

Online Appendix

Party Over Principles: Determinants of Public Opinion on Redistricting Reform

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Appendix A: Survey #1

Table A1: Experiment #1 Proportion Choosing Proposed Map by Treatment Group


	Proportion	95% Conf. Int.
Control Treatment	0.51	[0.45, 0.56]
Individual Representation Treatment	0.21	[0.16, 0.25]
Partisan Power Treatment	0.22	[0.18, 0.27]
Both Considerations Treatment	0.18	[0.13, 0.22]

Table A2: Experiment #1 Proportion Comparison Tests

	First Group Proportion	Second Group Proportion	95% Conf. Int.	p-value
<i>Difference of Proportions</i>				
Individual Representation - Partisan Power	0.21	0.22	[-0.08, 0.05]	0.71
Control - Partisan Power	0.51	0.22	[0.21, 0.36]	< 0.01
Control - Individual Representation	0.51	0.21	[0.23, 0.37]	< 0.01

I further evaluate my first hypothesis by exploring the alternative dependent variable – support for the proposed map on a seven-point Likert scale. Panel A in figure A1 plots mean support for the proposed map across experimental treatment condition, and I find similar results to those displayed in figure 1. Both the partisan power consideration and the individual representation consideration meaningfully decrease support for the proposed district map. Respondents in the partisan power consideration condition, individual representation consideration condition, and combined consideration condition oppose the proposed map, on average, more than respondents who read an explanation of the proposed map without any additional information on partisan power or individual representation considerations.

Figure A1: Support for Proposed Map by Treatment Condition



NOTE: Figure displays mean support for the proposed district map across treatment groups. 95 percent confidence intervals surround point estimates.

A difference of means test of support for the proposed map between the partisan power and individual representation considerations reveals evidence marginally in favor of hypothesis 1. The partisan power consideration leads to less support for the proposed map than the individual representation consideration. This difference is substantively small (0.28 on a seven-point scale) but reaches statistical significance (p -value < 0.05). Finally, I regress the map support variable on variables for the two treatment conditions, and Panel B in figure A1 displays the coefficient estimates along with 95% confidence intervals. The partisan power treatment decreases support for the proposed map by 0.45 standard deviations (95% CI: 0.55 - 0.34), whereas the representation treatment decreases support for the proposed map by 0.29 standard deviations (95% CI: 0.40 - 0.18). As such, I report that the partisan power consideration decreases support for the proposed map at a slightly higher rate than the individual representation consideration, but this difference is substantively small and only emerges when using the 1-7 measure of support for the proposed map instead of the binary choice between maps.


Table A3: Experiment #1 Mean Support for Proposed Map

	Mean	95% Conf. Int.
Control Treatment	4.73	[4.59, 4.87]
Individual Representation Treatment	3.88	[3.70, 4.07]
Partisan Power Treatment	3.60	[3.41, 3.80]
Both Considerations Treatment	3.44	[3.24, 3.64]

Table A4: Experiment #1 Mean Comparison Tests

	First Group	Second Group	95% Conf. Int.	p-value
	Mean	Mean		
<i>Difference of Means</i>				
Individual Representation - Partisan Power	3.88	3.60	[0.01, 0.55]	0.043
Control - Partisan Power	4.73	3.60	[0.88, 1.37]	< 0.01
Control - Individual Representation	4.73	3.88	[0.61, 1.08]	< 0.01

Figure A2: Support for Proposed Map by Treatment Condition and Party Affiliation



NOTE: Figure displays mean support for the proposed district map across treatment groups. 95 percent confidence intervals surround point estimates.

Table A5: Experiment #1 Regression Results

	1) Map Choice (0 / 1)	2) Map Choice (0 / 1)	3) Map Support (1 - 7)	4) Map Support (1 - 7)
Representation Treatment	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.30*** (0.03)	-0.29*** (0.05)	-0.48*** (0.08)
Partisan Power Treatment	-0.16*** (0.02)	-0.28*** (0.03)	-0.45*** (0.05)	-0.64*** (0.08)
Representation X Partisan Power Treatment		0.25*** (0.05)		0.39*** (0.11)
Constant	0.44*** (0.02)	0.50*** (0.02)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.47*** (0.05)
Num.Obs.	1279	1279	1279	1279
R2	0.066	0.086	0.069	0.079

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Models estimated using OLS Regression.

Table A6: Experiment #1 Regression Results (Logistic Regression)

	1) Map Choice (0 / 1)	2) Map Choice (0 / 1)
Representation Treatment	-0.92*** (0.13)	-1.37*** (0.18)
Partisan Power Treatment	-0.84*** (0.13)	-1.28*** (0.18)
Representation X Partisan Power Treatment		1.08*** (0.27)
Constant	-0.17* (0.10)	0.02 (0.11)
Num.Obs.	1279	1279

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Models estimated using Logistic Regression.

Table A7: Experiment #1 Regression Results with Demographic Covariates

	1) Map Choice (0 / 1)	2) Map Choice (0 / 1)	3) Map Support (1 - 7)	4) Map Support (1 - 7)
Representation Treatment	-0.18*** (0.02)	-0.31*** (0.03)	-0.29*** (0.05)	-0.50*** (0.08)
Partisan Power Treatment	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.28*** (0.03)	-0.45*** (0.05)	-0.65*** (0.08)
Representation X Partisan Power Treatment		0.26*** (0.05)		0.41*** (0.11)
Party: Ind.	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)
Party: Rep.	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)
Gender: Woman	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
Age	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Race: Black	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.03 (0.16)	0.01 (0.15)
Race: Latino/a	0.07 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)	-0.48** (0.21)	-0.48** (0.21)
Race: White	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.34** (0.13)	-0.35*** (0.13)
Race: Multi-racial	-0.23* (0.13)	-0.26** (0.13)	-0.69** (0.30)	-0.74** (0.30)
Race: Other	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.39** (0.18)	-0.40** (0.18)
Hispanic	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	0.12 (0.14)	0.12 (0.14)
Bachelors Degree or Higher	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05** (0.03)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)
Income	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Parent	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)
Constant	0.65*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)	0.92*** (0.17)	1.03*** (0.18)
Num.Obs.	1272	1272	1272	1272
R2	0.088	0.108	0.098	0.109

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Models estimated using OLS Regression.

Table A8: Experiment #1 Regression Results (Only Democrats)

	1) Map Choice (0 / 1)	2) Map Choice (0 / 1)	3) Map Support (1 - 7)	4) Map Support (1 - 7)
Representation Treatment	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.35*** (0.05)	-0.33*** (0.07)	-0.58*** (0.11)
Partisan Power Treatment	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.28*** (0.05)	-0.45*** (0.07)	-0.70*** (0.11)
Representation X Partisan Power Treatment		0.22*** (0.07)		0.47*** (0.15)
Constant	0.50*** (0.03)	0.56*** (0.04)	0.40*** (0.07)	0.53*** (0.08)
Num.Obs.	665	665	665	665
R2	0.094	0.109	0.076	0.090

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Models estimated using OLS Regression.

Table A9: Experiment #1 Regression Results (Only Republicans)

	1) Map Choice (0 / 1)	2) Map Choice (0 / 1)	3) Map Support (1 - 7)	4) Map Support (1 - 7)
Representation Treatment	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.58*** (0.11)	-0.43*** (0.13)	-0.39*** (0.11)
Partisan Power Treatment	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.68*** (0.11)	-0.77*** (0.13)	-0.60*** (0.11)
Representation X Partisan Power Treatment		0.68*** (0.16)		0.31* (0.16)
Constant	0.38*** (0.03)	0.46*** (0.08)	4.44*** (0.12)	0.41*** (0.08)
Num.Obs.	614	614	614	614
R2	0.046	0.074	0.064	0.070

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Models estimated using OLS Regression.

Table A10: Experiment 1 Demographics

Variable	N = 1,533¹
Party	
<i>Dem</i>	535 (35%)
<i>Ind</i>	497 (33%)
<i>Rep</i>	496 (32%)
Gender	
<i>Man</i>	740 (48%)
<i>Woman</i>	793 (52%)
Age	47 (34, 61)
Race	
<i>Asian American</i>	71 (4.6%)
<i>Black</i>	164 (11%)
<i>Latino</i>	87 (5.7%)
<i>Multi-racial</i>	26 (1.7%)
<i>Other</i>	86 (5.6%)
<i>White</i>	1,098 (72%)
Hispanic	134 (8.7%)
Education	
<i>Bachelors or higher</i>	621 (41%)
<i>Less than Bachelors</i>	904 (59%)
Income	
<i>Under \$29,999</i>	405 (26%)
<i>\$30,000-\$59,999</i>	513 (34%)
<i>\$60,000-\$119,999</i>	424 (28%)
<i>Over \$120,000</i>	187 (12%)
Parent	398 (26%)
¹ n (%); Median (Q1, Q3)	

Table A11: Experiment 1 Treatment Assignment Balance

Variable	control N = 309 ¹	rep N = 335 ¹	party N = 326 ¹	both N = 309 ¹	p-value ²
Party					0.4
<i>Dem</i>	126 (41%)	132 (39%)	136 (42%)	139 (45%)	
<i>Ind</i>	55 (18%)	68 (20%)	75 (23%)	56 (18%)	
<i>Rep</i>	128 (41%)	135 (40%)	115 (35%)	114 (37%)	
Gender					0.14
<i>Man</i>	154 (50%)	148 (44%)	164 (50%)	133 (43%)	
<i>Woman</i>	155 (50%)	187 (56%)	162 (50%)	176 (57%)	
Age	50 (35, 63)	49 (35, 61)	49 (34, 63)	48 (35, 61)	0.6
Race					
<i>Asian American</i>	16 (5.2%)	17 (5.1%)	14 (4.3%)	10 (3.2%)	
<i>Black</i>	26 (8.4%)	35 (10%)	28 (8.6%)	42 (14%)	
<i>Latino</i>	17 (5.5%)	23 (6.9%)	17 (5.2%)	16 (5.2%)	
<i>Multi-racial</i>	3 (1.0%)	2 (0.6%)	2 (0.6%)	6 (1.9%)	
<i>Other</i>	19 (6.1%)	13 (3.9%)	22 (6.7%)	14 (4.5%)	
<i>White</i>	228 (74%)	245 (73%)	243 (75%)	221 (72%)	
Hispanic	30 (9.7%)	28 (8.4%)	30 (9.2%)	22 (7.1%)	0.7
Education					0.6
<i>Bachelors or higher</i>	138 (45%)	134 (40%)	137 (42%)	138 (45%)	
<i>Less than Bachelors</i>	171 (55%)	200 (60%)	188 (58%)	170 (55%)	
Income	6.00 (4.00, 8.00)	6.00 (3.00, 8.00)	6.00 (4.00, 8.00)	6.00 (4.00, 9.00)	0.6
Parent	77 (25%)	89 (27%)	82 (25%)	84 (27%)	0.9

¹ n (%); Median (Q1, Q3)
² Pearson's Chi-squared test; Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test

Figure A3: Control Treatment Vignette

As you may know, state legislative districts must be redrawn every ten years, a process known as redistricting. A strictly non-partisan, non-profit organization recently proposed a new district map that would more accurately reflect voters in {State}.

Figure A4: Party Consideration Treatment Vignette

As you may know, state legislative districts must be redrawn every ten years, a process known as redistricting. A strictly non-partisan, non-profit organization recently proposed a new district map to more accurately reflect voters in {State}.

The proposed map would likely lead to the {Out Party} Party gaining seats in the state legislature, because the current district map tends to favor the {In Party} Party. However, the proposed map would not make any changes to your district in the state legislature.

Proposed Map

Change in State Legislature	{Out Party} Party is likely to gain additional seats
Change in Your District	No change

Figure A5: Representation Consideration Treatment Vignette

As you may know, state legislative districts must be redrawn every ten years, a process known as redistricting. A strictly non-partisan, non-profit organization recently proposed a new district map to more accurately reflect voters in {State}.

The proposed district map does not favor either party, so it would not change overall party power in the state legislature. However, the proposed map would increase the likelihood that a {Out Party} will represent your district in the state legislature.

Proposed Map

Change in State Legislature	No change overall
Change in Your District	A {Out Party} is more likely to win the seat

Figure A6: Both Considerations Treatment Vignette

As you may know, state legislative districts must be redrawn every ten years, a process known as redistricting. A strictly non-partisan, non-profit organization recently proposed a new district map to more accurately reflect voters in {State}.

The proposed map would likely lead to the {Out Party} Party gaining seats in the state legislature, because the current district map tends to favor the {In Party} Party. Additionally, the proposed map would likely lead to a {Out Party} representing your district in the state legislature.

Proposed Map

Change in State Legislature	{Out Party} Party is likely to gain additional seats
Change in Your District	A {Out Party} is more likely to win the seat

Respondent attention checks:

Survey respondents had to pass two attention check screeners before entering into the experimental component of the survey. Both screeners are designed to identify respondents who quickly click through survey questions without reading the prompt or giving thought to their answers. The first screener is the question displayed below. Respondents who failed to answer “Moderately interested” for this question were removed from the survey. The second attention screener involved asking respondents to select the state they currently live in both at the beginning of the introduction section and the end of the introduction section. Respondents who did not select the same state in these two questions were removed from the survey.

Figure A7: Attention Screener Question:

Social media regulation policy is currently a topic of debate in many countries. We would like to know whether people actually read survey questions. Please answer “Moderately interested” to show us that you read this question.

- Extremely interested
- Very interested
- Moderately interested
- Slightly interested
- Not interested at all

Appendix B: Survey #2

Table B1: Experiment #2 Proportion Choosing Proposed Map by Treatment Group

	Proportion	95% Conf. Int.
Neutral Treatment	0.51	[0.46, 0.57]
Partisan Loss Treatment	0.39	[0.33, 0.44]
Partisan Gain Treatment	0.34	[0.28, 0.39]

Table B2: Experiment #2 Proportion Violating Democratic Principles

	Proportion	95% Conf. Int.
Neutral Treatment	0.49	[0.43, 0.54]
Partisan Loss Treatment	0.61	[0.56, 0.67]
Partisan Gain Treatment	0.34	[0.28, 0.39]

Table B3: Experiment #2 Proportion Violating Principles Comparison Tests

	First Group Proportion	Second Group Proportion	95% Conf. Int.	p-value
<i>Difference of Proportions</i>				
Partisan Loss - Partisan Gain	0.61	0.34	[0.20, 0.36]	< 0.001
Neutral - Partisan Loss	0.49	0.61	[-0.20, -0.04]	< 0.01
Neutral - Partisan Gain	0.49	0.34	[0.07, 0.23]	< 0.01

Table B4: Experiment #2 Mean Support for Proposed Map (1-7 Likert Scale)

	Mean	95% Conf. Int.
Neutral Treatment	4.69	[4.54, 4.85]
Partisan Loss Treatment	4.60	[4.44, 4.76]
Partisan Gain Treatment	4.36	[4.20, 4.53]

Table B5: Experiment #2 Mean Support for Proposed Map Comparison Tests (1-7 Likert Scale)

	First Group	Second Group			
	Mean	Mean	95% Conf. Int.		p-value
<i>Difference of Means</i>					
Partisan Loss - Partisan Gain	4.60	4.36	[0.01, 0.47]		0.041
Neutral - Partisan Loss	4.69	4.60	[-0.13, 0.31]		0.433
Neutral - Partisan Gain	4.69	4.36	[0.10, 0.55]		< 0.01

Table B6: Experiment #2 Regression Results

	1) Map Choice (0 / 1)	2) Democratic Violation (0 / 1)	3) Map Support (1 - 7)
Partisan Loss	-0.12*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	-0.06 (0.08)
Partisan Gain	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.23*** (0.08)
Constant	0.51*** (0.03)	0.49*** (0.03)	0.09* (0.06)
Num.Obs.	909	909	909
R2	0.023	0.050	0.009

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Models estimated using OLS Regression.

Table B7: Experiment #2 Regression Results (Logistic Regression)

	1) Map Choice (0 / 1)	2) Democratic Violation (0 / 1)
Partisan Loss	-0.50*** (0.16)	0.50*** (0.16)
Partisan Gain	-0.73*** (0.17)	-0.64*** (0.17)
Constant	0.04 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)
Num.Obs.	909	909

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Models estimated using Logistic Regression.

Table B8: Experiment #2 Regression Results with Demographic Covariates

	1) Map Choice (0 / 1)	2) Democratic Violation (0 / 1)	3) Map Support (1 - 7)
Partisan Loss	-0.13*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	-0.07 (0.08)
Partisan Gain	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.26*** (0.08)
Party: Ind.	-0.05 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.10)
Party: Rep.	-0.06* (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.07)
Gender: Woman	-0.05* (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	-0.20*** (0.07)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Race: Black	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.15 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.24)
Race: Latino/a	-0.03 (0.15)	-0.25* (0.15)	-0.05 (0.30)
Race: White	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.14 (0.22)
Race: Multi-racial	0.24 (0.17)	-0.07 (0.17)	0.16 (0.35)
Race: Other	-0.04 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.19 (0.27)
Hispanic	0.01 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)	0.06 (0.17)
Bachelors Degree or Higher	0.02 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.07)
Income	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Constant	0.55*** (0.13)	0.57*** (0.12)	0.29 (0.25)
Num.Obs.	904	904	904
R2	0.035	0.066	0.048

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Models estimated using OLS Regression.

Table B9: Experiment #2 Regression Results (Only Democrats)

	1) Map Choice (0 / 1)	2) Democratic Violation (0 / 1)	3) Map Support 3) (1 - 7)
Partisan Loss	-0.15*** (0.06)	0.15*** (0.06)	-0.33* (0.17)
Partisan Gain	-0.22*** (0.06)	-0.10* (0.06)	-0.71*** (0.17)
Constant	0.56*** (0.04)	0.44*** (0.04)	4.92*** (0.12)
Num.Obs.	449	449	449
R2	0.033	0.041	0.036

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Models estimated using OLS Regression.

Table B10: Experiment #2 Regression Results (Only Republicans)

	1) Map Choice (0 / 1)	2) Democratic Violation (0 / 1)	3) Map Support 3) (1 - 7)
Partisan Loss	-0.10* (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.13 (0.15)
Partisan Gain	-0.14** (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.06)	0.03 (0.15)
Constant	0.47*** (0.04)	0.53*** (0.04)	4.49*** (0.10)
Num.Obs.	460	460	460
R2	0.015	0.062	0.002

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Models estimated using OLS Regression.

Table B11: Experiment 2 Demographics

Variable	N = 1,063⁷
Party	
<i>Dem</i>	372 (35%)
<i>Ind</i>	301 (28%)
<i>Rep</i>	390 (37%)
Gender	
<i>Man</i>	512 (48%)
<i>Woman</i>	550 (52%)
Age	47 (34, 61)
Race	
<i>Asian American</i>	33 (3.1%)
<i>Black</i>	111 (10%)
<i>Latino</i>	58 (5.5%)
<i>Multi-racial</i>	17 (1.6%)
<i>Other</i>	51 (4.8%)
<i>White</i>	792 (75%)
Hispanic	91 (8.6%)
Education	
<i>Bachelors or higher</i>	436 (41%)
<i>Less than Bachelors</i>	624 (59%)
Income	
<i>Under \$29,999</i>	272 (26%)
<i>\$30,000-\$59,999</i>	358 (34%)
<i>\$60,000-\$119,999</i>	299 (28%)
<i>Over \$120,000</i>	133 (13%)
⁷ n (%); Median (Q1, Q3)	

Table B12: Experiment 2 Treatment Assignment Balance

Variable	control N = 321 ¹	loss N = 299 ¹	win N = 289 ¹	p-value ²
Party				0.7
<i>Dem</i>	122 (38%)	126 (42%)	123 (43%)	
<i>Ind</i>	59 (18%)	46 (15%)	43 (15%)	
<i>Rep</i>	140 (44%)	127 (42%)	123 (43%)	
Gender				0.6
<i>Man</i>	158 (49%)	137 (46%)	143 (49%)	
<i>Woman</i>	163 (51%)	162 (54%)	146 (51%)	
Age	51 (35, 63)	50 (36, 61)	43 (33, 58)	0.013
Race				
<i>Asian American</i>	4 (1.3%)	11 (3.7%)	8 (2.8%)	
<i>Black</i>	28 (8.8%)	32 (11%)	29 (10%)	
<i>Latino</i>	16 (5.0%)	12 (4.0%)	21 (7.3%)	
<i>Multi-racial</i>	7 (2.2%)	3 (1.0%)	3 (1.0%)	
<i>Other</i>	15 (4.7%)	13 (4.3%)	17 (5.9%)	
<i>White</i>	250 (78%)	228 (76%)	211 (73%)	
Hispanic	27 (8.4%)	20 (6.7%)	31 (11%)	0.2
Education				0.7
<i>Bachelors or higher</i>	132 (41%)	133 (45%)	124 (43%)	
<i>Less than Bachelors</i>	189 (59%)	164 (55%)	164 (57%)	
Income	6.00 (3.00, 8.00)	6.00 (4.00, 8.00)	6.00 (4.00, 8.00)	0.3

¹ n (%); Median (Q1, Q3)

² Pearson's Chi-squared test; Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test

Figure B1: Neutral Treatment Vignette

As you may know, state legislative districts must be redrawn every ten years, a process known as redistricting. A strictly non-partisan, non-profit organization recently proposed a new district map that would more accurately reflect voters in {State}.

Figure B2: Partisan Loss Treatment Vignette

As you may know, state legislative districts must be redrawn every ten years, a process known as redistricting. A strictly non-partisan, non-profit organization recently proposed a new district map to more accurately reflect voters in {State}.

The proposed map would likely lead to the {Out Party} Party gaining seats in the state legislature, because the current district map tends to favor the {In Party} Party. However, the proposed map would not make any changes to your district in the state legislature.

Proposed Map

Change in State Legislature	{Out Party} Party is likely to gain additional seats
Change in Your District	No change

Figure B3: Partisan Gain Treatment Vignette

As you may know, state legislative districts must be redrawn every ten years, a process known as redistricting. The {In Party} Party recently proposed a new district map, but a strictly non-partisan, non-profit organization claims the proposed map would not accurately reflect voters in {State}.

The proposed map would likely lead to the {In Party} Party gaining seats in the state legislature, because the current district map does not give an advantage to either party. However, the proposed map would not make any changes to your district in the state legislature.

Proposed Map

Change in State Legislature	{In Party} Party is likely to gain additional seats
Change in Your District	No change

Respondent attention checks:

Survey respondents had to pass one attention check screener before entering into the experimental component of the survey. The screener question, displayed below, is designed to identify respondents who quickly click through survey questions without reading the prompt or giving thought to their answers. Respondents who failed to answer “Moderately interested” for this question were removed from the survey.

Figure B4: Attention Screener Question:

Social media regulation policy is currently a topic of debate in many countries. We would like to know whether people actually read survey questions. Please answer “Moderately interested” to show us that you read this question.

- Extremely interested
- Very interested
- Moderately interested
- Slightly interested
- Not interested at all