Appendix: Federalism and Democratic Backsliding in Comparative Perspective

Robert R. Kaufman, R. Daniel Kelemen, Burcu Kolcak

Contents

Appendix 1. Measurement of Democracy, Democratic Backsliding and Case Selection

Step 1. Identifying the Universe of Democracies

We define a country as democratic if its V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) score is *at least 0.5 for eight or more consecutive years*. V-Dem defines the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) as follows:

> The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy — liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other (See V-Dem Codebook V12, p. 380 for the elements of the index, which center on freedom of expression and association, suffrage, clean elections and that officials are fairly and freely elected).

Table A1 below shows the universe of democracies for our time frame between 1974 and 2021.

Table A1. Universe of Democracies (N = 105)

#	Country Name	# of Consecutive Years
1	Albania	14
2	Argentina	38
3	Australia	48
4	Austria	48
5	Bangladesh	10
6	Barbados	48
7	Belgium	48
8	Benin	27
9	Bhutan	13
10	Bolivia	34
11	Bosnia and Herzegovina	25
12	Botswana	48
13	Brazil	35
14	Bulgaria	31

15	Burkina Faso	16
16	Canada	48
17	Cape Verde	31
18	Chile	32
19	Colombia	31
20	Costa Rica	48
21	Croatia	22
22	Cyprus	47
23	Czech Republic	32
24	Denmark	48
25	Dominican Republic	26
26	Ecuador	42
27	El Salvador	22
28	Estonia	29
29	Fiji	13
30	Finland	48
31	France	48
32	Georgia	18
33	Germany	48
34	Ghana	27
35	Greece	47
36	Guatemala	22
37	Guyana	24
38	Honduras	18
39	Hungary	28
40	Iceland	48
41	India	42
42	Indonesia	23
43	Ireland	48
44	Israel	48
45	Italy	48
46	Jamaica	38
47	Japan	48
48	Kosovo	8
49	Latvia	32
50	Lebanon	8

51	Lesotho	20
52	Liberia	16
53	Lithuania	32
54	Luxembourg	48
55	Madagascar	8
56	Malawi	10
57	Mali	19
58	Malta	48
59	Mauritius	48
60	Mexico	26
61	Moldova	13
62	Mongolia	31
63	Namibia	27
64	Nepal	8
65	Netherlands	48
66	New Zealand	48
67	Nicaragua	17
68	Niger	11
69	Nigeria	9
70	North Macedonia	9
71	Norway	48
72	Panama	31
73	Papua New Guinea	33
74	Paraguay	29
75	Peru	21
76	Philippines	16
77	Poland	32
78	Portugal	46
79	Romania	31
80	Sao Tome and Principe	31
81	Senegal	38
82	Serbia	13
83	Sierra Leone	19
84	Slovakia	29
85	Slovenia	32

86	Solomon Islands	21
87	South Africa	27
88	South Korea	34
89	Spain	44
90	Sri Lanka	10
91	Suriname	30
92	Sweden	48
93	Switzerland	48
94	Taiwan	26
95	Thailand	8
96	Timor-Leste	20
97	Trinidad and Tobago	48
98	Tunisia	10
99	Turkey	25
100	United Kingdom	48
101	United States of America	48
102	Uruguay	37
103	Vanuatu	42
104	Venezuela	29
105	Zambia	13

Step 2. Identification of the Initial List of Backsliders

For operationalizing backsliding, however, we use movements in the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), rather than the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI). This enables us to capture movements in broader features of democracy, including independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances (Kaufman and Haggard 2021a, 2021b). Our motivation, therefore, is to employ a more nuanced indicator for backsliding that captures derogations from democratic rule, which does not necessarily arise from direct assaults on the integrity of the electoral system or basic rights. Moreover, following the lead of Haggard and Kaufman (2021), we would like to identify *backsliding episodes* as precisely as possible instead of comparisons that solely focuses on fixed time periods. While such measures can capture overall declines, they are less informative when it comes to the timing and duration of the backsliding episode. V-Dem defines the principles of the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) as follows:

The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account (see V-Dem Codebook V12, p. 381 for the elements of the index).

Backsliding, according to our measure, is any year or succession of years in which the score on the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) falls significantly below the peak liberal democracy score achieved during the democratic period. The drop is significant when the confidence intervals do not overlap (i.e., when the upper bound of the liberal democracy score in that year does not overlap with or exceed the lower bound of the peak year). Table A2 displays the backsliding countries that we identify based on our measure of backsliding.

Table A2. Backsliders: Initial Case Selection (N = 52)

#	Backsliding Country
1	Bangladesh
2	Benin
3	Bolivia
4	Botswana
5	Brazil
6	Bulgaria
7	Burkina Faso
8	Chile
9	Croatia
10	Czech Republic
11	Dominican Republic
12	Ecuador
13	El Salvador
14	Fiji
15	Ghana
16	Greece
17	Guatemala
18	Guyana
19	Honduras

20	Hungary
21	India
22	Indonesia
23	Lesotho
24	Madagascar
25	Malawi
26	Mali
27	Mauritius
28	Mexico
29	Moldova
30	Mongolia
31	Nepal
32	Nicaragua
33	Niger
34	North Macedonia
35	Papua New Guinea
36	Philippines
37	Poland
38	Romania
39	Senegal
40	Serbia
41	Sierra Leone
42	Slovenia
43	Solomon Islands
44	South Korea
45	Sri Lanka
46	Thailand
47	Tunisia
48	Turkey
49	United States of America
50	Vanuatu
51	Venezuela
52	Zambia

Step 3. Triangulation: Assessment of the initial list of backsliding countries

As explained above, the initial selection of cases involved two main steps: first, the identification of an appropriate threshold for democratic rule and second, a measure of democratic regression. A third step involved triangulation with alternative measures. To validate our measure of backsliding, we compare our initial list of backsliding countries with other global and time series democracy datasets. Here, our goal is to assess whether our measurement of backsliding using V-Dem data are validated by movements in other indices in proximate time periods. Below, in Table A3, we outline the datasets we use for this purpose, as well their underlying conception of democracy, and the time periods they cover.

Table A3: Datasets used for Triangulation

Dataset	Time Period	Description & Measurement of Backsliding	Validation
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule.	1972-2021	Freedom House produces research and reports on a number of core thematic issues related to democracy, political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House ranks countries as "Free," "Partly Free" or "Not Free" based on two indices, each on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represents the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom. The underlying political rights questions are grouped into three subcategories: Electoral Process, Political Pluralism and Participation, and Functioning of Government. The civil liberties questions are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law, and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights.	We consider changes from Free to Partly Free as evidence of a regime change but given the compressed scale also changes in either index within a ranking.
Polity 5	1800-2018	Polity reports democratic and autocratic "patterns of authority" and regime changes in all independent countries with total population greater than 500,000. Polity ranks countries on a "democracy-autocracy" scale from -10 to 10, with higher values associated with more democracy. The conceptual scheme consists of six component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. It also records changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. Polity offers a tripartite regime type definition: countries with Polity scores	Because of the relatively compressed scale, we considered cases with drops in Polity scores that nevertheless did not dip below the 6-point threshold for democracy (6–10) either over the 1974–2020 period or for the shorter 2006–2020 period (depending on the timing of the movements in V-Dem scores). We also note changes of regime (from

		equal to or greater than 6 are considered democracies; those between -5 and 5 are categorized as "anocracies" or hybrid regimes; and those -6 and below are autocracies.	democracy [6–10] to anocracy [-5 to 5] or autocracy [-6 to -10]).
MLL & **V-Dem 2022 Democracy Report**	1789 - 2021	Lührmann, Lindberg and Tannenberg (2018) develop a regime type classification based on V-Dem and Mechkova, Lührmann and Lindberg (2017, hereafter MLL) use it to identify decline within liberal democracies; decline from liberal to electoral democracy; decline within electoral democracy; and declines from democracy to electoral authoritarianism. V-Dem 2022 Democracy Report builds on the same measurement strategy used by MML. Thus, the report provides an extended time coverage. Therefore, for countries with more recent backsliding episodes, we use the report.	We triangulate our cases with the cases MLL identify.
MB		Mainwaring and Bizarro (2018, hereafter MB) look only at democracies that emerged during the Third Wave period and develop a classification of regime continuity and change over the entire period. Their conception of democracy is more minimalist: only 11 of their 33 cases of breakdown, for example, meet our criteria for being democratic in the first place. They discern five different outcomes: breakdown, or outright changes in regime; erosion (within democracy); stagnation (at low levels of democracy); advances and those that maintained a high level.	We triangulate our cases with the cases MB identify as "breakdown" or "erosion."
Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2022	2006-2021	The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index is a more recent entry into the field, and we can therefore only use it to consider developments in the "democratic deficit" period of 2006 to the present. The EIU index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation and political culture. The last three deserve comment as they reflect an effort to get a "thicker" conception of democracy. The functioning of government is a threshold condition that the government is capable of implementing decisions taken. The inclusion of measures of the extent of participation is also distinctive. Finally, a democratic political culture is defined as one in which the public is not passive and	We focus on changes from "full democracy" to a "flawed democracy" or "hybrid regime" but also on changes within full and flawed democracies.

apathetic and in which losing parties and their supporters accept the judgments of the voters.

Table A4 provides information on all the cases identified using our method, including the time period of the backsliding episode. We show whether the case is validated by inclusion in the other datasets. Those that are identified as eroding or backsliding to authoritarian rule by at least two other measures are included in our list of backsliding cases; all others are eliminated. For those included cases, we code them as undergoing either erosion, which we define as a decline in their electoral democracy score (ie. above our electoral democracy threshold of 0.5); or reversion, which is backsliding to authoritarian rule (below our electoral democracy threshold of 0.5).

Table A4. Assessment of Initial Backsliders via Triangulation

#	Country	Backsliding Episode	Inclusion in other datasets	Coding
1	Bangladesh	2007-2021	• Polity: decline from democracy to anocracy in DD period • MB: breakdown (2005) • MLL: transition from ED to EA	Eliminated; breakdown in MB reflects earlier coup, does not correspond with backsliding period
2	*Benin*	2019-2021	• FH: decline from free to partly free • EUI: decline within hybrid regime • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: Reversion from ED to EA	Reversion
3	*Bolivia*	2010-2021	• Polity: decline within democracy in DD period • EIU: decline from flawed democracy to hybrid regime	Erosion
4	Botswana	2020-2021	• V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: Decline within liberal democracy	Eliminated no other datasets
5	*Brazil*	2016-2021	• FH: Decline within civil liberties rating • EIU: decline within flawed democracy • MLL: LD to ED; V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within liberal democracy	Erosion

6	Bulgaria	2020	• EIU: decline within flawed democracy	Eliminated, only one other dataset
7	Burkina Faso	2014-2015	MB: Breakdown in 2005	Eliminated; breakdown in MB reflects the experience of erosion the year during the breakdown
8	Chile	2020-2021	None	Eliminated no other dataset
9	*Croatia*	2017-2021[1]	• EIU: decline within flawed democracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within electoral democracy	Erosion
10	Czech Republic	2018-2021	• V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within electoral democracy	Eliminated, only one other dataset
11	*The Dominican Republic*	2002-2020	• FH: decline from free to partly free • Polity: decline within democracy DD period • MB: but breakdown in earlier period (1990)	Erosion
12	*Ecuador*	2008-2017	• Polity: decline within democracy • MLL: decline within electoral democracy • MB: erosion	Erosion
13	*El Salvador*	2020-2021	• FH: decline from free to partly free • EIU: decline within hybrid democracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from ED to EA	Erosion in 2020 Reversion in 2021

---

[1] During the backsliding period, Croatia's LD score increased in the year 2020 and declined back in 2021. We count the period between 2017-2021 as a backsliding episode.

		2006-2011	• FH: Decline within civil liberties & political rights ratings • Polity: decline from democracy to anocracy in DD period • MB: Breakdown in 2007	Eliminated; breakdown in MB reflects the experience of erosion the year during the breakdown
14	Fiji			
15	*Ghana*	2021	• EIU: Decline within flawed democracy • FH: Decline within political rights rating • MLL: decline from LD to ED; V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from LD to ED	Erosion
16	*Greece*	2021	• FH: decline within PR rating • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within liberal democracy	Erosion
17	Guatemala	2021	None	Eliminated, no other datasets
18	Guyana	2021	None	Eliminated, no other datasets
19	Honduras	2018-2021	None	Eliminated, no other datasets
20	*Hungary*	2011 – 2021	• FH: decline from F to PF • EIU: decline within flawed democracy • MLL: decline within LD • V-Dem Report 2022: decline from ED to EA	Erosion (2011-2017) Reversion (2018-2021)
21	*India*	2015-2021	• FH: decline from F to PF • EIU: decline within flawed democracy • V-Dem Report 2022: decline from ED to EA	Erosion (2015-2018) Reversion (2019-2021)
22	Indonesia	2021	None	Eliminated, no other datasets
23	Lesotho	2017	None	Eliminated, no other

				datasets
24	Madagascar	2009-2012	None	Eliminated, no other dataset
25	Malawi	2019	None	Eliminated, no other dataset
26	*Mali*	2018-2021	• FH: Decline from partly free to not free • Polity: Decline from democracy to anocracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from electoral democracy to closed autocracy	Erosion in 2018 Reversion (2019-2021)
27	Mauritius	2020-2021	• V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from liberal democracy to electoral democracy	Eliminated, only one other dataset
28	Mexico	2021	• FH: Decline within CL rating	Eliminated, only one other dataset
29	Moldova	2015-2020	None	Eliminated, no other datasets
30	Mongolia	2021	• EIU: decline within flawed democracy	Eliminated, only one other dataset
31	Nepal	2012-2013	None	Eliminated, no other datasets
32	*Nicaragua*	2006-2021	• FH: decline from PF to NF • Polity: Decline within democracy • MLL: ED to EA • EIU: reversion to autocracy	Erosion in 2006 Reversion (2007-2021)
33	Niger	2009-2011	None	Eliminated, no other datasets
34	North Macedonia	2011-2017	• FH: decline within political rights rating	Eliminated, only one other dataset
35	Papua New	2013-2017	None	Eliminated, no other

	Guinea			datasets
36	*Philippines*	2018-2021	• FH: Decline within civil rights rating • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from electoral democracy to electoral autocracy	Reversion
37	*Poland*	2016-2021	• FH: decline within PR rating • MLL: decline from LD to ED; V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from LD to ED • MB: erosion	Erosion
38	Romania	2018-2019	None	Eliminated, no other datasets
39	Senegal	2001	None	Eliminated, no other datasets
40	*Serbia*	2013-2021	• FH: decline from F to PF • MB: breakdown (2017) • EIU: decline within flawed democracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from ED to EA	Erosion in 2013 Reversion (2014 – 2021)
41	Sierra Leone	2013-2016	None	Eliminated, no other datasets
42	*Slovenia*	2020-2021	• FH: decline within civil liberties rating • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from liberal democracy to electoral autocracy	Erosion
43	Solomon Islands	2006	None	Eliminated, no other datasets
44	South Korea	2008-2016	FH, decline within free	Eliminated, one other dataset only
45	Sri Lanka	2021	None	Eliminated no other datasets

#	Country	Period	Datasets	Coding
46	Thailand	2014-2017		Eliminated by definition; reversion due to coup, not elected government
47	Tunisia	2021	None	Eliminated no other datasets
48	*Turkey*	2010-2021	• FH: decline from PF to NF • Polity: decline from democracy to anocracy • MLL: ED to EA	Erosion (2010-2012) Reversion (2013 – 2021)
49	*United States of America*	2017-2021	• FH: decline within civil rights rating • Polity: decline within democracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within liberal democracy	Erosion
50	Vanuatu	1992 – 2008	None	Eliminated, no other datasets
51	*Venezuela*	1999-2021	• FH: decline from partly free to not free • Polity: decline within anocracy in DD period • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within electoral autocracy	Erosion (1999 – 2002) Reversion (2003 – 2021)
52	*Zambia*	2016-2021	• FH: decline within partly fee • Polity: decline within democracy • V-Dem: decline from electoral democracy to electoral autocracy	Reversion

Notes: The included cases are in bold italics. DD: democratic deficit period (2006–2017); MLL: Mechkova, Lührmann, and Lindberg, with their usages (LD, liberal democracy; ED, electoral democracy; EA electoral autocracy); MB: Mainwaring and Bizzarro.

Table A5 displays our final list of backsliders – 21 cases of backsliding after triangulation. Episodes coded as "erosion" saw the quality of democracy decline, but the system broadly

maintained, whereas episodes labeled as "reversion" ended in outright reversion to authoritarian rule. For our purposes, we further distinguish our sample based on the structure of the government: federal versus unitary systems (Forum of Federations 2021). In Appendix 2, we explain our identification of federal countries.

Table A5. Final List of Backsliders (N = 21)

#	Country	Backsliding Episode	Inclusion in other datasets	Coding	
1	*Benin*	2019-2021	• FH: decline from free to partly free • EUI: decline within hybrid regime • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: Reversion from ED to EA	Reversion	Unitary
2	*Bolivia*	2010-2021	• Polity: decline within democracy in DD period • EIU: decline from flawed democracy to hybrid regime	Erosion	Unitary
3	*Brazil*	2016-2021	• FH: Decline within civil liberties rating • EIU: decline within flawed democracy • MLL: LD to ED; V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within liberal democracy	Erosion	Federal
4	*Croatia*	2017-2021[2]	• EIU: decline within flawed democracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within electoral democracy	Erosion	Unitary
5	*The Dominican*	2002-2020	• FH: decline from free to partly free	Erosion	Unitary

---

[2] During the backsliding period, Croatia's LD score increased in the year 2020 and declined back in 2021. We count the period between 2017-2021 as a backsliding episode.

	Republic		• Polity: decline within democracy DD period • MB: but breakdown in earlier period (1990)		
6	*Ecuador*	2008-2017	• Polity: decline within democracy • MLL: decline within electoral democracy • MB: erosion	Erosion	Unitary
7	*El Salvador*	2020-2021	• FH: decline from free to partly free • EIU: decline within hybrid democracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from ED to EA	Erosion in 2020 Reversion in 2021	Unitary
8	*Ghana*	2021	• EIU: Decline within flawed democracy • FH: Decline within political rights rating • MLL: decline from LD to ED; V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from LD to ED	Erosion	Unitary
9	*Greece*	2021	• FH: decline within PR rating • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within liberal democracy	Erosion	Unitary
10	*Hungary*	2011 – 2021	• FH: decline from F to PF • EIU: decline within flawed democracy • MLL: decline within LD • V-Dem Report 2022: decline from ED to EA	Erosion (2011-2017) Reversion (2018-2021)	Unitary
11	*India*	2015-2021	• FH: decline from F to PF • EIU: decline within flawed democracy	Erosion (2015-2018) Reversion	Federal

			• V-Dem Report 2022: decline from ED to EA	(2019-2021)	
12	*Mali*	2018-2021	• FH: Decline from partly free to not free • Polity: Decline from democracy to anocracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from electoral democracy to closed autocracy	Erosion in 2018 Reversion (2019-2021)	Unitary
13	*Nicaragua*	2006-2021	• FH: decline from PF to NF • Polity: Decline within democracy • MLL: ED to EA • EIU: reversion to autocracy	Erosion in 2006 Reversion (2007-2021)	Unitary
14	*Philippines*	2018-2021	• FH: Decline within civil rights rating • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from electoral democracy to electoral autocracy	Reversion	Unitary
15	*Poland*	2016-2021	• FH: decline within PR rating • MLL: decline from LD to ED; V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from LD to ED • MB: erosion	Erosion	Unitary
16	*Serbia*	2013-2021	• FH: decline from F to PF • MB: breakdown (2017) • EIU: decline within flawed democracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from ED to EA	Erosion in 2013 Reversion (2014 – 2021)	Unitary
17	*Slovenia*	2020-2021	• FH: decline within civil liberties rating • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from liberal	Erosion	Unitary

			democracy to electoral autocracy		
18	*Turkey*	2010-2021	• FH: decline from PF to NF • Polity: decline from democracy to anocracy • MLL: ED to EA	Erosion (2010-2012) Reversion (2013 – 2021)	Unitary
19	*United States of America*	2017-2021	• FH: decline within civil rights rating • Polity: decline within democracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within liberal democracy	Erosion	Federal
20	*Venezuela*	1999-2021	• FH: decline from partly free to not free • Polity: decline within anocracy in DD period • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within electoral autocracy	Erosion (1999 – 2002) Reversion (2003 – 2021)	Federal
21	*Zambia*	2016-2021	• FH: decline within partly fee • Polity: decline within democracy • V-Dem: decline from electoral democracy to electoral autocracy	Reversion	Unitary

Appendix 2. Identification of Federal Countries

According to Forum of Federations, following countries are considered as federal: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Comoros, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America (N = 25). We exclude Micronesia and Saint Kitts and Nevis because they are not included among the countries in the V-Dem data set. We include Iraq, Sudan, and Venezuela (N = 26). All these countries recognize a federal government based on their constitutions. When we account for our universe of democracies, however, we end up having 18 democracies with federal systems. Table A5 below displays federal democracies. As Table A6 shows, among these 18 cases, 4 of them are backsliders based on our measurement strategy.

Table A6. Universe of Federal Democracies

#	Country	Backslider vs. Nonbackslider
1	Argentina	Nonbackslider
2	Australia	Nonbackslider
3	Austria	Nonbackslider
4	Belgium	Nonbackslider
5	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Nonbackslider
6	Brazil	**Backslider**
7	Canada	Nonbackslider
8	Cyprus	Nonbackslider
9	Germany	Nonbackslider
10	India	**Backslider**
11	Mexico	Nonbackslider
12	Nepal	Nonbackslider
13	Nigeria	Nonbackslider
14	South Africa	Nonbackslider
15	Spain	Nonbackslider
16	Switzerland	Nonbackslider
17	United States of America	**Backslider**
18	Venezuela	**Backslider**

Appendix 3. Additional Analyses of the Relationship between Federalism and Backsliding

Federalism and Severity of Backsliding

We compute the severity of backsliding by subtracting the difference between a country's Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) score prior to the first year of the backsliding episode from the lowest LDI score during the backsliding episode.

Table A7. Does Federalism Slow the Severity of Backsliding?

	Federal Systems	Unitary System	Difference	
Severity of Backsliding	0.28 (0.09)	0.18 (0.03)	0.10 (0.09)	p = 0.3206

Note: Table entries are group means and differences in group means. Standard errors in parentheses.

Venezuela can be considered as an outlier among the federal cases. One possible reason why Venezuela is exceptional is that, despite the federal constitution, it was a highly centralized system. In Venezuela, state governors were appointed by the President and the first direct popular election of governors took place in July 1989. However, even without Venezuela, the average difference in LDI scores of federal systems (0.20) are still higher than that of unitary systems (0.18).

Federalism and Speed of Backsliding

We compute the speed of backsliding for a country by dividing the score for severity of backsliding by the total years of backsliding.

Table A8. Does Federalism Slow the Speed of Backsliding?

	Federal Systems	Unitary System	Difference	
Speed of Backsliding	0.031 (0.006)	0.020 (0.004)	0.010 (0.007)	p = 0.1792

Note: Table entries are group means and differences in group means. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix 4. Logistic Regression Models for Decentralization and Democratic Backsliding

In this part, we look at the relationship between decentralization and backsliding by estimating a set of logistic regression models. For measuring the level of decentralization in a given democracy, we use the Regional Authority Index (RAI) which measures the authority in self-rule, shared rule and overall regional authority (an index for self-rule + shared rule) within countries (Hooghe et al. 2016). RAI geographically covers 96 countries through 1950 to 2018. The overall regional authority index ranges from 0 to 30 where 0 indicates the lowest level of regional authority and 30 indicates the highest level of regional authority. We also use one of the subcomponents of the index – self-rule. The self-rule index captures the authority exercised by a regional government, ranging from 0 to 18 where 0 indicates lowest level of self-rule and 18 indicates highest level of self-rule. Because of RAI's geographical coverage and time frame, we only conduct analyses for countries that are covered in RAI and for the time period between 1974 and 2018.

In our logistic regression models, we use the overall regional authority index (RAI) and self-rule (RAI self-rule) as our main independent variables (scaled from 0 to 1) and a dummy indicator variable for democratic backsliding is our main dependent variable while controlling for the structure of the government with a dummy variable (federal vs. unitary). Overall, we find no statistically significant relationship between decentralization and democratic backsliding.

Logistic Regression Models for RAI and Backsliding

First, we start with a set of models that focus on backsliders before triangulation (N = 52). Our main dependent variable is an indicator variable for backsliding for each country-year. It is coded as 1 if a country experienced backsliding and 0 otherwise. RAI score is composed of two main components: shared rule and self-rule. We use the overall RAI score as for our first IV. We also believe that self-rule is relevant to our theory and use this as our second IV. Because we expect decentralization to be a slow changing measure, for our first independent variable, we compute moving average of RAI score (scaled from 0 to 1). For example, for the 1974 RAI score of a country, we take the average of the score of that country between the years 1969-1974 (4 prior years + the current year). For our second independent variable, we focus on self-rule instead of the overall RAI score of a country. We also compute moving average of a country's RAI self-rule score using the same logic (scaled from 0 to 1).

Figures A1 and A2 display predicted probability of backsliding for the time period between 1974 and 2018. Figures A3 and A4 display predicted probability of backsliding for the time period between 2006 and 2018 to account for the fact that many countries experience backsliding starting in 2000s. Our findings indicate that the RAI score (neither the overall RAI nor the self-rule RAI) has no statistically significant explanatory power in explaining the variation in backsliding in any of the models underlying Figures A1-A4.

Figure A1: Moving Average RAI and Predicted Probability of Backsliding, 1974 – 2018, Initial List of Backsliders


Figure A2: Moving Average Self-Rule RAI and Predicted Probability of Backsliding, 1974 – 2018, Initial List of Backsliders

Figure A3: Moving Average RAI and Predicted Probability of Backsliding, 2006 – 2018, Initial List of Backsliders


Figure A4: Moving Average Self-Rule RAI and Predicted Probability of Backsliding, 2006 – 2018, Initial List of Backsliders

Next, we estimate a set of models that focus on backsliders after triangulation (N = 21). We keep everything the same except the number of backsliders. Figures A3 and A4 display predicted probability of backsliding for the time period between 1974 and 2018. Figures A7 and A8 display predicted probability of backsliding for the time period between 2006 and 2018 to account for the fact that many countries experience backsliding starting in 2000s. Our results indicate that the overall RAI score has no significant explanatory power in explaining variation in backsliding (Figures A5 and A7), while the estimates of self-rule RAI score are statistically significant (p < .05) and shows a positive association between self-rule RAI and backsliding (Figures A6 and A8). Yet, these models are at best illustrative, serving only exploratory purposes. We do not control for any potential confounding variables (except for the structure of government) in the logistic regression models underlying the presented figures.

**Figure A5: Moving Average RAI and Predicted Probability of Backsliding, 1974 – 2018, Final List of Backsliders**

Figure A6: Moving Average Self-Rule RAI and Predicted Probability of Backsliding, 1974 – 2018, Final List of Backsliders


Figure A7: Moving Average RAI and Predicted Probability of Backsliding, 2006 – 2018, Final List of Backsliders

Figure A8: Moving Average Self-Rule RAI and Predicted Probability of Backsliding, 2006 – 2018, Final List of Backsliders

Appendix 5. Partisan Control of States

Table A9. The United States: Partisan Control of State Governments, November 2020

State	Governor Party	Legislative Control[3]	State Control[4]	Electoral College Votes of States
Alabama	Republican	Republican	Republican	9
Alaska	Republican	Republican	Republican	3
Arizona	Republican	Republican	Republican	11
Arkansas	Republican	Republican	Republican	6
California	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	55
Colorado	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	9

---

[3] Legislative control: If the same party holds both chambers of the state legislature (house of representatives and state senate) then legislative control is categorized as Democrat or Republican; if control of the two chambers is split between the two parties, then legislative control is categorized as 'divided'.

[4] State control: indicates whether one political party or the other holds the governorship and majorities in both chambers of the state legislature, or whether control is divided between the two parties.

Connecticut	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	7
Delaware	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	3
Florida	Republican	Republican	Republican	29
Georgia	Republican	Republican	Republican	16
Hawaii	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	4
Idaho	Republican	Republican	Republican	4
Illinois	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	20
Indiana	Republican	Republican	Republican	11
Iowa	Republican	Republican	Republican	6
Kansas	Democratic	Republican	Divided	6
Kentucky	Democratic	Republican	Divided	8
Louisiana	Democratic	Republican	Divided	8
Maine	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	3
Maryland	Republican	Democratic	Divided	10
Massachusetts	Republican	Democratic	Divided	11
Michigan	Democratic	Republican	Divided	16
Minnesota	Democratic	Divided[5]	Divided	10
Mississippi	Republican	Republican	Republican	6
Missouri	Republican	Republican	Republican	10
Montana	Democratic	Republican	Divided	3
Nebraska	Republican	N/A[6]	Republican[7]	5
Nevada	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	6

---

[5] State Senate - Republicans; House of Representatives - Democrats

[6] The state legislature of Nebraska is unicameral and non-partisan.

[7] We have included Nebraska as a Republican controlled state since its Governor was Republican, though its legislature is formally nonpartisan.

New Hampshire	Republican	Democratic	Divided	4
New Jersey	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	14
New Mexico	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	5
New York	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	29
North Carolina	Democratic	Republican	Divided	15
North Dakota	Republican	Republican	Republican	3
Ohio	Republican	Republican	Republican	18
Oklahoma	Republican	Republican	Republican	7
Oregon	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	7
Pennsylvania	Democratic	Republican	Divided	20
Rhode Island	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	4
South Carolina	Republican	Republican	Republican	9
South Dakota	Republican	Republican	Republican	3
Tennessee	Republican	Republican	Republican	11
Texas	Republican	Republican	Republican	38
Utah	Republican	Republican	Republican	6
Vermont	Republican	Democratic	Divided	3
Virginia	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	13
Washington	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic	12
West Virginia	Republican	Republican	Republican	5
Wisconsin	Democratic	Republican	Divided	10
Wyoming	Republican	Republican	Republican	3
	Republican:	*Republican: 29*	***Republican: 22***	

	26 Democratic: 24	Democratic: 19 Divided: 1 N/A: 1	Democrat: 15 Divided: 13	

Table A10. Brazil: Partisan Control of State Governments, October 2018 [8]

State	Party of the Governor	State Control
Acre	Progressive Party (PP)	Undefined
Alagoas	Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB)	Undefined
Amapá	Democratic Labor Party (PDT)	Undefined
Amazonas	Social Christian Party(PSC)	Aligned w/ Bolsonaro
Bahia	Worker's Party (PT)	Opposition
Ceará	Worker's Party (PT)	Opposition
Federal District	Brazilian Democratic Movemenet (MDB)	Undefined
Espírito Santo	Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB)	Opposition
Goiás	Democrats (DEM)	Aligned w/ Bolsonaro
Maranhão	Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB)	Opposition
Mato Grosso	New Party (NOVO)	Aligned w/ Bolsonaro
Mato Grosso do Sul	Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB)	Aligned w/ Bolsonaro
Minas Gerais	New Party (NOVO)	Aligned w/ Bolsonaro
Paraná	Social Democratic Party (PSD)	Aligned w/ Bolsonaro
Paraibá	Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB)	Opposition
Pará	Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB)	Undefined

---

[8] The parties that have governorships aligned with Bolsonaro are indicated as Aligned w/ Bolsonaro", while the opposition parties are indicated as "Opposition". Categorization of some parties were not straightforward due to their absence of explicit support for either side. These parties are coded as "Undefined".

Pernambuco	Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB)	Opposition
Piauí	Worker's Party (PT)	Opposition
Rio de Janeiro	Social Christian Party(PSC)	Aligned w/ Bolsonaro
Rio Grande do Norte	Worker's Party (PT)	Opposition
Rio Grande do Sul	Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB)	Aligned w/ Bolsonaro
Rondônia	Social Liberal Party (PSL)	Aligned w/ Bolsonaro
Roraima	Social Liberal Party (PSL)	Aligned w/ Bolsonaro
São Paulo	Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB)	Aligned w/ Bolsonaro
Santa Catarina	Social Liberal Party (PSL)	Aligned w/ Bolsonaro
Sergipe	Social Democratic Party (PSD)	Aligned w/ Bolsonaro
Tocantins	Humanist Party of Solidarity (PHS)	Undefined
		Aligned with Bolsonaro: 13 ***Opposition: 8*** ***Undefined: 6***

Source: G1 (2018), Eleições 2018: veja tudo o que você precisa saber sobre a votação do 2º turno

Table A11. Venezuela: Political Distribution of State Governorships, 2000 to 2012

Election Year	State	State Control
2000	Amazonas	Opposition
2000	Anzoátegui	Chavez Government
2000	Apure	Opposition
2000	Aragua	Chavez Government
2000	Barinas	Chavez Government
2000	Bolívar	Chavez Government
2000	Carabobo	Opposition
2000	Cojedes	Chavez Government
2000	Delta Amacuro	Opposition
2000	Falcón	Chavez Government

2000	Guárico	Opposition
2000	Lara	Chavez Government
2000	Mérida	Chavez Government
2000	Miranda	Opposition
2000	Monagas	Opposition
2000	Nueva Esparta	Chavez Government
2000	Portuguesa	Chavez Government
2000	Sucre	Chavez Government
2000	Táchira	Chavez Government
2000	Trujillo	Chavez Government
2000	Vargas	Chavez Government
2000	Yaracuy	Opposition
2000	Zulia	Opposition
2004	Amazonas	Chavez Government
2004	Anzoátegui	Chavez Government
2004	Apure	Chavez Government
2004	Aragua	Chavez Government
2004	Barinas	Chavez Government
2004	Bolívar	Chavez Government
2004	Carabobo	Chavez Government
2004	Cojedes	Chavez Government
2004	Delta Amacuro	Chavez Government
2004	Falcón	Chavez Government
2004	Guárico	Chavez Government
2004	Lara	Chavez Government
2004	Mérida	Chavez Government
2004	Miranda	Chavez Government
2004	Monagas	Chavez Government
2004	Nueva Esparta	Opposition
2004	Portuguesa	Chavez Government
2004	Sucre	Chavez Government

2004	Táchira	Chavez Government
2004	Trujillo	Chavez Government
2004	Vargas	Chavez Government
2004	Yaracuy	Chavez Government
2004	Zulia	Opposition
2008	Amazonas	Chavez Government
2008	Anzoátegui	Chavez Government
2008	Apure	Chavez Government
2008	Aragua	Chavez Government
2008	Barinas	Chavez Government
2008	Bolívar	Chavez Government
2008	Carabobo	Opposition
2008	Cojedes	Chavez Government
2008	Delta Amacuro	Chavez Government
2008	Falcón	Chavez Government
2008	Guárico	Chavez Government
2008	Lara	Chavez Government
2008	Mérida	Chavez Government
2008	Miranda	Opposition
2008	Monagas	Chavez Government
2008	Nueva Esparta	Opposition
2008	Portuguesa	Chavez Government
2008	Sucre	Chavez Government
2008	Táchira	Opposition
2008	Trujillo	Chavez Government
2008	Vargas	Chavez Government
2008	Yaracuy	Chavez Government
2008	Zulia	Opposition
2012	Amazonas	Chavez Government
2012	Anzoátegui	Chavez Government
2012	Apure	Chavez Government

2012	Aragua	Chavez Government
2012	Barinas	Chavez Government
2012	Bolívar	Chavez Government
2012	Carabobo	Chavez Government
2012	Cojedes	Chavez Government
2012	Delta Amacuro	Chavez Government
2012	Falcón	Chavez Government
2012	Guárico	Chavez Government
2012	Lara	Opposition
2012	Mérida	Chavez Government
2012	Miranda	Opposition
2012	Monagas	Chavez Government
2012	Nueva Esparta	Chavez Government
2012	Portuguesa	Chavez Government
2012	Sucre	Chavez Government
2012	Táchira	Chavez Government
2012	Trujillo	Chavez Government
2012	Vargas	Chavez Government
2012	Yaracuy	Chavez Government
2012	Zulia	Chavez Government

Source: Political Database of the Americas, accessed in 2021

Table A12. India: Partisan Control of State Governments, 2014-2018

State	State Control in 2014	State Control in 2018
Andhra Pradesh	BJP allies	BJP allies
Arunachal Pradesh	INC	BJP
Assam	INC	BJP
Bihar	Other	BJP allies
Chhattisgarh	BJP	BJP
Goa	BJP	BJP
Gujarat	BJP	BJP
Haryana	INC	BJP

Himachal Pradesh	INC	BJP
Jammu & Kashmir	INC allies	BJP allies
Jharkhand	INC allies	BJP
Karnataka	INC	INC
Kerala	INC	Other
Madhya Pradesh	BJP	BJP
Maharashtra	INC	BJP
Manipur	INC	BJP
Meghalaya	INC	BJP allies
Mizoram	INC	INC
Nagaland	BJP allies	BJP allies
Odisha	Other	Other
Punjab	BJP allies	INC
Rajasthan	BJP	BJP
Sikkim	Other	BJP allies
Tamil Nadu	Other	Other
Telangana	Other	Other
Tripura	Other	BJP
Uttar Pradesh	Other	BJP
Uttarakhand	INC	BJP
West Bengal	Other	Other
	BJP: 5 *BJP allies: 3* *INC: 11* *INC Allies: 2* *Other: 8*	*BJP: 15* *BJP allies: 6* *INC: 3* *Other: 5*

Source: Vaishnav (2018)

Appendix 6. Alternative Measurement of Democratic Backsliding (V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index)

In our article, we use Haggard and Kaufman's strategy for the measurement of democracy and democratic backsliding. We define "democracies" as any country that experience at least eight consecutive years with a score of at least 0.5 on the V-Dem Electoral Democracy index (EDI), which is a measure that taps into "the basics" of democracy: free, fair and competitive elections with freedom for political and civil society organizations to operate. However, to identify "backsliding episodes", we use V-Dem Liberal Democracy index (LDI), which are marked by statistically significant declines from countries' peak scores on the LDI. The decision of using LDI to capture backsliding instead of EDI follows the motivation of Haggard and Kaufman

(2021) and we believe that LDI provides a more nuanced indicator capturing derogations from democratic rule that do not only arise from direct assaults on the integrity of the electoral system or the protection of basic rights to association but also puts weight on horizontal checks and the protection of civil liberties as well.

As a robustness check, in this section, we also operationalize democratic backsliding using an alternative measure. We identify "backsliding episodes" using V-Dem's Electoral Democracy index (EDI) instead of V-Dem's Liberal Democracy index (LDI), which are this time marked by statistically significant declines from countries' peak scores on the EDI. This alternative measurement generates a list of initial backsliders that is very similar our findings in Table A2. After further investigation of these two measures, we believe this is related to the high-level of correlation between LDI and EDI over time. Figure A9 below shows the correlation between LDI and EDI over time for the time frame of our study.

Figure A9: Correlation between LDI and EDI (1974 – 2021)

Source: V-Dem

While the list of backsliders is very similar for two approaches to backsliding, as we show in Tables A13, there are some minor differences. When it comes to the final list of backsliders after triangulation, we end up having a very similar list to Table A5 except Ghana is not included in the list. Furthermore, for some countries, backsliding episodes timing alters when we use V-Dem's EDI to identify backsliders.

Table A13. Final List of Backsliders (Alternative Measurement: V-Dem's EDI)

#	Country	Backsliding Episode	Inclusion in other datasets	Coding	
1	*Benin*	2019-2021	• FH: decline from free to partly free • EUI: decline within hybrid regime • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: Reversion from ED to EA	Reversion	Unitary
2	*Bolivia*	2015-2021	• Polity: decline within democracy in DD period • EIU: decline from flawed democracy to hybrid regime	Erosion	Unitary
3	*Brazil*	2017-2021	• FH: Decline within civil liberties rating • EIU: decline within flawed democracy • MLL: LD to ED; V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within liberal democracy	Erosion	Federal
4	*Croatia*	2017-2021[9]	• EIU: decline within flawed democracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within electoral democracy	Erosion	Unitary
5	*The Dominican Republic*	2016-2019	• FH: decline from free to partly free • Polity: decline within democracy DD period • MB: but breakdown in earlier period (1990)	Erosion	Unitary
6	*Ecuador*	2010-2017	• Polity: decline within	Erosion	Unitary

---

[9] During the backsliding period, Croatia's ED score increased in the year 2020 and declined back in 2021. We count the period between 2017-2021 as a backsliding episode.

			democracy • MLL: decline within electoral democracy • MB: erosion		
7	*El Salvador*	2021	• FH: decline from free to partly free • EIU: decline within hybrid democracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from ED to EA	Erosion in 2020 Reversion in 2021	Unitary
8	*Greece*	2021	• FH: decline within PR rating • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within liberal democracy	Erosion	Unitary
9	*Hungary*	2013 – 2021	• FH: decline from F to PF • EIU: decline within flawed democracy • MLL: decline within LD • V-Dem Report 2022: decline from ED to EA	Erosion (2011-2017) Reversion (2018-2021)	Unitary
10	*India*	2015-2021	• FH: decline from F to PF • EIU: decline within flawed democracy • V-Dem Report 2022: decline from ED to EA	Erosion (2015-2018) Reversion (2019-2021)	Federal
11	*Mali*	2020-2021	• FH: Decline from partly free to not free • Polity: Decline from democracy to anocracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from electoral democracy to closed autocracy	Erosion in 2018 Reversion (2019-2021)	Unitary
12	*Nicaragua*	2007-2021	• FH: decline from PF to NF • Polity: Decline within democracy	Erosion in 2006 Reversion (2007-2021)	Unitary

|					
			• MLL: ED to EA • EIU: reversion to autocracy		
13	*Philippines*	2019-2021	• FH: Decline within civil rights rating • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from electoral democracy to electoral autocracy	Reversion	Unitary
14	*Poland*	2016-2021	• FH: decline within PR rating • MLL: decline from LD to ED; V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from LD to ED • MB: erosion	Erosion	Unitary
15	*Serbia*	2013-2021	• FH: decline from F to PF • MB: breakdown (2017) • EIU: decline within flawed democracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from ED to EA	Erosion in 2013 Reversion (2014 – 2021)	Unitary
16	*Slovenia*	2020-2021	• FH: decline within civil liberties rating • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline from liberal democracy to electoral autocracy	Erosion	Unitary
17	*Turkey*	2010-2021	• FH: decline from PF to NF • Polity: decline from democracy to anocracy • MLL: ED to EA	Erosion (2010-2012) Reversion (2013 – 2021)	Unitary
18	*United States of America*	2017-2021	• FH: decline within civil rights rating • Polity: decline within democracy • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within liberal	Erosion	Federal

			democracy		
19	*Venezuela*	2000-2021	• FH: decline from partly free to not free • Polity: decline within anocracy in DD period • V-Dem Democracy Report 2022: decline within electoral autocracy	Erosion (1999 – 2002) Reversion (2003 – 2021)	Federal
20	*Zambia*	2016-2021	• FH: decline within partly fee • Polity: decline within democracy • V-Dem: decline from electoral democracy to electoral autocracy	Reversion	Unitary

Appendix 7. Visualization of Backsliders

**Figure A10. Visualization of Final List of Backsliders (N = 21)**

Final List of Backsliders
Movements of Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), Democracies (N=21)

Final List of Backsliders
Movements of Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), Democracies (N=21)

References

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Naz- ifa Alizada, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Katrin Kinzelbach, Joshua Krusell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Oskar Ryd´en, Johannes von R¨omer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sund- str¨om, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson and Daniel Ziblatt. 2022. "V- Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v12". *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project*. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds22.

Unit, E.I., 2013. "Democracy index 2022: Frontline Democracy and Battle for Ukraine". *Economic Intelligence Unit*

Forum of Federations. 2022. "Countries". *Forum of Federations*.

Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. 2021. *Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World*. Elements in Political Economy.

Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Schakel, A.H., Osterkatz, S.C., Niedzwiecki, S. and Shair-Rosenfield, S., 2016. *Measuring regional authority: A postfunctionalist theory of governance, Volume I*. Oxford University Press.

House, F. 2022. "Freedom in the world 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule:. *Freedom House*

Marshall, M. G., & Gurr, T. R. 2020. "Polity 5: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018". *Center for Systemic Peace*.

Mainwaring, S., & Bizzarro, F. 2019. "The fates of third-wave democracies". *Journal of Democracy*, 30(1), 99-113.

Mechkova, V., Lührmann, A. and Lindberg, S.I., 2017. "How much democratic backsliding?". *Journal of democracy*, *28*(4), pp.162-169.

Political Database of the Americas, Center for Latin American Studies, Georgetown University. Accessed in 2021.

Vaishnav, M. 2018. "From Cakewalk to Contest: India's 2019 General Election," Carnegie *Endowment for International Peace*.