

Supplemental Appendix for “The Politics of Police Reform in the States”

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1 Police Reform Measurement

I rely on summaries of state legislative activity over this period to both construct the universe of reforms and determine which states passed them. This includes the reports by NCSL,¹ the Wilson Center for Science and Justice at Duke Law (Garrett 2023), and the Howard Center at University of Maryland (Monnay 2022), as well as reports by the Associated Press (Slevin 2021), the Brennan Center for Justice (Subramanian and Arzy 2021), *News21* (an initiative housed at the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication at Arizona State University)², and the *New York Times* (Eder, Keller, and Migliozi 2021). I also include any police reforms asked about on the 2020 and 2022 Cooperative Election Study (CES) surveys.³

To construct the list of reforms, I read the reports cited above, keeping a tally of all discrete reforms mentioned by each report, and coding each as pro- or anti-reform. I also noted whether the report includes a complete state-by-state list of which states enacted the reform. If I was unable to obtain such a list, I excluded the particular reform from the analysis.⁴ Table A1 lists the reforms, the number of states passing each, and which reports cite each.

¹National Conference of State Legislatures 2021; 2022b; 2023; 2024; Widgery 2024; Miller and Barnes 2024.

²Gold and Brown-Clark 2022; Bredemeier 2022.

³Schaffner, Ansolabehere, and Luks 2021; Schaffner, Ansolabehere, and Shih 2023.

⁴For instance, several of the reports cite a new emphasis on mental health crisis response and diversion as an alternative to traditional police responses, but I do not include this policy in my analysis as I was ultimately unable to determine which states passed this reform. For the same reason, I exclude reforms intended to increase the diversity of police forces and to implement anti-bias training. I also limit my analysis to reforms passed between 2020 and 2023. As of this writing, the 2024 legislative sessions are not yet complete in all states. I exclude any pre-2020 reforms for several reasons. First, I am interested in states' responses to the 2020 protests, and how these responses relate to party control and public opinion after 2020. Second, few states passed these reforms prior to 2020, though I note some exceptions below.

Policy	Cited In:							
	AP	Brennan	CES	Howard	NCSL	News21	NYT	Wilson
<i>Pro-reform</i>								
Neck Restraints	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Other Use of Force		X		X	X	X	X	X
Body Cameras		X	X	X	X		X	X
Duty to Intervene	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Duty to Aid		X			X			
De-escalation					X	X		X
Certification	X	X			X			X
State Investigate	X				X			X
Officer Immunity		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Civilian Oversight	X				X	X	X	X
Data Misconduct	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
Data Use of Force	X	X			X	X		X
Military Equipment			X		X			X
No-Knock Warrants	X				X	X	X	X
<i>Anti-reform</i>								
Civilian Oversight					X			
Officer Immunity	X		X	X		X		X
Restrict Protests	X	X				X	X	X
Anti-Defunding			X			X		X

Table A1: Types of Police Reforms Passed by States Since 2020. This table lists the reform categories employed in the study, and which policies are cited by each of the reports used to generate the reform categories.

I next provide a summary of each policy, starting with the 14 I classify as *pro-reform*:

- **Limit Use of Neck Restraints:** Half the states passed laws limiting the use of neck restraints, or “chokeholds”. Some of these states banned chokeholds in all circumstances, while others only banned them when fatal force is not justified. I compiled a complete state-by-state from the NCSL and Brennan Center reports (National Conference of State Legislatures 2021; National Conference of State Legislatures 2022b; Subramanian and Arzy 2021) and supplementing with a search of the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, searching for the terms “choke” and “neck” among enacted bills).

- **Other Use of Force Regulations:** Twenty states regulated or limited officers’ use of force in ways that did not involve neck restraints specifically. These measures included new statewide use of force standards, restrictions on using force against fleeing suspects, and limits on the use of non-lethal weapons. I compiled a complete state-by-state from the NCSL and Brennan Center reports (National Conference of State Legislatures 2021; National Conference of State Legislatures 2022b; Subramanian and Arzy 2021) and supplementing with a search of the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, limiting to enacted bills relating to “use of force”).
- **Bodyworn Cameras:** Six states passed laws requiring the use of bodyworn cameras for officers serving in local police departments. This total does not include states that mandated cameras for state police (New York and Vermont), required them only for the service of no-knock warrants (Kentucky), or required them prior to 2020 (South Carolina). The state-by-state data come from the NCSL reports (National Conference of State Legislatures 2021; National Conference of State Legislatures 2022b); I also searched the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, limiting to enacted bills relating to “technology”).
- **Duty to Intervene / Report:** Twenty-three states required officers to intervene when witnessing a fellow officer improperly using force, and/or to report on these events. I collapse intervention and reporting requirements into one policy given that most enacting states did both (only two states, New Mexico and New York, required intervention only, and only one state, New Hampshire, required reporting only; I code all these states as enacting this reform). I compiled a complete state-by-state from the NCSL and Brennan Center reports (National Conference of State Legislatures 2021; National Conference of State Legislatures 2022b; Subramanian and Arzy 2021) and supplementing with a search of the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, limiting to enacted bills relating to “use of force”).

- **Duty to Provide Medical Aid:** Nine states required officers to offer medical assistance in cases of excessive force. The state-by-state data come from the NCSL reports and the Brennan Center. I compiled a complete state-by-state list from the NCSL and Brennan Center reports (National Conference of State Legislatures 2021; National Conference of State Legislatures 2022b; Subramanian and Arzy 2021) and supplementing with a search of the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, limiting to enacted bills relating to “use of force”).
- **De-escalation Training:** Thirteen states passed laws related to providing training in de-escalation tactics to officers; typically, these laws made such trainings mandatory.⁵ I compiled a complete state-by-state list from the NCSL reports (National Conference of State Legislatures 2021; National Conference of State Legislatures 2022b) and supplementing with a search of the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, limiting to enacted bills relating to “Training” and also searching for the phrase “escalation”).
- **Certification and De-certification:** Twenty-three the states either increased the requirements for officer certification (e.g., barring candidates with criminal records from becoming certified), created a process for the de-certification of officers guilty of misconduct, or both. Many states also passed laws enabling departments to share information on de-certified officers; I exclude these laws and instead assign them to another category (Data Collection and Reporting – Misconduct). I compiled a complete state-by-state from the NCSL and Brennan Center reports (National Conference of State Legislatures 2021; National Conference of State Legislatures 2022b; Widgery 2024; Subramanian and Arzy 2021) and supplement-

⁵While the NCSL reports do not state whether the training is made mandatory, cross-referencing their data with a separate journalistic source (Stockton 2021) suggest this is true in the majority of cases. The NCSL reports also mention Arizona as passing a law related to de-escalation training; however, it seems this law (2021 AZ HB 2893) required such training only for civilian review board members, and not police officers.

ing with a search of the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, limiting results to enacted bills relating to “certification” and “decertification”).

- **State Investigations:** Eighteen states empowered a state actor, such as the state attorney general or a state agency, to investigate or prosecute local officer misconduct. I compiled a complete state-by-state from the NCSL (National Conference of State Legislatures 2021; 2022b), supplementing with a search of the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, limiting results to enacted bills related to “oversight”).
- **Limit Officer Immunity:** Six states relaxed or removed limits on the liability of individual officers in civil or criminal cases. Five states sought to weaken the legal doctrine of qualified immunity, which protects officers from being sued in civil court by victims of police misconduct. Additionally, Maryland repealed its officer bill of rights, which gave officers special protections against criminal prosecution. (I exclude the roughly two dozen states who maintained existing bills of rights; see National Conference of State Legislatures 2022a.) I compiled a complete state-by-state from the NCSL (National Conference of State Legislatures 2021) and Wilson Center (Garrett 2023), and supplementing with a search of the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, searching for the phrase “immunity” among enacted bills).
- **Civilian Oversight:** Nine states took steps to involve civilians in the oversight of local police. Typically, this involved reserving some seats on a state-level board for community members or representatives of civilian organizations. Less commonly, this included empowering local communities to create civilian review boards. I compiled a complete state-by-state from the NCSL reports (National Conference of State Legislatures 2021; National Conference of State Legislatures 2023; Widgery 2024) and supplementing with a search of the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, limiting results to enacted bills relating to “oversight”).

- **Data Collection and Reporting – Misconduct:** Twenty-three states passed laws requiring the collection and reporting of officer misconduct. These laws typically require local agencies to report cases of misconduct to a state or federal agency. I include laws requiring local agencies to share misconduct information with other agencies in order to avoid hiring problem officers, the creation of public-facing databases, or the removal of confidentiality for disciplinary information. I compiled a complete state-by-state from the NCSL and Brennan Center reports (National Conference of State Legislatures 2021; National Conference of State Legislatures 2022b; Subramanian and Arzy 2021) and supplementing with a search of the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, limiting results to enacted bills relating to “data and transparency”).
- **Data Collection and Reporting – Use of Force:** Fourteen states passed laws requiring the collection and reporting of officer misconduct. These laws typically require local agencies to report cases of misconduct to a state or federal agency. I include laws requiring local agencies to share misconduct information with other agencies in order to avoid hiring problem officers. Occasionally these laws also involve the creation of public-facing databases. I compiled a complete state-by-state from the NCSL and Brennan Center reports (National Conference of State Legislatures 2021; National Conference of State Legislatures 2022b; Subramanian and Arzy 2021) and supplementing with a search of the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, limiting results to enacted bills relating to “data and transparency”).
- **Military Equipment Ban:** Five states limited local departments from receiving military equipment from the federal Department of Defense’s 1033 program. The NCSL reports do not mention these reforms. I obtained state-by-state data by searching the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024) for the phrase “defense” among enacted bills; and from Twyman and Kasai (2022).
- **Limit No-Knock Warrants:** Fourteen states banned, limited, or regulated the use of “no-

knock” warrants, which allow police to enter premises unannounced. The state-by-state data come from the NCSL reports, which do not distinguish between bans or limits. The NCSL report does mention that Kentucky limited these warrants in a particular way, namely requiring officers to wear cameras during their execution. I therefore code Kentucky as one of the states regulating these warrants. I compiled a complete state-by-state from the NCSL reports (National Conference of State Legislatures 2021; National Conference of State Legislatures 2022b) and supplementing with a search of the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, searching for the phrase “warrant” among enacted bills).

Next, I give a summary of the 5 *anti-reform* policies:

- **Weaken Civilian Oversight:** As detailed above, several states increased the role of civilians in police oversight. Two states went in the opposite direction: Arizona, which required 2/3 of the membership of any review board to be law enforcement professionals, and Tennessee, which required any member of a civilian review board to complete a law enforcement training course (Su, Roy, and Davidson 2022). I also checked for any other states using the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, limiting results to enacted bills related to “oversight”).
- **Expand Officer Immunity:** As detailed above, several states weakened officers’ protections from civil and criminal litigation. Three states went in the opposite direction: Arkansas, and Iowa strengthened protections from civil suits, and Georgia added an officers’ bill of rights with protections from criminal prosecution. These states are mentioned in the Wilson Center report (Garrett 2023). I then identified the specific bills and years of passage using the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, searching for the terms “rights” and “immunity” among enacted bills).⁶

⁶Garrett (2023) also identifies Utah as expanding qualified immunity, but I am unable to find a corresponding enacted bill in the NCSL database.

- **Restrict Protests:** As a reaction to the Black Lives Matter protests against police abuse, eight states passed laws cracking down on protesters. These laws include increasing penalties for protest-related crimes; in some cases, they also include providing immunity to motorists who run over protesters blocking traffic. These provisions are mentioned by several of the reports, but no report has a complete list; I obtain such a list from the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) (2024).⁷
- **Preempt Local Defunding:** Despite the salience of the phrase “defund the police” over this period, no state passed significant changes to the funding of state or local police budgets. Yet four states (Florida, Georgia, Missouri, and Texas) did pass laws seeking to make it harder for local governments to decrease police budgets. For instance, Florida’s law empowered the governor to undo any local police budget cuts if appealed by a local law enforcement official; Georgia’s law forbid any local funding cut greater than 5%. While several of the reports mention these laws, none has a comprehensive list; I obtain such a list from Su, Roy, and Davidson (2022). I also cross-checked the NCSL policing legislation database (National Conference of State Legislatures 2024, limiting results to enacted bills related to “other issues”).

⁷I filter the ICNL tracker to exclude laws passed before 2020. I also exclude laws that explicitly mention protesting on oil and gas sites, which a number of states passed during this period.

2 Policy Trends

Figure A1 plots the average policy index by year using the panel version of my data set. This figure shows that most pro-reform activity occurred in 2020 and 2021. A regression of the policy index on year indicators, clustering errors at the state level, shows the averages for 2020-2021 are statistically indistinguishable from one another at conventional levels ($p=0.949$), while the averages for 2022-2023 are not distinguishable from one another at conventional levels ($p=0.17$).




Figure A1: Average of Police Reform Index by Year.

3 Regressions Using State-Year Data

In this section I repeat my regression of the Police Reform Index on party control and opinion, now using panel data on states and policy in particular years as the outcome. Table A2 presents the results. Columns (1) through (5) do not include state fixed effects, but rely on pooled data, and are largely consistent with those in the main text. When including state effects in column (6), I am unable to include opinion measures as these do not vary within states; the coefficients on party control are consistent in sign and magnitude compared to prior columns but are imprecisely estimated.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Split control	0.92** (0.27)			0.65* (0.26)	0.79** (0.27)	0.64 (0.87)
Democratic control	1.63*** (0.32)			1.05* (0.49)	1.28*** (0.33)	1.31 (1.49)
Dem pres vote		2.57*** (0.39)		1.25* (0.54)		
Pro-reform opinion			2.35** (0.81)		1.04+ (0.54)	
Year 2021	0.08 (0.63)	0.04 (0.63)			0.07 (0.63)	0.07 (0.74)
Year 2022	-1.35** (0.47)	-1.40** (0.48)			-1.36** (0.47)	-1.36* (0.55)
Year 2023	-1.63*** (0.45)	-1.62*** (0.45)			-1.62*** (0.45)	-1.63** (0.53)
Constant	1.04** (0.38)	0.44 (0.38)	-0.08 (0.34)	-0.10 (0.21)	0.68+ (0.37)	1.21 (0.78)
Observations	200	200	200	200	200	200
Dem-Split (p-value)	-0.71 (0.07)			-0.41 (0.39)	-0.48 (0.21)	-0.67 (0.60)
State fixed effects						Yes

Table A2: Regressions Using State-Year Data. Cell entries are coefficients from linear regressions. The reference category for party control is unified Republican control. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. + p<0.1 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

4 Alternative Measures of Party Control

In this section I show results using alternative measures of party control. First, I use the unadjusted average of party control from 2020-2023. Second, I use party control in 2020 only. Third, I use a measure of 2020-2023 control that differentiates between types of split control. Results for the Policy Index and Scale are shown in Table A3. Results for specific policies and congruence are shown in Tables A4, A5, and A6.

(a) Average Control 2020-2023

	DV = Policy Index					DV = Policy Scale (IRT)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Party control	2.92*** (0.57)			1.67* (0.77)	2.37*** (0.64)	0.62*** (0.14)			0.32 (0.19)	0.54** (0.16)
Dem vote		9.42*** (1.42)		5.27** (1.76)			2.06*** (0.33)		1.27** (0.42)	
MRP			8.08*** (2.16)		3.20 (2.26)			1.56** (0.49)		0.44 (0.53)
Constant	4.29*** (0.49)	-1.03 (0.73)	0.03 (1.02)	1.36 (1.09)	2.68* (1.01)	0.09 (0.11)	-1.08*** (0.18)	-0.74** (0.25)	-0.62* (0.26)	-0.13 (0.25)
Obs	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50

(b) Control in 2020 Only

	DV = Policy Index					DV = Policy Scale (IRT)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Split control	2.88** (1.04)			1.47 (1.03)	2.52* (0.99)	0.59* (0.25)			0.25 (0.29)	0.54* (0.26)
Dem control	5.80*** (1.15)			3.35* (1.59)	4.65** (1.35)	1.23*** (0.28)			0.64+ (0.38)	1.08** (0.32)
Dem vote		9.42*** (1.42)		5.43** (1.96)			2.06*** (0.33)		1.30** (0.46)	
MRP			8.08*** (2.16)		3.24 (2.27)			1.56** (0.49)		0.43 (0.52)
Constant	1.33* (0.56)	-1.03 (0.73)	0.03 (1.02)	-0.37 (0.75)	0.23 (0.83)	-0.53** (0.16)	-1.08*** (0.18)	-0.74** (0.25)	-0.94*** (0.18)	-0.68** (0.21)
Obs	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50

(c) Gradations of Split Control

	DV = Policy Index					DV = Policy Scale (IRT)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Rep leg Dem gov	0.89 (0.83)			0.72 (0.90)	0.90 (0.84)	0.26 (0.27)			0.17 (0.29)	0.25 (0.26)
Split leg	5.11*** (1.24)			4.89*** (1.15)	5.06** (1.45)	1.06*** (0.30)			0.95*** (0.25)	1.10** (0.34)
Dem leg Rep gov	7.28*** (0.93)			6.32*** (1.73)	7.20*** (1.35)	1.41*** (0.19)			0.92+ (0.47)	1.46*** (0.31)
Dem leg Dem gov	5.74*** (1.16)			5.10** (1.60)	5.67*** (1.32)	1.23*** (0.28)			0.90* (0.42)	1.28*** (0.33)
Dem vote		9.42*** (1.42)		1.46 (2.15)			2.06*** (0.33)		0.74 (0.61)	
MRP			8.08*** (2.16)		0.21 (2.44)			1.56** (0.49)		-0.17 (0.62)
Constant	1.39* (0.54)	-1.03 (0.73)	0.03 (1.02)	0.91 (0.84)	1.32 (0.87)	-0.53** (0.15)	-1.08*** (0.18)	-0.74** (0.25)	-0.77** (0.22)	-0.47+ (0.24)
Obs	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50

Table A3: Regression Using Alternative Party Control Measures.

	DV = Binary Policy Adoption			DV = Congruence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Public opinion	-17.84 (11.13)		-35.29** (10.70)	-1.92 (2.93)		-0.36 (2.97)
Opinion X Chokeholds	19.44 ⁺ (11.03)		35.07** (11.11)	3.52 (3.21)		0.14 (3.70)
Opinion X Immunity	21.48 ⁺ (11.41)		35.67** (10.22)	5.56 (3.96)		0.74 (4.11)
Opinion X Military	20.63 ⁺ (11.03)		36.96** (10.60)	-5.85* (2.34)		-2.62 (2.65)
Opinion X Registry	21.28 ⁺ (11.47)		35.41** (11.67)	5.36 (3.96)		0.48 (4.56)
policy==chokeholds		0.37*** (0.09)	-31.82** (10.11)		0.37*** (0.09)	0.20 (3.16)
policy==immunity		0.02 (0.05)	-32.63** (9.43)		0.02 (0.05)	-0.61 (3.56)
policy==military		-0.02 (0.06)	-33.18** (9.76)		0.59*** (0.09)	1.72** (0.52)
policy==registry		0.34*** (0.09)	-32.11** (10.55)		0.34*** (0.09)	-0.09 (3.87)
partycontrolcont		0.18** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)		0.18** (0.06)	0.18** (0.06)
(policy==chokeholds)*partycontrolcont		-0.05 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.12)		-0.05 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.12)
(policy==immunity)*partycontrolcont		-0.02 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.07)		-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)
(policy==military)*partycontrolcont		-0.03 (0.08)	-0.14* (0.07)		-0.49*** (0.10)	-0.41*** (0.11)
(policy==registry)*partycontrolcont		-0.02 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.13)		-0.02 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.13)
Constant	1.91 (2.30)	0.14** (0.05)	32.49** (9.83)	-0.80 (0.88)	0.14** (0.05)	0.29 (1.25)
Observations	250	250	250	250	250	250

Table A4: Regression of Individual Reforms and Congruence Using Alternative Party Control Measures: Average Control 2020-2023.

	DV = Binary Policy Adoption			DV = Congruence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Public opinion	4.50*		2.84	1.92		-0.15
	(1.95)		(2.43)	(2.93)		(3.26)
Opinion X Chokeholds	-2.90		-3.33	3.52		-0.64
	(2.36)		(2.99)	(3.21)		(3.73)
Opinion X Immunity	-0.86		-1.27	5.56		1.42
	(3.14)		(3.77)	(3.96)		(4.77)
Opinion X Military	4.50*		2.56	-5.85*		-2.32
	(1.69)		(2.35)	(2.34)		(3.18)
Opinion X Registry	-1.06		-2.61	5.36		0.08
	(3.49)		(4.30)	(3.96)		(4.93)
policy==chokeholds		0.38**	3.33		0.38**	0.87
		(0.11)	(2.47)		(0.11)	(3.20)
policy==immunity		0.00	1.38		0.00	-1.08
		(.)	(3.17)		(.)	(4.09)
policy==military		0.00	-0.12		1.00	2.11***
		(.)	(0.33)		(.)	(0.56)
policy==registry		0.29**	2.70		0.29**	0.24
		(0.10)	(3.54)		(0.10)	(4.16)
Split		0.07	0.06		0.07	0.07
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.08)
Dem		0.33*	0.32*		0.33*	0.33*
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Split X Choke		0.05	0.07		0.05	0.06
		(0.21)	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.21)
Dem X Choke		-0.05	-0.02		-0.05	-0.03
		(0.22)	(0.24)		(0.22)	(0.24)
Split X Immun		0.14	0.14		0.14	0.13
		(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.09)
Dem X Immun		-0.07	-0.10		-0.07	-0.11
		(0.12)	(0.15)		(0.12)	(0.15)
Split X Military		-0.07	-0.08		-0.21	-0.17
		(0.07)	(0.09)		(0.16)	(0.13)
Dem X Military		-0.00	-0.12		-0.93***	-0.79**
		(0.17)	(0.15)		(0.21)	(0.25)
Split X Registry		0.21	0.22		0.21	0.21
		(0.17)	(0.18)		(0.17)	(0.18)
Dem X Registry		-0.02	-0.02		-0.02	-0.02
		(0.23)	(0.27)		(0.23)	(0.26)
Constant	-0.58	-0.00	-1.18	-1.76	-0.00	0.01
	(0.81)	(.)	(1.01)	(1.92)	(0.00)	(0.28)
Observations	250	250	250	250	250	250

Table A5: Regression of Individual Reforms and Congruence Using Alternative Party Control Measures: Control in 2020 Only.

	DV = Binary Policy Adoption			DV = Congruence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Public opinion	-4.50*		-2.91	-1.92		1.03
	(1.95)		(2.61)	(2.93)		(3.13)
Opinion X Chokeholds	-2.90		-5.47 ⁺	3.52		-3.59
	(2.36)		(3.15)	(3.21)		(3.66)
Opinion X Immunity	-0.86		-5.29	5.56		-3.42
	(3.14)		(3.46)	(3.96)		(3.90)
Opinion X Military	4.50*		2.86	-5.85*		-0.52
	(1.69)		(2.71)	(2.34)		(3.13)
Opinion X Registry	-1.06		-4.46	5.36		-2.58
	(3.49)		(4.04)	(3.96)		(4.33)
policy==chokeholds		0.39***	4.88 ⁺		0.39***	3.17
		(0.11)	(2.61)		(0.11)	(3.11)
policy==immunity		0.00	4.50		0.00	2.79
		(0.00)	(2.98)		(0.00)	(3.40)
policy==military		0.00**	-0.23		1.00***	1.61*
		(0.00)	(0.42)		(0.00)	(0.63)
policy==registry		0.30**	4.19		0.30**	2.47
		(0.10)	(3.35)		(0.10)	(3.65)
Rep leg Dem gov		0.00	-0.01		0.00	-0.00
		(.)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.01)
Split leg		0.00	-0.02		-0.00	-0.01
		(0.00)	(0.02)		(0.00)	(0.02)
Dem leg Rep gov		0.33	0.32		0.33	0.33
		(0.29)	(0.30)		(0.29)	(0.29)
Dem leg Dem gov		0.33*	0.32*		0.33*	0.33*
		(0.13)	(0.14)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Rep Dem X Choke		-0.11	-0.10		-0.11	-0.11
		(0.21)	(0.20)		(0.21)	(0.20)
Split X Choke		0.61***	0.74***		0.61***	0.73***
		(0.11)	(0.16)		(0.11)	(0.16)
Dem Rep X Choke		-0.06	0.07		-0.06	0.06
		(0.59)	(0.57)		(0.59)	(0.57)
Dem Dem X Choke		-0.06	0.06		-0.06	0.05
		(0.22)	(0.24)		(0.22)	(0.24)
Rep Dem X Immun		-0.00	0.01		-0.00	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.02)		(0.00)	(0.01)
Split X Immun		-0.00	0.03		0.00	0.02
		(0.00)	(0.03)		(0.00)	(0.03)
Dem Rep X Immun		0.67*	0.74*		0.67*	0.73*
		(0.29)	(0.29)		(0.29)	(0.29)
Dem Dem X Immun		-0.07	0.01		-0.07	0.01
		(0.12)	(0.15)		(0.12)	(0.15)
Rep Dem X Military		-0.00	0.00		-0.00	-0.01
		(0.00)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.03)
Split X Military		-0.00	0.02		0.00	0.06
		(0.00)	(0.03)		(0.00)	(0.06)
Dem Rep X Military		-0.33	-0.43		-1.00 ⁺	-0.94 ⁺
		(0.29)	(0.36)		(0.50)	(0.53)
Dem Dem X Military		-0.00	-0.14		-0.93***	-0.89**
		(0.17)	(0.16)		(0.21)	(0.26)
Rep Dem X Registry		-0.02	-0.00		-0.02	-0.01
		(0.21)	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.21)
Split X Registry		0.70***	0.74***		0.70***	0.73***
		(0.10)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.12)
Dem Rep X Registry		0.36	0.41		0.36	0.40
		(0.31)	(0.31)		(0.31)	(0.31)
Dem Dem X Registry		-0.04	0.01		-0.04	0.01
		(0.24)	(0.27)		(0.24)	(0.26)
Constant	1.67	-0.00	0.25	-0.80	-0.00	-0.43
	(1.30)	(0.00)	(0.22)	(0.88)	(0.00)	(1.30)
Observations	250	250	250	250	250	250

Table A6: Regression of Individual Reforms and Congruence Using Alternative Party Control Measures: Gradations of Split Control.

5 Results by CCEs Year

In the main text I pool responses from the 2020 and 2022 CES years to estimate state public opinion. In this section I test the sensitivity of the results to using either 2020 or 2022 alone, given opinions may have changed after 2020. First, Figure A2 summarizes any changes between years, finding little. Each figure shows distribution of changes across states by question. The average of the static policy question is in parentheses at the top of each panel, and the average change is indicated with the thick dashed line. While the public moved in the more conservative direction on three questions, the average changes are only a couple of points on a 0-100 scale, and none of the changes are large enough to change the position favored by the average majority.

Tables A7 and A8 show the responsiveness regressions yield similar results regardless of year, though the MRP coefficients are somewhat stronger for 2020. Tables A9 and A10 show the policy adoption and congruence regressions also yield similar results regardless of year used.




Figure A2: Changes in CES Policy Question Responses Between 2020 and 2022. The thick dashed line represents the average across states.

	DV = Policy Index					DV = Policy Scale (IRT)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Split control	3.19** (1.08)			1.86 ⁺ (1.00)	2.73** (0.99)	0.68* (0.25)			0.37 (0.27)	0.61* (0.26)
Dem control	5.74*** (1.14)			3.50* (1.47)	4.29** (1.36)	1.23*** (0.27)			0.70 ⁺ (0.35)	1.01** (0.33)
Dem vote		9.42*** (1.42)		5.14** (1.75)			2.06*** (0.33)		1.21** (0.40)	
MRP			9.35*** (2.27)		4.60 ⁺ (2.33)			1.80** (0.54)		0.68 (0.54)
Constant	1.39* (0.53)	-1.03 (0.73)	-0.98 (1.19)	-0.30 (0.72)	-0.45 (0.95)	-0.53** (0.15)	-1.08*** (0.18)	-0.94** (0.30)	-0.93*** (0.17)	-0.80** (0.24)
Obs	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Dem-Split (p-value)	-2.55 (0.07)			-1.64 (0.23)	-1.56 (0.28)	-0.55 (0.08)			-0.33 (0.26)	-0.40 (0.21)

Table A7: Regression of Police Reform Index on Party Control and Public Opinion: 2020 CES Only.

	DV = Policy Index					DV = Policy Scale (IRT)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Split control	3.19** (1.08)			1.86 ⁺ (1.00)	3.05** (1.03)	0.68* (0.25)			0.37 (0.27)	0.67* (0.25)
Dem control	5.74*** (1.14)			3.50* (1.47)	5.15*** (1.25)	1.23*** (0.27)			0.70 ⁺ (0.35)	1.18*** (0.31)
Dem vote		9.42*** (1.42)		5.14** (1.75)			2.06*** (0.33)		1.21** (0.40)	
MRP			7.05** (2.30)		1.84 (2.10)			1.34* (0.51)		0.13 (0.47)
Constant	1.39* (0.53)	-1.03 (0.73)	0.51 (1.08)	-0.30 (0.72)	0.72 (0.83)	-0.53** (0.15)	-1.08*** (0.18)	-0.64* (0.25)	-0.93*** (0.17)	-0.58** (0.21)
Obs	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Dem-Split (p-value)	-2.55 (0.07)			-1.64 (0.23)	-2.11 (0.16)	-0.55 (0.08)			-0.33 (0.26)	-0.51 (0.13)

Table A8: Regression of Police Reform Index on Party Control and Public Opinion: 2022 CES Only.

	DV = Binary Policy Adoption			DV = Congruence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Public opinion	-31.07* (13.90)		-33.37** (12.39)	0.79 (2.57)		1.28 (2.67)
Opinion X Chokeholds	33.44* (13.75)		34.18** (12.26)	1.58 (3.00)		-0.48 (3.34)
Opinion X Immunity	35.90* (14.39)		36.23** (13.25)	4.04 (3.79)		1.58 (4.00)
Opinion X Military	33.59* (13.85)		34.14** (12.71)	-6.37*** (1.51)		-5.81** (1.95)
Opinion X Registry	35.35* (15.15)		32.65* (14.83)	3.49 (5.03)		-2.00 (5.91)
Split control		0.08 (0.08)	0.19+ (0.10)		0.08 (0.08)	0.08 (0.09)
Dem control		0.33* (0.13)	0.33** (0.11)		0.33* (0.13)	0.33* (0.13)
Split control X Chokeholds		0.03 (0.22)	-0.10 (0.23)		0.03 (0.22)	0.02 (0.22)
Split control X Immunity		0.17 (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)		0.17 (0.11)	0.15 (0.11)
Split control X Military		-0.08 (0.08)	-0.21+ (0.11)		-0.33 (0.21)	-0.23 (0.17)
Split control X Registry		0.20 (0.18)	0.09 (0.20)		0.20 (0.18)	0.21 (0.20)
Dem control X Chokeholds		-0.06 (0.22)	-0.08 (0.22)		-0.06 (0.22)	-0.09 (0.24)
Dem control X Immunity		-0.07 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.14)		-0.07 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.14)
Dem control X Military		0.00 (0.17)	-0.04 (0.13)		-0.76** (0.22)	-0.44 (0.27)
Dem control X Registry		-0.04 (0.23)	-0.02 (0.23)		-0.04 (0.23)	-0.02 (0.26)
Constant	3.91 (2.67)	0.14*** (0.03)	5.73* (2.24)	-0.62 (1.08)	0.30*** (0.04)	0.68 (1.21)
Observations	250	250	250	250	250	250

Table A9: Regression of Individual Reforms and Congruence on Party Control and Public Opinion: 2020 CES Only.

	DV = Binary Policy Adoption			DV = Congruence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Public opinion	0.98 (9.59)		-18.00 (14.13)	-2.08 (4.67)		-2.39 (4.94)
Opinion X Chokeholds	-0.06 (9.97)		16.90 (14.63)	3.00 (4.50)		1.28 (5.10)
Opinion X Immunity	4.20 (9.06)		21.16 (13.11)	7.26 (5.34)		5.54 (5.90)
Opinion X Military	1.61 (9.77)		18.67 (13.90)	-6.42 (3.98)		-5.05 (4.61)
Opinion X Registry	2.47 (9.82)		19.01 (14.63)	5.52 (5.18)		3.39 (5.92)
Split control		0.08 (0.08)	0.13 (0.09)		0.08 (0.08)	0.09 (0.09)
Dem control		0.33* (0.13)	0.41** (0.15)		0.33* (0.13)	0.34** (0.13)
Split control X Chokeholds		0.03 (0.22)	0.00 (0.22)		0.03 (0.22)	0.04 (0.22)
Split control X Immunity		0.17 (0.11)	0.10 (0.11)		0.17 (0.11)	0.14 (0.12)
Split control X Military		-0.08 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.09)		-0.25 (0.18)	-0.22 (0.15)
Split control X Registry		0.20 (0.18)	0.14 (0.18)		0.20 (0.18)	0.18 (0.19)
Dem control X Chokeholds		-0.06 (0.22)	-0.09 (0.25)		-0.06 (0.22)	-0.02 (0.23)
Dem control X Immunity		-0.07 (0.12)	-0.22 (0.15)		-0.07 (0.12)	-0.15 (0.13)
Dem control X Military		0.00 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.16)		-0.80*** (0.22)	-0.62* (0.25)
Dem control X Registry		-0.04 (0.23)	-0.14 (0.27)		-0.04 (0.23)	-0.07 (0.26)
Constant	-1.65 (2.10)	0.14*** (0.03)	2.88 (2.89)	-0.94 (0.92)	0.34*** (0.03)	-0.21 (1.05)
Observations	250	250	250	250	250	250

Table A10: Regression of Individual Reforms and Congruence on Party Control and Public Opinion: 2022 CES Only.

6 Results for Individual Reforms

Here I show results for each policy that makes up my reform index. Figure A3 plots estimates for Split and Democratic control. In the first panel, I show results without adjusting for public opinion. As when using the index, we see states with Split control are somewhat more likely than Republican states to pass pro-reform policies and not pass anti-reform policies; the differences are more consistent for states controlled by Democrats. Also consistent with the results in the main text, the Democratic-Republican difference is attenuated when adjusting for presidential vote, and more precisely estimated when adjusting for MRP-estimated opinion.

Figure A4 shows corresponding estimates by policy for public opinion. Consistent with the results in the main text, presidential vote is a more consistent predictor of policy than policing opinions.




Figure A3: Party Control Results for Individual Policies. Points are coefficient estimates with lines spanning 95% confidence intervals. Estimates significant at the < .1 level are indicated with filled circles.




Figure A4: Public Opinion Results for Individual Policies. Points are coefficient estimates with lines spanning 95% confidence intervals. Estimates significant at the < .1 level are indicated with filled circles.

7 MRP Estimation

I use the following seven questions from the 2020 and 2022 CES Common Content:

- Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Require police officers to wear body cameras that record all of their activities while on duty.
- Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Ban the use of choke holds by police.
- Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Allow individuals or their families to sue a police officer for damages if the officer is found to have “recklessly disregarded” the individual’s rights.
- Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? End the Department of Defense program that sends surplus military weapons and equipment to police departments.
- Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Decrease the number of police on the street by 10 percent, and increase funding for other public services.
- Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Increase the number of police on the street by 10 percent, even if it means fewer funds for other public services.
- Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Create a national registry of police who have been investigated for or disciplined for misconduct.

I pool results from both years. For each item, I then estimate the following multi-level model:⁸

$$\Pr(y_i = 1) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\beta^0 + \alpha_{j[i]}^{\text{race-sex}} + \alpha_{k[i]}^{\text{edu}} + \alpha_{l[i]}^{\text{age}} + \alpha_{s[i]}^{\text{state}})$$

In words, the probability of a positive response is a function of a global intercept β^0 , plus group-level effects for each category of race-gender (male white non-Hispanic, male Black non-Hispanic,

⁸This section draws on Gelman and Hill (2007) and Kastle, Lax, and Phillips (2019).

male other race non-Hispanic, male Hispanic, female white non-Hispanic, female Black non-Hispanic, female other race non-Hispanic, female Hispanic), education (less than high school, high school, some college, BA or higher), age (18-29, 30-44, 45-64, 65+), and state. The group-level effects are in turn modeled as:

$$\alpha_j^{race-sex} \sim N(0, \sigma_{race-sex}^2), \text{ for } j = 1, \dots, 8$$

$$\alpha_k^{edu} \sim N(0, \sigma_{edu}^2), \text{ for } k = 1, \dots, 4$$

$$\alpha_l^{age} \sim N(0, \sigma_{age}^2), \text{ for } l = 1, \dots, 4$$

and the state effect is modeled as a function of 2020 presidential vote:

$$\alpha_s^{state} \sim N(\beta^{presvote} * presvote_s, \sigma_{state}^2), \text{ for } s = 1, \dots, 50$$

After estimating the model for each item, I use the resulting coefficient estimate obtain a predicted value for each of the $j \times k \times l \times s$ unique combinations of demographics and state, θ_c . I then post-stratify the estimates using population counts N_c of each category c obtained from the 2018-2022 American Community Survey 5-year estimates:

$$\hat{y}_s = \frac{\sum_{c \in s} N_c \theta_c}{\sum_{c \in s} N_c}$$

To compute the pro-reform opinion measure used in the main text, I simply average \hat{y}_s for all seven opinion items (for the item about increasing police funding, I use $1 - \hat{y}_s$).

For the analysis of congruence, I use the \hat{y}_s for the five items I can reasonably map onto state policies. The CES also includes two questions about increasing or decreasing police funding. However, as none of the state reforms directly relate to police funding, I can not use these questions for an analysis of congruence.

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