Socialists; Common Course; Red-Green Alliance; **The Alternative; Greens** |
| Finland | 4 | Left Alliance; Social Democratic Party of Finland; Democratic Alternative; **Green League** |
| France | 14 | Socialist Party; Independent Socialists; Unified Socialist Party; French Communist Party/Front de Gauche; Unbowed France; Workers' Struggle; Revolutionary Communist League; Extreme gauche; Other gauche; **Radical Party of the Left; Ecology Generation; Ecologist Party; Greens; Other ecologists** |
| Germany | 8 | Social Democratic Workers’ Party/Social Democratic Party of Germany; Communist Party of Germany; Independent Social Democrats; Party of Democratic Socialism-LINKE; **The Party - *Die Partei*; German Pirate Party; Animal Protection Party; Alliance 90 - Greens** |
| Greece | 11 | Panhellenic Socialist Movement; Communist Party of Greece; Communist Party of Greece-Interior; Coalition of the Left/Syriza; Democratic Social Movement; Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left; Democratic Left; Movement of Democratic Socialists; Popular Unity; **The River; Ecologist Greens** |
| Iceland | 13 | Social Democratic Party; Communist Party; People's Alliance; Alliance of Social Democrats; National Awakening-People's Movement; Social Democratic Alliance; People's Party; **Humanist Party; Rainbow; Union of Liberals and Leftist; Left-Green Movement; Icelandic Movement - Living Country; Women's Alliance** |
| Ireland | 9 | Labour Party; Irish Worker League; National Labour Party; National Progressive Democrats; Workers' Party; Socialist Party; People Before Profit Alliance; Democratic Left; **Green Party** |
| Italy | 17 | Italian Communist Party/Democratic Party of the Left/Democrats of the Left/Democratic Party; Italian Socialist Party/Italian Democratic Socialists; Reformist Socialist Party; Independent Socialists; Italian Socialist Democratic Party; Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity; Proletarian Democracy; Proletarian Unity Party; Communist Refoundation Party; Party of the Italian Communists; Left, Ecology and Freedom; Civil Revolution; Free and Equal; Power to the People; **Radicals; Green Lists; Federation of the Greens** |
| Luxembourg | 7 | Socialist Workers' Party; Communist Party of Luxembourg; Independent Socialists; The Left; **Social Democratic Party; Green Left Ecological Initiative; The Greens** |
| Malta | 3 | Labour Party; Malta Workers' Party; **Democratic Alternative** |
| Netherlands | 10 | Social Democratic Workers/Labour Party; Social Democratic League; Revolutionary Socialist Party; Communist Party of the Netherlands; Pacifist Socialist Party; Socialist Party; **Party for the Animals; Volt Netherlands; GreenLeft; Radical Political Party** |
| Norway | 6 | Norwegian Labour Party; Social Democratic Workers' Party; Communist Party of Norway; Socialist People's Party/Socialist Left Party; Red Electoral Alliance/Red Party; **Green Party** |
| Portugal | 13 | Socialist Party; Unified Democratic Coalition; People's Socialist Front; Movement of Socialist Left; Communist Party of Portuguese Workers; Workers Party of Socialist Unity; Revolutionary Socialist Party; Popular Democratic Union; Portuguese Democratic Movement; Bloc of the Left; **Free** - ***Livre*; Party for Animals and Nature; Ecologist Party - Greens** |
| Spain | 9 | Spanish Socialist Workers Party; Communist Party of Spain-United Left; People's Socialist Party-Socialist Unity; Party of Labour of Spain; Workers' Party of Spain-Communist Unity Board; *Podemos*; **More Country; Animalist Party Against Mistreatment to Animals; Equo** |
| Sweden | 7 | Social Democratic Party; Left Socialists; Communist Party of Sweden/Left Party; Hoglund Communists; Kilbom Communists/Socialist Party; **Feminist Initiative; Greens** |
| Switzerland | 8 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland; Communist Party; Swiss Party of Labour; Progressive Organizations of Switzerland; **Independents Alliance; Feminists and Green - Alternative Groups; Green Liberal Party; Greens** |
| UK | 2 | Independent Labour Party/Labour Party; **Green Party** |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 167 |  |
|  |  |  |

\*It includes Liberal-Socialist Cartels in early years.

Sources: Bartolini and Mair (1990); Bartolini (2000); Emanuele (2021) for traditional left parties; ‘new politics’ parties have been selected through the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2021) after a qualitative assessment of the respective ideological outlook through party-related sources. Notice that parties that never reach 1% of the national vote share in parliamentary elections (Lower House) have been excluded.

Table A7. Replication of Table 2 with the GPI of the left bloc including also ‘new politics’ parties.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Left) | 0.060\*\* | 0.022 | 0.054\* | 0.024 | 0.007 | 0.02 | 0.067\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.065\*\* | 0.023 | 0.084\*\* | 0.031 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Lagged DV | 0.812\*\*\* | 0.028 | 0.740\*\*\* | 0.032 | 0.751\*\*\* | 0.025 | 0.888\*\*\* | 0.022 | 0.866\*\*\* | 0.031 | 0.871\*\*\* | 0.026 | 0.908\*\*\* | 0.020 |
| Economic shocks | -0.001 | 0.019 | -0.031 | 0.021 | 0.003 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.019 | -0.035 | 0.021 | -0.048 | 0.031 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Periods of war | -0.01 | 0.031 | -0.075\*\* | 0.028 | -0.048+ | 0.025 | 0.021 | 0.025 | -0.025 | 0.035 | 0.019 | 0.055 | 0.006+ | 0.003 |
| Political corruption index | -0.816\*\* | 0.313 | -0.214 | 0.322 | -0.427+ | 0.248 | -0.397 | 0.301 | -0.073 | 0.329 | -0.448 | 0.479 | 0.001 | 0.039 |
| Clientelism index | 0.068 | 0.155 | 0.064 | 0.167 | -0.15 | 0.134 | -0.226 | 0.173 | -0.248 | 0.197 | -0.272 | 0.267 | 0.033+ | 0.020 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.004\*\* | 0.002 | 0.004+ | 0.002 | -0.001 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.238\*\*\* | 0.045 | 0.171\*\*\* | 0.044 | -0.032 | 0.038 | 0.009 | 0.051 | 0.130+ | 0.067 | 0.142 | 0.095 | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.312\*\*\* | 0.052 | 0.213\*\*\* | 0.05 | 0.123\*\* | 0.042 | 0.05 | 0.053 | 0.226\*\*\* | 0.068 | 0.207\* | 0.096 | -0.003 | 0.005 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.022 | 0.023 | -0.014 | 0.025 | 0.002 | 0.024 | 0.017 | 0.023 | -0.039 | 0.027 | 0.000 | 0.036 | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Euro member | -0.036 | 0.031 | -0.063+ | 0.037 | -0.005 | 0.033 | -0.101\*\* | 0.033 | -0.105\*\* | 0.035 | -0.06 | 0.05 | 0.013\*\* | 0.004 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.039\*\* | 0.013 | 0.081\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.018 | 0.013 | 0.023 | 0.016 | 0.022 | 0.017 | 0.033 | 0.024 | -0.004+ | 0.002 |
| Year | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Country-fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 0.834 | 0.748 | 0.634 | 0.902 | -6.387\*\*\* | 1.071 | -0.885 | 0.841 | -1.146 | 0.987 | 0.005 | 1.267 | 0.198 | 0.126 |
| Wald χ2 | 9036.0\*\*\* |  | 7608.3\*\*\* |  | 20023.3\*\*\* |  | 14710.0\*\*\* |  | 9769.3\*\*\* |  | 16902.3\*\*\* |  | 8003.6\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 588 |  | 588 |  | 588 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 508 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Table A8. Replication of Table 2 with the GPI of main left party as the focal predictor.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Left) | 0.057\* | 0.022 | 0.055\* | 0.024 | 0.005 | 0.02 | 0.063\*\* | 0.021 | 0.064\*\* | 0.024 | 0.084\*\* | 0.031 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Lagged DV | 0.815\*\*\* | 0.028 | 0.741\*\*\* | 0.032 | 0.751\*\*\* | 0.025 | 0.889\*\*\* | 0.022 | 0.867\*\*\* | 0.031 | 0.873\*\*\* | 0.026 | 0.908\*\*\* | 0.020 |
| Economic shocks | -0.003 | 0.019 | -0.032 | 0.021 | 0.003 | 0.02 | -0.012 | 0.019 | -0.036+ | 0.021 | -0.05 | 0.031 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Periods of war | -0.008 | 0.031 | -0.074\*\* | 0.028 | -0.047+ | 0.025 | 0.023 | 0.025 | -0.024 | 0.035 | 0.02 | 0.055 | 0.006+ | 0.003 |
| Political corruption index | -0.837\*\* | 0.313 | -0.238 | 0.322 | -0.430+ | 0.248 | -0.424 | 0.303 | -0.1 | 0.33 | -0.481 | 0.479 | 0.001 | 0.039 |
| Clientelism index | 0.071 | 0.155 | 0.065 | 0.167 | -0.15 | 0.134 | -0.218 | 0.174 | -0.241 | 0.197 | -0.263 | 0.268 | 0.034+ | 0.020 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.004\* | 0.002 | 0.004+ | 0.002 | -0.001 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.237\*\*\* | 0.045 | 0.171\*\*\* | 0.044 | -0.032 | 0.038 | 0.008 | 0.051 | 0.130+ | 0.067 | 0.141 | 0.095 | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.311\*\*\* | 0.052 | 0.213\*\*\* | 0.05 | 0.123\*\* | 0.042 | 0.051 | 0.053 | 0.226\*\*\* | 0.068 | 0.207\* | 0.096 | -0.003 | 0.005 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.021 | 0.023 | -0.012 | 0.025 | 0.002 | 0.024 | 0.018 | 0.023 | -0.037 | 0.027 | 0.003 | 0.036 | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Euro member | -0.034 | 0.031 | -0.062+ | 0.037 | -0.005 | 0.032 | -0.099\*\* | 0.033 | -0.103\*\* | 0.035 | -0.057 | 0.05 | 0.013\*\* | 0.004 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.039\*\* | 0.013 | 0.080\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.018 | 0.013 | 0.023 | 0.016 | 0.022 | 0.017 | 0.032 | 0.024 | -0.004+ | 0.002 |
| Year | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Country-fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 0.959 | 0.826 | 0.232 | 0.98 | -6.994\*\*\* | 1.168 | -1.077 | 0.913 | -1.127 | 1.074 | 0.616 | 1.342 | 0.200 | 0.126 |
| Wald χ2 | 9033.3\*\*\* |  | 7571.4\*\*\* |  | 19996.5\*\*\* |  | 14663.4\*\*\* |  | 9744.6\*\*\* |  | 16949.8\*\*\* |  | 8006.8\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 588 |  | 588 |  | 588 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 508 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Table A9. Replication of Table 2 with the GPI of main social democratic party as the focal predictor.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Left) | 0.065\*\* | 0.022 | 0.051\* | 0.025 | 0.008 | 0.021 | 0.069\*\*\* | 0.021 | 0.071\*\* | 0.024 | 0.092\*\* | 0.032 | -0.001 | 0.003 |
| Lagged DV | 0.812\*\*\* | 0.028 | 0.740\*\*\* | 0.032 | 0.751\*\*\* | 0.025 | 0.887\*\*\* | 0.022 | 0.864\*\*\* | 0.031 | 0.871\*\*\* | 0.026 | 0.908\*\*\* | 0.020 |
| Economic shocks | -0.001 | 0.019 | -0.031 | 0.021 | 0.003 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.019 | -0.034 | 0.021 | -0.047 | 0.031 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Periods of war | -0.009 | 0.03 | -0.074\*\* | 0.028 | -0.048+ | 0.025 | 0.022 | 0.025 | -0.024 | 0.035 | 0.02 | 0.055 | 0.006+ | 0.003 |
| Political corruption index | -0.874\*\* | 0.311 | -0.263 | 0.324 | -0.434+ | 0.248 | -0.462 | 0.3 | -0.138 | 0.327 | -0.532 | 0.479 | 0.002 | 0.039 |
| Clientelism index | 0.071 | 0.155 | 0.065 | 0.167 | -0.15 | 0.134 | -0.225 | 0.173 | -0.25 | 0.197 | -0.27 | 0.267 | 0.033+ | 0.020 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.004\* | 0.002 | 0.004+ | 0.002 | -0.001 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.238\*\*\* | 0.045 | 0.171\*\*\* | 0.044 | -0.032 | 0.038 | 0.009 | 0.051 | 0.130+ | 0.067 | 0.141 | 0.095 | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.310\*\*\* | 0.052 | 0.213\*\*\* | 0.05 | 0.122\*\* | 0.042 | 0.048 | 0.053 | 0.224\*\* | 0.068 | 0.204\* | 0.096 | -0.003 | 0.005 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.021 | 0.023 | -0.014 | 0.025 | 0.002 | 0.024 | 0.017 | 0.023 | -0.038 | 0.027 | 0.001 | 0.036 | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Euro member | -0.034 | 0.031 | -0.062+ | 0.037 | -0.004 | 0.032 | -0.099\*\* | 0.033 | -0.103\*\* | 0.035 | -0.057 | 0.05 | 0.013\*\* | 0.004 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.039\*\* | 0.013 | 0.081\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.018 | 0.013 | 0.023 | 0.016 | 0.022 | 0.017 | 0.032 | 0.024 | -0.004+ | 0.002 |
| Year | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Country-fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 0.974 | 0.825 | 0.201 | 0.98 | -6.97\*\*\* | 1.166 | -1.094 | 0.912 | -1.149 | 1.072 | 0.599 | 1.338 | 0.197 | 0.126 |
| Wald χ2 | 9048.0\*\*\* |  | 7599.0\*\*\* |  | 20034.0\*\*\* |  | 14680.7\*\*\* |  | 9806.6\*\*\* |  | 16805.5\*\*\* |  | 8003.0\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 588 |  | 588 |  | 588 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 508 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Table A10. Replication of Table 2 since the first time a left party accessed government in Western Europe (1906).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Left) | 0.065\*\* | 0.022 | 0.054\* | 0.023 | 0.007 | 0.021 | 0.068\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.066\*\* | 0.023 | 0.084\*\* | 0.031 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Lagged DV | 0.803\*\*\* | 0.031 | 0.756\*\*\* | 0.035 | 0.728\*\*\* | 0.028 | 0.885\*\*\* | 0.022 | 0.863\*\*\* | 0.032 | 0.869\*\*\* | 0.026 | 0.890\*\*\* | 0.022 |
| Economic shocks | -0.017 | 0.021 | -0.043\* | 0.021 | 0.004 | 0.021 | -0.012 | 0.019 | -0.034 | 0.022 | -0.054+ | 0.032 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Periods of war | 0.003 | 0.038 | -0.062+ | 0.033 | -0.038 | 0.031 | 0.023 | 0.025 | -0.027 | 0.036 | 0.028 | 0.056 | 0.006 | 0.004 |
| Political corruption index | -0.754\* | 0.323 | -0.101 | 0.336 | -0.390 | 0.263 | -0.362 | 0.305 | -0.050 | 0.333 | -0.426 | 0.481 | 0.008 | 0.041 |
| Clientelism index | 0.133 | 0.182 | 0.214 | 0.188 | -0.221 | 0.159 | -0.221 | 0.174 | -0.252 | 0.198 | -0.259 | 0.271 | 0.043+ | 0.023 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 0.004 | 0.002 | 0.007\*\*\* | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.004\* | 0.002 | 0.004+ | 0.002 | -0.001 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.245\*\*\* | 0.070 | 0.135\* | 0.067 | -0.081 | 0.058 | 0.003 | 0.058 | 0.150+ | 0.078 | 0.114 | 0.105 | 0.001 | 0.008 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.308\*\*\* | 0.072 | 0.172\* | 0.069 | 0.092 | 0.057 | 0.042 | 0.060 | 0.244\*\* | 0.078 | 0.179+ | 0.104 | -0.004 | 0.008 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.024 | 0.024 | -0.012 | 0.025 | -0.007 | 0.025 | 0.017 | 0.024 | -0.039 | 0.027 | 0.001 | 0.036 | 0.005 | 0.003 |
| Euro member | -0.032 | 0.033 | -0.052 | 0.037 | -0.017 | 0.034 | -0.099\*\* | 0.034 | -0.103\*\* | 0.036 | -0.055 | 0.050 | 0.016\*\*\* | 0.005 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.041\*\* | 0.015 | 0.076\*\*\* | 0.018 | 0.020 | 0.016 | 0.025 | 0.016 | 0.023 | 0.017 | 0.036 | 0.024 | -0.003 | 0.003 |
| Year | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | -0.000\* | 0.000 |
| Country-fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 0.763 | 0.915 | -0.132 | 1.002 | -7.924\*\*\* | 1.327 | -1.167 | 0.93 | -1.223 | 1.089 | 0.576 | 1.356 | 0.359\* | 0.150 |
| Wald χ2 | 6174.4\*\*\* |  | 5314.2\*\*\* |  | 14763.8\*\*\* |  | 13828.4\*\*\* |  | 9135.1\*\*\* |  | 15563.1\*\*\* |  | 6498.1\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 535 |  | 535 |  | 535 |  | 533 |  | 533 |  | 533 |  | 465 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Table A11. Replication of Table 2 with the exclusion of all observations that Polity V considers non-democratic.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Left) | 0.061\*\* | 0.023 | 0.051\* | 0.022 | 0.037+ | 0.022 | 0.053\*\* | 0.020 | 0.050\* | 0.024 | 0.085\*\* | 0.033 | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Lagged DV | 0.795\*\*\* | 0.035 | 0.598\*\*\* | 0.035 | 0.680\*\*\* | 0.031 | 0.870\*\*\* | 0.022 | 0.818\*\*\* | 0.039 | 0.846\*\*\* | 0.036 | 0.888\*\*\* | 0.022 |
| Economic shocks | -0.009 | 0.025 | -0.071\*\* | 0.024 | -0.019 | 0.025 | -0.032 | 0.021 | -0.044+ | 0.026 | -0.113\*\* | 0.039 | -0.001 | 0.003 |
| Periods of war | -0.015 | 0.041 | -0.018 | 0.034 | -0.044 | 0.034 | 0.049+ | 0.026 | 0.004 | 0.040 | 0.001 | 0.062 | 0.006 | 0.004 |
| Political corruption index | -1.053\*\* | 0.329 | 0.610\* | 0.295 | 0.218 | 0.283 | 0.149 | 0.324 | 0.542 | 0.360 | -0.268 | 0.441 | 0.038 | 0.048 |
| Clientelism index | -0.170 | 0.200 | 0.028 | 0.187 | -0.223 | 0.186 | 0.038 | 0.171 | -0.344 | 0.210 | -0.612\* | 0.289 | 0.057\* | 0.026 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.006\*\* | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.002 | 0.005\*\* | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.003 | -0.003 | 0.004 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.199 | 0.152 | 0.200+ | 0.105 | -0.138 | 0.095 | -0.049 | 0.101 | 0.224 | 0.213 | -0.013 | 0.253 | 0.017\* | 0.008 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.292+ | 0.156 | 0.237\* | 0.106 | 0.061 | 0.096 | -0.020 | 0.100 | 0.301 | 0.213 | 0.078 | 0.255 | 0.011 | 0.008 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.043+ | 0.024 | -0.040 | 0.025 | 0.020 | 0.027 | 0.025 | 0.025 | -0.054+ | 0.027 | 0.001 | 0.037 | 0.005 | 0.003 |
| Euro member | -0.066+ | 0.034 | -0.070\* | 0.036 | 0.029 | 0.038 | -0.064+ | 0.034 | -0.101\*\* | 0.036 | -0.088 | 0.056 | 0.016\*\*\* | 0.005 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.032 | 0.020 | 0.120\*\*\* | 0.020 | -0.002 | 0.020 | 0.046\* | 0.018 | 0.060\*\* | 0.020 | -0.006 | 0.033 | -0.003 | 0.003 |
| Year | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.000\* | 0.000 |
| Country-fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 0.981 | 0.83 | 0.214 | 0.908 | -8.101\*\*\* | 1.277 | -1.148 | 0.899 | -2.152+ | 1.17 | -0.59 | 1.537 | 0.361\*\* | 0.136 |
| Wald χ2 | 5661.6\*\*\* |  | 5500.4\*\*\* |  | 13052.9\*\*\* |  | 10336.7\*\*\* |  | 7423.6\*\*\* |  | 11823.2\*\*\* |  | 5757.9\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 453 |  | 453 |  | 453 |  | 443 |  | 443 |  | 443 |  | 429 |  |
| N of countries | 18 |  | 18 |  | 18 |  | 18 |  | 18 |  | 18 |  | 18 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Table A12. Replication of Table 2 with the Weighed share of cabinet seats for the left bloc replacing the GPI (Left).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Weighed share of cab. seats (Left) | 0.001\* | 0.000 | 0.001\* | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001\*\* | 0.000 | 0.001\* | 0.000 | 0.001\* | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Lagged DV | 0.811\*\*\* | 0.028 | 0.741\*\*\* | 0.032 | 0.751\*\*\* | 0.025 | 0.886\*\*\* | 0.022 | 0.865\*\*\* | 0.032 | 0.874\*\*\* | 0.026 | 0.908\*\*\* | 0.020 |
| Economic shocks | -0.001 | 0.019 | -0.031 | 0.021 | 0.004 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.019 | -0.035 | 0.022 | -0.048 | 0.032 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Periods of war | -0.008 | 0.03 | -0.073\*\* | 0.028 | -0.048+ | 0.025 | 0.024 | 0.025 | -0.021 | 0.035 | 0.023 | 0.055 | 0.006+ | 0.003 |
| Political corruption index | -0.828\*\* | 0.313 | -0.221 | 0.322 | -0.427+ | 0.247 | -0.41 | 0.302 | -0.086 | 0.329 | -0.461 | 0.478 | 0.001 | 0.039 |
| Clientelism index | 0.062 | 0.155 | 0.06 | 0.167 | -0.152 | 0.134 | -0.229 | 0.173 | -0.252 | 0.197 | -0.27 | 0.267 | 0.033+ | 0.020 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.006\*\* | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.004\* | 0.002 | 0.004+ | 0.002 | -0.002 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.236\*\*\* | 0.045 | 0.168\*\*\* | 0.044 | -0.033 | 0.038 | 0.007 | 0.051 | 0.129+ | 0.067 | 0.138 | 0.095 | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.311\*\*\* | 0.052 | 0.210\*\*\* | 0.051 | 0.121\*\* | 0.042 | 0.049 | 0.053 | 0.226\*\*\* | 0.068 | 0.205\* | 0.096 | -0.003 | 0.005 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.021 | 0.023 | -0.012 | 0.025 | 0.002 | 0.024 | 0.019 | 0.024 | -0.037 | 0.027 | 0.001 | 0.036 | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Euro member | -0.031 | 0.031 | -0.058 | 0.037 | -0.004 | 0.033 | -0.095\*\* | 0.033 | -0.099\*\* | 0.035 | -0.053 | 0.05 | 0.013\*\* | 0.004 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.038\*\* | 0.014 | 0.080\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.018 | 0.013 | 0.022 | 0.016 | 0.021 | 0.017 | 0.032 | 0.024 | -0.004+ | 0.002 |
| Year | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Country-fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 0.819 | 0.749 | 0.642 | 0.898 | -6.375\*\*\* | 1.066 | -0.914 | 0.838 | -1.189 | 0.989 | 0.055 | 1.269 | 0.197 | 0.125 |
| Wald χ2 | 8995.9\*\*\* |  | 7548.1\*\*\* |  | 20082.7\*\*\* |  | 15033.9\*\*\* |  | 9713.3\*\*\* |  | 17166.3\*\*\* |  | 8001.4\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 588 |  | 588 |  | 588 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 508 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Table A13. Replication of Table 2 with an alternative measure of Economic shocks.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Left) | 0.061\*\* | 0.022 | 0.056\* | 0.024 | 0.007 | 0.02 | 0.069\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.067\*\* | 0.024 | 0.085\*\* | 0.031 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Lagged DV | 0.812\*\*\* | 0.028 | 0.739\*\*\* | 0.032 | 0.752\*\*\* | 0.025 | 0.887\*\*\* | 0.022 | 0.871\*\*\* | 0.032 | 0.874\*\*\* | 0.026 | 0.906\*\*\* | 0.020 |
| Economic shocks | -0.005 | 0.013 | 0.01 | 0.015 | -0.015 | 0.013 | 0.011 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.015 | -0.013 | 0.021 | -0.006\*\*\* | 0.002 |
| Periods of war | -0.01 | 0.03 | -0.081\*\* | 0.028 | -0.047+ | 0.025 | 0.018 | 0.024 | -0.033 | 0.035 | 0.008 | 0.053 | 0.006\* | 0.003 |
| Political corruption index | -0.819\*\* | 0.311 | -0.29 | 0.319 | -0.406+ | 0.246 | -0.437 | 0.300 | -0.154 | 0.334 | -0.51 | 0.479 | 0.003 | 0.038 |
| Clientelism index | 0.072 | 0.153 | 0.088 | 0.165 | -0.15 | 0.133 | -0.22 | 0.172 | -0.213 | 0.196 | -0.227 | 0.266 | 0.033+ | 0.020 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.004\*\* | 0.002 | 0.004+ | 0.002 | -0.002 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.238\*\*\* | 0.045 | 0.170\*\*\* | 0.044 | -0.033 | 0.038 | 0.009 | 0.051 | 0.128+ | 0.068 | 0.142 | 0.095 | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.312\*\*\* | 0.052 | 0.211\*\*\* | 0.05 | 0.124\*\* | 0.042 | 0.048 | 0.054 | 0.223\*\* | 0.069 | 0.213\* | 0.096 | -0.002 | 0.005 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.022 | 0.023 | -0.012 | 0.025 | 0.001 | 0.024 | 0.018 | 0.023 | -0.038 | 0.027 | 0.002 | 0.036 | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Euro member | -0.035 | 0.031 | -0.066+ | 0.037 | -0.003 | 0.032 | -0.101\*\* | 0.033 | -0.107\*\* | 0.035 | -0.061 | 0.05 | 0.013\*\* | 0.004 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.039\*\* | 0.013 | 0.083\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.018 | 0.013 | 0.024 | 0.016 | 0.025 | 0.016 | 0.036 | 0.024 | -0.004 | 0.002 |
| Year | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Country-fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 0.827 | 0.745 | 0.564 | 0.905 | -6.335\*\*\* | 1.07 | -0.919 | 0.839 | -1.086 | 0.987 | -0.006 | 1.269 | 0.231+ | 0.125 |
| Wald χ2 | 9057.8\*\*\* |  | 7567.4\*\*\* |  | 20124.3\*\*\* |  | 14771.9\*\*\* |  | 9623.7\*\*\* |  | 17286.8\*\*\* |  | 8065.2\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 588 |  | 588 |  | 588 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 508 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Table A14. Replication of Table 2 with an alternative measure of Periods of war.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Left) | 0.060\*\* | 0.022 | 0.051\* | 0.024 | 0.006 | 0.02 | 0.070\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.065\*\* | 0.023 | 0.083\*\* | 0.031 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Lagged DV | 0.812\*\*\* | 0.028 | 0.745\*\*\* | 0.032 | 0.749\*\*\* | 0.025 | 0.887\*\*\* | 0.022 | 0.865\*\*\* | 0.031 | 0.872\*\*\* | 0.026 | 0.907\*\*\* | 0.020 |
| Economic shocks | -0.003 | 0.019 | -0.034 | 0.021 | 0.004 | 0.019 | -0.008 | 0.019 | -0.036+ | 0.021 | -0.053+ | 0.031 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Periods of war | 0.000 | 0.030 | -0.052+ | 0.028 | -0.058\* | 0.025 | 0.001 | 0.024 | -0.018 | 0.034 | 0.055 | 0.054 | 0.005 | 0.003 |
| Political corruption index | -0.837\*\* | 0.313 | -0.271 | 0.323 | -0.435+ | 0.246 | -0.372 | 0.299 | -0.093 | 0.329 | -0.496 | 0.477 | 0.005 | 0.039 |
| Clientelism index | 0.064 | 0.154 | 0.059 | 0.167 | -0.138 | 0.133 | -0.211 | 0.174 | -0.247 | 0.196 | -0.312 | 0.266 | 0.034+ | 0.020 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.004\* | 0.002 | 0.004+ | 0.002 | -0.001 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.238\*\*\* | 0.045 | 0.169\*\*\* | 0.044 | -0.034 | 0.038 | 0.01 | 0.051 | 0.130+ | 0.067 | 0.144 | 0.095 | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.312\*\*\* | 0.052 | 0.212\*\*\* | 0.051 | 0.123\*\* | 0.042 | 0.05 | 0.053 | 0.226\*\*\* | 0.068 | 0.207\* | 0.096 | -0.003 | 0.005 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.021 | 0.023 | -0.013 | 0.025 | 0.000 | 0.024 | 0.017 | 0.023 | -0.039 | 0.027 | 0.002 | 0.036 | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Euro member | -0.035 | 0.031 | -0.06 | 0.037 | -0.004 | 0.033 | -0.100\*\* | 0.033 | -0.103\*\* | 0.035 | -0.06 | 0.05 | 0.013\*\* | 0.004 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.039\*\* | 0.013 | 0.080\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.019 | 0.013 | 0.023 | 0.016 | 0.023 | 0.017 | 0.032 | 0.024 | -0.004+ | 0.002 |
| Year | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Country-fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 0.798 | 0.75 | 0.594 | 0.905 | -6.405\*\*\* | 1.069 | -0.882 | 0.841 | -1.192 | 0.996 | -0.088 | 1.274 | 0.204 | 0.126 |
| Wald χ2 | 9105.2\*\*\* |  | 7617.8\*\*\* |  | 20055.2\*\*\* |  | 14699.0\*\*\* |  | 9787.3\*\*\* |  | 16746.4\*\*\* |  | 7998.9\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 588 |  | 588 |  | 588 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 508 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Table A15. Replication of Table 2 with Disproportionality replaced by an alternative measure of Electoral system.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Left) | 0.061\*\* | 0.022 | 0.051\* | 0.024 | 0.010 | 0.020 | 0.064\*\* | 0.020 | 0.067\*\* | 0.023 | 0.080\*\* | 0.031 | -0.001 | 0.003 |
| Lagged DV | 0.814\*\*\* | 0.028 | 0.741\*\*\* | 0.032 | 0.752\*\*\* | 0.026 | 0.894\*\*\* | 0.022 | 0.859\*\*\* | 0.031 | 0.876\*\*\* | 0.026 | 0.901\*\*\* | 0.021 |
| Economic shocks | 0.005 | 0.019 | -0.027 | 0.021 | 0.015 | 0.020 | -0.007 | 0.019 | -0.032 | 0.021 | -0.044 | 0.031 | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Periods of war | -0.015 | 0.030 | -0.078\*\* | 0.028 | -0.056\* | 0.025 | 0.010 | 0.025 | -0.028 | 0.035 | 0.011 | 0.055 | 0.006+ | 0.003 |
| Political corruption index | -0.824\*\* | 0.311 | -0.268 | 0.326 | -0.441+ | 0.247 | -0.387 | 0.304 | -0.118 | 0.331 | -0.396 | 0.473 | 0.005 | 0.038 |
| Clientelism index | 0.095 | 0.152 | 0.062 | 0.167 | -0.122 | 0.130 | -0.186 | 0.174 | -0.233 | 0.196 | -0.289 | 0.262 | 0.026 | 0.019 |
| Electoral system (t-1) | 0.004 | 0.026 | 0.028 | 0.024 | 0.034 | 0.024 | -0.010 | 0.022 | 0.050\* | 0.026 | -0.073+ | 0.038 | -0.006+ | 0.004 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.217\*\*\* | 0.043 | 0.176\*\*\* | 0.043 | -0.055 | 0.037 | 0.011 | 0.050 | 0.131\* | 0.064 | 0.119 | 0.089 | 0.000 | 0.005 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.287\*\*\* | 0.051 | 0.209\*\*\* | 0.050 | 0.102\* | 0.043 | 0.046 | 0.052 | 0.230\*\*\* | 0.066 | 0.171+ | 0.089 | -0.006 | 0.005 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.017 | 0.024 | -0.013 | 0.026 | 0.004 | 0.025 | 0.021 | 0.024 | -0.039 | 0.027 | 0.009 | 0.037 | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Euro member | -0.030 | 0.032 | -0.054 | 0.038 | -0.009 | 0.034 | -0.082\* | 0.034 | -0.105\*\* | 0.036 | -0.040 | 0.051 | 0.014\*\* | 0.004 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.037\*\* | 0.013 | 0.081\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.016 | 0.013 | 0.022 | 0.016 | 0.020 | 0.017 | 0.033 | 0.024 | -0.003 | 0.002 |
| Year | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | -0.000+ | 0.000 |
| Country-fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 0.849 | 0.783 | 0.906 | 0.949 | -6.617\*\*\* | 1.091 | -0.371 | 0.878 | -1.468 | 1.02 | 0.707 | 1.321 | 0.281\* | 0.138 |
| Wald χ2 | 9558.9\*\*\* |  | 8044.9\*\*\* |  | 20175.4\*\*\* |  | 15337.3\*\*\* |  | 9815.3\*\*\* |  | 16711.4\*\*\* |  | 8161.4\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 594 |  | 594 |  | 594 |  | 543 |  | 543 |  | 543 |  | 512 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Table A16. Replication of Table 2 with the addition of Union density as a control variable.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Left) | 0.046\* | 0.021 | 0.056\* | 0.026 | 0.011 | 0.022 | 0.057\*\* | 0.018 | 0.071\*\* | 0.024 | 0.079\* | 0.032 | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Lagged DV | 0.818\*\*\* | 0.039 | 0.694\*\*\* | 0.038 | 0.698\*\*\* | 0.03 | 0.837\*\*\* | 0.026 | 0.814\*\*\* | 0.037 | 0.830\*\*\* | 0.033 | 0.864\*\*\* | 0.024 |
| Economic shocks | -0.019 | 0.022 | -0.064\* | 0.025 | -0.002 | 0.024 | -0.023 | 0.02 | -0.038 | 0.024 | -0.077\* | 0.037 | -0.002 | 0.003 |
| Periods of war | -0.021 | 0.035 | -0.086\* | 0.034 | -0.046 | 0.031 | -0.012 | 0.026 | -0.06 | 0.037 | 0.017 | 0.059 | 0.005 | 0.003 |
| Political corruption index | -0.862\*\* | 0.33 | -0.193 | 0.332 | -0.580\* | 0.268 | -0.533+ | 0.285 | -0.025 | 0.322 | -0.6 | 0.498 | -0.052 | 0.04 |
| Clientelism index | 0.166 | 0.168 | 0.262 | 0.191 | 0.04 | 0.161 | -0.396\* | 0.161 | -0.554\*\* | 0.211 | -0.348 | 0.292 | 0.052\* | 0.022 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 0.004\* | 0.002 | 0.007\*\*\* | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.009\*\*\* | 0.002 | 0.006\* | 0.003 | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0 | 0 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.251\*\* | 0.083 | 0.314\*\*\* | 0.069 | 0.013 | 0.063 | -0.019 | 0.062 | 0.14 | 0.104 | 0.166 | 0.176 | 0.005 | 0.006 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.331\*\*\* | 0.089 | 0.396\*\*\* | 0.074 | 0.242\*\*\* | 0.068 | 0.055 | 0.062 | 0.251\* | 0.105 | 0.235 | 0.179 | 0.005 | 0.006 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.013 | 0.024 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.027 | 0.04 | 0.025 | -0.035 | 0.029 | -0.004 | 0.039 | 0.007\* | 0.003 |
| Euro member | 0 | 0.033 | -0.028 | 0.045 | 0.042 | 0.039 | -0.028 | 0.034 | -0.067+ | 0.04 | -0.034 | 0.055 | 0.012\*\* | 0.005 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.027 | 0.016 | 0.107\*\*\* | 0.021 | 0.018 | 0.019 | -0.011 | 0.015 | -0.004 | 0.019 | 0.022 | 0.028 | 0 | 0.003 |
| Union density | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.003\*\* | 0.001 | -0.000\*\*\* | 0.000 |
| Year | -0.001 | 0.001 | -0.001 | 0.001 | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.001 | 0 | 0.001 | -0.000+ | 0 |
| Country fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 1.411 | 0.982 | 1.407 | 1.225 | -7.798\*\*\* | 1.446 | 0.43 | 0.866 | 0.153 | 1.102 | -0.009 | 1.593 | 0.309\* | 0.15 |
| Wald χ2 | 6746.4\*\*\* |  | 7236.0\*\*\* |  | 14822.5\*\*\* |  | 15416.9\*\*\* |  | 9579.1\*\*\* |  | 17169.8\*\*\* |  | 5183.4\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 484 |  | 484 |  | 484 |  | 470 |  | 470 |  | 470 |  | 455 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Table A17. Replication of Table 2 with the GPI of the center-right bloc as the focal predictor.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Center-right) | -0.037 | 0.023 | -0.046+ | 0.026 | -0.038+ | 0.021 | -0.035 | 0.024 | -0.035 | 0.027 | 0.011 | 0.034 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Lagged DV | 0.818\*\*\* | 0.027 | 0.751\*\*\* | 0.032 | 0.747\*\*\* | 0.025 | 0.892\*\*\* | 0.022 | 0.872\*\*\* | 0.031 | 0.882\*\*\* | 0.025 | 0.908\*\*\* | 0.020 |
| Economic shocks | -0.003 | 0.019 | -0.033 | 0.021 | 0.004 | 0.019 | -0.013 | 0.019 | -0.037+ | 0.022 | -0.050 | 0.032 | 0.000 | 0.003 |
| Periods of war | -0.006 | 0.031 | -0.071\* | 0.028 | -0.050\* | 0.025 | 0.028 | 0.025 | -0.018 | 0.036 | 0.032 | 0.056 | 0.006+ | 0.003 |
| Political corruption index | -0.847\*\* | 0.314 | -0.249 | 0.322 | -0.452+ | 0.245 | -0.440 | 0.302 | -0.116 | 0.329 | -0.460 | 0.474 | 0.001 | 0.039 |
| Clientelism index | 0.053 | 0.157 | 0.047 | 0.167 | -0.173 | 0.134 | -0.220 | 0.175 | -0.238 | 0.198 | -0.262 | 0.269 | 0.034+ | 0.020 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.005\*\* | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.004\* | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.002 | -0.002 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.230\*\*\* | 0.046 | 0.162\*\*\* | 0.045 | -0.039 | 0.038 | 0.007 | 0.052 | 0.129+ | 0.068 | 0.139 | 0.096 | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.313\*\*\* | 0.052 | 0.212\*\*\* | 0.051 | 0.119\*\* | 0.041 | 0.059 | 0.054 | 0.234\*\*\* | 0.069 | 0.217\* | 0.097 | -0.003 | 0.005 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.026 | 0.023 | -0.016 | 0.025 | 0.003 | 0.024 | 0.012 | 0.024 | -0.044 | 0.027 | -0.010 | 0.036 | 0.004 | 0.003 |
| Euro member | -0.034 | 0.031 | -0.060 | 0.037 | -0.002 | 0.032 | -0.100\*\* | 0.034 | -0.104\*\* | 0.035 | -0.061 | 0.050 | 0.013\*\* | 0.004 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.044\*\* | 0.014 | 0.085\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.022 | 0.013 | 0.028+ | 0.016 | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.036 | 0.024 | -0.004+ | 0.002 |
| Year | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.003\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Country-fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 0.823 | 0.762 | 0.712 | 0.912 | -6.260\*\*\* | 1.062 | -0.932 | 0.848 | -1.168 | 1.004 | -0.101 | 1.292 | 0.201 | 0.125 |
| Wald χ2 | 8984.2\*\*\* |  | 7658.4\*\*\* |  | 20350.8\*\*\* |  | 14697.0\*\*\* |  | 9605.3\*\*\* |  | 17778.0\*\*\* |  | 8007.1\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 588 |  | 588 |  | 588 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 508 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Table A18. Full models with the interaction between Governmental power index (Left) and Year.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Left) | 6.355\*\*\* | 1.408 | 2.462 | 1.578 | -1.048 | 1.476 | 3.902\*\* | 1.297 | 4.516\*\* | 1.453 | 10.437\*\*\* | 1.932 | -1.918 | 2.332 |
| Lagged DV | 0.795\*\*\* | 0.028 | 0.736\*\*\* | 0.033 | 0.809\*\*\* | 0.028 | 0.887\*\*\* | 0.022 | 0.863\*\*\* | 0.031 | 0.851\*\*\* | 0.025 | 11.693\*\*\* | 0.260 |
| Economic shocks | -0.010 | 0.019 | -0.034 | 0.021 | 0.005 | 0.021 | -0.014 | 0.018 | -0.040+ | 0.021 | -0.061\* | 0.031 | -0.007 | 0.033 |
| Periods of war | -0.019 | 0.030 | -0.079\*\* | 0.028 | -0.050+ | 0.027 | 0.013 | 0.025 | -0.033 | 0.035 | 0.000 | 0.053 | -0.070+ | 0.040 |
| Political corruption index | -0.803\*\* | 0.307 | -0.200 | 0.323 | -0.472+ | 0.267 | -0.363 | 0.296 | -0.032 | 0.323 | -0.367 | 0.467 | 0.000 | 0.501 |
| Clientelism index | 0.049 | 0.153 | 0.061 | 0.166 | -0.162 | 0.145 | -0.231 | 0.171 | -0.259 | 0.195 | -0.304 | 0.262 | -0.421 | 0.258 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.006\*\*\* | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.005\*\* | 0.002 | 0.005\* | 0.002 | 0.000 | 0.003 | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.230\*\*\* | 0.044 | 0.165\*\*\* | 0.044 | -0.032 | 0.041 | 0.001 | 0.051 | 0.122+ | 0.067 | 0.127 | 0.092 | -0.007 | 0.062 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.282\*\*\* | 0.050 | 0.197\*\*\* | 0.051 | 0.140\*\* | 0.047 | 0.025 | 0.053 | 0.199\*\* | 0.068 | 0.156+ | 0.093 | 0.061 | 0.069 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.015 | 0.023 | -0.012 | 0.025 | 0.001 | 0.026 | 0.020 | 0.023 | -0.035 | 0.027 | 0.014 | 0.036 | -0.057 | 0.041 |
| Euro member | -0.016 | 0.031 | -0.054 | 0.037 | -0.008 | 0.035 | -0.087\*\* | 0.033 | -0.089\* | 0.035 | -0.027 | 0.049 | -0.178\*\* | 0.055 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.035\*\* | 0.013 | 0.080\*\*\* | 0.016 | 0.021 | 0.015 | 0.021 | 0.016 | 0.019 | 0.017 | 0.026 | 0.023 | 0.051+ | 0.031 |
| Year | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.004\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.001\* | 0.000 | 0.001\* | 0.001 | 0.002\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Governmental power index (Left)\*Year | -0.003\*\*\* | 0.001 | -0.002 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.002\*\* | 0.001 | -0.002\*\* | 0.001 | -0.005\*\*\* | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Country-fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | -0.506 | 0.786 | 0.138 | 0.935 | -8.369\*\*\* | 1.17 | -1.700+ | 0.87 | -2.128\* | 1.028 | -2.715\* | 1.344 | -9.439\*\*\* | 1.555 |
| Wald χ2 | 9212.8\*\*\* |  | 7730.4\*\*\* |  | 20084.9\*\*\* |  | 14993.9\*\*\* |  | 9916.3\*\*\* |  | 15903.2\*\*\* |  | 8015.8\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 588 |  | 588 |  | 588 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 508 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

Figure A11. Replication of Figure 4 with the GPI of the left bloc including also ‘new politics’ parties.

Immagine che contiene diagramma, linea, Parallelo, Disegno tecnico

Descrizione generata automaticamente

Table A19. Full models with the interaction between Governmental power index (center-right) and Year.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Socioeconomic pos. | | Social group | | Gender | | Education | | Health | | Welfare | | Income | |
|  | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse | b | pcse |
| Governmental power index (Center-right) | -1.955+ | 1.043 | 0.064 | 1.242 | -0.623 | -1.25 | -0.623 | 1.254 | -0.483 | 1.368 | -1.459 | 1.808 | 0.797 | 1.912 |
| Lagged DV | 0.818\*\*\* | 0.027 | 0.750\*\*\* | 0.033 | 0.894\*\*\* | -0.02 | 0.894\*\*\* | 0.022 | 0.872\*\*\* | 0.031 | 0.882\*\*\* | 0.026 | 11.717\*\*\* | 0.258 |
| Economic shocks | -0.005 | 0.019 | -0.033 | 0.021 | -0.013 | -0.02 | -0.013 | 0.019 | -0.037+ | 0.022 | -0.052 | 0.032 | -0.008 | 0.033 |
| Periods of war | -0.003 | 0.031 | -0.071\* | 0.028 | 0.028 | -0.03 | 0.028 | 0.025 | -0.019 | 0.036 | 0.031 | 0.056 | -0.073+ | 0.040 |
| Political corruption index | -0.890\*\* | 0.315 | -0.247 | 0.322 | -0.454 | -0.3 | -0.454 | 0.303 | -0.127 | 0.331 | -0.495 | 0.475 | 0.054 | 0.505 |
| Clientelism index | 0.038 | 0.157 | 0.047 | 0.167 | -0.212 | -0.17 | -0.212 | 0.174 | -0.233 | 0.197 | -0.246 | 0.270 | -0.426+ | 0.257 |
| Disproportionality (t-1) | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.005\*\* | 0.002 | 0.004\* | -0 | 0.004\* | 0.002 | 0.004+ | 0.002 | -0.002 | 0.003 | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Suffrage (Ref: restricted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male suffrage | 0.220\*\*\* | 0.046 | 0.162\*\*\* | 0.045 | 0.006 | -0.05 | 0.006 | 0.052 | 0.129+ | 0.068 | 0.138 | 0.096 | -0.010 | 0.062 |
| Universal suffrage | 0.305\*\*\* | 0.052 | 0.213\*\*\* | 0.051 | 0.057 | -0.05 | 0.057 | 0.054 | 0.233\*\*\* | 0.069 | 0.213\* | 0.097 | 0.053 | 0.069 |
| EU constraints (Ref: not in the EU) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU member | -0.026 | 0.023 | -0.016 | 0.025 | 0.012 | -0.02 | 0.012 | 0.023 | -0.044 | 0.027 | -0.009 | 0.036 | -0.055 | 0.041 |
| Euro member | -0.033 | 0.031 | -0.060 | 0.037 | -0.099\*\* | -0.03 | -0.099\*\* | 0.034 | -0.104\*\* | 0.035 | -0.060 | 0.050 | -0.171\*\* | 0.055 |
| Rigorous public administration | 0.050\*\*\* | 0.014 | 0.085\*\*\* | 0.017 | 0.028+ | -0.02 | 0.028+ | 0.016 | 0.028 | 0.017 | 0.038 | 0.024 | 0.048 | 0.031 |
| Year | -0.001+ | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0 | -0 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Governmental power index (Center-right)\*Year | 0.001+ | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0 | -0 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Country fixed effects | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  | R |  |
| Constant | 2.358\* | 1.163 | 0.622 | 1.424 | -0.476 | -1.36 | -0.476 | 1.358 | -0.839 | 1.472 | 0.964 | 1.815 | -10.327\*\*\* | 2.152 |
| Wald χ2 | 9006.1\*\*\* |  | 7652.3\*\*\* |  | 14647.1\*\*\* |  | 14647.1\*\*\* |  | 9612.5\*\*\* |  | 18313.8\*\*\* |  | 8032.6\*\*\* |  |
| N of elections | 588 |  | 588 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 541 |  | 508 |  |
| N of countries | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  | 20 |  |

Note. Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. +p < 0.10; \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001.

**Literature Report**

To further elucidate how do our manuscript contributes to the relevant literature in an innovative way, we collected and analyzed several pieces of information related to the substantive focus and research design of the existing contributions that analyze the impact of the left on inequalities. We report this information in Table A19, included below, which allows us to have both a general overview and a detailed breakdown of the similarities and differences between our manuscript and the existing contributions.

As evident from Table A19, a number of important features that distinguish our article from the rest of the literature emerge. To begin with, in terms of substantive focus, our study focuses specifically on the relationship between left power and the reduction of inequalities, meaning that left power is the focal variable of our analysis. This is not the case in the vast majority of the existing contributions, which instead only treat left power as one of many independent variables (e.g., Huber and Stephens 2014; Jensen 2011; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Kristal 2010; Rueda and Pontusson 2000) or even as a control variable (Hancké 2013; Hicks and Kenworthy 2003) in studies that aim at identifying what are the determinants of inequality rather than examining specifically the relationship between left and inequality. Studies that specifically focus on the relationship between the left and the various forms of inequality are much rarer to come by. Indeed, our detailed review of the literature identifies only two works by Garritzmann and Seng (2016) and Kauder and Potrafke (2013); in addition to descriptive analyses by Morlino (2020) and Schmidt (2007). Furthermore,

other three studies, Busemeyer (2009), Hewitt (1977), and Jensen (2010), treating the left as their main focus alongside other factors, respectively, democracy, economic globalization, and right power as additional focal variables. Therefore, already in this regard, our explicit focus on the link between left power and the reduction of inequalities fits in a minority of existing articles in the specialized literature, and even within this group other characteristics make our contribution stand out.

Moreover, Table A19 highlights how no available study presents a fully-fledged and multidimensional conceptualization of the dependent variable, equality, as we do in our manuscript. Along the same line of reasoning as McKnight, Mendes Loureiro, and Vizard (2019), we conceive equality as a multidimensional concept that includes political, social, and economic aspects. These, in turn, can be empirically operationalized into different indicators of political, social, and economic forms of inequality that the left, in light of its historical mission, is expected to rectify. Instead, the majority of existing studies focus only on economic forms of inequality, thus neglecting its social and especially political dimensions. Indeed, only two studies out of the 28 reported in Table A19 focus on more than merely one dimension of inequality. More specifically, these are the studies by Hewitt (1977) and Huber and Stephens (2000) that, according to our conceptualization of equality, focus on some selected forms of social and economic inequality (respectively, educational and income inequality; and educational, health, and welfare inequality). Even conceding this, it is evident how, according to our detailed literature review reported in Table A19, no existing contribution provides an encompassing assessment of the impact of the left on the reduction of inequality in its several forms, which only our article comprehensively conceptualizes and operationalizes. By virtue of this, an additional novel contribution of our study is that it provides what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical assessment of the effect of the left on two specific forms of political inequality that have been neglected so far: access to political power by social group (including ethnicity, race and religion) and socioeconomic status. This constitutes another novel and significant contribution of our paper with important theoretical implications. In sum, the comprehensive multidimensional approach to both the conceptualization and operationalization of the dependent variable, inequality, emerges as another key feature and allows us to provide additional insights compared to the relevant literature.

Hence, so far this detailed comparative effort between our article and the available scholarship already indicated that: (1) our article fits a minority of contributions explicitly treating the left as their focal variable with regard to the reduction of inequalities; and (2) within the relevant literature at large and, hence, even this minority of studies in which it is located, our article presents a thoroughly multidimensional conceptualization and operationalization of inequality, which is unique to it and allows for a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the left on the reduction of various forms of inequality, so far missing.

Furthermore, another key innovation of the manuscript is the measurement of our focal predictor, left power, through the Governmental Power Index, which we believe is more accurate than the existing alternatives. As we explain in the section on the operationalization of our focal predictor, we argue that the index we derive from Bartolini (1998) can better take into account the governmental power of the left compared to the measures used in the literature, which span from simply looking at the electoral system of the country to the share of parliamentary seats of the left, to the cabinet ideological position, and up to the share of cabinet seats of left parties. All these measures provide only a partial account of the underlying concept and even the most sophisticated ones do not properly take into consideration both the cabinet status in parliament (i.e., multi-party minority, single-party minority, surplus coalition, minimum winning coalition, and single-party majority) and the party status in cabinet (i.e., junior or leading). In our view, these aspects are extremely important to complement the basic distinction between the left being in government or in opposition. Indeed, all else equal, we expect that a left party will be more effective in pursuing its objectives in majority governments compared to minority ones, as this is a key institutional aspect that will influence the ability of cabinets to accomplish its policy goals. At the same time, all else equal, we expect that a left party will be more effective in pursuing its objectives when it holds a leading position (that is, a relative majority of cabinet seats) within the cabinet rather than a junior position in governments that are led by other (non-left) formations.

In addition, our article also presents a research design feature that sets it apart from all other existing contributions, as illustrated by Table A19: its spatial-temporal framework. As regards the spatial framework, our study explicitly aims to test our relation of interest in Western Europe, that is, the region where left parties originally emerged and politicized the reduction of inequalities as their flagship goal. In this respect, we provide the most inclusive case selection possible, as we include all the 20 countries conventionally considered Western European (the list of countries is reported in footnote 1 on p. 8 of the manuscript). Hence, our case selection corresponds to the universe of cases, with extremely marginal exceptions for which this analysis would be unapplicable (e.g., the microstates of Andorra, Liechtenstein, San Marino). In this regard, it is noteworthy that our article is the first to cover all Western European countries, as the most inclusive available contributions only cover 16 Western European countries in conjunction with five additional ones that are not from the area (Busemeyer 2009; Garritzmann and Seng 2016). Hence, by doing so our article provides what is so far the most generalizable account of the relationship of interest within the region, without extending it beyond Western Europe (we have summarized this comment in footnote 1 on p. 8 in the manuscript).

Our temporal framework represents another important novel contribution of the manuscript. This is because we adopt an unmatched long-term perspective by analyzing 150 years (against an average timeframe considered by the list of works included in Table A19 of 24 years and the “longer” study in the literature, Braga, Checchi, and Meschi 2013, covering 71 years). While Table A19 highlights how each contribution presents a different and research-specific spatial and temporal scope, by presenting the most inclusive (within Western Europe) and by far the longest spatial-temporal framework, our article is able to come to less idiosyncratic conclusions. This is especially important for the evaluation of the long-term evolution of the equalizing effect of the left, which would otherwise been impossible; as well as for gauging this impact not only in recent decades, but also in previous periods that have not been covered by the literature (i.e., usually before the 1960s and in general from the early 1900s backwards). Moreover, our comprehensive spatial-temporal framework allows us to present regression models based on a larger number of observations compared to the rest of the literature (between 502 and 588 in our manuscript against an average of between 158 and 215 depending on the model considered in the studies reported in Table A19) and our findings show to be robust to many different controls and model specifications.

In a nutshell, compared to the relevant literature on the topic, our manuscript provides: 1) a specific focus on the relationship between left power and inequalities; 2) a multidimensional conceptualization of the explanandum; 3) a research design based on a comprehensive spatial-temporal framework presenting the most inclusive (within Western Europe) and by far the longest time-series-cross-section analysis of the phenomenon under study; 4) a more accurate conceptualization of left power which has to be conceived first and foremost as *governmental* power and the consequent development of a more fine-grained measure compared to the existing alternatives. We believe this makes our manuscript well-placed to provide the relevant literature with an important theoretical and empirical contribution.

Table A20. Comparison between our manuscript and existing studies (substantive focus, research design, variables, and findings).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Paper (author year)** | **Dimension of equality** | **Y Indicator** | **Left power is** | **Left power operationalisation** | **Controls** | **Spatial framework** | **Temporal framework** | **N** | **Effects** |
|  |
| **Manuscript** | **3 Political, 2 Social, 2 Economic** | **6 measures of Political, Social, and Economic inequality, post-taxes/transfers Gini** | **Focal variable** | **Governmental Power Index (GPI)** | **Economic, political, and social** | **20 Western European countries** | **1871-2000** | **502-588** | **Mixed** |  |
| Hewitt 1977 | Economic (Income) and Social (Education) | 3 measures of income inequality, amount of higher education and proportion of university students from the lower classes | One of two focal variables | Proportion of left parliamentary seats | Economic | 25 developed countries, 13 WE | 1960-1965 | 25 | Yes |  |
| Kenworthy and Malami 1999 | Political (Gender) | Share of parliamentary seats held by women | One of many IVs | Share of left parliamentary seats | Economic, political, social, and cultural | 20 developed countries | 1998 | 20 | Yes |  |
| Huber and Stephens 2000 | Social (Education and Health) and Economic (Welfare) | Percent of working-age population employed in public health, education, and welfare | One of many IVs | Cumulative leftist cabinet measure | Economic, political, and social | 9 developed countries | 1975, 1980, 1985 | 27 | Yes |  |
| Rueda and Pontusson 2000 | Economic (Income) | 90:10 ratio in distribution of gross income from employment | One of many IVs | Cabinet ideological balance | Economic and social | 16 developed countries, 12 WE | 1973-1995 | 217 | Yes |  |
| Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002 | Economic (Income) | Various national wage ratios (90:10, 90:50, 50:10) | One of many IVs | Cabinet ideological balance | Economic, political, and social | 16 developed countries, 12 WE | 1973-1995 | 211 | Yes |  |
| Bradley et al. 2003 | Economic (Income) | Gini before taxes and transfers; Gini reduction after taxes and transfers | One of many IVs | Leftist cabinet measure | Economic, political, and social | 14 developed countries, 10 WE | 1967-1997 | 61 | Yes |  |
| Hicks and Kenworthy 2003 | Economic (Income) | Income redistribution, employment performance, gender equality in the labour market | Control | Left cabinet shares | Economic, political, and social | 18 developed countries, 13 WE | 1980-1999 | 26-36 | No |  |
| Allan and Scruggs 2004 | Economic (Welfare) | Net replacement rates for unemployment and sickness insurance | One of many IVs | Left cabinet shares | Economic, political, and social | 18 developed countries, 13 WE | 1975-1999 | 425-450 | Yes |  |
| Mahler 2004 | Economic (Income) | Gini on earnings inequality, state fiscal redistribution, and Gini after taxes and transfers | One of many IVs | Cabinet ideological balance | Economic and political | 14 developed countries, 11 WE | 1981-2000 | 50-264 | No |  |
| Iversen and Soskice 2006 | Economic (Income) | Gini reduction after taxes and transfers | One of many IVs | PR system; cabinet ideological balance | Economic, political, and social | 13 developed countries, 10 WE | 1967-1997 | 47 | Yes |  |
| Schmidt 2007 | Social (Education) | Public education spending (percentage of GDP) | Focal variable | Left cabinet shares | None | 21 developed countries, 16 WE | 1975-2002 | 21 | Yes |  |
| Ansell 2008 | Social (Education) | Relative tertiary education spending and tertiary enrollment | One of many IVs | Cabinet ideological balance | Economic and political | 22 developed countries (6 non-WE) | 1980-1997 | 93-271 | Mixed |  |
| Rueda 2008 | Economic (Income) | 50:10 ratio of wage inequality | One of many IVs | Cabinet ideological balance | Economic and social | 16 developed countries, 12 WE | 1973-1995 | 226 | No |  |
| Beramendi and Cusack 2009 | Economic (Income) | 90:10 ratio of wage inequality and Gini after taxes and transfers | One of many Ivs | Cabinet ideological balance (20-year average) | Economic, political, and social | 13 developed countries, 10 WE | 1978-2002 | 41 | Yes |  |
| Busemeyer 2009 | Social (Education) | Public education spending (percentage of GDP) and tertiary enrollment | One of two focal variables | Left cabinet shares | Economic, political, and social | 21 developed countries, 16 WE | 1980-2002 | 188-390 | Yes |  |
| Jensen 2010 | Economic (Welfare) | Gross public social expenditures as a percentage of GDP | One of two focal variables | Left cabinet shares | Economic, political, and social | 18 Western countries, 13 WE | 1980-2000 | 125-316 | Yes |  |
| Kristal 2010 | Economic (Income) | Labour's share of national income | One of many IVs | Leftist cabinet measure | Economic and social | 16 developed countries, 12 WE | 1960-2005 | 417-702 | No |  |
| Mahler 2010 | Economic (Income) | Gini reduction after taxes and transfers, 95:25 ratio reduction, poverty reduction | One of many Ivs | Left cabinet shares | Economic, political, and social | 13 developed countries, 10 WE | 1979-2005 | 70-71 | No |  |
| Jensen 2011 | Social (Education) | Public education spending (percentage of GDP) | One of many IVs | Left cabinet shares | Economic, political, and social | 18 Western countries, 13 WE | 1980-2000 | 234-281 | No |  |
| Lupu and Pontusson 2011 | Economic (Income) | Gini reduction after taxes and transfers | Intervening variable | Cabinet ideological balance | Economic, political, and social | 15 developed countries, 12 WE | 1980-2004 | 50-60 | No |  |
| Braga, Checchi, and Meschi 2013 | Social (Education) | Inclusive educational policies | One of many IVs | Cabinet ideological balance | Economic and political | 22 European countries, 15 WE and 7 CEE | 1929-2000 | 770-843 | Yes |  |
| Hancké 2013 | Economic (Income) | Labour income as share of GDP | Control | Left cabinet shares | Economic and social | 14 developed countries, 12 WE | 1970-1999 | 132 | No |  |
| Kauder and Potrafke 2013 | Social (Education) | Tuition fees (in euro) | Focal variable | Trichotomic: left-only government, coalition, opposition | Political | 16 German Länders | 2005-2013 | 208-240 | Yes |  |
| Yi 2013 | Economic (Income) | Gini after taxes and transfers | One of many IVs | Trichotomic: govt. is economically leftist, centrist, or conservative | Economic, social, political, and geographical | 26 new democracies, 2 WE | 1975-2006 | 138-174 | No |  |
| Huber and Stephens 2014 | Economic (Income) | Gini before taxes and transfers; Gini reduction after taxes and transfers | One of many IVs | Cumulative leftist cabinet measure | Economic and social | 18 developed countries (including US, Canada, and Australia) | 1967-2010 | 100-111 | Mixed |  |
| Iversen and Soskice 2015 | Economic (Welfare) | Changes in spending for unemployment benefits and active labour market policies | One of many IVs | Cabinet ideological balance | Economic and social | 18 developed countries (4 non-WE) | mid-1980s-mid-2000s | 395-481 | Yes |  |
| Garritzmann and Seng 2016 | Social (Education) | Total and sectoral education spending (share of GDP) | Focal variable | Left cabinet shares | Economic, political, and social | 21 developed countries, 16 WE | 1995-2010 | 74-245 | No |  |
| Morlino 2020 | Economic (Income) | Gini after taxes and transfers | Focal variable | Share of vote for leftist parties | None | 6 WE countries | 1993-2019 | 44 | No |  |