**Online Appendix for**

**“Extremism and Terrorism: Rebel Goals and Tactics in Civil Wars”**

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**1. Rebel Extremism Dataset (RED) Sources and Variables**

The following codebook describes the Rebel Extremism Dataset (RED). For the full dataset, please contact the authors.

**RED Data Sources**

To code rebel group aims, we relied primarily on the following sources:

* The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), available at <https://ucdp.uu.se/>. The data program includes detailed information on conflict origins, including actor aims, organized by the country, the conflict dyad, and the actor.
* The Non-State Actor (NSA) Data case notes from Gleditsch, Cunningham, and Salehyan, Version 3.4, available at <http://ksgleditsch.com/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf>.[[1]](#footnote-1) The case notes build on information in the UCDP Armed Conflict Data and provide additional information about rebel groups, including group aims.

We supplemented these sources with primary source material where available, including group manifestos or group web sites. For primary sources, we focused on documents or web pages that dated to the outset of the conflict. We also consulted secondary sources as necessary, including the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs), and historical dictionaries. We used these sources to code 14 variables capturing different aspects of group aims, described in the following section.

**RED Variables**

We coded group goals at the outset of the conflict, considered as UCDP’s *startdate2* (the date that UCDP determines the conflict crosses the 25 battle-death threshold). The status quo is defined as the political situation at the outset of the conflict, no matter how recently it might have changed. Cases are divided by UCDP into “incompatibilities” over territory and governmental control. Following UCDP, we coded a different set of indicators for groups in conflicts over territory and conflicts over government.

We exclude two conflicts included in UCDP, between the U.S. government and al-Qaeda and between Israel and Hezbollah, because they were not civil conflicts. We include 39 cases of coups, which are often excluded in the civil war literature, but the results of our empirical analyses are robust to dropping them.

Variables coded for conflicts over government control[[2]](#footnote-2) [Incompatibility = 2]:

*ExecPower*

Does the rebel group aim to change the formal constitution and/or the system of leader selection (e.g., to abolish a monarchy or to hold direct, popular elections)?

0 = no

1 = yes

*Ideology*

Does the rebel group aim to change the basic political ideology of the state (e.g., from capitalism/market economy to communism/collective ownership or vice versa? And/or from secularism to religious law or vice versa)?

0 = no

1 = yes

*StateName(g)*

Does the rebel group aim to change the official name of the state?

0 = no

1 = yes

*GenderStatus*

Does the rebel group aim to change women’s political status, political power, or liberties (e.g., legislate dress codes, change employment options, property ownership, grant or remove women’s right to vote, etc.)?

0 = no

1 = yes

*IdentityStatus*

Does the rebel group aim to change the political status, power, or liberties of an identity group (an ethnic, religious, language, or other identity group) e.g., do they aim to enact or remove discrimination laws, grant or remove the right to vote, change employment options, property ownership, etc. for an identity group?

0 = no

1 = yes, goal is changes for the identity group **within** the existing political structure (e.g., increased representation in administration, legislature, or armed forces) [example: MQM in Pakistan]. This includes extensive changes that are still within the existing political structure [example: UTO in Tajikistan]

2 = yes, and changes would transform the political system in a way that would fundamentally reshape the political power of identity groups (e.g., to depose a government led by another identity group and replace it with one led by its own identity group, or to institute majoritarian democracy in a country currently ruled by a minority led government) [examples: the FPR (aka RPF) in Rwanda; ANC in South Africa]

*Exclusion*

Would the rebel group’s desired goals result in the effective political exclusion of other identity groups (including but not limited to the identity group currently in power)?

0 = no

1 = yes

Variables coded for conflicts over territorial goals [Incompatibility = 1]

*Borders*

Does the group intend to redraw the national borders of the state, whether to create a new state (secessionist) or to move a territory from one state to another (irredentist)?

0 = no, clear statement that it does not aim to redraw borders

1 = mixed/indirect – no clear evidence of a statement can be found, or conflicting statements

2 = yes, clearly stated intention

*Irredentist*

Does the group aim to join another pre-existing state?

0 = no

1 = yes

*Independence*

Has the group indicated an intention to create an independent state?

0 = no

1 = evidence of intention to create an independent state

*IndDate*

Year of **formal** declaration of independence, if any.

NB: *Independence* and *IndDate* were coded with reference to Coggin’s (2011) list of secessionist movements. One of her criteria for including a movement is a formal declaration of independence, so inclusion of the group in question on her list implies that *Independence* = 1. However, there may be cases in which a specific rebel group has not signed on to the declaration that others in the same larger movement have proclaimed.

*StateName(t)*

Does the group call the territory it is fighting for by an official name?

0 = no

1 = yes

*Flag*

Does the group have a national flag other than the flag of the existing government?

0 = no

1 = yes

Variables coded for both types of conflict:

*Transnational*

Do the group’s goals affect multiple states?

0 = no

1 = yes

NB: coded as 0 if the rebel group expressed general solidarity with transnational causes rather than explicit aims that would affect more than one state (e.g., CPP in the Philippines).

*Description*

Briefly describe the political goals of the rebel group.

*Sources*

Sources used to code (including page numbers and URLs for web sources).

*GroupURL*

Link to the group’s web site, if it has one.

*GoalsChange*

Do the goals of the group change over the course of the conflict in ways that would change any of the coding above?

0 = no

1 = maybe

2 = yes

*Change*

If *GoalsChange* > 0, describe the change, the variable affected, and when the change occurs.

Changes in these goals are relatively rare over time. RED codes *GoalsChange* > 0 in only 35 out of 409 rebel groups and *GoalsChange* > 1 in only 12 cases. A caveat is that coders were instructed to focus on coding group goals at the outset of the conflict, noting changes in goals if they came across this evidence (rather than focusing their research on evidence of goals changing). As a result, this variable should be treated cautiously; the true incidence of goals changing may be higher. Note also that minor changes that would not lead to different coding above are not captured in the data.

An example of *GoalsChange* = 1 is the LTTE, which sought to establish an independent Tamil Eelam. In 2002, the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement predicated on a settlement for autonomy and the LTTE briefly indicated that it would accept a federal autonomy arrangement. However, the group returned to war to fight on for its stated goal of independence. Historians of the conflict in Sri Lanka tend to agree that the LTTE and its leader Prabhakaran never deviated from the ultimate goal of an independent Tamil Eelam, but there was a moment during the ceasefire period in 2002 where they appeared willing to settle for less (or at least indicate as much to the international community). Because Prabhakaran indicated briefly that the LTTE’s desired goals did not necessarily include statehood but the LTTE quickly returned to its originally stated goals, we do not view this as evidence of a fundamental shift in goals.

An example of *GoalsChange* = 2 is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which sought to overthrow the Uzbek government and establish an Islamic state. In 2001, IMU declared its intention to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia, marking a shift in scope of aims.

Among the 35 cases where there is at least some evidence of goals changing, 14 became more moderate over time. An example of a group’s goals becoming more moderate would be the ULFA, which fought for an independent state of Assam, but eventually dropped their demand for independence to enter ceasefire negotiations with the Indian government in 2011. Another 10 cases became more extreme over time—for example, the IMU’s goal expansion from toppling the Uzbek government to toppling multiple governments. In 11 cases, group goals changed in ways that were indeterminate for extremism, such as Hezb-i-Wahdat, which originally sought to overthrow the Afghan government but shifted over time from an Islamist platform to an ethno-nationalist one for Hazara rights.

**2. Variable Measurement**

**Dependent Variables:**

Our dependent variables are all from the Terrorism in Armed Conflict (TAC) data set (Fortna et al. 2022)

Our main results use *km\_a*, a measure of annual terrorism fatalities attributed to a rebel group, using matching version A, and TAC’s more restrictive measure of deliberately indiscriminate terrorism.[[3]](#footnote-3)

Robustness tests use the following alternative measures of terrorism:

*tm\_a* is the number of terrorism incidents (rather than fatalities), version A, more restrictive.

*km\_e* is fatalities, using matching version E (which includes generic descriptors), more restrictive.

*k\_a* is fatalities, using matching version E and the less restrictive measure of deliberately indiscriminate terrorism.

**Independent Variables:**

**Secession**

To code secession-seeking groups, we created a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if *Borders* = 2 or if *Borders* = 1 and *Independence* = 1. If *Borders* = 1, indicating ambiguous or conflicting evidence, and *Independence* = 0, we coded secession as 0. Most groups engaged in conflict over territory are secession-seeking: only 18 groups have stated aims that clearly fall short of changing international borders. Another 10 groups have mixed or indirect evidence of secessionist or irredentist intent; we coded these groups as non-secession-seeking.

**Transform Ideology/Identity**

To code groups that seek to transform the political system in conflicts over government, we took two different approaches. For the statistical analyses presented in the main text, we used the *Ideology* indicator (coded 1 if the group aims to change the basic political ideology of the state) and a second binary indicator based on *IdentityStatus*. This indicator, *Id\_major*, takes a value of 1 if *IdentityStatus* = 2, indicating that a group seeks major changes in political status for an identity group, such that would fundamentally reshape political power within the system.

Mapping these indicators to the classification of rebel aims in Figure 2 in the main text, the “transform system” category includes cases of *Ideology* = 1 and *Id\_major* = 1, that is, conflicts over government in which rebels aim to transform either the basic political ideology of the state or the fundamental political relationship of identity groups, or both. Cases for which neither true are in the “reform system” category.

We do not include groups aiming to change the methods of selection of executive leadership unless accompanied by other extreme goals. During the period we examine, the Cold War and its aftermath, there were strategic reasons for many organizations to call for democracy (sometimes including “democratic” in their names). The sincerity of these calls is sometimes questionable, as, for example, with the Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice in its attempted coup in Guinea. Our *ExecPower* variable codes whether the group claims to want to change the system of leader selection, so other researchers could make a different decision about whether to code these groups as extremist. Of the cases for which *ExecPower* = 1, most are coded as extremist in any case, because they also call for a transformation of the state’s ideology or a fundamental change in identity status. A small number of groups, however, claim to want to change the methods of leader selection without evidence of wanting to transform the political ideology of the state or the political status of an identity group. An example of a group whose stated goals included instituting a multiparty democracy (i.e., *ExecPower* =1), but who did not have clear ideological goals or seek a fundamental change in identity status is the RUF in Sierra Leone. Another example would be the EPRDF in Ethiopia, a Marxist group that fought against the Marxist military junta, the “Derg,” for the creation of a democratic state.

**Extreme Aim**

A dummy variable coded 1 if any of the extremism variables (secession, transform ideology, or transform identity) are 1.

**Control Variables:**

The following supplements our discussion of controls in the main manuscript with additional information about variable measurement:

**Democracy**

We use Fortna et al. (2018, 788)’s measure of democracy that fixes limitations identified by [Vreeland (2008)](https://www.zotero.org/google-docs/?RBPVeK) and [Plümper and Neumayer (2010)](https://www.zotero.org/google-docs/?4JBwdC) with the commonly used Polity scores.

**Rebel strength**

We include a measure of rebel strength, relative to the government, from the NSA data [(Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013)](https://www.zotero.org/google-docs/?s1IG70). Data available through 2011.

**Popular support**

We use NSA’s measure of mobilization capacity as a rough proxy of popularity [(Fortna 2022; Wood 2014)](https://www.zotero.org/google-docs/?7aaUgR). Data available through 2011.

**Ethnic conflict**

We use a measure from the ACD2EPR data (Vogt et al. 2015) based on whether a rebel group claims to fight for an ethnic group or recruits from that group.

**Rebel financing**

We use a measure from Fortna et al. 2018 of whether a rebel organization was financially supported by an external state or financed its operations with lootable resources such as gems, drugs, etc. The Fortna et al. 2018 measure is derived from data in Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) and San-Akca 2016). Note, these data are available only through 2006.

**Conflict intensity**

We use the UCDP measure that distinguishes between minor conflict (between 25 and 999 battle deaths per year) and major conflict (1000 or more battle deaths per year).

**Cold War**

A dummy variable marks years up to and including 1989.

**Population**

We use the natural log of a state’s population, from Kristian Gleditsch’s data.[[4]](#footnote-4)

**Multiple groups**

A dummy variable indicates cases in which a conflict included more than one dyad, as coded by UCDP, or when a UCDP dyad is an amalgam of multiple groups, for example, “Kashmir insurgents” or “Serbian irregulars” (coding notes available from Fortna).

**Conflict duration**

Duration is measured as the number of years elapsed since UCDP’s conflict start date (*confstartdate*) .


**3. Summary Statistics**

**Summary Statistics for Key Variables**


Figures A1 and A2 present correlation matrices for the key variables in the main analyses. Figure A1 shows the correlation matrix for conflicts over government control; Figure A2 shows the correlation matrix for conflicts over territory.

Table A1 presents summary statistics for the key variables in the main analyses and the robustness tests.

**Figure A1. Correlation Matrix for Key Variables (Conflicts over Government Control)**



**Figure A2. Correlation Matrix for Key Variables (Conflicts over Territory)**



**Table A1. Summary Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Statistic** | **N** | **Mean** | **St. Dev.** | **Min** | **Max** |
| *Main analyses* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Terrorism fatalities | 1,999 | 18.9 | 78.1 | 0 | 1,301.3 |
| Transform system (ideology) | 1,143 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Transform system (identity) | 1,144 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Secession | 897 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Democracy | 2,027 | 0.6 | 4.5 | -6 | 7 |
| Rebel strength | 1,931 | 1.6 | 0.7 | 1 | 5 |
| Popular support | 1,899 | 1.5 | 0.6 | 0 | 3 |
| Multiple groups | 2,055 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Conflict intensity | 2,055 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Ethnic conflict | 1,975 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Rebel financing | 1,607 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| Population | 1,972 | 10.2 | 1.5 | 6 | 14.1 |
| Cold War | 2,055 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| GTD period 2 | 2,055 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 |
| GTD period 3 | 2,055 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 |
| GTD period 4 | 2,055 | 0.02 | 0.1 | 0 | 1 |
| *Additional tests and robustness checks* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Aim: full state | 2,055 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Aim: multiple states | 2,055 | 0.04 | 0.2 | 0 | 1 |
| Terrorism attacks | 1,999 | 4.3 | 15.0 | 0 | 265 |
| Terrorism fatalities (version E) | 1,999 | 25.8 | 88.0 | 0 | 1,301.3 |
| Terrorism fatalities (least restrictive) | 1,999 | 24.5 | 90.8 | 0 | 1,519 |
| Conflict duration | 2,055 | 10.1 | 10.5 | 0 | 52 |
| FORGE: ideology | 1,958 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 |
| FORGE: independence | 1,958 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |

**4. Robustness Tests**

This section reports the results of six sets of robustness tests. First, we examine the robustness of the main results to alternative measures of terrorism. Second, we incorporate additional covariates, including a lagged dependent variable and a measure of conflict duration. Third, we drop the control for ethnic conflict. Fourth, we lag potentially endogenous control variables and use multiple imputation to deal with missingness in the data caused by lagging the variables. Fifth, we drop cases where we code a change in rebel group goals. Sixth, we use negative binomial regression as an alternative model specification.

As noted in the manuscript, the results that are least robust to these alternative tests are those for groups seeking to transform the political status of identify groups. In a number of robustness tests the coefficient loses statistical significance in the inflate model, that is on the choice to use terrorism at all, while results of identity group extremism are more robust for the amount of terrorism used (count model). Results for ideological extremism, and for the null effects of secessionism are generally robust.

**Alternative Measures of Terrorism**

We examine the robustness of the main results to three alternative measures of terrorism. Table A2 uses terrorism attacks instead of terrorism fatalities as the dependent variable, because alternative specifications may change the results.[[5]](#footnote-5)

Table A3 uses version E from TAC, which has less restrictive criteria for matching incidents in GTD to rebel groups in UCDP. Version E includes, inter alia, generic descriptors that apply to the group in question (e.g., “Basque separatists” vis-a-vis ETA).

Table A4 presents results using TAC’s “least restrictive” method of filtering attack and target types that provides a more expansive definition of terrorism.

The results are mostly robust to these alternative specifications. One exception is in Table A2. When we use the number of terrorism attacks instead of terrorism fatalities, results are largely consistent for the pooled model (the coefficient flips positive in the count model, but remains insignificant), however, in conflicts over government control, the coefficient on the decision to use terrorism (inflate model) is no longer statistically significant and becomes positive (indicating a lower likelihood of employing terrorism) for groups seeking to transform political power across identity groups. Extremist identity goals continue to associate significantly with higher numbers of attacks (count model), as in our main results. Secessionism continues to have no effect on terrorism.

The results using version E of TAC (Table A3) are consistent with the main results. The fact that the results largely hold even with this noisier measure increases our confidence in the reliability of the main tests. Notably, they hold even if we relax the potentially problematic assumption made in much of the literature that terrorist incidents attributed in GTD to “generic descriptor” perpetrators (such as “Kurdish separatists”) are not carried out by organized rebel groups.

Table A4 present results using TAC’s least restrictive method for measuring deliberately indiscriminate terrorism. Here, the negative coefficient for secession becomes marginally statistically significant in the count model, suggesting that secessionist goals are, if anything, associated with fewer fatalities when we use a more expansive measure of terrorism. Meanwhile, the coefficient on the decision to use terrorism for groups seeking major identity status change drops to become only marginally significant.

**Table A2. Alternative DV: Terrorism Attacks**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable: Terrorism attacks* | | | | | | | |
|  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |
| Extreme aim | 0.298 | -1.232\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.414) | (0.484) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transform system (ideology) |  |  |  | 0.558 | -1.616\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.418) | (0.501) |  |  |  |
| Transform system (identity) |  |  |  | 0.987\*\*\* | 0.198 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.212) | (0.693) |  |  |  |
| Secession |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.106 | -0.551 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.569) | (0.743) |
| Democracy | 0.126\*\*\* | -0.203\*\*\* |  | 0.069\* | -0.210\*\*\* |  | 0.146\*\*\* | -0.288\*\*\* |
|  | (0.021) | (0.054) |  | (0.039) | (0.074) |  | (0.016) | (0.075) |
| Rebel strength | -0.358\* | -0.065 |  | -0.586\*\* | -0.373 |  | -0.368 | -0.114 |
|  | (0.211) | (0.318) |  | (0.235) | (0.510) |  | (0.236) | (0.767) |
| Popular support | 0.092 | -0.154 |  | 0.096 | 0.016 |  | 0.292\*\* | -0.574 |
|  | (0.124) | (0.313) |  | (0.198) | (0.399) |  | (0.121) | (0.448) |
| Multiple groups | -0.297 | -0.270 |  | -0.632 | 0.277 |  | -0.365\*\* | -0.025 |
|  | (0.200) | (0.631) |  | (0.489) | (1.257) |  | (0.166) | (0.639) |
| Conflict intensity | 0.857\*\*\* | -0.010 |  | 0.884\*\*\* | -0.110 |  | 0.885\*\*\* | 0.192 |
|  | (0.119) | (0.350) |  | (0.181) | (0.450) |  | (0.254) | (0.813) |
| Ethnic conflict | -0.365\* | 0.488 |  | -0.896\*\* | 0.220 |  | 2.721\*\*\* | -1.609\* |
|  | (0.200) | (0.452) |  | (0.354) | (0.826) |  | (0.323) | (0.871) |
| Rebel financing | 0.139 | -0.688\*\* |  | -0.041 | -0.699\* |  | -0.047 | -0.753 |
|  | (0.197) | (0.288) |  | (0.223) | (0.394) |  | (0.224) | (0.553) |
| Population | -0.404\*\*\* | -0.372 |  | -0.483\*\*\* | -0.556 |  | -0.349\*\*\* | 0.205 |
|  | (0.078) | (0.314) |  | (0.108) | (0.340) |  | (0.060) | (0.296) |
| Cold War | 0.057 | 1.067\*\*\* |  | -0.314 | 1.108\*\*\* |  | 0.435\*\* | 0.700 |
|  | (0.168) | (0.341) |  | (0.211) | (0.310) |  | (0.220) | (0.685) |
| Ln(alpha) | 0.437\*\* |  |  | 0.241 |  |  | 0.026 |  |
|  | (0.193) |  |  | (0.268) |  |  | (0.423) |  |
| N | 1490 |  |  | 863 |  |  | 625 |  |
| Note: robust standard errors (clustered on conflict). \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 | | | | | | | | |

**Table A3. Alternative DV: Terrorism Fatalities (Version E)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable: terrorism fatalities (version E)* | | | | | | | |
|  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |
| Extreme aim | 0.161 | -1.130\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.318) | (0.377) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transform system (ideology) |  |  |  | 0.159 | -0.992\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.355) | (0.432) |  |  |  |
| Transform system (identity) |  |  |  | 1.031\*\*\* | -1.350\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.236) | (0.534) |  |  |  |
| Secession |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.182 | -0.524 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.627) | (0.436) |
| Democracy | -0.005 | -0.187\*\*\* |  | -0.089\*\* | -0.118\*\* |  | 0.086\*\* | -0.295\*\*\* |
|  | (0.032) | (0.040) |  | (0.043) | (0.051) |  | (0.033) | (0.085) |
| Rebel strength | 0.050 | 0.078 |  | -0.387\*\* | 0.029 |  | 0.583 | 0.345 |
|  | (0.229) | (0.222) |  | (0.181) | (0.228) |  | (0.424) | (0.519) |
| Popular support | -0.002 | -0.133 |  | -0.032 | -0.211 |  | 0.032 | -0.539 |
|  | (0.168) | (0.271) |  | (0.185) | (0.337) |  | (0.249) | (0.468) |
| Multiple groups | 0.523\*\* | 0.091 |  | -0.058 | 0.404 |  | 0.631\*\* | 0.607 |
|  | (0.237) | (0.459) |  | (0.528) | (0.805) |  | (0.298) | (0.625) |
| Conflict intensity | 1.309\*\*\* | -0.453 |  | 1.202\*\*\* | -0.526 |  | 1.318\*\*\* | -0.386 |
|  | (0.168) | (0.277) |  | (0.211) | (0.354) |  | (0.271) | (0.400) |
| Ethnic conflict | -0.267 | 0.241 |  | -1.008\*\*\* | 0.797 |  | -0.819 | -2.930\*\*\* |
|  | (0.271) | (0.370) |  | (0.374) | (0.606) |  | (1.245) | (0.994) |
| Rebel financing | -0.456\*\*\* | -0.362 |  | -0.620\*\*\* | -0.430 |  | -0.474\*\* | -0.257 |
|  | (0.162) | (0.265) |  | (0.161) | (0.335) |  | (0.218) | (0.383) |
| Population | 0.022 | -0.017 |  | -0.171\* | -0.109 |  | 0.101 | 0.212 |
|  | (0.075) | (0.134) |  | (0.103) | (0.187) |  | (0.089) | (0.228) |
| Cold War | -0.135 | 0.928\*\*\* |  | -0.371\* | 1.014\*\*\* |  | 0.392 | 0.837\* |
|  | (0.190) | (0.262) |  | (0.225) | (0.346) |  | (0.311) | (0.462) |
| Ln(alpha) | 0.761\*\*\* |  |  | 0.553\*\*\* |  |  | 0.668\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.119) |  |  | (0.148) |  |  | (0.147) |  |
| N | 1490 |  |  | 863 |  |  | 625 |  |
| Note: robust standard errors (clustered on conflict). \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 | | | | | | | | |

**Table A4. Alternative DV: Terrorism Fatalities (Least Restrictive)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable: Terrorism fatalities (least restrictive)* | | | | | | | |
|  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |
| Extreme aim | -0.222 | -0.961\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.277) | (0.411) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transform system (ideology) |  |  |  | -0.008 | -1.296\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.299) | (0.479) |  |  |  |
| Transform system (identity) |  |  |  | 1.080\*\*\* | -0.787\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.205) | (0.464) |  |  |  |
| Secession |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.794\* | -0.370 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.440) | (0.599) |
| Democracy | 0.030 | -0.186\*\*\* |  | -0.041\* | -0.147\*\* |  | 0.078\*\* | -0.307\*\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.043) |  | (0.023) | (0.061) |  | (0.036) | (0.071) |
| Rebel strength | 0.189 | -0.013 |  | -0.237 | -0.244 |  | 0.713\* | 0.179 |
|  | (0.226) | (0.264) |  | (0.185) | (0.304) |  | (0.396) | (0.552) |
| Popular support | -0.212 | -0.090 |  | -0.164 | 0.028 |  | -0.096 | -0.567 |
|  | (0.151) | (0.281) |  | (0.201) | (0.362) |  | (0.215) | (0.446) |
| Multiple groups | 0.466\*\* | -0.235 |  | -0.244 | -0.013 |  | 0.713\*\* | 0.095 |
|  | (0.234) | (0.505) |  | (0.368) | (0.884) |  | (0.292) | (0.622) |
| Conflict intensity | 1.371\*\*\* | -0.424 |  | 1.300\*\*\* | -0.651\* |  | 1.128\*\*\* | -0.079 |
|  | (0.166) | (0.284) |  | (0.168) | (0.373) |  | (0.307) | (0.418) |
| Ethnic conflict | -0.133 | 0.447 |  | -0.708\*\* | 1.045\* |  | 1.403\*\*\* | -2.747\*\*\* |
|  | (0.228) | (0.379) |  | (0.322) | (0.604) |  | (0.368) | (0.956) |
| Rebel financing | -0.220 | -0.912\*\*\* |  | -0.589\* | -0.811\*\* |  | -0.297 | -1.152\*\*\* |
|  | (0.200) | (0.287) |  | (0.344) | (0.374) |  | (0.243) | (0.406) |
| Population | -0.128\*\* | -0.074 |  | -0.248\*\*\* | -0.292 |  | -0.049 | 0.351\* |
|  | (0.063) | (0.149) |  | (0.080) | (0.256) |  | (0.066) | (0.211) |
| Cold War | 0.036 | 0.970\*\*\* |  | 0.019 | 1.150\*\*\* |  | 0.117 | 0.908\* |
|  | (0.145) | (0.276) |  | (0.199) | (0.346) |  | (0.232) | (0.465) |
| Ln(alpha) | 0.633\*\*\* |  |  | 0.478\*\*\* |  |  | 0.563\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.127) |  |  | (0.148) |  |  | (0.181) |  |
| N | 1490 |  |  | 863 |  |  | 625 |  |
| Note: robust standard errors (clustered on conflict). \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 | | | | | | | | |

**Additional Covariates**

The next set of tests incorporates two additional control variables. Table A5 adds a lagged measure of terrorism attacks in the previous year. Prior use of terrorism could influence the decision to use it in the future. For example, it could be that groups, having already paid the legitimacy costs associated with using *any* terrorism, become more likely to use it again.[[6]](#footnote-6) Terrorism in the previous year is indeed generally associated with terrorism in the current year, although not significantly so in the model that includes secessionism. Including this variable reduces the size of coefficients for our key independent variables such that they lose significance in the inflate model for both the pooled results and those for conflicts over government control. It is not clear, however, whether this variable has systematic causal value and including it might artificially deflate the substantive coefficients of the primary independent variables.[[7]](#footnote-7)

Table A6 incorporates a measure of time since start of conflict. It is possible that the fight becomes more polarized and rebels become more extreme as conflict grinds on. According to some “weapon of the weak” arguments, terrorism is used more at the beginning of the conflict as a group gathers strength, or conversely at the very end of a conflict out of desperation.[[8]](#footnote-8) The results are robust to including the conflict duration variable.

**Table A5. Additional Control: Lagged DV**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable: Terrorism fatalities* | | | | | | | |
|  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |
| Extreme aim | 0.032 | -0.326 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.271) | (0.369) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transform system (ideology) |  |  |  | 0.519\* | -0.351 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.298) | (0.475) |  |  |  |
| Transform system (identity) |  |  |  | 0.761\*\*\* | -0.544 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.224) | (0.459) |  |  |  |
| Secession |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.504 | -0.584 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.489) | (0.643) |
| Terrorism fatalities (t-1) | 0.006\*\*\* | -0.863\*\*\* |  | 0.004\*\*\* | -0.807\*\* |  | 0.007 | -0.905\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.240) |  | (0.001) | (0.315) |  | (0.005) | (0.498) |
| Democracy | 0.017 | -0.121\*\*\* |  | -0.040 | -0.098\*\* |  | 0.075\*\* | -0.177\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) | (0.035) |  | (0.028) | (0.049) |  | (0.038) | (0.058) |
| Rebel strength | 0.349\*\* | -0.010 |  | 0.047 | -0.208 |  | 0.668\* | 0.262 |
|  | (0.178) | (0.267) |  | (0.152) | (0.338) |  | (0.342) | (0.527) |
| Popular support | -0.188 | -0.196 |  | -0.201 | 0.048 |  | -0.116 | -0.417 |
|  | (0.147) | (0.260) |  | (0.222) | (0.394) |  | (0.211) | (0.379) |
| Multiple groups | 0.350 | 0.027 |  | -0.524 | -0.203 |  | 0.538\* | 0.506 |
|  | (0.242) | (0.369) |  | (0.400) | (0.787) |  | (0.281) | (0.621) |
| Conflict intensity | 1.089\*\*\* | 0.067 |  | 0.978\*\*\* | -0.199 |  | 0.943\*\*\* | 0.378 |
|  | (0.183) | (0.257) |  | (0.202) | (0.408) |  | (0.350) | (0.570) |
| Ethnic conflict | 0.026 | 0.421 |  | -0.585\* | 0.590 |  | 1.799\*\*\* | -0.881 |
|  | (0.199) | (0.301) |  | (0.318) | (0.528) |  | (0.390) | (0.775) |
| Rebel financing | -0.143 | -0.544\* |  | -0.239 | -0.450 |  | -0.195 | -0.597 |
|  | (0.155) | (0.296) |  | (0.305) | (0.462) |  | (0.185) | (0.467) |
| Population | -0.050 | -0.055 |  | -0.177\* | -0.288\* |  | -0.012 | 0.193 |
|  | (0.052) | (0.124) |  | (0.094) | (0.168) |  | (0.069) | (0.196) |
| Cold War | 0.200 | 0.897\*\*\* |  | 0.205 | 0.995\*\*\* |  | 0.282 | 0.712 |
|  | (0.152) | (0.286) |  | (0.149) | (0.325) |  | (0.252) | (0.531) |
| Ln(alpha) | 0.727\*\*\* |  |  | 0.621\*\*\* |  |  | 0.743\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.095) |  |  | (0.118) |  |  | (0.148) |  |
| N | 1263 |  |  | 706 |  |  | 556 |  |
| Note: robust standard errors (clustered on conflict). \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 | | | | | | | | |

**Table A6. Additional Control: Conflict Duration**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable: Terrorism fatalities* | | | | | | | |
|  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |
| Extreme aim | -0.041 | -0.917\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.333) | (0.459) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transform system (ideology) |  |  |  | 0.607\* | -1.362\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.325) | (0.616) |  |  |  |
| Transform system (identity) |  |  |  | 1.102\*\*\* | -0.958\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.176) | (0.486) |  |  |  |
| Secession |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.396 | -0.675 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.581) | (0.866) |
| Conflict duration | -0.028\*\* | -0.054\*\*\* |  | -0.039\*\*\* | -0.033 |  | -0.013 | -0.069\*\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.019) |  | (0.009) | (0.030) |  | (0.030) | (0.028) |
| Democracy | 0.034 | -0.190\*\*\* |  | -0.025 | -0.149\*\* |  | 0.064 | -0.326\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) | (0.044) |  | (0.022) | (0.058) |  | (0.045) | (0.083) |
| Rebel strength | 0.394\* | 0.171 |  | 0.085 | -0.044 |  | 0.961\* | 0.358 |
|  | (0.237) | (0.310) |  | (0.146) | (0.294) |  | (0.502) | (0.634) |
| Popular support | -0.287\* | -0.083 |  | -0.339 | 0.141 |  | -0.250 | -0.783\* |
|  | (0.160) | (0.313) |  | (0.218) | (0.408) |  | (0.251) | (0.475) |
| Multiple groups | 0.352 | -0.329 |  | -0.639\* | 0.132 |  | 0.683\* | -0.086 |
|  | (0.280) | (0.501) |  | (0.363) | (0.805) |  | (0.374) | (0.711) |
| Conflict intensity | 1.383\*\*\* | -0.507\* |  | 1.194\*\*\* | -0.765\*\* |  | 1.087\*\* | -0.331 |
|  | (0.182) | (0.301) |  | (0.189) | (0.373) |  | (0.478) | (0.536) |
| Ethnic conflict | -0.085 | 0.495 |  | -0.925\*\*\* | 1.275\*\* |  | 1.463\*\*\* | -2.745\*\*\* |
|  | (0.245) | (0.399) |  | (0.322) | (0.630) |  | (0.527) | (0.951) |
| Rebel financing | -0.117 | -0.455\* |  | -0.206 | -0.560\* |  | -0.443 | -0.410 |
|  | (0.235) | (0.260) |  | (0.325) | (0.313) |  | (0.321) | (0.451) |
| Population | -0.101 | 0.052 |  | -0.274\*\*\* | -0.116 |  | -0.021 | 0.366 |
|  | (0.069) | (0.136) |  | (0.081) | (0.221) |  | (0.065) | (0.229) |
| Cold War | 0.017 | 0.909\*\*\* |  | -0.105 | 1.297\*\*\* |  | 0.240 | 0.624 |
|  | (0.155) | (0.304) |  | (0.206) | (0.396) |  | (0.273) | (0.469) |
| Ln(alpha) | 0.689\*\*\* |  |  | 0.482\*\*\* |  |  | 0.655\*\* |  |
|  | (0.120) |  |  | (0.129) |  |  | (0.256) |  |
| N | 1490 |  |  | 863 |  |  | 625 |  |
| Note: robust standard errors (clustered on conflict). \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 | | | | | | | | |

**Dropping the Ethnic Conflict Control**

Because the majority of territorial conflicts are ethnic, the ethnic conflict control may be picking up the effect of the few cases that are not, and they might be idiosyncratic in ways that could bias findings. We rerun the main analyses with this control dropped. The results, shown in Table A7 are largely robust, although the negative coefficient for groups seeking major identity status change in the inflate model becomes insignificant.

**Table A7. Dropping Ethnic Conflict**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable: Terrorism fatalities* | | | | | | | |
|  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |
| Extreme aim | -0.198 | -1.118\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.286) | (0.435) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transform system (ideology) |  |  |  | 0.037 | -1.505\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.320) | (0.524) |  |  |  |
| Transform system (identity) |  |  |  | 0.810\*\*\* | -0.405 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.240) | (0.380) |  |  |  |
| Secession |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.551 | -0.388 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.592) | (0.727) |
| Democracy | 0.022 | -0.190\*\*\* |  | -0.016 | -0.166\*\*\* |  | 0.079\*\* | -0.228\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.043) |  | (0.022) | (0.054) |  | (0.031) | (0.066) |
| Rebel strength | 0.213 | 0.082 |  | -0.194 | -0.114 |  | 1.066\*\*\* | 0.726 |
|  | (0.224) | (0.274) |  | (0.185) | (0.306) |  | (0.373) | (0.590) |
| Popular support | -0.242 | 0.039 |  | -0.160 | 0.293 |  | -0.215 | -0.635 |
|  | (0.160) | (0.312) |  | (0.224) | (0.411) |  | (0.226) | (0.391) |
| Multiple groups | 0.444\* | -0.254 |  | -0.528 | 0.004 |  | 0.810\*\*\* | -0.104 |
|  | (0.244) | (0.468) |  | (0.410) | (0.980) |  | (0.304) | (0.584) |
| Conflict intensity | 1.426\*\*\* | -0.523\* |  | 1.378\*\*\* | -0.657\* |  | 0.925\*\*\* | -0.538 |
|  | (0.191) | (0.304) |  | (0.207) | (0.379) |  | (0.324) | (0.447) |
| Rebel financing | -0.224 | -0.635\*\* |  | -0.233 | -0.644\*\* |  | -0.386 | -0.407 |
|  | (0.225) | (0.262) |  | (0.330) | (0.317) |  | (0.315) | (0.354) |
| Population | -0.128\*\* | 0.022 |  | -0.231\*\*\* | -0.189 |  | -0.022 | 0.233 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.139) |  | (0.084) | (0.250) |  | (0.064) | (0.183) |
| Cold War | 0.110 | 0.849\*\*\* |  | 0.095 | 1.038\*\*\* |  | 0.130 | 0.746\* |
|  | (0.142) | (0.293) |  | (0.174) | (0.354) |  | (0.255) | (0.413) |
| Ln(alpha) | 0.675\*\*\* |  |  | 0.523\*\*\* |  |  | 0.508\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.124) |  |  | (0.142) |  |  | (0.137) |  |
| N | 1518 |  |  | 888 |  |  | 627 |  |
| Note: robust standard errors (clustered on conflict). \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 | | | | | | | | |

**Lagging Potentially Endogenous Control Variables**

Several of our control variables are plausibly endogenous to, or have a reciprocal relationship with, extremism. For example, levels of terrorism may be higher in more intense conflicts because all forms of violence are more prevalent and conflict may be more intense when the warring parties’ positions are further apart. It might also be the case that more intense fighting polarizes positions, making rebels more extreme. Other variables that are potentially endogenous to extremism include rebel strength, popular support, and rebel financing, following the logics outlined in the main text. We test the robustness of our results by lagging all of the plausibly endogenous control variables by one year. Doing so creates issues with missing data, however, because many of these variables are coded only for years in which the conflict is active. Lagged variables are thus missing for the first year of the conflict, and for the first year after a lull in the conflict (that is, when battle deaths drop below 25/year). Missing data that causes conflicts or conflict periods that last only one year to be dropped altogether would potentially bias results. We use multiple imputation to prevent listwise deletion of these observations. We use multiple imputation by chained equations (MICE), which employs individual conditional distributions for each imputed variable, and create 50 imputed datasets. We choose this method because a number of the variables that we impute can only take on specific values (e.g., binary and ordinal variables). The results, shown in Table A8, are consistent with our main analyses with one exception: the coefficient for groups seeking major identity status change drops to marginally significant in both the count and inflate models.

**Table A8. Lagging Potentially Endogenous Controls**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable: Terrorism fatalities* | | | | | | | |
|  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |
| Extreme aim | 0.488 | -1.290\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.309) | (0.397) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transform system (ideology) |  |  |  | 0.572 | -1.606\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.376) | (0.443) |  |  |  |
| Transform system (identity) |  |  |  | 0.534\* | -0.792\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.306) | (0.420) |  |  |  |
| Secession |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.518 | -2.683 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.735) | (2.390) |
| Democracy | -0.004 | -0.175\*\*\* |  | -0.023 | -0.143\*\*\* |  | 0.141\*\*\* | -0.315 |
|  | (0.030) | (0.040) |  | (0.035) | (0.055) |  | (0.040) | (0.315) |
| Rebel strength | 0.267 | -0.058 |  | 0.013 | -0.160 |  | 0.939\* | 0.511 |
|  | (0.220) | (0.228) |  | (0.201) | (0.261) |  | (0.508) | (1.049) |
| Popular support | -0.369\* | 0.002 |  | -0.352 | 0.279 |  | 0.060 | -1.133 |
|  | (0.195) | (0.280) |  | (0.250) | (0.342) |  | (0.282) | (1.027) |
| Multiple groups | 0.199 | -0.316 |  | -0.832 | 0.024 |  | 0.718\* | 0.648 |
|  | (0.366) | (0.465) |  | (0.520) | (0.775) |  | (0.410) | (1.410) |
| Conflict intensity | 1.091\*\*\* | -0.590\*\* |  | 1.240\*\*\* | -0.770\*\* |  | 0.429 | 0.027 |
|  | (0.198) | (0.279) |  | (0.193) | (0.342) |  | (0.301) | (0.938) |
| Ethnic conflict | 0.168 | 0.645\* |  | 0.423 | 0.872\* |  | 2.231\*\*\* | -1.724 |
|  | (0.280) | (0.365) |  | (0.410) | (0.528) |  | (0.762) | (3.022) |
| Rebel financing | 0.050 | -0.423 |  | 0.370 | -0.196 |  | 0.035 | -0.801 |
|  | (0.248) | (0.278) |  | (0.335) | (0.327) |  | (0.425) | (1.447) |
| Population | -0.103 | -0.180 |  | -0.083 | -0.175 |  | -0.017 | -0.934 |
|  | (0.086) | (0.178) |  | (0.121) | (0.222) |  | (0.126) | (1.525) |
| Cold War | 0.202 | 0.929\*\*\* |  | 0.439 | 1.261\*\*\* |  | -0.169 | 1.999 |
|  | (0.229) | (0.322) |  | (0.271) | (0.369) |  | (0.343) | (1.871) |
| Ln(alpha) | 1.126\*\*\* |  |  | 0.827\*\*\* |  |  | 1.330\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.174) |  |  | (0.121) |  |  | (0.474) |  |
| N | 2055 |  |  | 1142 |  |  | 897 |  |
| Note: robust standard errors (clustered on conflict). \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 | | | | | | | | |

**Dropping Cases where Rebel Group Goals Changed**

In 35 cases, we found evidence that the goals of the group changed over the course of the conflict in ways that potentially would have changed the initial coding of goals. We do not use a time-varying measure of aims in the main results to avoid endogeneity (war aims may expand with battlefield success or shrink with setbacks). To check whether using a static coding of war aims affects our findings, we rerun the main analyses dropping observations that include a coded change in aims. For these analyses, we drop the 12 cases where *GoalsChange* > 1, meaning that there was clear evidence of a change in goals. The results, presented in Table A9, are robust to dropping these cases.

**Table A9. Dropping Cases Where Rebel Group Goals Changed**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable: Terrorism fatalities* | | | | | | | |
|  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |
| Extreme aim | -0.589 | -0.999\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.498) | (0.464) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Transform system (ideology) |  |  |  | 0.089 | -1.474\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.348) | (0.524) |  |  |  |
| Transform system (identity) |  |  |  | 1.144\*\*\* | -1.036\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.224) | (0.454) |  |  |  |
| Secession |  |  |  |  |  |  | -1.114 | -0.122 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.835) | (0.825) |
| Democracy | 0.019 | -0.215\*\*\* |  | -0.069\*\* | -0.162\*\*\* |  | 0.077 | -0.339\*\*\* |
|  | (0.032) | (0.046) |  | (0.031) | (0.057) |  | (0.061) | (0.121) |
| Rebel strength | 0.211 | 0.092 |  | -0.336\* | -0.278 |  | 1.387\*\*\* | 1.150 |
|  | (0.248) | (0.293) |  | (0.191) | (0.289) |  | (0.429) | (0.833) |
| Popular support | -0.254 | 0.100 |  | -0.167 | 0.242 |  | -0.490 | -0.722 |
|  | (0.184) | (0.349) |  | (0.213) | (0.415) |  | (0.323) | (0.572) |
| Multiple groups | 1.006\*\*\* | -0.138 |  | -0.542 | -0.101 |  | 1.697\*\*\* | 0.747 |
|  | (0.386) | (0.701) |  | (0.507) | (0.873) |  | (0.533) | (1.322) |
| Conflict intensity | 1.439\*\*\* | -0.630\*\* |  | 1.228\*\*\* | -0.823\*\* |  | 0.837\*\* | -0.628 |
|  | (0.193) | (0.316) |  | (0.225) | (0.383) |  | (0.338) | (0.503) |
| Ethnic conflict | -0.051 | 0.459 |  | -0.927\*\* | 1.225\*\* |  | 0.934 | -2.555 |
|  | (0.284) | (0.371) |  | (0.389) | (0.569) |  | (0.595) | (1.566) |
| Rebel financing | -0.422\*\* | -0.743\*\* |  | -0.714\*\*\* | -0.888\*\* |  | -0.408 | -0.579 |
|  | (0.215) | (0.298) |  | (0.222) | (0.375) |  | (0.325) | (0.496) |
| Population | -0.157\*\* | 0.021 |  | -0.274\*\*\* | -0.133 |  | -0.073 | 0.445\* |
|  | (0.069) | (0.146) |  | (0.086) | (0.221) |  | (0.066) | (0.242) |
| Cold War | 0.163 | 0.940\*\*\* |  | 0.077 | 1.209\*\*\* |  | 0.177 | 0.803\* |
|  | (0.160) | (0.317) |  | (0.167) | (0.374) |  | (0.359) | (0.437) |
| Ln(alpha) | 0.686\*\*\* |  |  | 0.457\*\*\* |  |  | 0.529\* |  |
|  | (0.143) |  |  | (0.112) |  |  | (0.291) |  |
| N | 1374 |  |  | 841 |  |  | 531 |  |
| Note: robust standard errors (clustered on conflict). \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 | | | | | | | | |

**Alternative Model Specification**

Next, we use negative binomial models as an alternative model specification. The results, presented in Table A10, are largely consistent with conclusions we draw from the results from the zero-inflated negative binomial models with the exception that extreme aims in the pooled model show no significant effect. Extremist ideological and identity status goals both continue to exercise a strong effect on terrorism, while secession goals have no statistically significant effect.

**Table A10. Negative Binomial Model Specification**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable: Terrorism fatalities* | | | | |
| Extreme aim | 0.576 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.483) |  |  |  |  |
| Transform system (ideology) |  |  | 1.539\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.467) |  |  |
| Transform system (identity) |  |  | 1.293\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.565) |  |  |
| Secession |  |  |  |  | -0.023 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.860) |
| Democracy | 0.179\*\*\* |  | 0.072 |  | 0.266\*\*\* |
|  | (0.042) |  | (0.065) |  | (0.045) |
| Rebel strength | 0.677\* |  | 0.225 |  | 1.275\*\* |
|  | (0.349) |  | (0.327) |  | (0.508) |
| Popular support | 0.025 |  | -0.219 |  | 0.541\* |
|  | (0.266) |  | (0.356) |  | (0.317) |
| Multiple groups | 0.164 |  | -1.112 |  | 0.487 |
|  | (0.483) |  | (0.867) |  | (0.468) |
| Conflict intensity | 1.485\*\*\* |  | 1.437\*\*\* |  | 0.562\* |
|  | (0.270) |  | (0.381) |  | (0.299) |
| Ethnic conflict | -0.462 |  | -1.002\* |  | 3.321\*\*\* |
|  | (0.351) |  | (0.592) |  | (0.581) |
| Rebel financing | 0.364 |  | 0.801\* |  | 0.057 |
|  | (0.289) |  | (0.462) |  | (0.411) |
| Population | -0.041 |  | -0.119 |  | -0.020 |
|  | (0.118) |  | (0.173) |  | (0.138) |
| Cold War | -0.683\*\*\* |  | -0.985\*\*\* |  | -0.636\* |
|  | (0.256) |  | (0.326) |  | (0.354) |
| Ln(alpha) | 2.513\*\*\* |  | 2.533\*\*\* |  | 2.206\*\*\* |
|  | (0.189) |  | (0.283) |  | (0.231) |
| N | 1490 |  | 863 |  | 625 |
| Note: robust standard errors (clustered on conflict). \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 | | | | | |

**5. Comparison to Other Data Sets**

In this section, we compare RED to other data sets and replicate our main results using alternative measures of ideology and independence from the FORGE data set. We briefly compare RED with the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) data set.[[9]](#footnote-9) As with our data set, FORGE builds on UCDP and the NSA Database. The primary focus of the FORGE data set is on the nature of the parent organizations that give rise to rebel groups (e.g., other rebel groups, political parties, civil society organizations, government or military factions, ethnic groups, etc.). However, FORGE also codes information on initial group goals, ideology, and religious or ethnic identification,[[10]](#footnote-10) which is where similarities between our data sets emerge.

The data sets vary in key ways, however, because they were designed for different research purposes. The FORGE data set’s primary purpose is to gather information on group origins rather than the distance of group goals from the political status quo. As a result, the FORGE goal variables do not easily facilitate differentiation between moderate and extreme goals. For example, FORGE includes two variables (g*oalrights* and *goalrep*) thatmeasure whether group goals included group rights and political participation, but do not distinguish between changes that would reform versus transform power within a political system.

A related difference between FORGE and RED is the treatment of ideology. The FORGE data set includes an *ideology* variable that indicates if groups were founded with a political ideology, whereas the RED *ideology* variable indicatesif a group’s stated goals include changing the basic political ideology of the state. While these often correlate, they sometimes do not. As we note, all groups have some sort of ideology; it is whether rebels want to change the basic political ideology of the state that makes them more or less extreme. In other words, ideology itself cannot tell us about the extremism of a group’s goals, because that can only be defined relative to the status quo. An example would be the EPRDF, a rebel group with a Marxist ideological orientation that fought to oust the Derg in Ethiopia, which also had a Marxist orientation. Because ideology did not mark a salient difference between the rebels and the government, we code *ideology* as 0 for the EPRDF, whereas FORGE codes *ideology* as 1.

Table A11 below replicates the main analyses for H2 using the FORGE data set’s *ideology* and *goalindep* variables as validity checks for our measures of ideological goals and secession goals. The FORGE *ideology* variable captures whether a group was founded with a political ideology—as opposed to our narrower measure of whether a group’s goals involve changing the political ideology of the state. The FORGE measure thus might introduce measurement error by overcounting ideological extremism, but we use it to probe the validity of our basic concept of ideology. The FORGE *goalindep* variable measures whether a group’s initial goal was to establish an independent state, which is similar but conceptually distinct from changing the borders of a sovereign state. We use this variable as a substitute for our measure of secession in conflicts over territory.

The results for ideology are consistent with our main results. Rebel groups that FORGE identifies as founded with a political ideology are significantly more likely to use terrorism, although not necessarily to produce more of it. The results for independence partially diverge. The coefficient for independence is not significant in the inflate model, but becomes significant and negative in the count model, suggesting that groups seeking independence produce fewer terrorism fatalities.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable: Terrorism fatalities* | | | | |
|  | Count | Inflate |  | Count | Inflate |
| FORGE: ideology | -0.065 | -2.066\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.474) | (0.682) |  |  |  |
| Transform system (identity) | 1.098\*\*\* | -0.832 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.224) | (0.518) |  |  |  |
| FORGE: independence |  |  |  | -1.348\*\*\* | -1.485 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.321) | (1.360) |
| Democracy | -0.059\*\* | -0.173\*\*\* |  | 0.095\*\*\* | -0.254\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.059) |  | (0.032) | (0.070) |
| Rebel strength | -0.203 | -0.015 |  | 0.985\*\* | 0.671 |
|  | (0.159) | (0.281) |  | (0.466) | (0.654) |
| Popular support | -0.172 | 0.072 |  | -0.223 | -0.625 |
|  | (0.212) | (0.366) |  | (0.241) | (0.408) |
| Multiple groups | -0.346 | -0.092 |  | 0.862\*\*\* | 0.199 |
|  | (0.431) | (0.690) |  | (0.309) | (0.586) |
| Conflict intensity | 1.341\*\*\* | -0.642\* |  | 0.985\*\* | -0.394 |
|  | (0.204) | (0.330) |  | (0.394) | (0.453) |
| Ethnic conflict | -0.739\*\* | 1.295\*\* |  | 1.547\*\*\* | -2.298\*\*\* |
|  | (0.349) | (0.586) |  | (0.347) | (0.787) |
| Rebel financing | -0.399 | -0.835\*\* |  | -0.359 | -0.609 |
|  | (0.333) | (0.350) |  | (0.288) | (0.383) |
| Population | -0.205\* | -0.138 |  | -0.024 | 0.356 |
|  | (0.105) | (0.260) |  | (0.056) | (0.219) |
| Cold War | 0.131 | 1.273\*\*\* |  | 0.182 | 0.566 |
|  | (0.169) | (0.380) |  | (0.265) | (0.438) |
| Ln(alpha) | 0.521\*\*\* |  |  | 0.517\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.122) |  |  | (0.162) |  |
| N | 855 |  |  | 614 |  |
| Note: robust standard errors (clustered on conflict). \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 | | | | | |

**Table A11. Replication Using FORGE Variables**

Finally, we consider differences and similarities between RED and other recent studies that code non-state actor goals as “maximalist” or “non-maximalist,” particularly works by Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017, and Thomas, Reed, and Wolford 2016. Our conceptualization is similar to their respective works, as well as in relation to several other authors. However, our empirical coding differs in some important respects.

For example, Thomas et al. (2016: 492) code “maximalist” demands as those “when rebels issue demands for the resignation of the head of state, or dissolution of or control over the entire state.” Chenoweth and Ulfelder’s (2017: 310) coding of “maximalist” goals likewise counts “removal of the incumbent government… or the removal of a foreign occupying military.” None of these would necessarily be extreme in our coding. For example, a group fighting to overthrow one leader and replace him with another without changing the political structure of the state in other ways would not be coded by us as extremist. Such power struggles can be extremely brutal despite the absence of extreme aims to transform politics.

As a case in point, Thomas et al. illustrate maximalist demands with the example of Chadian including the National Council for Recovery (CNR), Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT), United Front for Democratic Change in Chad (FUCD), Rally of Democratic Forces (RAFD), and Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD). None of these groups are coded as extreme in our data set. All sought the removal of Chadian president Idriss Deby, and some sought to change the method of leader selection (the MDJT reportedly wanted democratic reforms including new constitution and elections). But none sought to fundamentally transform the political structure of the state or the status of identity groups within the state. Our focus on whether the political vision of the state held by the rebels differs significantly from that of the government thus leads us to distinguish among center-seeking rebels that other data sets treat as similarly extreme.

Our coding decisions are much closer when it comes to coding extremism in conflicts over territory. Both Thomas et al., and Chenoweth and Ulfelder code maximalist self-determination goals as secession as opposed to autonomy, which aligns with our coding.

A final point of divergence between the data sets concerns scope. Thomas et al.’s empirical scope is narrower than ours, as they look only at African civil conflicts between 1989 and 2010, while Chenoweth and Ulfelder’s empirical scope includes both violent and non-violent conflicts from 1955-2013, but only conflicts deemed “maximalist.”

**6. Results for Alternative Conception of Extremism**


Finally, we use the data to explore one of the alternative conceptions of extremism discussed in the paper. If, following Buhaug, we think of extremism as the territorial extent of change, then instead of separating territorial from governmental conflicts, we can measure extremism along a continuum from territorial conflicts that claim only a part of a state, to government conflicts that would affect the whole state, to conflicts driven by transnational or universalist movements. Here the distinction between governmental and territorial conflicts is a proxy for extremism, i.e., rebels who seek a piece of the state are more limited in their aims than those who seek control of the entire state, while those who seek to control the state are less extreme than those who seek to establish transnational empire. This suggests that civil conflicts over territory will see the least terrorism; wars over control of the government of (only) one existing state, will see medium levels of terrorism; and wars in which rebels fight as part of transnational or universalist movements for changes affecting multiple states will see the most terrorism. To test this empirically, we pool incompatibility types and create dummy variables that indicate whether the group’s aims affect less than the whole state, the whole state, or multiple states.

Table A12 shows the results, which provide mixed support for this conception of extremism. Relative to groups whose ambitions span just a part of the state (the omitted category), groups seeking to control the entire state are nomore likely to use terrorism. But rebels with transnational goals that span multiple sovereign states are much more likely to use terrorism and when they do, to use more of it. The average marginal effects are shown in Figure A3.

**Table A12. Extremism as Geographic Scope of Goals and Terrorism**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Dependent variable: Terrorism fatalities* | |
|  | Count | Inflate |
| Aim: full state | 0.148 | 0.056 |
|  | (0.468) | (0.471) |
| Aim: multiple states | 1.184\*\* | -2.871\*\*\* |
|  | (0.577) | (1.071) |
| Democracy | 0.047 | -0.210\*\*\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.044) |
| Rebel strength | 0.413\* | 0.080 |
|  | (0.230) | (0.243) |
| Popular support | -0.314\* | -0.095 |
|  | (0.164) | (0.288) |
| Multiple groups | 0.371 | -0.261 |
|  | (0.272) | (0.473) |
| Conflict intensity | 1.386\*\*\* | -0.598\*\* |
|  | (0.206) | (0.291) |
| Ethnic conflict | 0.198 | 0.419 |
|  | (0.402) | (0.400) |
| Rebel financing | -0.215 | -0.837\*\*\* |
|  | (0.215) | (0.272) |
| Population | -0.117\*\* | -0.048 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.139) |
| Cold War | 0.173 | 0.835\*\*\* |
|  | (0.145) | (0.278) |
| Ln(alpha) | 0.621\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.108) |  |
| N | 1490 |  |
| Note: robust standard errors (clustered on conflict).  \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01 | | |

**Figure A3. Marginal Effects**



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1. See Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. These variables draw on Colgan’s (2012) coding of “revolutionary policy changes.” [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Note that TAC’s measures use fatality data from GTD, which records fractions for the number killed in some incidents, due to “insufficiently specific information in the source materials about casualties across attacks that are reported in aggregate” as explained in the GTD codebook and discussed further in the TAC codebook. We round to the nearest integer for ZINB analyses. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Available at http://ksgleditsch.com/data.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Young 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Fortna, Lotito, and Rubin 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Achen 2001. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Fortna 2022 finds little support for either of these dynamics. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Ibid., 188. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)